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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 </para>
104
105 <para>
106 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 LAWRENCE LESSIG
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS
118 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
119 York, New York
120 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
121 <sbr/>All rights reserved
122 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
129 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
132 <sbr/>p. cm.
133 <sbr/>Includes index.
134 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
135 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
136 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
137 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
138 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
139 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
141 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
142 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 </para>
144
145 <para>
146 &translationblock;
147 </para>
148
149 <para>
150 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
151 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
152 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
153 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
154 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
155 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
156 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
157 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
158 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
159 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
160 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
161 </para>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
163
164 <para>
165 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
166 it continues still.
167 </para>
168
169 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
170 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
171 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
172 </figure>
173
174 <toc id="toc"></toc>
175
176 <lot>
177 <title>List of figures</title>
178 </lot>
179
180 <!--
181 c PREFACE xiii
182 c INTRODUCTION
183 c "PIRACY"
184 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
185 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
186 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
187 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
188 2 Film
189 2 Recorded Music
190 2 Radio
191 2 Cable TV
192 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
193 2 Piracy I
194 2 Piracy II
195 c "PROPERTY"
196 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
197 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
198 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
199 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
200 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
201 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
202 2 Beginnings
203 2 Law: Duration
204 2 Law: Scope
205 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
206 2 Architecture and Law: Force
207 2 Market: Concentration
208 2 Together
209 c PUZZLES
210 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
211 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
212 2 Constraining Creators
213 2 Constraining Innovators
214 2 Corrupting Citizens
215 c BALANCES
216 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
217 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
218 c CONCLUSION
219 c AFTERWORD
220 1 Us, Now
221 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
222 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
223 1 Them, Soon
224 2 1. More Formalities
225 3 Registration and Renewal
226 3 Marking
227 2 2. Shorter Terms
228 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
229 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
230 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
231 c NOTES
232 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
233 c INDEX
234 -->
235
236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
237
238 </chapter>
239 <chapter id="c-preface">
240 <title>PREFACE</title>
241 <para>
242 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
243 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
244 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
245 </para>
246 <blockquote>
247 <para>
248 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
249 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
250 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
251 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
252 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
253 </para></footnote>
254 </para>
255 </blockquote>
256 <para>
257 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
258 software,
259 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
260 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
261 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
262 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
263 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
264 </para>
265 <para>
266 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
267 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
268 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
270 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
271 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
272 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
273 </para>
274 <para>
275 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
276 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
277 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
278 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
279 </para>
280 <para>
281 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
282 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
283 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
284 freesoftware movement<footnote>
285 <para>
286 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
287 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
288 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
289 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
290 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
291 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
292 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
293 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
294 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
295 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
296 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
297 or of creators from the past.
298 </para>
299 <para>
300 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
301 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
302 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
303 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
304 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
305 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
306 culture deem fundamental.
307 </para>
308 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
309 <para>
310 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
311 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
312 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
313 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
314 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
315 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
316 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
317 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
318 he asked,
319 </para>
320 <blockquote>
321 <para>
322 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
323 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
324 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
325 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
326 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
327 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
328 </para></footnote>
329 </para>
330 </blockquote>
331 <para>
332 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
333 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
334 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
335 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
336 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
337 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
338 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
339 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
340 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
341 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
342 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
343 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
344 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
345 that this work is "merely" derivative.
346 </para>
347 <para>
348 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
349 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
350 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
351 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
352 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
353 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
354 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
355 future
356 if we change the path we are on right now.
357 xv
358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
359 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
360 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
361 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
362 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
363 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
364 what I advance here.
365 </para>
366 <para>
367 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
368 between
369 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
370 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
371 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
372 property
373 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
374 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
375 culture
376 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
377 </para>
378
379 </chapter>
380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
381
382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
383 <chapter id="c-introduction">
384 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
385 <para>
386 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
387 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
388 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
389 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
390 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
391 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
392 </para>
393 <para>
394 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
395 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
396 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
397 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
398 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
399 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
400 </para></footnote>
401 For many
402 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
403 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
404 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
405 </para>
406 <para>
407 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
408 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
409 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
410 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
411 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
412 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
413 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
414 </para>
415 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
416 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
417 <para>
418 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
419 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
420 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
421 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
422 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
423 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
424 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
425 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
426 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
427 </para>
428 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
429 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
430 <para>
431 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
432 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
433 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
434 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
435 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
436 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
437 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
438 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
439 </para>
440 <blockquote>
441 <para>
442 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
443 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
444 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
445 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
446 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
447 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
448 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
449 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
450 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
451 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
452 <para>
453 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
454 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
455 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
456 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
457 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
458 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
459 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
460 1112&ndash;13.
461 </para></footnote>
462 </para>
463 </blockquote>
464 <para>
465 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
466 </para>
467 <para>
468 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
469 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
470 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
472 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
473 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
474 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
475 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
476 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
477 </para>
478 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
479 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
480 <para>
481 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
482 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
483 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
484 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
485 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
486 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
487 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
488 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
489 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
490 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
491 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
492 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
493 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
494 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
495 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
496 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
497 </para>
498 <para>
499 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
500 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
501 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
502 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
503 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
504 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
505 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
506 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
507 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
508 understanding of radio.
509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
510 </para>
511 <para>
512 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
513 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
514 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
515 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
516 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
517 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
518 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
519 much less transmitter power and static.
520 </para>
521 <para>
522 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
523 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
524 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
525 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
526 seventeen
527 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
528 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
529 device,
530 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
531 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
532 modulation
533 at two and a half meters."
534 </para>
535 <para>
536 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
537 </para>
538 <blockquote>
539 <para>
540 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
541 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
542 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
543 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
544 piano
545 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
546 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
547 "music box."<footnote><para>
548 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
549 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
550 </para></footnote>
551 </para>
552 </blockquote>
553 <para>
554 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
555 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
556 Armstrong
557 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
558 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
559 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
560 owned by a handful of networks.
561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
562 </para>
563 <para>
564 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
565 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
566 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
567 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
568 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
569 </para>
570 <blockquote>
571 <para>
572 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
573 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
574 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
575 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
576 Electronic
577 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
578
579 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
580 </para></footnote>
581 </para>
582 </blockquote>
583 <para>
584 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
585 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
586 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
587 described,
588 </para>
589 <blockquote>
590 <para>
591 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
592 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
593 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
594 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
595 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
596 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
597 </para></footnote>
598 </para>
599 </blockquote>
600 <para>
601 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
602 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
603 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
604 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
605 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
606 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
607 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
608 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
609 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
610 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
611 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
612 </para>
613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
614 <blockquote>
615 <para>
616 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
617 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
618 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
619 deviousness.<footnote><para>
620 Lessing, 256.
621 </para></footnote>
622 </para>
623 </blockquote>
624 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
625 <para>
626 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
627 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
628 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
629 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
630 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
631 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
632 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
633 least temporarily.
634 </para>
635 <para>
636 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
637 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
638 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
639 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
640 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
641 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
642 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
643 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
644 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
645 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
646 </para>
647 <para>
648 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
649 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
650 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
651 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
652 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
653 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
654 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
655 course always public spirited; the reality is something
656 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
657 to themselves, would crumble in
658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
659 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
660 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
661 effect
662 of technological change.
663 </para>
664 <para>
665 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
666 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
667 Internet
668 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
669 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
670 access
671 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
672 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
673 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
674 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
675 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
676 </para></footnote>
677 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
678 of 2004.
679 </para>
680 <para>
681 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
682 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
683 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
684 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
685 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
686 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
687 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
688 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
689 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
690 </para>
691 <para>
692 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
693 Internet
694 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
695 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
696 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
697 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
698 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
699 </para>
700 <para>
701 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
702 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
703 regulation
704 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
705 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
706 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
708 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
709 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
710 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
711 </para>
712 <para>
713 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
714 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
715 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
716 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
717 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
718 culture
719 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
720 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
721 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
722 left alone by the law.
723 </para>
724 <para>
725 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
726 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
727 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
728 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
729 marketplace.<footnote>
730 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
731 <para>
732 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
733 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
734 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
735 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
736 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
737 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
738 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
739 198&ndash;200.
740 </para></footnote>
741 This is also, of
742 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
743 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
744 dominant
745 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
746 part, balanced with the free.
747 </para>
748 <para>
749 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
750 been erased.<footnote><para>
751 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
752 2001), ch. 13.
753 </para></footnote>
754 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
755 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
756 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
757 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
758 expanded
759 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
760 creativity
761 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
762 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
763 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
764 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
765 more a permission culture.
766 </para>
767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
768 <para>
769 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
770 creativity.
771 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
772 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
773 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
774 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
775 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
776 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
777 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
778 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
779 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
780 </para>
781 <para>
782 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
783 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
784 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
785 marketplace
786 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
787 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
788 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
789 century
790 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
791 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
792 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
793 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
794 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
795 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
796 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
797 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
798 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
799 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
800 </para>
801 <para>
802 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
803 happening
804 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
805 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
806 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
807 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
808 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
809 </para>
810 <para>
811 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
813 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
814 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
815 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
816 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
817 Motion
818 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
819 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
820 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
821 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
822 Times, 17 January 2002.
823 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
824 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
825 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
826 against it.
827 </para>
828 <para>
829 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
830 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
831 especially
832 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
833 property."
834 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
835 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
836 </para>
837 <para>
838 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
839 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
840 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
841 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
842 </para>
843 <para>
844 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
845 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
846 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
847 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
848 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
849 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
850 <para>
851 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
852 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
853 </para></footnote>
854 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
855 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
856 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
857 could cultivate and extend our culture.
858 </para>
859 <para>
860 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
861 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
862 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
863 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
864 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
865 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
866 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
867 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
868 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
869 </para>
870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
871 <para>
872 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
873 "centrality
874 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
875 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
876 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
877 morality
878 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
879 </para>
880 <para>
881 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
882 inspired
883 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
884 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
885 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
886 technologies
887 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
888 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
889 understand
890 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
891 </para>
892 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
893 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
894 <para>
895 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
896 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
897 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
898 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
899 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
900 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
901 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
902 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
903 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
904 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
905 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
906 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
907 trespass.
908 </para>
909 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
910 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
911 <para>
912 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
913 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
914 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
915 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
916 war. Unlike
917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
918 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
919 on its side.
920 </para>
921 <para>
922 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
923 increasingly
924 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
925 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
926 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
927 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
928 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
929 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
930 </para>
931 <para>
932 The puzzle is, Why?
933 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
934 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
935 because
936 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
937 absolute
938 claim was wrong?
939 </para>
940 <para>
941 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
942 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
943 </para>
944 <para>
945 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
946 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
947 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
948 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
949 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
950 </para>
951 <para>
952 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
953 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
954 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
955 Armstrong
956 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
957 more powerful view?
958 </para>
959 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
960 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
961 <para>
962 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
963 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
964 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
965 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
966 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
967 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
968 this silliness will be much more profound.
969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
970 </para>
971 <para>
972 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
973 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
974 ideas.
975 </para>
976 <para>
977 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
978 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
979 obscure
980 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
981 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
982 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
983 can be more fully understood.
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
987 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
988 government,
989 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
990 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
991 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
992 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
993 threatened
994 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
995 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
996 who we have always been.
997 </para>
998 <para>
999 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1000 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1001 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1002 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1003 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1004 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1005 </para>
1006 </chapter>
1007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1008 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1009 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1010
1011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1012 <para>
1013 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1014 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1015 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1016 capture.
1017 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1018 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1019 </para>
1020 <blockquote>
1021 <para>
1022 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1023 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1024 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1025 <!-- f1 -->
1026 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1027 </para></footnote>
1028 </para>
1029 </blockquote>
1030 <para>
1031 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1032 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1033 efficient
1034 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1035 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1036 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1037 content
1038 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1040 </para>
1041 <para>
1042 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1043 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1044 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1045 sharing
1046 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1047 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1048 </para>
1049 <para>
1050 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1051 increasingly
1052 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1053 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1054 believe
1055 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1056 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1057 </para>
1058 <para>
1059 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1060 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1061 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1062 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1063 </para>
1064 <para>
1065 The idea goes something like this:
1066 </para>
1067 <blockquote>
1068 <para>
1069 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1070 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1071 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1072 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1073 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1074 piracy.
1075 </para>
1076 </blockquote>
1077 <para>
1078 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1079 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1080 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1081 <!-- f2 -->
1082 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1083 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1084 </para></footnote>
1085 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1086 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1087 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1088 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1089 <!-- f3 -->
1090 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1091 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1092 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1093 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1094 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1095 </para></footnote>
1096 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1097 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1098 </para>
1099 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1100 <para>
1101 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1102 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1104 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1105 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1106 property.
1107 It has never taken hold within our law.
1108 </para>
1109 <para>
1110 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1111 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1112 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1113 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1114 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1115 </para>
1116 <para>
1117 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1118 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1119 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1120 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1121 copyright law today regulates both.
1122 </para>
1123 <para>
1124 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1125 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1126 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1127 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1128 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1129 more expense of doing business.
1130 </para>
1131 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1132 <para>
1133 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1134 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1135 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1136 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1137 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1138 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1139 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1140 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1141 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1142 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1143 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1144 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1145 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1146 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1147 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1149 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1150 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1151 <para>
1152 <!-- f4 -->
1153 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1154 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1155 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1156 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1157 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1158 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1159 enabled are much more tenuous.
1160 </para></footnote>
1161 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1162 this creative class.
1163 </para>
1164 <para>
1165 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1166 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1167 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1168 </para>
1169
1170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1171 <sect1 id="creators">
1172 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1173 <para>
1174 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1175 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1176 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1177 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1178 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1179 </para>
1180 <para>
1181 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1182 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1183 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1184 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1185 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1186 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1187 </para>
1188 <blockquote>
1189 <para>
1190 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1191 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1192 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1193 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1195 </para>
1196 <para>
1197 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1198 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1199 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1200 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1201 synchronization was pretty close.
1202 </para>
1203 <para>
1204 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1205 electric.
1206 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1207 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1208 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1209 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1210 <!-- f1 -->
1211 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1212 Cartoons
1213 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1214 </para></footnote>
1215 </para>
1216 </blockquote>
1217 <para>
1218 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1219 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1220 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1221 </para>
1222 <para>
1223 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1224 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1225 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1226 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1227 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1228 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1229 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1230 </para>
1231 <para>
1232 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1233 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1234 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1235 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1236 </para>
1237 <para>
1238 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1239 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1240 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1241 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1242 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1243 genre.
1244 </para>
1245 <para>
1246 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1248 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1249 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1250 <!-- f2 -->
1251 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1252 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1253 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1254 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1255 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1256 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1257 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1258 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1259 </para></footnote>
1260 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1261 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1262 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1263 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1264 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1265 Mouse.
1266 </para>
1267 <para>
1268 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1269 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1270 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1271 <!-- f3 -->
1272 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1273 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1274 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1275 </para></footnote>
1276 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1277 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1278 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1279 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1280 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1281 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1282 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1283 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1284 old.
1285 </para>
1286 <para>
1287 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1288 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1289 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1290 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1291 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1292 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1293 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1294 </para>
1295 <para>
1296 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1297 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1298 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1299 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1300 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1301 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1302 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1303 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1304 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1305 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1307 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1308 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1309 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1310 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1311 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1312 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1313 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1314 </para>
1315 <para>
1316 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1317 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1318 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1319 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1320 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1321 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1322 culture around us and makes it something different.
1323 </para>
1324 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1325 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1326 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1327 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1328 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1329 <!-- f4 -->
1330 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1331 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1332 determining
1333 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1334 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1335 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1336 average
1337 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1338 Web site associated with this book, available at
1339 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1340 </para></footnote>
1341 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1342 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1343 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1344 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1345 </para>
1346 <para>
1347 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1348 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1349 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1350 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1351 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1352 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1353 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1354 </para>
1355 <para>
1356 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1357 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1358 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1359 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1360
1361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1362 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1363 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1364 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1365 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1366 content from before the Great Depression.
1367 </para>
1368 <para>
1369 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1370 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1371 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1372 universal.
1373 </para>
1374 <para>
1375 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1376 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1377 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1378 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1379 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1380 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1381 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1382 </para>
1383 <para>
1384 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1385 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1386 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1387 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1388 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1389 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1390 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1391 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1392 interestingly different way.
1393 </para>
1394 <para>
1395 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1396 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1397 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1398 </para>
1399 <para>
1400 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1401 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1402 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1403 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1405 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1406 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1407 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1408 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1409 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1410 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1411 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1412 </para>
1413 <para>
1414 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1415 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1416 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1417 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1418 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1419 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1420 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1421 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1422 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1423 </para>
1424 <para>
1425 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1426 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1427 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1428 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1429 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1430 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1431 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1432 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1433 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1434 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1435 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1436 original copyright owner's permission.
1437 </para>
1438 <para>
1439 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1440 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1441 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1442 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1443 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1444
1445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1446 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1447 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1448 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1449 <!-- f5 -->
1450 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1451 York: Perennial, 2000).
1452 </para></footnote>
1453 </para>
1454 <para>
1455 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1456 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1457 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1458 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1459 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1460 which are fifty years old."
1461 </para>
1462 <para>
1463 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1464 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1465 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1466 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1467 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1468 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1469 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1470 <!-- f6 -->
1471 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1472 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1473 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1474 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1475 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1476 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1477 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1478 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1479 </para></footnote>
1480 </para>
1481 <para>
1482 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1483 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1484 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1485 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1486 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1487 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1488 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1489 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1490 culture?
1491 </para>
1492 <para>
1493 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1494 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1495 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1496 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1497 to prosecute cases like this."
1498 </para>
1499 <para>
1500 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1501 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1502 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1503 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1505 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1506 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1507 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1508 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1509 their clients or hurt them?
1510 Let's pause for a moment.
1511 </para>
1512 <para>
1513 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1514 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1515 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1516 </para>
1517 <para>
1518 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1519 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1520 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1521 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1522 <!-- f7 -->
1523 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1524 Vaidhyanathan,
1525 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1526 University
1527 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1528 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1529 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1530 nature of those rights is very different.
1531 </para></footnote>
1532 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1533 property;
1534 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1535 intellectual property.
1536 </para>
1537 <para>
1538 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1539 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1540 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1541 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1542 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1543 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1544 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1545 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1546 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1547 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1548 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1549 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1550 the public domain.
1551 </para>
1552 <para>
1553 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1554 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1555 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1556
1557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1558 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1559 freedom is good.
1560 </para>
1561 <para>
1562 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1563 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1564 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1565 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1566 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1567 form, whether large or small.
1568 </para>
1569 <para>
1570 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1571 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1572 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1573 particular find it hard to say why.
1574 </para>
1575 <para>
1576 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1577 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1578 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1579 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1580 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1581 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1582 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1583 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1584 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1585 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1586 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1587 films in 1997.
1588 </para>
1589 <para>
1590 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1591 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1592 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1593 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1594 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1595 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1596 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1597 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1599 </para>
1600 <para>
1601 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1602 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1603 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1604 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1605 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1606 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1607 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1608 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1609 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1610 </para>
1611 <para>
1612 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1613 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1614 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1615 </para>
1616
1617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1618 </sect1>
1619 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1620 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1621 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1622 <para>
1623 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1624 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1625 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1626 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1627 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1628 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1629 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1630 </para>
1631 <para>
1632 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1633 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1634 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1635 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1636 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1637 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1638 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1639 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1640 amateurs.
1641 </para>
1642 <para>
1643 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1644 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1646 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1647 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1648 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1649 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1650 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1651 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1652 population of photographers.
1653 </para>
1654 <para>
1655 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1656 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1657 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1658 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1659 <!-- f1 -->
1660 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1661 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1662 </para>
1663 <blockquote>
1664 <para>
1665 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1666 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1667 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1668 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1669 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1670 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1671 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1672 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1673 chemicals.<footnote>
1674 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1675 <para>
1676 <!-- f2 -->
1677 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1678 1977), 53.
1679 </para></footnote>
1680 </para>
1681 </blockquote>
1682 <para>
1683 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1684 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1685 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1686 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1687 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1688 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1689 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1690 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1691 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1692 percent.<footnote><para>
1693 <!-- f3 -->
1694 Jenkins, 177.
1695 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1696 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1697 <!-- f4 -->
1698 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1699 </para></footnote>
1700 </para>
1701 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1702 <para>
1703
1704 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1705 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1706 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1707 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1708 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1709 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1710 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1711 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1712 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1713 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1714 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1715 <!-- f5 -->
1716 Coe, 58.
1717 </para></footnote>
1718 </para>
1719 <para>
1720 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1721 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1722 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1723 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1724 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1725 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1726 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1727 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1728 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1729 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1730 have before.
1731 </para>
1732 <para>
1733 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1734 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1735 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1736 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1737 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1738 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1739 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1740 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1741 <!-- f6 -->
1742 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1743 </para></footnote>
1744 </para>
1745 <para>
1746 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1747 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1748 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1749 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1750 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1751 draw
1752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1753 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1754 that they thought valuable.
1755 </para>
1756 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1757 <para>
1758 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1759 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1760 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1761 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1762 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1763 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1764 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1765 <para>
1766 <!-- f7 -->
1767 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1768 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1769 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1770 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1771 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1772 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1773 </para>
1774 <para>
1775 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1776 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1777 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1778 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1779 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1780 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1781 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1782 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1783 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1784 <!-- f8 -->
1785 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1786 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1787 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1788 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1789 (1993).
1790 </para></footnote>)
1791 </para>
1792 <para>
1793 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1794 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1795 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1796 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1797 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1798 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1799 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1800 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1801 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1802 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1803 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1804 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1805 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1806 </para>
1807 <para>
1808
1809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1810 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1811 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1812 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1813 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1814 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1815 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1816 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1817 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1818 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1819 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1820 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1821 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1822 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1823 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1824 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1825 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1826 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1827 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1828 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1829 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1830 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1831 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1832 learn.
1833 </para>
1834 <para>
1835 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1836 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1837 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1838 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1839 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1840 <!-- f9 -->
1841 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1842 Software
1843 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1844 February 2002, available at
1845 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1846 </para></footnote>
1847 These buses are filled with technology that
1848 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1849 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1850 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1851 teachers call "media literacy."
1852 </para>
1853 <para>
1854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1855 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1856 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1857 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1858 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1859 the way people access it."
1860 </para>
1861 <para>
1862 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1863 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1864 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1865 about.
1866 </para>
1867 <para>
1868 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1869 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1870 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1871 <!-- f10 -->
1872 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1873 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1874 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1875 </para></footnote>
1876 it is increasingly important to understand the
1877 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1878 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1879 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1880 constructing
1881 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1882 </para>
1883 <para>
1884 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1885 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1886 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1887 sequence
1888 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1889 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1890 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1891 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1892 emotion or builds suspense.
1893 </para>
1894 <para>
1895 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1896 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1897 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1898 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1899 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1900 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1901 </para>
1902 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1903 <para>
1904 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1905 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1906 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1907
1908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1909 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1910 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1911 texture."<footnote>
1912 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1913 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1914 <para>
1915 <!-- f11 -->
1916 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1917 2002.
1918 </para></footnote>
1919 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1920 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1921 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1922 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1923 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1924 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1925 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1926 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1927 <!-- f12 -->
1928 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1929 November 2000, available at
1930 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1931 available at
1932 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1933 </para></footnote>
1934 </para>
1935 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1936 <para>
1937 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1938 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1939 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1940 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1941 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1942 </para>
1943 <para>
1944 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1945 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1946 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1947 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1948 </para>
1949 <blockquote>
1950 <para>
1951 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1952 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1953 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1954 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1955 being read-only.
1956 </para>
1957 </blockquote>
1958 <para>
1959 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1960 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1961 twentieth century.
1962 </para>
1963 <para>
1964 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1965 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1966 understanding
1967 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1968 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1970 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1971 appropriate
1972 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
1973 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1974 <para>
1975 <!-- f13 -->
1976 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1977 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1978 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
1979 <!-- f14 -->
1980 Ibid.
1981 </para></footnote>
1982 </para>
1983 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1984 <para>
1985 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1986 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1987 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1988 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1989 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1990 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1991 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1992 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1993 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1994 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
1995 </para>
1996 <para>
1997 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1998 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1999 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2000 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2001 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2002 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2003 </para>
2004 <para>
2005 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2006 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2007 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2008 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2009 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2010 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2011 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2012 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2013 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2014 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2015 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2016 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2017 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2018 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2019 to this form of expression.
2020 </para>
2021 <para>
2022
2023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2024 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2025 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2026 Daley
2027 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2028 meaning."
2029 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2030 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2031 increasingly,
2032 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2033 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2034 </para>
2035 <blockquote>
2036 <para>
2037 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2038 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2039 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2040 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2041 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2042 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2043 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2044 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2045 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2046 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2047 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2048 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2049 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2050 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2051 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2052 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2053 about the topic. . . .
2054 </para>
2055 <para>
2056 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2057 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2058 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2059 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2060 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2061 </para>
2062 <para>
2063 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2064 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2065 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2066 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2067 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2068 had a lot of power with this language."
2069 </para>
2070 </blockquote>
2071 <para>
2072 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2073 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2074 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2075 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2076 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2077 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2078 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2079 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2080 world would be watching.
2081 </para>
2082 <para>
2083 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2084 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2085 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2086 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2087 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2088 entertainment is tragedy.
2089 </para>
2090 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2091 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2092 <para>
2093 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2094 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2095 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2096 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2097 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2098 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2099 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2100 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2101 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2102 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2103 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2104 was also the Internet.
2105 </para>
2106 <para>
2107 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2108 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2109 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2110 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2111 movie
2112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2113 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2114 with sound or text.
2115 </para>
2116 <para>
2117 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2118 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2119 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2120 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2121 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2122 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2123 spread practically instantaneously.
2124 </para>
2125 <para>
2126 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2127 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2128 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2129 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2130 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2131 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2132 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2133 </para>
2134 <para>
2135 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2136 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2137 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2138 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2139 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2140 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2141 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2142 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2143 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2144 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2145 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2146 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2147 </para>
2148 <para>
2149 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2150 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2151 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2152 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2153 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2154 people vote
2155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2156 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2157 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2158 </para>
2159 <para>
2160 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2161 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2162 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2163 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2164 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2165 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2166 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2167 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2168 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2169 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2170 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2171 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2172 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2173 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2174 <!-- f15 -->
2175 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2176 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2177 </para></footnote>
2178 </para>
2179 <para>
2180 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2181 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2182 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2183 <!-- f16 -->
2184 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2185 Political
2186 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2187 </para></footnote>
2188 And in some towns in
2189 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2190 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2191 deliberation"
2192 to occur.
2193 </para>
2194 <para>
2195 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2196 occur.
2197 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2198 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2199 politics
2200 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2201 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2202 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2203 <!-- f17 -->
2204 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2205 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2206 </para></footnote> We say what our
2207 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2208 </para>
2209 <para>
2210 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2211 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2212 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2213 Technologies
2214 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2215 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2216
2217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2218 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2219 place.
2220 </para>
2221 <para>
2222 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2223 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2224 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2225 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2226 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2227 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2228 </para>
2229 <para>
2230 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2231 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2232 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2233 reading
2234 is having an effect.
2235 </para>
2236 <para>
2237 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2238 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2239 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2240 praising
2241 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2242 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2243 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2244 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2245 instances
2246 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2247 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2248 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2249 <!-- f18 -->
2250 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2251 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2252 </para></footnote>
2253 </para>
2254 <para>
2255 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2256 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2257 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2258 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2259 on.
2260 </para>
2261 <para>
2262 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2263 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2264 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2265 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2266 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2267 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2268 peer-generated rankings.
2269 </para>
2270 <para>
2271 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2273 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2274 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2275 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2276 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2277 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2278 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2279 get it out of the way."
2280 </para>
2281 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2282 <para>
2283 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2284 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2285 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2286 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2287 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2288 <!-- f19 -->
2289 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2290 </para></footnote>
2291 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2292 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2293 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2294 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2295 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2296 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2297 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2298 </para>
2299 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2300 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2301 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2302 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2303 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2304 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2305 had seen.<footnote><para>
2306 <!-- f20 -->
2307 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2308 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2309 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2310 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2311 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2312 </para></footnote>
2313 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2314 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2315 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2316 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2317 </para>
2318 <para>
2319 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2320 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2321 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2322 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2323 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2324 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2325 <para>
2326 <!-- f21 -->
2327 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2328 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2329 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2330 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2331 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2332 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2333 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2334 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2335 </para></footnote>
2336 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2337
2338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2339 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2340 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2341 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2342 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2343 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2344 </para>
2345 <para>
2346 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2347 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2348 gatekeeper."
2349 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2350 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2351 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2352 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2353 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2354 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2355 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2356 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2357 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2358 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2359 extraordinary
2360 to report.
2361 </para>
2362 <para>
2363 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2364 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2365 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2366 </para>
2367 <para>
2368 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2369 differently
2370 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2371 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2372 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2373 </para>
2374 <para>
2375 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2376 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2377 lawnmower
2378 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2379 technologies
2380 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2381 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2382 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2384 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2385 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2386 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2387 tinkering of many others.
2388 </para>
2389 <para>
2390 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2391 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2392 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2393 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2394 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2395 </para>
2396 <para>
2397 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2398 platform,"
2399 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2400 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2401 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2402 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2403 becomes
2404 a major apprenticeship platform."
2405 </para>
2406 <para>
2407 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2408 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2409 abstract,
2410 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2411 doing
2412 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2413 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2414 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2415 </para>
2416 <para>
2417 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2418 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2419 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2420 multiple
2421 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2422 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2423 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2424 artistic,
2425 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2426 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2427 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2428 </para>
2429 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2430 <para>
2431 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2432 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2433
2434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2435 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2436 of recognition.
2437 </para>
2438 <para>
2439 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2440 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2441 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2442 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2443 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2444 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2445 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2446 </para>
2447 <para>
2448 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2449 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2450 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2451 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2452 general.<footnote><para>
2453 <!-- f22 -->
2454 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2455 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2456 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2457 </para></footnote>
2458 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2459 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2460 </para>
2461 <para>
2462 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2463 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2464 and want to learn."
2465 </para>
2466 <para>
2467 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2468 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2469 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2470 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2471 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2472 </para>
2473 <para>
2474 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2475 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2476 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2477 the law to close down that technology.
2478 </para>
2479 <para>
2480 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2481 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2482 </para>
2483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2484 </sect1>
2485 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2486 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2487 <para>
2488 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2489 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2490 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2491 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2492 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2493 </para>
2494 <para>
2495 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2496 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2497 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2498 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2499 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2500 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2501 </para>
2502 <para>
2503 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2504 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2505 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2506 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2507 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2508 </para>
2509 <para>
2510 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2512 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2513 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2514 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2515 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2516 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2517 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2518 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2519 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2520 </para>
2521 <para>
2522 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2523 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2524 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2525 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2526 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2527 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2528 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2529 </para>
2530 <para>
2531 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2532 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2533 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2534 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2535 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2536 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2537 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2538 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2539 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2540 on-line.
2541 </para>
2542 <para>
2543 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2544 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2545 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2546 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2547 be on users' computers.
2548 </para>
2549 <para>
2550 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2551 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2552 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2553 students
2554 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2556 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2557 computer.
2558 </para>
2559 <para>
2560 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2561 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2562 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2563 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2564 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2565 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2566 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2567 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2568 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2569 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2570 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2571 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2572 supposed to do.
2573 </para>
2574 <para>
2575 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2576 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2577 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2578 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2579 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2580 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2581 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2582 </para>
2583 <para>
2584 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2585 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2586 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2587 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2588 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2589 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2590 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2591 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2592 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2593 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2594 </para>
2595 <para>
2596 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2597 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2599 demanded
2600 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2601 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2602 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2603 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2604 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2605 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2606 </para>
2607 <para>
2608 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2609 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2610 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2611 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2612 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2613 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2614 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2615 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2616 <!-- f1 -->
2617 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2618 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2619 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2620 </para></footnote>
2621 </para>
2622 <para>
2623 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2624 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2625 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2626 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2627 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2628 </para>
2629 <para>
2630 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2631 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2632 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2633 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2634 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2635 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2636 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2637 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2638 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2639 </para>
2640 <para>
2641 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2642 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2643 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2644 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2645 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2647 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2648 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2649 </para>
2650 <para>
2651 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2652 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2653 </para>
2654 <para>
2655 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2656 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2657 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2658 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2659 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2660 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2661 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2662 <!-- f2 -->
2663 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2664 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2665 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2666 </para></footnote>
2667 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2668 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2669 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2670 <!-- f3 -->
2671 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2672 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2673 </para></footnote>
2674 </para>
2675 <para>
2676 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2677 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2678 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2679 activist:
2680 </para>
2681 <blockquote>
2682 <para>
2683 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2684 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2685 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2686 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2687 </para>
2688 </blockquote>
2689 <para>
2690 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2691 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2692 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2693 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2694 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2695 </para>
2696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2697 </sect1>
2698 <sect1 id="pirates">
2699 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2700 <para>
2701 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2702 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2703 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2704 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2705 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2706 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2707 </para>
2708 <sect2 id="film">
2709 <title>Film</title>
2710 <para>
2711 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2712 <!-- f1 -->
2713 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2714 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2715 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2716 </para></footnote>
2717 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2718 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2719 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2720 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2721 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2722 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2723 this creative property
2724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2725 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2726 </para>
2727 <para>
2728 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2729 </para>
2730 <blockquote>
2731 <para>
2732 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2733 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2734 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2735 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2736 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2737 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2738 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2739 </para>
2740 <para>
2741 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2742 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2743 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2744 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2745 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2746 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2747 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2748 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2749 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2750 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2751 <!-- f2 -->
2752 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2753 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2754 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2755 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2756 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2757 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2758 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2759 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2760 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2761 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2762 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2763 </para>
2764 </blockquote>
2765 <para>
2766 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2767 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2768 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2769 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2770 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2771 <!-- f3 -->
2772 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2773 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2774 </para></footnote>
2775 That led the independents to flee the East
2776 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2777 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2778 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2779 did just that.
2780 </para>
2781 <para>
2782 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2783 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2784 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2785
2786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2787 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2788 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2789 Edison's creative property.
2790 </para>
2791 </sect2>
2792 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2793 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2794 <para>
2795 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2796 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2797 </para>
2798 <para>
2799 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2800 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2801 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2802 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2803 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2804 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2805 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2806 right to perform it publicly.
2807 </para>
2808 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2809 <para>
2810 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2811 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2812 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2813 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2814 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2815 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2816 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2817 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2818 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2819 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2820 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2821 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2822 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2823 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2824 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2825 its composer anything.
2826 </para>
2827 <para>
2828 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2830 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2831 put it,
2832 </para>
2833 <blockquote>
2834 <para>
2835 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2836 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2837 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2838 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2839 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2840 rights.<footnote><para>
2841 <!-- f4 -->
2842 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2843 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2844 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2845 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2846 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2847 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2848 </para></footnote>
2849 </para>
2850 </blockquote>
2851 <para>
2852 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2853 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2854 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2855 <!-- f5 -->
2856 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2857 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2858 </para></footnote>
2859 and the "music publishing industry"
2860 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2861 <!-- f6 -->
2862 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2863 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2864 </para></footnote>
2865 As John Philip
2866 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2867 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2868 <!-- f7 -->
2869 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2870 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2871 </para></footnote>
2872 </para>
2873 <para>
2874 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2875 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2876 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2877 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2878 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2879 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2880 <!-- f8 -->
2881 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2882 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2883 Perforating
2884 Company of New York).
2885 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2886 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2887 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2888 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2889 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2890 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2891 <!-- f9 -->
2892 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2893 (prepared
2894 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2895 American
2896 Graphophone Company Association).
2897 </para></footnote>
2898 </para>
2899 <para>
2900 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2901 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2902 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2903 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2904 control
2905 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2906 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2907 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2908
2909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2910 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2911 authorizes
2912 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2913 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2914 </para>
2915 <para>
2916 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2917 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2918 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2919 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2920 recordings
2921 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2922 by the statute.
2923 </para>
2924 <para>
2925 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2926 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2927 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2928 whatever
2929 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2930 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2931 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2932 </para>
2933 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2934 <para>
2935 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2936 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2937 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2938 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2939 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2940 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2941 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2942 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2943 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2944 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2945 stifle
2946 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
2947 <!-- f10 -->
2948 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2949 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2950 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2951 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2952 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2953 </para></footnote>
2954 </para>
2955 <para>
2956 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2957 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2958 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2959 relates,
2960 </para>
2961 <blockquote>
2962 <para>
2963 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2965 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2966 industry
2967 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2968 importance
2969 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2970 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2971 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2972 access
2973 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
2974 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
2975 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
2976 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2977 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
2978 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
2979 improved
2980 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
2981 <!-- f11 -->
2982 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2983 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2984 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2985 this report.</para></footnote>
2986 </para>
2987 </blockquote>
2988 <para>
2989 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2990 creative
2991 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2992 </para>
2993 </sect2>
2994 <sect2 id="radio">
2995 <title>Radio</title>
2996 <para>
2997 Radio was also born of piracy.
2998 </para>
2999 <para>
3000 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3001 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3002 <!-- f12 -->
3003 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
3004 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3005 messages
3006 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3007 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3008 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3009 Manufacturing
3010 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
3011 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3012 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3013 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3014 </para></footnote>
3015 As I described above,
3016 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3017 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3018 composer
3019 money for that performance.
3020 </para>
3021 <para>
3022 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3023 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3024 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3025 Birthday"
3026 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3027 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3028 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3029 station.
3030 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3031 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3032 composer
3033 of the music for his work.
3034
3035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3036 </para>
3037 <para>
3038 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3039 radio
3040 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3041 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3042 something
3043 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3044 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3045 playing the song.
3046 </para>
3047 <para>
3048 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3049 music.
3050 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3051 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3052 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3053 </para>
3054 <para>
3055 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3056 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3057 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3058 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3059 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3060 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3061 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3062 </para>
3063 <para>
3064 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3065 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3066 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3067 ordinarily
3068 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3069 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3070 something for nothing.
3071 </para>
3072 </sect2>
3073 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3074 <title>Cable TV</title>
3075 <para>
3076
3077 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3078 </para>
3079 <para>
3080 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3081 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3082 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3083 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3085 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3086 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3087 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3088 give away.
3089 </para>
3090 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3091 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3092 <para>
3093 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3094 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3095 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3096 <!-- f13 -->
3097 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3098 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3099 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3100 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3101 Commission).
3102 </para></footnote>
3103 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3104 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3105 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3106 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3107 <!-- f14 -->
3108 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3109 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3110 </para></footnote>
3111 As another broadcaster put it,
3112 </para>
3113 <blockquote>
3114 <para>
3115 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3116 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3117 paid for.<footnote><para>
3118 <!-- f15 -->
3119 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3120 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3121 </para></footnote>
3122 </para>
3123 </blockquote>
3124 <para>
3125 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3126 </para>
3127 <blockquote>
3128 <para>
3129 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3130 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3131 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3132 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3133 <!-- f16 -->
3134 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3135 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3136 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3137 </para></footnote>
3138 </para>
3139 </blockquote>
3140 <para>
3141 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3142 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3143 compensation."<footnote><para>
3144 <!-- f17 -->
3145 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3146 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3147 </para></footnote>
3148 </para>
3149 <para>
3150 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3151 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3152 </para>
3153 <blockquote>
3154 <para>
3155 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3156 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3157 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3158 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3159
3160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3161 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3162 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3163 <!-- f18 -->
3164 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3165 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3166 </para></footnote>
3167 </para>
3168 </blockquote>
3169 <para>
3170 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3171 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3172 </para>
3173 <para>
3174 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3175 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3176 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3177 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3178 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3179 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3180 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3181 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3182 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3183 created by broadcasters' content.
3184 </para>
3185 <para>
3186 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3187 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3188 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3189 today<footnote><para>
3190 <!-- f19 -->
3191 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3192 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3193 Information, available at
3194 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3195 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3196 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3197 </para></footnote>
3198 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3199 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3200 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3201 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3202 generation&mdash;until now.
3203 </para>
3204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3205 </sect2>
3206 </sect1>
3207 <sect1 id="piracy">
3208 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3209 <para>
3210 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3211 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3212 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3213 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3214 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3215 should stop it.
3216 </para>
3217 <para>
3218 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3219 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3220 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3221 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3222 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3223 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3224 has so often done in the past.
3225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3226 </para>
3227 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3228 <title>Piracy I</title>
3229 <para>
3230 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3231 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3232 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3233 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3234 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3235 <!-- f1 -->
3236 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3237 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3238
3239 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3240 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3241 </para></footnote>
3242 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3243 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3244 worldwide to piracy.
3245 </para>
3246 <para>
3247 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3248 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3249 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3250 This piracy is wrong.
3251 </para>
3252 <para>
3253 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3254 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3255 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3256 foreign
3257 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3258 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3259 developing
3260 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3261 existence, treated as right.
3262 </para>
3263 <para>
3264 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3265 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3266 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3267 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3268 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3269 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3270 violate
3271 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3272 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3273 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3274 </para>
3275 <para>
3276 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3277 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3279 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3280 pirate
3281 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3282 childhood.
3283 </para>
3284 <para>
3285 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3286 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3287 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3288 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3289 <!-- f2 -->
3290 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3291 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3292 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3293 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3294 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3295 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3296 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3297 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3298 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3299 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3300 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3301 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3302 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3303 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3304 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3305 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3306 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3307 is wrong.
3308 </para>
3309 <para>
3310 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3311 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3312 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3313 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3314 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3315 <!-- f3 -->
3316 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3317 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3318 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3319 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3320 instance
3321 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3322 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3323 </para></footnote>
3324 </para>
3325 <para>
3326 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3327 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3328 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3329 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3330 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3331 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3332 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3333 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3334 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3335 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3336 piracy of the tangible.
3337 </para>
3338 <para>
3339 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3340 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3341 property
3342 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3343 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3344 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3345 licenses
3346 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3347 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3348 copyrighted
3349 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3350
3351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3352 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3353 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3354 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3355 technology
3356 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3357 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3358 </para>
3359 <para>
3360 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3361 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3362 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3363 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3364 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3365 nation
3366 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3367 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3368 benefit
3369 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3370 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3371 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3372 Microsoft.
3373 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3374 </para>
3375 <para>
3376 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3377 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3378 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3379 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3380 become
3381 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3382 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3383 </para>
3384 <para>
3385 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3386 alcoholic
3387 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3388 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3389 ordinarily
3390 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3391 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3392 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3393 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3394 giving
3395 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3396 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3397 copyright
3398 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3399 wrong.
3400 </para>
3401 <para>
3402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3403 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3404 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3405 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3406 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3407 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3408 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3409 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3410 is flat out wrong.
3411 </para>
3412 <para>
3413 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3414 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3415 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3416 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3417 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3418 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3419 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3420 </para>
3421 <para>
3422 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3423 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3424 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3425 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3426 </para>
3427 <para>
3428 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3429 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3430 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3431 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3432 </para>
3433 <para>
3434 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3435 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3436 sharing
3437 to survive.
3438 </para>
3439 </sect2>
3440 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3441 <title>Piracy II</title>
3442 <para>
3443 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3444 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3445 <!-- f4 -->
3446 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3447 </para></footnote>
3448 This means we must determine whether
3449 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3451 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3452 author of his profit.
3453 </para>
3454 <para>
3455 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3456 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3457 innovations.
3458 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3459 arguably,
3460 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3461 <!-- f5 -->
3462 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3463 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3464 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3465 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3466 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3467 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3468 technology
3469 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3470 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3471 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3472 put together components that had been developed independently.
3473 </para>
3474 <para>
3475 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3476 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3477 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3478 system.<footnote><para>
3479 <!-- f6 -->
3480 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3481 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3482 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3483 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3484 "Napster's
3485 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3486 "Hollywood
3487 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3488 </para></footnote>
3489 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3490 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3491 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3492 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3493 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3494 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3495 or your 20,000 best friends.
3496 </para>
3497 <para>
3498 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3499 Americans
3500 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3501 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3502 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3503 <!-- f7 -->
3504 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3505 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3506 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3507 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3508 </para></footnote>
3509 A survey by the NPD
3510 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3511 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3512 <!-- f8 -->
3513 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3514 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3515 </para></footnote>
3516 The vast
3517 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3518 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3519 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3520 enjoy
3521 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3522 </para>
3523 <para>
3524 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3525 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3526 infringement,
3527 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3528 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3529 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3530 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3531 </para>
3532 <para>
3533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3534 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3535 different kinds into four types.
3536 </para>
3537 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3538 <listitem><para>
3539 <!-- A. -->
3540 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3541 purchasing
3542 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3543 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3544 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3545 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3546 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3547 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3548 instead
3549 of purchasing.
3550 </para></listitem>
3551 <listitem><para>
3552 <!-- B. -->
3553 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3554 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3555 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3556 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3557 succeed.
3558 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3559 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3560 recommendations
3561 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3562 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3563 </para></listitem>
3564 <listitem><para>
3565 <!-- C. -->
3566 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3567 copyrighted
3568 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3569 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3570 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3571 rewarding
3572 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3573 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3574 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3575 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3576 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3577 available.)
3578 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3579 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3580 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3581 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3582 a local collector.
3583 </para></listitem>
3584 <listitem><para>
3585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3586 <!-- D. -->
3587 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3588 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3589 wants to give away.
3590 </para></listitem>
3591 </orderedlist>
3592 <para>
3593 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3594 </para>
3595 <para>
3596 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3597 perspective
3598 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3599 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3600 <!-- f9 -->
3601 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3602 </para></footnote>
3603 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3604 illegal,
3605 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3606 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3607 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3608 certainly
3609 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3610 suggests.
3611 </para>
3612 <para>
3613 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3614 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3615 Hollywood,
3616 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3617 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3618 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3619 that is "devastating" the industry.
3620 </para>
3621 <para>
3622 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3623 harmful
3624 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3625 practice
3626 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3627 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3628 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3629 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3630 <!-- f10 -->
3631 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3632 Industry's
3633 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3634 industry's
3635 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3636 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3637 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3638 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3639 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3640 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3641 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3642 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3643 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3644 </para></footnote>
3645 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3646 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3647 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3648 problem,
3649 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3650 </para>
3651 <para>
3652 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3653 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3654 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3655 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3657 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3658 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3659 <!-- f11 -->
3660 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3661 </para></footnote>
3662 </para>
3663 <para>
3664 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3665 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3666 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3667 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3668 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3669 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3670 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3671 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3672 </para>
3673 <para>
3674 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3675 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3676 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3677 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3678 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3679 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3680 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3681 </para>
3682 <para>
3683 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3684 because
3685 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3686 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3687 </para>
3688 <para>
3689 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3690 percent,
3691 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3692 <!-- f12 -->
3693 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3694 available at
3695 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3696 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3697 25 June 2003, available at
3698 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3699 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3700 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3701 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3702 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3703 music
3704 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3705 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3706 </para></footnote>
3707 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3708 Internet
3709 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3710 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3711 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3712 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3713 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3714 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3715 <!-- f13 -->
3716 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3717 <para>
3718 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3719 February 2003, available at
3720 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3721 </para>
3722 </footnote>
3723 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3724 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3725 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3726 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3727 <!-- f14 -->
3728 Ibid.
3729 </para></footnote>
3730 </para>
3731 <para>
3732
3733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3734 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3735 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3736 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3737 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3738 although
3739 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3740 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3741 </para>
3742 <para>
3743 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3744 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3745 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3746 between
3747 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3748 numbers
3749 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3750 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3751 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3752 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3753 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3754 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3755 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3756 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3757 between
3758 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3759 </para>
3760 <para>
3761 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3762 assume,
3763 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3764 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3765 costs?
3766 </para>
3767 <para>
3768 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3769 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3770 available.
3771 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3772 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3773 <!-- f15 -->
3774 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3775 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3776 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3777 Committee
3778 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3779 statement
3780 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3781 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3782 </para></footnote>
3783 And while it's
3784 conceivable
3785 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3786 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3787 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3788 distributor
3789 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3790 make it available.
3791 </para>
3792 <para>
3793 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3795 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3796 thousands
3797 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3798 <!-- f16 -->
3799 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3800 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3801 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3802 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3803 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3804 National
3805 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3806 Results,"
3807 available at
3808 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3809 </para></footnote>
3810 These
3811 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3812 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3813 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3814 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3815 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3816 companies
3817 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3818 owner for the content they sell.
3819 </para>
3820 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3821 <para>
3822 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3823 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3824 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3825 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3826 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3827 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3828 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3829 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3830 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3831 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3832 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3833 </para>
3834 <para>
3835 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3836 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3837 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3838 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3839 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3840 shut as well?
3841 </para>
3842 <para>
3843 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3844 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3845 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3846 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3847 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3848 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3849
3850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3851 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3852 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3853 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3854 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3855 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3856 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3857 great book!)
3858 </para>
3859 <para>
3860 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3861 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3862 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3863 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3864 </para>
3865 <para>
3866 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3867 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3868 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3869 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3870 unavailable?"
3871 </para>
3872 <para>
3873 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3874 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3875 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3876 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3877 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3878 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3879 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3880 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3881 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3882 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3883 found only with time.
3884 </para>
3885 <para>
3886 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3887 just what you call type A sharing?"
3888 </para>
3889 <para>
3890 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3891 effect
3892 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3893 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3894 Napster
3895 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3896 developed
3897 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3899 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3900 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3901 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3902 <!-- f17 -->
3903 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3904 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3905 MHP, available at
3906 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3907 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3908 Fanning's
3909 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3910 </para></footnote>
3911 </para>
3912 <para>
3913 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3914 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3915 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3916 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3917 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3918 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3919 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3920 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3921 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3922 </para>
3923 <para>
3924 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3925 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3926 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3927 content
3928 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3929 technology.
3930 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3931 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3932 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3933 </para>
3934 <para>
3935 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3936 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3937 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3938 composers,
3939 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3940 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3941 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3942 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3943 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3944 broadcast),
3945 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3946 </para>
3947 <para>
3948 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3949 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3950 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3951 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3952 companies
3953 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3954 </para>
3955 <para>
3956
3957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3958 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3959 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3960 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3961 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3962 Second,
3963 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3964 content
3965 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3966 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3967 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3968 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3969 Congress
3970 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3971 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3972 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3973 control
3974 over the future (cable).
3975 </para>
3976 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3977 <para>
3978 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3979 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3980 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3981 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3982 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3983 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3984 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3985 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3986 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3987 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3988 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3989 </para>
3990 <para>
3991 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3992 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3993 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3994 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3995 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3996 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3997 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3998 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4000 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4001 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4002 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4003 for the architecture it chose.
4004 </para>
4005 <para>
4006 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4007 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4008 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4009 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4010 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4011 copyright."<footnote><para>
4012 <!-- f18 -->
4013 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4014 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4015 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4016 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4017 </para></footnote>
4018 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4019 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4020 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4021 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4022 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4023 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4024 <!-- f19 -->
4025 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4026 </para></footnote>
4027 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4028 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4029 <!-- f20 -->
4030 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4031 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4032 </para></footnote>
4033 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4034 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4035 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4036 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4037 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4038 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4039 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4040 <!-- f21 -->
4041 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4042 of Jack Valenti).
4043 </para></footnote>
4044 </para>
4045 <para>
4046 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4047 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4048 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4049 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4050 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4051 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4052 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4053 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4054 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4055 technology.<footnote><para>
4056 <!-- f22 -->
4057 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4058 1981).
4059 </para></footnote>
4060 </para>
4061 <para>
4062 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4063
4064 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4065 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4066 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4067 Court wrote,
4068 </para>
4069 <blockquote>
4070 <para>
4071 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4072 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4073 market
4074 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4075 authority
4076 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4077 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4078 implicated
4079 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4080 <!-- f23 -->
4081 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4082 </para></footnote>
4083 </para>
4084 </blockquote>
4085 <para>
4086 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4087 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4088 Congress
4089 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4090 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4091 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4092 </para>
4093
4094 <table id="t1">
4095 <title>Table</title>
4096 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4097 <thead>
4098 <row>
4099 <entry>CASE</entry>
4100 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4101 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4102 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4103 </row>
4104 </thead>
4105 <tbody>
4106 <row>
4107 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4108 <entry>Composers</entry>
4109 <entry>No protection</entry>
4110 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4111 </row>
4112 <row>
4113 <entry>Radio</entry>
4114 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4115 <entry>N/A</entry>
4116 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4117 </row>
4118 <row>
4119 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4120 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4121 <entry>No protection</entry>
4122 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4123 </row>
4124 <row>
4125 <entry>VCR</entry>
4126 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4127 <entry>No protection</entry>
4128 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4129 </row>
4130 </tbody>
4131 </tgroup>
4132 </table>
4133
4134 <para>
4135 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4136 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4137 <!-- f24 -->
4138 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4139 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4140 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4141 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4142 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4143 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4144 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4145 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4146 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4147 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4148 </para></footnote>
4149 In each case, throughout our history,
4150 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4151 work.
4152 </para>
4153 <para>
4154 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4155 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4156 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4157 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4158 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4159 legitimacy
4160 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4161 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4162 the interests at stake.
4163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4164 </para>
4165 <para>
4166 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4167 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4168 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4169 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4170 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4171 regulated?
4172 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4173 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4174 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4175 permission to record a song?
4176 </para>
4177 <para>
4178 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4179 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4180 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4181 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4182 <!-- f25 -->
4183 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4184 (1984).
4185 </para></footnote>
4186 Instead, the particular uses that the
4187 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4188 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4189 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4190 technology
4191 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4192 the distribution of content.
4193 </para>
4194 <para>
4195 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4196 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4197 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4198 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4199 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4200 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4201 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4202 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4203 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4204 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4205 protection
4206 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4207 continue.
4208 </para>
4209 <para>
4210
4211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4212 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4213 superior
4214 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4215 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4216 network.
4217 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4218 efficient.
4219 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4220 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4221 <!-- f26 -->
4222 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4223 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4224 </para></footnote>
4225 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4226 warriors
4227 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4228 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4229 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4230 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4231 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4232 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4233 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4234 </para>
4235 <para>
4236 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4237 just as any other property is protected."
4238 </para>
4239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4240 </sect2>
4241 </sect1>
4242 </chapter>
4243 <chapter id="c-property">
4244 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4245 <para>
4246
4247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4248 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4249 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4250 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4251 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4252 the price she can get.
4253 </para>
4254 <para>
4255 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4256 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4257 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4258 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4259 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4260 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4261 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4262 going
4263 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4264 thing I am taking then?
4265 </para>
4266 <para>
4267 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4268 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4270 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4271 narrow
4272 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4273 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4274 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4275 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4276 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4277 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4278 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4279 <!-- f1 -->
4280 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4281 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4282 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4283 </para></footnote>
4284 </para>
4285 <para>
4286 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4287 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4288 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4289 expression
4290 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4291 property.
4292 </para>
4293 <para>
4294 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4295 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4296 turning
4297 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4298 "property"
4299 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4300 <!-- f2 -->
4301 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4302 intangible.
4303 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4304 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4305 physical
4306 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4307 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4308 Property?
4309 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4310 373, 429 n. 241.
4311 </para></footnote>
4312 </para>
4313 <para>
4314 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4315 preceding
4316 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4317 material
4318 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4319 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4320 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4321 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4322 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4323 us draw.
4324 </para>
4325
4326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4327 <sect1 id="founders">
4328 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4329 <para>
4330 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4331 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4332 Shakespeare
4333 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4334 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4335 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4336 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4337 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4338 adaptation
4339 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4340 </para>
4341 <para>
4342 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4343 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4344 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4345 <!-- f1 -->
4346 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4347 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4348 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4349 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4350 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4351 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4352 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4353 </para></footnote>
4354 Tonson was the
4355 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4356 <!-- f2 -->
4357 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4358 Vanderbilt
4359 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4360 </para></footnote>
4361 who
4362 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4363 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4364 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4366 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4367 copyright.
4368 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4369 produce
4370 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4371 </para>
4372 <para>
4373 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4374 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4375 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4376 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4377 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4378 renewable
4379 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4380 published
4381 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4382 <!-- f3 -->
4383 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4384 "copyright
4385 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4386 </para></footnote>
4387 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4388 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4389 </para>
4390 <para>
4391 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4392 "copyright"
4393 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4394 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4395 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4396 expired
4397 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4398 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4399 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4400 publishers,
4401 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4402 </para>
4403 <para>
4404 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4405 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4406 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4407 govern
4408 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4409 "positive
4410 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4411 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4412 legislature,
4413 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4414 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4415 expired
4416 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4417 independent
4418 of any positive law.
4419 </para>
4420 <para>
4421 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4422 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4423 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4424 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4425
4426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4427 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4428 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4429 ultimately
4430 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4431 </para>
4432 <para>
4433 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4434 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4435 however,
4436 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4437 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4438 "expired,"
4439 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4440 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4441 </para>
4442 <para>
4443 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4444 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4445 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4446 </para>
4447 <para>
4448 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4449 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4450 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4451 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4452 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4453 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4454 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4455 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4456 reason
4457 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4458 </para>
4459 <para>
4460 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4461 special
4462 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4463 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4464 "booksellers."
4465 </para>
4466 <para>
4467 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4468 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4469 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4470 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4471 others
4472 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4473 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4474 beyond
4475 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4477 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4478 restrictions
4479 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4480 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4481 perform, and so on.
4482 </para>
4483 <para>
4484 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4485 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4486 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4487 permission
4488 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4489 anything,
4490 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4491 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4492 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4493 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4494 </para>
4495 <para>
4496 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4497 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4498 especially
4499 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4500 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4501 monopolies&mdash;especially
4502 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4503 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4504 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4505 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4506 Monopolies,
4507 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4508 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4509 publishing.
4510 </para>
4511 <para>
4512 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4513 naturally
4514 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4515 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4516 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4517 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4518 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4519 specialinterest
4520 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4521 </para>
4522 <para>
4523 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4524 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4525 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4526 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4528 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4529 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4530 themselves
4531 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4532 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4533 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4534 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4535 <!-- f4 -->
4536 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4537 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4538 </para></footnote>
4539 </para>
4540 <para>
4541 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4542 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4543 Enlightenment
4544 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4545 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4546 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4547 that idea.
4548 </para>
4549 <para>
4550 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4551 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4552 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4553 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4554 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4555 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4556 compromise
4557 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4558 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4559 construction and spread of culture.
4560 </para>
4561 <para>
4562 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4563 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4564 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4565 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4566 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4567 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4568 they said; they needed more time.
4569 </para>
4570 <para>
4571 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4572 words that echo today,
4573 </para>
4574 <blockquote>
4575 <para>
4576 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4577 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4579 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4580 establishing
4581 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4582 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4583 Discouragement
4584 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4585 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4586 of the Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4587 <!-- f5 -->
4588 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4589 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4590 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4591 Encouragement
4592 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4593 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4594 mentioned
4595 (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
4596 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4597 </para></footnote>
4598 </para>
4599 </blockquote>
4600 <para>
4601 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4602 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4603 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4604 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4605 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4606 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4607 creative
4608 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4609 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4610 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4611 protections
4612 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4613 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4614 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4615 authors.
4616 </para>
4617 <para>
4618 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4619 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4620 chutzpah.
4621 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4622 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4623 for cattle."<footnote><para>
4624 <!-- f6 -->
4625 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4626 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4627 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4628 </para></footnote>
4629 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4630 author.
4631 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4632 </para>
4633 <para>
4634 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4635 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4636 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4637 <!-- f7 -->
4638 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4639 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4640 </para></footnote>
4641 </para>
4642 <para>
4643 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4644 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4645 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4646 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4647 <!-- f8 -->
4648 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4649 1993), 92.
4650 </para></footnote>
4651 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4653 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4654 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4655 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4656 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4657 <!-- f9 -->
4658 Ibid., 93.
4659 </para></footnote>
4660 </para>
4661 <para>
4662 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4663 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4664 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4665 defiance
4666 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."<footnote><para>
4667 <!-- f10 -->
4668 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4669 Borwell).
4670 </para></footnote>
4671 His
4672 books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
4673 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4674 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4675 </para>
4676 <para>
4677 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4678 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4679 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4680 </para>
4681 <para>
4682 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4683 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4684 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4685 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4686 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4687 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4688 <!-- f11 -->
4689 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4690 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29
4691 (1983): 1152.
4692 </para></footnote>
4693 </para>
4694 <para>
4695 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4696 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4697 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4698 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4699 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4700 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4701 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4702 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4703 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4704 </para>
4705 <para>
4706 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4707 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4708 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4709 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4710 with in 1710: How best to limit
4711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4712 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4713 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4714 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4715 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4716 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4717 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4718 </para>
4719 <para>
4720 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4721 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4722 </para>
4723 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4724 <para>
4725 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4726 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4727 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4728 <!-- f12 -->
4729 Ibid., 1156.
4730 </para></footnote>
4731 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4732 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4733 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4734 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4735 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4736 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4737 </para>
4738 <para>
4739 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4740 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4741 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4742 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4743 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4744 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4745 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4746 statute were no longer protected.
4747 </para>
4748 <para>
4749 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4750 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4751 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4752 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4753 House of Lords generally voted.
4754 </para>
4755 <para>
4756 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4757 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4758 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4759 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4760 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4761 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4762 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4763 passed into the public domain.
4764 </para>
4765 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4766 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4767 <para>
4768 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4769 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4770 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4771 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4772 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4773 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4774 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4775 legal restraint.
4776 </para>
4777 <para>
4778 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4779 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4780 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4781 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4782 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4783 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4784 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4785 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4786 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4787 <!-- f13 -->
4788 Rose, 97.
4789 </para></footnote>
4790 </para>
4791 <para>
4792 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4793 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4794 reported:
4795 </para>
4796 <blockquote>
4797 <para>
4798 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4799 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4800 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4801 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4802 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4803 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4804 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4805 successors.<footnote><para>
4806 <!-- f14 -->
4807 Ibid.
4808 </para></footnote>
4809 </para>
4810 </blockquote>
4811 <para>
4812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4813 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4814 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4815 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4816 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4817 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4818 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4819 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4820 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4821 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4822 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4823 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4824 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4825 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4826 readers chose to let it develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought
4827 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4828 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4829 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4830 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4831 </para>
4832 <para>
4833 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4834 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4835 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4836 protected.
4837 </para>
4838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4839 </sect1>
4840 <sect1 id="recorders">
4841 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4842 <para>
4843 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4844 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4845 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4846 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4847 He was their god.)
4848 </para>
4849 <para>
4850 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4851 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4852 today.
4853 </para>
4854 <para>
4855 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4856 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4857 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4858 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4859 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4860 stage.
4861 </para>
4862 <para>
4863 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4864 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4865 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4866 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4868 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4869 about the scene.
4870 </para>
4871 <para>
4872 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4873 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4874 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4875 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4876 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4877 </para>
4878 <para>
4879 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4880 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4881 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4882 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4883 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4884 </para>
4885 <para>
4886 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4887 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4888 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4889 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4890 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4891 </para>
4892 <para>
4893 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4894 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4895 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4896 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4897 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4898 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4899 </para>
4900 <para>
4901 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4902 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4903 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4904 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4905 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4906 confirm what he had been told.
4907 </para>
4908 <para>
4909 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4910 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4911 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4912 about
4913
4914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4915 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4916 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4917 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4918 the money."
4919 </para>
4920 <para>
4921 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4922 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4923 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4924 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4925 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4926 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4927 </para>
4928 <para>
4929 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4930 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4931 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4932 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4933 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4934 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4935 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4936 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4937 says the owner gets to control.
4938 </para>
4939 <para>
4940 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4941 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4942 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4943 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4944 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4945 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4946 by the law.
4947 </para>
4948 <para>
4949 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4950 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4951 <!-- f1 -->
4952 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4953 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4954 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4955 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4956 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4957 </para></footnote>
4958 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4959 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use does
4960 not require the permission of anyone.
4961 </para>
4962 <para>
4963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4964 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4965 </para>
4966 <blockquote>
4967 <para>
4968 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4969 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4970 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4971 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4972 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4973 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4974 </para>
4975 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4976 <listitem><para>
4977 <!-- 1. -->
4978 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4979 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4980 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4981 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4982 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4983 </para></listitem>
4984 <listitem><para>
4985 <!-- 2. -->
4986 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4987 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4988 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
4989 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
4990 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4991 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
4992 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4993 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4994 principle.
4995 </para></listitem>
4996 <listitem><para>
4997 <!-- 3. -->
4998 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4999 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5000 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5001 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5002 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5003 pockets, me or them.
5004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5005 </para></listitem>
5006 <listitem><para>
5007 <!-- 4. -->
5008 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5009 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5010 money.
5011 </para></listitem>
5012 </orderedlist>
5013 </blockquote>
5014 <para>
5015 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5016 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5017 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5018 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5019 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5020 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5021 </para>
5022 <para>
5023 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5024 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5025 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5026 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5027 not.
5028 </para>
5029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5030 </sect1>
5031 <sect1 id="transformers">
5032 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5033 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5034 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5035 <para>
5036 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5037 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5038 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5039 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5040 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5041 </para>
5042 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5043 <para>
5044 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5045 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5046 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5047 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5048 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5049 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5050 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5051 important to his career.
5052 </para>
5053 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5054 <para>
5055 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5056 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5057 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5058 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5059 </para>
5060 <para>
5061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5062 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5063 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5064 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5065 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5066 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5067 </para>
5068 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5069 <para>
5070 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5071 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5072 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5073 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5074 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5075 actor's career."
5076 </para>
5077 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5078 <para>
5079 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5080 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5081 </para>
5082 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5083 <para>
5084 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5085 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5086 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5087 for it."<footnote>
5088 <indexterm>
5089 <primary>artists</primary>
5090 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5091 </indexterm>
5092 <para>
5093 <!-- f1 -->
5094 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5095 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5096 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5097 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5098 </para></footnote>
5099 </para>
5100 <para>
5101 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5102 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5103 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5104 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5105 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5106 </para>
5107 <para>
5108 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5109 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5110 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5111 </para>
5112 <blockquote>
5113 <para>
5114 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5115 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5116 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5117 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5118 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5119 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5120 </para>
5121 <para>
5122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5123 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5124 dayplayer
5125 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5126 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5127 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5128 So we had to identify the people&mdash;some of them were hard to
5129 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5130 crashing through the glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5131 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5132 others, and we just started calling people.
5133 </para>
5134 </blockquote>
5135 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5136 <para>
5137 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5138 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5139 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5140 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5141 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5142 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5143 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5144 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5145 career.
5146 </para>
5147 <para>
5148 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5149 were totally in the clear."
5150 </para>
5151 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5152 <para>
5153 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5154 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5155 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5156 </para>
5157 <blockquote>
5158 <para>
5159 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5160 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5161 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5162 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5163 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5164 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5165 systematically and cleared the rights.
5166 </para>
5167 </blockquote>
5168 <para>
5169
5170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5171 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5172 loved it, and it sold very well.
5173 </para>
5174 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5175 <para>
5176 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5177 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5178 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5179 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5180 at all."<footnote><para>
5181 <!-- f2 -->
5182 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5183 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5184 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5185 </para></footnote>
5186 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5187 has to be made?
5188 </para>
5189 <para>
5190 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5191 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5192 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5193 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5194 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5195 </para>
5196 <blockquote>
5197 <para>
5198 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5199 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5200 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5201 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5202 compensated for that.
5203 </para>
5204 </blockquote>
5205 <para>
5206 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5207 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5208 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5209 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5210 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5211 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5212 creative
5213 process could be made to be more clean?
5214 </para>
5215 <blockquote>
5216 <para>
5217 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5218 mechanism&mdash;where
5219 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5220 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5221 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5223 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5224 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5225 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5226 paying
5227 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5228 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5229 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5230 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5231 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5232 investments
5233 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5234 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5235 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5236 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5237 one of these things together.
5238 </para>
5239 </blockquote>
5240 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5241 <para>
5242 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5243 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5244 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5245 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5246 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5247 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5248 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5249 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5250 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5251 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5252 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5253 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5254 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5255 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5256 "Does this still make sense?"
5257 </para>
5258 <para>
5259 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5260 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5261 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5262 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5263
5264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5265 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5266 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5267 </para>
5268 <para>
5269 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5270 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5271 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5272 judges loved every minute of it.
5273 </para>
5274 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5275 <para>
5276 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5277 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5278 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5279 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5280 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5281 were just violated in this room?"
5282 </para>
5283 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5284 <para>
5285 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5286 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5287 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5288 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5289 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5290 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5291 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5292 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5293 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5294 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5295 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5296 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5297 couldn't easily do them legally.
5298 </para>
5299 <para>
5300 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5301 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5302 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5303 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5304 planted in your presentation.
5305 </para>
5306 <para>
5307 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5309 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5310 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5311 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5312 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5313 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5314 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5315 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5316 </para>
5317 <para>
5318 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5319 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5320 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5321 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5322 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5323 </para>
5324 <para>
5325 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5326 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5327 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5328 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5329 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5330 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5331 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5332 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5333 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5334 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5335 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5336 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5337 registers the work.
5338 </para>
5339 <para>
5340 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5341 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5342 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5343 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5344 </para>
5345 <para>
5346 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5347 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5349 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5350 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5351 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5352 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5353 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5354 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5355 entertainment."
5356 </para>
5357 <para>
5358 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5359 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5360 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5361 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5362 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5363 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5364 new audiences, it is Mike."
5365 </para>
5366 <para>
5367 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5368 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5369 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5370 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5371 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5372 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5373 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5374 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5375 </para>
5376 <para>
5377 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5378 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5379 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5380 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5381 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5382 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5383 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5384 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5385 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5386 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5387 curse, reserved for the few.
5388 </para>
5389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5390 </sect1>
5391 <sect1 id="collectors">
5392 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5393 <para>
5394 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5395 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5396 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5397 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5398 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5399 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5400 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5401 </para>
5402 <para>
5403 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5404 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5405 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5406 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5407 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
5408 as when those pages changed.
5409 </para>
5410 <para>
5411 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5412 appreciated.
5413 In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5414 constantly
5415 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5416 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5417 </para>
5418 <para>
5419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5420 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5421 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5422 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5423 </para>
5424 <para>
5425 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5426 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5427 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5428 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5429 library&mdash;constantly
5430 updated, without any reliable memory.
5431 </para>
5432 <para>
5433 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5434 Machine,
5435 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5436 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5437 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5438 remember and what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5439 <!-- f1 -->
5440 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5441 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
5442 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5443 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5444 E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5445 </para></footnote>
5446 </para>
5447 <para>
5448 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5449 remember
5450 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5451 reaction
5452 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965,
5453 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5454 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5455 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5456 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what it is
5457 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5458 </para>
5459 <para>
5460 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5461 repeat
5462 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5463 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5464 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5465 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5466 researchers,
5467 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5468 </para>
5469 <para>
5470 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5471 Internet
5472 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5473 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5474 important
5475 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5477 important
5478 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5479 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5480 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the one kept by the
5481 Internet
5482 Archive.
5483 </para>
5484 <para>
5485 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5486 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5487 researcher.
