Use xrefs to refer to chapters, instead of hardcoded chapter numbers.

diff --git a/freeculture.xml b/freeculture.xml
index cd27cc4efa8edb80acebeba08c7b34d122434005..dd10ccbc45ab80a3f1d325e691915769566bcf59 100644 (file)
--- a/freeculture.xml
+++ b/freeculture.xml
@@ -2478,7 +2478,8 @@ freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
 <para>
 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
 <para>
 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter

-10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
+<xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
+has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to

 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
 general.<footnote><para>
 <!-- f22 -->
 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
 general.<footnote><para>
 <!-- f22 -->


@@ -2510,7 +2511,8 @@ the law to close down that technology.
 </para>
 <para>
 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
 </para>
 <para>
 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in

-chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
+chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
+quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.

 </para>
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
 </chapter>
 </para>
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
 </chapter>


@@ -3867,7 +3869,8 @@ unavailable?"
 <para>
 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
 <para>
 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly

-legal and good.  And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
+legal and good.  And like the piracy I described in chapter
+<xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of

 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and


@@ -6361,12 +6364,13 @@ publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
 </para>
 <para>
 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
 </para>
 <para>
 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw

-in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
-assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
-culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
-assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
-unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
-requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
+in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
+the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
+would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
+disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
+followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
+English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
+copyrights extend "to Authors" only.

 </para>
 <para>
 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
 </para>
 <para>
 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the


@@ -8379,10 +8383,12 @@ I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the

-reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
-whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
-More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
-rights were more sharply restricted.
+reasons sketched especially in chapters
+<xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
+<xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
+might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
+transformation.  More commercial transformative work would be created
+if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.

 </para>
 <para>
 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
 </para>
 <para>
 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of


@@ -8888,7 +8894,8 @@ critical or reflective.
 </para>
 <para>
 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
 </para>
 <para>
 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the

-changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
+changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
+<xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an

 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get


@@ -8910,10 +8917,12 @@ right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
 </para>
 <para>
 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
 </para>
 <para>
 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I

-described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
-filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
-who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
-law regulates such a use.
+described in chapter
+<xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
+response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
+been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
+fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
+use.

 </para>
 <para>
 
 </para>
 <para>
 


@@ -9002,12 +9011,13 @@ against the competitors of tomorrow.
 <para>
 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
 <para>
 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->

-strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
-massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
-law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
-innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
-dominant industries.  That lesson has been taught through a series of
-cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
+strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
+labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
+threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
+that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
+only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
+industries.  That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
+that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a

 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
 </para>
 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
 </para>


@@ -9281,11 +9291,14 @@ When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
 </para>
 <para>
 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
 </para>
 <para>

-As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
-regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
-Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
-<!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
-2001).
+As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
+linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
+regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
+Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
+Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
+<!-- f9. -->
+Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
+N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).

 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
 </para></footnote>
  overall this history of copyright
 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
 </para></footnote>
  overall this history of copyright


@@ -9344,10 +9357,11 @@ the story of the demise of Internet radio.
 <para>
 
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
 <para>
 
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->

-As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
-recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless
-he or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
-recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
+As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
+linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
+artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
+is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
+version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous

 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas


@@ -10170,16 +10184,17 @@ protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
 </para>
 <para>
 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
 </para>
 <para>
 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's

-collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to pass into the public
-domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
-library.  But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
-in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
-terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
-would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
-collection until 2019.  Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
-the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
-extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
-million patents will pass into the public domain.
+collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
+pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
+his free public library.  But Congress got in the way. As I described
+in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
+linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
+Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
+twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
+than 1923 to his collection until 2019.  Indeed, no copyrighted work
+would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
+if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
+more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.

 </para>
 <para>
 
 </para>
 <para>
 


@@ -11811,7 +11826,8 @@ where copyright owners could be identified.
 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
 <para>
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
 <para>
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->

-As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
+As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
+linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were

 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
 <!-- f1. -->
 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
 <!-- f1. -->


@@ -12950,8 +12966,9 @@ What made it assured?
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
 <para>
 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
 <para>
 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter

-10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
-for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
+<xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
+privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
+gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who

 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
 assured.  But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
 assured.  But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable


@@ -13391,8 +13408,9 @@ default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
 Why?
 </para>
 <para>
 Why?
 </para>
 <para>

-As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
-was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
+As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
+linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
+good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities

 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those


@@ -13816,10 +13834,11 @@ an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
 </para>
 <para>
 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
 </para>
 <para>

-File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
-spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
-course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
-chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
+File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
+content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
+that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
+<xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
+four different kinds of sharing:

 </para>
 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
 <listitem><para>
 </para>
 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
 <listitem><para>


@@ -13855,7 +13874,8 @@ effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
 significantly weakened.
 </para>
 <para>
 significantly weakened.
 </para>
 <para>

-As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
+As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
+linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is

 controversial.  For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
 controversial.  For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing