]> pere.pagekite.me Git - text-free-culture-lessig.git/blob - freeculture.xml
Drop number in front of titles.
[text-free-culture-lessig.git] / freeculture.xml
1 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' ?>
2 <?xml-stylesheet href="docbook-css-0.4/driver.css" type="text/css"?>
3 <!-- Converted to DocBook by Hans Schou 2004-03-29. Updated and improved
4 by Petter Reinholdtsen 2012 with input from Martin Borg. -->
5 <!--
6 TODO
7 * indexterm primary
8 -->
9 <!DOCTYPE book PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN"
10 "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd"
11 [
12 <!ENTITY copy "©">
13 <!ENTITY translationblock "">
14 ]>
15 <book id="index" lang="en">
16 <bookinfo>
17 <title>Free Culture</title>
18
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
20
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
23
24 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
25
26 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
27
28 <authorgroup>
29 <author>
30 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig</surname>
32 </author>
33 </authorgroup>
34
35 <!-- <subjectset> and cover <mediaobject> Based on example from
36 http://jfearn.fedorapeople.org/en-US/Publican/2.7/html/Users_Guide/chap-Users_Guide-Creating_a_document.html
37 -->
38 <subjectset scheme="libraryofcongress">
39 <subject>
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
41 </subject>
42 <subject>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
44 </subject>
45 <subject>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
47 </subject>
48 <subject>
49 <subjectterm>Art&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
50 </subject>
51 </subjectset>
52
53
54 <publisher>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York</city></address>
57 </publisher>
58
59 <copyright>
60 <year>2004</year>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
62 </copyright>
63 <legalnotice>
64 <para>
65 <inlinemediaobject>
66 <imageobject>
67 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.png" contentdepth="3em" width="100%" align="center"/>
68 </imageobject>
69 <imageobject>
70 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.svg" contentdepth="3em" width="100%" align="center"/>
71 </imageobject>
72 <textobject>
73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
74 </textobject>
75 </inlinemediaobject>
76 </para>
77
78 <para>
79 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
84 </para>
85 </legalnotice>
86
87 <abstract>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
89 <para>
90 LAWRENCE LESSIG
91 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's <quote>e.biz 25,</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's <quote>50 visionaries.</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
105 Appeals.
106 </para>
107 </abstract>
108
109 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
110 <mediaobject role="cover">
111 <imageobject remap="lrg" role="front-large">
112 <imagedata fileref="images/cover.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
113 </imageobject>
114 <!--
115 <imageobject remap="s" role="front">
116 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
117 </imageobject>
118 <imageobject remap="xs" role="front-small">
119 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
120 </imageobject>
121 <imageobject remap="cs" role="thumbnail">
122 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
123 </imageobject>
124 -->
125 </mediaobject>
126
127 <biblioid class="isbn">1-59420-006-8</biblioid>
128
129 <!-- LCCN from
130 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
131 -->
132 <biblioid class="libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
133
134 </bookinfo>
135 <!--PAGE BREAK 1-->
136 <dedication id="salespoints">
137 <title></title>
138 <para>
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
140 </para>
141 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
143 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
144 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
145 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
146 </itemizedlist>
147 </dedication>
148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id="alsobylessig">
151 <title></title>
152 <para>
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
154 </para>
155 <para>
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
157 </para>
158 <para>
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
160 </para>
161 </dedication>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <dedication id="frontpublisher">
164 <title></title>
165 <para>
166 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
167 </para>
168 </dedication>
169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
170 <dedication id="frontbookinfo">
171 <title></title>
172 <para>
173 FREE CULTURE
174 </para>
175
176 <para>
177 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
178 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
179 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
180 </para>
181
182 <para>
183 LAWRENCE LESSIG
184 </para>
185 </dedication>
186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
187 <colophon>
188 <para>
189 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
190 York, New York
191 </para>
192 <para>
193 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
194 </para>
195 <para>
196 Excerpt from an editorial titled <quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,</quote>
197 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
198 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
199 </para>
200 <para>
201 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
202 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
203 </para>
204 <para>
205 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
206 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
207 </para>
208 <para>
209 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
210 </para>
211 <para>
212 Lessig, Lawrence.
213 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
214 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
215 </para>
216 <para>
217 p. cm.
218 </para>
219 <para>
220 Includes index.
221 </para>
222 <para>
223 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
224 </para>
225
226 <para>
227 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
228 </para>
229 <para>
230 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
231 </para>
232 <para>
233 KF2979.L47
234 </para>
235 <para>
236 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
237 </para>
238 <para>
239 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
240 </para>
241 <para>
242 Printed in the United States of America
243 </para>
244 <para>
245 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
246 </para>
247 <para>
248 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
249 </para>
250
251 <para>
252 &translationblock;
253 </para>
254
255 <para>
256 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
257 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
258 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
259 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
260 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
261 the above publisher of this book.
262 </para>
263 <para>
264 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
265 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
266 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
267 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
268 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
269 author's rights is appreciated.
270 </para>
271 </colophon>
272
273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
274 <dedication><title></title>
275 <para>
276 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
277 it continues still.
278 </para>
279 </dedication>
280
281 <toc id="toc"></toc>
282
283 <lot>
284 <title>List of figures</title>
285 </lot>
286
287 <!--
288 c PREFACE xiii
289 c INTRODUCTION
290 c "PIRACY"
291 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
292 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
293 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
294 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
295 2 Film
296 2 Recorded Music
297 2 Radio
298 2 Cable TV
299 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
300 2 Piracy I
301 2 Piracy II
302 c "PROPERTY"
303 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
304 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
305 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
306 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
307 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
308 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
309 2 Beginnings
310 2 Law: Duration
311 2 Law: Scope
312 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
313 2 Architecture and Law: Force
314 2 Market: Concentration
315 2 Together
316 c PUZZLES
317 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
318 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
319 2 Constraining Creators
320 2 Constraining Innovators
321 2 Corrupting Citizens
322 c BALANCES
323 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
324 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
325 c CONCLUSION
326 c AFTERWORD
327 1 Us, Now
328 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
329 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
330 1 Them, Soon
331 2 1. More Formalities
332 3 Registration and Renewal
333 3 Marking
334 2 2. Shorter Terms
335 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
336 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
337 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
338 c NOTES
339 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
340 c INDEX
341 -->
342
343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
344
345 <preface id="preface">
346 <title>PREFACE</title>
347 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
348 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
349 </indexterm>
350 <para>
351 <emphasis role="bold">At the end</emphasis> of his review of my first
352 book, <citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David
353 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
354 computer-related texts, wrote this:
355 </para>
356 <blockquote>
357 <para>
358 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
359 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
360 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
361 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
362 David Pogue, <quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
363 </para></footnote>
364 </para>
365 </blockquote>
366 <para>
367 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
368 software, or <quote>code,</quote> functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
369 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
370 could always <quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome</quote>-like simply flip a
371 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
372 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
373 <quote>affect</quote> us anymore.
374 </para>
375 <para>
376 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
377 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
378 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
379 causes even after the modem is turned
380 <!--PAGE BREAK 12-->
381 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
382 on-line have fundamentally affected <quote>people who aren't online.</quote> There
383 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
384 </para>
385 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
386 <para>
387 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
388 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
389 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
390 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
391 important.
392 </para>
393 <para>
394 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
395 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of <quote>free culture</quote>&mdash;not
396 <quote>free</quote> as in <quote>free beer</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
397 free software movement<footnote>
398 <para>
399 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
400 </para></footnote>), but <quote>free</quote> as in <quote>free speech,</quote> <quote>free markets,</quote>
401 <quote>free trade,</quote> <quote>free enterprise,</quote> <quote>free will,</quote> and <quote>free elections.</quote> A
402 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
403 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
404 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
405 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
406 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
407 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
408 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
409 <quote>permission culture</quote>&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
410 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
411 past.
412 </para>
413 <para>
414 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not <quote>we</quote>
415 on the Left or <quote>you</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
416 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
417 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
418 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
419 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
420 culture deem fundamental.
421 </para>
422 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
423 <para>
424 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
425 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
426 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
427 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
428 As William Safire described marching <quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
429 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
430 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,</quote> he formulated perhaps
431 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
432 he asked,
433 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
434 </para>
435 <blockquote>
436 <para>
437 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
438 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
439 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
440 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
441 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
442 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
443 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
444 </para></footnote>
445 </para>
446 </blockquote>
447 <para>
448 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
449 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
450 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
451 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
452 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
453 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
454 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
455 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
456 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
457 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
458 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
459 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
460 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
461 that this work is <quote>merely</quote> derivative.
462 </para>
463 <para>
464 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
465 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
466 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
467 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
468 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
469 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
470 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
471 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
472
473 <!--PAGE BREAK 14-->
474 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
475 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
476 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
477 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
478 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
479 what I advance here.
480 </para>
481 <para>
482 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
483 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
484 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
485 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
486 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
487 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
488 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
489 book is written.
490 </para>
491
492 </preface>
493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
494
495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
496 <chapter label="0" id="c-introduction">
497 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
498 <indexterm id='idxairtraffic' class='startofrange'>
499 <primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.</primary>
500 </indexterm>
501 <indexterm id='idxlandownership' class='startofrange'>
502 <primary>land ownership, air traffic and</primary>
503 </indexterm>
504 <indexterm id='idxproprigtair' class='startofrange'>
505 <primary>property rights</primary>
506 <secondary>air traffic vs.</secondary>
507 </indexterm>
508 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
509 <para>
510 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
511 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
512 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
513 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
514 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
515 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
516 </para>
517 <para>
518 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
519 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
520 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
521 and all the space above, to <quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.</quote><footnote><para>
522 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
523 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
524 </para></footnote>
525 For many
526 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
527 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
528 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
529 </para>
530 <para>
531 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
532 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
533 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
534 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
535 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
536 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
537 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
538 </para>
539 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
540 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
541 <para>
542 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
543 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
544 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
545 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
546 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
547 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
548 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to <quote>an indefinite
549 extent, upwards,</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
550 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
551 </para>
552 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
553 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
554 <para>
555 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
556 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
557 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
558 <quote>taking</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
559 that <quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
560 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.</quote> But Justice Douglas
561 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
562 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
563 </para>
564 <blockquote>
565 <para>
566 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
567 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
568 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
569 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
570 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
571 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
572 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
573 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
574 <para>
575 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
576 that there could be a <quote>taking</quote> if the government's use of its land
577 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
578 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, <quote>(Intellectual)
579 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
580 Authorship,</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
581 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
582 1112&ndash;13.
583 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
584 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
585 </para></footnote>
586 </para>
587 </blockquote>
588 <para>
589 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.</quote>
590 </para>
591 <para>
592 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
593 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
594 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
595 <!--PAGE BREAK 18-->
596 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: <quote>Common sense revolts
597 at the idea.</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
598 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
599 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
600 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
601 </para>
602 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
603 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
604 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
605 <para>
606 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
607 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
608 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
609 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
610 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
611 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
612 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
613 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
614 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by <quote>what
615 seemed reasonable</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
616 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
617 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
618 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
619 end, the force of what seems <quote>obvious</quote> to everyone else&mdash;the power of
620 <quote>common sense</quote>&mdash;would prevail. Their <quote>private interest</quote> would not be
621 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
622 </para>
623 <indexterm startref='idxproprigtair' class='endofrange'/>
624 <indexterm startref='idxlandownership' class='endofrange'/>
625 <indexterm startref='idxairtraffic' class='endofrange'/>
626 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwin' class='startofrange'>
627 <primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary>
628 </indexterm>
629 <para>
630 <emphasis role='strong'>Edwin Howard Armstrong</emphasis> is one of America's forgotten inventor
631 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
632 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
633 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
634 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
635 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
636 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
637 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
638 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
639 understanding of radio.
640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
641 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
642 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
643 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
644 </para>
645 <para>
646 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
647 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
648 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
649 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
650 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
651 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
652 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
653 much less transmitter power and static.
654 </para>
655 <para>
656 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
657 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
658 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
659 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
660 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
661 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
662 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
663 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
664 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.</quote>
665 </para>
666 <para>
667 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
668 </para>
669 <blockquote>
670 <para>
671 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
672 sounded like a glass of water being poured. &hellip; A paper was crumpled
673 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
674 fire. &hellip; Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
675 and guitar number were performed. &hellip; The music was projected with a
676 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio <quote>music
677 box.</quote><footnote><para>
678 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
679 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
680 </para></footnote>
681 </para>
682 </blockquote>
683 <para>
684 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
685 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
686 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
687 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
688 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
689 a handful of networks.
690 <!--PAGE BREAK 20-->
691 </para>
692 <para>
693 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
694 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
695 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
696 that removed static from <quote>radio.</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
697 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
698 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
699 </para>
700 <blockquote>
701 <para>
702 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
703 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
704 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
705 RCA.<footnote><para> See <quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
706 Electronic Era,</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
707 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
708
709 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
710 </para></footnote>
711 </para>
712 </blockquote>
713 <para>
714 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
715 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
716 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
717 described,
718 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
719 </para>
720 <blockquote>
721 <para>
722 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
723 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
724 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
725 unrestrained, posed &hellip; a complete reordering of radio power
726 &hellip; and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
727 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
728 </para></footnote>
729 </para>
730 </blockquote>
731 <para>
732 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
733 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
734 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
735 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
736 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
737 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
738 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
739 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
740 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
741 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
742 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
743 </para>
744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
745 <blockquote>
746 <para>
747 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
748 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
749 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
750 deviousness.<footnote><para>
751 Lessing, 256.
752 </para></footnote>
753 </para>
754 </blockquote>
755 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
756 <para>
757 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
758 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
759 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
760 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
761 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
762 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
763 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
764 least temporarily.
765 </para>
766 <para>
767 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
768 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
769 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
770 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
771 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
772 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
773 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
774 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
775 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
776 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
777 </para>
778 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwin' class='endofrange'/>
779 <para>
780 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
781 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
782 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
783 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
784 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
785 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
786 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
787 course always public spirited; the reality is something
788 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
789 to themselves, would crumble in
790 <!--PAGE BREAK 22-->
791 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
792 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
793 effect of technological change.
794 </para>
795 <para>
796 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
797 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
798 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
799 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
800 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
801 before.<footnote><para>
802 Amanda Lenhart, <quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
803 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,</quote> Pew Internet and American
804 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
805 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
806 </para></footnote>
807 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
808 of 2004.
809 </para>
810 <para>
811 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
812 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
813 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
814 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
815 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
816 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
817 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
818 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
819 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
820 </para>
821 <para>
822 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
823 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
824 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
825 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
826 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
827 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
828 has introduced.
829 </para>
830 <para>
831 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
832 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
833 regulation of each. By <quote>commercial culture</quote> I mean that part of our
834 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
835 <quote>noncommercial culture</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
836 parks or on
837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
838 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
839 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his <quote>Reader,</quote> or
840 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
841 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel</primary></indexterm>
842 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah</primary></indexterm>
843 </para>
844 <para>
845 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
846 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
847 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
848 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
849 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
850 left this culture <quote>free.</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
851 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
852 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
853 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
854 </para>
855 <para>
856 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
857 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
858 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
859 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
860 marketplace.<footnote>
861 <para>
862 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
863 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
864 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
865 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
866 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
867 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
868 D. Brandeis, <quote>The Right to Privacy,</quote> Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
869 198&ndash;200.
870 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
871 </para></footnote>
872 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
873 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
874 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
875 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
876 </para>
877 <para>
878 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
879 been erased.<footnote><para>
880 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
881 2001), ch. 13.
882 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
883 </para></footnote>
884 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
885 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
886 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
887 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
888 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
889 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
890 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
891 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
892 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
893 culture, more and more a permission culture.
894 </para>
895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
896 <para>
897 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
898 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
899 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
900 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
901 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
902 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
903 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
904 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
905 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
906 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
907 Causbys.
908 </para>
909 <para>
910 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
911 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
912 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
913 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
914 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
915 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
916 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
917 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
918 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
919 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
920 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
921 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
922 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
923 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
924 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
925 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
926 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
927 </para>
928 <para>
929 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
930 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
931 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
932 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
933 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
934 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
935 remakes them.
936 </para>
937 <para>
938 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
940 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
941 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether <quote>piracy</quote> will
942 be permitted, and whether <quote>property</quote> will be protected. The <quote>war</quote> that
943 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
944 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
945 calls his <quote>own terrorist war</quote><footnote><para>
946 Amy Harmon, <quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
947 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,</quote> <citetitle>New York
948 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
949 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
950 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
951 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
952 against it.
953 </para>
954 <para>
955 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
956 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
957 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
958 <quote>creative property.</quote> I believe that <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong, and that the
959 law, properly tuned, should punish <quote>piracy,</quote> whether on or off the
960 Internet.
961 </para>
962 <para>
963 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
964 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
965 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet <quote>pirates</quote> will also rid our
966 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
967 </para>
968 <para>
969 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
970 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
971 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
972 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
973 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
974 <para>
975 Neil W. Netanel, <quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
976 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
977 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
978 </para></footnote>
979 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
980 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
981 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
982 could cultivate and extend our culture.
983 </para>
984 <para>
985 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
986 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
987 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
988 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
989 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
990 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
991 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
992 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
993 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
994 </para>
995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
996 <para>
997 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
998 <quote>centrality of technology</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
999 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
1000 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
1001 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
1002 against an industry.
1003 </para>
1004 <para>
1005 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
1006 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
1007 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
1008 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
1009 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
1010 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
1011 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
1012 </para>
1013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1015 <para>
1016 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about <quote>property.</quote> The
1017 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1018 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1019 this <quote>property</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1020 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1021 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1022 of <quote>intellectual property</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1023 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1024 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1025 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1026 <quote>trespassing</quote> upon legitimate claims of <quote>property.</quote> It is as plain to
1027 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1028 trespass.
1029 </para>
1030 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1031 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1032 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
1033 <para>
1034 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1035 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1036 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1037 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1038 war. Unlike
1039 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1040 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1041 on its side.
1042 </para>
1043 <para>
1044 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1045 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1046 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1047 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1048 our <quote>culture</quote> was as <quote>owned</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1049 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1050 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1051 accepted as it is now.
1052 </para>
1053 <para>
1054 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1055 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1056 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1057 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1058 </para>
1059 <para>
1060 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1061 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1062 </para>
1063 <para>
1064 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1065 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1066 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1067 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1068 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1069 </para>
1070 <para>
1071 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1072 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1073 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1074 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1075 view?
1076 </para>
1077 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1078 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1079 <para>
1080 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1081 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1082 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1083 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of <quote>intellectual
1084 property.</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1085 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1086 this silliness will be much more profound.
1087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1088 </para>
1089 <para>
1090 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: <quote>piracy</quote> and
1091 <quote>property.</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1092 ideas.
1093 </para>
1094 <para>
1095 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1096 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1097 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1098 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1099 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1100 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1101 </para>
1102 <para>
1103 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1104 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1105 government, pushed by big media to respond to this <quote>something new,</quote> is
1106 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1107 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let <quote>common
1108 sense</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1109 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1110 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1111 fundamental about who we have always been.
1112 </para>
1113 <para>
1114 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1115 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1116 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1117 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1118 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1119 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1120 </para>
1121 </chapter>
1122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1123 <part id="c-piracy">
1124 <title><quote>PIRACY</quote></title>
1125 <partintro>
1126 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1127 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1128 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1129 </indexterm>
1130 <para>
1131 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1132 been a war against <quote>piracy.</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1133 <quote>piracy,</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1134 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1135 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1136 </para>
1137 <blockquote>
1138 <para>
1139 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1140 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1141 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1142 <!-- f1 -->
1143 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1144 </para></footnote>
1145 </para>
1146 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1147 </blockquote>
1148 <para>
1149 Today we are in the middle of another <quote>war</quote> against <quote>piracy.</quote> The
1150 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1151 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1152 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1153 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1154 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1156 </para>
1157 <para>
1158 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1159 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1160 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1161 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1162 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will <quote>rob the author of the
1163 profit.</quote>
1164 </para>
1165 <para>
1166 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1167 increasingly to technology to defend their <quote>property</quote> against this
1168 <quote>piracy.</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1169 raised to believe that <quote>property</quote> should be <quote>free.</quote> Forget tattoos,
1170 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1171 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1172 </para>
1173 <para>
1174 There's no doubt that <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1175 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1176 notion of <quote>piracy</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1177 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1178 </para>
1179 <para>
1180 The idea goes something like this:
1181 </para>
1182 <blockquote>
1183 <para>
1184 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1185 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1186 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1187 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1188 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1189 piracy.
1190 </para>
1191 </blockquote>
1192 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1193 <para>
1194 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1195 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the <quote>if value, then right</quote>
1196 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1197 <!-- f2 -->
1198 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, <quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1199 in the Pepsi Generation,</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1200 </para></footnote>
1201 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1202 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1203 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1204 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1205 <!-- f3 -->
1206 Lisa Bannon, <quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1207 Up,</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1208 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1209 Zittrain, <quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1210 Speech, No One Wins,</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1211 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1212 </para></footnote>
1213 There was <quote>value</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1214 <quote>right</quote>&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1215 </para>
1216 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1217 <para>
1218 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1219 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1221 of law protecting creative property. But the <quote>if value, then right</quote>
1222 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1223 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1224 </para>
1225 <para>
1226 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1227 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1228 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1229 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1230 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1231 </para>
1232 <para>
1233 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1234 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1235 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1236 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1237 copyright law today regulates both.
1238 </para>
1239 <para>
1240 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1241 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1242 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1243 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1244 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1245 more expense of doing business.
1246 </para>
1247 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1248 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1249 <para>
1250 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1251 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1252 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1253 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1254 <quote>copying,</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1255 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1256 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1257 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1258 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1259 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1260 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1261 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1262 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1263 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1264 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1266 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the <quote>Rise of the Creative
1267 Class.</quote><footnote>
1268 <para>
1269 <!-- f4 -->
1270 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York:
1271 Basic Books, 2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1272 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1273 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1274 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1275 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1276 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1277
1278 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1279 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1280 </para></footnote>
1281 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1282 this creative class.
1283 </para>
1284 <para>
1285 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1286 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1287 context the current battles about behavior labeled <quote>piracy.</quote>
1288 </para>
1289 </partintro>
1290
1291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1292 <chapter label="1" id="creators">
1293 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1294 <indexterm id="idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'>
1295 <primary>animated cartoons</primary>
1296 </indexterm>
1297 <para>
1298 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1299 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1300 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1301 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1302 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1303 </para>
1304 <para>
1305 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1306 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1307 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1308 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1309 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1310 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1311 </para>
1312 <blockquote>
1313 <para>
1314 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1315 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1316 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1317 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1319 </para>
1320 <para>
1321 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1322 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1323 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1324 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1325 synchronization was pretty close.
1326 </para>
1327 <para>
1328 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1329 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1330 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1331 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1332 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1333 <!-- f1 -->
1334 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1335 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1336 </para></footnote>
1337 </para>
1338 </blockquote>
1339 <para>
1340 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1341 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: <quote>I have never been so thrilled
1342 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.</quote>
1343 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1344 </para>
1345 <para>
1346 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1347 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1348 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1349 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1350 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1351 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1352 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1353 </para>
1354 <para>
1355 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1356 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1357 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1358 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1359 </para>
1360 <para>
1361 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1362 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1363 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1364 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1365 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1366 and among the best of its genre.
1367 </para>
1368 <para>
1369 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1370 Willie.
1371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1372 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1373 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1374 <!-- f2 -->
1375 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1376 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1377 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1378 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: <quote>Steamboat Bill,</quote> <quote>The
1379 Simpleton</quote> (Delille), <quote>Mischief Makers</quote> (Carbonara), <quote>Joyful Hurry No. 1</quote>
1380 (Baron), and <quote>Gawky Rube</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song, <quote>The Turkey in the
1381 Straw,</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1382 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1383 </para></footnote>
1384 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1385 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1386 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1387 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song <quote>Steamboat Bill,</quote>
1388 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1389 Mouse.
1390 </para>
1391 <para>
1392 This <quote>borrowing</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1393 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1394 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1395 <!-- f3 -->
1396 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, <quote>The Mouse
1397 that Ate the Public Domain,</quote> Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1398 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1399 </para></footnote>
1400 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1401 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1402 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1403 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1404 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1405 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1406 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1407 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1408 old.
1409 </para>
1410 <para>
1411 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1412 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1413 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1414 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1415 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1416 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1417 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1418 </para>
1419 <para>
1420 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1421 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1422 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1423 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1424 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1425 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1426 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1427 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1428 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1429 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1430 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1432 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1433 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1434 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1435 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1436 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1437 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1438 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1439 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1440 </para>
1441 <indexterm startref="idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'/>
1442 <para>
1443 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1444 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1445 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1446 its importance. We could call this <quote>Disney creativity,</quote> though that
1447 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, <quote>Walt Disney
1448 creativity</quote>&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1449 culture around us and makes it something different.
1450 </para>
1451 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1452 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1453 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1454 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1455 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1456 <!-- f4 -->
1457 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1458 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the <quote>average</quote> term by
1459 determining
1460 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1461 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1462 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1463 average
1464 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1465 Web site associated with this book, available at
1466 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1467 </para></footnote>
1468 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1469 copyright holders of a creative work had an <quote>exclusive right</quote> to control
1470 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1471 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1472 </para>
1473 <para>
1474 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1475 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1476 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a <quote>lawyer-free
1477 zone.</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1478 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1479 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1480 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1481 </para>
1482 <para>
1483 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1484 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1485 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1486 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1487
1488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1489 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1490 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1491 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1492 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1493 content from before the Great Depression.
1494 </para>
1495 <para>
1496 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on <quote>Walt Disney creativity.</quote>
1497 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1498 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1499 universal.
1500 </para>
1501 <para>
1502 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1503 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1504 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1505 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1506 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1507 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1508 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1509 </para>
1510 <para>
1511 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1512 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1513 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1514 the stories that these <quote>graphic novels</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1515 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are <quote>men in tights.</quote>
1516 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1517 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1518 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1519 interestingly different way.
1520 </para>
1521 <para>
1522 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1523 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1524 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1525 </para>
1526 <para>
1527 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1528 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1529 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1530 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1531 transforming it either subtly or
1532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1533 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1534 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1535 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1536 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently <quote>different.</quote> But they
1537 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1538 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1539 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1540 </para>
1541 <para>
1542 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1543 huge. More than 33,000 <quote>circles</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1544 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1545 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1546 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1547 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1548 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1549 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1550 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1551 </para>
1552 <para>
1553 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1554 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1555 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1556 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1557 one. Doujinshi are plainly <quote>derivative works.</quote> There is no general
1558 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1559 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1560 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1561 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that <quote>taking</quote> without
1562 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1563 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1564 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1565 </para>
1566 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1567 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1568 </indexterm>
1569 <para>
1570 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1571 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1572 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, <quote>The
1573 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1574 in Japan now. &hellip; American comics were born out of copying each
1575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1576 other. &hellip; That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1577 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them</quote>
1578 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1579 <!-- f5 -->
1580 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1581 York: Perennial, 2000).
1582 </para></footnote>
1583 </para>
1584 <para>
1585 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1586 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1587 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, <quote>there are these rules
1588 and you have to stick to them.</quote> There are things Superman <quote>cannot</quote>
1589 do. <quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1590 which are fifty years old.</quote>
1591 </para>
1592 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1593 <para>
1594 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1595 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1596 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1597 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1598 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1599 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1600 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1601 <!-- f6 -->
1602 See Salil K. Mehra, <quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1603 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1604 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. <quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1605 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1606 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1607 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1608 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1609 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.</quote>
1610 </para></footnote>
1611 </para>
1612 <para>
1613 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1614 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1615 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1616 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1617 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1618 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1619 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1620 a more general pattern of blocking this <quote>free taking</quote> by the doujinshi
1621 culture?
1622 </para>
1623 <para>
1624 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1625 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1626 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. <quote>We don't have enough
1627 lawyers,</quote> he told me one afternoon. There <quote>just aren't enough resources
1628 to prosecute cases like this.</quote>
1629 </para>
1630 <para>
1631 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1632 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1633 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1634 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1635 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1636 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1637 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1638 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1639 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1640 their clients or hurt them?
1641 Let's pause for a moment.
1642 </para>
1643 <para>
1644 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1645 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1646 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1647 </para>
1648 <para>
1649 We live in a world that celebrates <quote>property.</quote> I am one of those
1650 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1651 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1652 <quote>intellectual property.</quote><footnote><para>
1653 <!-- f7 -->
1654 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1655 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1656 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1657 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1658 describes a set of <quote>property</quote> rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1659 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1660 very different.
1661 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1662 </para></footnote>
1663 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1664 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1665 property.
1666 </para>
1667 <para>
1668 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1669 plenty of value out there that <quote>property</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1670 mean <quote>money can't buy you love,</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1671 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1672 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1673 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1674 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1675 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1676 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1677 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1678 Disney's use would have been considered <quote>fair.</quote> There was nothing
1679 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1680 the public domain.
1681 </para>
1682 <para>
1683 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1684 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1685 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1686
1687 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1688 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1689 freedom is good.
1690 </para>
1691 <para>
1692 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1693 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1694 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1695 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1696 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1697 form, whether large or small.
1698 </para>
1699 <para>
1700 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1701 say that the copycat comic artists are <quote>stealing.</quote> This form of Walt
1702 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1703 particular find it hard to say why.
1704 </para>
1705 <para>
1706 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1707 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1708 without asking or paying for the privilege. (<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1709 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1710 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?</quote>) Acting companies
1711 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1712 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1713 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1714 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1715 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1716 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1717 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1718 </para>
1719 <para>
1720 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1721 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1722 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1723 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1724 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1725 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1726 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1727 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1729 </para>
1730 <para>
1731 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1732 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1733 question instead is <quote><emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?</quote>
1734 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1735 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1736 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1737 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1738 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1739 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1740 a studio or not?
1741 </para>
1742 <para>
1743 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1744 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1745 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1746 </para>
1747
1748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1749 </chapter>
1750 <chapter label="2" id="mere-copyists">
1751 <title>CHAPTER TWO: <quote>Mere Copyists</quote></title>
1752 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1753 <primary>photography</primary>
1754 </indexterm>
1755 <para>
1756 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1757 producing what we would call <quote>photographs.</quote> Appropriately enough, they
1758 were called <quote>daguerreotypes.</quote> The process was complicated and
1759 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1760 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1761 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1762 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1763 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1764 </para>
1765 <para>
1766 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1767 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1768 <quote>automatic pictures.</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1769 making <quote>negatives.</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1770 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1771 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1772 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1773 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1774 amateurs.
1775 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1776 </para>
1777 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1778 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1779 </indexterm>
1780 <para>
1781 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1782 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1784 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1785 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1786 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1787 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1788 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1789 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1790 population of photographers.
1791 </para>
1792 <para>
1793 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1794 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1795 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. <quote>You press the button and we
1796 do the rest.</quote><footnote><para>
1797 <!-- f1 -->
1798 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1799 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1800 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)</primary></indexterm>
1801 </para>
1802 <blockquote>
1803 <para>
1804 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1805 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1806 that only an expert can do. &hellip; We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1807 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1808 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1809 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1810 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1811 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1812 chemicals.<footnote>
1813 <para>
1814 <!-- f2 -->
1815 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1816 1977), 53.
1817 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1818 </para></footnote>
1819 </para>
1820 </blockquote>
1821 <para>
1822 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1823 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1824 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1825 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1826 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1827 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1828 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1829 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1830 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1831 percent.<footnote><para>
1832 <!-- f3 -->
1833 Jenkins, 177.
1834 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1835 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1836 <!-- f4 -->
1837 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1838 </para></footnote>
1839 </para>
1840 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1841 <para>
1842
1843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1844 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1845 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1846 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1847 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1848 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, <quote>For the
1849 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1850 permanent record of his family and its activities. &hellip; For the first
1851 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1852 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1853 interpretation or bias.</quote><footnote><para>
1854 <!-- f5 -->
1855 Coe, 58.
1856 </para></footnote>
1857 </para>
1858 <para>
1859 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1860 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1861 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1862 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1863 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1864 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its <quote>quality</quote>;
1865 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1866 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1867 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1868 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1869 have before.
1870 </para>
1871 <para>
1872 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1873 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1874 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1875 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1876 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1877 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1878 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1879 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1880 <!-- f6 -->
1881 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1882 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1883 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1884 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1885 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1886 </para></footnote>
1887 </para>
1888 <para>
1889 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1890 familiar. The photographer was <quote>taking</quote> something from the person or
1891 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1892 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1893 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1894 draw
1895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1896 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1897 that they thought valuable.
1898 </para>
1899 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1900 <para>
1901 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1902 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1903 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1904 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1905 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1906 <para>
1907 <!-- f7 -->
1908 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, <quote>The Right to Privacy,</quote>
1909 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1910 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1911 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1912 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1913 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1914 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1915 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1916 </para>
1917 <para>
1918 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1919 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1920 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1921 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1922 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1923 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1924 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1925 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1926 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1927 <!-- f8 -->
1928 See Melville B. Nimmer, <quote>The Right of Publicity,</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1929 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, <quote>Privacy,</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1930 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1931 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1932 (1993).
1933 </para></footnote>)
1934 </para>
1935 <para>
1936 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1937 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1938 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1939 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1940 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1941 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1942 Kodak would be benefiting from the <quote>theft</quote> committed by the
1943 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1944 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1945 from the <quote>image-right</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1946 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1947 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1948 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1949 </para>
1950 <para>
1951
1952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1953 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1954 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1955 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1956 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1957 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1958 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1959 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1960 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1961 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1962 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1963 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1964 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1965 striking images, and the logo <quote>Just Think!</quote> in place of the name of a
1966 school. But there's little that's <quote>just</quote> cerebral in the projects that
1967 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1968 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1969 film of your VCR. Rather the <quote>film</quote> of digital cameras. Just Think!
1970 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1971 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1972 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1973 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1974 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1975 learn.
1976 </para>
1977 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1978 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1979 <para>
1980 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1981 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1982 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, <quote>Five years ago, a good
1983 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1984 professional quality for $595.</quote><footnote><para>
1985 <!-- f9 -->
1986 H. Edward Goldberg, <quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1987 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,</quote>
1988 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1989 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1990 </para></footnote>
1991 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1992 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1993 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1994 learning more and more of something teachers call <quote>media literacy.</quote>
1995 </para>
1996 <para>
1997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1998 <quote>Media literacy,</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1999 Think!, puts it, <quote>is the ability &hellip; to understand, analyze, and
2000 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
2001 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
2002 the way people access it.</quote>
2003 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
2004 </para>
2005 <para>
2006 This may seem like an odd way to think about <quote>literacy.</quote> For most
2007 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
2008 and noticing split infinitives are the things that <quote>literate</quote> people know
2009 about.
2010 </para>
2011 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
2012 <para>
2013 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
2014 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
2015 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
2016 <!-- f10 -->
2017 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2018 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); <quote>Findings on Family and TV
2019 Study,</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
2020 </para></footnote>
2021 it is increasingly important to understand the <quote>grammar</quote> of media. For
2022 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2023 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2024 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2025 (at least at first) terrible media.
2026 </para>
2027 <para>
2028 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2029 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2030 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
2031 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2032 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
2033 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2034 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2035 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2036 </para>
2037 <para>
2038 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2039 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2040 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2041 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2042 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2043 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2044 </para>
2045 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
2046 <para>
2047 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2048 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2049 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2050
2051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2052 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2053 about <quote>the placement of objects, color, &hellip; rhythm, pacing, and
2054 texture.</quote><footnote>
2055 <para>
2056 <!-- f11 -->
2057 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
2058 2002.
2059 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2060 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
2061 </para></footnote>
2062 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2063 <quote>played</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2064 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2065 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2066 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2067 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2068 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2069 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
2070 <!-- f12 -->
2071 See Scott Steinberg, <quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,</quote> E!online, 4
2072 November 2000, available at
2073 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; <quote>Timeline,</quote> 22 November 2000,
2074 available at
2075 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
2076 </para></footnote>
2077 </para>
2078 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
2079 <para>
2080 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2081 describes, <quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2082 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2083 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2084 led.</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2085 </para>
2086 <para>
2087 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
2088 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2089 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2090 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2091 </para>
2092 <blockquote>
2093 <para>
2094 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2095 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2096 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2097 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2098 being read-only.
2099 </para>
2100 </blockquote>
2101 <para>
2102 <quote>Read-only.</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2103 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2104 twentieth century.
2105 </para>
2106 <para>
2107 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2108 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2109 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2110 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2111 literacy,
2112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2113 and this literacy in particular, is to <quote>empower people to choose the
2114 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2115 express.</quote><footnote>
2116 <para>
2117 <!-- f13 -->
2118 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2119 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2120 </para></footnote> It is to enable students <quote>to communicate in the
2121 language of the twenty-first century.</quote><footnote><para>
2122 <!-- f14 -->
2123 Ibid.
2124 </para></footnote>
2125 </para>
2126 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2127 <para>
2128 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2129 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2130 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2131 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2132 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2133 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2134 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2135 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2136 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2137 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2138 </para>
2139 <para>
2140 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2141 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2142 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2143 away. The <quote>kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,</quote>
2144 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2145 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2146 </para>
2147 <para>
2148 Using whatever <quote>free web stuff they could find,</quote> and relatively simple
2149 tools to enable the kids to mix <quote>image, sound, and text,</quote> Barish said
2150 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2151 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2152 close to the lives of these students. The project <quote>gave them a tool
2153 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2154 it,</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2155 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2156 been created using only text. <quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2157 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2158 gone and done something else,</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2159 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2160 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2161 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2162 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2163 </para>
2164 <para>
2165
2166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2167 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?</quote> I asked. In part,
2168 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2169 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of <quote>constructing
2170 meaning.</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2171 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2172 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2173 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2174 our interview,
2175 </para>
2176 <blockquote>
2177 <para>
2178 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2179 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2180 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2181 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2182 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2183 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2184 you say, <quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.</quote>
2185 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2186 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2187 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, <quote>Well, with all these things that you
2188 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2189 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2190 for me something that reflects that.</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2191 camera and &hellip; saying, <quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2192 make a little movie.</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2193 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2194 about the topic.&hellip;
2195 </para>
2196 <para>
2197 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2198 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2199 bump up against the fact, <quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2200 to write something.</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2201 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2202 </para>
2203 <para>
2204 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2205 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2206 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2208 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2209 had a lot of power with this language.
2210 </para>
2211 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2212 not match with any start quote. -->
2213 </blockquote>
2214 <para>
2215 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2216 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2217 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2218 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2219 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2220 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2221 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2222 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2223 world would be watching.
2224 </para>
2225 <para>
2226 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2227 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2228 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was <quote>balance,</quote>
2229 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2230 increasingly come to expect it, <quote>news as entertainment,</quote> even if the
2231 entertainment is tragedy.
2232 </para>
2233 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2234 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2235 <para>
2236 But in addition to this produced news about the <quote>tragedy of September
2237 11,</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2238 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2239 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2240 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2241 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2242 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2243 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2244 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2245 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2246 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2247 was also the Internet.
2248 </para>
2249 <para>
2250 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2251 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2252 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2253 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2254 movie
2255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2256 by a student on the <quote>Just Think!</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2257 with sound or text.
2258 </para>
2259 <para>
2260 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2261 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2262 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2263 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2264 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2265 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2266 spread practically instantaneously.
2267 </para>
2268 <para>
2269 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2270 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2271 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2272 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2273 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2274 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2275 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2276 </para>
2277 <para>
2278 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2279 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2280 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2281 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2282 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2283 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2284 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2285 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2286 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2287 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2288 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2289 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2290 </para>
2291 <para>
2292 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2293 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2294 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2295 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2296 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2297 people vote
2298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2299 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2300 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2301 </para>
2302 <para>
2303 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2304 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2305 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2306 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2307 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2308 most important account of early <quote>Democracy in America.</quote> It wasn't
2309 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2310 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2311 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2312 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2313 deliberated. Members argued about the <quote>right</quote> result; they tried to
2314 persuade each other of the <quote>right</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2315 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2316 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2317 <!-- f15 -->
2318 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2319 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2320 </para></footnote>
2321 </para>
2322 <para>
2323 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2324 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2325 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2326 <!-- f16 -->
2327 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, <quote>Deliberation Day,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2328 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2329 </para></footnote>
2330 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2331 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2332 place for <quote>democratic deliberation</quote> to occur.
2333 </para>
2334 <para>
2335 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2336 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2337 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2338 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2339 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2340 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2341 <!-- f17 -->
2342 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2343 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2344 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2345 little beyond what our friends say.
2346 </para>
2347 <para>
2348 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2349 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2350 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2351 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2352 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2353
2354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2355 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2356 place.
2357 </para>
2358 <para>
2359 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2360 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2361 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2362 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2363 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2364 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2365 </para>
2366 <para>
2367 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2368 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2369 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2370 is having an effect.
2371 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2372 </para>
2373 <para>
2374 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2375 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2376 <quote>misspoke</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2377 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2378 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2379 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2380 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2381 more instances of the same <quote>misspeaking</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2382 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2383 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2384 <!-- f18 -->
2385 Noah Shachtman, <quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,</quote> New
2386 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2387 </para></footnote>
2388 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2389 </para>
2390 <para>
2391 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2392 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2393 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2394 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2395 on.
2396 </para>
2397 <para>
2398 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2399 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2400 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2401 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2402 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2403 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2404 peer-generated rankings.
2405 </para>
2406 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2407 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2408 </indexterm>
2409 <para>
2410 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2412 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2413 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2414 difference is the absence of a financial <quote>conflict of interest.</quote> <quote>I think you
2415 have to take the conflict of interest</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2416 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2417 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2418 get it out of the way.</quote>
2419 </para>
2420 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2421 <para>
2422 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2423 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2424 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2425 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2426 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2427 <!-- f19 -->
2428 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2429 </para></footnote>
2430 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2431 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2432 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2433 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2434 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2435 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2436 told her that <emphasis>they</emphasis> were writing <quote>the story.</quote>)
2437 </para>
2438 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2439 debate&mdash;<quote>amateur</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2440 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2441 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2442 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2443 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2444 had seen.<footnote><para>
2445 <!-- f20 -->
2446 John Schwartz, <quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2447 Information Online,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2448 D. Kramer, <quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,</quote>
2449 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2450 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2451 </para></footnote>
2452 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2453 <quote>triangulate,</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2454 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2455 out of it</quote>&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2456 </para>
2457 <para>
2458 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2459 with blogs. <quote>It's going to become an essential skill,</quote> Winer predicts,
2460 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2461 not clear that <quote>journalism</quote> is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2462 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2463 <para>
2464 <!-- f21 -->
2465 See Michael Falcone, <quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?</quote> <citetitle>New
2466 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. (<quote>Not all news organizations have
2467 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2468 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2469 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2470 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2471 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2472 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.</quote>)
2473 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2474 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve</primary></indexterm>
2475 </para></footnote>
2476 But it is clear that we are still in transition. <quote>A
2477
2478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2479 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,</quote> Winer told me.
2480 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2481 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2482 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, <quote>we will
2483 be the last thing that gets shut down.</quote>
2484 </para>
2485 <para>
2486 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because <quote>you
2487 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.</quote>
2488 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2489 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2490 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2491 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2492 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2493 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2494 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2495 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2496 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2497 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2498 extraordinary to report.
2499 </para>
2500 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2501 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2502 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2503 </indexterm>
2504 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'>
2505 <primary>advertising</primary>
2506 </indexterm>
2507 <para>
2508 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2509 His work, as his Web site describes it, is <quote>human learning and &hellip; the
2510 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating &hellip; innovation.</quote>
2511 </para>
2512 <para>
2513 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2514 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2515 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2516 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2517 affect learning.
2518 </para>
2519 <para>
2520 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When <quote>a lot of us grew up,</quote>
2521 he explains, that tinkering was done <quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2522 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.</quote> But digital technologies
2523 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2524 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2525 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2527 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2528 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2529 or <quote>free collage,</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2530 the tinkering of many others.
2531 </para>
2532 <para>
2533 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2534 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2535 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2536 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2537 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2538 </para>
2539 <para>
2540 This opportunity creates a <quote>completely new kind of learning platform,</quote>
2541 as Brown describes. <quote>As soon as you start doing that, you &hellip;
2542 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2543 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2544 if they can improve it.</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2545 apprenticeship. <quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.</quote>
2546 </para>
2547 <para>
2548 In this process, <quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2549 They are code.</quote> Kids are <quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2550 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2551 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2552 platform. &hellip; You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2553 you tinker the more you improve.</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2554 learn.
2555 </para>
2556 <para>
2557 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2558 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2559 it, <quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2560 intelligence.</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2561 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2562 text. <quote>The Web &hellip; says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2563 you are visual, if you are interested in film &hellip; [then] there is a
2564 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2565 these multiple forms of intelligence.</quote>
2566 </para>
2567 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'/>
2568 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2569 <para>
2570 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2571 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2572
2573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2574 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2575 kind of recognition.
2576 </para>
2577 <para>
2578 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2579 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2580 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2581 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2582 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2583 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2584 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2585 </para>
2586 <para>
2587 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2588 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2589 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2590 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the <quote>right to
2591 tinker</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2592 general.<footnote><para>
2593 <!-- f22 -->
2594 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, <quote>Technological Access
2595 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2596 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2597 </para></footnote>
2598 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2599 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2600 </para>
2601 <para>
2602 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,</quote> Brown
2603 explains. We need to <quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2604 and want to learn.</quote>
2605 </para>
2606 <para>
2607 <quote>Yet,</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2608 evince, <quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2609 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. &hellip; We're building an
2610 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2611 system that closes down that part of the brain.</quote>
2612 </para>
2613 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2614 <para>
2615 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2616 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2617 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2618 the law to close down that technology.
2619 </para>
2620 <para>
2621 <quote>No way to run a culture,</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2622 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2623 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2624 </para>
2625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2626 </chapter>
2627 <chapter label="3" id="catalogs">
2628 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2629 <indexterm><primary>RPI</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</see></indexterm>
2630 <indexterm id="idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'>
2631 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</primary>
2632 </indexterm>
2633 <para>
2634 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2635 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2636 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2637 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2638 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2639 </para>
2640 <para>
2641 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2642 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2643 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2644 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2645 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2646 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2647 </para>
2648 <para>
2649 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2650 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2651 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2652 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2653 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2654 </para>
2655 <para>
2656 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2658 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2659 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2660 engines can do this even better. The idea of <quote>intranet</quote> search
2661 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2662 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2663 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2664 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2665 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2666 </para>
2667 <para>
2668 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2669 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2670 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2671 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2672 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2673 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2674 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2675 </para>
2676 <para>
2677 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2678 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2679 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2680 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2681 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2682 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2683 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2684 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2685 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2686 on-line.
2687 </para>
2688 <para>
2689 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2690 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2691 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2692 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2693 be on users' computers.
2694 </para>
2695 <para>
2696 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2697 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2698 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2699 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2701 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2702 computer.
2703 </para>
2704 <para>
2705 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2706 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2707 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2708 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2709 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2710 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2711 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2712 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2713 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2714 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2715 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2716 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2717 supposed to do.
2718 </para>
2719 <para>
2720 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2721 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2722 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2723 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2724 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2725 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2726 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2727 </para>
2728 <para>
2729 <quote>It was absurd,</quote> he told me. <quote>I don't think I did anything
2730 wrong. &hellip; I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2731 engine that I ran or &hellip; what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2732 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2733 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2734 easier to use</quote>&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2735 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2736 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2737 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2738 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2739 with music.
2740 </para>
2741 <para>
2742 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2743 network and had therefore <quote>willfully</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2745 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2746 <quote>willful infringement,</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2747 call <quote>statutory damages.</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2748 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2749 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2750 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2751 </para>
2752 <para>
2753 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2754 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2755 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2756 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2757 huge demands for <quote>damages</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2758 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2759 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2760 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2761 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2762 2001.<footnote><para>
2763
2764 <!-- f1 -->
2765 Tim Goral, <quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2766 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages,</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2767 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2768 </para></footnote>
2769 </para>
2770 <indexterm startref="idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'/>
2771 <para>
2772 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2773 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2774 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2775 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2776 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2777 </para>
2778 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt</primary></indexterm>
2779 <para>
2780 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2781 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2782 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2783 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2784 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2785 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2786 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, <quote>You don't want to pay another
2787 visit to a dentist like me.</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2788 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2789 </para>
2790 <para>
2791 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2792 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2793 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2794 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2795 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2797 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2798 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2799 </para>
2800 <para>
2801 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2802 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2803 </para>
2804 <indexterm>
2805 <primary>artists</primary>
2806 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
2807 </indexterm>
2808 <para>
2809 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2810 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2811 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2812 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2813 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2814 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2815 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2816 <!-- f2 -->
2817 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2818 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2819 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2820 </para></footnote>
2821 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2822 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2823 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2824 <!-- f3 -->
2825 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in <quote>KaZaA and Punishment,</quote>
2826 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2827 </para></footnote>
2828 </para>
2829 <para>
2830 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2831 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2832 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2833 activist:
2834 </para>
2835 <blockquote>
2836 <para>
2837 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2838 an activist. &hellip; [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2839 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2840 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2841 </para>
2842 </blockquote>
2843 <para>
2844 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2845 his father told me, Jesse <quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2846 I. &hellip; He's not a tree hugger. &hellip; I think it's bizarre that they would
2847 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2848 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.</quote>
2849 </para>
2850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2851 </chapter>
2852 <chapter label="4" id="pirates">
2853 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: <quote>Pirates</quote></title>
2854 <para>
2855 If <quote>piracy</quote> means using the creative property of others without
2856 their permission&mdash;if <quote>if value, then right</quote> is true&mdash;then the history of
2857 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2858 <quote>big media</quote> today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2859 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2860 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2861 </para>
2862 <section id="film">
2863 <title>Film</title>
2864 <para>
2865 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2866 <!-- f1 -->
2867 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2868 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2869 which details Edison's <quote>adventures</quote> with copyright and patent.
2870 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2871 </para></footnote>
2872 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2873 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2874 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2875 exercised through a monopoly <quote>trust,</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2876 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2877 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2878 this creative property
2879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2880 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2881 </para>
2882 <para>
2883 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2884 </para>
2885 <blockquote>
2886 <para>
2887 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2888 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2889 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2890 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2891 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2892 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2893 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2894 </para>
2895 <para>
2896 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2897 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2898 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2899 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2900 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2901 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2902 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2903 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2904 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2905 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2906 <!-- f2 -->
2907 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2908 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2909 posted at <quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2910 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,</quote> available at
2911 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2912 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2913 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, <quote>From
2914 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2915 the Propertization of Copyright</quote> (September 2002), University of
2916 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2917 Working Paper No. 159.
2918 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
2919 </para></footnote>
2920 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William</primary></indexterm>
2921 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2922 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2923 </para>
2924 </blockquote>
2925 <para>
2926 The Napsters of those days, the <quote>independents,</quote> were companies like
2927 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2928 resisted. <quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2929 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2930 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.</quote><footnote><para>
2931 <!-- f3 -->
2932 Marc Wanamaker, <quote>The First Studios,</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2933 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2934 </para></footnote>
2935 That led the independents to flee the East
2936 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2937 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2938 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2939 did just that.
2940 </para>
2941 <para>
2942 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2943 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2944 patent holder a truly <quote>limited</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2945
2946 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2947 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2948 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2949 Edison's creative property.
2950 </para>
2951 </section>
2952 <section id="recordedmusic">
2953 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2954 <para>
2955 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2956 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2957 </para>
2958 <indexterm id="idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'>
2959 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri</primary>
2960 </indexterm>
2961 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil</primary></indexterm>
2962 <para>
2963 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2964 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2965 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2966 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2967 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2968 1899 hit <quote>Happy Mose,</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2969 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2970 right to perform it publicly.
2971 </para>
2972 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2973 <para>
2974 But what if I wanted to record <quote>Happy Mose,</quote> using Edison's phonograph
2975 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2976 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2977 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2978 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2979 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2980 <quote>public performance</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2981 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2982 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2983 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2984 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2985 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2986 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2987 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2988 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2989 its composer anything.
2990 </para>
2991 <indexterm startref="idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'/>
2992 <para>
2993 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2995 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2996 put it,
2997 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
2998 </para>
2999 <blockquote>
3000 <para>
3001 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3002 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3003 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3004 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3005 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3006 rights.<footnote><para>
3007 <!-- f4 -->
3008 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3009 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
3010 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3011 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
3012 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3013 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3014 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
3015 </para></footnote>
3016 </para>
3017 </blockquote>
3018 <para>
3019 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3020 people's works were <quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3021 genius of American composers,</quote><footnote><para>
3022 <!-- f5 -->
3023 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
3024 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3025 </para></footnote>
3026 and the <quote>music publishing industry</quote>
3027 was thereby <quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.</quote><footnote><para>
3028 <!-- f6 -->
3029 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
3030 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3031 </para></footnote>
3032 As John Philip
3033 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, <quote>When they make money
3034 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.</quote><footnote><para>
3035 <!-- f7 -->
3036 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
3037 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3038 </para></footnote>
3039 </para>
3040 <para>
3041 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3042 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3043 player piano argued that <quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3044 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3045 of anything he had before their introduction.</quote> Rather, the machines
3046 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
3047 <!-- f8 -->
3048
3049 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
3050 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3051 Perforating Company of New York).
3052 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3053 Congress was <quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3054 they represent, and whose servants they are.</quote> <quote>All talk about
3055 `theft,'</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3056 wrote, <quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3057 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3058 statute.</quote><footnote><para>
3059 <!-- f9 -->
3060 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
3061 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3062 Graphophone Company Association).
3063 </para></footnote>
3064 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company</primary></indexterm>
3065 </para>
3066 <para>
3067 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3068 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3069 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the <quote>mechanical
3070 reproductions</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3071 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3072 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3073 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3074 recorded once. This is the part of
3075
3076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3077 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3078 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3079 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3080 </para>
3081 <para>
3082 American law ordinarily calls this a <quote>compulsory license,</quote> but I will
3083 refer to it as a <quote>statutory license.</quote> A statutory license is a license
3084 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3085 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3086 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3087 the fee set by the statute.
3088 </para>
3089 <para>
3090 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3091 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3092 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3093 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3094 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3095 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3096 Grisham.
3097 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
3098 </para>
3099 <para>
3100 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3101 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
3102 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
3103 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3104 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3105 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3106 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3107 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3108 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3109 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3110 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3111 creativity.<footnote><para>
3112
3113 <!-- f10 -->
3114 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3115 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3116 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3117 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3118 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3119 </para></footnote>
3120 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3121 </para>
3122 <para>
3123 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3124 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3125 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3126 relates,
3127 </para>
3128 <blockquote>
3129 <para>
3130 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3132 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3133 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3134 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3135 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3136 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3137 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3138 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3139 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3140 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3141 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3142 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3143 choice.<footnote><para>
3144 <!-- f11 -->
3145 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3146 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3147 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3148 this report.</para></footnote>
3149 </para>
3150 </blockquote>
3151 <para>
3152 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3153 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3154 </para>
3155 </section>
3156 <section id="radio">
3157 <title>Radio</title>
3158 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'>
3159 <primary>artists</primary>
3160 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
3161 </indexterm>
3162 <para>
3163 Radio was also born of piracy.
3164 </para>
3165 <para>
3166 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3167 <quote>public performance</quote> of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3168 <!-- f12 -->
3169 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3170 record companies printed <quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast</quote> and other
3171 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3172 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3173 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3174 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3175 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, <quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3176 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3177 Copyright,</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3178 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3179 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3180 </para></footnote>
3181 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3182 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3183 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3184 </para>
3185 <para>
3186 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3187 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3188 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3189 work. It's one thing to have <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> sung on the radio by the
3190 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3191 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3192 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3193 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3194 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3195 music for his work.
3196 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3197
3198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3199 </para>
3200 <para>
3201 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3202 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3203 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3204 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3205 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3206 of playing the song.
3207 </para>
3208 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3209 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3210 </indexterm>
3211 <para>
3212 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3213 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3214 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3215 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3216 </para>
3217 <para>
3218 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3219 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3220 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3221 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3222 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3223 <quote>protected</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3224 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3225 her anything.
3226 </para>
3227 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3228 <para>
3229 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3230 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3231 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3232 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3233 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3234 to take something for nothing.
3235 </para>
3236 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'/>
3237 </section>
3238 <section id="cabletv">
3239 <title>Cable TV</title>
3240 <para>
3241
3242 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3243 </para>
3244 <para>
3245 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3246 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3247 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3248 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3250 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3251 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3252 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3253 give away.
3254 </para>
3255 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3256 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3257 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3258 <para>
3259 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3260 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3261 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.</quote><footnote><para>
3262 <!-- f13 -->
3263 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3264 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3265 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3266 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3267 Commission).
3268 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3269 </para></footnote>
3270 There may have been a <quote>public interest</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3271 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3272 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, <quote>Does public
3273 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?</quote><footnote><para>
3274 <!-- f14 -->
3275 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3276 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3277 </para></footnote>
3278 As another broadcaster put it,
3279 </para>
3280 <blockquote>
3281 <para>
3282 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3283 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3284 paid for.<footnote><para>
3285 <!-- f15 -->
3286 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3287 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3288 </para></footnote>
3289 </para>
3290 </blockquote>
3291 <para>
3292 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3293 </para>
3294 <blockquote>
3295 <para>
3296 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3297 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3298 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3299 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3300 <!-- f16 -->
3301 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3302 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3303 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3304 </para></footnote>
3305 </para>
3306 </blockquote>
3307 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3308 <para>
3309 These were <quote>free-ride[rs],</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3310 Heston said, who were <quote>depriving actors of
3311 compensation.</quote><footnote><para>
3312 <!-- f17 -->
3313 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3314 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3315 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3316 </para>
3317 </footnote>
3318 </para>
3319 <para>
3320 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3321 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3322 </para>
3323 <blockquote>
3324 <para>
3325 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3326 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3327 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3328 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. &hellip; The
3329
3330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3331 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3332 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3333 <!-- f18 -->
3334 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3335 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3336 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3337 </para></footnote>
3338 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3339 </para>
3340 </blockquote>
3341 <para>
3342 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3343 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3344 </para>
3345 <para>
3346 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3347 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they <quote>pirated.</quote>
3348 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3349 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3350 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3351 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3352 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3353 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3354 companies thus built their empire in part upon a <quote>piracy</quote> of the value
3355 created by broadcasters' content.
3356 </para>
3357 <para>
3358 These separate stories sing a common theme. If <quote>piracy</quote> means
3359 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3360 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3361 today<footnote><para>
3362 <!-- f19 -->
3363 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3364 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3365 Information</citetitle>, available at
3366 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. <quote>The
3367 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3368 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet.</quote>
3369 </para></footnote>
3370 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3371 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3372 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. &hellip; The list is long and
3373 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3374 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3375 </para>
3376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3377 </section>
3378 </chapter>
3379 <chapter label="5" id="piracy">
3380 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: <quote>Piracy</quote></title>
3381 <para>
3382 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3383 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3384 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3385 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3386 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3387 should stop it.
3388 </para>
3389 <para>
3390 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of <quote>taking</quote>
3391 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3392 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3393 taking <quote>piracy,</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3394 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3395 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3396 has so often done in the past.
3397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3398 </para>
3399 <section id="piracy-i">
3400 <title>Piracy I</title>
3401 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3402 <para>
3403 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3404 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3405 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3406 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3407 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3408 <!-- f1 -->
3409 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3410 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3411 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3412 also Ben Hunt, <quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3413 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3414 </para></footnote>
3415 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3416 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3417 </para>
3418 <para>
3419 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3420 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3421 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3422 This piracy is wrong.
3423 </para>
3424 <para>
3425 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3426 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3427 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3428 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3429 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3430 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3431 of our existence, treated as right.
3432 </para>
3433 <para>
3434 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3435 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3436 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3437 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3438 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3439 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3440 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3441 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3442 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3443 </para>
3444 <para>
3445 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3446 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3447 <beginpage pagenum="77"/>
3448 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3449 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3450 similar childhood.
3451 </para>
3452 <para>
3453 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3454 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3455 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3456 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3457 <!-- f2 -->
3458 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3459 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The
3460 New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13, 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3461 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3462 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3463 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3464 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3465 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3466 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3467 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3468 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3469 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3470 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3471 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3472 TRIPS framework.
3473 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents</primary></indexterm>
3474 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3475 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3476 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3477 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3478 is wrong.
3479 </para>
3480 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3481 <para>
3482 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3483 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3484 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3485 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3486 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3487 <!-- f3 -->
3488 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3489 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3490 144&ndash;90. <quote>In some instances &hellip; the impact of piracy on the
3491 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3492 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3493 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3494 pirating were not an option.</quote> Ibid., 149.
3495 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3496 </para></footnote>
3497 </para>
3498 <para>
3499 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3500 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3501 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3502 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3503 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3504 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?</quote>
3505 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3506 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3507 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3508 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3509 piracy of the tangible.
3510 </para>
3511 <para>
3512 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3513 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3514 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3515 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3516 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3517 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3518 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3519 give people the right to <quote>take</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3520 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3521
3522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3523 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3524 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3525 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3526 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3527 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what <quote>property</quote> means.
3528 </para>
3529 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3530 <para>
3531 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3532 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese <quote>steal</quote>
3533 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3534 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3535 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3536 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3537 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3538 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3539 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3540 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3541 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3542 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3543 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3544 <indexterm>
3545 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3546 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3547 </indexterm>
3548 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3549 </para>
3550 <para>
3551 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3552 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3553 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3554 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3555 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3556 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3557 </para>
3558 <para>
3559 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3560 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3561 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3562 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3563 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3564 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3565 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3566 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3567 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3568 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3569 violating the law is still wrong.
3570 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3571 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer</primary></indexterm>
3572 <indexterm><primary>Netscape</primary></indexterm>
3573 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3574 </para>
3575 <para>
3576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3577 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3578 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3579 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3580 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3581 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3582 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3583 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3584 is flat out wrong.
3585 </para>
3586 <para>
3587 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3588 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all <quote>piracy</quote> is. Or
3589 at least, not all <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3590 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of <quote>piracy</quote> are useful
3591 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3592 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3593 <quote>piracy</quote> in that sense of the term.
3594 </para>
3595 <para>
3596 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3597 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3598 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3599 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3600 </para>
3601 <para>
3602 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3603 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3604 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3605 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3606 </para>
3607 <para>
3608 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3609 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3610 sharing to survive.
3611 </para>
3612 </section>
3613 <section id="piracy-ii">
3614 <title>Piracy II</title>
3615 <para>
3616 The key to the <quote>piracy</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that <quote>rob[s]
3617 the author of [his] profit.</quote><footnote><para>
3618 <!-- f4 -->
3619 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3620 </para></footnote>
3621 This means we must determine whether
3622 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3624 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3625 author of his profit.
3626 </para>
3627 <para>
3628 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3629 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3630 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3631 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3632 <!-- f5 -->
3633 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3634 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3635 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3636 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3637 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3638 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3639 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3640 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3641
3642 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3643 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3644 put together components that had been developed independently.
3645 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3646 </para>
3647 <para>
3648 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3649 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3650 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3651 system.<footnote><para>
3652 <!-- f6 -->
3653 See Carolyn Lochhead, <quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,</quote> <citetitle>San
3654 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; <quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,</quote>
3655 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, <quote>Napster Names CEO,
3656 Secures New Financing,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3657 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,</quote> <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3658 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet</quote> (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3659 </para></footnote>
3660 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3661 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3662 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3663 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3664 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3665 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3666 or your 20,000 best friends.
3667 </para>
3668 <para>
3669 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3670 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3671 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3672 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3673
3674 <!-- f7 -->
3675 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3676 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3677 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3678 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3679 </para></footnote>
3680 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3681 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3682 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3683 <!-- f8 -->
3684 Amy Harmon, <quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,</quote> <citetitle>New
3685 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3686 </para></footnote>
3687 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3688 massive quantity of content is being <quote>taken</quote> on these networks. The
3689 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3690 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3691 </para>
3692 <para>
3693 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3694 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3695 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3696 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3697 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3698 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3699 of harm it entails.
3700 </para>
3701 <para>
3702 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3703 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3704 different kinds into four types.
3705 </para>
3706 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3707 <listitem><para>
3708 <!-- A. -->
3709 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3710 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3711 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3712 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3713 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3714 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3715 users who download instead of purchasing.
3716 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3717 </para></listitem>
3718 <listitem><para>
3719 <!-- B. -->
3720 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3721 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3722 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3723 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3724 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3725 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3726 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3727 music purchased.
3728 </para></listitem>
3729 <listitem><para>
3730 <!-- C. -->
3731 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3732 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3733 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3734 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3735 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3736 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3737 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend <quote>recalling</quote> old
3738 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3739 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3740 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3741 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3742 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3743 a local collector.
3744 </para></listitem>
3745 <listitem><para>
3746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3747 <!-- D. -->
3748 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3749 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3750 wants to give away.
3751 </para></listitem>
3752 </orderedlist>
3753 <para>
3754 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3755 </para>
3756 <para>
3757 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3758 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3759 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3760 harmful.<footnote><para>
3761 <!-- f9 -->
3762 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3763 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3764 </para></footnote>
3765 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3766 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3767 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3768 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3769 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3770 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3771 </para>
3772 <para>
3773 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3774 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3775 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3776 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3777 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of <quote>theft</quote> that is
3778 <quote>devastating</quote> the industry.
3779 </para>
3780 <para>
3781 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3782 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3783 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3784 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3785 &amp; Young put it, <quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3786 technology, the labels fought it.</quote><footnote><para>
3787 <!-- f10 -->
3788 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3789 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3790 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3791 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3792 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption <quote>Home taping
3793 is killing music.</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3794 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3795 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3796 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3797 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3798 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3799 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3800 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3801 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3802 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3803 regulating technology was the answer.
3804 </para>
3805 <para>
3806 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3807 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3808 turnaround. <quote>In the end,</quote> Cap Gemini concludes, <quote>the `crisis' &hellip; was
3809 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3811 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3812 innovation at the major labels.</quote><footnote><para>
3813 <!-- f11 -->
3814 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3815 </para></footnote>
3816 </para>
3817 <para>
3818 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3819 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3820 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3821 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3822 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3823 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3824 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3825 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3826 </para>
3827 <para>
3828 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3829 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3830 The <quote>net harm</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3831 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3832 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3833 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3834 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3835 them.
3836
3837 </para>
3838 <para>
3839 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3840 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3841 actually suggest it might be close.
3842 </para>
3843 <para>
3844 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3845 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3846 percent.<footnote><para>
3847 <!-- f12 -->
3848 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3849 available at
3850 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3851 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3852 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3853 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3854 #16</ulink>: <quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3855 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3856 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3857 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3858 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3859 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3860 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3861 shipments).</quote>
3862 </para></footnote>
3863 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3864 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3865 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3866 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3867 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3868 account for at least some of the loss. <quote>From 1999 to 2001, the average
3869 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19.</quote><footnote>
3870 <!-- f13 -->
3871 <para>
3872 Jane Black, <quote>Big Music's Broken Record,</quote> BusinessWeek online, 13
3873 February 2003, available at
3874 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3875 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3876 </para>
3877 </footnote>
3878 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3879 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, <quote>The
3880 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3881 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3882 $19.99.</quote><footnote><para>
3883 <!-- f14 -->
3884 Ibid.
3885 </para></footnote>
3886 </para>
3887 <para>
3888
3889 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3890 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3891 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3892 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3893 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3894 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3895 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3896 </para>
3897 <para>
3898 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3899 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3900 The recording industry constantly asks, <quote>What's the difference between
3901 downloading a song and stealing a CD?</quote>&mdash;but their own numbers
3902 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3903 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3904 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3905 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3906 Kazaa <quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit</quote>&mdash;then the industry
3907 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3908 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3909 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3910 a huge difference between <quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.</quote>
3911 </para>
3912 <para>
3913 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3914 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3915 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3916 these costs?
3917 </para>
3918 <para>
3919 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3920 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3921 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3922 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3923 available.<footnote><para>
3924 <!-- f15 -->
3925 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3926 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3927 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3928 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3929 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3930 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3931 </para></footnote>
3932 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3933 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3934 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3935 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3936 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3937 </para>
3938 <para>
3939 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3941 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3942 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3943 today.<footnote><para>
3944 <!-- f16 -->
3945 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3946 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3947 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3948 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3949 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3950 National
3951 Association of Recording Merchandisers, <quote>2002 Annual Survey
3952 Results,</quote>
3953 available at
3954 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3955 </para></footnote>
3956 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3957 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3958 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3959 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3960 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3961 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3962 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3963 the content they sell.
3964 </para>
3965 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3966 <para>
3967 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3968 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3969 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3970 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3971 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3972 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's <quote>Two Love Songs,</quote>
3973 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3974 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3975 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3976 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3977 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3978 </para>
3979 <para>
3980 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3981 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3982 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3983 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3984 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3985 shut as well?
3986 </para>
3987 <para>
3988 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3989 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3990 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3991 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3992 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
3993 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3994
3995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3996 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3997 would be a great advertisement for the <quote>real</quote> book. People would read
3998 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3999 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4000 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4001 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4002 great book!)
4003 </para>
4004 <para>
4005 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4006 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4007 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4008 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4009 </para>
4010 <para>
4011 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4012 understandably says, <quote>This is how much we've lost,</quote> we must also ask,
4013 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4014 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4015 unavailable?</quote>
4016 </para>
4017 <para>
4018 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4019 chapter, much of the <quote>piracy</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4020 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4021 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
4022 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4023 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4024 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4025 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4026 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4027 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4028 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4029 found only with time.
4030 </para>
4031 <para>
4032 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4033 just what you call type A sharing?</quote>
4034 </para>
4035 <para>
4036 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4037 effect
4038 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4039 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4040 Napster
4041 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4042 developed
4043 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
4044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4045 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
4046 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4047 <quote>down to zero.</quote><footnote><para>
4048 <!-- f17 -->
4049 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
4050 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
4051 MHP, available at
4052
4053 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
4054 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4055 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
4056 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
4057 </para></footnote>
4058 </para>
4059 <para>
4060 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4061 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4062 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
4063 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
4064 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
4065 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4066 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4067 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4068 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4069 </para>
4070 <para>
4071 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4072 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4073 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4074 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4075 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4076 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4077 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4078 </para>
4079 <indexterm>
4080 <primary>artists</primary>
4081 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
4082 </indexterm>
4083 <para>
4084 So, as we've seen, when <quote>mechanical reproduction</quote> threatened the
4085 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4086 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4087 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4088 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4089 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4090 complained to Congress that their <quote>creative property</quote> was not being
4091 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4092 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4093 benefit was enough.
4094 </para>
4095 <para>
4096 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4097 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4098 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4099 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4100 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4101 price.
4102 </para>
4103 <para>
4104
4105 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4106 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4107 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
4108 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4109 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4110 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4111 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4112 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4113 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4114 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4115 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4116 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4117 Congress chose a path that would assure
4118 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
4119 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4120 </para>
4121 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
4122 <para>
4123 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4124 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4125 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4126 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4127 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4128 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4129 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4130 <quote>record</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4131 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4132 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4133 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4134 </para>
4135 <para>
4136 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4137 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4138 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4139 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4140 machine to copy only if there were a special <quote>copy me</quote> signal on the
4141 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4142 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4143 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4145 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4146 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4147 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4148 for the architecture it chose.
4149 </para>
4150 <para>
4151 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4152 champion. Valenti called VCRs <quote>tapeworms.</quote> He warned, <quote>When there are
4153 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4154 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4155 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4156 copyright.</quote><footnote><para>
4157 <!-- f18 -->
4158 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4159 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4160 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4161 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4162 </para></footnote>
4163 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4164 creative judgment,</quote> he told Congress, <quote>to understand the devastation
4165 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4166 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4167 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4168 and plain common sense.</quote><footnote><para>
4169 <!-- f19 -->
4170 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4171 </para></footnote>
4172 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4173 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4174 <!-- f20 -->
4175 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4176 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4177 </para></footnote>
4178 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not <quote>fair.</quote> By
4179 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4180 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4181 copyrightowners,</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would <quote>take from the
4182 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4183 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4184 profit from its reproduction.</quote><footnote><para>
4185 <!-- f21 -->
4186 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4187 of Jack Valenti).
4188 </para></footnote>
4189 </para>
4190 <para>
4191 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4192 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4193 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4194 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the <quote>Hollywood
4195 Circuit</quote>&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4196 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4197 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4198 called <quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry</quote> (worse
4199 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4200 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4201 technology.<footnote><para>
4202 <!-- f22 -->
4203 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4204 1981).
4205 </para></footnote>
4206 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex</primary></indexterm>
4207 </para>
4208 <para>
4209 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4210
4211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4212 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4213 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4214 Court wrote,
4215 </para>
4216 <blockquote>
4217 <para>
4218 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4219 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4220 market
4221 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4222 authority
4223 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4224 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4225 implicated
4226 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4227 <!-- f23 -->
4228 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4229 </para></footnote>
4230 </para>
4231 </blockquote>
4232 <para>
4233 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4234 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4235 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4236 enough, this <quote>taking</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4237 together, a pattern is clear:
4238 </para>
4239
4240 <informaltable id="t1">
4241 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4242 <thead>
4243 <row>
4244 <entry>CASE</entry>
4245 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS <quote>PIRATED</quote></entry>
4246 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4247 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4248 </row>
4249 </thead>
4250 <tbody>
4251 <row>
4252 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4253 <entry>Composers</entry>
4254 <entry>No protection</entry>
4255 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4256 </row>
4257 <row>
4258 <entry>Radio</entry>
4259 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4260 <entry>N/A</entry>
4261 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4262 </row>
4263 <row>
4264 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4265 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4266 <entry>No protection</entry>
4267 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4268 </row>
4269 <row>
4270 <entry>VCR</entry>
4271 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4272 <entry>No protection</entry>
4273 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4274 </row>
4275 </tbody>
4276 </tgroup>
4277 </informaltable>
4278
4279 <para>
4280 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4281 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4282 <!-- f24 -->
4283 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4284 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4285 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4286 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4287 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4288 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4289 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4290 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4291 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, <quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,</quote>
4292 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4293 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
4294 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4295 </para></footnote>
4296 In each case, throughout our history,
4297 that change meant that someone got a <quote>free ride</quote> on someone else's
4298 work.
4299 </para>
4300 <para>
4301 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4302 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4303 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4304 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4305 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of <quote>piracy.</quote>
4306 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4307 the behavior of the <quote>pirates.</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4308 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4309 interests at stake.
4310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4311 </para>
4312 <para>
4313 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4314 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4315 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4316 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4317 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4318 regulated?
4319 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4320 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4321 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4322 permission to record a song?
4323 </para>
4324 <para>
4325 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4326 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4327 copyright <quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4328 over all possible uses of his work.</quote><footnote><para>
4329 <!-- f25 -->
4330 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4331 (1984).
4332 </para></footnote>
4333 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4334 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4335 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4336 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4337 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4338 facilitate the distribution of content.
4339 </para>
4340 <para>
4341 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4342 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4343 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4344 should not become a tool for <quote>stealing</quote> from artists. But neither
4345 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4346 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4347 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4348 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4349 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4350 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4351 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4352 public interest that innovation continue.
4353 </para>
4354 <para>
4355
4356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4357 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4358 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4359 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4360 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4361 efficient. Yet these <quote>potential public benefits,</quote> as John Schwartz
4362 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, <quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4363 fight.</quote><footnote><para>
4364 <!-- f26 -->
4365 John Schwartz, <quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4366 Echoes Past Efforts,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4367 </para></footnote>
4368 Yet when anyone begins to talk about <quote>balance,</quote> the copyright warriors
4369 raise a different argument. <quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4370 incentives,</quote> they say, <quote>misses a fundamental point. Our content,</quote> the
4371 warriors insist, <quote>is our <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we
4372 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4373 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4374 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4375 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4376 arrest him?</quote>
4377 </para>
4378 <para>
4379 <quote>It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>,</quote> the warriors
4380 insist. <quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4381 is protected.</quote>
4382 </para>
4383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4384 </section>
4385 </chapter>
4386 </part>
4387 <part id="c-property">
4388 <title><quote>PROPERTY</quote></title>
4389 <partintro>
4390 <para>
4391
4392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4393 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4394 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4395 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4396 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4397 the price she can get.
4398 </para>
4399 <para>
4400 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a <quote>property</quote> right is a
4401 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4402 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4403 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4404 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4405 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4406 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4407 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4408 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4409 then?
4410 </para>
4411 <para>
4412 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4413 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4415 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4416 narrow
4417 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4418 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4419 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4420 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4421 when I copy the way someone else dresses), <quote>He who receives an idea
4422 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4423 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.</quote><footnote><para>
4424 <!-- f1 -->
4425 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4426 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4427 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4428 </para></footnote>
4429 </para>
4430 <para>
4431 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4432 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4433 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4434 expression
4435 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4436 property.
4437 </para>
4438 <para>
4439 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4440 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4441 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4442 <quote>property</quote> in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4443 <!-- f2 -->
4444 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4445 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4446 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4447 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4448 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4449 Adam Mossoff, <quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,</quote>
4450 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4451 </para></footnote>
4452 </para>
4453 <para>
4454 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4455 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4456 <quote>copyright material is property</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4457 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4458 these stories, the significance of this true
4459 statement&mdash;<quote>copyright material is property</quote>&mdash; will be a bit
4460 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4461 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4462 </para>
4463 </partintro>
4464
4465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4466 <chapter label="6" id="founders">
4467 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4468 <indexterm><primary>Henry V</primary></indexterm>
4469 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
4470 <para>
4471 William Shakespeare wrote <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play
4472 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4473 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4474 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4475 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4476 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4477 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4478 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: <quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare
4479 is so full of clichés.</quote>
4480 </para>
4481 <para>
4482 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4483 <quote>copy-right</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4484 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4485 <!-- f1 -->
4486 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4487 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4488 handsome <quote>definitive editions</quote> of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4489 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4490 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4491 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, <quote>Jacob Tonson,
4492 Bookseller,</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4493 </para></footnote>
4494 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4495 the Conger<footnote><para>
4496 <!-- f2 -->
4497 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4498 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4499 </para></footnote>
4500 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4501 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the <quote>copy</quote> of
4502 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4503 that no
4504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4505 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4506 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4507 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4508 </para>
4509 <para>
4510 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4511 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4512 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4513 adopted the first <quote>copyright</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4514 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4515 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4516 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4517 additional years.<footnote><para>
4518 <!-- f3 -->
4519 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4520 <quote>copyright law.</quote> See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4521 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4522 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4523 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4524 Tonson's control in 1774?
4525 </para>
4526 <para>
4527 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a <quote>copyright</quote>
4528 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4529 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4530 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4531 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4532 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4533 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4534 that the publishers, or <quote>Stationers,</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4535 books.
4536 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4537 </para>
4538 <para>
4539 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4540 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4541 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4542 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4543 from legislatures <quote>positive law.</quote> We call the words from judges
4544 <quote>common law.</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4545 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4546 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4547 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4548 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4549 </para>
4550 <para>
4551 This question was important to the publishers, or <quote>booksellers,</quote> as
4552 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4553 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4554 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4555
4556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4557 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4558 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4559 ultimately
4560 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4561 </para>
4562 <para>
4563 The Statute of Anne granted the author or <quote>proprietor</quote> of a book an
4564 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4565 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4566 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4567 copyright <quote>expired,</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4568 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4569 believed.
4570 </para>
4571 <para>
4572 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4573 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4574 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4575 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4576 </para>
4577 <para>
4578 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4579 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4580 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4581 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4582 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4583 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4584 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4585 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4586 reason is there to allow someone else to <quote>steal</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4587 </para>
4588 <para>
4589 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4590 about the notion of <quote>copyright</quote> that existed at the time of the
4591 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4592 <quote>booksellers.</quote>
4593 </para>
4594 <para>
4595 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4596 to apply the concept of <quote>copyright</quote> ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4597 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4598 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4599 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the <quote>copy-right</quote> was a right
4600 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4601 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4602 generally how
4603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4604 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4605 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4606 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4607 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4608 </para>
4609 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
4610 <para>
4611 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4612 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4613 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4614 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4615 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4616 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4617 allowed to make his films. The <quote>copy-right</quote> was only an exclusive
4618 right to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4619 </para>
4620 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England</primary></indexterm>
4621 <para>
4622 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4623 They had had a long and ugly experience with <quote>exclusive rights,</quote>
4624 especially <quote>exclusive rights</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4625 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4626 monopolies&mdash;especially monopolies for works that already
4627 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4628 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4629 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the
4630 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4631 inventions. And by 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4632 monopoly in publishing.
4633 </para>
4634 <para>
4635 Thus the <quote>copy-right,</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4636 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4637 claim that <quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,</quote> try
4638 sounding convincing when uttering, <quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4639 have it forever.</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4640 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4641 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4642 </para>
4643 <para>
4644 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4645 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4646 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4647 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4648 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4649
4650 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4651 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4652 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4653 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as <quote>old patentees
4654 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling</quote>; they were <quote>men who do
4655 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4656 indetted.</quote><footnote><para>
4657
4658 <!-- f4 -->
4659 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4660 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4661 </para></footnote>
4662 </para>
4663 <para>
4664 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4665 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4666 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4667 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4668 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4669 with that idea.
4670 </para>
4671 <para>
4672 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4673 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4674 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4675 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4676 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4677 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4678 compromise
4679 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4680 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4681 construction and spread of culture.
4682 </para>
4683 <para>
4684 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4685 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4686 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4687 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4688 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4689 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4690 they said; they needed more time.
4691 </para>
4692 <para>
4693 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4694 words that echo today,
4695 </para>
4696 <blockquote>
4697 <para>
4698 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4699 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4701 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4702 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4703 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4704 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4705 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4706 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4707 <!-- f5 -->
4708 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4709 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4710 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4711 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4712 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4713 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4714 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4715 </para></footnote>
4716 </para>
4717 </blockquote>
4718 <para>
4719 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4720 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4721 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4722 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4723 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4724 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4725 creative <quote>property</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4726 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4727 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4728 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4729 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4730 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4731 way to protect authors.
4732 </para>
4733 <para>
4734 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4735 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4736 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4737 <quote>The publishers &hellip; had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4738 rancher has for cattle.</quote><footnote><para>
4739 <!-- f6 -->
4740 Lyman Ray Patterson, <quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4741 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4742 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4743 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4744 </para></footnote>
4745 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4746 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4747 </para>
4748 <para>
4749 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4750 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4751 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4752 <!-- f7 -->
4753 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4754 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4755 </para></footnote>
4756 </para>
4757 <para>
4758 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4759 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4760 reprints <quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,</quote> at least
4761 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4762 <!-- f8 -->
4763 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4764 1993), 92.
4765 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
4766 </para></footnote>
4767 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4769 and became <quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4770 them,</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was <quote>the young James Boswell
4771 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4772 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.</quote><footnote><para>
4773 <!-- f9 -->
4774 Ibid., 93.
4775 </para></footnote>
4776 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James</primary></indexterm>
4777 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4778 </para>
4779 <para>
4780 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4781 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4782 inexpensive editions <quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4783 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4784 Property.</quote><footnote><para>
4785 <!-- f10 -->
4786 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4787 Borwell).
4788 </para></footnote>
4789 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4790 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4791 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4792 </para>
4793 <para>
4794 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block <quote>piracy</quote> like
4795 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the <quote>pirates,</quote>
4796 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4797 </para>
4798 <para>
4799 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4800 Thomson's poem <quote>The Seasons.</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4801 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4802 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4803 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4804 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4805 <!-- f11 -->
4806 Howard B. Abrams, <quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4807 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4808 (1983): 1152.
4809 </para></footnote>
4810 </para>
4811 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4812 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4813 </indexterm>
4814 <para>
4815 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4816 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4817 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4818 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4819 law would protect the author against subsequent <quote>pirates.</quote>
4820 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4821 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4822 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4823 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4824 </para>
4825 <para>
4826 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4827 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4828 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4829 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4830 with in 1710: How best to limit
4831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4832 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4833 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4834 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4835 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4836 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4837 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4838 </para>
4839 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4840 <para>
4841 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4842 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4843 </para>
4844 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4845 <para>
4846 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4847 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4848 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4849 <!-- f12 -->
4850 Ibid., 1156.
4851 </para></footnote>
4852 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4853 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4854 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4855 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4856 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4857 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4858 </para>
4859 <para>
4860 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4861 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4862 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4863 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4864 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4865 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4866 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4867 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4868 </para>
4869 <para>
4870 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4871 presented to the House and voted upon first by the <quote>law lords,</quote>
4872 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4873 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4874 House of Lords generally voted.
4875 </para>
4876 <para>
4877 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4878 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4880 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4881 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4882 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4883 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4884 passed into the public domain.
4885 </para>
4886 <para>
4887 <quote>The public domain.</quote> Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4888 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4889 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4890 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4891 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4892 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4893 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4894 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4895 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4896 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4897 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4898 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4899 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4900 </para>
4901 <para>
4902 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4903 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4904 where most of the <quote>pirate publishers</quote> did their work, people
4905 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4906 reported, <quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4907 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4908 decision of which so many individuals were interested.</quote> <quote>Great
4909 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4910 and illuminations.</quote><footnote><para>
4911 <!-- f13 -->
4912 Rose, 97.
4913 </para></footnote>
4914 </para>
4915 <para>
4916 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4917 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4918 reported:
4919 </para>
4920 <blockquote>
4921 <para>
4922 By the above decision &hellip; near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4923 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4924 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4925 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4926 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4927 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4928 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4929 successors.<footnote><para>
4930 <!-- f14 -->
4931 Ibid.
4932 </para></footnote>
4933 </para>
4934 </blockquote>
4935 <para>
4936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4937 <quote>Ruined</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4938 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4939 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4940 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4941 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4942 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4943 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4944 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4945 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4946 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4947 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4948 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4949 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4950 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4951 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4952 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4953 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4954 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4955 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4956 </para>
4957 <para>
4958 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4959 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4960 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4961 protected.
4962 </para>
4963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4964 </chapter>
4965 <chapter label="7" id="recorders">
4966 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4967 <para>
4968 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4969 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4970 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4971 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4972 He was their god.)
4973 </para>
4974 <para>
4975 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4976 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4977 today.
4978 </para>
4979 <para>
4980 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4981 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4982 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4983 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4984 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4985 stage.
4986 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4987 </para>
4988 <para>
4989 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4990 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4991 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4992 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
4993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4994 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4995 about the scene.
4996 </para>
4997 <para>
4998 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4999 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
5000 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5001 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5002 unless <quote>fair use</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5003 </para>
5004 <para>
5005 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5006 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5007 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5008 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5009 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5010 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
5011 </para>
5012 <para>
5013 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5014 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5015 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5016 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5017 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5018 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
5019 </para>
5020 <para>
5021 Then, as Else told me, <quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5022 &hellip; that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
5023 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.</quote>
5024 And second, Fox <quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5025 to use this four-point-five seconds of &hellip; entirely unsolicited
5026 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.</quote>
5027 </para>
5028 <para>
5029 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5030 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5031 explained to her, <quote>There must be some mistake here. &hellip; We're
5032 asking for your educational rate on this.</quote> That was the educational
5033 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5034 confirm what he had been told.
5035 </para>
5036 <para>
5037 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,</quote> he told me. <quote>Yes, you
5038 have your facts straight,</quote> she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
5039 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5040 about
5041
5042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5043 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, <quote>And
5044 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.</quote> As an assistant
5045 to Herrera told Else later on, <quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5046 the money.</quote>
5047 </para>
5048 <para>
5049 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5050 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5051 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5052 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5053 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5054 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5055 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
5056 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
5057 </para>
5058 <para>
5059 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5060 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5061 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5062 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5063 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5064 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5065 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5066 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5067 says the owner gets to control.
5068 </para>
5069 <para>
5070 For example, <quote>public performance</quote> is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
5071 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5072 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see <quote>My
5073 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>,</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5074 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5075 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
5076 by the law.
5077 </para>
5078 <para>
5079 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5080 thought is <quote>fair use.</quote><footnote><para>
5081 <!-- f1 -->
5082 For an excellent argument that such use is <quote>fair use,</quote> but that
5083 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is <quote>fair use,</quote> see Richard
5084 A. Posner with William F. Patry, <quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5085 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5086 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5087 </para></footnote>
5088 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5089 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
5090 not require the permission of anyone.
5091 </para>
5092 <para>
5093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5094 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon <quote>fair use.</quote> Here's his reply:
5095 </para>
5096 <blockquote>
5097 <para>
5098 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5099 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5100 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5101 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was <quote>clearly
5102 fair use</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5103 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5104 </para>
5105 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5106 <listitem><para>
5107 <!-- 1. -->
5108 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5109 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5110 <quote>visual cue sheet</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5111 shot in the film. They take a dim view of <quote>fair use,</quote> and a claim of
5112 <quote>fair use</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5113 </para></listitem>
5114 <listitem><para>
5115 <!-- 2. -->
5116 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5117 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5118 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
5119 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5120 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5121 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5122 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5123 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5124 principle.
5125 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
5126 </para></listitem>
5127 <listitem><para>
5128 <!-- 3. -->
5129 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5130 School &hellip; who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5131 that Fox would <quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5132 life,</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5133 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5134 pockets, me or them.
5135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5136 </para></listitem>
5137 <listitem><para>
5138 <!-- 4. -->
5139 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5140 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5141 money.
5142 </para></listitem>
5143 </orderedlist>
5144 </blockquote>
5145 <para>
5146 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5147 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5148 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5149 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5150 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5151 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5152 </para>
5153 <para>
5154 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5155 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5156 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5157 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5158 not.
5159 </para>
5160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5161 </chapter>
5162 <chapter label="8" id="transformers">
5163 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5164 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5165 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'>
5166 <primary>Alben, Alex</primary>
5167 </indexterm>
5168 <para>
5169 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5170 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5171 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5172 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5173 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5174 </para>
5175 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'>
5176 <primary>artists</primary>
5177 <secondary>retrospective compilations on</secondary>
5178 </indexterm>
5179 <para>
5180 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5181 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5182 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5183 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5184 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5185 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5186 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5187 important to his career.
5188 </para>
5189 <para>
5190 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5191 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5192 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5193 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5194 </para>
5195 <para>
5196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5197 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5198 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5199 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5200 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5201 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5202 </para>
5203 <para>
5204 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. <quote>Our
5205 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5206 Eastwood's films,</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5207 arose. <quote>No one had ever really done this before,</quote> Alben explained. <quote>No
5208 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5209 actor's career.</quote>
5210 </para>
5211 <para>
5212 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5213 Slade asked, <quote>Well, what will it take?</quote>
5214 </para>
5215 <para>
5216 Alben replied, <quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5217 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5218 else that we want to use in these film clips.</quote> Slade said, <quote>Great! Go
5219 for it.</quote><footnote>
5220 <para>
5221 <!-- f1 -->
5222 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5223 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5224 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden <quote>Rip, Mix,
5225 Burn</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5226 <indexterm>
5227 <primary>artists</primary>
5228 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5229 </indexterm>
5230 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5231 </para></footnote>
5232 </para>
5233 <para>
5234 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5235 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5236 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5237 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5238 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5239 </para>
5240 <para>
5241 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5242 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5243 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5244 </para>
5245 <blockquote>
5246 <para>
5247 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5248 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5249 course we were going to use the <quote>Make my day</quote> clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5250 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5251 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5252 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5253 </para>
5254 <para>
5255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5256 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5257 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5258 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5259 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5260 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5261 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5262 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5263 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5264 started calling people.
5265 </para>
5266 </blockquote>
5267 <para>
5268 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5269 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5270 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5271 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5272 know, $1,200?</quote> And they would say, <quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5273 to get $1,200.</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5274 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5275 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5276 career.
5277 </para>
5278 <para>
5279 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;<quote>and even then we
5280 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.</quote>
5281 </para>
5282 <para>
5283 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5284 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5285 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5286 </para>
5287 <blockquote>
5288 <para>
5289 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5290 hands and said, <quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5291 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5292 actors.</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5293 constituent parts and said, <quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5294 directors, &hellip; this many musicians,</quote> and we just went at it very
5295 systematically and cleared the rights.
5296 </para>
5297 </blockquote>
5298 <para>
5299
5300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5301 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5302 loved it, and it sold very well.
5303 </para>
5304 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5305 <para>
5306 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5307 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5308 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, <quote>There is
5309 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5310 at all.</quote><footnote><para>
5311 <!-- f2 -->
5312 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5313 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5314 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5315 </para></footnote>
5316 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5317 has to be made?
5318 </para>
5319 <para>
5320 For, as he acknowledged, <quote>very few &hellip; have the time and resources,
5321 and the will to do this,</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5322 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5323 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5324 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5325 </para>
5326 <blockquote>
5327 <para>
5328 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5329 he or she gets paid very well. &hellip; And then when 30 seconds of
5330 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5331 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person &hellip; should be
5332 compensated for that.
5333 </para>
5334 </blockquote>
5335 <para>
5336 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5337 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5338 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5339 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5340 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5341 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5342 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5343 made to be more clean?
5344 </para>
5345 <blockquote>
5346 <para>
5347 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5348 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5349 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5350 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5352 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5353 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5354 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5355 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5356 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5357 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5358 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5359 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5360 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, <quote>Oh, I
5361 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5362 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5363 money,</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5364 </para>
5365 </blockquote>
5366 <para>
5367 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5368 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5369 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5370 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5371 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5372 </para>
5373 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'/>
5374 <para>
5375 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5376 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5377 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5378 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5379 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5380 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5381 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5382 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5383 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5384 <quote>Does this still make sense?</quote>
5385 </para>
5386 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'/>
5387 <para>
5388 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5389 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5390 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5391 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5392
5393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5394 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5395 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5396 </para>
5397 <para>
5398 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5399 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5400 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5401 judges loved every minute of it.
5402 </para>
5403 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5404 <para>
5405 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5406 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5407 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5408 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5409 began his talk with a question: <quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5410 were just violated in this room?</quote>
5411 </para>
5412 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5413 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5414 <para>
5415 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5416 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5417 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5418 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5419 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5420 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5421 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5422 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5423 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5424 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5425 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5426 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5427 couldn't easily do them legally.
5428 </para>
5429 <para>
5430 We live in a <quote>cut and paste</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5431 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5432 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5433 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5434 planted in your presentation.
5435 </para>
5436 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5437 <para>
5438 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5440 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5441 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5442 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5443 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5444 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5445 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5446 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5447 </para>
5448 <para>
5449 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5450 wanted to be <quote>legal,</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5451 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5452 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5453 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5454 </para>
5455 <para>
5456 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5457 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5458 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5459 necessarily requiring that the <quote>free</quote> use be free as in <quote>free beer.</quote>
5460 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5461 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5462 along: a rule, for example, that says <quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5463 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5464 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5465 copyright owner.</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5466 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5467 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5468 registers the work.
5469 </para>
5470 <para>
5471 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5472 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5473 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5474 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5475 </para>
5476 <para>
5477 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5478 Myers, the comic genius of <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5480 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5481 would work together to form a <quote>unique filmmaking pact.</quote> Under the
5482 agreement, DreamWorks <quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5483 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5484 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5485 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5486 entertainment.</quote>
5487 </para>
5488 <para>
5489 The announcement called this <quote>film sampling.</quote> As Myers explained,
5490 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5491 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5492 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5493 to take that same concept and apply it to film.</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5494 quoted as saying, <quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5495 new audiences, it is Mike.</quote>
5496 </para>
5497 <para>
5498 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5499 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5500 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5501 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5502 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5503 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5504 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5505 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5506 </para>
5507 <para>
5508 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5509 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of <quote>fair use.</quote>
5510 Much of <quote>sampling</quote> should be considered <quote>fair use.</quote> But few would
5511 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5512 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5513 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5514 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5515 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5516 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5517 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5518 curse, reserved for the few.
5519 </para>
5520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5521 </chapter>
5522 <chapter label="9" id="collectors">
5523 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5524 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'>
5525 <primary>archives, digital</primary>
5526 </indexterm>
5527 <para>
5528 In April 1996, millions of <quote>bots</quote>&mdash;computer codes designed to
5529 <quote>spider,</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5530 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5531 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5532 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5533 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5534 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5535 </para>
5536 <para>
5537 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5538 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5539 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5540 the world. Using a technology called <quote>the Way Back Machine,</quote> you could
5541 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5542 well as when those pages changed.
5543 </para>
5544 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'>
5545 <primary>Orwell, George</primary>
5546 </indexterm>
5547 <para>
5548 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5549 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5550 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5551 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5552 reports.
5553 </para>
5554 <para>
5555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5556 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5557 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5558 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5559 </para>
5560 <para>
5561 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5562 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5563 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5564 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5565 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5566 </para>
5567 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'/>
5568 <para>
5569 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5570 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5571 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5572 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5573 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5574 <!-- f1 -->
5575 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5576 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5577 press release stated, <quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.</quote> That was
5578 later changed, without notice, to <quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5579 Have Ended.</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5580 </para></footnote>
5581 </para>
5582 <para>
5583 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5584 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5585 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5586 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5587 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5588 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5589 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5590 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5591 truth.
5592 </para>
5593 <para>
5594 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5595 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5596 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5597 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5598 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5599 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5600 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5601 </para>
5602 <para>
5603 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5604 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5605 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5606 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5608 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5609 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5610 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5611 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5612 </para>
5613 <para>
5614 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5615 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5616 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5617 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5618 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5619 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5620 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5621 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5622 </para>
5623 <para>
5624 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5625 human history. At the end of 2002, it held <quote>two hundred and thirty
5626 terabytes of material</quote>&mdash;and was <quote>ten times larger than the
5627 Library of Congress.</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5628 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5629 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5630 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5631 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5632 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5633 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5634 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5635 is available to scholars for a very low fee. <quote>But other than that,
5636 [television] is almost unavailable,</quote> Kahle told me. <quote>If you were
5637 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5638 just a graduate student?</quote> As Kahle put it,
5639 </para>
5640 <blockquote>
5641 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan</primary></indexterm>
5642 <para>
5643 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5644 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5645 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5646 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5647 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5648
5649 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5650 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it &hellip; it would be almost
5651 impossible. &hellip; Those materials are almost unfindable. &hellip;
5652 </para>
5653 </blockquote>
5654 <para>
5655 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5656 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5657 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5658 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5659 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5660 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5661 </para>
5662 <para>
5663 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5664 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5665 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5666 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5667 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5668 work.
5669 </para>
5670 <para>
5671 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5672 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5673 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5674 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5675 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and <quote>borrowed
5676 back.</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5677 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5678 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5679 <!-- f2 -->
5680 Doug Herrick, <quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5681 the Library of Congress,</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5682 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5683 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5684 Co., 1992), 36.
5685 </para></footnote>
5686 </para>
5687 <para>
5688 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5689 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5690 broadcasts, so there was no fear of <quote>theft.</quote> But as technology enabled
5691 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5692 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5693 <quote>copyrighted.</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5694 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5695 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5696 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5697 </para>
5698 <para>
5699 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5701 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5702 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5703 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5704 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5705 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5706 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5707 events of that day.
5708 </para>
5709 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5710 <indexterm>
5711 <primary>archive.org</primary>
5712 <seealso>Internet Archive</seealso>
5713 </indexterm>
5714 <para>
5715 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5716 archive of film includes close to 45,000 <quote>ephemeral films</quote> (meaning
5717 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5718 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5719 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5720 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5721 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5722 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5723 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5724 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5725 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5726 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5727 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the <quote>Duck and Cover</quote> film
5728 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5729 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5730 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5731 </para>
5732 <para>
5733 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5734 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5735 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5736 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5737 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5738 to find them.
5739 </para>
5740 <para>
5741 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5742 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5743 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5744 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5745 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5746 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5747 </para>
5748 <para>
5749 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5750 of creative property goes through different <quote>lives.</quote> In its first
5751 life, if the
5752
5753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5754 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5755 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5756 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5757 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5758 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5759 </para>
5760 <para>
5761 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5762 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5763 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5764 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5765 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5766 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5767 longer sold.
5768 </para>
5769 <para>
5770 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5771 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5772 <!-- f3 -->
5773 Dave Barns, <quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5774 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5775 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5776 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5777 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5778 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5779 </para></footnote>). After
5780 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5781 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5782 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5783 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5784 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5785 </para>
5786 <para>
5787 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5788 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5789 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5790 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5791 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5792 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5793 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5794 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5795 disappears.
5796 </para>
5797 <para>
5798 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5799 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5800 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5801 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5802 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5803 generally, the
5804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5805 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5806 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5807 little practical effect.
5808 </para>
5809 <para>
5810 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5811 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5812 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5813 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5814 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5815 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5816 </para>
5817 <para>
5818 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5819 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5820 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5821 Kahle describes,
5822 </para>
5823 <blockquote>
5824 <indexterm>
5825 <primary>books</primary>
5826 <secondary>total number of</secondary>
5827 </indexterm>
5828 <para>
5829 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5830 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5831 movies, &hellip; and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5832 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5833 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5834 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5835 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5836 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5837 &hellip; thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5838 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5839 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5840 </para>
5841 </blockquote>
5842 <para>
5843 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5844 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5845 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5846 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5847 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5848 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5849 will draw upon it to understand it;
5850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5851 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5852 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5853 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5854 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5855 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5856 </para>
5857 <para>
5858 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5859 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5860 call these <quote>archives,</quote> as warm as the idea of a <quote>library</quote> might seem,
5861 the <quote>content</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5862 someone's <quote>property.</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5863 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5864 </para>
5865 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'/>
5866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5867 </chapter>
5868 <chapter label="10" id="property-i">
5869 <title>CHAPTER TEN: <quote>Property</quote></title>
5870 <para>
5871 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5872 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5873 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5874 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5875 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5876 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5877 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5878 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5879 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
5880 </para>
5881 <para>
5882 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5883 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5884 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5885 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5886 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5887 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5888 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5889 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5890 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5891 Warner Brothers.
5892 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5893 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5894 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5895 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5896 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5897 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5898 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5899 </para>
5900 <para>
5901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5902 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5903 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5904 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5905 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5906 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5907 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5908 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5909 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5910 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5911 Washingtonian way.
5912 </para>
5913 <para>
5914 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5915 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5916 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5917 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5918 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5919 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5920 redefine the meaning of <quote>creative property.</quote>
5921 </para>
5922 <para>
5923 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5924 perfectly:
5925 </para>
5926 <blockquote>
5927 <para>
5928 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5929 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5930 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5931 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5932 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5933 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5934 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5935 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5936 <!-- f1 -->
5937 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5938 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5939 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5940 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5941 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5942 Valenti).
5943 </para></footnote>
5944 </para>
5945 </blockquote>
5946 <para>
5947 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5948 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5949 <quote>central theme</quote> to which <quote>reasonable men and women</quote> will return is
5950 this:
5951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5952 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5953 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.</quote>
5954 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5955 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5956 </para>
5957 <para>
5958 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5959 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5960 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5961 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
5962 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5963 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5964 it comes to the nature and scope of <quote>creative property.</quote> His views
5965 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5966 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5967 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5968 </para>
5969 <para>
5970 While <quote>creative property</quote> is certainly <quote>property</quote> in a nerdy and
5971 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5972 <!-- f2 -->
5973 Lawyers speak of <quote>property</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5974 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5975 object. Thus, my <quote>property right</quote> to my car gives me the right to
5976 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5977 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of <quote>property</quote> to
5978 <quote>lawyer talk,</quote> see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
5979 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5980 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5981 <quote>creative property owners</quote> have been <quote>accorded the same rights and
5982 protection resident in all other property owners.</quote> Indeed, if creative
5983 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5984 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5985 in our tradition.
5986 </para>
5987 <para>
5988 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5989 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5990 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5991 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5992 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5993 culture would develop.
5994 </para>
5995 <para>
5996 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5997 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5998 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5999 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
6000 differently from the rights resident in all other property
6001 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
6002 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
6003 the same would be to
6004
6005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6006 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6007 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6008 perfect control.
6009 </para>
6010 <para>
6011 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6012 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6013 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6014 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6015 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6016 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6017 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
6018 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
6019 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
6020 Constitution itself.
6021 </para>
6022 <para>
6023 The framers of our Constitution loved <quote>property.</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6024 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6025 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
6026 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6027 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's <quote>Takings
6028 Clause,</quote> to pay you <quote>just compensation</quote> for that taking. The
6029 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6030 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
6031 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6032 </para>
6033 <para>
6034 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6035 Valenti calls <quote>creative property.</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6036 power to create <quote>creative property,</quote> the Constitution
6037 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a <quote>limited time,</quote> Congress
6038 take back the rights that it has granted and set the <quote>creative
6039 property</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6040 the expiration of a copyright term <quote>takes</quote> your copyright and turns it
6041 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6042 pay <quote>just compensation</quote> for this <quote>taking.</quote> Instead, the same
6043 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6045 requires that you lose your <quote>creative property</quote> right without any
6046 compensation at all.
6047 </para>
6048 <para>
6049 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6050 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6051 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6052 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6053 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6054 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6055 itself.
6056 </para>
6057 <para>
6058 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6059 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6060 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6061 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6062 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6063 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
6064 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6065 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6066 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6067 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6068 </para>
6069 <para>
6070 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6071 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6072 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6073 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6074 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6075 domain?
6076 </para>
6077 <para>
6078 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6079 history of these <quote>creative property</quote> rights, and the control that they
6080 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6081 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6082 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
6083 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6084 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6085 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6086 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6087 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6088 also control how culture develops.
6089 </para>
6090 <para>
6091
6092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6093 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6094 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6095 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6096 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6097 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6098 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6099 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6100 </para>
6101 <figure id="fig-1331">
6102 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6103 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6104 </figure>
6105 <para>
6106 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6107 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6108 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6109 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6110 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6111 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6112 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6113 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6114 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6115 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6116 Web, you can be punished
6117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6118 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6119 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6120 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
6121 </para>
6122 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6123 <para>
6124 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6125 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6126 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6127 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6128 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6129 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6130 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6131 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6132 the source of the enforcement.
6133 </para>
6134 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6135 <para>
6136 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6137 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6138 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6139 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6140 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6141 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6142 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6143 individual or group might behave.
6144 </para>
6145 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6146 <para>
6147 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6148 <quote>architecture</quote>&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
6149 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6150 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6151 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6152 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6153 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6154 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6155 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6156 theft, but by nature, by <quote>architecture.</quote> If a 500-pound boulder
6157 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6158 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6159 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6160 </para>
6161 <para>
6162
6163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6164 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6165 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6166 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6167 undermined by another.
6168 </para>
6169 <para>
6170 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6171 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6172 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6173 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6174 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6175 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6176 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6177 </para>
6178 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6179 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6180 </indexterm>
6181 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6182 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6183 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6184 <para>
6185 So, for example, consider the <quote>freedom</quote> to drive a car at a high
6186 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6187 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6188 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6189 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6190 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6191 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6192 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6193 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6194 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6195 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6196 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6197 </para>
6198 <para>
6199 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6200 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6201 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6202 <!-- f3 -->
6203 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6204 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6205 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6206 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6207 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6208 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6209 Lawrence Lessig, <quote>The New Chicago School,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6210 June 1998.
6211 </para></footnote>
6212 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6213 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6214 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6215 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6216 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6217 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6218 used to require that other laws be more
6219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6220 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6221 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6222 driving.
6223 </para>
6224 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6225
6226 <figure id="fig-1361">
6227 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6228 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6229 </figure>
6230 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6231 <para>
6232 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6233 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6234 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6235 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6236 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6237 another.<footnote>
6238 <para>
6239 <!-- f4 -->
6240 Some people object to this way of talking about <quote>liberty.</quote> They object
6241 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6242 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6243 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6244 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6245 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6246 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6247 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6248 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6249 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6250 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6251 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a
6252 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6253 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6254 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6255 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6256 <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6257 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6258 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, <quote>The
6259 Right to Work,</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6260 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6261 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6262 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6263 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6264 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6265 12101 (2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6266 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6267 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6268 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6269 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)</primary></indexterm>
6270 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6271 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6272 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6273 </para></footnote>
6274 </para>
6275 <section id="hollywood">
6276 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6277 <para>
6278 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6279 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6280 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6281 rallying makes sense.
6282 </para>
6283 <para>
6284 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6285 Internet:
6286 </para>
6287 <figure id="fig-1371">
6288 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6289 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6290 </figure>
6291 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6292 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6293 <para>
6294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6295 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6296 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6297 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6298 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6299 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6300 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6301 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6302 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6303 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6304 this form of infringement.
6305 </para>
6306 <para>
6307 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6308 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6309 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6310 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6311 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6312 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6313 </para>
6314 <para>
6315 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6316 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6317 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6318 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6319 Iraq
6320 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6321 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6322 looting that results.
6323 </para>
6324 <figure id="fig-1381">
6325 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6326 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6327 </figure>
6328 <para>
6329 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6330 warriors. Indeed, in a <quote>White Paper</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6331 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6332 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6333 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6334 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6335 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6336 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6337 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6338 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6339 </para>
6340 <para>
6341 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6342 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6343 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6344 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6345 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6346 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6347 life. Homeowners living in a
6348
6349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6350 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6351 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6352 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6353 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6354 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6355 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6356 </para>
6357 <para>
6358 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6359 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6360 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6361 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6362 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6363 Brown describes it, its <quote>architecture of revenue.</quote>
6364 </para>
6365 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry</primary></indexterm>
6366 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
6367 <para>
6368 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6369 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6370 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6371 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6372 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6373 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6374 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6375 <!-- f5 -->
6376 See Geoffrey Smith, <quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?</quote>
6377 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6378 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6379 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6380 R. Schoenberger, <quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?</quote> Forbes.com, 6
6381 October 2003, available at
6382 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6383 </para></footnote>
6384
6385 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6386 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6387 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6388 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6389 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6390 weakened the <quote>stickiness</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6391 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6392 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6393 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6394 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6395 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6396 </para>
6397 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid</primary></indexterm>
6398 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6399 <para>
6400 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6401 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6402 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6404 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6405 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6406 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6407 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, <quote>established companies
6408 have an interest in excluding future competitors.</quote><footnote><para>
6409 <!-- f6 -->
6410 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6411 </para></footnote>
6412 And relative to a
6413 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6414 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6415 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6416 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6417 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6418 Brezhnev.
6419 </para>
6420 <para>
6421 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6422 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6423 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6424 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6425 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6426 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6427 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6428 opportunities for innovation and change.
6429 </para>
6430 <para>
6431 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6432 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6433 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6434 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6435 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6436 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6437 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6438 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: <quote>Congress
6439 shall make no law &hellip; abridging the freedom of speech.</quote> So when
6440 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would <quote>abridge</quote> the freedom
6441 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6442 regulation is justified.
6443 </para>
6444 <para>
6445 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6447 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6448 <quote>justified.</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6449 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6450 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6451 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6452 </para>
6453 <para>
6454 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6455 </para>
6456 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6457 <primary>DDT</primary>
6458 </indexterm>
6459 <para>
6460 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6461 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6462 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6463 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6464 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6465 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6466 </para>
6467 <para>
6468 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6469 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6470 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6471 </para>
6472 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6473 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6474 <para>
6475 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6476 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6477 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6478 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6479 </para>
6480 <para>
6481 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6482 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6483 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6484 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6485 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6486 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6487 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6488 </para>
6489 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James</primary></indexterm>
6490 <para>
6491 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6492 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an <quote>environmentalism</quote> for
6493 culture.<footnote><para>
6494 <!-- f7 -->
6495 See, for example, James Boyle, <quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6496 Environmentalism for the Net?</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6497 </para></footnote>
6498 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6499 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6500 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6501 <quote>for free.</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6502 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6503 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6505 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6506 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6507 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6508 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6509 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6510 </para>
6511 <para>
6512 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6513 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6514 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6515 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6516 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6517 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6518 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6519 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6520 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6521 </para>
6522 <para>
6523 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6524 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6525 be lost.
6526 </para>
6527 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6528 </section>
6529 <section id="beginnings">
6530 <title>Beginnings</title>
6531 <para>
6532 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6533 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of <quote>creative
6534 property</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6535 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6536 </para>
6537 <para>
6538 The power to establish <quote>creative property</quote> rights is granted to
6539 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6540 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6541 </para>
6542 <para>
6543 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6544 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6545 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6546
6547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6548 We can call this the <quote>Progress Clause,</quote> for notice what this clause
6549 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6550 <quote>creative property rights.</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6551 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6552 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6553 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6554 </para>
6555 <para>
6556 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6557 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6558 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6559 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6560 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6561 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6562 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6563 copyrights extend <quote>to Authors</quote> only.
6564 </para>
6565 <para>
6566 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6567 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6568 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6569 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6570 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6571 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6572 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6573 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6574 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6575 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6576 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6577 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6578 concentrations of power.
6579 </para>
6580 <para>
6581 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call <quote>copyright</quote>
6582 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6583 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6584 <quote>copyright</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6585 years since they first struck its design.
6586 </para>
6587 <para>
6588 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6589 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6591 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6592 started here:
6593 </para>
6594 <figure id="fig-1441">
6595 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6596 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6597 </figure>
6598 <para>
6599 We will end here:
6600 </para>
6601 <figure id="fig-1442">
6602 <title><quote>Copyright</quote> today.</title>
6603 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6604 </figure>
6605 <para>
6606 Let me explain how.
6607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6608 </para>
6609 </section>
6610 <section id="lawduration">
6611 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6612 <para>
6613 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6614 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6615 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6616 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6617 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6618 authorship.<footnote>
6619 <para>
6620 <!-- f8 -->
6621 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6622 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6623 485&ndash;86: <quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6624 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6625 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis></quote>
6626 (emphasis added).
6627 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6628 </para></footnote>
6629 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6630 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6631 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6632 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6633 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6634 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6635 </para>
6636 <para>
6637 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6638 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6639 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6640 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6641 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6642 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6643 </para>
6644 <para>
6645 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6646 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6647 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6648 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6649 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6650 </para>
6651 <para>
6652 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6653 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6654 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6655 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6656 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6657 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6658 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6659 <!-- f9 -->
6660 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6661 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6662 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6663 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6664 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6665 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6666 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6667 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6668 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6669 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6670 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6671 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6672 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6673 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6674 </para>
6675 <para>
6676 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6677 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6679 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6680 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6681 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6682 copyright, either.
6683 </para>
6684 <para>
6685 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6686 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6687 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6688 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6689 domain.<footnote><para>
6690 <!-- f10 -->
6691 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6692 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6693 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6694 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, <quote>Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,</quote>
6695 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6696 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6697 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, <quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,</quote>
6698 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6699 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6700 </para>
6701 <para>
6702 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6703 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6704 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6705 <!-- f11 -->
6706 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6707 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6708 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6709 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6710 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6711 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6712 </para>
6713 <para>
6714 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6715 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6716 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6717 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6718 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6719 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6720 </para>
6721 <para>
6722 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6723 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6724 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6725 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6726 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6727 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6728 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6729 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6730 </para>
6731 <para>
6732 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6733 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6734 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6735 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6736
6737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6738 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6739 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6740 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6741 </para>
6742 <para>
6743 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6744 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6745 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6746 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6747 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6748 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6749 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6750 value.
6751 </para>
6752 <para>
6753 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6754 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6755 maximum term. For <quote>natural</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6756 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6757 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6758 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6759 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6760 was ninety-five years.
6761 </para>
6762 <para>
6763 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6764 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6765 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6766 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6767 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6768 that terms be <quote>limited,</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6769 them.
6770 </para>
6771 <para>
6772 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6773 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6774 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6775 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6776 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6777 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6778 years.<footnote><para>
6779 <!-- f12 -->
6780 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6781 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6782 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6783 Posner, <quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,</quote> loc. cit.
6784 </para></footnote>
6785 </para>
6786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6787 </section>
6788 <section id="lawscope">
6789 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6790 <para>
6791 The <quote>scope</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6792 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6793 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6794 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6795 </para>
6796 <para>
6797 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only <quote>maps,
6798 charts, and books.</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6799 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6800 the author the exclusive right to <quote>publish</quote> copyrighted works. That
6801 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6802 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6803 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6804 did not extend to what lawyers call <quote>derivative works.</quote> It would not,
6805 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6806 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6807 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6808 </para>
6809 <para>
6810 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6811 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6812 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6813 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6814 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6815 work not only the exclusive right to <quote>publish</quote> the work, but also the
6816 exclusive right of control over any <quote>copies</quote> of that work. And most
6817 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6818 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6819 <quote>derivative work</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6820 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6821 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6822 on the initial creative work.
6823 </para>
6824 <para>
6825 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6826 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6827 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6829 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6830 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6831 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6832 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6833 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6834 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6835 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6836 secured.
6837 </para>
6838 <para>
6839 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6840 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6841 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6842 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6843 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6844 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6845 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6846 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6847 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6848 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6849 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6850 original author.
6851 </para>
6852 <para>
6853 All of these <quote>formalities</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6854 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6855 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6856 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6857 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6858 copy available for others to copy.
6859 </para>
6860 <para>
6861 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6862 differences.
6863 </para>
6864 <para>
6865 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6866 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6867 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6868 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6869 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6870 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6871 <!-- f13 -->
6872 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, <quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6873 Creation of American Literature,</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6874 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6875 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6876
6877 </para></footnote>
6878 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6879 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6880 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6881 </para>
6882 <para>
6883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6884 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6885 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6886 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6887 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6888 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6889 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6890 were restrained.
6891 </para>
6892 <para>
6893 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6894 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6895 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6896 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6897 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6898 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6899 protect it.
6900 </para>
6901 <para>
6902 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6903 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6904 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6905 </para>
6906 <para>
6907 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6908 control
6909 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6910 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of <quote>derivative
6911 rights.</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6912 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6913 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6914 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6915 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6916 exclusive
6917 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6918 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6919 </para>
6920 <para>
6921 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6922 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6923 expansion
6924 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6925 copyright.
6926 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6927 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6928 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6929 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6930 </para>
6931 <para>
6932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6933 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6934 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6935 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6936 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6937 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6938 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6939 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6940 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6941 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6942 <!-- f14 -->
6943 Jonathan Zittrain, <quote>The Copyright Cage,</quote> <citetitle>Legal
6944 Affairs</citetitle>, July/August 2003, available at
6945 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6946 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6947 </para></footnote>
6948 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6949 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6950 the wrong of direct piracy.
6951 </para>
6952 <para>
6953 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6954 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6955 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6956 of my book.<footnote><para>
6957 <!-- f15 -->
6958 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6959 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6960 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere <quote>copies</quote> and
6961 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, <quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
6962 Copyright's Constitutionality,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
6963 Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially
6964 pp. 53&ndash;59).
6965 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb</primary></indexterm>
6966 </para></footnote>
6967 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6968 </para>
6969 <para>
6970 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6971 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6972 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6973 called <quote>Mickey Mouse,</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6974 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6975 created?
6976 </para>
6977 <para>
6978 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6979 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6980 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6981 the rights originally granted.
6982 </para>
6983 </section>
6984 <section id="lawreach">
6985 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6986 <para>
6987 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6988 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6989 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6990 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6991 <!-- f16 -->
6992 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6993 certainly regulates more than <quote>copies</quote>&mdash;a public performance of a
6994 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6995 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6996 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a <quote>copy</quote>; 17
6997 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
6998 existing law (which regulates <quote>copies;</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6999 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7000 </para></footnote>
7001 </para>
7002 <para>
7003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7004 <quote>Copies.</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
7005 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
7006 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that <quote>creative
7007 property</quote> deserves the <quote>same rights</quote> as all other property, it is the
7008 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7009 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7010 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7011 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7012 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7013 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
7014 the trigger for copyright law.
7015 </para>
7016 <para>
7017 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7018 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7019 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7020 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
7021 <!-- f17 -->
7022 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7023 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7024 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7025 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7026 technology.
7027 </para></footnote>
7028 because it is clear that the
7029 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7030 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7031 </para>
7032 <para>
7033 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7034 empty circle.
7035 </para>
7036 <figure id="fig-1521">
7037 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
7038 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
7039 </figure>
7040 <para>
7041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7042 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7043 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7044 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7045 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7046 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7047 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7048 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7049 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7050 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7051 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7052 acts do not make a copy.
7053 </para>
7054 <figure id="fig-1531">
7055 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
7056 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
7057 </figure>
7058 <para>
7059 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7060 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7061 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7062 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7063 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7064 diagram on next page).
7065 </para>
7066 <para>
7067 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7068 that remain unregulated because the law considers these <quote>fair uses.</quote>
7069 </para>
7070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7071 <figure id="fig-1541">
7072 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7073 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7074 </figure>
7075 <para>
7076 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7077 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7078 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7079 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7080 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7081 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7082 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such <quote>fair uses</quote>
7083 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7084 </para>
7085 <figure id="fig-1542">
7086 <title>Unregulated copying considered <quote>fair uses.</quote></title>
7087 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7088 </figure>
7089 <para> </para>
7090 <figure id="fig-1551">
7091 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7092 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7093 </figure>
7094 <para>
7095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7096 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7097 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7098 are nonetheless deemed <quote>fair</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7099 </para>
7100 <para>
7101 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7102 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7103 <!-- f18 -->
7104 I don't mean <quote>nature</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7105 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7106 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7107 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7108 of copies remain.
7109 </para></footnote>
7110 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7111 digital network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses
7112 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7113 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7114 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7115 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7116 a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into category 2. And those who
7117 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7118 exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7119 shift.
7120 </para>
7121 <para>
7122 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7123 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7124 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
7125 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7126 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7127 the book once, ten times, or every
7128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7129 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7130 use&mdash;reading&mdash; could be regulated by copyright law because
7131 none of those uses produced a copy.
7132 </para>
7133 <para>
7134 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7135 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7136 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
7137 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7138 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7139 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7140 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7141 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7142 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7143 copyright owner's wish.
7144 </para>
7145 <para>
7146 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7147 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7148 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7149 points also become clear:
7150 </para>
7151 <para>
7152 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7153 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7154 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7155 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7156 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7157 part of free culture before the Internet.
7158 </para>
7159 <para>
7160 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7161 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7162 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7163 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7164 using a machine. <quote>Copy and paste</quote> and <quote>cut and paste</quote> become
7165 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7166 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7167 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7168 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7169 creative work.
7170 </para>
7171 <para>
7172 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7173
7174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7175 burden on category 3 (<quote>fair use</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7176 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7177 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7178 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7179 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7180 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7181 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7182 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7183 regulated.
7184 </para>
7185 <para>
7186 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7187 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7188 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7189 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7190 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7191 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7192 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7193 enough.
7194 </para>
7195 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'>
7196 <primary>advertising</primary>
7197 </indexterm>
7198 <para>
7199 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7200 in the business of making <quote>trailer</quote> advertisements for movies available
7201 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7202 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7203 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7204 </para>
7205 <para>
7206 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began
7207 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7208 previews. The idea was to expand their <quote>selling by sampling</quote>
7209 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7210 <quote>browsing.</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7211 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7212 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7213 </para>
7214 <para>
7215 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7216 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7217 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7218 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7220 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7221 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7222 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7223 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7224 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7225 <quote>fair use</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7226 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7227 their rights.
7228 </para>
7229 <para>
7230 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7231 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had <quote>willfully
7232 infringed</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7233 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7234 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7235 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7236 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7237 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7238 </para>
7239 <para>
7240 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7241 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7242 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7243 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7244 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7245 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7246 Disney's permission.
7247 </para>
7248 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'/>
7249 <para>
7250 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7251 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7252 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7253 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7254 was in the marketplace, the <quote>first-sale doctrine</quote> would free the
7255 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7256 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7257 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7258 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7259 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7260 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7261 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7262 </para>
7263 <indexterm><primary>Barnes &amp; Noble</primary></indexterm>
7264 <para>
7265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7266 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7267 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7268 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7269 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7270 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7271 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7272 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7273 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7274 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7275 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7276 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7277 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7278 happening are quite slight.
7279 </para>
7280 <para>
7281 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7282 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7283 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7284 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7285 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7286 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7287 </para>
7288 </section>
7289 <section id="lawforce">
7290 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7291 <para>
7292 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7293 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7294 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7295 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7296 </para>
7297 <para>
7298 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7299 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7300 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7301 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7302 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7303 your freedom.
7304 </para>
7305 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7306 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7307 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7308 </indexterm>
7309 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7310 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7311 </indexterm>
7312 <para>
7313 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7314 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7316 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7317 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7318 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7319 plan.<footnote><para>
7320 <!-- f19 -->
7321 See David Lange, <quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7322 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7323 </para></footnote>
7324 </para>
7325 <para>
7326 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7327 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers <quote>were brothers long before
7328 you were.</quote><footnote><para>
7329 <!-- f20 -->
7330 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7331 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7332 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7333 </para></footnote>
7334 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7335 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7336 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7337 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7338 </para>
7339 <para>
7340 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7341 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7342 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7343 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7344 </para>
7345 <para>
7346 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7347 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7348 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7349 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7350 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7351 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7352 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7353 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7354 </para>
7355 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7356 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7357
7358 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7359 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7360 </indexterm>
7361 <para>
7362 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7363 </para>
7364 <para>
7365 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7366 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7367 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7368 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7369 technology.
7370 </para>
7371 <para>
7372 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7373 Reader.
7374 </para>
7375 <para>
7376 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7377 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7378 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7379 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7380 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7381 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7382 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7383 copy of
7384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7385 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7386 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7387 </para>
7388 <figure id="fig-1611">
7389 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7390 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7391 </figure>
7392 <para>
7393 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7394 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7395 </para>
7396 <figure id="fig-1612">
7397 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7398 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7399 </figure>
7400 <para>
7401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7402 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7403 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7404 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7405 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7406 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7407 read aloud through the computer.
7408 </para>
7409 <para>
7410 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7411 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7412 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7413 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7414 </para>
7415 <figure id="fig-1621">
7416 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s <quote>Politics</quote></title>
7417 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7418 </figure>
7419 <para>
7420 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7421 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7422 the book.
7423 </para>
7424 <figure id="fig-1622">
7425 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s <quote>Politics</quote>.</title>
7426 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7427 </figure>
7428 <para>
7429 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7430 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7431 Ideas</citetitle>:
7432 </para>
7433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7434 <figure id="fig-1631">
7435 <title>List of the permissions for <quote>The Future of Ideas</quote>.</title>
7436 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7437 </figure>
7438 <para>
7439 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7440 </para>
7441 <para>
7442 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7443 <quote>permissions</quote>&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7444 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7445 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7446 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7447 power.<footnote><para>
7448 <!-- f21 -->
7449 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7450 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7451 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7452 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7453 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7454 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7455 subsequently acquired the book.
7456 </para></footnote>
7457 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7458 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7459 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7460 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7461 control that the law would enable.
7462 </para>
7463 <para>
7464 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7465 within which the e-book <quote>lives.</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7466 permissions, they are not the sort of <quote>permissions</quote> that most of us
7467 deal with. When a teenager gets <quote>permission</quote> to stay out till
7468 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7469 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7470 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7471 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7472 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7473 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7474 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7475 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7476 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7477 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7478 won't read aloud.
7479 </para>
7480 <para>
7481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7482 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7483 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7484 you tried to type <quote>Warner Brothers,</quote> erased <quote>Brothers</quote> from the
7485 sentence.
7486 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7487 </para>
7488 <para>
7489 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7490 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7491 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7492 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7493 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7494 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7495 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7496 </para>
7497 <para>
7498 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7499 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7500 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7501 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7502 to defeat these protections as well?
7503 </para>
7504 <para>
7505 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7506 eBook Reader.
7507 </para>
7508 <para>
7509 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7510 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7511 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7512 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7513 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7514 following report:
7515 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7516 </para>
7517 <figure id="fig-1641">
7518 <title>List of the permissions for <quote>Alice's Adventures in
7519 Wonderland</quote>.</title>
7520 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7521 </figure>
7522 <beginpage pagenum="164"/>
7523 <para>
7524 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7525 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7526 <quote>permissions</quote> indicated, not allowed to <quote>read aloud</quote>!
7527 </para>
7528 <para>
7529 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7530 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7531 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7532 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7533 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7534 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7535 </para>
7536 <para>
7537 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7538 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7539 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7540 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7541 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7542 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7543 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7544 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7545 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7546 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7547 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7548 </para>
7549 <para>
7550 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7551 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7552 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7553 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7554 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7555 often crazy.
7556 </para>
7557 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7558 <para>
7559 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7560 story of mine that makes the same point.
7561 </para>
7562 <indexterm id="idxaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7563 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7564 </indexterm>
7565 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'>
7566 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7567 </indexterm>
7568 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7569 <primary>Sony</primary>
7570 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7571 </indexterm>
7572 <para>
7573 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named <quote>Aibo.</quote> The Aibo
7574 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7575 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7576 </para>
7577 <para>
7578 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7579 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7580 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7581 <beginpage pagenum="165"/>
7582 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7583 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7584 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7585 </para>
7586 <para>
7587 <quote>Teach</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7588 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7589 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7590 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7591 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7592 their computer <quote>dog</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7593 </para>
7594 <para>
7595 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7596 <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7597 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7598 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7599 them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much more positive
7600 term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7601 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7602 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7603 old computer doesn't run, or <quote>drive,</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7604 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7605 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7606 you just bought.
7607 </para>
7608 <para>
7609 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7610 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7611 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7612 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7613 ethically.
7614 </para>
7615 <para>
7616 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7617 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7618 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7619 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7620 than Sony had built.
7621 </para>
7622 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7623 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'/>
7624 <indexterm startref="idxaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7625 <para>
7626 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7627 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7628 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7629 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7630 the
7631
7632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7633 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7634 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7635 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7636 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7637 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7638 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7639 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7640 </para>
7641 <para>
7642 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7643 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7644 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7645 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7646 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7647 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7648 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7649 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7650 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7651 </para>
7652 <para>
7653 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7654 <!-- f22 -->
7655 See Pamela Samuelson, <quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,</quote>
7656 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, <quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7657 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7658 January 2002; <quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7659 DMCA,</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7660 Holland, <quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,</quote> <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7661 May 2001; Janelle Brown, <quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?</quote> Salon.com,
7662 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, <quote>Frequently Asked
7663 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case,</quote> available at
7664 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7665 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7666 </para></footnote>
7667 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7668 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7669 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7670 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7671 </para>
7672 <para>
7673 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7674 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7675 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7676 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7677 <quote>this music cannot be copied,</quote> and have a computer respect that
7678 command. The technology was to be part of a <quote>trusted system</quote> of
7679 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7680 Internet much more.
7681 </para>
7682 <para>
7683 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7684 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7685 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7686 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7687 </para>
7688 <para>
7689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7690 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7691 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7692 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7693 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7694 </para>
7695 <para>
7696 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7697 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7698 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7699 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7700 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7701 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7702 </para>
7703 <para>
7704 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7705 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7706 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7707 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7708 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7709 constituted, succeed.
7710 </para>
7711 <indexterm id="idxaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7712 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7713 </indexterm>
7714 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'>
7715 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7716 </indexterm>
7717 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7718 <primary>Sony</primary>
7719 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7720 </indexterm>
7721 <para>
7722 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7723 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7724 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7725 wrote:
7726 </para>
7727 <blockquote>
7728 <para>
7729 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7730 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7731 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7732 </para>
7733 </blockquote>
7734 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7735 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'/>
7736 <indexterm startref="idxaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7737 <para>
7738 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7739 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7740 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7741 </para>
7742 <blockquote>
7743 <para>
7744 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7746 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7747 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7748 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (<quote>DMCA</quote>).
7749 </para>
7750 </blockquote>
7751 <para>
7752 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7753 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7754 spreading such information an offense.
7755 </para>
7756 <para>
7757 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7758 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7759 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7760 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7761 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7762 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7763 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7764 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7765 protection for copyright owners.
7766 </para>
7767 <para>
7768 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7769 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7770 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7771 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7772 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7773 </para>
7774 <para>
7775 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7776 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7777 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7778 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7779 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7780 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7781 have been a copyright violation.
7782 </para>
7783 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7784 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7785 <indexterm>
7786 <primary>Sony</primary>
7787 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7788 </indexterm>
7789 <para>
7790 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7791 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7792 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7793 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7794 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7795 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7796 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7798 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7799 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7800 </para>
7801 <para>
7802 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7803 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7804 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7805 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7806 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7807 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7808 </para>
7809 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7810 <para>
7811 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7812 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7813 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7814 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7815 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7816 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka <quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>,</quote>
7817 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7818 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7819 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7820 </para>
7821 <blockquote>
7822 <para>
7823 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7824 <quote>Neighborhood</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7825 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7826 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7827 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7828 <quote>Neighborhood</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the <quote>Neighborhood</quote>
7829 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7830 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7831 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7832 broadcasting has always been <quote>You are an important person just the way
7833 you are. You can make healthy decisions.</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7834 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7835 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7836 important.<footnote><para>
7837 <!-- f23 -->
7838 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7839 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7840 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7841 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7842 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7843 </para></footnote>
7844 </para>
7845 </blockquote>
7846 <para>
7847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7848 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7849 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7850 the VCR responsible.
7851 </para>
7852 <para>
7853 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7854 the DMCA.
7855 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7856 </para>
7857 <para>
7858 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7859 </para>
7860 <para>
7861 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7862 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7863 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7864 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7865 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7866 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7867 </para>
7868 <para>
7869 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7871 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7872 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7873 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7874 and bad uses.
7875 </para>
7876 <figure id="fig-1711">
7877 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7878 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7879 </figure>
7880 <para>
7881 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7882 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7883 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7884 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7885 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7886 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7887 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7888 </para>
7889 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7890 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7891 <indexterm>
7892 <primary>Sony</primary>
7893 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7894 </indexterm>
7895 <para>
7896 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7897 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7898 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7899 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7900 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7901 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7902 </para>
7903 <para>
7904 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7905 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7906 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7907 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7908 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7909 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7910 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7911 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7912 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7913 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7914 </para>
7915 <para>
7916 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7917 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7918 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7919 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7920 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7921 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7922 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7923 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7924 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7925 </para>
7926 <para>
7927
7928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7929 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7930 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7931 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7932 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7933 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7934 <!-- f24 -->
7935 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, <quote>Legal Fictions,
7936 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7937 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7938 </para></footnote>
7939 </para>
7940 <para>
7941 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7942 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7943 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7944 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7945 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7946 </para>
7947 <para>
7948 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7949 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7950 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7951 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7952 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7953 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7954 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7955 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7956 </para>
7957 <para>
7958 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7959 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7960 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7961 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7962 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7963 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7964 </para>
7965 </section>
7966 <section id="marketconcentration">
7967 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7968 <para>
7969 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7970 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7971 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7972 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7973 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7974 find better ways
7975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7976 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7977 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7978 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7979 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7980 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7981 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7982 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7983 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7984 control.
7985 </para>
7986 <para>
7987 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7988 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7989 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7990 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7991 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7992 </para>
7993 <para>
7994 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7995 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7996 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7997 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7998 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7999 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8000 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8001 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8002 of the media.
8003 </para>
8004 <para>
8005 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8006 nature.
8007 </para>
8008 <para>
8009 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8010 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8011 ownership, <quote>five companies control 85 percent of our media sources.</quote><footnote><para>
8012 <!-- f25 -->
8013 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8014 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
8015 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
8016 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8017 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
8018 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
8019 <!-- f26 -->
8020 Lynette Holloway, <quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8021 Slide,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
8022 </para></footnote>
8023 The <quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8024 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.</quote><footnote><para>
8025 <!-- f27 -->
8026 Molly Ivins, <quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
8027 31 May 2003.
8028 </para></footnote>
8029 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
8030 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
8031 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
8032 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
8033 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group</primary></indexterm>
8034 </para>
8035 <para>
8036 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8037 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8039 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
8040 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8041 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
8042 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
8043 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
8044 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8045 </para>
8046 <para>
8047 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8048 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8049 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8050 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8051 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
8052 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
8053 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8054 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8055 protected&mdash; by the market.
8056 </para>
8057 <para>
8058 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8059 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8060 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8061 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
8062 </para>
8063 <blockquote>
8064 <para>
8065 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8066 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
8067 &hellip; Fox TV shows &hellip; Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8068 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8069 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8070 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8071 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8072 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8073 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8074 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
8075 <!-- f28 -->
8076 James Fallows, <quote>The Age of Murdoch,</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
8077 2003): 89.
8078 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
8079 </para></footnote>
8080 </para>
8081 </blockquote>
8082 <para>
8083 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8084 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8085 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8086 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8087 </para>
8088 <figure id="fig-1761">
8089 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
8090 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
8091 </figure>
8092 <para>
8093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8094 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8095 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8096 distribute content?
8097 </para>
8098 <para>
8099 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8100 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8101 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8102 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8103 </para>
8104 <para>
8105 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8106 integration may matter.
8107 </para>
8108 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8109 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8110 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8111 <para>
8112 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
8113 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8114 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8115 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8116 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8117 </para>
8118 <para>
8119 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8120 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8121 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8122 control.<footnote><para>
8123 <!-- f29 -->
8124 Leonard Hill, <quote>The Axis of Access,</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8125 Forum, <quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,</quote> St. Louis,
8126 Missouri, 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8127 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8128 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8129 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8130 </para></footnote>
8131 </para>
8132 <para>
8133
8134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8135 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8136 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8137 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8138 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
8139 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8140 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was <quote>independent</quote> of the
8141 networks.
8142 </para>
8143 <para>
8144 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8145 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
8146 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8147 2002, only five independent television studios remained. <quote>In 1992,
8148 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8149 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8150 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent.</quote> <quote>In 1992, 16
8151 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8152 year there was one.</quote><footnote><para>
8153 <!-- f30 -->
8154 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8155 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
8156 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8157 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8158 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8159 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8160 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
8161 2003.
8162 </para></footnote>
8163 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8164 that ran it. <quote>In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
8165 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8166 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8167 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8168 63%.</quote><footnote><para>
8169 <!-- f31 -->
8170 Ibid.
8171 </para></footnote>
8172 </para>
8173 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8174 <para>
8175 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
8176 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8177 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8178 owned by the network.
8179 </para>
8180 <para>
8181 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8182 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8183 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8184 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
8185 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
8186 </para>
8187 <blockquote>
8188 <para>
8189 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8190 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8191 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8192 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8194 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8195 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8196 handful.<footnote><para>
8197 <!-- f32 -->
8198 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
8199 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8200 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8201 </para></footnote>
8202 </para>
8203 </blockquote>
8204 <para>
8205 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8206 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8207 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8208 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8209 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8210 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8211 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8212 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8213 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8214 democracy.
8215 </para>
8216 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8217 <para>
8218 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8219 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the <quote>Innovator's
8220 Dilemma</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8221 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8222 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8223 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8224 <!-- f33 -->
8225 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8226 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8227 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8228 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8229 Kim B. Clark, <quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8230 Concepts in Technological Evolution,</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8231 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8232 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8233 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8234 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8235
8236 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8237 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8238 sprinting.
8239 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8240 </para>
8241 <para>
8242 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8243 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8244 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8245 measure.
8246 </para>
8247 <para>
8248 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8249 suggest the concern.
8250 </para>
8251 <para>
8252 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8253 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8254 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8255 </para>
8256 <para>
8257 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8258 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8259 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8260
8261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8262 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8263 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8264 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8265 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8266 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8267 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8268 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8269 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8270 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8271 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8272 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8273 outweigh these costs.
8274 </para>
8275 <para>
8276 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8277 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8278 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8279 these issues.
8280 </para>
8281 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'>
8282 <primary>advertising</primary>
8283 </indexterm>
8284 <para>
8285 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8286 a media campaign as part of the <quote>war on drugs.</quote> The campaign produced
8287 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8288 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8289 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8290 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8291 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8292 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8293 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8294 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8295 </para>
8296 <para>
8297 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8298 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8299 </para>
8300 <para>
8301 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8302 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8303 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8304 war. Can you do it?
8305 </para>
8306 <para>
8307 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8309 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8310 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8311 message will be heard then?
8312 </para>
8313 <para>
8314 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8315 <quote>controversial</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8316 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8317 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8318 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8319 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8320 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8321 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8322 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8323 <!-- f34 -->
8324 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8325 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8326 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as <quote>against
8327 [their] policy.</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8328 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8329 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8330 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8331 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8332 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, <quote>On the Issue of
8333 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,</quote> <citetitle>New
8334 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8335 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8336 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, <quote>Ad
8337 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8338 Radio,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8339 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8340 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8341 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8342 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8343 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8344 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, <quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8345 After Muni Rejects Ad,</quote> SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8346 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8347 was that the criticism was <quote>too controversial.</quote>
8348 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8349 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8350 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8351 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8352 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8353 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8354 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
8355 </para></footnote>
8356 </para>
8357 <para>
8358 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8359 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8360 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8361 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8362 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8363 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8364 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8365 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8366 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8367 </para>
8368 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'/>
8369 </section>
8370 <section id="together">
8371 <title>Together</title>
8372 <para>
8373 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8374 copyright warriors that the government should <quote>protect my property.</quote>
8375 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8376 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8377 </para>
8378 <para>
8379 But when we see how dramatically this <quote>property</quote> has changed&mdash;
8380 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8381 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8382 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8383 to seem
8384
8385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8386 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8387 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8388 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8389 the massively expanded <quote>property</quote> rights granted by copyright
8390 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8391 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8392 be redefined.
8393 </para>
8394 <para>
8395 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8396 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8397 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8398 our culture today.
8399 </para>
8400 <para>
8401 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8402 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8403 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8404 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8405 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8406 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8407 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8408 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8409 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8410 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8411 </para>
8412 <para>
8413 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8414 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8415 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8416 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8417 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8418 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8419 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8420 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8421 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8422 in control that technology and the market enable.
8423 </para>
8424 <para>
8425 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8426 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8428 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8429 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8430 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8431 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8432 </para>
8433 <para>
8434 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8435 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8436 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8437 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8438 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8439 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8440 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8441 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8442 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8443 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8444 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8445 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8446 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8447 known.<footnote><para>
8448 <!-- f35 -->
8449 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his <quote>four surrenders</quote> of
8450 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8451 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8452 </para></footnote>
8453 </para>
8454 <para>
8455 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8456 </para>
8457 <para>
8458 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8459 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8460 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8461 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8462 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8463 </para>
8464
8465 <informaltable id="t2">
8466 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8467 <thead>
8468 <row>
8469 <entry></entry>
8470 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8471 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8472 </row>
8473 </thead>
8474 <tbody>
8475 <row>
8476 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8477 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8478 <entry>Free</entry>
8479 </row>
8480 <row>
8481 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8482 <entry>Free</entry>
8483 <entry>Free</entry>
8484 </row>
8485 </tbody>
8486 </tgroup>
8487 </informaltable>
8488
8489 <para>
8490 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8491 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8492 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8493
8494 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8495 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8496 noncommercial work was also free.
8497 </para>
8498 <para>
8499 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8500 </para>
8501
8502 <informaltable id="t3">
8503 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8504 <thead>
8505 <row>
8506 <entry></entry>
8507 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8508 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8509 </row>
8510 </thead>
8511 <tbody>
8512 <row>
8513 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8514 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8515 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8516 </row>
8517 <row>
8518 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8519 <entry>Free</entry>
8520 <entry>Free</entry>
8521 </row>
8522 </tbody>
8523 </tgroup>
8524 </informaltable>
8525
8526 <para>
8527 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8528 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8529 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8530 transformation were still essentially free.
8531 </para>
8532 <para>
8533 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8534 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8535 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8536 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8537 we could say the law began to look like this:
8538 </para>
8539
8540 <informaltable id="t4">
8541 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8542 <thead>
8543 <row>
8544 <entry></entry>
8545 <entry>COPY</entry>
8546 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8547 </row>
8548 </thead>
8549 <tbody>
8550 <row>
8551 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8552 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8553 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8554 </row>
8555 <row>
8556 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8557 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8558 <entry>Free</entry>
8559 </row>
8560 </tbody>
8561 </tgroup>
8562 </informaltable>
8563
8564 <para>
8565 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8566 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8567 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8568 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8569 that the law now looks like this:
8570 </para>
8571
8572 <informaltable id="t5">
8573 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8574 <thead>
8575 <row>
8576 <entry></entry>
8577 <entry>COPY</entry>
8578 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8579 </row>
8580 </thead>
8581 <tbody>
8582 <row>
8583 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8584 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8585 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8586 </row>
8587 <row>
8588 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8589 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8590 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8591 </row>
8592 </tbody>
8593 </tgroup>
8594 </informaltable>
8595
8596 <para>
8597 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8598 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8599 creativity&mdash;
8600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8601 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8602 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8603 </para>
8604 <para>
8605 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8606 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8607 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8608 these domains actually does any good.
8609 </para>
8610 <para>
8611 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8612 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8613 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8614 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8615 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8616 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8617 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8618 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8619 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8620 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8621 </para>
8622 <para>
8623 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8624 course copyright is a kind of <quote>property,</quote> and of course, as with any
8625 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8626 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8627 property rights<footnote><para>
8628 <!-- f36 -->
8629 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8630 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8631 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, <quote>The
8632 Disintegration of Property,</quote> in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8633 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8634 Press, 1980).
8635 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement</primary></indexterm>
8636 </para></footnote>)
8637 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8638 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8639 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8640 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the <quote>copyright</quote>
8641 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8642 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8643 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8644 vibrant and rich free culture.
8645 </para>
8646 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital</primary></indexterm>
8647 <para>
8648 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8649 limits on the scope of the interests protected by <quote>property.</quote> The very
8650 birth of <quote>copyright</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8651 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8652 story of chapter 6). The tradition of <quote>fair use</quote> is animated by a
8653 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8654 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8655 chapter 7). Adding
8656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8657 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8658 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8659 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8660 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8661 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8662 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8663 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8664 dominates the debate today.
8665 </para>
8666 <para>
8667 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8668 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8669 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8670 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8671 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8672 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8673 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8674 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8675 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8676 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8677 lawyer.
8678 </para>
8679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8680 </section>
8681 </chapter>
8682 </part>
8683 <part id="c-puzzles">
8684 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8685
8686 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8687 <chapter label="11" id="chimera">
8688 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8689 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8690 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8691 </indexterm>
8692 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8693 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8694 </indexterm>
8695 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8696 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The</quote> (Wells)</primary>
8697 </indexterm>
8698
8699 <para>
8700 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8701 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8702 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8703 <!-- f1. -->
8704 H. G. Wells, <quote>The Country of the Blind</quote> (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8705 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8706 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8707 </para></footnote>
8708 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with <quote>sweet water, pasture,
8709 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8710 that bore an excellent fruit.</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8711 takes this as an opportunity. <quote>In the Country of the Blind,</quote> he tells
8712 himself, <quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8713 villagers to explore life as a king.
8714 </para>
8715 <para>
8716 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8717 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8718 <quote>blind.</quote> They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8719 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8720 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8721 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. <quote>`You
8722 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8723 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8724 alone!'</quote>
8725 </para>
8726 <para>
8727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8728 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8729 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8730 affection, a young woman who to him seems <quote>the most beautiful thing in
8731 the whole of creation,</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8732 description of what he sees <quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8733 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8734 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8735 indulgence.</quote> <quote>She did not believe,</quote> Wells tells us, and <quote>she could
8736 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.</quote>
8737 </para>
8738 <para>
8739 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his <quote>mysteriously delighted</quote>
8740 love, the father and the village object. <quote>You see, my dear,</quote> her
8741 father instructs, <quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8742 anything right.</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8743 </para>
8744 <para>
8745 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. <quote>His brain
8746 is affected,</quote> he reports.
8747 </para>
8748 <para>
8749 <quote>What affects it?</quote> the father asks. <quote>Those queer things that are
8750 called the eyes &hellip; are diseased &hellip; in such a way as to affect
8751 his brain.</quote>
8752 </para>
8753 <para>
8754 The doctor continues: <quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8755 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8756 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8757 irritant bodies [the eyes].</quote>
8758 </para>
8759 <para>
8760 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8761 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8762 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8763 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8764 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8765 womb. That fusion produces a <quote>chimera.</quote> A chimera is a single creature
8766 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8767 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8768
8769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8770 plot for murder mysteries. <quote>But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8771 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8772 scene. &hellip;</quote>
8773 </para>
8774 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8775 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8776 <para>
8777 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8778 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8779 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8780 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8781 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8782 understanding of a <quote>person</quote> should reflect this reality.
8783 </para>
8784 <para>
8785 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8786 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8787 unfairly enough, <quote>the copyright wars,</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8788 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question <quote>What is
8789 p2p file sharing?</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8790 wrong. One side says, <quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8791 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8792 thirty years without any question at all.</quote> That's true, at least in
8793 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8794 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8795 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8796 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8797 </para>
8798 <para>
8799 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8800 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8801 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8802 <quote>friends</quote> beyond recognition to say <quote>my ten thousand best friends</quote> can
8803 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8804 what <quote>we have always been allowed to do,</quote> we have not always been
8805 allowed to share music with <quote>our ten thousand best friends.</quote>
8806 </para>
8807 <para>
8808 Likewise, when the other side says, <quote>File sharing is just like walking
8809 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8810 with it,</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8811 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8812 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8813 from Tower.
8814 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8815 </para>
8816 <para>
8817
8818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8819 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8820 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8821 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8822 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8823 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8824 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8825 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8826 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8827 </para>
8828 <para>
8829 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8830 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8831 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8832 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8833 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8834 </para>
8835 <para>
8836 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8837 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8838 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8839 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8840 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8841 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8842 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8843 implemented.<footnote><para>
8844 <!-- f2. -->
8845 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8846 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8847 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> 27 June 2003,
8848 available at
8849 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8850 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8851 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8852 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8853 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, <quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8854 Stakes on Piracy,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8855 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8856 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8857 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8858 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8859 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8860 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8861 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8862 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8863 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8864 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8865 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8866 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8867 Elizabeth Young, <quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,</quote> redandblack.com,
8868 August 2003, available at
8869 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8870 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8871 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8872 identities, see James Collins, <quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8873 Name Students,</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8874 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8875 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.</primary></indexterm>
8876 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8877 </para></footnote>
8878
8879 </para>
8880 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8881 <para>
8882 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8883 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8884 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8885 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8886 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8887 </para>
8888 <para>
8889 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8890 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8891 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8892 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8893 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8894 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8895 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8896 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8897 </para>
8898 <para>
8899
8900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8901 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8902 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8903 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8904 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8905 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8906 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8907 </para>
8908 <para>
8909 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to <quote>steal</quote> music. My
8910 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8911 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8912 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8913 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8914 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8915 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8916 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8917 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8918 protection for copyrighted material,
8919 </para>
8920 <blockquote>
8921 <para>
8922 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8923 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8924 </para>
8925 <para>
8926 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8927 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8928 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8929 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8930 produce a totally different industry model.
8931 </para>
8932 <para>
8933 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8934 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8935 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8936 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8937 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8938 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8939 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8940 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8941 interests.<footnote><para>
8942 <!-- f3. -->
8943 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8944 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8945 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8946 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
8947 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8948 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8949 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
8950 </para>
8951 </blockquote>
8952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8953 <para>
8954 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8955 one of <quote>the major labels.</quote> Its position on these matters has now
8956 changed.
8957 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
8958 </para>
8959 <para>
8960 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8961 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8962 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8963 </para>
8964
8965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8966 </chapter>
8967 <chapter label="12" id="harms">
8968 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8969 <para>
8970 To fight <quote>piracy,</quote> to protect <quote>property,</quote> the content industry has
8971 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8972 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8973 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8974 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8975 </para>
8976 <para>
8977 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8978 particular, the consequences for <quote>free culture.</quote> But my aim now is to
8979 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8980 justified?
8981 </para>
8982 <para>
8983 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8984 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8985 power of the property called <quote>intellectual property</quote> is at its greatest in
8986 our history.
8987 </para>
8988 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8989 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8990 <para>
8991 Yet <quote>common sense</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8992 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8993 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8994 rejection of <quote>piracy</quote> still has play.
8995 </para>
8996 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary></indexterm>
8997 <para>
8998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8999 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9000 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9001 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9002 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9003 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9004 </para>
9005 <section id="constrain">
9006 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
9007 <para>
9008 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9009 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9010 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9011 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9012 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9013 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9014 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9015 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9016 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9017 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9018 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9019 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
9020 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9021 </para>
9022 <para>
9023 This digital <quote>capturing and sharing</quote> is in part an extension of the
9024 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9025 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9026 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9027 of digital <quote>capturing and sharing</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9028 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9029 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9030 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9031 the culture all around.
9032 </para>
9033 <para>
9034 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9035 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9036
9037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9038
9039 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9040 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9041 storytelling extended across the globe.
9042 </para>
9043 <para>
9044 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9045 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9046 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9047 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9048 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9049 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9050 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9051 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9052 work is presumptively illegal.
9053 </para>
9054 <para>
9055 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9056 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9057 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9058 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9059 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9060 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
9061 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9062 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
9063 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9064 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
9065 million.<footnote><para>
9066 <!-- f1. -->
9067 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
9068 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
9069 the settlement, see MCI press release, <quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9070 Approval for SEC Settlement</quote> (7 July 2003), available at
9071 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
9072 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
9073 </para></footnote>
9074 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9075 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9076 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9077 suffering.<footnote>
9078 <para>
9079 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9080 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9081 an overview, see Tanya Albert, <quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9082 Say Tort Reformers,</quote> amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9083 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9084 and <quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,</quote> CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9085 available at
9086 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9087 recent months.
9088 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
9089 </para></footnote>
9090 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9091 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9092 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9093 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
9094 </para>
9095 <indexterm><primary>art, underground</primary></indexterm>
9096 <para>
9097 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9098 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9099 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9100 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9101 Disneys <quote>pirates.</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9102 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9103 designed to
9104
9105 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9106 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9107 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9108 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9109 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
9110 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9111 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9112 fraught. Already, exhibits of <quote>illegal art</quote> tour the United
9113 States.<footnote><para>
9114 <!-- f3. -->
9115
9116 See Danit Lidor, <quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,</quote> <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
9117 2003, available at
9118 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9119 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9120 </para></footnote>
9121 In what does their <quote>illegality</quote> consist?
9122 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9123 critical or reflective.
9124 </para>
9125 <para>
9126 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9127 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9128 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
9129 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9130 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9131 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9132 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9133 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9134 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9135 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9136 </para>
9137 <para>
9138 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9139 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9140 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9141 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9142 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9143 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9144 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9145 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9146 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9147 </para>
9148 <para>
9149 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9150 described in chapter
9151 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
9152 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9153 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9154 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9155 use.
9156 </para>
9157 <para>
9158
9159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9160 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9161 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9162 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9163 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9164 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9165 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9166 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9167 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9168 </para>
9169 <para>
9170 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9171 <quote>breathing room</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9172 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9173 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9174 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9175 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9176 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9177 these rules have little relationship to the <quote>law</quote> with which judges
9178 comfort themselves.
9179 </para>
9180 <para>
9181 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9182 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9183 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9184 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9185 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9186 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9187 <quote>copyright</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9188 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9189 culture that is free.
9190 </para>
9191 <para>
9192 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9193 </para>
9194 <blockquote>
9195 <para>
9196 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9197 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9198 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9199 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made &hellip; you're not
9200 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9202 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, <quote>This has been
9203 cleared.</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9204 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9205 </para>
9206 </blockquote>
9207 </section>
9208 <section id="innovators">
9209 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9210 <para>
9211 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9212 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9213 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9214 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9215 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9216 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9217 </para>
9218 <para>
9219 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9220 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9221 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9222 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9223 other aspect by substituting <quote>free market</quote> every place I've spoken of
9224 <quote>free culture.</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9225 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9226 </para>
9227 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
9228 <para>
9229 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9230 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9231 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9232 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9233 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9234 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9235 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9236 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9237 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9238 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9239 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9240 </para>
9241 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9242 <para>
9243 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9245 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9246 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9247 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9248 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9249 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9250 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9251 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9252 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9253 <quote>nuclear pall</quote> that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9254 </para>
9255 <para>
9256 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9257 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9258 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9259 </para>
9260 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael</primary></indexterm>
9261 <para>
9262 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9263 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9264 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9265 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9266 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9267 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9268 </para>
9269 <para>
9270 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9271 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9272 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9273 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9274 Raitt. And so on.
9275 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9276 </para>
9277 <para>
9278 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9279 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9280 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9281 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9282 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9283 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9284 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9285 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9286 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9287 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9288 </para>
9289 <para>
9290 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9291 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9292
9293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9294 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9295 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9296 the kind of content the users liked.
9297 </para>
9298 <para>
9299 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9300 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9301 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9302 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9303 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9304 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9305 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9306 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9307 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9308 they had already bought.
9309 </para>
9310 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9311 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9312 </indexterm>
9313 <para>
9314 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9315 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9316 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9317 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9318 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9319 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9320 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9321 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9322 </para>
9323 <para>
9324 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9325 </para>
9326 <para>
9327 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9328 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9329 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9330 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9331 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9332 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9333 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9334 demanded.
9335 </para>
9336 <para>
9337 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9338 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9339 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9340 clients in this
9341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9342 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9343 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9344 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9345 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9346 </para>
9347 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9348 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9349 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9350 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad</primary></indexterm>
9351 <para>
9352 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9353 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9354 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9355 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9356 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9357 <!-- f4. -->
9358 See Joseph Menn, <quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9359 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9360 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, <quote>The Music
9361 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,</quote> Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9362 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9363 See also Jon Healey, <quote>Online Music Services Besieged,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9364 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9365 </para></footnote>
9366 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9367 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9368 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9369 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9370 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9371 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9372 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9373 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9374 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9375 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9376 <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9377 discussion with BMW:
9378 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
9379 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
9380 </para>
9381 <blockquote>
9382 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9383 <para>
9384 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9385 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9386 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9387 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9388 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9389 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9390 United States with bona fide MP3 players. &hellip; <footnote>
9391 <para>
9392 <!-- f5. -->
9393 Rafe Needleman, <quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,</quote> <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9394 2003, available at
9395 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9396 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9397 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9398 </para></footnote>
9399 </para>
9400 </blockquote>
9401 <para>
9402 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with <quote>your money or your
9403 life</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9404 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9405 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9406 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9407 constantly threatened by litigation.
9408 </para>
9409 <para>
9410
9411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9412 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9413 enterprises. The point is the definition of <quote>illegal.</quote> The law is a
9414 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9415 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9416 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9417 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9418 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9419 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9420 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9421 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9422 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9423 much less creativity.
9424 </para>
9425 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
9426 <para>
9427 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9428 use. Whatever the <quote>real</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9429 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9430 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9431 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9432 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9433 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9434 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9435 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9436 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9437 </para>
9438 <para>
9439 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9440 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9441 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9442 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9443 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9444 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9445 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9446 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9447 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9448 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9449 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9450 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9452 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9453 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9454 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9455 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9456 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9457 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9458 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9459 </para>
9460 <para>
9461 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9462 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9463 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9464 this feature is a <quote>bug.</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9465 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9466 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9467 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables <quote>piracy,</quote> then,
9468 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9469 </para>
9470 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
9471 <para>
9472 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9473 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9474 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9475 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9476 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> GartnerG2 and
9477 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9478 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9479 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9480 </para></footnote>
9481 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9482 <quote>broadcast flag</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9483 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9484 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9485 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9486 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9487 copyright violators and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9488 <!-- f7. -->
9489 GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9490 </para></footnote>
9491 </para>
9492 <para>
9493 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9494 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9495 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9496 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9497 and costs on
9498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9499 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9500 those requirements.
9501 </para>
9502 <para>
9503 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9504 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9505 would impose.<footnote><para>
9506 <!-- f8. -->
9507 See David McGuire, <quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,</quote> Newsbytes,
9508 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9509 </para></footnote>
9510 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9511 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9512 harm than good.
9513 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
9514 </para>
9515 <para>
9516 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9517 innovation&mdash;again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9518 free market crowd.
9519 </para>
9520 <para>
9521 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9522 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9523 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9524 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9525 </para>
9526 <para>
9527 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9528 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9529 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9530 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9531 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9532 <!-- f9. -->
9533 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9534 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9535 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9536 </para></footnote>
9537 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10 details,
9538 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9539 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9540 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9541 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9542 </para>
9543 <para>
9544 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9545 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9546 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9547 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9548 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9549 </para>
9550 <para>
9551 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9552 <!-- f10. -->
9553 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9554 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9555 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9556 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9557 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9558 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9559 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9560 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9561 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9562 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9563 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9564 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9565 liability.
9566 </para></footnote>
9567 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9568 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9569 here.<footnote><para>
9570 <!-- f11. -->
9571 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9572 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9573 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9574 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9575 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9576 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9577 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a <quote>broadcast flag</quote> that
9578 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9579 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9580 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9581 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, <quote>Copyright and
9582 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9583 available at
9584 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9585 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9586 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz</primary></indexterm>
9587 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
9588 </para></footnote>
9589 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9590 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9591 </para>
9592 <indexterm>
9593 <primary>artists</primary>
9594 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
9595 </indexterm>
9596 <para>
9597
9598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9599 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9600 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9601 artist doesn't get paid for that <quote>radio performance</quote> unless he or she
9602 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9603 version of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote>&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9604 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9605 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9606 copyright owners of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> would get some money, whereas
9607 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9608 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
9609 </para>
9610 <para>
9611 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9612 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9613 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9614 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9615 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9616 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9617 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9618 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9619 recording artists.
9620 </para>
9621 <para>
9622 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9623 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9624 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9625 spectrum. Thus, I can <quote>tune in</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9626 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9627 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9628 metropolitan area.
9629 </para>
9630 <para>
9631 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9632 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9633 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9634 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9635 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9636 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9637 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9638 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9639 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9640 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9641 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9642 </para>
9643 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary></indexterm>
9644 <para>
9645
9646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9647 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9648 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9649 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9650 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9651 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9652 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9653 FM radio,
9654 </para>
9655 <blockquote>
9656 <para>
9657 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9658 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9659 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9660 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9661 than by technical restrictions. &hellip; Armstrong likened the situation
9662 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9663 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9664 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9665 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9666 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9667 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9668 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9669 shackles.<footnote><para>
9670 <!-- f12. -->
9671 Lessing, 239.
9672 </para></footnote>
9673 </para>
9674 </blockquote>
9675 <para>
9676 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9677 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9678 underestimated the power of <quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9679 legislation</quote><footnote><para>
9680 <!-- f13. -->
9681 Ibid., 229.
9682 </para></footnote>
9683 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9684 </para>
9685 <para>
9686 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9687 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9688 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9689 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9690 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9691 radio?
9692 </para>
9693 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'>
9694 <primary>artists</primary>
9695 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
9696 </indexterm>
9697 <para>
9698 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9699 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9700
9701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9702 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9703 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9704 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9705 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9706 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9707 of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9708 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9709 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9710 burdens terrestrial radio.
9711 </para>
9712 <para>
9713 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9714 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9715 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9716 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9717 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9718 <para>
9719 <!-- f14. -->
9720 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9721 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9722 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9723 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9724 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9725 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9726 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9727 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9728 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9729 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9730 C. Picker, <quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9731 Distribution,</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: <quote>This was
9732 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9733 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9734 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9735 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9736 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.</quote>
9737 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9738 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9739 </para></footnote>
9740 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9741 equivalent fee.
9742 </para>
9743 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'/>
9744 <para>
9745 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9746 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9747 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9748 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9749 </para>
9750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9751 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9752 <listitem><para>
9753 name of the service;
9754 </para></listitem>
9755 <listitem><para>
9756 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9757 </para></listitem>
9758 <listitem><para>
9759 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9760 </para></listitem>
9761 <listitem><para>
9762 date of transmission;
9763 </para></listitem>
9764 <listitem><para>
9765 time of transmission;
9766 </para></listitem>
9767 <listitem><para>
9768 time zone of origination of transmission;
9769 </para></listitem>
9770 <listitem><para>
9771 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9772 </para></listitem>
9773 <listitem><para>
9774 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9775 </para></listitem>
9776 <listitem><para>
9777 sound recording title;
9778 </para></listitem>
9779 <listitem><para>
9780 ISRC code of the recording;
9781 </para></listitem>
9782 <listitem><para>
9783 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9784 </para></listitem>
9785 <listitem><para>
9786 featured recording artist;
9787 </para></listitem>
9788 <listitem><para>
9789 retail album title;
9790 </para></listitem>
9791 <listitem><para>
9792 recording label;
9793 </para></listitem>
9794 <listitem><para>
9795 UPC code of the retail album;
9796 </para></listitem>
9797 <listitem><para>
9798 catalog number;
9799 </para></listitem>
9800 <listitem><para>
9801 copyright owner information;
9802 </para></listitem>
9803 <listitem><para>
9804 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9805 </para></listitem>
9806 <listitem><para>
9807 name of the service or entity;
9808 </para></listitem>
9809 <listitem><para>
9810 channel or program;
9811 </para></listitem>
9812 <listitem><para>
9813 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9814 </para></listitem>
9815 <listitem><para>
9816 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9817 </para></listitem>
9818 <listitem><para>
9819 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9820 </para></listitem>
9821 <listitem><para>
9822 unique user identifier;
9823 </para></listitem>
9824 <listitem><para>
9825 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9826 </para></listitem>
9827 </orderedlist>
9828
9829 <para>
9830 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9831 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9832 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9833 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9834 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9835 that terrestrial radio does not.
9836 </para>
9837 <para>
9838 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9839 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9840 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9841 </para>
9842 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
9843 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'>
9844 <primary>Alben, Alex</primary>
9845 </indexterm>
9846 <para>
9847 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9848 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9849 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9850 </para>
9851 <blockquote>
9852 <para>
9853 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9854 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9855 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9856 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9857 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9858 webcasters asked the RIAA, &hellip; <quote>How do you come up with a
9859
9860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9861 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9862 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9863 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9864 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9865 business. &hellip;</quote>
9866 </para>
9867 <indexterm>
9868 <primary>artists</primary>
9869 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
9870 </indexterm>
9871 <para>
9872 And the RIAA experts said, <quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
9873 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9874 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9875 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>.</quote> (Emphasis
9876 added.)
9877 </para>
9878 </blockquote>
9879 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'/>
9880 <para>
9881 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9882 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9883 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9884 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9885 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9886 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9887 effective to prevent it.
9888 </para>
9889 </section>
9890 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9891 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9892 <para>
9893 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9894 dinosaurs
9895 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9896 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9897 </para>
9898 <para>
9899 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9900 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9901 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9902 </para>
9903 <para>
9904 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9905 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9906 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9907 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9908 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, <quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,</quote> Pew
9909 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9910 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9911 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9912 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9913 </para></footnote>
9914 According to the RIAA,
9915 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9916 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9917
9918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9919 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9920 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9921 increasingly
9922 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9923 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9924 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9925 extreme
9926 response by the other.
9927 </para>
9928 <para>
9929 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9930 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9931 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9932 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9933 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9934 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9935 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9936 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9937 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9938 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9939 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9940 was.<footnote><para>
9941 <!-- f16. -->
9942 Alex Pham, <quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,</quote> <citetitle>Los
9943 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
9944 </para></footnote>
9945 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9946 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9947 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9948 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9949 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9950 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9951 they oppose.
9952 </para>
9953 <para>
9954 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9955 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9956 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9957 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9958 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9959 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9960 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9961 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9962 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9963 <!-- f17. -->
9964 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, <quote>Alcohol Consumption During
9965 Prohibition,</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9966 </para></footnote>
9967 We have
9968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9969 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9970 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9971 <!-- f18. -->
9972 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9973 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9974 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9975 </para></footnote>
9976 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9977 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9978 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9979 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9980 cheat.<footnote><para>
9981 <!-- f19. -->
9982 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, <quote>Tax
9983 Compliance,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9984 compliance literature).
9985 </para></footnote>
9986 We pride ourselves on our <quote>free society,</quote> but an endless array of
9987 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9988 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9989 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
9990 </para>
9991 <para>
9992 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9993 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9994 students about the importance of <quote>ethics.</quote> As my colleague Charlie
9995 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9996 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9997 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9998 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9999 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
10000 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
10001 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
10002 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
10003 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
10004 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
10005 lives both normally and legally, since <quote>normally</quote> entails a certain
10006 degree of illegality.
10007 <indexterm><primary>law schools</primary></indexterm>
10008 </para>
10009 <para>
10010 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10011 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10012 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10013 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10014 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10015 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10016 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10017 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10018 to consider the alternative.
10019 </para>
10020 <para>
10021
10022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10023 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10024 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10025 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10026 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10027 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10028 </para>
10029 <para>
10030 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10031 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10032 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10033 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10034 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10035 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10036 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10037 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10038 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10039 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10040 introduced this different idea of <quote>sharing.</quote> We need to be able to
10041 call these twenty million Americans <quote>citizens,</quote> not <quote>felons.</quote>
10042 </para>
10043 <para>
10044 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10045 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10046 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10047 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10048 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10049 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10050 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10051 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10052 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10053 a nation of felons?
10054 </para>
10055 <para>
10056 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10057 </para>
10058 <para>
10059 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10060 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10061 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10062 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10063 used
10064
10065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10066 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That <quote>use</quote> of the
10067 recordings is free.
10068 </para>
10069 <para>
10070 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10071 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10072 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am <quote>free</quote> to copy,
10073 or <quote>rip,</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10074 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that <quote>freedom</quote> was a
10075 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the <quote>Rip, Mix, Burn</quote>
10076 capacities of digital technologies.
10077 </para>
10078 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
10079 <para>
10080 This <quote>use</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10081 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10082 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10083 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10084 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10085 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10086 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10087 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10088 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10089 </para>
10090 <para>
10091 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
10092 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10093 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10094 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10095 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10096 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10097 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10098 on people's machines.
10099 </para>
10100 <para>
10101 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10102 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10103 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10104 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10105 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10106 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10107
10108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10109 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10110 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10111 plastic or were part of a massively complex <quote>digital rights
10112 management</quote> system.
10113 </para>
10114 <para>
10115 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10116 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10117 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10118 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10119 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10120 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10121 freedom to move content easily?
10122 </para>
10123 <para>
10124 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10125 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10126 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10127 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10128 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10129 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10130 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10131 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10132 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10133 </para>
10134 <para>
10135 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10136 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10137 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10138 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10139 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10140 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10141 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10142 </para>
10143 <para>
10144 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10145 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10146 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10147 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10148 </para>
10149 <para>
10150 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10151 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10152
10153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10154
10155 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10156 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10157 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10158 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10159 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10160 Lohmann describes, this is the <quote>collateral damage</quote> that <quote>arises
10161 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10162 criminals.</quote> This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10163 generally.
10164 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
10165 </para>
10166 <para>
10167 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,</quote> von Lohmann
10168 explains,
10169 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10170 </para>
10171 <blockquote>
10172 <para>
10173 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10174 evaporate to one degree or another. &hellip; If you're a copyright
10175 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10176 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10177 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10178 access? &hellip; Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, <quote>Oh, well,
10179 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.</quote> Well, what this campaign
10180 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10181 American Internet-using population into <quote>lawbreakers.</quote>
10182 </para>
10183 </blockquote>
10184 <para>
10185 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10186 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10187 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10188 </para>
10189 <para>
10190 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10191 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10192 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10193 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10194 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10195 an Internet user is revealed.
10196 </para>
10197 <para>
10198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10199 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10200 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10201 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10202 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10203 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10204 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10205 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10206 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10207 <!-- f20. -->
10208 See Frank Ahrens, <quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10209 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,</quote>
10210 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, <quote>Worried Parents
10211 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10212 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10213 Being Sued,</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10214 Graham, <quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
10215 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, <quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10216 Fan, Either,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, <quote>Is
10217 Brianna a Criminal?</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
10218 </para></footnote>
10219
10220 </para>
10221 <para>
10222 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10223 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10224 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10225 <!-- f21. -->
10226 See <quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10227 Some Methods Used,</quote> CNN.com, available at
10228 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10229 </para></footnote>
10230 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10231 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10232 one of those MP3s will have the same <quote>fingerprint.</quote>
10233 </para>
10234 <para>
10235 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10236 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10237 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10238 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10239 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10240 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10241 network is <quote>cooperating</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10242 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10243 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10244 as a <quote>criminal.</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10245 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10246 <!-- f22. -->
10247 See Jeff Adler, <quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,</quote>
10248 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, <quote>Four
10249 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10250 Colleges,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10251 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10252 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, <quote>Music
10253 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10254 Lawsuit Possible,</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, <quote>RIAA
10255 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,</quote> <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10256 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10257 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, <quote>Download Warning 101: Freshman
10258 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10259 Sharing,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; <quote>Raid, Letters
10260 Are Weapons at Universities,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10261 </para></footnote>
10262 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10263 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10264 </para>
10265 <para>
10266 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10267 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10268 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10269 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10270 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10271 this <quote>contraband</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10272 college students
10273
10274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10275 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10276 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10277 Says von Lohmann,
10278 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10279 </para>
10280 <blockquote>
10281 <para>
10282 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10283 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10284 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10285 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10286 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10287 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10288 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10289 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10290 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10291 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10292 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10293 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10294 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10295 larger number of Americans than drug use. &hellip; If forty to sixty
10296 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10297 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10298 million of them.
10299 </para>
10300 </blockquote>
10301 <para>
10302 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered <quote>criminals</quote> under
10303 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10304 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10305 considered <quote>criminals,</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10306 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10307 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10308 </para>
10309
10310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10311 </section>
10312 </chapter>
10313 </part>
10314 <part id="c-balances">
10315 <title>BALANCES</title>
10316 <partintro>
10317
10318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10319 <para>
10320 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10321 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10322 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10323 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10324 </para>
10325 <para>
10326 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10327 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10328 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10329 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10330 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10331 everything around.
10332 </para>
10333 <para>
10334 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10335 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10336 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10337 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10338 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10339 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10340 </para>
10341 <para>
10342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10343 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10344 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10345 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10346 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10347 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10348 made that is happening all around.
10349 </para>
10350 <para>
10351 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10352 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10353 gasoline onto this fire.
10354 </para>
10355 <para>
10356 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10357 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10358 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10359 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10360 </para>
10361 <para>
10362 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10363 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10364 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10365 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10366 success will require.
10367 </para>
10368 </partintro>
10369
10370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10371 <chapter label="13" id="eldred">
10372 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10373 <indexterm id="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'>
10374 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel</primary>
10375 </indexterm>
10376 <para>
10377 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10378 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10379 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10380 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10381 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10382 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10383 come alive.
10384 </para>
10385 <para>
10386 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10387 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10388 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10389 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10390 them available for free.
10391 </para>
10392 <para>
10393 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10394 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10395 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10396 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10397 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10399 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10400 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10401 accessible&mdash;today.
10402 </para>
10403 <para>
10404 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10405 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10406 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10407 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10408 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10409 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10410 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10411 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10412 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10413 commercial publications of public domain works.
10414 </para>
10415 <indexterm startref="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'/>
10416 <para>
10417 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10418 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10419 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10420 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10421 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10422 call the <quote>noncommercial publishing industry,</quote> which before the
10423 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10424 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10425 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10426 generally.<footnote><para>
10427 <!-- f1. -->
10428 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10429 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10430 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10431 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10432 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10433 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10434 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10435 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10436 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10437 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10438 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10439 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10440 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10441 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10442 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10443 </para>
10444 <para>
10445 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10446 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10447 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10448 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10449 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10450 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10451 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10452 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10453 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10454 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10455 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10456 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10457 </para>
10458 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary</primary></indexterm>
10459 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny</primary></indexterm>
10460 <para>
10461
10462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10463 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10464 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10465 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10466 <quote>copyrights should be forever.</quote><footnote><para>
10467 <!-- f2. -->
10468 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary</primary></indexterm>
10469 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny</primary></indexterm>
10470 The full text is: <quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10471 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10472 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10473 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10474 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10475 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10476 Congress,</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10477 </para></footnote>
10478
10479 </para>
10480 <para>
10481 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10482 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10483 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10484 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10485 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10486 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10487 to undertake.
10488 </para>
10489 <para>
10490 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10491 constitutional
10492 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10493 interpretation.
10494 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10495 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10496 importantly
10497 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10498 </para>
10499 <blockquote>
10500 <para>
10501 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science &hellip;
10502 by securing for limited Times to Authors &hellip; exclusive Right to
10503 their &hellip; Writings. &hellip;
10504 </para>
10505 </blockquote>
10506 <para>
10507 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10508 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10509 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10510 something&mdash;for example, to regulate <quote>commerce among the several
10511 states</quote> or <quote>declare War.</quote> But here, the <quote>something</quote> is something quite
10512 specific&mdash;to <quote>promote &hellip; Progress</quote>&mdash;through means that
10513 are also specific&mdash; by <quote>securing</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights</quote> (i.e.,
10514 copyrights) <quote>for limited Times.</quote>
10515 </para>
10516 <para>
10517 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10518 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10519 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10520 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be <quote>limited</quote> will have
10521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10522 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10523 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10524 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms <quote>on the
10525 installment plan,</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10526 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10527 </para>
10528 <para>
10529 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10530 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10531 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10532 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10533 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10534 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10535 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10536 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10537 this gravy train going.
10538 </para>
10539 <para>
10540 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10541 government. <quote>Corruption</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10542 bribed. Rather, <quote>corruption</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10543 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10544 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10545 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10546 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10547 </para>
10548 <para>
10549 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10550 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10551 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10552 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10553 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10554 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10555 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10556 published by anyone for free.
10557 </para>
10558 <para>
10559 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10560 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10561 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10562 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10563 report:
10564 </para>
10565 <para>
10566 <quote>Next year,</quote> the adviser announces, <quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10567
10568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10569 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10570 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10571 those works.</quote>
10572 </para>
10573 <para>
10574 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,</quote> she continues, <quote>that
10575 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10576 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10577 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.</quote>
10578 </para>
10579 <para>
10580 <quote>Hope?</quote> a fellow board member says. <quote>Can't we be doing something
10581 about it?</quote>
10582 </para>
10583 <para>
10584 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,</quote> the adviser responds. <quote>We could contribute
10585 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10586 they support the bill.</quote>
10587 </para>
10588 <para>
10589 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10590 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. <quote>How much
10591 would we get if this extension were passed?</quote> you ask the adviser. <quote>How
10592 much is it worth?</quote>
10593 </para>
10594 <para>
10595 <quote>Well,</quote> the adviser says, <quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10596 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10597 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10598 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate.</quote>
10599 </para>
10600 <para>
10601 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10602 correct conclusion:
10603 </para>
10604 <para>
10605 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10606 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10607 contributions
10608 would assure that the bill was passed?</quote>
10609 </para>
10610 <para>
10611 <quote>Absolutely,</quote> the adviser responds. <quote>It is worth it to you to
10612 contribute
10613 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10614 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000.</quote>
10615 </para>
10616 <para>
10617 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10618 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10619 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10620 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10622 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10623 copyrights
10624 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10625 the copyright term extended.
10626 </para>
10627 <para>
10628 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10629 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10630 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10631 </para>
10632 <para>
10633 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10634 Copyright
10635 Term Extension Act, this <quote>theory</quote> about incentives was proved
10636 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10637 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10638 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10639 contributions.<footnote><para>
10640 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, <quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10641 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,</quote>
10642 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10643 </para></footnote>
10644 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10645 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10646 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10647 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, <quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10648 Age,</quote> available at
10649 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10650 </para></footnote>
10651 Disney is estimated to have
10652 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10653 cycle.<footnote><para>
10654 <!-- f5. -->
10655 Alan K. Ota, <quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,</quote>
10656 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10657 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10658 </para></footnote>
10659
10660 </para>
10661 <para>
10662 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10663 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10664 reality
10665 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10666 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10667 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10668 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10669 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10670 <quote>limited.</quote>
10671 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10672 and again.
10673 </para>
10674 <para>
10675 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10676 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10677 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10678 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10679 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10680 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10681 Supreme Court's
10682
10683 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10684 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10685 guns near schools.
10686 </para>
10687 <para>
10688 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10689 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10690 power to regulate only <quote>commerce among the several states</quote> (aka
10691 <quote>interstate
10692 commerce</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10693 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10694 interstate
10695 commerce.
10696 </para>
10697 <para>
10698 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10699 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10700 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10701 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10702 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10703 </para>
10704 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
10705 <para>
10706 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10707 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10708 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10709 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10710 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10711 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10712 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10713 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10714 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10715 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10716 position to second-guess Congress.
10717 </para>
10718 <para>
10719 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,</quote>
10720 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10721 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10722 </para></footnote>
10723 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10724 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10725 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10726 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10727 <!-- f7. -->
10728 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10729 </para></footnote>
10730 </para>
10731 <para>
10732 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10733 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10734 <!-- f8. -->
10735 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10736 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10737 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10738 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10739 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10740 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10741 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10742 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10743 limitation to <quote>limited times</quote> notwithstanding.
10744 </para></footnote>
10745 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10746 yield the conclusion that Congress
10747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10748 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10749 term, then there would be no <quote>stopping point</quote> to Congress's power over
10750 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10751 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10752 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10753 term of existing copyrights.
10754 </para>
10755 <para>
10756 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10757 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10758 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10759 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10760 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10761 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10762 demonstrating the <quote>fidelity</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10763 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10764 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10765 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10766 were going to be petty politicians.
10767 </para>
10768 <para>
10769 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10770 argument in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10771 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10772 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10773 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10774 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10775 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10776 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10777 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10778 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10779 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10780 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10781 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10782 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10783 piracy that affects us all.
10784 </para>
10785 <para>
10786 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10787
10788 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10789 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10790 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than <quote>legal piracy.</quote><footnote><para>
10791 <!-- f9. -->
10792 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10793 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10794 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10795 </para></footnote>
10796 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10797 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10798 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10799 charter.
10800 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10801 </para>
10802 <para>
10803 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10804 copyright
10805 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10806 influence
10807 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10808 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10809 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10810 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10811 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10812 bought to extend them again.
10813 </para>
10814 <para>
10815 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10816 extended.
10817 Mickey Mouse and <quote>Rhapsody in Blue.</quote> These works are too
10818 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10819 society
10820 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10821 Disney's.
10822 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10823 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10824 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10825 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10826 exploited,
10827 and no longer available as a result.
10828 </para>
10829 <para>
10830 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10831 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10832 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10833 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10834 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10835 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10836 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10837 Congressional
10838 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10839 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10840 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10841 </para></footnote>
10842
10843 </para>
10844 <para>
10845 Think practically about the consequence of this
10846 extension&mdash;practically,
10847 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10848
10849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10850 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10851 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10852 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10853 remaining
10854 9,873. What would you have to do?
10855 </para>
10856 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital</primary></indexterm>
10857 <para>
10858 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10859 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10860 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10861 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10862 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10863 list of books still under copyright.
10864 </para>
10865 <para>
10866 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10867 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10868 </para>
10869 <para>
10870 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10871 owners
10872 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10873 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10874 being at least a list?
10875 </para>
10876 <para>
10877 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10878 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10879 practically
10880 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10881 thousands
10882 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10883 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10884 </para>
10885 <para>
10886 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,</quote> the
10887 apologists for the system respond. <quote>Why should there be a list of
10888 copyright owners?</quote>
10889 </para>
10890 <para>
10891 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10892 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10893 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10894 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10895 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10896 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10897 what tangible property.
10898 </para>
10899 <para>
10900 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10901 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10902 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10903
10904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10905 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10906 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10907 happen
10908 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10909 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10910 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10911 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10912 know quite well who owns what property.
10913 </para>
10914 <para>
10915 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10916 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10917 already
10918 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10919 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10920 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10921 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10922 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10923 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10924 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10925 </para>
10926 <para>
10927 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10928 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10929 consequence
10930 for other creative works is much more dire.
10931 </para>
10932 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'>
10933 <primary>Agee, Michael</primary>
10934 </indexterm>
10935 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
10936 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films</primary></indexterm>
10937 <para>
10938 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10939 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10940 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10941 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
10942 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10943 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10944 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10945 money. According to one estimate, <quote>Roach has sold about 60,000
10946 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10947 films.</quote><footnote><para>
10948 <!-- f11. -->
10949 See David G. Savage, <quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,</quote>
10950 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, <quote>Classic Movies,
10951 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10952 Down Copyright Extension,</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
10953 </para></footnote>
10954
10955 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
10956 </para>
10957 <para>
10958 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10959 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10960 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10961 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10962 </para>
10963 <para>
10964 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10965
10966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10967 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10968 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10969 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10970 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10971 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10972 work available for distribution.
10973 </para>
10974 <para>
10975 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10976 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10977 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10978 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10979 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10980 mm film.<footnote><para>
10981 <!-- f12. -->
10982 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10983 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
10984 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10985 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10986 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
10987 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10988 </para></footnote>
10989
10990 </para>
10991 <para>
10992 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10993 important.
10994 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10995 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10996 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10997 locate the copyright owner.
10998 </para>
10999 <para>
11000 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
11001 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
11002 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
11003 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
11004 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
11005 to these films is exceptionally high.
11006 </para>
11007 <para>
11008 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11009 copyright owner when she shows up?</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11010 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11011 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11012 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11013 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11014 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11015 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11016 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11017 </para>
11018 <para>
11019 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11020
11021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11022 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11023 benefit
11024 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11025 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11026 the copyright expires.
11027 </para>
11028 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'/>
11029 <para>
11030 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11031 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11032 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11033 canisters
11034 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11035 than dust.
11036 </para>
11037 <para>
11038 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
11039 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
11040 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
11041 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
11042 creative
11043 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an <quote>engine of
11044 free expression.</quote>
11045 </para>
11046 <para>
11047 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11048 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11049 indicated,
11050 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11051 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11052 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11053 distributors,
11054 the commercial life ends.
11055 </para>
11056 <para>
11057 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11058 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
11059 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11060 between
11061 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11062 Friday
11063 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11064 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
11065 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11066 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11067 have, we need to have access to this history.
11068 </para>
11069 <para>
11070 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11071
11072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11073 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11074 this context do no good.
11075 </para>
11076 <para>
11077 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11078 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11079 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11080 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11081 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11082 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11083 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11084 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11085 was independent of copyright law.
11086 </para>
11087 <para>
11088 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11089 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
11090 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11091 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11092 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11093 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11094 market didn't have more to offer.
11095 </para>
11096 <para>
11097 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11098 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11099 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11100 would not have interfered with anything.
11101 </para>
11102 <para>
11103 But this situation has now changed.
11104 </para>
11105 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'>
11106 <primary>archives, digital</primary>
11107 </indexterm>
11108 <para>
11109 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11110 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11111 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11112 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11113 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11114 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11115 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11116 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11117 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11118 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11119 </para>
11120 <para>
11121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11122 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11123 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11124 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11125 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11126 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11127 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11128 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11129 written for a radically different context.
11130 </para>
11131 <para>
11132 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11133 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11134 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11135 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11136 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11137 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11138 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
11139 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11140 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11141 </para>
11142 <para>
11143 You may well ask, <quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11144 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11145 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11146 culture widely?</quote>
11147 </para>
11148 <para>
11149 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11150 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11151 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11152 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11153 of a library is to serve what <quote>the market</quote> would demand. But if you
11154 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11155 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11156 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11157 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11158 </para>
11159 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'/>
11160 <para>
11161 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11162 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11163 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11164 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11165
11166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11167 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11168 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11169 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11170 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11171 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11172 <!-- f13. -->
11173 Jason Schultz, <quote>The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,</quote> 20
11174 December 2002, available at
11175 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11176 </para></footnote>
11177
11178 </para>
11179 <para>
11180 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11181 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11182 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11183 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11184 violated the Constitution's <quote>limited Times</quote> requirement, and (2) that
11185 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11186 </para>
11187 <para>
11188 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11189 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11190 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11191 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11192 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11193 </para>
11194 <para>
11195 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11196 copyrights be for <quote>limited Times</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11197 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11198 <quote>stopping point</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11199 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11200 terms that are <quote>limited.</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11201 to interpret the term <quote>limited Times</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11202 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11203 power to extend existing terms.
11204 </para>
11205 <para>
11206 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11207 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11208 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11209 whole, where the court will sit <quote>en banc</quote> to hear the case.
11210 </para>
11211 <para>
11212 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11213 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11214
11215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11216 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11217 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11218 overstepped its bounds.
11219 </para>
11220 <para>
11221 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11222 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11223 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11224 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11225 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11226 </para>
11227 <para>
11228 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11229 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11230 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11231 briefs and preparing for argument.
11232 </para>
11233 <para>
11234 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11235 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11236 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11237 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11238 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11239 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11240 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11241 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11242 </para>
11243 <para>
11244 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11245 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11246 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11247 mistake lost it.
11248 </para>
11249 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11250 <para>
11251 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11252 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11253 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11254 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11255 heat
11256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11257 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11258 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11259 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11260 </para>
11261 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11262 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11263 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11264 <para>
11265 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11266 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11267 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11268 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11269 told me, if we could make the issue seem <quote>important</quote> to the Supreme
11270 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11271 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against <quote>the
11272 most powerful media companies in the world.</quote>
11273 </para>
11274 <para>
11275 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11276 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11277 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11278 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11279 <quote>right</quote> as in <quote>true,</quote> I thought, but it is <quote>wrong</quote> as in <quote>it just shouldn't be
11280 that way.</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11281 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11282 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11283 interpretation
11284 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11285 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11286 unconstitutional,
11287 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11288 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11289 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11290 Constitution,
11291 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11292 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11293 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11294 </para>
11295 <para>
11296 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11297 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11298 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11299 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11300 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11301 why it was unconstitutional.
11302 </para>
11303 <para>
11304 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11305
11306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11307 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11308 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11309 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11310 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11311 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11312 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11313 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11314 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11315 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11316 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11317 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11318 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11319 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11320 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11321 </para>
11322 <para>
11323 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11324 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11325 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11326 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11327 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11328 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11329 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11330 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11331 to get bogged down?</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11332 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11333 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11334 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11335 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11336 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11337 </para>
11338 <para>
11339 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11340 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11341 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11342 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11343 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11344 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11345 </para>
11346 <para>
11347 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11348 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11349
11350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11351 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11352 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11353 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11354 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11355 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11356 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11357 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11358 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11359 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
11360 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11361 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11362 </para>
11363 <para>
11364 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11365 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11366 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11367 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11368 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11369 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11370 </para>
11371 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
11372 <para>
11373 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11374 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11375 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11376 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11377 clear.
11378 </para>
11379 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11380 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11381 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11382 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11383 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11384 <para>
11385 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11386 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11387 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11388 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11389 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11390 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11391 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11392 nothing more than <quote>rent-seeking</quote>&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11393 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11394 </para>
11395 <para>
11396 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11397 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11398 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11399 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11400 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11401 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11402 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11403 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11404
11405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11406 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11407 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11408 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11409 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan</primary></indexterm>
11410 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen</primary></indexterm>
11411 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11412 </para>
11413 <para>
11414 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11415 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11416 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11417 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11418 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11419 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11420 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11421 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11422 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11423 confidence in our argument.
11424 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11425 </para>
11426 <para>
11427 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11428 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these <quote>friends</quote> included
11429 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11430 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11431 copyright holders.
11432 </para>
11433 <para>
11434 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11435 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11436 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11437 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11438 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11439 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11440 wanted to control.
11441 </para>
11442 <para>
11443 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11444 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11445 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11446 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11447 domain, then people could use it to <quote>glorify drugs or to create
11448 pornography.</quote><footnote><para>
11449 <!-- f14. -->
11450 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11451 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11452 </para></footnote>
11453 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11454 <quote>protection</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11455 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11456 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11457 <!-- f15. -->
11458 Dinitia Smith, <quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11459 Mouse Joins the Fray,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11460 </para></footnote>
11461 That's
11462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11463 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11464 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11465 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11466 </para>
11467 <para>
11468 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11469 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11470 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11471 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11472 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, <quote>Give us twenty years
11473 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11474 better with them than anyone else.</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11475 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11476 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11477 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11478 </para>
11479 <para>
11480 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11481 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11482 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11483 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11484 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11485 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11486 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11487 </para>
11488 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
11489 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day</primary></indexterm>
11490 <para>
11491 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11492 called <quote>the Conservatives.</quote> The other we called <quote>the Rest.</quote> The
11493 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11494 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11495 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11496 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line
11497 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11498 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11499 </para>
11500 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11501 <para>
11502 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11503 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11504 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11505 the Constitution
11506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11507 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11508 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11509 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11510 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11511 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11512 </para>
11513 <para>
11514 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11515 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11516 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11517 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11518 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11519 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11520 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11521 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11522 sense.
11523 </para>
11524 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11525 <para>
11526 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11527 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11528 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11529 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11530 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11531 these retrospective extensions.
11532 </para>
11533 <para>
11534 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11535 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11536 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11537 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11538 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11539 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11540 </para>
11541 <para>
11542 This analysis of <quote>the Rest</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11543 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11544 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11545 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11546 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the
11547 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11548 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11549 powers have limits.
11550 </para>
11551 <para>
11552 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11553 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11554 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11556 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11557 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11558 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11559 supposed to be <quote>limited.</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11560 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with
11561 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11562 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11563 be limited.
11564 </para>
11565 <para>
11566 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11567 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11568 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11569 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11570 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11571 </para>
11572 <para>
11573 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11574 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in 1831
11575 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11576 existing
11577 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11578 </para>
11579 <para>
11580 But this <quote>consistency</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11581 extended
11582 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11583 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11584 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11585 existing
11586 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11587 restraint
11588 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11589 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11590 hesitated
11591 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11592 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11593 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11594 arrived
11595 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11596 weeks, I was repeatedly <quote>mooted</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11597
11598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11599 help in the case. Such <quote>moots</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11600 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11601 </para>
11602 <para>
11603 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11604 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11605 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11606 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11607 Congress
11608 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11609 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11610 this central idea.
11611 </para>
11612 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11613 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11614 <para>
11615 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11616 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11617 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11618 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11619 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11620 </para>
11621 <para>
11622 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11623 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11624 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11625 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11626 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.</quote>
11627 </para>
11628 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11629 <para>
11630 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11631 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11632 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11633 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11634 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11635 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11636 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11637 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11638 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11639 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11640 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11641
11642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11643 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11644 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11645 </para>
11646 <para>
11647 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11648 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11649 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11650 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11651 congressmen
11652 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11653 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11654 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11655 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11656 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11657 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11658 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11659 family of the Justices.
11660 </para>
11661 <para>
11662 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11663 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11664 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11665 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11666 </para>
11667 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day</primary></indexterm>
11668 <para>
11669 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11670 The history was bothering her.
11671 </para>
11672 <blockquote>
11673 <para>
11674 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11675 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11676 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11677 practice that began with the very first act.
11678 </para>
11679 </blockquote>
11680 <para>
11681 She was quite willing to concede <quote>that this flies directly in the face
11682 of what the framers had in mind.</quote> But my response again and again
11683 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11684 </para>
11685 <blockquote>
11686 <para>
11687 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11688 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11690 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11691 is yes.
11692 </para>
11693 </blockquote>
11694 <para>
11695 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11696 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11697 Kennedy, who observed,
11698 </para>
11699 <blockquote>
11700 <para>
11701 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11702 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11703 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11704 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11705 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11706 </para>
11707 </blockquote>
11708 <para>
11709 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11710 student,
11711 I answered,
11712 </para>
11713 <blockquote>
11714 <para>
11715 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11716 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11717 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11718 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11719 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11720 </para>
11721 </blockquote>
11722 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11723 <para>
11724 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11725 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11726 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11727 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11728 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11729 </para>
11730 <para>
11731 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11732 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11733 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11734 </para>
11735 <para>
11736 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11737 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11738
11739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11740 </para>
11741 <blockquote>
11742 <para>
11743 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11744 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11745 </para>
11746 <para>
11747 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11748 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11749 domain
11750 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11751 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11752 into the Copyright Clause.
11753 </para>
11754 </blockquote>
11755 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.</primary></indexterm>
11756 <para>
11757 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11758 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11759 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11760 </para>
11761 <blockquote>
11762 <para>
11763 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11764 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11765 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11766 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11767 time.
11768 </para>
11769 </blockquote>
11770 <para>
11771 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11772 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11773 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11774 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11775 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11776 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11777 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11778 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11779 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11780 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11781 Court to my side.
11782 </para>
11783 <para>
11784 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11785 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11786
11787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11788 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11789 optimistic.
11790 </para>
11791 <para>
11792 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11793 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11794 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11795 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11796 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11797 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11798 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11799 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11800 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11801 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11802 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11803 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11804 law that it had established elsewhere.
11805 </para>
11806 <para>
11807 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11808 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11809 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11810 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11811 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11812 </para>
11813 <para>
11814 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11815 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11816 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11817 </para>
11818 <para>
11819 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11820 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11821 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11822 reasoning.
11823 </para>
11824 <para>
11825 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11826 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11827 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11828 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11829 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11830 </para>
11831 <para>
11832
11833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11834 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11835 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11836 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11837 </para>
11838 <para>
11839 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11840 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11841 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11842 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11843 </para>
11844 <para>
11845 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11846 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11847 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11848 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11849 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11850 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11851 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11852 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11853 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11854 </para>
11855 <para>
11856 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11857 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11858 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11859 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11860 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11861 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11862 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11863 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11864 the system we have.
11865 </para>
11866 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11867 <para>
11868 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11869 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11870 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11871 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11872 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11873 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11874 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11875 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11876 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11877 </para>
11878 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11879 <para>
11880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11881 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11882 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11883 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11884 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11885 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11886 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11887 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11888 <quote>limited,</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11889 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11890 </para>
11891 <para>
11892 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11893 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11894 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11895 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11896 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11897 </para>
11898 <para>
11899 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11900 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11901 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11902 </para>
11903 <indexterm><primary>originalism</primary></indexterm>
11904 <para>
11905 It was first anger with the five <quote>Conservatives.</quote> It would have been
11906 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
11907 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11908 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11909 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11910 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11911 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is <quote>originalism</quote>&mdash;to
11912 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11913 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11914 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other <quote>originalist</quote> rulings. Where was their
11915 <quote>originalism</quote> now?
11916 </para>
11917 <para>
11918 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11919 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11920 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11921 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11922
11923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11924 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11925 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11926 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11927 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11928 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11929 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11930 own principles.
11931 </para>
11932 <para>
11933 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11934 myself.
11935 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11936 the law as it is.
11937 </para>
11938 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11939 <para>
11940 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11941 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11942 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11943 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11944 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11945 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11946 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11947 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11948 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11949 </para>
11950 <para>
11951 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11952 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11953 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11954 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11955 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11956 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11957 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11958 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11959 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11960 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11961 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11962 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11963 effort to persuade; but I
11964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11965 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11966 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11967 should decide the issue.
11968 </para>
11969 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11970 <para>
11971 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11972 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11973 Kathleen Sullivan?
11974 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11975 </para>
11976 <para>
11977 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11978 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11979 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11980 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11981 </para>
11982 <para>
11983 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11984 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11985 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11986 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11987 have persuaded.
11988 </para>
11989 <para>
11990 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11991 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11992 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11993 case was a mistake. <quote>The Court is not ready,</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
11994 issue should not be raised until it is.
11995 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11996 </para>
11997 <para>
11998 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11999 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12000 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12001 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12002 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12003 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12004 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
12005 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
12006 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
12007 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
12008 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
12009
12010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12011 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12012 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12013 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12014 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12015 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12016 </para>
12017 <blockquote>
12018 <para>
12019 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12020 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12021 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12022 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12023 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12024 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12025 </para>
12026 </blockquote>
12027 <para>
12028 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12029 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12030 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12031 (<xref linkend="fig-18"/>). The <quote>powerful and wealthy</quote> line is a bit
12032 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12033 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
12034 </para>
12035 <figure id="fig-18">
12036 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</title>
12037 <graphic fileref="images/18.png"></graphic>
12038 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
12039 </figure>
12040 <para>
12041 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12042 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That <quote>grand experiment</quote> we call the
12043 <quote>public domain</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think, <quote>Honey,
12044 I shrunk the Constitution.</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12045 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12046 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12047 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12048 </para>
12049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12050 </chapter>
12051 <chapter label="14" id="eldred-ii">
12052 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
12053 <para>
12054 The day <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
12055 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was
12056 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
12057 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
12058 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
12059 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
12060 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
12061 </para>
12062 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
12063 <para>
12064 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12065 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12066 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12067 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12068 Justice Kennedy: <quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12069 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12070 that.</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12071 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12072 </para>
12073 <para>
12074 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12075 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12077 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12078 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12079 the work passed into the public domain.
12080 </para>
12081 <para>
12082 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12083 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12084 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12085 </para>
12086 <para>
12087 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12088 is either the <quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act</quote> or the <quote>Copyright
12089 Term Deregulation Act.</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12090 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12091 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12092 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
12093 everything else, let the content go.
12094 </para>
12095 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12096 <para>
12097 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12098 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12099 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12100 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12101 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12102 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12103 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12104 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12105 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12106 the stupid harm of the present system.
12107 </para>
12108 <para>
12109 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12110 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12111 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12112 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12113 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12114 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12115 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12116 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12117 where copyright owners could be identified.
12118 </para>
12119 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12120 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12121 <para>
12122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12123 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
12124 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12125 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12126 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12127 <!-- f1. -->
12128 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12129 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12130 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12131 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
12132 every text of the Convention has provided that <quote>the enjoyment and the
12133 exercise</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention <quote>shall not be subject
12134 to any formality.</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12135 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12136 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12137 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12138 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12139 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12140 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12141 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12142 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12143 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
12144 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12145 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
12146 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a <quote>natural right.</quote> Natural
12147 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12148 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12149 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12150 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12151 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12152 </para>
12153 <para>
12154 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12155 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12156 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12157 <quote>Walt Disney creativity</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12158 know what's protected and what's not.
12159 </para>
12160 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12161 <para>
12162 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12163 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12164 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12165 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12166 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12167 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12168 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
12169 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12170 </para>
12171 <para>
12172 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12173 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12174 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12175 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12176 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12177 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12178 </para>
12179 <para>
12180 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12181 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12182 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12183 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12184 burden
12185 imposed upon creators.
12186 </para>
12187 <para>
12188 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12189 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12190
12191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12192 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12193 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12194 the government. He has a property right over the table <quote>naturally,</quote>
12195 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12196 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12197 table.
12198 </para>
12199 <para>
12200 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12201 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12202 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12203 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12204 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12205 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12206 spread.
12207 </para>
12208 <para>
12209 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12210 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12211 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12212 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12213 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12214 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12215 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12216 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12217 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12218 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12219 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12220 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12221 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12222 system of protection for property generally.
12223 </para>
12224 <para>
12225 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12226 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12227 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12228 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12229 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12230 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12231 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12232 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12233
12234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12235 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12236 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12237 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
12238 </para>
12239 <para>
12240 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12241 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12242 didn't <quote>get.</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12243 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12244 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, <quote>short,</quote> then this
12245 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12246 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12247 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12248 </para>
12249 <para>
12250 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12251 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12252 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12253 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12254 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12255 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12256 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
12257 </para>
12258 <para>
12259 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12260 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12261 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12262 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12263 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12264 </para>
12265 <para>
12266 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12267 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12268 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12269 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12270 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12271 </para>
12272 <para>
12273 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12274 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12275 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12276 registration?
12277 </para>
12278 <para>
12279 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12280 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12281 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12282
12283 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12284 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12285 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12286 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12287 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12288 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12289 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12290 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12291 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12292 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12293 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12294 </para>
12295 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12296 <para>
12297 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12298 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12299 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12300 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12301 </para>
12302 <para>
12303 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12304 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12305 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12306 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12307 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, <quote>we are
12308 close.</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12309 something good might happen here.
12310 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12311 </para>
12312 <para>
12313 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12314 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12315 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12316 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12317 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12318 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12319 </para>
12320 <para>
12321 The MPAA argued first that Congress had <quote>firmly rejected the central
12322 concept in the proposed bill</quote>&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12323 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's <quote>firm rejection</quote> had occurred
12324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12325 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12326 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12327 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12328 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12329 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12330 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12331 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12332 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12333 argued that the bill would impose <quote>enormous</quote> costs, since a
12334 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12335 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12336 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12337 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12338 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12339 film is a valid derivative use.
12340 </para>
12341 <para>
12342 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12343 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12344 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12345 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12346 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12347 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12348 </para>
12349 <para>
12350 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12351 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12352 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12353 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12354 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12355 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12356 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12357 threat.
12358 </para>
12359 <para>
12360 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12361 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12362 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12363 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12364 sense?
12365 </para>
12366 <para>
12367
12368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12369 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12370 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12371 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12372 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12373 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12374 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12375 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12376 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12377 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12378 </para>
12379 <para>
12380 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12381 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12382 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12383 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12384 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12385 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the <quote>Dark
12386 Content</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12387 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12388 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin</primary></indexterm>
12389 </para>
12390 <para>
12391 What does this industry really want?
12392 </para>
12393 <para>
12394 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12395 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12396 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12397 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12398 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12399 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12400 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12401 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12402 first.
12403 </para>
12404 <para>
12405 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12406 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12407 its aim not the protection of <quote>property</quote> but the rejection of a
12408 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12409 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12410 theirs</emphasis>.
12411 </para>
12412 <para>
12413 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12414 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12415
12416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12417 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12418 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12419 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12420 and to share its own creation.
12421 </para>
12422 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12423 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12424 <para>
12425 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12426 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12427 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12428 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12429 block the progress of others.
12430 </para>
12431 <para>
12432 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12433 <quote>property</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12434 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12435 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing <quote>permission
12436 society.</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12437 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12438 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12439 </para>
12440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12441 </chapter>
12442 </part>
12443 <chapter label="15" id="c-conclusion">
12444 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12445 <indexterm id="idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'>
12446 <primary>antiretroviral drugs</primary>
12447 </indexterm>
12448 <indexterm id="idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'>
12449 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies</primary>
12450 </indexterm>
12451 <indexterm id="idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'>
12452 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in</primary>
12453 </indexterm>
12454 <para>
12455 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12456 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12457 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12458 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12459 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12460 </para>
12461 <para>
12462 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12463 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12464 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12465 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12466 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12467 the disease almost invisible.
12468 </para>
12469 <para>
12470 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12471 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12472 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12473 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12474 population:
12475 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12476 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12477 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, <quote>Final Report: Integrating
12478 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy</quote> (London, 2002),
12479 available at
12480 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12481 release
12482 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12483 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12484 </para></footnote>
12485 </para>
12486 <para>
12487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12488 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12489 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12490 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12491 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12492 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12493 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12494 </para>
12495 <para>
12496 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12497 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12498 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12499 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12500 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12501 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12502 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12503 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12504 changes.
12505 </para>
12506 <para>
12507 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12508 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12509 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12510 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12511 costs significantly below the market price.
12512 </para>
12513 <para>
12514 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12515 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12516 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12517 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12518 Africa from India. This is called <quote>parallel importation,</quote> and it is
12519 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12520 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12521 <para>
12522 <!-- f2. -->
12523 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12524 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12525 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12526 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12527 </para></footnote>
12528 </para>
12529 <para>
12530 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12531 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12532 characterized it, <quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa &hellip;
12533 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12534 imports.</quote><footnote><para>
12535 <!-- f3. -->
12536 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12537 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12538 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12539 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12540 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12541 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12542 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12543 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12544 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12545 Love).
12546 </para></footnote>
12547 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12548 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12549 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12550 possible trade sanctions.
12551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12552 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12553 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12554 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12555 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12556 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12557 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12558 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12559 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12560 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12561 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12562 <!-- f4. -->
12563 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12564 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12565 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12566 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12567 </para>
12568 <para>
12569 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12570 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12571 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12572 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12573 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12574 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12575 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12576 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12577 </para>
12578 <para>
12579 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12580 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12581 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12582 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12583 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12584 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12585 </para>
12586 <para>
12587 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12588 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12589 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12590 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12591 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12592 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12593 by U.S. companies.
12594 </para>
12595 <para>
12596 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12597 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12598 argument
12599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12600 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12601 <!-- f5. -->
12602 See Sabin Russell, <quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12603 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12604 May 1999, A1, available at
12605 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12606 (<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12607 system of intellectual property protection</quote>); Robert Weissman, <quote>AIDS
12608 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12609 Medicines,</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12610 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12611 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, <quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12612 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12613 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12614 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12616 </para></footnote>
12617 It was because <quote>intellectual property</quote> would be violated that these
12618 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12619 importance of <quote>intellectual property</quote> that led these government actors
12620 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12621 </para>
12622 <para>
12623 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12624 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12625 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12626 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12627 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the <quote>sanctity</quote> of an
12628 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12629 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12630 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12631 </para>
12632 <para>
12633 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12634 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12635 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12636 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12637 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12638 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12639 </para>
12640 <para>
12641 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12642 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12643 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12644 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12645 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12646 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12647 </para>
12648 <para>
12649 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12650 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12651 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, <quote>How
12652 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12653 drug would cost an American $1,500?</quote> Because there is no <quote>sound
12654 bite</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12655 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12656 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12658 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12659 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12660 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12661 idea called <quote>intellectual property.</quote>
12662 </para>
12663 <para>
12664 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12665 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12666 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12667 What is the argument?
12668 </para>
12669 <para>
12670 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12671 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12672 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12673 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12674 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12675 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12676 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12677 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12678 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12679 were balanced in just this sense.
12680 </para>
12681 <para>
12682 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12683 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12684 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12685 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12686 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12687 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12688 </para>
12689 <indexterm startref="idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'/>
12690 <indexterm startref="idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'/>
12691 <indexterm startref="idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'/>
12692 <para>
12693 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12694 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12695 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12696 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12697 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12698 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12699 our
12700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12701 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12702 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12703 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12704 this common sense open its eyes.
12705 </para>
12706 <para>
12707 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12708 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12709 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12710 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12711 to fight <quote>piracy,</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12712 the idea of <quote>creative property,</quote> while transforming real creators into
12713 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12714 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12715 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12716 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12717 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12718 produce the <quote>perfect storm</quote> for free culture.
12719 </para>
12720 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
12721 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'>
12722 <primary>biomedical research</primary>
12723 </indexterm>
12724 <para>
12725 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12726 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12727 meeting.<footnote><para>
12728 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, <quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12729 August 2003, E1, available at
12730 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, <quote>Global Group's
12731 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12732 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12733 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, <quote>U.S. Official
12734 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12735 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12736 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12737 </para></footnote>
12738 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12739 a meeting to discuss <quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12740 goods.</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12741 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12742 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12743 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12744 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12745 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12746 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12747 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12748 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12749 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12750 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12752 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12753 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12754 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12755 in the early 1980s. And it included <quote>open source and free software.</quote>
12756 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12757 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12758 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12759 </para>
12760 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'/>
12761 <para>
12762 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12763 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12764 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12765 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12766 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12767 </para>
12768 <para>
12769 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12770 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12771 meeting.
12772 </para></footnote>
12773 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12774 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12775 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12776 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12777 property issues.
12778 </para>
12779 <para>
12780 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12781 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12782 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12783 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12784 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12785 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12786 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12787 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12788 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12789 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12790 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12791 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12792 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12793 talk about an <quote>Information Society</quote> unless one also talked about the
12794 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12795 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12796 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12797 stuff of
12798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12799 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12800 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12801 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12802 </para>
12803 <para>
12804 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12805 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12806 thus the meeting about <quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12807 public goods</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12808 </para>
12809 <para>
12810 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12811 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is <quote>open source
12812 and free software.</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12813 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12814 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12815 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12816 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12817 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12818 rather than <quote>proprietary software,</quote> for their own internal uses.
12819 </para>
12820 <para>
12821 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12822 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12823 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12824 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12825 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12826 operating system, the most famous bit of <quote>free software</quote>&mdash;and IBM
12827 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support <quote>open source and
12828 free software</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12829 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12830 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12831 <!-- f8. -->
12832 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12833 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12834 <quote>open source</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12835 principal opposition is to <quote>free software</quote> licensed under a <quote>copyleft</quote>
12836 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12837 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, <quote>The Future
12838 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
12839 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12840 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12841 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12842 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12843 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12844 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12845 May 2001), available at
12846 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12847 </para></footnote>
12848 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12849 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft</quote> licenses</primary></indexterm>
12850 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12851 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12852 </para>
12853 <para>
12854 More important for our purposes, to support <quote>open source and free
12855 software</quote> is not to oppose copyright. <quote>Open source and free software</quote>
12856 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12857 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12858 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12859 by
12860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12861 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12862 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12863 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12864 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12865 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12866 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12867 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12868 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12869 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12870 </para>
12871 <para>
12872 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12873 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12874 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12875 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12876 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12877 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12878 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12879 <!-- f9. -->
12880 Krim, <quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,</quote> available at <ulink
12881 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12882 </para></footnote>
12883 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12884 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
12885 </para>
12886 <para>
12887 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12888 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12889 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12890 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12891 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12892 its lobbying efforts.
12893 </para>
12894 <para>
12895 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12896 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12897 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12898 Office, explained that <quote>open-source software runs counter to the
12899 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.</quote>
12900 She is quoted as saying, <quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12901 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12902 goals of WIPO.</quote>
12903 </para>
12904 <para>
12905 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12906 </para>
12907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12908 <para>
12909 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12910 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12911 right called <quote>copyright</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12912 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it <quote>runs counter</quote> to the mission
12913 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12914 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12915 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12916 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12917 </para>
12918 <para>
12919 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to <quote>promote</quote>
12920 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12921 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12922 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12923 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12924 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12925 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12926 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12927 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12928 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12929 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12930 </para>
12931 <para>
12932 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12933 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12934 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12935 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12936 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to <quote>waive</quote> or
12937 <quote>disclaim</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12938 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
12939 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12940 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12941 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12942 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
12943 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12944 </para>
12945 <para>
12946 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12947 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,</quote> she's
12948 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12950 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12951 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from <quote>waiving</quote> or
12952 <quote>disclaiming</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12953 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12954 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12955 way possible.
12956 </para>
12957 <para>
12958 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12959 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called <quote>feudalism.</quote> Under
12960 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12961 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12962 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12963 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12964 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12965 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12966 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12967 that control.
12968 </para>
12969 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12970 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12971 <para>
12972 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12973 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12974 <!-- f10. -->
12975 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
12976 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12977 </para></footnote>
12978 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12979 choice now is whether that information society will be
12980 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
12981 toward the feudal.
12982 </para>
12983 <para>
12984 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12985 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12986 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12987 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12988 </para>
12989 <blockquote>
12990 <para>
12991 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12992 it should be (<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12993 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12994 not simply to promote intellectual property rights</quote>), not as it is. If
12995 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12996 say anything wrong. But in the world
12997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12998 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12999 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13000 </para>
13001 </blockquote>
13002 <para>
13003 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13004 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13005 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13006 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13007 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13008 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13009 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13010 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13011 </para>
13012 <para>
13013 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13014 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13015 <quote>goal</quote> of a government should be <quote>to promote the right balance</quote> of
13016 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13017 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. <quote>Typical for
13018 an academic,</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13019 </para>
13020 <para>
13021 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13022 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13023 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13024 our own country's history).
13025 </para>
13026 <para>
13027 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13028 government should be to <quote>seek balance,</quote> then count me with the silly,
13029 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13030 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13031 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13032 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13033 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13034 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
13035 democracy in the world, become?
13036 </para>
13037 <para>
13038 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13039 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13040 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13042 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13043 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
13044 </para>
13045 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
13046 <para>
13047 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
13048 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
13049 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
13050 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
13051 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
13052 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
13053 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
13054 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
13055 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
13056 hearings and a different result.
13057 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
13058 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
13059 </para>
13060 <para>
13061 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13062 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13063 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13064 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13065 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13066 concentration in the media.
13067 </para>
13068 <para>
13069 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13070 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13071 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13072 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13073 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13074 </para>
13075 <para>
13076 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13077 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13078 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13079 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13080 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13081 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
13082 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
13083 </para>
13084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13085 <para>
13086 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13087 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13088 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13089 Americans have a long history of fighting <quote>big,</quote> wisely or not. That
13090 we could be motivated to fight <quote>big</quote> again is not something new.
13091 </para>
13092 <para>
13093 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13094 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13095 the idea of <quote>intellectual property.</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13096 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13097 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13098 called <quote>property</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13099 </para>
13100 <para>
13101 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13102 of our tragedy.
13103 </para>
13104 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
13105 <para>
13106 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13107 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
13108 <!-- f11. -->
13109 John Borland, <quote>RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers,</quote> CNET News.com, September
13110 2003, available at
13111 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
13112 R. La Monica, <quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,</quote> CNN/Money, 8 September
13113 2003, available at
13114 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
13115 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, <quote>Sued for a Song,
13116 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers,</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
13117 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, <quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13118 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13119 Defendants,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13120 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,</quote> <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
13121 available at
13122 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
13123 </para></footnote>
13124 Eminem has just been sued for <quote>sampling</quote> someone else's
13125 music.<footnote><para>
13126 <!-- f12. -->
13127 Jon Wiederhorn, <quote>Eminem Gets Sued &hellip; by a Little Old Lady,</quote>
13128 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
13129 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
13130 </para></footnote>
13131 The story about Bob Dylan <quote>stealing</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13132 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13133 <!-- f13. -->
13134 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, <quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13135 Dylan Songs,</quote> Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13136 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13138 </para></footnote>
13139 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
13140 anonymous&mdash;reports <quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13141 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13142 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13143 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13144 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.</quote> Congressmen are
13145 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13146 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13147 kids who use a computer to share content.
13148 </para>
13149 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
13150 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
13151 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
13152 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
13153 <indexterm><primary>BBC</primary></indexterm>
13154 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in</primary></indexterm>
13155 <para>
13156 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13157 that it will build a <quote>Creative Archive,</quote> from which British citizens can
13158 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13159 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,</quote> BBC press release,
13160 24 August 2003, available at
13161 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13162 </para></footnote>
13163 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13164 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13165 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13166 country.<footnote><para>
13167 <!-- f15. -->
13168 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,</quote> Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
13169 available at
13170 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13171 </para></footnote>
13172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13173 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13174 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13175 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13176 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13177 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13178 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13179 day into the Causbys.
13180 </para>
13181 <para>
13182 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13183 potential is ever to be realized.
13184
13185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13186
13187 </para>
13188 </chapter>
13189 <chapter label="16" id="c-afterword">
13190 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13191 <para>
13192
13193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13194 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13195 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13196 maps what might be done.
13197 </para>
13198 <para>
13199 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13200 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13201 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13202 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13203 </para>
13204 <para>
13205 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13206 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13207 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13208 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13209 is so important.
13210 </para>
13211 <para>
13212 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13213 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13214 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13215 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13216 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13217 </para>
13218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13219
13220 <section id="usnow">
13221 <title>US, NOW</title>
13222 <para>
13223 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13224 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13225 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13226 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13227 </para>
13228 <para>
13229 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13230 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13231 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;<quote>All Rights
13232 Reserved</quote>&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;<quote>No Rights
13233 Reserved.</quote> The <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13234 permission before you <quote>use</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The <quote>No
13235 Rights Reserved</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13236 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13237 </para>
13238 <para>
13239 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13240 tilted in the <quote>no rights reserved</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13241 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13242 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13243 the
13244
13245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13246 original design of the Internet was <quote>no rights reserved.</quote> Content was
13247 <quote>taken</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13248 unprotected.
13249 </para>
13250 <para>
13251 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13252 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13253 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13254 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13255 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13256 architecture made the effective default <quote>no rights reserved,</quote> the
13257 future architecture will make the effective default <quote>all rights
13258 reserved.</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13259 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13260 content requires permission. The <quote>cut and paste</quote> world that defines
13261 the Internet today will become a <quote>get permission to cut and paste</quote>
13262 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13263 </para>
13264 <para>
13265 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
13266 <quote>all rights reserved</quote> nor <quote>no rights reserved</quote> but <quote>some rights
13267 reserved</quote>&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13268 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13269 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13270 before.
13271 </para>
13272
13273 <section id="examples">
13274 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13275 <para>
13276 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13277 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13278 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13279 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13280 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13281 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13282 to your neighbors or boss. The <quote>privacy</quote> of your browsing habits was
13283 assured.
13284 </para>
13285 <para>
13286 What made it assured?
13287 </para>
13288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13289 <para>
13290 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13291 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
13292 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13293 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13294 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13295 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13296 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13297 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13298 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13299 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13300 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13301 (there is no law protecting <quote>privacy</quote> in public places), and in many
13302 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13303 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13304 </para>
13305 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13306 <para>
13307 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13308 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13309 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13310 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13311 <quote>recently viewed</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13312 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13313 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any <quote>privacy</quote>
13314 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13315 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet</primary></indexterm>
13316 </para>
13317 <para>
13318 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13319 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13320 people should have the <quote>right</quote> to browse in a library without the
13321 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13322 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13323 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13324 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13325 disappears.
13326 </para>
13327 <para>
13328 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define <quote>privacy</quote>
13329 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13330 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13331 friction did.<footnote><para>
13332 <!-- f1. -->
13333
13334 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, <quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13335 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13336 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13337
13338 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13339 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13340 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13341 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13342 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13343 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13344 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13345
13346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13347 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13348 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13349 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13350 </para>
13351 <para>
13352 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13353 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13354 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13355 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13356 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13357 care much about controlling their software.
13358 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
13359 </para>
13360 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13361 <para>
13362 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13363 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13364 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13365 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13366 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13367 people's work.
13368 </para>
13369 <para>
13370 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13371 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13372 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13373 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13374 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13375 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13376 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13377 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13378 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13379 anything else?
13380 </para>
13381 <para>
13382 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13383 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13384 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13385 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13386 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13387 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13388 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13389 </para>
13390 <para>
13391 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13392 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13394 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13395 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13396 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13397 fundamentally weakened.
13398 </para>
13399 <para>
13400 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13401 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13402 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's <quote>Linux</quote>
13403 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13404 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13405 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13406 </para>
13407 <para>
13408 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13409 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13410 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13411 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13412 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13413 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13414 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13415 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13416 byproduct.
13417 </para>
13418 <para>
13419 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13420 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13421 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13422 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13423 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13424 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13425 </para>
13426 <para>
13427 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13428 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13429 scientific journals are produced.
13430 </para>
13431 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13432 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13433 </indexterm>
13434 <para>
13435 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13436 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13437 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13438 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13439 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13440 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13441 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13442 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13443 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13444 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13445 and Westlaw are also free
13446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13447 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13448 Court opinion through their respective services.
13449 </para>
13450 <para>
13451 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13452 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13453 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13454 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13455 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13456 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13457 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13458 </para>
13459 <para>
13460 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13461 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13462 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13463 </para>
13464 <para>
13465 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13466 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13467 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13468 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13469 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13470 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13471 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13472 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13473 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13474 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13475 </para>
13476 <para>
13477 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13478 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13479 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13480 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13481 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13482 granted before.
13483 </para>
13484 <para>
13485 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13486 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13487 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13488 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13490 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13491 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13492 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13493 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13494 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13495 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13496 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13497 </para>
13498 <para>
13499 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13500 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13501 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13502 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13503 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13504 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13505 and science.
13506 </para>
13507 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13508
13509 </section>
13510 <section id="oneidea">
13511 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13512 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13513 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13514 </indexterm>
13515 <para>
13516 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13517 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13518 </para>
13519 <para>
13520 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13521 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13522 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13523 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13524 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13525 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13526 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13527 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13528 make this possible.
13529 </para>
13530 <para>
13531 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13532 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13533 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13534 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13535 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13536 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13537 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13538 human-readable description, and
13539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13540 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13541 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13542 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13543 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13544 different than the <quote>All</quote> or <quote>No</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13545 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13546 certain freedoms are given.
13547 </para>
13548 <para>
13549 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13550 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13551 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13552 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13553 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13554 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (<quote>share and share
13555 alike</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13556 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13557 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13558 </para>
13559 <para>
13560 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13561 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13562 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13563 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13564 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13565 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13566 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13567 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13568 a public domain.
13569 </para>
13570 <para>
13571 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13572 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13573 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13574 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13575 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13576 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13578 of content (<quote>content conducers,</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13579 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13580 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13581 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13582 </para>
13583 <para>
13584 The aim is not to fight the <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13585 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13586 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13587 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13588 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13589 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13590 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13591 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13592 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13593 to begin to build those rules.
13594 </para>
13595 <para>
13596 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13597 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13598 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13599 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13600 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13601 </para>
13602 <para>
13603 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13604 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13605 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13606 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13607 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13608 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13609 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13610 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13611 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13612 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13613 </para>
13614 <para>
13615 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13616 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13617 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13618 was a total success.
13619 </para>
13620 <para>
13621 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13622 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13624 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13625 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13626 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13627 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13628 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13629 well.
13630 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)</primary></indexterm>
13631 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13632 </para>
13633 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy</primary></indexterm>
13634 <indexterm><primary>rap music</primary></indexterm>
13635 <para>
13636 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13637 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13638 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13639 reasons. Many who use the <quote>sampling license</quote> do so because anything
13640 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13641 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13642 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13643 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13644 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13645 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13646 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13647 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not <quote>allow</quote>
13648 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13649 high<footnote><para>
13650 <!-- f2. -->
13651 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13652 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13653 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13654 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13655 </para></footnote>),
13656 these artists release into the creative environment content
13657 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13658 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter</primary></indexterm>
13659 </para>
13660 <para>
13661 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13662 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13663 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13664 you are effectively saying you believe in the <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote>
13665 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13666 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13667 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13668 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13669 this notion of <quote>Some Rights Reserved,</quote> and gives many the chance to
13670 say it to others.
13671 </para>
13672 <para>
13673 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13674 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13675 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13676 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13677
13678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13679 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13680 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13681 </para>
13682 <para>
13683 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13684 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13685 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13686 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13687 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13688 steps are possible.
13689 </para>
13690 <para>
13691 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13692 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13693 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13694 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13695 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13696 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13697 creativity to spread more easily.
13698 </para>
13699 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13700
13701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13702 </section>
13703 </section>
13704 <section id="themsoon">
13705 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13706 <para>
13707 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13708 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13709 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13710 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13711 changes that we need.
13712 </para>
13713 <para>
13714 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13715 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13716 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13717 to our end.
13718 </para>
13719
13720 <section id="formalities">
13721 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13722 <para>
13723 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13724 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13725 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13726 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13727 </para>
13728 <para>
13729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13730 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13731 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13732 protected.
13733 </para>
13734 <para>
13735 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13736 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13737 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13738 default is control, and <quote>formalities</quote> are banished.
13739 </para>
13740 <para>
13741 Why?
13742 </para>
13743 <para>
13744 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13745 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13746 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13747 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13748 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13749 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13750 formalities were getting in the way.
13751 </para>
13752 <para>
13753 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13754 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13755 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13756 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13757 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13758 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13759 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13760 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13761 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13762 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13763 </para>
13764 <para>
13765 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13766 <!-- f1. -->
13767 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13768 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13769 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13770 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13771 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13772 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13773 </para>
13774 <para>
13775 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13776 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13777 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13778 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13779 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13780 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13781 developed by others.
13782 </para>
13783
13784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13785
13786 <section id="registration">
13787 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13788 <para>
13789 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13790 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13791 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13792 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13793 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13794 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13795 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13796 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13797 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13798 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13799 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13800 </para>
13801 <para>
13802 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13803 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13804 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13805 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13806 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13807 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13808 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13809 </para>
13810 <para>
13811 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13812 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13813 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13814 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13815 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13816 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13817 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13818 with which registration occurs up.
13819 </para>
13820 <para>
13821 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13822 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13823 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13824 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13825 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13826 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13827 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13828 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13829 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13831 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13832 </para>
13833
13834 </section>
13835 <section id="marking">
13836 <title>MARKING</title>
13837 <para>
13838 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13839 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13840 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13841 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13842 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13843 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13844 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13845 uniformly across all media.
13846 </para>
13847 <para>
13848 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13849 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13850 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13851 use the work.
13852 </para>
13853 <para>
13854 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13855 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13856 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13857 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13858 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13859 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13860 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13861 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13862 </para>
13863 <para>
13864 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13865 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13866 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13867 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13868 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13869 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13870 <!-- f2. -->
13871 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13872 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13873 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13874 </para></footnote>
13875 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be <quote>use unless someone
13876 complains.</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13877 stop using the work in any new
13878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13879 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13880 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13881 their work.
13882 </para>
13883 <para>
13884 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13885 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13886 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13887 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13888 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13889 </para>
13890 <para>
13891 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13892 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13893 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13894 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13895 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13896 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13897 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13898 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13899 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13900 other important functions.
13901 </para>
13902 <para>
13903 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13904 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13905 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13906 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13907 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13908 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13909 </para>
13910 <para>
13911 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13912 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13913 make things unclear.
13914 </para>
13915 <para>
13916 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13917 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13918 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13919 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13920 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13921 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13922 </para>
13923
13924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13925 </section>
13926 </section>
13927 <section id="shortterms">
13928 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13929 <para>
13930 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13931 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13932 natural authors.
13933 </para>
13934 <para>
13935 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13936 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13937 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13938 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13939 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13940 copyright term.<footnote><para>
13941
13942 <!-- f3. -->
13943 <quote>A Radical Rethink,</quote> <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13944 available at
13945 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13946 </para></footnote>
13947 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13948 </para>
13949 <para>
13950 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13951 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13952 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13953 terms.
13954 </para>
13955 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13956 <listitem><para>
13957 <!-- (1) -->
13958 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13959 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13960 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13961 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13962 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13963 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13964 </para></listitem>
13965 <listitem><para>
13966 <!-- (2) -->
13967 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
13968 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13969 fuzziness of <quote>fair use,</quote> and the distinction between <quote>ideas</quote> and
13970 <quote>expression.</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13971 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13972 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13973 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13974 <quote>lawyer-free zone</quote> makes the complexities of <quote>fair use</quote> and
13975 <quote>idea/expression</quote> less necessary to navigate.
13976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13977 </para></listitem>
13978 <listitem><para>
13979 <!-- (3) -->
13980 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13981 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13982 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13983 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13984 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13985 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13986 pension.<footnote><para>
13987 <!-- f4. -->
13988 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13989 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13990 available at
13991 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13992 </para></footnote>
13993 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13994 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13995 single form.
13996 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
13997 </para></listitem>
13998 <listitem><para>
13999 <!-- (4) -->
14000 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
14001 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
14002 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
14003 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
14004 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
14005 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
14006 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
14007 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
14008 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
14009 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14010 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14011 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14012 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14013 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
14014 </orderedlist>
14015 <para>
14016 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
14017 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
14018 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14019 same.
14020 </para>
14021 <para>
14022 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas <quote>radical.</quote> (After all, I
14023 call them <quote>extremists.</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14024 than the term under Richard Nixon. How <quote>radical</quote> can it be to ask for
14025 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14026 </para>
14027
14028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14029
14030 </section>
14031 <section id="freefairuse">
14032 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
14033 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and</primary></indexterm>
14034 <indexterm>
14035 <primary>property rights</primary>
14036 <secondary>air traffic vs.</secondary>
14037 </indexterm>
14038 <para>
14039 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14040 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14041 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14042 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14043 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14044 the emergence of that new technology.
14045 </para>
14046 <para>
14047 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors <quote>exclusive
14048 right</quote> to <quote>their writings.</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14049 right to <quote>their writings</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14050 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14051 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14052 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14053 though that movie is not <quote>my writing.</quote>
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
14057 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14058 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
14059 <!-- f5. -->
14060 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14061 University Press, 1967), 32.
14062 </para></footnote>
14063 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14064 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14065 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14066 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin</primary></indexterm>
14067 </para>
14068 <blockquote>
14069 <para>
14070 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14071 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14072 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14073 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
14074 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
14075 </para></footnote>
14076 </para>
14077 </blockquote>
14078 <para>
14079 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14080 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14081 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14082 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14083 Consider each limitation in turn.
14084 </para>
14085 <para>
14086 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14087 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14088 sense to protect John
14089
14090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14091 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14092 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14093 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14094 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14095 after the creative work is done.
14096 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
14097 </para>
14098 <para>
14099 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14100 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14101 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14102 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14103 material. When all <quote>reuse</quote> of creative material was within the control
14104 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14105 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14106 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14107 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14108 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14109 the creative process. Smothers it.
14110 </para>
14111 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
14112 <para>
14113 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14114 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14115 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
14116 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
14117 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14118 much more sense.
14119 </para>
14120 <para>
14121 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14122 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14123 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14124 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
14125 <para>
14126 <!-- f7. -->
14127 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14128 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14129 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
14130 </para></footnote>
14131 His view is that the law should be written so that
14132 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14133 </para>
14134 <para>
14135 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14136 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14137 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14138 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14139 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14140 </para>
14141 <para>
14142 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14144 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14145 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14146 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14147 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14148 </para>
14149 </section>
14150
14151 <section id="liberatemusic">
14152 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14153 <para>
14154 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14155 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14156 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
14157 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14158 battles around the sharing of music.
14159 </para>
14160 <para>
14161 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14162 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14163 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14164 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14165 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14166 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14167 innovation on the network.
14168 </para>
14169 <para>
14170 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14171 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14172 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14173 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14174 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14175 </para>
14176 <para>
14177 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14178 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14179 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14180 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
14181 four different kinds of sharing:
14182 </para>
14183 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14184 <listitem><para>
14185 <!-- A. -->
14186 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14187 for purchasing CDs.
14188 </para></listitem>
14189 <listitem><para>
14190 <!-- B. -->
14191 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14192 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14193 </para></listitem>
14194 <listitem><para>
14195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14196 <!-- C. -->
14197 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14198 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14199 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14200 </para></listitem>
14201 <listitem><para>
14202 <!-- D. -->
14203 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14204 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14205 owner plainly endorses.
14206 </para></listitem>
14207 </orderedlist>
14208 <para>
14209 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14210 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14211 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14212 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14213 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14214 significantly weakened.
14215 </para>
14216 <para>
14217 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
14218 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14219 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14220 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14221 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14222 networks.
14223 </para>
14224 <para>
14225 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14226 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14227 should respond.
14228 </para>
14229 <para>
14230 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14231 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14232 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14233 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14234 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
14235 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14236 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14237 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14238 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14239 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14240 </para>
14241 <para>
14242 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14243 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14244 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14246 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14247 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14248 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14249 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14250 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14251 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
14252 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
14253 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14254 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14255 </para>
14256 <indexterm><primary>cell phones, music streamed over</primary></indexterm>
14257 <para>
14258 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14259 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
14260 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14261 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
14262 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14263 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14264 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14265 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14266 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14267 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14268 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14269 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14270 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14271 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14272 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14273 paying for this content even though <quote>free</quote> content is available in the
14274 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14275 <!-- f8. -->
14276 See, for example, <quote>Music Media Watch,</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14277 April 2002, available at
14278 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14279 </para></footnote>
14280
14281 </para>
14282 <para>
14283 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14284 present: It is emphatically temporary. The <quote>problem</quote> with file
14285 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14286 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14287 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14288 makers today to be <quote>solving</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14289 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14290 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14291 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14292 artists get paid, during
14293
14294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14295 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14296 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14297 </para>
14298 <para>
14299 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different <quote>problems</quote>
14300 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14301 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14302 <quote>problem</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14303 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14304 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14305 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14306 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14307 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14308 </para>
14309 <para>
14310 Type C content raises a different <quote>problem.</quote> This is content that was,
14311 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14312 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14313 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14314 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14315 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14316 way that returns something to the artist.
14317 </para>
14318 <para>
14319 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14320 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14321 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14322 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14323 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14324 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14325 from the author's perspective, this <quote>sharing</quote> of his content without
14326 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14327 </para>
14328 <para>
14329 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14330 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14331 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14332 providers would be free, under this rule, to <quote>share</quote> that content,
14333 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14334 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14335 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14336 </para>
14337 <para>
14338
14339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14340 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14341 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14342 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14343 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14344 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14345 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14346 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14347 trade.
14348 </para>
14349 <para>
14350 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14351 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14352 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14353 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14354 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14355 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14356 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14357 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14358 </para>
14359 <para>
14360 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14361 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14362 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14363 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14364 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14365 delivering and accessing content.
14366 </para>
14367 <para>
14368 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14369 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14370 </para>
14371 <para>
14372 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14373 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14374 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14375 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14376 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14377 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14378 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14379 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14380 </para>
14381 <para>
14382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14383 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14384 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14385 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14386 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14387 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14388 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14389 </para>
14390 <para>
14391 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14392 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14393 <para>
14394 <!-- f9. -->
14395 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'>
14396 <primary>artists</primary>
14397 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
14398 </indexterm>
14399 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14400 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14401 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14402 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14403 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14404 2004), ch. 6, available at
14405 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14406 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14407 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14408 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, <quote>Impose a
14409 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,</quote> available at
14410 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, <quote>Who's Holding Back
14411 Broadband?</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14412 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14413 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14414 available at
14415 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14416 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14417 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14418 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14419 2002, available at
14420 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, <quote>Getting Copyright Right,</quote>
14421 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14422 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14423 McCullagh, <quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,</quote> CNET News.com, 27 August
14424 2002, available at
14425 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14426 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14427 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14428 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14429 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14430 debate by about a decade. See
14431 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14432 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14433 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14434 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14435 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'/>
14436 </para></footnote>
14437 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14438 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14439 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14440 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14441 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14442 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14443 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14444 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14445 tax.
14446 </para>
14447 <para>
14448 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14449 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14450 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14451 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14452 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14453 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14454 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14455 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14456 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14457 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14458 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14459 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14460 controlling access.
14461 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14462 </para>
14463 <indexterm>
14464 <primary>artists</primary>
14465 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
14466 </indexterm>
14467 <para>
14468 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14469 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14470 the system supports the widest range of <quote>semiotic democracy</quote>
14471 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14472 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14473 limits on derivative
14474
14475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14476 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14477 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14478 allowed to do with the content itself.
14479 </para>
14480 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
14481 <para>
14482 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14483 <quote>harm</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14484 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14485 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14486 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14487 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat <quote>free</quote> by being
14488 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14489 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14490 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14491 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14492 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14493 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14494 on-line.
14495 </para>
14496 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
14497 <para>
14498 This competition has already occurred against the background of <quote>free</quote>
14499 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14500 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14501 that, there is nothing impossible at all about <quote>competing with free.</quote>
14502 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14503 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14504 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14505 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with <quote>first class</quote> seats, and meals
14506 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14507 finding ways to compete with <quote>free.</quote>
14508 </para>
14509 <para>
14510 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14511 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14512 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14513 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14514 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14515 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14516 the law.
14517 </para>
14518 <para>
14519 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14520 </para>
14521 <para>
14522
14523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14524 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14525 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14526 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14527 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14528 create.
14529 </para>
14530 <para>
14531 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14532 by
14533 </para>
14534 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14535 <listitem><para>
14536 <!-- 1. -->
14537 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14538 </para></listitem>
14539 <listitem><para>
14540 <!-- 2. -->
14541 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14542 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14543 statute;
14544 </para></listitem>
14545 <listitem><para>
14546 <!-- 3. -->
14547 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14548 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14549 </para></listitem>
14550 </orderedlist>
14551 <para>
14552 But what if <quote>piracy</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14553 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14554 consumers continue to <quote>take</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14555 something then?
14556 </para>
14557 <para>
14558 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14559 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14560 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14561 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14562 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14563 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14564 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14565 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14566 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14567 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14568 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14569 pirates.
14570 </para>
14571 <para>
14572 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14573 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14574 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14575
14576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14577 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14578 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14579 </para>
14580 </section>
14581
14582 <section id="firelawyers">
14583 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14584 <para>
14585 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14586 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14587 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14588 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14589 </para>
14590 <para>
14591 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14592 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14593 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14594 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14595 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14596 strong view queers the law.
14597 </para>
14598 <para>
14599 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14600 <quote>radical</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14601 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14602 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14603 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14604 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14605 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14606 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14607 <!-- f10. -->
14608 Lawrence Lessig, <quote>Copyright's First Amendment</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14609 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14610 </para></footnote>
14611
14612 </para>
14613 <para>
14614 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14615 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14616 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14617 </para>
14618 <para>
14619 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14620 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14621 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14622 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14623 <!-- f11. -->
14624 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14625 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14626 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14627 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14628 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14629 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14630 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14631 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14632 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14633 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?</quote> working paper, June 2003,
14634 available at
14635 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14636 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14637 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14638 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14639 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14640 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14641 </para></footnote>
14642 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14643 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14644 them it works.
14645 </para>
14646 <para>
14647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14648 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14649 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14650 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14651 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14652 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14653 practically never be done.
14654 </para>
14655 <para>
14656 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14657 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14658 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14659 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14660 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14661 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14662 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14663 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14664 </para>
14665 <para>
14666 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14667 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14668 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14669 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14670 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14671 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14672 </para>
14673 <para>
14674 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14675 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14676 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14677 its review.
14678 </para>
14679 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid</primary></indexterm>
14680 <para>
14681 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14682 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14683 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14684 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14685 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14686 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14687 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14688 </para>
14689 <para>
14690 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14691 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14692
14693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14694 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14695 simple pragmatic question: <quote>Will it do good?</quote> When challenged about
14696 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, <quote>Why not?</quote>
14697 </para>
14698 <para>
14699 We should ask, <quote>Why?</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14700 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14701 keep your lawyers away.
14702 </para>
14703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14704 </section>
14705 </section>
14706 </chapter>
14707 <chapter label="17" id="c-notes">
14708 <title>NOTES</title>
14709 <para>
14710 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14711 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14712 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14713 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14714 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14715 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14716 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14717 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14718 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14719 the material.
14720 </para>
14721 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14722
14723 </chapter>
14724 <chapter label="18" id="c-acknowledgments">
14725 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14726 <para>
14727 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14728 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14729 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14730 to him that this book is dedicated.
14731 </para>
14732 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
14733 <para>
14734 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14735 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14736 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14737 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14738 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14739 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14740 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14741 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14742 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14743 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14744 critical eye on much of this.
14745 </para>
14746 <para>
14747 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14748 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14749 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14750 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14751 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14752 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14753 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14754 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14755 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14756 </para>
14757 <para>
14758 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14759 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14760 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14761 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14762 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14763 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14764 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14765 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14766 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14767 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14768 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14769 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14770 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14771 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14772 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, <quote>Wink,</quote> Roger Wood, <quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,</quote>
14773 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14774 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14775 a bunch of great replies.)
14776 </para>
14777 <para>
14778 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14779 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14780 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14781 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14782 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14783 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14784 throughout this book.
14785 </para>
14786 <para>
14787 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14788 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14789 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14790 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14791 </para>
14792 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->
14793
14794 </chapter>
14795 <index></index>
14796 </book>