5488 In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5489 success.
5490 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5491 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5492 Internet
5493 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5494 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
5495 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5496 </para>
5497 <para>
5498 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5499 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5500 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5501 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5502 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5503 constructing
5504 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5505 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5506 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5507 culture
5508 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5509 recorded
5510 each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a specific
5511 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5512 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5513 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5514 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5515 put it,
5516 </para>
5517 <blockquote>
5518 <para>
5519 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5520 Murphy
5521 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5522 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5523 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5524 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5525
5526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5527 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5528 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5529 </para>
5530 </blockquote>
5531 <para>
5532 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5533 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5534 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5535 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5536 nineteenthcentury
5537 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5538 understand
5539 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5540 </para>
5541 <para>
5542 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5543 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5544 libraries.
5545 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5546 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5547 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5548 </para>
5549 <para>
5550 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of
5551 Congress
5552 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5553 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5554 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915
5555 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5556 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5557 library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at all&mdash;in the library archive of the
5558 film company.<footnote><para>
5559 <!-- f2 -->
5560 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5561 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3 (1980): 5;
5562 Anthony
5563 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5564 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
5565 </para></footnote>
5566 </para>
5567 <para>
5568 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5569 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5570 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5571 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5572 required
5573 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5574 "copyrighted."
5575 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5576 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5577 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5578 anyone who would look.
5579 </para>
5580 <para>
5581 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5583 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5584 stations
5585 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5586 September
5587 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5588 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
5589 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5590 Anyone
5591 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5592 events of that day.
5593 </para>
5594 <para>
5595 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5596 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films"
5597 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5598 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5599 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5600 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5601 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5602 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5603 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5604 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5605 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5606 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5607 culture.
5608 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5609 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5610 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes&mdash;for free.
5611 </para>
5612 <para>
5613 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5614 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5615 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5616 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5617 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5618 </para>
5619 <para>
5620 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5621 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5622 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5623 culture.
5624 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5625 during
5626 a second life that all creative property has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5627 </para>
5628 <para>
5629 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5630 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5631
5632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5633 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5634 market
5635 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5636 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5637 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5638 market,
5639 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5640 </para>
5641 <para>
5642 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5643 tradition
5644 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5645 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5646 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5647 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5648 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5649 </para>
5650 <para>
5651 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5652 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5653 <!-- f3 -->
5654 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5655 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5656 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5657 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5658 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5659 Review
5660 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5661 </para></footnote>). After it is
5662 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5663 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5664 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5665 second
5666 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5667 spread and stability of culture.
5668 </para>
5669 <para>
5670 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5671 creative
5672 property does not hold true with the most important components
5673 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5674 these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&mdash;there is no
5675 guarantee
5676 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5677 libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5678 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5679 Beyond
5680 that, culture disappears.
5681 </para>
5682 <para>
5683 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5684 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5685 accessible
5686 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5687 extraordinarily
5688 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5689 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5691 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5692 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5693 practical
5694 effect.
5695 </para>
5696 <para>
5697 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5698 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5699 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5700 distributed
5701 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5702 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5703 archive of all moving images and sound.
5704 </para>
5705 <para>
5706 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5707 imagined
5708 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5709 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5710 Kahle describes,
5711 </para>
5712 <blockquote>
5713 <para>
5714 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5715 music.
5716 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5717 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5718 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5719 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5720 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5721 company.
5722 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5723 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5724 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5725 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5726 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5727 press.
5728 </para>
5729 </blockquote>
5730 <para>
5731 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5732 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5733 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5734 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5735 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5736 remains
5737 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5739 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5740 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5741 become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a future for our past. The
5742 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5743 Alexandria real again.
5744 </para>
5745 <para>
5746 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5747 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5748 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5749 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5750 someone's
5751 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5752 Kahle and others would exercise.
5753 </para>
5754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5755 </sect1>
5756 <sect1 id="property-i">
5757 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5758 <para>
5759 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5760 Association
5761 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5762 with Lyndon Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture
5763 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5764 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5765 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5766 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5767 </para>
5768 <para>
5769 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5770 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
5771 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5772 criticism.
5773 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5774 producers
5775 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5776 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5777 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5778 programs
5779 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5780 Entertainment,
5781 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5782 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5783 </para>
5784 <para>
5785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5786 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5787 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5788 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5789 important
5790 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5791 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5792 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5793 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5794 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5795 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5796 Washingtonian way.
5797 </para>
5798 <para>
5799 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5800 culture
5801 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5802 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5803 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5804 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5805 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5806 the meaning of "creative property."
5807 </para>
5808 <para>
5809 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5810 perfectly:
5811 </para>
5812 <blockquote>
5813 <para>
5814 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5815 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5816 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5817 fundamental
5818 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5819 Creative
5820 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5821 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5822 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5823 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5824 <!-- f1 -->
5825 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5826 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5827 Subcommittee
5828 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5829 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th
5830 Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5831 </para></footnote>
5832 </para>
5833 </blockquote>
5834 <para>
5835 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5836 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5837 "central
5838 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5840 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5841 protections
5842 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5843 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5844 be no second-class property owners.
5845 </para>
5846 <para>
5847 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5848 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5849 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5850 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5851 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5852 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5853 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5854 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5855 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5856 </para>
5857 <para>
5858 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5859 precise
5860 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5861 <!-- f2 -->
5862 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5863 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5864 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5865 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5866 ordinary
5867 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5868 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
5869 26&ndash;27.
5870 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5871 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5872 "accorded
5873 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5874 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5875 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5876 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5877 </para>
5878 <para>
5879 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5880 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5881 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5882 overturned
5883 in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5884 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5885 culture would develop.
5886 </para>
5887 <para>
5888 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5889 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5890 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5891 history.
5892 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5893 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5894 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5895 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5896
5897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5898 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5899 Creativity
5900 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5901 control.
5902 </para>
5903 <para>
5904 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5905 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5906 notwithstanding,
5907 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5908 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5909 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5910 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5911 opportunity
5912 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5913 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5914 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5915 Constitution itself.
5916 </para>
5917 <para>
5918 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
5919 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5920 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if it
5921 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&mdash;it is
5922 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
5923 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
5924 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
5925 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5926 </para>
5927 <para>
5928 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5929 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5930 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
5931 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
5932 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
5933 Congress
5934 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
5935 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
5936 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
5937 Instead,
5938 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5940 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5941 compensation
5942 at all.
5943 </para>
5944 <para>
5945 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5946 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
5947 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
5948 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
5949 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
5950 effectively
5951 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
5952 </para>
5953 <para>
5954 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5955 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5956 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5957 appointed
5958 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
5959 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
5960 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
5961 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
5962 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
5963 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
5964 it, we should, too.
5965 </para>
5966 <para>
5967 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5968 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5969 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
5970 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5971 creative
5972 property there must be a public domain?
5973 </para>
5974 <para>
5975 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5976 history
5977 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5978 enabled.
5979 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5980 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
5981 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
5982 protected,
5983 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
5984 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
5985 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
5986 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
5987 </para>
5988 <para>
5989
5990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5991 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5992 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5993 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5994 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5995 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5996 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5997 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5998 </para>
5999 <figure id="fig-1331">
6000 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6001 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6002 </figure>
6003 <para>
6004 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6005 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6006 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6007 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6008 represent
6009 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&mdash;
6010 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6011 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6012 punishments
6013 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6014 example,
6015 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6016 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6018 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6019 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6020 </para>
6021 <para>
6022 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6023 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6024 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6025 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6026 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6027 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6028 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6029 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6030 the source of the enforcement.
6031 </para>
6032 <para>
6033 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6034 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6035 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6036 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6037 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6038 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6039 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6040 group might behave.
6041 </para>
6042 <para>
6043 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6044 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a constraint on
6045 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6046 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6047 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6048 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6049 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6050 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6051 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6052 "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6053 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket
6054 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6055 enforces this constraint.
6056 </para>
6057 <para>
6058
6059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6060 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6061 obvious:
6062 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6063 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6064 another.
6065 </para>
6066 <para>
6067 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6068 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6069 particular
6070 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6071 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6072 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6073 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6074 consider how these four in particular interact.
6075 </para>
6076 <para>
6077 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6078 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6079 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6080 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6081 rational
6082 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6083 maximum
6084 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6085 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6086 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6087 community
6088 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50
6089 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6090 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6091 a different town, or at night.
6092 </para>
6093 <para>
6094 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6095 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6096 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6097 <!-- f3 -->
6098 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6099 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6100 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6101 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6102 expressed.
6103 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6104 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6105 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6106 </para></footnote>
6107 The law, in other words, sometimes
6108 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6109 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6110 increase
6111 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6112 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6113 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6114 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6116 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6117 example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6118 </para>
6119 <figure id="fig-1361">
6120 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6121 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6122 </figure>
6123 <para>
6124 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6125 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6126 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6127 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6128 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6129 another.<footnote>
6130 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6131 <para>
6132 <!-- f4 -->
6133 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6134 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6135 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6136 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6137 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6138 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6139 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6140 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6141 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6142 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6143 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6144 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6145 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6146 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6147 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6148 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6149 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6150 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6151 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6152 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6153 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6154 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6155 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6156 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6157 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6158 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6159 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6160 of these groups might face. </para></footnote>
6161 </para>
6162 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6163 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6164 <para>
6165 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6166 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6167 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6168 rallying makes sense.
6169 </para>
6170 <para>
6171 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6172 Internet:
6173 </para>
6174 <figure id="fig-1371">
6175 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6176 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6177 </figure>
6178 <para>
6179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6180 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6181 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6182 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6183 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6184 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6185 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6186 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6187 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6188 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6189 this form of infringement.
6190 </para>
6191 <para>
6192 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6193 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6194 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6195 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6196 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6197 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6198 </para>
6199 <para>
6200 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6201 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6202 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6203 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6204 Iraq
6205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6206 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6207 looting that results.
6208 </para>
6209 <figure id="fig-1381">
6210 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6211 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6212 </figure>
6213 <para>
6214 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6215 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6216 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6217 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6218 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6219 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6220 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6221 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6222 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6223 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6224 </para>
6225 <para>
6226 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6227 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6228 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6229 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6230 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6231 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6232 life. Homeowners living in a
6233
6234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6235 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6236 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6237 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6238 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6239 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6240 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6241 </para>
6242 <para>
6243 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6244 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6245 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6246 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6247 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6248 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6249 </para>
6250 <para>
6251 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6252 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6253 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6254 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6255 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6256 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6257 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6258 <!-- f5 -->
6259 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6260 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6261 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6262 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6263 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6264 October 2003, available at
6265 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6266 </para></footnote>
6267
6268 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6269 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6270 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6271 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6272 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6273 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6274 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6275 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6276 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6277 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6278 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6279 </para>
6280 <para>
6281 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6282 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6283 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6285 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6286 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6287 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6288 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6289 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6290 <!-- f6 -->
6291 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6292 </para></footnote>
6293 And relative to a
6294 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6295 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6296 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6297 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6298 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6299 Brezhnev.
6300 </para>
6301 <para>
6302 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6303 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6304 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6305 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6306 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6307 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6308 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6309 opportunities for innovation and change.
6310 </para>
6311 <para>
6312 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6313 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6314 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6315 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6316 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6317 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6318 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6319 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6320 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6321 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6322 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6323 regulation is justified.
6324 </para>
6325 <para>
6326 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6328 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6329 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6330 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6331 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6332 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6333 </para>
6334 <para>
6335 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6336 </para>
6337 <para>
6338 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6339 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6340 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6341 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6342 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6343 </para>
6344 <para>
6345 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6346 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6347 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6348 </para>
6349 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6350 <para>
6351 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6352 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6353 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6354 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6355 </para>
6356 <para>
6357 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6358 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6359 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6360 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6361 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6362 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6363 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6364 </para>
6365 <para>
6366 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6367 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6368 culture.<footnote><para>
6369 <!-- f7 -->
6370 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6371 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6372 </para></footnote>
6373 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6374 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6375 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6376 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6377 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6378 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6380 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6381 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6382 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6383 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6384 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6385 </para>
6386 <para>
6387 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6388 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6389 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6390 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6391 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6392 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6393 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6394 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6395 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6396 </para>
6397 <para>
6398 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6399 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6400 be lost.
6401 </para>
6402 </sect2>
6403 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6404 <title>Beginnings</title>
6405 <para>
6406 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6407 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6408 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6409 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6410 </para>
6411 <para>
6412 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6413 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6414 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6415 </para>
6416 <para>
6417 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6418 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6419 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6420
6421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6422 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6423 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6424 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6425 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6426 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6427 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6428 </para>
6429 <para>
6430 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6431 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6432 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6433 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6434 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6435 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6436 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6437 </para>
6438 <para>
6439 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6440 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6441 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6442 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6443 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6444 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6445 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6446 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6447 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6448 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6449 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6450 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6451 power.
6452 </para>
6453 <para>
6454 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6455 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6456 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6457 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6458 years since they first struck its design.
6459 </para>
6460 <para>
6461 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6462 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6464 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6465 started here:
6466 </para>
6467 <figure id="fig-1441">
6468 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6469 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6470 </figure>
6471 <para>
6472 We will end here:
6473 </para>
6474 <figure id="fig-1442">
6475 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6476 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6477 </figure>
6478 <para>
6479 Let me explain how.
6480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6481 </para>
6482 </sect2>
6483 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6484 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6485 <para>
6486 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6487 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6488 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6489 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6490 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6491 authorship.<footnote>
6492 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6493 <para>
6494 <!-- f8 -->
6495 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6496 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6497 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6498 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6499 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6500 </para></footnote>
6501 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6502 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6503 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6504 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6505 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6506 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6507 </para>
6508 <para>
6509 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6510 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6511 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6512 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6513 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6514 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6515 </para>
6516 <para>
6517 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6518 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6519 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6520 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6521 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6522 </para>
6523 <para>
6524 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6525 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6526 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6527 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6528 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6529 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6530 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6531 <!-- f9 -->
6532 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6533 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6534 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6535 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6536 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6537 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6538 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6539 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6540 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6541 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6542 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6543 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6544 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6545 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6546 </para>
6547 <para>
6548 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6549 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6551 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6552 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6553 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6554 copyright, either.
6555 </para>
6556 <para>
6557 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6558 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6559 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6560 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6561 domain.<footnote><para>
6562 <!-- f10 -->
6563 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6564 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6565 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6566 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6567 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6568 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6569 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6570 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6571 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6572 </para>
6573 <para>
6574 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6575 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6576 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6577 <!-- f11 -->
6578 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6579 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6580 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6581 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6582 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6583 effectively free.
6584 </para>
6585 <para>
6586 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6587 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6588 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6589 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6590 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6591 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6592 </para>
6593 <para>
6594 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6595 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6596 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6597 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6598 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6599 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6600 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6601 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6602 </para>
6603 <para>
6604 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6605 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6606 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6607 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6608
6609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6610 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6611 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6612 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6613 </para>
6614 <para>
6615 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6616 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6617 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6618 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6619 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6620 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6621 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6622 value.
6623 </para>
6624 <para>
6625 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6626 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6627 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6628 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6629 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6630 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6631 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6632 was ninety-five years.
6633 </para>
6634 <para>
6635 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6636 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6637 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6638 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6639 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6640 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6641 them.
6642 </para>
6643 <para>
6644 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6645 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6646 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6647 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6648 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6649 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6650 years.<footnote><para>
6651 <!-- f12 -->
6652 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6653 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6654 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6655 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6656 </para></footnote>
6657 </para>
6658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6659 </sect2>
6660 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6661 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6662 <para>
6663 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6664 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6665 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6666 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6667 </para>
6668 <para>
6669 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6670 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6671 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6672 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6673 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6674 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6675 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6676 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6677 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6678 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6679 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6680 </para>
6681 <para>
6682 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6683 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6684 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6685 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6686 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6687 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6688 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6689 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6690 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6691 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6692 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6693 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6694 on the initial creative work.
6695 </para>
6696 <para>
6697 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6698 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6699 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6701 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6702 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6703 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6704 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6705 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6706 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6707 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6708 </para>
6709 <para>
6710 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6711 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6712 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6713 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6714 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6715 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6716 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6717 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6718 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6719 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6720 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6721 original author.
6722 </para>
6723 <para>
6724 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6725 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6726 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6727 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6728 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6729 copy available for others to copy.
6730 </para>
6731 <para>
6732 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6733 differences.
6734 </para>
6735 <para>
6736 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6737 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6738 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6739 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6740 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6741 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6742 <!-- f13 -->
6743 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6744 Creation
6745 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6746 International
6747 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6748 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6749 </para></footnote>
6750 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6751 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6752 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6753 </para>
6754 <para>
6755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6756 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6757 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6758 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6759 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6760 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6761 creative
6762 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6763 restrained.
6764 </para>
6765 <para>
6766 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6767 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6768 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6769 reduced
6770 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6771 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6772 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6773 </para>
6774 <para>
6775 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6776 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6777 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6778 </para>
6779 <para>
6780 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6781 control
6782 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6783 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6784 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6785 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6786 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6787 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6788 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6789 exclusive
6790 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6791 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6792 </para>
6793 <para>
6794 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6795 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6796 expansion
6797 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6798 copyright.
6799 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6800 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6801 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6802 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6803 </para>
6804 <para>
6805
6806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6807 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6808 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6809 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6810 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6811 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6812 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6813 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6814 protect
6815 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6816 <!-- f14 -->
6817 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6818 2003, available at
6819 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6820 </para></footnote>
6821 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6822 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6823 the wrong of direct piracy.
6824 </para>
6825 <para>
6826 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6827 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6828 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6829 transformative
6830 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6831 <!-- f15 -->
6832 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6833 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6834 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6835 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6836 Constitutionality,"
6837 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6838 </para></footnote>
6839 These two different uses of my creative work are
6840 treated the same.
6841 </para>
6842 <para>
6843 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6844 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6845 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6846 creates
6847 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6848 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6849 originally created?
6850 </para>
6851 <para>
6852 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6853 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6854 simply
6855 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6856 rights originally granted.
6857 </para>
6858 </sect2>
6859 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6860 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6861 <para>
6862 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6863 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6864 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6865 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6866 <!-- f16 -->
6867 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6868 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6869 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6870 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6871 sometimes
6872 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6873 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6874 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6875 </para></footnote>
6876 </para>
6877 <para>
6878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6879 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6880 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6881 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6882 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6883 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6884 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6885 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6886 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6887 trigger for copyright law.
6888 </para>
6889 <para>
6890 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6891 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6892 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6893 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6894 <!-- f17 -->
6895 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6896 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6897 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6898 basis
6899 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6900 </para></footnote>
6901 because it is clear that the
6902 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6903 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6904 </para>
6905 <para>
6906 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6907 empty circle.
6908 </para>
6909 <figure id="fig-1521">
6910 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6911 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6912 </figure>
6913 <para>
6914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6915 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6916 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6917 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6918 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6919 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6920 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6921 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6922 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6923 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6924 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6925 not make a copy.
6926 </para>
6927 <figure id="fig-1531">
6928 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6929 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6930 </figure>
6931 <para>
6932 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6933 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6934 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6935 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6936 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6937 diagram on next page).
6938 </para>
6939 <para>
6940 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6941 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6942 </para>
6943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6944 <figure id="fig-1541">
6945 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6946 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6947 </figure>
6948 <para>
6949 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6950 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6951 unregulated.
6952 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6953 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6954 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6955 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6956 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6957 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6958 </para>
6959 <figure id="fig-1542">
6960 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6961 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6962 </figure>
6963 <para> </para>
6964 <figure id="fig-1551">
6965 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6966 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6967 </figure>
6968 <para>
6969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6970 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6971 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6972 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6973 </para>
6974 <para>
6975 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6976 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6977 <!-- f18 -->
6978 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6979 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6980 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6981 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6982 </para></footnote>
6983 And because of this single,
6984 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6985 category
6986 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6987 unregulated
6988 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6989 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6990 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6991 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6992 category
6993 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6994 copyrighted
6995 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6996 burden of this shift.
6997 </para>
6998 <para>
6999 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7000 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7001 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7002 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7003 nothing
7004 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7006 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
7007 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7008 produced
7009 a copy.
7010 </para>
7011 <para>
7012 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7013 different
7014 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7015 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7016 copyright
7017 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7018 accidental
7019 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7020 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7021 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7022 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7023 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7024 </para>
7025 <para>
7026 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7027 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7028 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7029 points also become clear:
7030 </para>
7031 <para>
7032 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7033 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7034 presumptively
7035 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7036 evidence
7037 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7038 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7039 free culture before the Internet.
7040 </para>
7041 <para>
7042 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7043 transformative
7044 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7045 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7046 transformation
7047 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7048 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7049 releasing
7050 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7051 justification.
7052 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7053 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7054 transformative
7055 uses of creative work.
7056 </para>
7057 <para>
7058 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7059
7060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7061 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7062 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7063 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7064 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7065 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7066 Internet,
7067 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7068 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7069 protected
7070 before because reading was not regulated.
7071 </para>
7072 <para>
7073 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7074 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7075 depend
7076 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7077 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7078 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7079 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7080 protections
7081 of fair use are not enough.
7082 </para>
7083 <para>
7084 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7085 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7086 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7087 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7088 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7089 </para>
7090 <para>
7091 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7092 began
7093 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7094 previews.
7095 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7096 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7097 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7098 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7099 before
7100 you bought it.
7101 </para>
7102 <para>
7103 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7104 distributors
7105 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7106 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7107 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7109 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7110 business
7111 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7112 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7113 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7114 immediately.
7115 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7116 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7117 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7118 </para>
7119 <para>
7120 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7121 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7122 infringed"
7123 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7124 willful
7125 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7126 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7127 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7128 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7129 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7130 </para>
7131 <para>
7132 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7133 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7134 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7135 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7136 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7137 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7138 Disney's permission.
7139 </para>
7140 <para>
7141 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7142 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7143 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7144 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7145 marketplace,
7146 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7147 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7148 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7149 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7150 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7151 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7152 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7153 </para>
7154 <para>
7155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7156 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7157 control
7158 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7159 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7160 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7161 Noble
7162 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7163 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7164 argument
7165 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7166 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7167 exercising
7168 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7169 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7170 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7171 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7172 </para>
7173 <para>
7174 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7175 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7176 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7177 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7178 owners
7179 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7180 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7181 </para>
7182 </sect2>
7183 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7184 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7185 <para>
7186 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7187 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7188 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7189 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7190 </para>
7191 <para>
7192 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7193 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7194 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7195 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7196 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7197 your freedom.
7198 </para>
7199 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7200 <para>
7201 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7202 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7204 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7205 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7206 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7207 <!-- f19 -->
7208 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7209 Contemporary
7210 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7211 </para></footnote>
7212 </para>
7213 <para>
7214 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7215 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7216 you were."<footnote><para>
7217 <!-- f20 -->
7218 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7219 </para></footnote>
7220 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7221 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7222 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7223 </para>
7224 <para>
7225 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7226 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7227 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7228 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7229 </para>
7230 <para>
7231 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7232 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7233 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7234 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7235 copyrighted
7236 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7237 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7238 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7239 that is not at all funny.
7240 </para>
7241 <para>
7242 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7243 </para>
7244 <para>
7245 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7246 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7247 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7248 technology,
7249 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7250 </para>
7251 <para>
7252 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7253 Reader.
7254 </para>
7255 <para>
7256 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7257 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7258 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7259 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7260 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7261 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7263 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7264 called Permissions.
7265 </para>
7266 <figure id="fig-1611">
7267 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7268 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7269 </figure>
7270 <para>
7271 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7272 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7273 </para>
7274 <figure id="fig-1612">
7275 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7276 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7277 </figure>
7278 <para>
7279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7280 According to my eBook
7281 Reader, I have the permission
7282 to copy to the clipboard of the
7283 computer ten text selections
7284 every ten days. (So far, I've
7285 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7286 I also have the permission to
7287 print ten pages from the book
7288 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7289 the permission to use the Read
7290 Aloud button to hear
7291 Middlemarch
7292 read aloud through the
7293 computer.
7294 </para>
7295 <para>
7296 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7297 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7298 </para>
7299 <figure id="fig-1621">
7300 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7301 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7302 </figure>
7303 <para>
7304 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7305 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7306 the book.
7307 </para>
7308 <figure id="fig-1622">
7309 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7310 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7311 </figure>
7312 <para>
7313 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7314 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7315 </para>
7316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7317 <figure id="fig-1631">
7318 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7319 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7320 </figure>
7321 <para>
7322 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7323 </para>
7324 <para>
7325 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7326 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7327 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7328 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7329 under
7330 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7331 <!-- f21 -->
7332 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7333 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7334 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7335 obligation
7336 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7337 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7338 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7339 </para></footnote>
7340 When my e-book of
7341 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7342 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7343 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7344 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7345 </para>
7346 <para>
7347 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7348 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7349 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7350 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7351 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7352 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7353 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7354 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7355 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7356 restrictions:
7357 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7358 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7359 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7360 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7361 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7362 </para>
7363 <para>
7364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7365 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7366 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7367 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7368 </para>
7369 <para>
7370 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7371 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7372 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7373 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7374 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7375 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7376 </para>
7377 <para>
7378 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7379 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7380 technologies
7381 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7382 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7383 protections as well?
7384 </para>
7385 <para>
7386 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7387 eBook Reader.
7388 </para>
7389 <para>
7390 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7391 public
7392 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7393 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7394 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7395 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7396 </para>
7397 <figure id="fig-1641">
7398 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7399 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7400 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7401 </figure>
7402 <para>
7403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7404 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7405 allowed
7406 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7407 "permissions"
7408 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7409 </para>
7410 <para>
7411 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7412 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7413 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7414 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7415 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7416 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7417 </para>
7418 <para>
7419 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7420 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7421 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7422 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7423 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7424 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7425 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7426 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7427 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7428 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7429 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7430 </para>
7431 <para>
7432 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7433 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7434 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7435 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7436 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7437 often crazy.
7438 </para>
7439 <para>
7440 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7441 story of mine that makes the same point.
7442 </para>
7443 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7444 <para>
7445 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7446 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7447 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7448 </para>
7449 <para>
7450 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7451 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7452 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7454 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7455 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7456 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7457 </para>
7458 <para>
7459 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7460 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7461 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7462 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7463 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7464 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7465 </para>
7466 <para>
7467 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7468 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7469 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7470 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7471 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7472 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7473 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7474 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7475 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7476 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7477 </para>
7478 <para>
7479 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7480 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7481 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7482 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7483 ethically.
7484 </para>
7485 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7486 <para>
7487 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7488 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7489 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7490 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7491 than Sony had built.
7492 </para>
7493 <para>
7494 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7495 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7496 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7497 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7498 the
7499
7500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7501 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7502 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7503 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7504 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7505 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7506 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7507 dog to dance?
7508 </para>
7509 <para>
7510 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7511 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7512 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7513 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7514 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7515 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7516 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7517 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7518 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7519 </para>
7520 <para>
7521 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7522 <!-- f22 -->
7523 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7524 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7525 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7526 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7527 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7528 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7529 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7530 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7531 Questions
7532 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7533 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7534 </para></footnote>
7535 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7536 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7537 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7538 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7539 </para>
7540 <para>
7541 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7542 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7543 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7544 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7545 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7546 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7547 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7548 Internet much more.
7549 </para>
7550 <para>
7551 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7552 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7553 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7554 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7555 </para>
7556 <para>
7557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7558 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7559 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7560 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7561 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7562 </para>
7563 <para>
7564 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7565 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7566 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7567 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7568 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7569 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7570 </para>
7571 <para>
7572 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7573 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7574 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7575 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7576 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7577 constituted, succeed.
7578 </para>
7579 <para>
7580 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7581 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7582 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7583 wrote:
7584 </para>
7585 <blockquote>
7586 <para>
7587 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7588 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7589 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7590 </para>
7591 </blockquote>
7592 <para>
7593 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7594 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7595 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7596 </para>
7597 <blockquote>
7598 <para>
7599 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7601 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7602 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7603 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7604 </para>
7605 </blockquote>
7606 <para>
7607 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7608 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7609 spreading such information an offense.
7610 </para>
7611 <para>
7612 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7613 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7614 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7615 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7616 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7617 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7618 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7619 </para>
7620 <para>
7621 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7622 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7623 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7624 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7625 </para>
7626 <para>
7627 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7628 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7629 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7630 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7631 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7632 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7633 have been a copyright violation.
7634 </para>
7635 <para>
7636 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7637 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7638 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7639 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7640 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7641 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7642 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7644 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7645 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7646 </para>
7647 <para>
7648 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7649 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7650 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7651 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7652 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7653 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7654 </para>
7655 <para>
7656 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7657 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7658 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7659 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7660 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7661 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7662 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7663 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7664 </para>
7665 <blockquote>
7666 <para>
7667 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7668 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7669 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7670 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7671 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7672 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7673 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7674 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7675 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7676 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7677 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7678 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7679 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7680 important.<footnote><para>
7681 <!-- f23 -->
7682 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7683 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7684 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7685 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7686 </para></footnote>
7687 </para>
7688 </blockquote>
7689 <para>
7690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7691 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7692 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7693 the VCR responsible.
7694 </para>
7695 <para>
7696 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7697 the DMCA.
7698 </para>
7699 <para>
7700 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7701 </para>
7702 <para>
7703 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7704 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7705 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7706 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7707 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7708 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7709 </para>
7710 <para>
7711 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7713 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7714 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7715 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7716 and bad uses.
7717 </para>
7718 <figure id="fig-1711">
7719 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7720 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7721 </figure>
7722 <para>
7723 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7724 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7725 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7726 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7727 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7728 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7729 </para>
7730 <para>
7731 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7732 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7733 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7734 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7735 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7736 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7737 </para>
7738 <para>
7739 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7740 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7741 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7742 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7743 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7744 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7745 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7746 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7747 </para>
7748 <para>
7749 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7750 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7751 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7752 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7753 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7754 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7755 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7756 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7757 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7758 </para>
7759 <para>
7760
7761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7762 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7763 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7764 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7765 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7766 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7767 <!-- f24 -->
7768 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7769 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7770 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7771 </para></footnote>
7772 </para>
7773 <para>
7774 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7775 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7776 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7777 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7778 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7779 </para>
7780 <para>
7781 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7782 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7783 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7784 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7785 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7786 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7787 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7788 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7789 </para>
7790 <para>
7791 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7792 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7793 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7794 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7795 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7796 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7797 </para>
7798 </sect2>
7799 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7800 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7801 <para>
7802 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7803 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7804 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7805 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7806 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7807 find better ways
7808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7809 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7810 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7811 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7812 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7813 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7814 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7815 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7816 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7817 control.
7818 </para>
7819 <para>
7820 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7821 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7822 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7823 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7824 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7825 </para>
7826 <para>
7827 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7828 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7829 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7830 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7831 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7832 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7833 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7834 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7835 of the media.
7836 </para>
7837 <para>
7838 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7839 nature.
7840 </para>
7841 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7842 <para>
7843 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7844 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7845 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7846 <!-- f25 -->
7847 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7848 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7849 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7850 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7851 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7852 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7853 <!-- f26 -->
7854 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7855 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7856 </para></footnote>
7857 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7858 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7859 <!-- f27 -->
7860 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7861 31 May 2003.
7862 </para></footnote>
7863 </para>
7864 <para>
7865 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7866 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7868 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7869 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7870 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7871 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7872 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7873 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7874 </para>
7875 <para>
7876 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7877 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7878 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7879 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7880 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7881 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7882 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7883 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7884 protected&mdash; by the market.
7885 </para>
7886 <para>
7887 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7888 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7889 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7890 </para>
7891 <blockquote>
7892 <para>
7893 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7894 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7895 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7896 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7897 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7898 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7899 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7900 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7901 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7902 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7903 <!-- f28 -->
7904 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7905 2003): 89.
7906 </para></footnote>
7907 </para>
7908 </blockquote>
7909 <para>
7910 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7911 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7912 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7913 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7914 </para>
7915 <figure id="fig-1761">
7916 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7917 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7918 </figure>
7919 <para>
7920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7921 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7922 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7923 distribute content?
7924 </para>
7925 <para>
7926 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7927 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7928 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7929 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7930 </para>
7931 <para>
7932 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7933 integration may matter.
7934 </para>
7935 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7936 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7937 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7938 <para>
7939 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7940 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7941 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7942 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7943 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7944 </para>
7945 <para>
7946 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7947 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7948 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7949 control.<footnote><para>
7950 <!-- f29 -->
7951 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7952 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7953 Missouri,
7954 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7955 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7956 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7957 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7958 </para></footnote>
7959 </para>
7960 <para>
7961
7962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7963 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
7964 forbade
7965 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
7966 law required a separation between the networks and the content
7967 producers;
7968 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
7969 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7970 television&mdash;75
7971 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
7972 </para>
7973 <para>
7974 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
7975 independence.
7976 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
7977 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
7978 studios;
7979 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
7980 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
7981 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7982 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
7983 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
7984 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
7985 <!-- f30 -->
7986 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
7987 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
7988 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
7989 Consumers
7990 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7991 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
7992 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
7993 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
7994 </para></footnote>
7995 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
7996 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
7997 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
7998 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
7999 number
8000 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8001 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
8002 <!-- f31 -->
8003 Ibid.
8004 </para></footnote>
8005 </para>
8006 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8007 <para>
8008 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8009 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8010 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8011 owned by the network.
8012 </para>
8013 <para>
8014 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8015 ownership
8016 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8017 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8018 </para>
8019 <blockquote>
8020 <para>
8021 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8022 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8023 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8024 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8026 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8027 production
8028 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8029 than a handful.<footnote><para>
8030 <!-- f32 -->
8031 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8032 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8033 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8034 </para></footnote>
8035 </para>
8036 </blockquote>
8037 <para>
8038 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8039 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8040 Increasingly
8041 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8042 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8043 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8044 inside,
8045 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8046 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8047 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8048 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8049 </para>
8050 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8051 <para>
8052 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8053 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8054 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8055 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8056 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8057 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8058 <!-- f33 -->
8059 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8060 National
8061 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8062 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8063 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8064 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8065 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8066 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8067 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
8068 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
8069 </para></footnote>
8070
8071 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8072 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8073 sprinting.
8074 </para>
8075 <para>
8076 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8077 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8078 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8079 measure.
8080 </para>
8081 <para>
8082 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8083 suggest the concern.
8084 </para>
8085 <para>
8086 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8087 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8088 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8089 </para>
8090 <para>
8091 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8092 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8093 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8094
8095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8096 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8097 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8098 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8099 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8100 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8101 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8102 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8103 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8104 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8105 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8106 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8107 outweigh these costs.
8108 </para>
8109 <para>
8110 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8111 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8112 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8113 these issues.
8114 </para>
8115 <para>
8116 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8117 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8118 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8119 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8120 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8121 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8122 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8123 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8124 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8125 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8126 </para>
8127 <para>
8128 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8129 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8130 </para>
8131 <para>
8132 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8133 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8134 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8135 war. Can you do it?
8136 </para>
8137 <para>
8138 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8140 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8141 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8142 message will be heard then?
8143 </para>
8144 <para>
8145 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8146 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8147 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8148 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8149 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8150 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8151 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8152 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8153 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8154 <!-- f34 -->
8155 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8156 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8157 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8158 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8159 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8160 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8161 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8162 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8163 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8164 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8165 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8166 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8167 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8168 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8169 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8170 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8171 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8172 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8173 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8174 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8175 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8176 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8177 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8178 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8179 </para></footnote>
8180 </para>
8181 <para>
8182 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8183 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8184 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8185 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8186 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8187 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8188 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8189 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8190 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8191 </para>
8192 </sect2>
8193 <sect2 id="together">
8194 <title>Together</title>
8195 <para>
8196 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8197 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8198 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8199 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8200 </para>
8201 <para>
8202 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8203 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8204 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8205 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8206 to seem
8207
8208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8209 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8210 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8211 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8212 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8213 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8214 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8215 be redefined.
8216 </para>
8217 <para>
8218 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8219 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8220 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8221 our culture today.
8222 </para>
8223 <para>
8224 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8225 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8226 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8227 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8228 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8229 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8230 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8231 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8232 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8233 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8234 </para>
8235 <para>
8236 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8237 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8238 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8239 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8240 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8241 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8242 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8243 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8244 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8245 technology and the market enable.
8246 </para>
8247 <para>
8248 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8249 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8251 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8252 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8253 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8254 the development of our culture than now.
8255 </para>
8256 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8257 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8258 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8259 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8260 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8261 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8262 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8263 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8264 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8265 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8266 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8267 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8268 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8269 <!-- f35 -->
8270 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8271 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8272 </para></footnote>
8273 </para>
8274 <para>
8275 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8276 </para>
8277 <para>
8278 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8279 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8280 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8281 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8282 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8283 </para>
8284
8285 <table id="t2">
8286 <title></title>
8287 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8288 <thead>
8289 <row>
8290 <entry></entry>
8291 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8292 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8293 </row>
8294 </thead>
8295 <tbody>
8296 <row>
8297 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8298 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8299 <entry>Free</entry>
8300 </row>
8301 <row>
8302 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8303 <entry>Free</entry>
8304 <entry>Free</entry>
8305 </row>
8306 </tbody>
8307 </tgroup>
8308 </table>
8309
8310 <para>
8311 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8312 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8313 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8314
8315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8316 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8317 noncommercial work was also free.
8318 </para>
8319 <para>
8320 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8321 </para>
8322
8323 <table id="t3">
8324 <title></title>
8325 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8326 <thead>
8327 <row>
8328 <entry></entry>
8329 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8330 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8331 </row>
8332 </thead>
8333 <tbody>
8334 <row>
8335 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8336 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8337 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8338 </row>
8339 <row>
8340 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8341 <entry>Free</entry>
8342 <entry>Free</entry>
8343 </row>
8344 </tbody>
8345 </tgroup>
8346 </table>
8347
8348 <para>
8349 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8350 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8351 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8352 transformation were still essentially free.
8353 </para>
8354 <para>
8355 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8356 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8357 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8358 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8359 we could say the law began to look like this:
8360 </para>
8361
8362 <table id="t4">
8363 <title></title>
8364 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8365 <thead>
8366 <row>
8367 <entry></entry>
8368 <entry>COPY</entry>
8369 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8370 </row>
8371 </thead>
8372 <tbody>
8373 <row>
8374 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8375 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8376 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8377 </row>
8378 <row>
8379 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8380 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8381 <entry>Free</entry>
8382 </row>
8383 </tbody>
8384 </tgroup>
8385 </table>
8386
8387 <para>
8388 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8389 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8390 commercial
8391 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8392 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8393 means that the law now looks like this:
8394 </para>
8395
8396 <table id="t5">
8397 <title></title>
8398 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8399 <thead>
8400 <row>
8401 <entry></entry>
8402 <entry>COPY</entry>
8403 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8404 </row>
8405 </thead>
8406 <tbody>
8407 <row>
8408 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8409 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8410 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8411 </row>
8412 <row>
8413 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8414 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8415 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8416 </row>
8417 </tbody>
8418 </tgroup>
8419 </table>
8420
8421 <para>
8422 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8423 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8424 creativity&mdash;
8425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8426 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8427 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8428 </para>
8429 <para>
8430 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8431 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8432 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8433 these domains actually does any good.
8434 </para>
8435 <para>
8436 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8437 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8438 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8439 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8440 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8441 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8442 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8443 rights were more sharply restricted.
8444 </para>
8445 <para>
8446 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8447 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8448 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8449 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8450 property rights<footnote><para>
8451 <!-- f36 -->
8452 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8453 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8454 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8455 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8456 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8457 Press, 1980).
8458 </para></footnote>)
8459 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8460 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8461 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8462 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8463 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8464 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8465 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8466 free culture.
8467 </para>
8468 <para>
8469 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8470 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8471 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8472 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8473 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8474 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8475 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8476 chapter 7). Adding
8477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8478 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8479 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8480 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8481 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8482 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8483 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8484 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8485 dominates the debate today.
8486 </para>
8487 <para>
8488 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8489 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8490 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8491 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8492 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8493 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8494 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8495 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8496 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8497 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8498 lawyer.
8499 </para>
8500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8501 </sect2>
8502 </sect1>
8503 </chapter>
8504 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8505 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8506 <para></para>
8507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8508 <sect1 id="chimera">
8509 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8510 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8511 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8512 </indexterm>
8513 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8514 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8515 </indexterm>
8516 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8517 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8518 </indexterm>
8519
8520 <para>
8521 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8522 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8523 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8524 <!-- f1. -->
8525 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8526 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8527 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8528 </para></footnote>
8529 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8530 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8531 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8532 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8533 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8534 villagers to explore life as a king.
8535 </para>
8536 <para>
8537 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8538 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8539 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8540 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8541 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8542 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8543 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8544 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8545 alone!'"
8546 </para>
8547 <para>
8548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8549 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8550 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8551 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8552 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8553 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8554 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8555 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8556 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8557 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8558 </para>
8559 <para>
8560 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8561 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8562 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8563 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8564 </para>
8565 <para>
8566 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8567 is affected," he reports.
8568 </para>
8569 <para>
8570 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8571 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8572 his brain."
8573 </para>
8574 <para>
8575 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8576 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8577 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8578 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8579 </para>
8580 <para>
8581 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8582 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8583 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8584 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8585 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8586 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8587 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8588 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8589
8590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8591 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8592 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8593 scene. . . ."
8594 </para>
8595 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8596 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8597 <para>
8598 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8599 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8600 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8601 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8602 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8603 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8604 </para>
8605 <para>
8606 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8607 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8608 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8609 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8610 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8611 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8612 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8613 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8614 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8615 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8616 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8617 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8618 </para>
8619 <para>
8620 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8621 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8622 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8623 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8624 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8625 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8626 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8627 </para>
8628 <para>
8629 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8630 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8631 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8632 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8633 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8634 from Tower.
8635 </para>
8636 <para>
8637
8638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8639 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8640 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8641 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8642 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8643 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8644 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8645 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8646 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8647 </para>
8648 <para>
8649 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8650 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8651 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8652 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8653 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8654 </para>
8655 <para>
8656 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8657 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8658 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8659 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8660 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8661 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8662 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8663 implemented.<footnote><para>
8664 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8665 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8666 "Copyright
8667 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8668 at
8669 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8670 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8671 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8672 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8673 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8674 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8675 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8676 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8677 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8678 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8679 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8680 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8681 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8682 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8683 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8684 billion
8685 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8686 Elizabeth
8687 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8688 August 2003, available at
8689 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8690 targeting
8691 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8692 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8693 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8694 D3, available at
8695 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8696 </para></footnote>
8697
8698 </para>
8699 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8700 <para>
8701 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8702 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8703 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8704 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8705 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8706 </para>
8707 <para>
8708 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8709 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8710 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8711 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8712 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8713 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8714 alternative.
8715 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8716 of the two extremes.
8717 </para>
8718 <para>
8719
8720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8721 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8722 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8723 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8724 content
8725 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8726 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8727 innovation
8728 and new creativity will be lost.
8729 </para>
8730 <para>
8731 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8732 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8733 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8734 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8735 innovation
8736 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8737 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8738 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8739 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8740 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8741 material,
8742 </para>
8743 <blockquote>
8744 <para>
8745 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8746 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8747 </para>
8748 <para>
8749 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8750 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8751 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8752 answer
8753 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8754 well produce a totally different industry model.
8755 </para>
8756 <para>
8757 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8758 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8759 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8760 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8761 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8762 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8763 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8764 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8765 interests.<footnote><para>
8766 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8767 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8768 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8769 Protection,
8770 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8771 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8772 EMusic.com),
8773 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8774 Congressional
8775 Testimony File.
8776 </para></footnote>
8777 </para>
8778 </blockquote>
8779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8780 <para>
8781 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8782 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8783 changed.
8784 </para>
8785 <para>
8786 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8787 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8788 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8789 </para>
8790
8791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8792 </sect1>
8793 <sect1 id="harms">
8794 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8795 <para>
8796
8797 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8798 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8799 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8800 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8801 prohibition,
8802 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8803 </para>
8804 <para>
8805 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8806 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8807 extend
8808 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8809 justified?
8810 </para>
8811 <para>
8812 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8813 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8814 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8815 our history.
8816 </para>
8817 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8818 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8819 <para>
8820 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8821 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8822 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8823 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8824 </para>
8825 <para>
8826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8827 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8828 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8829 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8830 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8831 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8832 </para>
8833 <sect2 id="constrain">
8834 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8835 <para>
8836 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8837 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8838 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8839 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8840 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8841 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8842 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8843 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8844 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8845 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8846 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8847 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8848 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8849 </para>
8850 <para>
8851 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8852 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8853 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8854 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8855 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8856 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8857 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8858 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8859 the culture all around.
8860 </para>
8861 <para>
8862 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8863 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8864
8865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8866
8867 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8868 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8869 storytelling extended across the globe.
8870 </para>
8871 <para>
8872 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8873 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8874 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8875 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8876 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8877 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8878 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8879 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8880 work is presumptively illegal.
8881 </para>
8882 <para>
8883 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8884 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8885 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8886 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8887 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8888 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8889 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8890 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8891 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8892 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8893 million.<footnote><para>
8894 <!-- f1. -->
8895 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8896 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8897 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8898 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8899 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8900 </para></footnote>
8901 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8902 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8903 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8904 suffering.<footnote>
8905 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8906 <para>
8907 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8908 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8909 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8910 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8911 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8912 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8913 available at
8914 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8915 recent months.
8916 </para></footnote>
8917 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8918 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8919 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8920 </para>
8921 <para>
8922 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8923 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8924 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8925 creative
8926 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8927 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8928 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8929
8930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8931 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8932 create,
8933 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8934 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8935 begin
8936 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8937 necessarily
8938 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8939 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8940 "illegal
8941 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8942 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8943 available
8944 at
8945 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8946 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8947 </para></footnote>
8948 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8949 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8950 critical or reflective.
8951 </para>
8952 <para>
8953 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8954 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8955 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8956 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8957 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8958 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8959 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8960 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8961 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8962 </para>
8963 <para>
8964 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8965 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8966 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8967 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8968 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8969 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8970 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8971 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8972 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8973 </para>
8974 <para>
8975 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8976 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
8977 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8978 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8979 law regulates such a use.
8980 </para>
8981 <para>
8982
8983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8984 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8985 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8986 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8987 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8988 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8989 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8990 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8991 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8992 </para>
8993 <para>
8994 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8995 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8996 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8997 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8998 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8999 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9000 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9001 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9002 comfort themselves.
9003 </para>
9004 <para>
9005 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9006 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9007 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9008 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9009 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9010 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9011 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9012 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9013 culture that is free.
9014 </para>
9015 <para>
9016 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9017 </para>
9018 <blockquote>
9019 <para>
9020 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9021 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9022 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9023 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9024 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9026 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9027 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9028 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9029 </para>
9030 </blockquote>
9031 </sect2>
9032 <sect2 id="innovators">
9033 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9034 <para>
9035 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9036 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9037 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9038 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9039 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9040 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9041 </para>
9042 <para>
9043 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9044 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9045 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9046 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9047 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9048 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9049 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9050 </para>
9051 <para>
9052 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9053 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9054 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9055 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9056 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9057 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9058 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9059 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9060 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9061 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9062 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9063 </para>
9064 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9065 <para>
9066 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9068 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9069 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9070 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9071 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9072 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9073 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9074 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9075 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9076 </para>
9077 <para>
9078 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9079 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9080 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9081 </para>
9082 <para>
9083 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9084 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9085 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9086 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9087 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9088 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9089 </para>
9090 <para>
9091 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9092 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9093 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9094 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9095 Raitt. And so on.
9096 </para>
9097 <para>
9098 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9099 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9100 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9101 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9102 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9103 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9104 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9105 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9106 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9107 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9108 </para>
9109 <para>
9110 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9111 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9112
9113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9114 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9115 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9116 the kind of content the users liked.
9117 </para>
9118 <para>
9119 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9120 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9121 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9122 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9123 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9124 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9125 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9126 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9127 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9128 they had already bought.
9129 </para>
9130 <para>
9131 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9132 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9133 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9134 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9135 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9136 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9137 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9138 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9139 </para>
9140 <para>
9141 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9142 </para>
9143 <para>
9144 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9145 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9146 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9147 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9148 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9149 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9150 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9151 demanded.
9152 </para>
9153 <para>
9154 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9155 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9156 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9157 clients in this
9158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9159 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9160 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9161 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9162 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9163 </para>
9164 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9165 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9166 <para>
9167 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9168 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9169 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9170 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9171 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9172 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9173 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9174 innovation
9175 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9176 Revolution
9177 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9178 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9179 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9180 Times, 28 May 2001.
9181 </para></footnote>
9182 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9183 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9184 industry
9185 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9186 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9187 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9188 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9189 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9190 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9191 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9192 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9193 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9194 </para>
9195 <blockquote>
9196 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9197 <para>
9198 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9199 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9200 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9201 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9202 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9203 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9204 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9205 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9206 <para>
9207 <!-- f5. -->
9208 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9209 2003, available at
9210 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9211 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9212 </para></footnote>
9213 </para>
9214 </blockquote>
9215 <para>
9216 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9217 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9218 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9219 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9220 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9221 constantly threatened by litigation.
9222 </para>
9223 <para>
9224
9225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9226 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9227 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9228 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9229 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9230 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9231 imposes,
9232 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9233 conservative
9234 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9235 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9236 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9237 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9238 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9239 </para>
9240 <para>
9241 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9242 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9243 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9244 systematically
9245 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9246 industries
9247 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9248 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9249 competition.
9250 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9251 competition.
9252 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9253 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9254 overregulatedregulated
9255 market.
9256 </para>
9257 <para>
9258 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9259 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9260 burden
9261 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9262 culture
9263 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9264 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9265 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9266 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9267 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9268 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9269 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9270 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9272 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9273 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9274 creativity.
9275 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9276 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9277 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9278 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9279 technology
9280 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9281 </para>
9282 <para>
9283 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9284 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9285 Internet's
9286 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9287 feature
9288 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9289 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9290 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9291 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9292 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9293 </para>
9294 <para>
9295 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9296 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9297 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9298 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9299 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9300 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9301 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9302 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9303 </para></footnote>
9304
9305 Congress
9306 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9307 "broadcast
9308 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9309 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9310 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9311 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9312 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9313 violators
9314 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9315 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9316 </para></footnote>
9317
9318 </para>
9319 <para>
9320 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9321 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9322 regulation
9323 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9324 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9325
9326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9327 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9328 those requirements.
9329 </para>
9330 <para>
9331 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9332 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9333 impose.<footnote><para>
9334 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9335 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9336 </para></footnote>
9337 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9338 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9339 harm than good.
9340 </para>
9341 <para>
9342 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9343 innovation&mdash;again,
9344 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9345 crowd.
9346 </para>
9347 <para>
9348 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9349 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9350 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9351 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9352 </para>
9353 <para>
9354 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9355 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9356 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9357 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9358 2001).
9359 </para></footnote>
9360 overall this history of copyright
9361 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9362 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9363 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9364 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9365 </para>
9366 <para>
9367 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9368 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9369 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9370 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9371 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9372 </para>
9373 <para>
9374 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9375 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9376 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9377 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9378 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9379 copyright
9380 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9381 music
9382 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9383 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9384 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9385 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9386 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9387 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9388 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9389 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9390 </para></footnote>
9391 It has been
9392 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9393 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9394 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9395 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9396 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9397 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9398 August
9399 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9400 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9401 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9402 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9403 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9404 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9405 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9406 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9407 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9408 </para></footnote>
9409 But there is one
9410 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9411 demise
9412 of Internet radio.
9413 </para>
9414 <para>
9415
9416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9417 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9418 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9419 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9420 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9421 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9422 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9423 copyright
9424 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9425 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9426 </para>
9427 <para>
9428 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9429 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9430 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9431 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9432 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9433 Probably
9434 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9435 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9436 efforts
9437 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9438 </para>
9439 <para>
9440 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9441 technology
9442 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9443 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9444 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9445 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9446 regular
9447 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9448 </para>
9449 <para>
9450 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9451 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9452 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9453 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9454 broadcasters
9455 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9456 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9457 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9458 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9459 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9460 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9461 in to this new form of radio.
9462 </para>
9463 <para>
9464
9465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9466 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9467 improvement
9468 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9469 improvement
9470 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9471 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9472 establish
9473 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9474 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9475 </para>
9476 <blockquote>
9477 <para>
9478 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9479 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9480 radio
9481 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9482 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9483 competition
9484 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9485 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9486 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9487 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9488 communications
9489 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9490 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9491 acquire
9492 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9493 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9494 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9495 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9496 </para></footnote>
9497 </para>
9498 </blockquote>
9499 <para>
9500 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9501 Armstrong
9502 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9503 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9504 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9505 </para></footnote>
9506 to
9507 retard
9508 the growth of this competing technology.
9509 </para>
9510 <para>
9511 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9512 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9513 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9514 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9515 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9516 radio?
9517 </para>
9518 <para>
9519 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9520 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9521
9522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9523 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9524 phenomenon
9525 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9526 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9527 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9528 hypothetical
9529 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9530 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9531 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9532 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9533 </para>
9534 <para>
9535 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9536 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9537 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9538 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9539 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9540 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9541 <para>
9542 <!-- f14. -->
9543 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9544 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9545 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9546 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9547 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9548 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9549 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9550 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9551 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9552 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9553 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9554 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9555 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9556 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9557 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9558 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9559 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9560 </para></footnote>
9561 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9562 equivalent fee.
9563 </para>
9564 <para>
9565 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9566 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9567 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9568 </para>
9569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9570 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9571 <listitem><para>
9572 name of the service;
9573 </para></listitem>
9574 <listitem><para>
9575 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9576 </para></listitem>
9577 <listitem><para>
9578 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9579 </para></listitem>
9580 <listitem><para>
9581 date of transmission;
9582 </para></listitem>
9583 <listitem><para>
9584 time of transmission;
9585 </para></listitem>
9586 <listitem><para>
9587 time zone of origination of transmission;
9588 </para></listitem>
9589 <listitem><para>
9590 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9591 </para></listitem>
9592 <listitem><para>
9593 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9594 </para></listitem>
9595 <listitem><para>
9596 sound recording title;
9597 </para></listitem>
9598 <listitem><para>
9599 ISRC code of the recording;
9600 </para></listitem>
9601 <listitem><para>
9602 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9603 </para></listitem>
9604 <listitem><para>
9605 featured recording artist;
9606 </para></listitem>
9607 <listitem><para>
9608 retail album title;
9609 </para></listitem>
9610 <listitem><para>
9611 recording label;
9612 </para></listitem>
9613 <listitem><para>
9614 UPC code of the retail album;
9615 </para></listitem>
9616 <listitem><para>
9617 catalog number;
9618 </para></listitem>
9619 <listitem><para>
9620 copyright owner information;
9621 </para></listitem>
9622 <listitem><para>
9623 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9624 </para></listitem>
9625 <listitem><para>
9626 name of the service or entity;
9627 </para></listitem>
9628 <listitem><para>
9629 channel or program;
9630 </para></listitem>
9631 <listitem><para>
9632 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9633 </para></listitem>
9634 <listitem><para>
9635 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9636 </para></listitem>
9637 <listitem><para>
9638 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9639 </para></listitem>
9640 <listitem><para>
9641 Unique User identifier;
9642 </para></listitem>
9643 <listitem><para>
9644 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9645 </para></listitem>
9646 </orderedlist>
9647
9648 <para>
9649 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9650 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9651 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9652 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9653 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9654 does not.
9655 </para>
9656 <para>
9657 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9658 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9659 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9660 </para>
9661 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9662 <para>
9663 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9664 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9665 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9666 </para>
9667 <blockquote>
9668 <para>
9669 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9670 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9671 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9672 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9673 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9674 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9675
9676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9677 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9678 Because
9679 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9680 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9681 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9682 of business. . . ."
9683 </para>
9684 <para>
9685 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9686 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9687 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9688 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9689 </para>
9690 </blockquote>
9691 <para>
9692 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9693 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9694 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9695 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9696 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9697 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9698 effective to prevent it.
9699 </para>
9700 </sect2>
9701 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9702 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9703 <para>
9704 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9705 dinosaurs
9706 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9707 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9708 </para>
9709 <para>
9710 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9711 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9712 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9713 </para>
9714 <para>
9715 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9716 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9717 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9718 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9719 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9720 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9721 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9722 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9723 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9724 </para></footnote>
9725 According to the RIAA,
9726 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9727 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9728
9729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9730 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9731 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9732 increasingly
9733 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9734 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9735 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9736 extreme
9737 response by the other.
9738 </para>
9739 <para>
9740 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9741 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9742 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9743 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9744 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9745 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9746 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9747 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9748 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9749 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9750 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9751 was.<footnote><para>
9752 <!-- f16. -->
9753 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9754 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9755 </para></footnote>
9756 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9757 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9758 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9759 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9760 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9761 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9762 they oppose.
9763 </para>
9764 <para>
9765 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9766 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9767 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9768 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9769 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9770 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9771 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9772 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9773 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9774 <!-- f17. -->
9775 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9776 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9777 </para></footnote>
9778 We have
9779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9780 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9781 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9782 <!-- f18. -->
9783 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9784 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9785 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9786 </para></footnote>
9787 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9788 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9789 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9790 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9791 cheat.<footnote><para>
9792 <!-- f19. -->
9793 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9794 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9795 compliance literature).
9796 </para></footnote>
9797 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9798 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9799 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9800 </para>
9801 <para>
9802 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9803 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9804 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9805 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9806 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9807 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9808 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9809 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9810 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9811 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9812 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9813 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9814 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9815 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9816 degree of illegality.
9817 </para>
9818 <para>
9819 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9820 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9821 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9822 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9823 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9824 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9825 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9826 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9827 to consider the alternative.
9828 </para>
9829 <para>
9830
9831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9832 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9833 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9834 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9835 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9836 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9837 </para>
9838 <para>
9839 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9840 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9841 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9842 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9843 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9844 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9845 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9846 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9847 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9848 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9849 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9850 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9851 </para>
9852 <para>
9853 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9854 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9855 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9856 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9857 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9858 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9859 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9860 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9861 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9862 a nation of felons?
9863 </para>
9864 <para>
9865 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9866 </para>
9867 <para>
9868 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9869 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9870 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9871 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9872 used
9873
9874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9875 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9876 recordings is free.
9877 </para>
9878 <para>
9879 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9880 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9881 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9882 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9883 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9884 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9885 capacities of digital technologies.
9886 </para>
9887 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9888 <para>
9889 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9890 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9891 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9892 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9893 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9894 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9895 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9896 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9897 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9898 </para>
9899 <para>
9900 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9901 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9902 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9903 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9904 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9905 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9906 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9907 on people's machines.
9908 </para>
9909 <para>
9910 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9911 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9912 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9913 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9914 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9915 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9916
9917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9918 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9919 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9920 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9921 management" system.
9922 </para>
9923 <para>
9924 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9925 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9926 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9927 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9928 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9929 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9930 freedom to move content easily?
9931 </para>
9932 <para>
9933 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9934 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9935 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9936 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9937 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9938 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9939 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9940 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9941 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9942 </para>
9943 <para>
9944 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9945 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9946 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9947 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9948 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9949 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9950 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9951 </para>
9952 <para>
9953 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9954 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9955 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9956 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9957 </para>
9958 <para>
9959 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9960 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9961
9962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9963
9964 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9965 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9966 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9967 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9968 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9969 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9970 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9971 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9972 generally.
9973 </para>
9974 <para>
9975 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9976 explains,
9977 </para>
9978 <blockquote>
9979 <para>
9980 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9981 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9982 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9983 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9984 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9985 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9986 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9987 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9988 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9989 </para>
9990 </blockquote>
9991 <para>
9992 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9993 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9994 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9995 </para>
9996 <para>
9997 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9998 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9999 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10000 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10001 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10002 an Internet user is revealed.
10003 </para>
10004 <para>
10005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10006 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10007 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10008 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10009 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10010 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10011 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10012 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10013 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10014 <!-- f20. -->
10015 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10016 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10017 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10018 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10019 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10020 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10021 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
10022 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10023 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10024 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
10025 </para></footnote>
10026
10027 </para>
10028 <para>
10029 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10030 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10031 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10032 <!-- f21. -->
10033 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10034 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10035 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10036 </para></footnote>
10037 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10038 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10039 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10040 </para>
10041 <para>
10042 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10043 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10044 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10045 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10046 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10047 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10048 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10049 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10050 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10051 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10052 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10053 <!-- f22. -->
10054 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10055 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10056 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10057 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10058 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10059 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10060 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10061 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10062 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
10063 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10064 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10065 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10066 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10067 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10068 </para></footnote>
10069 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10070 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10071 </para>
10072 <para>
10073 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10074 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10075 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10076 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10077 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10078 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10079 college students
10080
10081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10082 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10083 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10084 Says von Lohmann,
10085 </para>
10086 <blockquote>
10087 <para>
10088 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10089 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10090 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10091 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10092 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10093 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10094 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10095 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10096 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10097 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10098 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10099 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10100 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10101 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10102 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10103 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10104 million of them.
10105 </para>
10106 </blockquote>
10107 <para>
10108 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10109 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10110 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10111 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10112 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10113 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10114 </para>
10115
10116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10117 </sect2>
10118 </sect1>
10119 </chapter>
10120 <chapter id="c-balances">
10121 <title>BALANCES</title>
10122
10123 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10124 <para>
10125 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10126 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10127 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10128 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10129 </para>
10130 <para>
10131 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10132 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10133 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10134 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10135 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10136 everything around.
10137 </para>
10138 <para>
10139 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10140 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10141 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10142 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10143 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10144 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10145 </para>
10146 <para>
10147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10148 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10149 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10150 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10151 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10152 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10153 made that is happening all around.
10154 </para>
10155 <para>
10156 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10157 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10158 gasoline onto this fire.
10159 </para>
10160 <para>
10161 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10162 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10163 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10164 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10165 </para>
10166 <para>
10167 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10168 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10169 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10170 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10171 success will require.
10172 </para>
10173
10174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10175 <sect1 id="eldred">
10176 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10177 <para>
10178 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10179 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10180 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10181 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10182 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10183 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10184 come alive.
10185 </para>
10186 <para>
10187 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10188 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10189 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10190 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10191 them available for free.
10192 </para>
10193 <para>
10194 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10195 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10196 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10197 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10198 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10200 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10201 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10202 accessible&mdash;today.
10203 </para>
10204 <para>
10205 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10206 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10207 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10208 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10209 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10210 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10211 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10212 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10213 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10214 commercial publications of public domain works.
10215 </para>
10216 <para>
10217 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10218 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10219 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10220 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10221 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10222 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10223 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10224 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10225 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10226 generally.<footnote><para>
10227 <!-- f1. -->
10228 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10229 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10230 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10231 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10232 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10233 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10234 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10235 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10236 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10237 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10238 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10239 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10240 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10241 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10242 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10243 </para>
10244 <para>
10245 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10246 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10247 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10248 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10249 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10250 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10251 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10252 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10253 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10254 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10255 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10256 </para>
10257 <para>
10258
10259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10260 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10261 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10262 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10263 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10264 <!-- f2. -->
10265 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10266 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10267 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10268 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10269 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10270 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10271 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10272 </para></footnote>
10273
10274 </para>
10275 <para>
10276 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10277 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10278 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10279 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10280 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10281 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10282 to undertake.
10283 </para>
10284 <para>
10285 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10286 constitutional
10287 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10288 interpretation.
10289 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10290 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10291 importantly
10292 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10293 </para>
10294 <blockquote>
10295 <para>
10296 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10297 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10298 their . . . Writings. . . .
10299 </para>
10300 </blockquote>
10301 <para>
10302 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10303 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10304 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10305 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10306 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10307 specific&mdash;to
10308 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10309 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10310 </para>
10311 <para>
10312 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10313 extending
10314 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10315 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10316 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10318 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10319 Congress
10320 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10321 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10322 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10323 </para>
10324 <para>
10325 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10326 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10327 consideration
10328 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10329 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10330 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10331 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10332 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10333 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10334 keep this gravy train going.
10335 </para>
10336 <para>
10337 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10338 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10339 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10340 beneficiaries
10341 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10342 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10343 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10344 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10345 </para>
10346 <para>
10347 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10348 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10349 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10350 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10351 continues
10352 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10353 benefits
10354 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10355 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10356 by anyone for free.
10357 </para>
10358 <para>
10359 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10360 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10361 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10362 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10363 report:
10364 </para>
10365 <para>
10366 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10367
10368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10369 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10370 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10371 those works.
10372 </para>
10373 <para>
10374 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10375 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10376 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10377 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10378 </para>
10379 <para>
10380 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10381 about it?"
10382 </para>
10383 <para>
10384 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10385 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10386 they support the bill."
10387 </para>
10388 <para>
10389 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10390 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10391 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10392 much is it worth?"
10393 </para>
10394 <para>
10395 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10396 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10397 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10398 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10399 </para>
10400 <para>
10401 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10402 correct conclusion:
10403 </para>
10404 <para>
10405 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10406 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10407 contributions
10408 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10409 </para>
10410 <para>
10411 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10412 contribute
10413 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10414 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10415 </para>
10416 <para>
10417 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10418 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10419 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10420 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10422 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10423 copyrights
10424 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10425 the copyright term extended.
10426 </para>
10427 <para>
10428 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10429 legislation
10430 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10431 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10432 </para>
10433 <para>
10434 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10435 Copyright
10436 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10437 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10438 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10439 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10440 contributions.<footnote><para>
10441 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10442 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10443 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10444 </para></footnote>
10445 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10446 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10447 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10448 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10449 Age," available at
10450 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10451 </para></footnote>
10452 Disney is estimated to have
10453 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10454 cycle.<footnote><para>
10455 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10456 Congressional
10457 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10458 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10459 </para></footnote>
10460
10461 </para>
10462 <para>
10463 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10464 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10465 reality
10466 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10467 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10468 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10469 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10470 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10471 "limited."
10472 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10473 and again.
10474 </para>
10475 <para>
10476 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10477 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10478 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10479 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10480 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10481 scholars,
10482 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10483
10484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10485 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10486 guns near schools.
10487 </para>
10488 <para>
10489 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10490 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10491 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10492 "interstate
10493 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10494 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10495 interstate
10496 commerce.
10497 </para>
10498 <para>
10499 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10500 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10501 activity,
10502 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10503 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10504 interpreted
10505 to impose no limit.
10506 </para>
10507 <para>
10508 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10509 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10510 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10511 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10512 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10513 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10514 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10515 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10516 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10517 government
10518 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10519 </para>
10520 <para>
10521 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10522 arguments,"
10523 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10524 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10525 </para></footnote>
10526 If anything Congress says is interstate
10527 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10528 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10529 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10530 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10531 </para></footnote>
10532
10533 </para>
10534 <para>
10535 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10536 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10537 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10538 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10539 context
10540 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10541 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10542 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10543 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10544 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10545 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10546 </para></footnote>
10547 And if it is applied to the
10548 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10549 Congress
10550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10551 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10552 existing
10553 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10554 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10555 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10556 copyrights
10557 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10558 existing copyrights.
10559 </para>
10560 <para>
10561 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10562 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10563 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10564 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10565 rejected
10566 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10567 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10568 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10569 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10570 boring.
10571 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10572 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10573 </para>
10574 <para>
10575 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10576 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10577 Constitution's
10578 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10579 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10580 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10581 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10582 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10583 already
10584 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10585 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10586 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10587 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10588 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10589 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10590 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10591 </para>
10592 <para>
10593 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10594
10595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10596 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10597 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10598 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10599 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10600 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10601 </para></footnote>
10602 But
10603 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10604 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10605 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10606 </para>
10607 <para>
10608 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10609 copyright
10610 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10611 influence
10612 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10613 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10614 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10615 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10616 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10617 bought to extend them again.
10618 </para>
10619 <para>
10620 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10621 extended.
10622 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10623 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10624 society
10625 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10626 Disney's.
10627 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10628 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10629 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10630 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10631 exploited,
10632 and no longer available as a result.
10633 </para>
10634 <para>
10635 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10636 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10637 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10638 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10639 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10640 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10641 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10642 Congressional
10643 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10644 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10645 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10646 </para></footnote>
10647
10648 </para>
10649 <para>
10650 Think practically about the consequence of this
10651 extension&mdash;practically,
10652 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10653
10654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10655 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10656 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10657 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10658 remaining
10659 9,873. What would you have to do?
10660 </para>
10661 <para>
10662 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10663 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10664 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10665 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10666 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10667 list of books still under copyright.
10668 </para>
10669 <para>
10670 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10671 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10672 </para>
10673 <para>
10674 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10675 owners
10676 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10677 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10678 being at least a list?
10679 </para>
10680 <para>
10681 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10682 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10683 practically
10684 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10685 thousands
10686 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10687 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10688 </para>
10689 <para>
10690 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10691 apologists
10692 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10693 owners?"
10694 </para>
10695 <para>
10696 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10697 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10698 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10699 suggesting
10700 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10701 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10702 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10703 </para>
10704 <para>
10705 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10706 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10707 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10708
10709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10710 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10711 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10712 happen
10713 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10714 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10715 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10716 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10717 know quite well who owns what property.
10718 </para>
10719 <para>
10720 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10721 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10722 already
10723 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10724 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10725 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10726 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10727 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10728 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10729 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10730 </para>
10731 <para>
10732 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10733 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10734 consequence
10735 for other creative works is much more dire.
10736 </para>
10737 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10738 <para>
10739 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10740 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10741 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10742 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10743 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10744 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10745 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10746 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10747 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10748 films."<footnote><para>
10749 <!-- f11. -->
10750 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10751 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10752 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10753 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10754 </para></footnote>
10755
10756 </para>
10757 <para>
10758 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10759 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10760 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10761 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10762 </para>
10763 <para>
10764 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10765
10766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10767 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10768 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10769 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10770 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10771 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10772 work available for distribution.
10773 </para>
10774 <para>
10775 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10776 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10777 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10778 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10779 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10780 mm film.<footnote><para>
10781 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10782 Supporting
10783 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10784 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10785 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10786 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10787 </para></footnote>
10788
10789 </para>
10790 <para>
10791 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10792 important.
10793 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10794 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10795 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10796 locate the copyright owner.
10797 </para>
10798 <para>
10799 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10800 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10801 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10802 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10803 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10804 exceptionally
10805 high.
10806 </para>
10807 <para>
10808 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10809 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10810 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10811 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10812 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10813 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10814 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10815 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10816 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10817 </para>
10818 <para>
10819 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10820
10821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10822 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10823 benefit
10824 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10825 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10826 the copyright expires.
10827 </para>
10828 <para>
10829 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10830 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10831 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10832 canisters
10833 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10834 than dust.
10835 </para>
10836 <para>
10837 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10838 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10839 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10840 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10841 creative
10842 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10843 free expression."
10844 </para>
10845 <para>
10846 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10847 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10848 indicated,
10849 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10850 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10851 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10852 distributors,
10853 the commercial life ends.
10854 </para>
10855 <para>
10856 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10857 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10858 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10859 between
10860 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10861 Friday
10862 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10863 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10864 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10865 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10866 have, we need to have access to this history.
10867 </para>
10868 <para>
10869 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10870
10871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10872 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10873 this context do no good.
10874 </para>
10875 <para>
10876 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10877 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10878 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10879 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10880 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10881 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10882 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10883 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10884 </para>
10885 <para>
10886 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10887 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10888 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10889 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10890 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10891 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10892 market didn't have more to offer.
10893 </para>
10894 <para>
10895 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10896 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10897 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10898 would not have interfered with anything.
10899 </para>
10900 <para>
10901 But this situation has now changed.
10902 </para>
10903 <para>
10904 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10905 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10906 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10907 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10908 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10909 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10910 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10911 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10912 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10913 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10914 </para>
10915 <para>
10916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10917 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10918 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10919 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10920 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10921 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10922 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10923 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10924 written for a radically different context.
10925 </para>
10926 <para>
10927 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10928 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10929 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10930 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10931 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10932 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10933 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10934 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10935 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10936 </para>
10937 <para>
10938 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10939 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10940 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10941 culture widely?"
10942 </para>
10943 <para>
10944 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10945 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10946 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10947 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10948 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10949 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10950 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10951 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10952 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10953 </para>
10954 <para>
10955 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10956 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10957 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10958 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10959
10960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10961 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10962 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10963 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10964 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10965 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10966 <!-- f13. -->
10967 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10968 December 2002, available at
10969 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10970 </para></footnote>
10971
10972 </para>
10973 <para>
10974 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10975 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10976 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10977 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10978 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10979 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10980 </para>
10981 <para>
10982 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10983 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10984 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10985 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10986 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10987 </para>
10988 <para>
10989 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10990 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10991 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10992 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10993 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10994 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10995 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10996 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10997 power to extend existing terms.
10998 </para>
10999 <para>
11000 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11001 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11002 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11003 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11004 </para>
11005 <para>
11006 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11007 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11008
11009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11010 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11011 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11012 overstepped its bounds.
11013 </para>
11014 <para>
11015 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11016 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11017 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11018 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11019 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11020 </para>
11021 <para>
11022 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11023 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11024 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11025 briefs and preparing for argument.
11026 </para>
11027 <para>
11028 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11029 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11030 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11031 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11032 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11033 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11034 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11035 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11036 </para>
11037 <para>
11038 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11039 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11040 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11041 mistake lost it.
11042 </para>
11043 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11044 <para>
11045 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11046 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11047 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11048 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11049 heat
11050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11051 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11052 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11053 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11054 </para>
11055 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11056 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11057 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11058 <para>
11059 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11060 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11061 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11062 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11063 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11064 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11065 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11066 most powerful media companies in the world."
11067 </para>
11068 <para>
11069 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11070 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11071 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11072 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11073 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11074 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11075 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11076 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11077 interpretation
11078 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11079 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11080 unconstitutional,
11081 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11082 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11083 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11084 Constitution,
11085 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11086 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11087 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11088 </para>
11089 <para>
11090 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11091 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11092 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11093 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11094 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11095 why it was unconstitutional.
11096 </para>
11097 <para>
11098 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11099
11100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11101 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11102 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11103 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11104 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11105 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11106 minority.
11107 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11108 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11109 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11110 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11111 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11112 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11113 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11114 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11115 </para>
11116 <para>
11117 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11118 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11119 beginning.
11120 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11121 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11122 Republican
11123 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11124 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11125 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11126 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11127 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11128 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11129 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11130 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11131 </para>
11132 <para>
11133 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11134 supporting
11135 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11136 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11137 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11138 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11139 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11140 </para>
11141 <para>
11142 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11143 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11144
11145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11146 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11147 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11148 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11149 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11150 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11151 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11152 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11153 </para>
11154 <para>
11155 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11156 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11157 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11158 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11159 </para>
11160 <para>
11161 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11162 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11163 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11164 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11165 clear.
11166 </para>
11167 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11168 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11169 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11170 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11171 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11172 <para>
11173 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11174 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11175 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11176 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11177 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11178 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11179 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11180 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11181 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11182 </para>
11183 <para>
11184 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11185 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11186 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11187 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11188 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11189 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11190 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11191 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11192
11193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11194 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11195 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11196 </para>
11197 <para>
11198 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11199 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11200 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11201 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11202 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11203 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11204 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11205 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11206 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11207 confidence in our argument.
11208 </para>
11209 <para>
11210 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11211 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11212 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11213 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11214 copyright holders.
11215 </para>
11216 <para>
11217 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11218 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11219 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11220 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11221 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11222 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11223 wanted to control.
11224 </para>
11225 <para>
11226 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11227 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11228 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11229 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11230 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11231 pornography."<footnote><para>
11232 <!-- f14. -->
11233 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11234 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11235 </para></footnote>
11236 That was also the motive of
11237 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11238 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11239 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11240 <!-- f15. -->
11241 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11242 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11243 </para></footnote>
11244 That's
11245
11246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11247 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11248 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11249 </para>
11250 <para>
11251 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11252 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11253 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11254 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11255 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11256 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11257 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11258 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11259 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11260 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11261 </para>
11262 <para>
11263 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11264 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11265 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11266 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11267 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11268 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11269 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11270 </para>
11271 <para>
11272 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11273 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11274 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11275 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11276 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11277 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11278 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11279 powers had limits.
11280 </para>
11281 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11282 <para>
11283 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11284 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11285 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11286 the Constitution
11287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11288 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11289 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11290 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11291 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11292 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11293 </para>
11294 <para>
11295 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11296 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11297 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11298 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11299 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11300 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11301 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11302 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11303 sense.
11304 </para>
11305 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11306 <para>
11307 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11308 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11309 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11310 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11311 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11312 these retrospective extensions.
11313 </para>
11314 <para>
11315 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11316 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11317 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11318 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11319 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11320 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11321 </para>
11322 <para>
11323 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11324 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11325 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11326 overriding
11327 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11328 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11329 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11330 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11331 </para>
11332 <para>
11333 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11334 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11335
11336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11337 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11338 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11339 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11340 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11341 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11342 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11343 copyright be limited.
11344 </para>
11345 <para>
11346 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11347 Congress
11348 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11349 government
11350 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11351 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11352 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11353 </para>
11354 <para>
11355 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11356 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11357 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11358 existing
11359 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11360 </para>
11361 <para>
11362 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11363 extended
11364 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11365 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11366 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11367 existing
11368 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11369 restraint
11370 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11371 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11372 hesitated
11373 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11374 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11375 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11376 arrived
11377 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11378 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11379
11380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11381 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11382 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11383 </para>
11384 <para>
11385 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11386 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11387 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11388 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11389 Congress
11390 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11391 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11392 this central idea.
11393 </para>
11394 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11395 <para>
11396 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11397 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11398 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11399 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11400 </para>
11401 <para>
11402 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11403 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11404 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11405 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11406 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11407 </para>
11408 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11409 <para>
11410 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11411 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11412 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11413 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11414 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11415 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11416 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11417 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11418 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11419 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11420 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11421
11422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11423 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11424 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11425 </para>
11426 <para>
11427 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11428 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11429 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11430 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11431 congressmen
11432 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11433 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11434 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11435 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11436 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11437 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11438 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11439 family of the Justices.
11440 </para>
11441 <para>
11442 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11443 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11444 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11445 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11446 </para>
11447 <para>
11448 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11449 The history was bothering her.
11450 </para>
11451 <blockquote>
11452 <para>
11453 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11454 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11455 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11456 practice that began with the very first act.
11457 </para>
11458 </blockquote>
11459 <para>
11460 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11461 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11462 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11463 </para>
11464 <blockquote>
11465 <para>
11466 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11467 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11469 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11470 is yes.
11471 </para>
11472 </blockquote>
11473 <para>
11474 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11475 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11476 Kennedy, who observed,
11477 </para>
11478 <blockquote>
11479 <para>
11480 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11481 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11482 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11483 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11484 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11485 </para>
11486 </blockquote>
11487 <para>
11488 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11489 student,
11490 I answered,
11491 </para>
11492 <blockquote>
11493 <para>
11494 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11495 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11496 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11497 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11498 effectively
11499 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11500 </para>
11501 </blockquote>
11502 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11503 <para>
11504 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11505 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11506 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11507 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11508 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11509 </para>
11510 <para>
11511 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11512 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11513 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11514 </para>
11515 <para>
11516 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11517 sympathetic.
11518 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11519
11520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11521 </para>
11522 <blockquote>
11523 <para>
11524 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11525 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11526 </para>
11527 <para>
11528 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11529 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11530 domain
11531 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11532 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11533 into the Copyright Clause.
11534 </para>
11535 </blockquote>
11536 <para>
11537 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11538 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11539 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11540 </para>
11541 <blockquote>
11542 <para>
11543 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11544 unlimited
11545 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11546 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11547 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11548 an unlimited time.
11549 </para>
11550 </blockquote>
11551 <para>
11552 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11553 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11554 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11555 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11556 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11557 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11558 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11559 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11560 specific
11561 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11562 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11563 </para>
11564 <para>
11565 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11566 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11567
11568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11569 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11570 optimistic.
11571 </para>
11572 <para>
11573 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11574 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11575 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11576 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11577 believed
11578 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11579 Copyright
11580 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11581 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11582 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11583 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11584 Copyright
11585 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11586 believe
11587 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11588 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11589 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11590 </para>
11591 <para>
11592 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11593 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11594 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11595 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11596 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11597 </para>
11598 <para>
11599 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11600 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11601 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11602 </para>
11603 <para>
11604 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11605 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11606 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11607 </para>
11608 <para>
11609 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11610 distinguish
11611 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11612 argument
11613 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11614 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11615 in the Court's opinion.
11616 </para>
11617 <para>
11618
11619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11620 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11621 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11622 generally,
11623 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11624 </para>
11625 <para>
11626 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11627 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11628 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11629 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11630 </para>
11631 <para>
11632 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11633 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11634 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11635 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11636 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11637 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11638 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11639 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11640 would not.
11641 </para>
11642 <para>
11643 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11644 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11645 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11646 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11647 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11648 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11649 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11650 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11651 the system we have.
11652 </para>
11653 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11654 <para>
11655 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11656 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11657 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11658 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11659 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11660 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11661 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11662 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11663 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11664 </para>
11665 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11666 <para>
11667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11668 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11669 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11670 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11671 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11672 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11673 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11674 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11675 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11676 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11677 </para>
11678 <para>
11679 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11680 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11681 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11682 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11683 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11684 </para>
11685 <para>
11686 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11687 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11688 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11689 </para>
11690 <para>
11691 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11692 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11693 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11694 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11695 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11696 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11697 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11698 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11699 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11700 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11701 "originalism" now?
11702 </para>
11703 <para>
11704 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11705 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11706 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11707 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11708
11709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11710 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11711 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11712 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11713 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11714 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11715 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11716 own principles.
11717 </para>
11718 <para>
11719 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11720 myself.
11721 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11722 the law as it is.
11723 </para>
11724 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11725 <para>
11726 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11727 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11728 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11729 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11730 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11731 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11732 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11733 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11734 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11735 </para>
11736 <para>
11737 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11738 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11739 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11740 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11741 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11742 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11743 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11744 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11745 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11746 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11747 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11748 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11749 effort to persuade; but I
11750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11751 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11752 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11753 should decide the issue.
11754 </para>
11755 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11756 <para>
11757 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11758 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11759 Kathleen Sullivan?
11760 </para>
11761 <para>
11762 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11763 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11764 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11765 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11766 </para>
11767 <para>
11768 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11769 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11770 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11771 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11772 have persuaded.
11773 </para>
11774 <para>
11775 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11776 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11777 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11778 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11779 issue should not be raised until it is.
11780 </para>
11781 <para>
11782 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11783 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11784 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11785 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11786 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11787 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11788 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11789 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11790 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11791 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11792 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11793
11794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11795 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11796 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11797 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11798 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11799 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11800 </para>
11801 <blockquote>
11802 <para>
11803 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11804 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11805 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11806 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11807 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11808 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11809 </para>
11810 </blockquote>
11811 <para>
11812 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11813 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11814 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11815 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11816 in the face felt exactly like that.
11817 </para>
11818 <para>
11819 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11820 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11821 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11822 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11823 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11824 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11825 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11826 </para>
11827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11828 </sect1>
11829 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11830 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11831 <para>
11832 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11833 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11834 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11835 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11836 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11837 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11838 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11839 </para>
11840 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11841 <para>
11842 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11843 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11844 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11845 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11846 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11847 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11848 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11849 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11850 </para>
11851 <para>
11852 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11853 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11855 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11856 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11857 the work passed into the public domain.
11858 </para>
11859 <para>
11860 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11861 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11862 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11863 </para>
11864 <para>
11865 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11866 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11867 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11868 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11869 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11870 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11871 everything else, let the content go.
11872 </para>
11873 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11874 <para>
11875 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11876 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11877 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11878 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11879 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11880 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11881 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11882 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11883 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11884 the stupid harm of the present system.
11885 </para>
11886 <para>
11887 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11888 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11889 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11890 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11891 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11892 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11893 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11894 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11895 where copyright owners could be identified.
11896 </para>
11897 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11898 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11899 <para>
11900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11901 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11902 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11903 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11904 <!-- f1. -->
11905 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11906 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11907 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11908 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11909 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11910 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11911 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11912 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11913 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11914 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11915 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11916 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11917 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11918 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11919 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11920 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11921 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11922 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11923 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11924 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11925 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11926 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11927 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11928 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11929 </para>
11930 <para>
11931 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11932 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11933 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11934 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11935 know what's protected and what's not.
11936 </para>
11937 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11938 <para>
11939 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11940 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11941 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11942 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11943 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11944 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11945 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11946 in the loss of widows' only income.
11947 </para>
11948 <para>
11949 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11950 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11951 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11952 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11953 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11954 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11955 </para>
11956 <para>
11957 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11958 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11959 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11960 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11961 burden
11962 imposed upon creators.
11963 </para>
11964 <para>
11965 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11966 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11967
11968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11969 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11970 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11971 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11972 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11973 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11974 table.
11975 </para>
11976 <para>
11977 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11978 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11979 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11980 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11981 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11982 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11983 spread.
11984 </para>
11985 <para>
11986 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11987 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11988 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11989 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11990 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11991 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11992 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11993 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11994 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11995 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11996 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11997 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11998 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11999 system of protection for property generally.
12000 </para>
12001 <para>
12002 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12003 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12004 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12005 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12006 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12007 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12008 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12009 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12010
12011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12012 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12013 take their place.
12014 </para>
12015 <para>
12016 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12017 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12018 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12019 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12020 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12021 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12022 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12023 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12024 </para>
12025 <para>
12026 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12027 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12028 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12029 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12030 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12031 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12032 seen before because there are no formalities.
12033 </para>
12034 <para>
12035 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12036 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12037 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12038 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12039 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12040 </para>
12041 <para>
12042 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12043 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12044 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12045 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12046 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12047 </para>
12048 <para>
12049 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12050 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12051 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12052 registration?
12053 </para>
12054 <para>
12055 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12056 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12057 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12058
12059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12060 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12061 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12062 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12063 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12064 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12065 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12066 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12067 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12068 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12069 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12070 </para>
12071 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12072 <para>
12073 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12074 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12075 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12076 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12077 </para>
12078 <para>
12079 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12080 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12081 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12082 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12083 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12084 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12085 something good might happen here.
12086 </para>
12087 <para>
12088 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12089 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12090 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12091 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12092 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12093 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12094 </para>
12095 <para>
12096 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12097 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12098 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12100 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12101 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12102 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12103 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12104 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12105 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12106 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12107 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12108 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12109 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12110 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12111 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12112 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12113 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12114 film is a valid derivative use.
12115 </para>
12116 <para>
12117 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12118 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12119 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12120 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12121 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12122 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12123 </para>
12124 <para>
12125 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12126 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12127 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12128 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12129 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12130 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12131 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12132 threat.
12133 </para>
12134 <para>
12135 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12136 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12137 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12138 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12139 sense?
12140 </para>
12141 <para>
12142
12143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12144 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12145 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12146 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12147 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12148 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12149 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12150 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12151 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12152 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12153 </para>
12154 <para>
12155 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12156 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12157 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12158 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12159 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12160 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12161 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12162 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12163 </para>
12164 <para>
12165 What does this industry really want?
12166 </para>
12167 <para>
12168 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12169 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12170 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12171 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12172 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12173 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12174 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12175 permission first.
12176 </para>
12177 <para>
12178 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12179 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12180 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12181 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12182 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12183 </para>
12184 <para>
12185 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12186 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12187
12188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12189 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12190 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12191 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12192 and to share its own creation.
12193 </para>
12194 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12195 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12196 <para>
12197 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12198 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12199 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12200 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12201 block the progress of others.
12202 </para>
12203 <para>
12204 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12205 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12206 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12207 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12208 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12209 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12210 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12211 </para>
12212 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12213 </sect1>
12214 </chapter>
12215 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12216 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12217 <para>
12218 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12219 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12220 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12221 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12222 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12223 </para>
12224 <para>
12225 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12226 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12227 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12228 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12229 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12230 the disease almost invisible.
12231 </para>
12232 <para>
12233 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12234 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12235 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12236 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12237 population:
12238 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12239 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12240 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12241 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12242 available at
12243 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12244 release
12245 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12246 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12247 </para></footnote>
12248 </para>
12249 <para>
12250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12251 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12252 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12253 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12254 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12255 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12256 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12257 </para>
12258 <para>
12259 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12260 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12261 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12262 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12263 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12264 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12265 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12266 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12267 changes.
12268 </para>
12269 <para>
12270 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12271 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12272 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12273 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12274 costs significantly below the market price.
12275 </para>
12276 <para>
12277 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12278 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12279 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12280 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12281 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12282 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12283 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12284 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12285 <para>
12286 <!-- f2. -->
12287 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12288 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12289 </para></footnote>
12290 </para>
12291 <para>
12292 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12293 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12294 Association
12295 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12296 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12297 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12298 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12299 Prepared
12300 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12301 2000), 14, available at
12302 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12303 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12304 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12305 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12306 (statement of James Love).
12307 </para></footnote>
12308 Through the
12309 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12310 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12311 request,
12312 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12314 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12315 began
12316 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12317 government's
12318 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12319 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12320 companies,
12321 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12322 international
12323 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12324 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12325 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12326 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12327 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12328 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12329 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12330 Prepared
12331 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12332 2000), 15.
12333 </para></footnote>
12334 </para>
12335 <para>
12336 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12337 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12338 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12339 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12340 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12341 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12342 marginal,
12343 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12344 the flow of medications into Africa.
12345 </para>
12346 <para>
12347 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12348 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12349 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12350 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12351 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12352 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12353 </para>
12354 <para>
12355 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12356 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12357 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12358 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12359 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12360 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12361 by U.S. companies.
12362 </para>
12363 <para>
12364 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12365 information,
12366 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12368 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12369 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12370 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12371 May 1999, A1, available at
12372 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12373 markets
12374 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12375 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12376 Access
12377 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12378 available at
12379 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12380 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12381 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12382 Synopsis,"
12383 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12385 </para></footnote>
12386 It was because "intellectual property"
12387 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12388 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12389 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12390 response
12391 to AIDS.
12392 </para>
12393 <para>
12394 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12395 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12396 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12397 direct
12398 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12399 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12400 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12401 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12402 many to die for such an abstraction?
12403 </para>
12404 <para>
12405 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12406 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12407 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12408 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12409 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12410 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12411 </para>
12412 <para>
12413 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12414 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12415 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12416 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12417 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12418 technology.
12419 They could be overcome.
12420 </para>
12421 <para>
12422 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12423 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12424 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12425 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12426 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12427 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12428 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12429 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12431 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12432 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12433 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12434 idea called "intellectual property."
12435 </para>
12436 <para>
12437 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12438 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12439 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12440 What is the argument?
12441 </para>
12442 <para>
12443 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12444 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12445 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12446 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12447 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12448 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12449 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12450 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12451 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12452 balanced in just this sense.
12453 </para>
12454 <para>
12455 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12456 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12457 extremism.
12458 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12459 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12460 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12461 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12462 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12463 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12464 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12465 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12466 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12467 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12469 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12470 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12471 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12472 this common sense open its eyes.
12473 </para>
12474 <para>
12475 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12476 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12477 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12478 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12479 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12480 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12481 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12482 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12483 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12484 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12485 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12486 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12487 </para>
12488 <para>
12489 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12490 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12491 meeting.<footnote><para>
12492 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12493 August 2003, E1, available at
12494 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12495 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12496 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12497 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12498 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12499 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12500 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12501 </para></footnote>
12502 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12503 decided
12504 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12505 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12506 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12507 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12508 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12509 protocols
12510 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12511 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12512 project
12513 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12514 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12515 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12516 comprised
12517 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12518 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12520 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12521 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12522 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12523 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12524 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12525 </para>
12526 <para>
12527 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12528 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12529 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12530 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12531 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12532 </para>
12533 <para>
12534 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12535 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12536 meeting.
12537 </para></footnote>
12538 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12539 noncommercial
12540 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12541 perspectives.
12542 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12543 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12544 property issues.
12545 </para>
12546 <para>
12547 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12548 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12549 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12550 Society
12551 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12552 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12553 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12554 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12555 interrupted
12556 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12557 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12558 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12559 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12560 relatively
12561 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12562 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12563 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12564 information
12565 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12566 immoderate
12567 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12568 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12570 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12571 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12572 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12573 </para>
12574 <para>
12575 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12576 property,
12577 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12578 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12579 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12580 agenda.
12581 </para>
12582 <para>
12583 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12584 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12585 software."
12586 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12587 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12588 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12589 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12590 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12591 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12592 software," for their own internal uses.
12593 </para>
12594 <para>
12595 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12596 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12597 noncommercial
12598 software. There are many important companies that depend
12599 fundamentally
12600 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12601 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12602 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12603 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12604 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12605 support a mode of software development that is different from
12606 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12607 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12608 sophisticated.
12609 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12610 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12611 opposition
12612 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12613 license
12614 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12615 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12616 Marketplace
12617 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12618 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12619 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12620 available at
12621 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12622 president,
12623 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12624 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12625 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12626 </para></footnote>
12627 </para>
12628 <para>
12629 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12630 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12631 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12632 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12633 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12634 by
12635 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12636 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12637 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12638 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12639 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12640 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12641 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12642 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12643 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12644 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12645 </para>
12646 <para>
12647 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12648 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12649 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12650 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12651 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12652 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12653 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12654 <!-- f9. -->
12655 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12656 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12657 </para></footnote>
12658 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12659 </para>
12660 <para>
12661 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12662 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12663 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12664 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12665 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12666 its lobbying efforts.
12667 </para>
12668 <para>
12669 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12670 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12671 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12672 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12673 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12674 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12675 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12676 goals of WIPO."
12677 </para>
12678 <para>
12679 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12680 </para>
12681 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12682 <para>
12683 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12684 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12685 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12686 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12687 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12688 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12689 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12690 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12691 </para>
12692 <para>
12693 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12694 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12695 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12696 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12697 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12698 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12699 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12700 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12701 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12702 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12703 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12704 </para>
12705 <para>
12706 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12707 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12708 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12709 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12710 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12711 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12712 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12713 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12714 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12715 right to decide what to do with their property.
12716 </para>
12717 <para>
12718 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12719 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12720 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12722 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12723 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12724 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12725 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12726 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12727 way possible.
12728 </para>
12729 <para>
12730 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12731 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12732 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12733 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12734 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12735 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12736 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12737 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12738 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12739 that control.
12740 </para>
12741 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12742 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12743 <para>
12744 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12745 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12746 <!-- f10. -->
12747 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12748 </para></footnote>
12749 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12750 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12751 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12752 </para>
12753 <para>
12754 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12755 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12756 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12757 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12758 </para>
12759 <blockquote>
12760 <para>
12761 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12762 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12763 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
12764 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12765 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12766 say anything wrong. But in the world
12767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12768 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12769 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12770 </para>
12771 </blockquote>
12772 <para>
12773 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12774 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12775 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12776 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12777 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12778 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12779 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12780 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12781 </para>
12782 <para>
12783 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12784 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12785 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12786 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12787 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12788 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12789 </para>
12790 <para>
12791 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12792 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12793 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12794 our own country's history).
12795 </para>
12796 <para>
12797 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12798 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12799 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12800 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12801 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12802 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12803 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12804 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12805 democracy in the world, become?
12806 </para>
12807 <para>
12808 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12809 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12810 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12812 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12813 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12814 </para>
12815 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12816 <para>
12817 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12818 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12819 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12820 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12821 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12822 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12823 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12824 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12825 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12826 hearings and a different result.
12827 </para>
12828 <para>
12829 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12830 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12831 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12832 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12833 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12834 concentration in the media.
12835 </para>
12836 <para>
12837 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12838 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12839 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12840 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12841 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12842 </para>
12843 <para>
12844 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12845 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12846 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12847 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12848 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12849 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12850 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12851 </para>
12852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12853 <para>
12854 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12855 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12856 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12857 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12858 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12859 </para>
12860 <para>
12861 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12862 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12863 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12864 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12865 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12866 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12867 </para>
12868 <para>
12869 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12870 of our tragedy.
12871 </para>
12872 <para>
12873 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12874 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12875 <!-- f11. -->
12876 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12877 2003, available at
12878 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12879 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12880 2003, available at
12881 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12882 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12883 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12884 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12885 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12886 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12887 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12888 available at
12889 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12890 </para></footnote>
12891 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12892 music.<footnote><para>
12893 <!-- f12. -->
12894 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12895 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12896 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12897 </para></footnote>
12898 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12899 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12900 <!-- f13. -->
12901 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12902 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12903 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12905 </para></footnote>
12906 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12907 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12908 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12909 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12910 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12911 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12912 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12913 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12914 kids who use a computer to share content.
12915 </para>
12916 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12917 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12918 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12919 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12920 <para>
12921 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12922 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12923 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12924 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12925 24 August 2003, available at
12926 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12927 </para></footnote>
12928 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12929 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12930 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12931 country.<footnote><para>
12932 <!-- f15. -->
12933 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12934 available at
12935 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12936 </para></footnote>
12937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12938 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12939 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12940 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12941 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12942 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12943 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12944 day into the Causbys.
12945 </para>
12946 <para>
12947 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12948 potential is ever to be realized.
12949
12950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12951
12952 </para>
12953 </chapter>
12954 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12955 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12956 <para>
12957
12958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12959 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12960 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12961 maps what might be done.
12962 </para>
12963 <para>
12964 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12965 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12966 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12967 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12968 </para>
12969 <para>
12970 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12971 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12972 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12973 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12974 is so important.
12975 </para>
12976 <para>
12977 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12978 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12979 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12980 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12981 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12982 </para>
12983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12984
12985 <sect1 id="usnow">
12986 <title>US, NOW</title>
12987 <para>
12988 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12989 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12990 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12991 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12992 </para>
12993 <para>
12994 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12995 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12996 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12997 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12998 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12999 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13000 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13001 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13002 </para>
13003 <para>
13004 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13005 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13006 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13007 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13008 the
13009
13010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13011 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13012 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13013 unprotected.
13014 </para>
13015 <para>
13016 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13017 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13018 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13019 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13020 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13021 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13022 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13023 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13024 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13025 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13026 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13027 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13028 </para>
13029 <para>
13030 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
13031 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
13032 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13033 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13034 freedoms
13035 that we could just take for granted before.
13036 </para>
13037
13038 <sect2 id="examples">
13039 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13040 <para>
13041 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13042 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13043 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13044 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13045 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13046 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13047 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13048 assured.
13049 </para>
13050 <para>
13051 What made it assured?
13052 </para>
13053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13054 <para>
13055 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13056 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
13057 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13058 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13059 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13060 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13061 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13062 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13063 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13064 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13065 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13066 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13067 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13068 </para>
13069 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13070 <para>
13071 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13072 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13073 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13074 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13075 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13076 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13077 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13078 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13079 </para>
13080 <para>
13081 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13082 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13083 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13084 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13085 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13086 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13087 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13088 disappears.
13089 </para>
13090 <para>
13091 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13092 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13093 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13094 friction did.<footnote><para>
13095 <!-- f1. -->
13096
13097 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13098 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13099 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13100
13101 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13102 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13103 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13104 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13105 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13106 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13107 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13108
13109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13110 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13111 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13112 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13113 </para>
13114 <para>
13115 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13116 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13117 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13118 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13119 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13120 care much about controlling their software.
13121 </para>
13122 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13123 <para>
13124 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13125 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13126 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13127 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13128 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13129 people's work.
13130 </para>
13131 <para>
13132 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13133 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13134 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13135 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13136 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13137 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13138 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13139 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13140 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13141 anything else?
13142 </para>
13143 <para>
13144 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13145 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13146 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13147 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13148 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13149 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13150 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13151 </para>
13152 <para>
13153 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13154 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13156 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13157 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13158 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13159 fundamentally weakened.
13160 </para>
13161 <para>
13162 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13163 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13164 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13165 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13166 </para>
13167 <para>
13168 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13169 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13170 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13171 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13172 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13173 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13174 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13175 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13176 byproduct.
13177 </para>
13178 <para>
13179 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13180 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13181 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13182 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13183 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13184 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13185 </para>
13186 <para>
13187 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13188 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13189 scientific journals are produced.
13190 </para>
13191 <para>
13192 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13193 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13194 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13195 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13196 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13197 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13198 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13199 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13200 service.
13201 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13202 anyone
13203 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13205 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13206 Court opinion through their respective services.
13207 </para>
13208 <para>
13209 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13210 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13211 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13212 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13213 allowed
13214 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13215 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13216 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13217 </para>
13218 <para>
13219 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13220 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13221 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13222 </para>
13223 <para>
13224 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13225 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13226 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13227 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13228 because
13229 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13230 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13231 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13232 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13233 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13234 access to a paper journal.
13235 </para>
13236 <para>
13237 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13238 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13239 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13240 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13241 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13242 granted before.
13243 </para>
13244 <para>
13245 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13246 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13247 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13248 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13250 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13251 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13252 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13253 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13254 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13255 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13256 </para>
13257 <para>
13258 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13259 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13260 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13261 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13262 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13263 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13264 and science.
13265 </para>
13266
13267 </sect2>
13268 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13269 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13270 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13271 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13272 </indexterm>
13273 <para>
13274 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13275 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13276 </para>
13277 <para>
13278 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13279 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13280 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13281 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13282 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13283 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13284 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13285 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13286 </para>
13287 <para>
13288 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13289 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13290 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13291 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13292 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13293 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13294 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13295 description, and
13296 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13297 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13298 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13299 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13300 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13301 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13302 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13303 certain freedoms are given.
13304 </para>
13305 <para>
13306 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13307 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13308 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13309 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13310 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13311 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13312 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13313 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13314 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13315 </para>
13316 <para>
13317 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13318 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13319 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13320 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13321 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13322 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13323 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13324 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13325 a public domain.
13326 </para>
13327 <para>
13328 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13329 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13330 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13331 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13332 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13333 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13335 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13336 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13337 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13338 </para>
13339 <para>
13340 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13341 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13342 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13343 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13344 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13345 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13346 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13347 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13348 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13349 to begin to build those rules.
13350 </para>
13351 <para>
13352 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13353 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13354 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13355 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13356 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13357 </para>
13358 <para>
13359 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13360 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13361 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13362 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13363 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13364 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13365 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13366 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13367 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13368 sales of Cory's book.
13369 </para>
13370 <para>
13371 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13372 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13373 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13374 was a total success.
13375 </para>
13376 <para>
13377 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13378 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13380 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13381 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13382 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13383 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13384 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13385 well.
13386 </para>
13387 <para>
13388 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13389 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13390 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13391 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13392 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13393 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13394 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13395 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13396 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13397 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13398 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13399 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13400 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13401 <!-- f2. -->
13402
13403 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13404 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13405 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13406 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13407 </para></footnote>),
13408 these artists release into the creative environment content
13409 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13410 </para>
13411 <para>
13412 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13413 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13414 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13415 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13416 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13417 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13418 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13419 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13420 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13421 say it to others.
13422 </para>
13423 <para>
13424 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13425 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13426 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13427 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13428
13429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13430 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13431 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13432 </para>
13433 <para>
13434 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13435 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13436 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13437 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13438 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13439 steps are possible.
13440 </para>
13441 <para>
13442 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13443 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13444 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13445 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13446 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13447 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13448 creativity to spread more easily.
13449 </para>
13450 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13451
13452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13453 </sect2>
13454 </sect1>
13455 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13456 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13457 <para>
13458 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13459 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13460 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13461 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13462 changes that we need.
13463 </para>
13464 <para>
13465 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13466 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13467 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13468 to our end.
13469 </para>
13470
13471 <sect2 id="formalities">
13472 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13473 <para>
13474 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13475 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13476 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13477 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13478 </para>
13479 <para>
13480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13481 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13482 requirements
13483 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13484 </para>
13485 <para>
13486 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13487 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13488 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13489 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13490 </para>
13491 <para>
13492 Why?
13493 </para>
13494 <para>
13495 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13496 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13497 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13498 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13499 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13500 formalities
13501 were getting in the way.
13502 </para>
13503 <para>
13504 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13505 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13506 burdens
13507 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13508 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13509 creative
13510 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13511 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13512 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13513 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13514 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13515 speak.
13516 </para>
13517 <para>
13518 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13519 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13520 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13521 by other countries as well.
13522 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13523 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13524 require
13525 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13526 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13527 </para>
13528 <para>
13529 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13530 registering
13531 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13532 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13533 second
13534 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13535 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13536 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13537 </para>
13538
13539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13540
13541 <sect3 id="registration">
13542 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13543 <para>
13544 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13545 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13546 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13547 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13548 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13549 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13550 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13551 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13552 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13553 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13554 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13555 </para>
13556 <para>
13557 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13558 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13559 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13560 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13561 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13562 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13563 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13564 </para>
13565 <para>
13566 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13567 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13568 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13569 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13570 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13571 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13572 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13573 with which registration occurs up.
13574 </para>
13575 <para>
13576 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13577 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13578 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13579 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13580 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13581 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13582 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13583 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13584 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13586 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13587 </para>
13588
13589 </sect3>
13590 <sect3 id="marking">
13591 <title>MARKING</title>
13592 <para>
13593 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13594 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13595 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13596 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13597 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13598 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13599 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13600 uniformly across all media.
13601 </para>
13602 <para>
13603 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13604 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13605 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13606 use the work.
13607 </para>
13608 <para>
13609 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13610 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13611 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13612 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13613 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13614 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13615 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13616 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13617 </para>
13618 <para>
13619 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13620 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13621 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13622 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13623 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13624 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13625 <!-- f2. -->
13626 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13627 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13628 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13629 </para></footnote>
13630 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13631 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13632 stop using the work in any new
13633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13634 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13635 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13636 their work.
13637 </para>
13638 <para>
13639 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13640 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13641 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13642 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13643 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13644 </para>
13645 <para>
13646 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13647 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13648 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13649 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13650 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13651 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13652 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13653 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13654 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13655 </para>
13656 <para>
13657 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13658 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13659 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13660 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13661 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13662 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13663 </para>
13664 <para>
13665 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13666 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13667 make things unclear.
13668 </para>
13669 <para>
13670 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13671 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13672 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13673 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13674 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13675 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13676 </para>
13677
13678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13679 </sect3>
13680 </sect2>
13681 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13682 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13683 <para>
13684 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13685 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13686 natural authors.
13687 </para>
13688 <para>
13689 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13690 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13691 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13692 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13693 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13694 term.<footnote><para>
13695 <!-- f3. -->
13696 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13697 available at
13698 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13699 </para></footnote>
13700 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13701 </para>
13702 <para>
13703 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13704 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13705 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13706 terms.
13707 </para>
13708 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13709 <listitem><para>
13710 <!-- (1) -->
13711 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13712 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13713 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13714 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13715 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13716 regulations when it no longer benefits an author. </para></listitem>
13717 <listitem><para>
13718 <!-- (2) -->
13719 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13720 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13721 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13722 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13723 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13724 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13725 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13726 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13727 navigate.
13728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13729 </para></listitem>
13730 <listitem><para>
13731 <!-- (3) -->
13732 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13733 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13734 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13735 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13736 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13737 veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13738 <!-- f4. -->
13739 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13740 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13741 available at
13742 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13743 </para></footnote>
13744 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13745 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13746 single form.
13747 </para></listitem>
13748 <listitem><para>
13749 <!-- (4) -->
13750 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13751 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13752 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
13753 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13754 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13755 fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13756 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13757 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13758 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13759 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13760 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13761 not increase their creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done,
13762 and there's nothing we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13763 </orderedlist>
13764 <para>
13765 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13766 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13767 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13768 </para>
13769 <para>
13770 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13771 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13772 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13773 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13774 </para>
13775
13776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13777
13778 </sect2>
13779 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13780 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13781 <para>
13782 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13783 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13784 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13785 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13786 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13787 the emergence of that new technology.
13788 </para>
13789 <para>
13790 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13791 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13792 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13793 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13794 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13795 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13796 though that movie is not "my writing."
13797 </para>
13798 <para>
13799 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13800 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13801 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13802 <!-- f5. -->
13803 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13804 University Press, 1967), 32.
13805 </para></footnote>
13806 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13807 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13808 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13809 </para>
13810 <blockquote>
13811 <para>
13812 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13813 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13814 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13815 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13816 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13817 </para></footnote>
13818 </para>
13819 </blockquote>
13820 <para>
13821 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13822 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13823 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13824 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13825 Consider each limitation in turn.
13826 </para>
13827 <para>
13828 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13829 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13830
13831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13832 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13833 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13834 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13835 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13836 after the creative work is done.
13837 </para>
13838 <para>
13839 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13840 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13841 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13842 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13843 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13844 perhaps
13845 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
13846 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
13847 creative
13848 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
13849 pouring
13850 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
13851 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13852 </para>
13853 <para>
13854 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13855 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13856 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13857 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13858 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13859 much more sense.
13860 </para>
13861 <para>
13862 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13863 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13864 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13865 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13866 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13867 <para>
13868 <!-- f7. -->
13869 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13870 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13871 </para></footnote>
13872 His view is that the law should be written so that
13873 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13874 </para>
13875 <para>
13876 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13877 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13878 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13879 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13880 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13881 </para>
13882 <para>
13883 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13885 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13886 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13887 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13888 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13889 </para>
13890 </sect2>
13891
13892 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13893 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13894 <para>
13895 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13896 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13897 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13898 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13899 battles around the sharing of music.
13900 </para>
13901 <para>
13902 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13903 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13904 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13905 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13906 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13907 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13908 innovation on the network.
13909 </para>
13910 <para>
13911 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13912 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13913 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13914 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13915 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13916 </para>
13917 <para>
13918 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13919 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13920 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13921 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13922 </para>
13923 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13924 <listitem><para>
13925 <!-- A. -->
13926 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13927 for purchasing CDs.
13928 </para></listitem>
13929 <listitem><para>
13930 <!-- B. -->
13931 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13932 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13933 </para></listitem>
13934 <listitem><para>
13935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13936 <!-- C. -->
13937 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13938 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13939 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13940 </para></listitem>
13941 <listitem><para>
13942 <!-- D. -->
13943 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13944 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13945 owner plainly endorses.
13946 </para></listitem>
13947 </orderedlist>
13948 <para>
13949 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13950 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13951 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13952 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13953 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13954 significantly weakened.
13955 </para>
13956 <para>
13957 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13958 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13959 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13960 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13961 networks.
13962 </para>
13963 <para>
13964 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13965 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13966 should respond.
13967 </para>
13968 <para>
13969 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13970 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13971 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13972 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13973 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13974 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13975 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13976 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13977 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13978 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13979 </para>
13980 <para>
13981 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13982 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13983 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13985 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13986 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13987 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13988 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13989 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13990 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13991 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13992 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13993 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13994 </para>
13995 <para>
13996 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13997 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
13998 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13999 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
14000 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
14001 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
14002 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
14003 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
14004 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14005 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14006 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14007 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14008 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14009 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14010 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14011 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14012 <!-- f8. -->
14013 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14014 April 2002, available at
14015 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14016 </para></footnote>
14017
14018 </para>
14019 <para>
14020 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14021 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14022 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14023 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14024 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14025 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14026 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14027 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14028 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14029 artists get paid, during
14030
14031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14032 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14033 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14034 </para>
14035 <para>
14036 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14037 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14038 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14039 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14040 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14041 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14042 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14043 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14044 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14045 </para>
14046 <para>
14047 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14048 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14049 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14050 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14051 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14052 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14053 way that returns something to the artist.
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14057 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14058 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14059 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14060 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14061 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14062 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14063 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14064 </para>
14065 <para>
14066 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14067 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14068 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14069 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14070 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14071 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14072 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14073 </para>
14074 <para>
14075
14076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14077 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14078 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14079 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14080 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14081 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14082 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14083 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14084 trade.
14085 </para>
14086 <para>
14087 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14088 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14089 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14090 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14091 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14092 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14093 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14094 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14095 </para>
14096 <para>
14097 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14098 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14099 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14100 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14101 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14102 delivering and accessing content.
14103 </para>
14104 <para>
14105 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14106 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14107 </para>
14108 <para>
14109 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14110 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14111 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14112 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14113 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14114 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14115 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14116 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14117 </para>
14118 <para>
14119 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14120 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14121 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14122 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14123 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14124 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14125 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14126 </para>
14127 <para>
14128 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14129 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14130 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14131 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14132 <para>
14133 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14134 10 October 2000), available at
14135 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14136 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14137 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14138 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14139 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14140 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14141 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14142 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14143 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14144 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14145 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14146 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14147 available at
14148 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14149 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14150 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14151 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14152 2002, available at
14153 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14154 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14155 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14156 McCullagh,
14157 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14158 2002, available at
14159 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14160 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14161 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14162 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14163 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14164 debate
14165 by about a decade. See
14166 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14167 </para></footnote>
14168 Fisher suggests a
14169 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14170 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14171 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14172 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14173 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14174 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14175 basis
14176 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14177 compensation
14178 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14179 </para>
14180 <para>
14181 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14182 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14183 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14184 simple:
14185 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14186 system.
14187 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14188 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14189 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14190 facilitating
14191 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14192 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14193 exchange
14194 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14195 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14196 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14197 </para>
14198 <para>
14199 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14200 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14201 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14202 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14203 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14204
14205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14206 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14207 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14208 allowed
14209 to do with the content itself.
14210 </para>
14211 <para>
14212 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14213 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14214 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14215 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14216 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14217 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14218 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14219 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14220 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14221 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14222 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14223 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14224 on-line.
14225 </para>
14226 <para>
14227 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14228 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14229 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14230 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14231 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14232 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14233 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14234 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14235 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14236 finding ways to compete with "free."
14237 </para>
14238 <para>
14239 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14240 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14241 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14242 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14243 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14244 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14245 the law.
14246 </para>
14247 <para>
14248 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14249 </para>
14250 <para>
14251
14252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14253 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14254 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14255 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14256 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14257 create.
14258 </para>
14259 <para>
14260 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14261 by
14262 </para>
14263 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14264 <listitem><para>
14265 <!-- 1. -->
14266 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14267 </para></listitem>
14268 <listitem><para>
14269 <!-- 2. -->
14270 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14271 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14272 statute;
14273 </para></listitem>
14274 <listitem><para>
14275 <!-- 3. -->
14276 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14277 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14278 </para></listitem>
14279 </orderedlist>
14280 <para>
14281 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14282 competitive
14283 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14284 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14285 something then?
14286 </para>
14287 <para>
14288 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14289 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14290 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14291 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14292 technology
14293 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14294 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14295 market
14296 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14297 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14298 authorized
14299 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14300 compensation
14301 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14302 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14303 </para>
14304 <para>
14305 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14306 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14307 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14308
14309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14310 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14311 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14312 </para>
14313 </sect2>
14314
14315 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14316 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14317 <para>
14318 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14319 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14320 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14321 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14322 </para>
14323 <para>
14324 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14325 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14326 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14327 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14328 unwillingness
14329 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14330 the law.
14331 </para>
14332 <para>
14333 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14334 "radical"
14335 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14336 advocating
14337 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14338 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14339 example,
14340 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14341 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14342 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14343 obvious.<footnote><para>
14344 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14345 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14346 </para></footnote>
14347
14348 </para>
14349 <para>
14350 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14351 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14352 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14353 </para>
14354 <para>
14355 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14356 benefits.
14357 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14358 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14359 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14360 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14361 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14362 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14363 predicted
14364 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14365 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14366 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14367 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14368 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14369 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14370 June 2003, available at
14371 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14372 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14373 effect
14374 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14375 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14376 </para></footnote>
14377 They see a system that has been
14378 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14379 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14380 </para>
14381 <para>
14382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14383 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14384 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14385 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14386 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14387 system
14388 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14389 </para>
14390 <para>
14391 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14392 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14393 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14394 obscure
14395 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14396 little.
14397 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14398 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14399 doctrine
14400 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14401 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14402 </para>
14403 <para>
14404 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14405 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14406 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14407 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14408 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14409 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14410 </para>
14411 <para>
14412 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14413 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14414 precisely
14415 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14416 to its review.
14417 </para>
14418 <para>
14419 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14420 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14421 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14422 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14423 something.
14424 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14425 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14426 requires
14427 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14428 Russia.
14429 </para>
14430 <para>
14431 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14432 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14433
14434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14435 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14436 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14437 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14438 </para>
14439 <para>
14440 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14441 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14442 keep your lawyers away.
14443 </para>
14444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14445 </sect2>
14446 </sect1>
14447 </chapter>
14448 <chapter id="c-notes">
14449 <title>NOTES</title>
14450 <para>
14451 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14452 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14453 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14454 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14455 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14456 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14457 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14458 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14459 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14460 the material.
14461 </para>
14462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14463
14464 </chapter>
14465 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14466 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14467 <para>
14468 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14469 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14470 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14471 to him that this book is dedicated.
14472 </para>
14473 <para>
14474 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14475 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14476 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14477 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14478 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14479 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14480 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14481 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14482 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14483 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14484 critical eye on much of this.
14485 </para>
14486 <para>
14487 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14488 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14489 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14490 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14492 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14493 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14494 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14495 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14496 </para>
14497 <para>
14498 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14499 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14500 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14501 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14502 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14503 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14504 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14505 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14506 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14507 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14508 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14509 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14510 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14511 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14512 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14513 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14514 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14515 a bunch of great replies.)
14516 </para>
14517 <para>
14518 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14519 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14520 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14521 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14522 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14523 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14524 throughout this book.
14525 </para>
14526 <para>
14527 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14528 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14529 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14530 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14531 </para>
14532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14533
14534 </chapter>
14535 </book>