From: Petter Reinholdtsen Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2012 13:20:18 +0000 (+0200) Subject: Use xrefs to refer to chapters, instead of hardcoded chapter numbers. X-Git-Tag: edition-2015-10-10~2018 X-Git-Url: https://pere.pagekite.me/gitweb/text-free-culture-lessig.git/commitdiff_plain/177b18c48ae1cb0e3789f45edd4557691e6d8225?ds=sidebyside Use xrefs to refer to chapters, instead of hardcoded chapter numbers. --- diff --git a/freeculture.xml b/freeculture.xml index cd27cc4..dd10ccb 100644 --- a/freeculture.xml +++ b/freeculture.xml @@ -2478,7 +2478,8 @@ freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure. These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars. Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter -10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to +) +has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in general. @@ -2510,7 +2511,8 @@ the law to close down that technology. "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in -chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence. +chapter , +quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence. @@ -3867,7 +3869,8 @@ unavailable?" For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly -legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of +legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter +, much of this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and @@ -6361,12 +6364,13 @@ publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors. The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw -in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to -assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over -culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can -assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, -unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by -requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only. +in chapter , +the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few +would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising +disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers +followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the +English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that +copyrights extend "to Authors" only. The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the @@ -8379,10 +8383,12 @@ I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying. But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and, especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the -reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder -whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation. -More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative -rights were more sharply restricted. +reasons sketched especially in chapters + and +, one +might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial +transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created +if derivative rights were more sharply restricted. The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of @@ -8888,7 +8894,8 @@ critical or reflective. Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the -changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an +changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter +. But an even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get @@ -8910,10 +8917,12 @@ right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free. Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I -described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary -filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers -who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the -law regulates such a use. +described in chapter +, in +response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have +been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was +fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a +use. @@ -9002,12 +9011,13 @@ against the competitors of tomorrow. This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory -strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this -massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright -law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely -innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's -dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of -cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a +strategy that I described in chapter . The consequence of this massive +threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is +that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate +only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant +industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases +that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a lesson. That lesson—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley—has been learned. @@ -9281,11 +9291,14 @@ When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors. -As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as -regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica -Litman in her book Digital Copyright, - Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, -2001). +As I described in chapter , despite this feature of copyright as +regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by +Jessica Litman in her book Digital +Copyright, + +Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, +N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001). Litman, Jessica overall this history of copyright @@ -9344,10 +9357,11 @@ the story of the demise of Internet radio. -As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the -recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless -he or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had -recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"—to memorialize her famous +As I described in chapter , when a radio station plays a song, the recording +artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she +is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a +version of "Happy Birthday"—to memorialize her famous performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden— then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas @@ -10170,16 +10184,17 @@ protect noncommercial pornographers. As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's -collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public -domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public -library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10, -in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the -terms of existing copyrights—this time by twenty years. Eldred -would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his -collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into -the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress -extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1 -million patents will pass into the public domain. +collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to +pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in +his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described +in chapter , in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, +Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights—this time by +twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent +than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work +would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then, +if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, +more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain. @@ -11811,7 +11826,8 @@ where copyright owners could be identified. Berne Convention (1908) -As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were +As I described in chapter , formalities in copyright law were removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning any formal requirement before a copyright is granted. @@ -12950,8 +12966,9 @@ What made it assured? Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter -10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture -for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who +, your +privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for +gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable @@ -13391,8 +13408,9 @@ default is control, and "formalities" are banished. Why? -As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities -was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities +As I suggested in chapter , the motivation to abolish formalities was a +good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those @@ -13816,10 +13834,11 @@ an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance. -File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the -spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of -course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in -chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing: +File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of +content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course, +that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter +, they enable +four different kinds of sharing: @@ -13855,7 +13874,8 @@ effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is significantly weakened. -As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is +As I said in chapter , the actual harm caused by sharing is controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing