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15 <book id=
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17 <title>Free Culture
</title>
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
24 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
26 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
30 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
35 <!-- <subjectset> and cover <mediaobject> Based on example from
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38 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
67 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.png" contentdepth=
"3em" width=
"100%" align=
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70 <imagedata fileref=
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"100%" align=
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73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
79 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
91 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's
<quote>e.biz
25,
</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's
<quote>50 visionaries.
</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
109 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
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127 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
130 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
132 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
136 <dedication id=
"salespoints">
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
141 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
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&N
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144 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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145 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id=
"alsobylessig">
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
167 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
171 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
174 Excerpt from an editorial titled
<quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,
</quote>
175 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
176 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
179 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
180 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
183 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
184 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
187 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
191 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
192 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
201 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
205 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
208 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
214 343.7309'
9—dc22
217 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
220 Printed in the United States of America
226 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
234 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
235 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
236 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
237 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
238 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
239 the above publisher of this book.
242 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
243 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
244 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
245 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
246 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
247 author's rights is appreciated.
251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
252 <dedication><title></title>
254 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
262 <title>List of figures
</title>
269 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
270 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
271 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
272 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
277 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
281 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
282 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
283 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
284 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
285 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
286 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
290 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
291 2 Architecture and Law: Force
292 2 Market: Concentration
295 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
296 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
297 2 Constraining Creators
298 2 Constraining Innovators
299 2 Corrupting Citizens
301 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
302 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
306 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
307 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
309 2 1. More Formalities
310 3 Registration and Renewal
313 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
314 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
315 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
323 <preface id=
"preface">
324 <title>PREFACE
</title>
325 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
326 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
329 <emphasis role=
"bold">At the end
</emphasis> of his review of my first
330 book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David
331 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
332 computer-related texts, wrote this:
336 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
337 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
338 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
339 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
340 David Pogue,
<quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
345 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
346 software, or
<quote>code,
</quote> functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
347 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
348 could always
<quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome
</quote>-like simply flip a
349 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
350 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
351 <quote>affect
</quote> us anymore.
354 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
355 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
356 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
357 causes even after the modem is turned
359 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
360 on-line have fundamentally affected
<quote>people who aren't online.
</quote> There
361 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
363 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
365 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
366 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
367 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
368 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
372 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
373 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of
<quote>free culture
</quote>—not
374 <quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free beer
</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
375 free software movement
<footnote>
377 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
378 </para></footnote>), but
<quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free speech,
</quote> <quote>free markets,
</quote>
379 <quote>free trade,
</quote> <quote>free enterprise,
</quote> <quote>free will,
</quote> and
<quote>free elections.
</quote> A
380 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
381 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
382 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
383 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
384 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
385 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
386 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
387 <quote>permission culture
</quote>—a culture in which creators get to create
388 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
392 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not
<quote>we
</quote>
393 on the Left or
<quote>you
</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
394 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
395 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
396 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
397 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
398 culture deem fundamental.
400 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
401 <indexterm><primary>Stevens, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
403 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
404 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
405 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
406 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
407 As William Safire described marching
<quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
408 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
409 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,
</quote> he formulated perhaps
410 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
412 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
416 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
417 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
418 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
419 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
420 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
421 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
422 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
427 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
428 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
429 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
430 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
431 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
432 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
433 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
434 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
435 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
436 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
437 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
438 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
439 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
440 that this work is
<quote>merely
</quote> derivative.
443 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
444 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
445 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
446 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
447 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
448 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
449 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
450 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
453 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
454 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
455 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
456 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
457 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
461 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
462 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
463 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
464 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
465 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
466 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
467 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
475 <chapter label=
"0" id=
"c-introduction">
476 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
477 <indexterm id='idxairtraffic' class='startofrange'
>
478 <primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.
</primary>
480 <indexterm id='idxlandownership' class='startofrange'
>
481 <primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary>
483 <indexterm id='idxproprigtair' class='startofrange'
>
484 <primary>property rights
</primary>
485 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
487 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
489 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
490 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
491 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
492 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
493 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
494 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
497 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
498 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
499 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
500 and all the space above, to
<quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.
</quote><footnote><para>
501 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
502 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
505 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
506 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
507 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
510 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
511 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
512 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
513 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
514 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
515 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
516 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
518 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
519 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
521 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
522 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
523 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
524 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
525 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
526 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
527 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to
<quote>an indefinite
528 extent, upwards,
</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
529 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
532 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
534 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
535 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
536 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
537 <quote>taking
</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
538 that
<quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
539 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.
</quote> But Justice Douglas
540 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
541 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
545 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
546 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
547 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
548 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
549 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
550 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
551 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
552 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
554 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
555 that there could be a
<quote>taking
</quote> if the government's use of its land
556 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
557 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece,
<quote>(Intellectual)
558 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
559 Authorship,
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
560 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
562 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
563 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
568 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.
</quote>
571 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
572 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
573 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
575 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line:
<quote>Common sense revolts
576 at the idea.
</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
577 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
578 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
579 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
581 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
582 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
583 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
585 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
586 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
587 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
588 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
589 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
590 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
591 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
592 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
593 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by
<quote>what
594 seemed reasonable
</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
595 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
596 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
597 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
598 end, the force of what seems
<quote>obvious
</quote> to everyone else
—the power of
599 <quote>common sense
</quote>—would prevail. Their
<quote>private interest
</quote> would not be
600 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
602 <indexterm startref='idxproprigtair' class='endofrange'
/>
603 <indexterm startref='idxlandownership' class='endofrange'
/>
604 <indexterm startref='idxairtraffic' class='endofrange'
/>
605 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwin' class='startofrange'
>
606 <primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary>
609 <emphasis role='strong'
>Edwin Howard Armstrong
</emphasis> is one of America's forgotten inventor
610 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
611 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
612 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
613 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
614 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
615 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
616 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
617 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
618 understanding of radio.
619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
620 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
621 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
622 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
625 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
626 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
627 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
628 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
629 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
630 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
631 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
632 much less transmitter power and static.
635 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
636 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
637 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
638 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
639 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
640 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
641 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
642 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
643 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.
</quote>
646 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
650 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
651 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
652 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
653 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
654 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
655 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
<quote>music
656 box.
</quote><footnote><para>
657 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
658 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
663 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
664 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
665 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
666 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
667 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
668 a handful of networks.
672 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
673 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
674 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
675 that removed static from
<quote>radio.
</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
676 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
677 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
681 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
682 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
683 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
684 RCA.
<footnote><para> See
<quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
685 Electronic Era,
</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
686 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
688 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
692 <indexterm id='idxlessing' class='startofrange'
>
693 <primary>Lessing, Lawrence
</primary>
696 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
697 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
698 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
700 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
704 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
705 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
706 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
707 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
708 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
709 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
714 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
715 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
716 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
717 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
718 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
719 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
720 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
721 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
722 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
723 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
724 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
729 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
730 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
731 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
732 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
737 <indexterm startref='idxlessing' class='endofrange'
/>
738 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
740 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
741 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
742 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
743 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
744 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
745 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
746 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
750 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
751 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
752 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
753 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
754 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
755 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
756 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
757 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
758 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
759 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
761 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwin' class='endofrange'
/>
763 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
764 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
765 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
766 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
767 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
768 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
769 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
770 course always public spirited; the reality is something
771 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
772 to themselves, would crumble in
774 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
775 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
776 effect of technological change.
779 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
780 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
781 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
782 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
783 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
784 before.
<footnote><para>
785 Amanda Lenhart,
<quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
786 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,
</quote> Pew Internet and American
787 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
788 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
790 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
794 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
795 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
796 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
797 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
798 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
799 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
800 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
801 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
802 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
805 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
806 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
807 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
808 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
809 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
810 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
814 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
815 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
816 regulation of each. By
<quote>commercial culture
</quote> I mean that part of our
817 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
818 <quote>noncommercial culture
</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
821 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
822 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his
<quote>Reader,
</quote> or
823 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
824 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
825 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
828 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
829 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
830 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
831 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
832 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
833 left this culture
<quote>free.
</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
834 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
835 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
836 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
839 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
840 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
841 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
842 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
843 marketplace.
<footnote>
845 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
846 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
847 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
848 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
849 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
850 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
851 D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote> Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
853 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
855 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
856 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
857 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
858 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
861 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
862 been erased.
<footnote><para>
863 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
865 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
867 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
868 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
869 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
870 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
871 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
872 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
873 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
874 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
875 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
876 culture, more and more a permission culture.
878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
880 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
881 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
882 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
883 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
884 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
885 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
886 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
887 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
888 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
889 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
893 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
894 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
895 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
896 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
897 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
898 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
899 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
900 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
901 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
902 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
903 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
904 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
905 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
906 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
907 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
908 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
909 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
912 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
913 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
914 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
915 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
916 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
917 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
921 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
923 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
924 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether
<quote>piracy
</quote> will
925 be permitted, and whether
<quote>property
</quote> will be protected. The
<quote>war
</quote> that
926 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
927 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
928 calls his
<quote>own terrorist war
</quote><footnote><para>
929 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
930 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,
</quote> <citetitle>New York
931 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
932 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
933 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
934 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
938 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
939 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
940 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
941 <quote>creative property.
</quote> I believe that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that the
942 law, properly tuned, should punish
<quote>piracy,
</quote> whether on or off the
946 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
947 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
948 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet
<quote>pirates
</quote> will also rid our
949 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
952 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
953 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
954 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
955 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
956 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
958 Neil W. Netanel,
<quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
959 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
960 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
962 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
963 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
964 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
965 could cultivate and extend our culture.
968 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
969 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
970 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
971 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
972 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
973 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
974 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
975 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
976 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
980 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
981 <quote>centrality of technology
</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
982 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
983 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
984 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
988 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
989 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
990 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
991 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
992 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
993 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
994 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
996 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
999 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about
<quote>property.
</quote> The
1000 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1001 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1002 this
<quote>property
</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1003 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1004 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1005 of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1006 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1007 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1008 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1009 <quote>trespassing
</quote> upon legitimate claims of
<quote>property.
</quote> It is as plain to
1010 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1015 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
1017 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1018 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1019 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1020 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1022 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1023 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1027 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1028 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1029 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1030 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1031 our
<quote>culture
</quote> was as
<quote>owned
</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1032 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1033 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1034 accepted as it is now.
1037 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1038 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1039 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1040 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1043 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1044 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1047 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1048 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1049 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1050 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1051 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1054 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1055 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1056 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1057 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1060 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1061 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1063 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1064 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1065 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1066 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of
<quote>intellectual
1067 property.
</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1068 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1069 this silliness will be much more profound.
1070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1073 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas:
<quote>piracy
</quote> and
1074 <quote>property.
</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1078 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1079 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1080 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1081 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1082 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1083 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1086 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1087 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1088 government, pushed by big media to respond to this
<quote>something new,
</quote> is
1089 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1090 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let
<quote>common
1091 sense
</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1092 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1093 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1094 fundamental about who we have always been.
1097 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1098 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1099 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1100 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1101 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1102 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1105 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1106 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1107 <title><quote>PIRACY
</quote></title>
1109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1110 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1111 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1114 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1115 been a war against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1116 <quote>piracy,
</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1117 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1118 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1122 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1123 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1124 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1126 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1129 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1132 Today we are in the middle of another
<quote>war
</quote> against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The
1133 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1134 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1135 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1136 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1137 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1141 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1142 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1143 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1144 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1145 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will
<quote>rob the author of the
1149 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1150 increasingly to technology to defend their
<quote>property
</quote> against this
1151 <quote>piracy.
</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1152 raised to believe that
<quote>property
</quote> should be
<quote>free.
</quote> Forget tattoos,
1153 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1154 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1157 There's no doubt that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1158 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1159 notion of
<quote>piracy
</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1160 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1163 The idea goes something like this:
1167 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1168 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1169 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1170 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1171 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1175 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1176 <indexterm><primary>Girl Schouts
</primary></indexterm>
1177 <indexterm id='idxifvalue' class='startofrange'
>
1178 <primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary>
1181 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1182 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1183 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1185 See Rochelle Dreyfuss,
<quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1186 in the Pepsi Generation,
</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1188 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1189 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1190 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1191 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1193 Lisa Bannon,
<quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1194 Up,
</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1195 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1196 Zittrain,
<quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1197 Speech, No One Wins,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1198 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1200 There was
<quote>value
</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1201 <quote>right
</quote>—even against the Girl Scouts.
1203 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1205 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1206 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1208 of law protecting creative property. But the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1209 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1210 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1212 <indexterm startref='idxifvalue' class='endofrange'
/>
1214 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1215 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1216 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1217 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1218 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1221 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1222 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1223 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1224 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1225 copyright law today regulates both.
1228 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1229 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1230 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1231 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1232 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1233 more expense of doing business.
1235 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1236 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1238 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1239 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1240 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1241 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1242 <quote>copying,
</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1243 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1244 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1245 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1246 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1247 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1248 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1249 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1250 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1251 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1252 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1253 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1254 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the
<quote>Rise of the Creative
1255 Class.
</quote><footnote>
1258 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York:
1259 Basic Books,
2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1260 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1261 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1262 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1263 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1264 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1266 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1267 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1269 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1270 this creative class.
1273 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1274 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1275 context the current battles about behavior labeled
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
1279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1280 <chapter label=
"1" id=
"creators">
1281 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1282 <indexterm id=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'
>
1283 <primary>animated cartoons
</primary>
1286 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1287 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1288 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1289 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1290 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1293 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1294 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1295 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1296 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1297 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1298 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1302 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1303 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1304 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1305 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1309 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1310 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1311 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1312 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1313 synchronization was pretty close.
1316 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1317 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1318 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1319 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1320 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1322 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1323 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1328 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1329 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly:
<quote>I have never been so thrilled
1330 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.
</quote>
1331 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1334 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1335 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1336 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1337 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1338 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1339 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1340 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1343 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1344 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1345 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1346 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1349 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1350 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1351 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1352 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1353 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1354 and among the best of its genre.
1357 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1359 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1360 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1361 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1363 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1364 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1365 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1366 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>:
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote> <quote>The
1367 Simpleton
</quote> (Delille),
<quote>Mischief Makers
</quote> (Carbonara),
<quote>Joyful Hurry No.
1</quote>
1368 (Baron), and
<quote>Gawky Rube
</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song,
<quote>The Turkey in the
1369 Straw,
</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1370 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1372 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1373 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1374 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1375 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote>
1376 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1380 This
<quote>borrowing
</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1381 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1382 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1384 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman,
<quote>The Mouse
1385 that Ate the Public Domain,
</quote> Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1386 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1388 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1389 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1390 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1391 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1392 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1393 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1394 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1395 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1399 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1400 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1401 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1402 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1403 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1404 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1405 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1408 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1409 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1410 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1411 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1412 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1413 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1414 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1415 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1416 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1417 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1418 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1420 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1421 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1422 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1423 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1424 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1425 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1426 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1427 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1429 <indexterm startref=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'
/>
1431 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1432 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1433 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1434 its importance. We could call this
<quote>Disney creativity,
</quote> though that
1435 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely,
<quote>Walt Disney
1436 creativity
</quote>—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1437 culture around us and makes it something different.
1439 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1440 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1441 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1442 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1443 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1445 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1446 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the
<quote>average
</quote> term by
1448 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1449 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1450 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1452 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1453 Web site associated with this book, available at
1454 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1456 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1457 copyright holders of a creative work had an
<quote>exclusive right
</quote> to control
1458 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1459 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1462 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1463 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1464 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a
<quote>lawyer-free
1465 zone.
</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1466 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1467 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1468 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1471 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1472 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1473 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1474 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1477 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1478 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1479 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1480 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1481 content from before the Great Depression.
1484 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on
<quote>Walt Disney creativity.
</quote>
1485 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1486 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1490 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1491 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1492 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1493 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1494 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1495 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1496 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1499 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1500 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1501 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1502 the stories that these
<quote>graphic novels
</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1503 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are
<quote>men in tights.
</quote>
1504 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1505 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1506 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1507 interestingly different way.
1510 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1511 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1512 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1515 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1516 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1517 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1518 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1519 transforming it either subtly or
1520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1521 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1522 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1523 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1524 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently
<quote>different.
</quote> But they
1525 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1526 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1527 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1530 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1531 huge. More than
33,
000 <quote>circles
</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1532 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1533 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1534 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1535 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1536 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1537 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1538 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1541 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1542 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1543 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1544 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1545 one. Doujinshi are plainly
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> There is no general
1546 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1547 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1548 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1549 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that
<quote>taking
</quote> without
1550 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1551 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1552 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1554 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1555 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1558 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1559 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1560 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me,
<quote>The
1561 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1562 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1564 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1565 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them
</quote>
1566 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1568 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1569 York: Perennial,
2000).
1572 <indexterm><primary>Superman comics
</primary></indexterm>
1574 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1575 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1576 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me,
<quote>there are these rules
1577 and you have to stick to them.
</quote> There are things Superman
<quote>cannot
</quote>
1578 do.
<quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1579 which are fifty years old.
</quote>
1581 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1583 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1584 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1585 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1586 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1587 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1588 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1589 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1591 See Salil K. Mehra,
<quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1592 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?
</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1593 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
<quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1594 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1595 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1596 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1597 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1598 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.
</quote>
1602 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1603 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1604 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1605 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1606 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1607 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1608 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1609 a more general pattern of blocking this
<quote>free taking
</quote> by the doujinshi
1613 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1614 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1615 a friend from a major Japanese law firm.
<quote>We don't have enough
1616 lawyers,
</quote> he told me one afternoon. There
<quote>just aren't enough resources
1617 to prosecute cases like this.
</quote>
1620 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1621 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1622 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1623 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1625 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1626 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1627 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1628 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1629 their clients or hurt them?
1630 Let's pause for a moment.
1633 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1634 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1635 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1638 We live in a world that celebrates
<quote>property.
</quote> I am one of those
1639 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1640 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1641 <quote>intellectual property.
</quote><footnote><para>
1643 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1644 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1645 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1646 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1647 describes a set of
<quote>property
</quote> rights
—copyright, patents,
1648 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1650 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1652 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1653 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1657 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1658 plenty of value out there that
<quote>property
</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1659 mean
<quote>money can't buy you love,
</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1660 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1661 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1662 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1663 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1664 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1665 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1666 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1667 Disney's use would have been considered
<quote>fair.
</quote> There was nothing
1668 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1672 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1673 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1674 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1677 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1681 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1682 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1683 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1684 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1685 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1686 form, whether large or small.
1689 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1690 say that the copycat comic artists are
<quote>stealing.
</quote> This form of Walt
1691 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1692 particular find it hard to say why.
1695 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1696 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1697 without asking or paying for the privilege. (
<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1698 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1699 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?
</quote>) Acting companies
1700 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1701 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1702 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1703 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1704 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1705 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1706 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1709 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1710 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1711 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1712 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1713 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1714 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1715 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1716 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1720 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1721 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1722 question instead is
<quote><emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?
</quote>
1723 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1724 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1725 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1726 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1727 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1728 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1732 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1733 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1734 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1739 <chapter label=
"2" id=
"mere-copyists">
1740 <title>CHAPTER TWO:
<quote>Mere Copyists
</quote></title>
1741 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1742 <primary>photography
</primary>
1745 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1746 producing what we would call
<quote>photographs.
</quote> Appropriately enough, they
1747 were called
<quote>daguerreotypes.
</quote> The process was complicated and
1748 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1749 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1750 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1751 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1752 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1755 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1756 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1757 <quote>automatic pictures.
</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1758 making
<quote>negatives.
</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1759 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1760 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1761 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1762 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1764 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1766 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1767 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1770 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1771 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1773 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1774 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1775 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1776 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1777 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1778 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1779 population of photographers.
1782 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1783 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1784 marketed on the basis of its simplicity.
<quote>You press the button and we
1785 do the rest.
</quote><footnote><para>
1787 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1788 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1789 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1793 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1794 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1795 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1796 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1797 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1798 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1799 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1800 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1801 chemicals.
<footnote>
1804 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1806 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1811 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1812 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1813 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1814 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1815 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1816 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1817 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1818 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1819 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1820 percent.
<footnote><para>
1823 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1824 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1826 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1829 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1833 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1834 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1835 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1836 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1837 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes,
<quote>For the
1838 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1839 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1840 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1841 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1842 interpretation or bias.
</quote><footnote><para>
1848 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1849 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1850 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1851 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1852 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1853 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its
<quote>quality
</quote>;
1854 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1855 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1856 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1857 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1861 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1862 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1863 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1864 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1865 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1866 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1867 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1868 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1870 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1871 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1872 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1873 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1878 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1879 familiar. The photographer was
<quote>taking
</quote> something from the person or
1880 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1881 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1882 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1885 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1886 that they thought valuable.
1888 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1890 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1891 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1892 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1893 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1894 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1897 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote>
1898 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1899 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1900 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1901 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1902 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1903 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1904 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1906 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
1908 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1909 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1910 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1911 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1912 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1913 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1914 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1915 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1916 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1918 See Melville B. Nimmer,
<quote>The Right of Publicity,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1919 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
<quote>Privacy,
</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1920 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1921 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1926 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1927 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1928 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1929 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1930 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1931 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1932 Kodak would be benefiting from the
<quote>theft
</quote> committed by the
1933 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1934 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1935 from the
<quote>image-right
</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1936 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1937 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1938 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1943 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1944 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1945 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1946 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1947 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1948 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1949 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1950 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1951 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1952 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1953 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1954 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1955 striking images, and the logo
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> in place of the name of a
1956 school. But there's little that's
<quote>just
</quote> cerebral in the projects that
1957 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1958 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1959 film of your VCR. Rather the
<quote>film
</quote> of digital cameras. Just Think!
1960 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1961 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1962 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1963 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1964 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1967 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1968 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1970 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1971 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1972 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it,
<quote>Five years ago, a good
1973 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1974 professional quality for $
595.
</quote><footnote><para>
1976 H. Edward Goldberg,
<quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1977 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,
</quote>
1978 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1979 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1981 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1982 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1983 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1984 learning more and more of something teachers call
<quote>media literacy.
</quote>
1987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1988 <quote>Media literacy,
</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1989 Think!, puts it,
<quote>is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
1990 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1991 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1992 the way people access it.
</quote>
1993 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1996 This may seem like an odd way to think about
<quote>literacy.
</quote> For most
1997 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1998 and noticing split infinitives are the things that
<quote>literate
</quote> people know
2001 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
2003 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
2004 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
2005 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
2007 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2008 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990);
<quote>Findings on Family and TV
2009 Study,
</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
2011 it is increasingly important to understand the
<quote>grammar
</quote> of media. For
2012 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2013 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2014 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2015 (at least at first) terrible media.
2018 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2019 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2020 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
2021 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2022 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2023 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2024 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2025 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2028 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2029 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2030 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2031 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2032 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2033 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2035 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2037 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2038 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2039 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2042 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2043 about
<quote>the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2044 texture.
</quote><footnote>
2047 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2049 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2050 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2052 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2053 <quote>played
</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2054 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2055 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2056 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2057 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2058 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2059 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2061 See Scott Steinberg,
<quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,
</quote> E!online,
4
2062 November
2000, available at
2063 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>;
<quote>Timeline,
</quote> 22 November
2000,
2065 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2068 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2070 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2071 describes,
<quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2072 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2073 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2074 led.
</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2077 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2078 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2079 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2080 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2084 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2085 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2086 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2087 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2092 <quote>Read-only.
</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2093 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2097 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2098 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2099 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2100 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2103 and this literacy in particular, is to
<quote>empower people to choose the
2104 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2105 express.
</quote><footnote>
2108 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2109 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2110 </para></footnote> It is to enable students
<quote>to communicate in the
2111 language of the twenty-first century.
</quote><footnote><para>
2116 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2118 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2119 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2120 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2121 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2122 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2123 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2124 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2125 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2126 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2127 students know something about
—gun violence.
2130 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2131 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2132 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2133 away. The
<quote>kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,
</quote>
2134 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2135 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2138 Using whatever
<quote>free web stuff they could find,
</quote> and relatively simple
2139 tools to enable the kids to mix
<quote>image, sound, and text,
</quote> Barish said
2140 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2141 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2142 close to the lives of these students. The project
<quote>gave them a tool
2143 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2144 it,
</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2145 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2146 been created using only text.
<quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2147 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2148 gone and done something else,
</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2149 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2150 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2151 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2152 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2157 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?
</quote> I asked. In part,
2158 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2159 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of
<quote>constructing
2160 meaning.
</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2161 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2162 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2163 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2168 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2169 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2170 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2171 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2172 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2173 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2174 you say,
<quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.
</quote>
2175 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2176 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2177 you. [But i]nstead, if you say,
<quote>Well, with all these things that you
2178 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2179 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2180 for me something that reflects that.
</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2181 camera and
… saying,
<quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2182 make a little movie.
</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2183 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2184 about the topic.
…
2187 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2188 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2189 bump up against the fact,
<quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2190 to write something.
</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2191 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2194 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2195 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2196 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2198 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2199 had a lot of power with this language.
2201 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2202 not match with any start quote. -->
2204 <indexterm><primary>World Trade Center
</primary></indexterm>
2206 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2207 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2208 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2209 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2210 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2211 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2212 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2213 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2214 world would be watching.
2217 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2218 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2219 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was
<quote>balance,
</quote>
2220 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2221 increasingly come to expect it,
<quote>news as entertainment,
</quote> even if the
2222 entertainment is tragedy.
2224 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2225 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2227 But in addition to this produced news about the
<quote>tragedy of September
2228 11,
</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2229 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2230 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2231 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2232 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2233 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2234 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2235 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2236 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2237 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2238 was also the Internet.
2241 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2242 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2243 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2244 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2247 by a student on the
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2251 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2252 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2253 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2254 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2255 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2256 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2257 spread practically instantaneously.
2260 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2261 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2262 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2263 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2264 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2265 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2266 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2269 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2270 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2271 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2272 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2273 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2274 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2275 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2276 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2277 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2278 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2279 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2280 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2283 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2284 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2285 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2286 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2287 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2290 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2291 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2293 <indexterm><primary>Tocqueville, Alexis de
</primary></indexterm>
2295 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2296 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2297 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2298 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2299 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2300 most important account of early
<quote>Democracy in America.
</quote> It wasn't
2301 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2302 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2303 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2304 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2305 deliberated. Members argued about the
<quote>right
</quote> result; they tried to
2306 persuade each other of the
<quote>right
</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2307 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2308 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2310 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2311 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2315 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2316 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2317 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2319 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin,
<quote>Deliberation Day,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2320 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2322 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2323 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2324 place for
<quote>democratic deliberation
</quote> to occur.
2327 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2328 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2329 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2330 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2331 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2332 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2334 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2335 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2336 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2337 little beyond what our friends say.
2340 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2341 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2342 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2343 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2344 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2347 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2351 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2352 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2353 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2354 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2355 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2356 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2359 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2360 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2361 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2362 is having an effect.
2363 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2365 <indexterm><primary>Thurmond, Strom
</primary></indexterm>
2367 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2368 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2369 <quote>misspoke
</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2370 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2371 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2372 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2373 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2374 more instances of the same
<quote>misspeaking
</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2375 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2376 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2378 Noah Shachtman,
<quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,
</quote> New
2379 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2381 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2384 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2385 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2386 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2387 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2391 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2392 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2393 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2394 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2395 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2396 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2397 peer-generated rankings.
2399 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2400 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2403 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2405 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2406 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2407 difference is the absence of a financial
<quote>conflict of interest.
</quote> <quote>I think you
2408 have to take the conflict of interest
</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2409 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2410 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2411 get it out of the way.
</quote>
2413 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2414 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2416 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2417 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2418 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2419 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2420 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2422 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2424 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2425 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2426 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2427 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2428 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2429 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2430 told her that
<emphasis>they
</emphasis> were writing
<quote>the story.
</quote>)
2432 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2433 debate
—<quote>amateur
</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2434 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2435 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2436 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2437 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2438 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2440 John Schwartz,
<quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2441 Information Online,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2442 D. Kramer,
<quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,
</quote>
2443 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2444 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2446 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2447 <quote>triangulate,
</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2448 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2449 out of it
</quote>—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2452 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2453 with blogs.
<quote>It's going to become an essential skill,
</quote> Winer predicts,
2454 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2455 not clear that
<quote>journalism
</quote> is happy about this
—some journalists
2456 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2459 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2460 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2461 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
2462 See Michael Falcone,
<quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?
</quote> <citetitle>New
2463 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. (
<quote>Not all news organizations have
2464 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2465 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2466 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2467 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2468 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2469 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.
</quote>)
2471 But it is clear that we are still in transition.
<quote>A
2473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2474 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,
</quote> Winer told me.
2475 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2476 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2477 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said,
<quote>we will
2478 be the last thing that gets shut down.
</quote>
2481 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
<quote>you
2482 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.
</quote>
2483 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2484 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2485 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2486 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2487 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2488 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2489 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2490 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2491 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2492 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2493 extraordinary to report.
2495 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2496 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2497 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2499 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'
>
2500 <primary>advertising
</primary>
2503 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2504 His work, as his Web site describes it, is
<quote>human learning and
… the
2505 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation.
</quote>
2508 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2509 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2510 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2511 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2515 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When
<quote>a lot of us grew up,
</quote>
2516 he explains, that tinkering was done
<quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2517 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.
</quote> But digital technologies
2518 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2519 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2520 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2522 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2523 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2524 or
<quote>free collage,
</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2525 the tinkering of many others.
2528 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2529 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2530 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2531 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2532 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2535 This opportunity creates a
<quote>completely new kind of learning platform,
</quote>
2536 as Brown describes.
<quote>As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2537 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2538 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2539 if they can improve it.
</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2540 apprenticeship.
<quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.
</quote>
2543 In this process,
<quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2544 They are code.
</quote> Kids are
<quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2545 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2546 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2547 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2548 you tinker the more you improve.
</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2552 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2553 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2554 it,
<quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2555 intelligence.
</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2556 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2557 text.
<quote>The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2558 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2559 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2560 these multiple forms of intelligence.
</quote>
2562 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'
/>
2563 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2565 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2566 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2569 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2570 kind of recognition.
2573 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2574 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2575 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2576 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2577 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2578 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2579 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2582 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2583 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2584 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2585 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the
<quote>right to
2586 tinker
</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2587 general.
<footnote><para>
2589 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel,
<quote>Technological Access
2590 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,
</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2591 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2593 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2594 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2597 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,
</quote> Brown
2598 explains. We need to
<quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2599 and want to learn.
</quote>
2602 <quote>Yet,
</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2603 evince,
<quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2604 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2605 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2606 system that closes down that part of the brain.
</quote>
2608 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2610 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2611 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2612 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2613 the law to close down that technology.
2616 <quote>No way to run a culture,
</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2617 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2618 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2622 <chapter label=
"3" id=
"catalogs">
2623 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2624 <indexterm><primary>RPI
</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</see></indexterm>
2625 <indexterm id=
"idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'
>
2626 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</primary>
2629 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2630 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2631 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2632 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2633 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2636 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2637 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2638 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2639 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2640 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2641 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2644 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2645 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2646 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2647 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2648 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2651 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2653 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2654 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2655 engines can do this even better. The idea of
<quote>intranet
</quote> search
2656 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2657 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2658 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2659 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2660 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2663 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2664 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2665 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2666 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2667 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2668 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2669 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2672 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2673 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2674 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2675 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2676 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2677 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2678 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2679 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2680 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2684 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2685 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2686 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2687 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2688 be on users' computers.
2691 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2692 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2693 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2694 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2696 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2700 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2701 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2702 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2703 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2704 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2705 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2706 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2707 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2708 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2709 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2710 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2711 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2715 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2716 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2717 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2718 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2719 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2720 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2721 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2724 <quote>It was absurd,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>I don't think I did anything
2725 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2726 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2727 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2728 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2729 easier to use
</quote>—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2730 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2731 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2732 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2733 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2736 <indexterm><primary>statutory damages
</primary></indexterm>
2738 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2739 network and had therefore
<quote>willfully
</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2741 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2742 <quote>willful infringement,
</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2743 call
<quote>statutory damages.
</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2744 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2745 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2746 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2748 <indexterm><primary>Princeton University
</primary></indexterm>
2749 <indexterm><primary>Michigan Technical University
</primary></indexterm>
2751 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2752 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2753 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2754 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2755 huge demands for
<quote>damages
</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2756 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2757 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2758 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2759 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2760 2001.
<footnote><para>
2763 Tim Goral,
<quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2764 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,
</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2765 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2768 <indexterm startref=
"idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'
/>
2770 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2771 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2772 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2773 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2774 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2776 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt
</primary></indexterm>
2778 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2779 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2780 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2781 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2782 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2783 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2784 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse,
<quote>You don't want to pay another
2785 visit to a dentist like me.
</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2786 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2789 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2790 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2791 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2792 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2793 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2795 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2796 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2799 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2800 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2803 <primary>artists
</primary>
2804 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
2807 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2808 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2809 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2810 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2811 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2812 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2813 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2815 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2816 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2817 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2819 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2820 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2821 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2823 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in
<quote>KaZaA and Punishment,
</quote>
2824 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2828 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2829 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2830 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2835 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2836 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2837 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2838 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2842 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2843 his father told me, Jesse
<quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2844 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2845 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2846 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.
</quote>
2848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2850 <chapter label=
"4" id=
"pirates">
2851 <title>CHAPTER FOUR:
<quote>Pirates
</quote></title>
2852 <indexterm><primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary></indexterm>
2854 <emphasis role=
"strong">If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
</emphasis>
2855 using the creative property of others without their
2856 permission
—if
<quote>if value, then right
</quote> is
2857 true
—then the history of the content industry is a history of
2858 piracy. Every important sector of
<quote>big media
</quote>
2859 today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2860 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last
2861 generation's pirates join this generation's country club
—until
2867 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2869 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2870 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2871 which details Edison's
<quote>adventures
</quote> with copyright and patent.
2872 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2874 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2875 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2876 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2877 exercised through a monopoly
<quote>trust,
</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2878 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2879 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2880 this creative property
2881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2882 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2885 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2889 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2890 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2891 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2892 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2893 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2894 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2895 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2898 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2899 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2900 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2901 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2902 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2903 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2904 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2905 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2906 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2907 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2909 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2910 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2911 posted at
<quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2912 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,
</quote> available at
2913 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2914 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2915 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From
2916 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2917 the Propertization of Copyright
</quote> (September
2002), University of
2918 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2919 Working Paper No.
159.
2920 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
2922 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2923 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2924 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2928 The Napsters of those days, the
<quote>independents,
</quote> were companies like
2929 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2930 resisted.
<quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2931 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2932 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.
</quote><footnote><para>
2934 Marc Wanamaker,
<quote>The First Studios,
</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2935 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2937 That led the independents to flee the East
2938 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2939 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2940 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2944 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2945 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2946 patent holder a truly
<quote>limited
</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2949 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2950 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2951 Edison's creative property.
2954 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2955 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2957 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2958 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2960 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2961 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2963 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil
</primary></indexterm>
2965 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2966 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2967 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2968 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2969 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2970 1899 hit
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2971 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2972 right to perform it publicly.
2974 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2976 But what if I wanted to record
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> using Edison's phonograph
2977 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2978 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2979 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2980 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2981 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2982 <quote>public performance
</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2983 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2984 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2985 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2986 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2987 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2988 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2989 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2990 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2991 its composer anything.
2993 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
2995 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2997 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2999 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3003 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3004 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3005 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3006 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3007 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3008 rights.
<footnote><para>
3010 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3011 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
3012 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3013 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
3014 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3015 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3016 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3020 <indexterm><primary>Sousa, John Philip
</primary></indexterm>
3022 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3023 people's works were
<quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3024 genius of American composers,
</quote><footnote><para>
3026 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
3027 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3029 and the
<quote>music publishing industry
</quote>
3030 was thereby
<quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.
</quote><footnote><para>
3032 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
3033 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3036 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible,
<quote>When they make money
3037 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3039 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3040 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3044 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3045 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3046 player piano argued that
<quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3047 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3048 of anything he had before their introduction.
</quote> Rather, the machines
3049 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3052 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
3053 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3054 Perforating Company of New York).
3055 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3056 Congress was
<quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3057 they represent, and whose servants they are.
</quote> <quote>All talk about
3058 `theft,'
</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3059 wrote,
<quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3060 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3061 statute.
</quote><footnote><para>
3063 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3064 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3065 Graphophone Company Association).
3067 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3070 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3071 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3072 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the
<quote>mechanical
3073 reproductions
</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3074 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3075 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3076 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3077 recorded once. This is the part of
3079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3080 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3081 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3082 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3085 American law ordinarily calls this a
<quote>compulsory license,
</quote> but I will
3086 refer to it as a
<quote>statutory license.
</quote> A statutory license is a license
3087 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3088 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3089 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3090 the fee set by the statute.
3093 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3094 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3095 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3096 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3097 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3098 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3100 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3103 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3104 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3105 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3106 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3107 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3108 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3109 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3110 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3111 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3112 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3113 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3114 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3117 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3118 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3119 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3120 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3121 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3123 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3126 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3127 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3128 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3133 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3135 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3136 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3137 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3138 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3139 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3140 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3141 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3142 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3143 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3144 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3145 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3146 choice.
<footnote><para>
3148 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3149 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3150 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3151 this report.
</para></footnote>
3155 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3156 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3159 <section id=
"radio">
3160 <title>Radio
</title>
3161 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'
>
3162 <primary>artists
</primary>
3163 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
3166 Radio was also born of piracy.
3169 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3170 <quote>public performance
</quote> of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3172 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3173 record companies printed
<quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast
</quote> and other
3174 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3175 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3176 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3177 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3178 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3179 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3180 Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3181 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3182 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3184 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3185 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3186 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3189 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3190 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3191 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3192 work. It's one thing to have
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> sung on the radio by the
3193 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3194 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3195 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3196 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3197 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3199 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3204 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3205 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3206 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3207 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3208 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3209 of playing the song.
3211 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3212 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3215 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3216 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3217 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3218 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3221 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3222 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3223 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3224 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3225 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3226 <quote>protected
</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3227 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3230 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3232 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3233 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3234 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3235 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3236 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3237 to take something for nothing.
3239 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'
/>
3241 <section id=
"cabletv">
3242 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3245 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3248 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3249 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3250 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3251 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3253 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3254 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3255 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3258 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3259 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3260 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3262 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3263 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3264 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.
</quote><footnote><para>
3266 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3267 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3268 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3269 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3271 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3273 There may have been a
<quote>public interest
</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3274 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3275 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony,
<quote>Does public
3276 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?
</quote><footnote><para>
3278 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3279 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3281 As another broadcaster put it,
3285 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3286 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3287 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3289 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3290 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3295 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3299 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3300 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3301 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3302 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3304 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3305 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3306 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3310 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3312 These were
<quote>free-ride[rs],
</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3313 Heston said, who were
<quote>depriving actors of
3314 compensation.
</quote><footnote><para>
3316 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3317 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3318 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3323 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3324 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3328 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3329 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3330 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3331 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3334 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3335 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3337 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3338 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3339 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3341 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3345 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3346 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3349 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3350 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they
<quote>pirated.
</quote>
3351 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3352 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3353 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3354 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3355 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3356 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3357 companies thus built their empire in part upon a
<quote>piracy
</quote> of the value
3358 created by broadcasters' content.
3361 These separate stories sing a common theme. If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
3362 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3363 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3364 today
<footnote><para>
3366 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3367 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3368 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3369 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>.
<quote>The
3370 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3371 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet.
</quote>
3373 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3374 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3375 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3376 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3377 last. Every generation
—until now.
3379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3382 <chapter label=
"5" id=
"piracy">
3383 <title>CHAPTER FIVE:
<quote>Piracy
</quote></title>
3385 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3386 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3387 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3388 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3389 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3393 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of
<quote>taking
</quote>
3394 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3395 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3396 taking
<quote>piracy,
</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3397 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3398 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3399 has so often done in the past.
3400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3402 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3403 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3404 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3406 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3407 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3408 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3409 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3410 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3412 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3413 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3414 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3415 also Ben Hunt,
<quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3416 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3418 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3419 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3422 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3423 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3424 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3425 This piracy is wrong.
3428 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3429 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3430 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3431 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3432 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3433 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3434 of our existence, treated as right.
3437 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3438 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3439 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3440 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3441 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3442 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3443 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3444 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3445 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3448 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3449 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3450 <beginpage pagenum=
"77"/>
3451 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3452 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3456 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3457 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3458 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3459 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3461 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3462 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The
3463 New Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3464 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3465 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3466 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3467 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3468 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3469 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3470 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3471 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3472 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3473 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3474 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3476 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents
</primary></indexterm>
3477 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3478 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3479 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3480 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3483 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3485 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3486 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3487 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3488 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3489 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3491 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3492 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3493 144–90.
<quote>In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3494 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3495 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3496 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3497 pirating were not an option.
</quote> Ibid.,
149.
3498 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3502 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3503 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3504 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3505 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3506 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3507 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?
</quote>
3508 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3509 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3510 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3511 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3512 piracy of the tangible.
3515 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3516 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3517 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3518 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3519 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3520 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3521 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3522 give people the right to
<quote>take
</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3523 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3526 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3527 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3528 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3529 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3530 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what
<quote>property
</quote> means.
3532 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3534 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3535 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
<quote>steal
</quote>
3536 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3537 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3538 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3539 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3540 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3541 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3542 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3543 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3544 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3545 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3546 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3548 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3549 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3551 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3554 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3555 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3556 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3557 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3558 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3559 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3562 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3563 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3564 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3565 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3566 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3567 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3568 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3569 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3570 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3571 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3572 violating the law is still wrong.
3573 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3574 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3575 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3576 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3579 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3580 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3581 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3582 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3583 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3584 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3585 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3586 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3590 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3591 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is. Or
3592 at least, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3593 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of
<quote>piracy
</quote> are useful
3594 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3595 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3596 <quote>piracy
</quote> in that sense of the term.
3599 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3600 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3601 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3602 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3605 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3606 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3607 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3608 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3611 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3612 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3616 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3617 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3619 The key to the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that
<quote>rob[s]
3620 the author of [his] profit.
</quote><footnote><para>
3622 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3624 This means we must determine whether
3625 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3627 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3628 author of his profit.
3630 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3632 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3633 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3634 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3635 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3637 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3638 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3639 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3640 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3641 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3642 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3643 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3644 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3645 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3647 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3648 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3649 put together components that had been developed independently.
3650 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3653 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3654 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3655 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3656 system.
<footnote><para>
3658 See Carolyn Lochhead,
<quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,
</quote> <citetitle>San
3659 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1;
<quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,
</quote>
3660 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Napster Names CEO,
3661 Secures New Financing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3662 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3663 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet
</quote> (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3665 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3666 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3667 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3668 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3669 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3670 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3671 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3674 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3675 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3676 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3677 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3680 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3681 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3682 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3683 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3685 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3686 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3687 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3689 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,
</quote> <citetitle>New
3690 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3692 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3693 massive quantity of content is being
<quote>taken
</quote> on these networks. The
3694 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3695 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3698 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3699 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3700 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3701 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3702 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3703 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3708 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3709 different kinds into four types.
3711 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3714 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3715 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3716 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3717 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3718 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3719 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3720 users who download instead of purchasing.
3721 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3725 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3726 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3727 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3728 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3729 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3730 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3731 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3736 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3737 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3738 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3739 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3740 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3741 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3742 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend
<quote>recalling
</quote> old
3743 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3744 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3745 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3746 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3747 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3753 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3754 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3759 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3762 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3763 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3764 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3765 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3767 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3768 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3770 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3771 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3772 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3773 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3774 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3775 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3778 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3779 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3780 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3781 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3782 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of
<quote>theft
</quote> that is
3783 <quote>devastating
</quote> the industry.
3786 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3787 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3788 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3789 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3790 & Young put it,
<quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3791 technology, the labels fought it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3793 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3794 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3795 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3796 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3797 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption
<quote>Home taping
3798 is killing music.
</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3799 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3800 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3801 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3802 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3803 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3804 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3805 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3806 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3807 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3808 regulating technology was the answer.
3811 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3812 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3813 turnaround.
<quote>In the end,
</quote> Cap Gemini concludes,
<quote>the `crisis'
… was
3814 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3816 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3817 innovation at the major labels.
</quote><footnote><para>
3819 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3823 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3824 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3825 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3826 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3827 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3828 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3829 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3830 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3833 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3834 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3835 The
<quote>net harm
</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3836 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3837 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3838 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3839 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3844 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3845 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3846 actually suggest it might be close.
3849 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3850 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3851 percent.
<footnote><para>
3853 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3855 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3856 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3857 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3858 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3859 #
16</ulink>:
<quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3860 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3861 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3862 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3863 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3864 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3865 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3868 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3869 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3870 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3871 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3872 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3873 account for at least some of the loss.
<quote>From
1999 to
2001, the average
3874 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19.
</quote><footnote>
3877 Jane Black,
<quote>Big Music's Broken Record,
</quote> BusinessWeek online,
13
3878 February
2003, available at
3879 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3880 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3883 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3884 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes,
<quote>The
3885 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3886 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3887 $
19.99.
</quote><footnote><para>
3894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3895 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3896 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3897 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3898 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3899 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3900 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3903 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3904 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3905 The recording industry constantly asks,
<quote>What's the difference between
3906 downloading a song and stealing a CD?
</quote>—but their own numbers
3907 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3908 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3909 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3910 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3911 Kazaa
<quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit
</quote>—then the industry
3912 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3913 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3914 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3915 a huge difference between
<quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.
</quote>
3918 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3919 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3920 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3924 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3925 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3926 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3927 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3928 available.
<footnote><para>
3930 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3931 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3932 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3933 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3934 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3935 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3937 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3938 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3939 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3940 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3941 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3944 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3946 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3947 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3948 today.
<footnote><para>
3950 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3951 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3952 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3953 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3954 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3956 Association of Recording Merchandisers,
<quote>2002 Annual Survey
3959 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3961 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3962 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3963 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3964 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3965 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3966 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3967 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3968 the content they sell.
3970 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3972 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3973 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3974 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3975 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3976 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3977 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's
<quote>Two Love Songs,
</quote>
3978 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3979 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3980 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3981 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3982 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3985 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3986 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3987 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3988 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3989 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3993 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3994 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3995 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3996 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3997 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
3998 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
4000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
4001 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
4002 would be a great advertisement for the
<quote>real
</quote> book. People would read
4003 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
4004 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4005 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4006 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4010 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4011 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4012 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4013 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4016 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4017 understandably says,
<quote>This is how much we've lost,
</quote> we must also ask,
4018 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4019 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4020 unavailable?
</quote>
4023 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4024 chapter, much of the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4025 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4026 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
4027 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4028 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4029 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4030 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4031 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4032 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4033 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4034 found only with time.
4037 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4038 just what you call type A sharing?
</quote>
4041 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4043 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4044 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4046 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4048 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4050 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4051 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4052 <quote>down to zero.
</quote><footnote><para>
4054 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4055 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4058 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
4059 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4060 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
4061 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
4065 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4066 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4067 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4068 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4069 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4070 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4071 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4072 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4073 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4076 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4077 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4078 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4079 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4080 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4081 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4082 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4085 <primary>artists
</primary>
4086 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
4089 So, as we've seen, when
<quote>mechanical reproduction
</quote> threatened the
4090 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4091 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4092 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4093 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4094 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4095 complained to Congress that their
<quote>creative property
</quote> was not being
4096 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4097 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4101 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4102 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4103 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4104 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4105 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4111 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4112 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4113 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4114 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4115 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4116 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4117 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4118 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4119 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4120 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4121 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4122 Congress chose a path that would assure
4123 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4124 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4126 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4128 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4129 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4130 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4131 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4132 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4133 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4134 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4135 <quote>record
</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4136 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4137 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4138 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4141 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4142 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4143 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4144 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4145 machine to copy only if there were a special
<quote>copy me
</quote> signal on the
4146 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4147 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4148 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4150 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4151 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4152 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4153 for the architecture it chose.
4156 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4157 champion. Valenti called VCRs
<quote>tapeworms.
</quote> He warned,
<quote>When there are
4158 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4159 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4160 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4161 copyright.
</quote><footnote><para>
4163 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4164 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4165 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4166 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4168 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4169 creative judgment,
</quote> he told Congress,
<quote>to understand the devastation
4170 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4171 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4172 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4173 and plain common sense.
</quote><footnote><para>
4175 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4177 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4178 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4180 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4183 — a use the Court would later hold was not
<quote>fair.
</quote> By
4184 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4185 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4186 copyrightowners,
</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would
<quote>take from the
4187 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4188 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4189 profit from its reproduction.
</quote><footnote><para>
4191 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4196 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4197 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4198 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4199 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the
<quote>Hollywood
4200 Circuit
</quote>—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4201 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4202 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4203 called
<quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry
</quote> (worse
4204 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4205 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4206 technology.
<footnote><para>
4208 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4211 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4214 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4217 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4218 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4223 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4224 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4226 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4228 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4229 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4231 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4233 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4238 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4239 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4240 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4241 enough, this
<quote>taking
</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4242 together, a pattern is clear:
4245 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4246 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4250 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS
<quote>PIRATED
</quote></entry>
4251 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4252 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4257 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4258 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4259 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4260 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4263 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4264 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4266 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4269 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4270 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4271 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4272 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4276 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4277 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4278 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4285 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4286 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4288 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4289 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4290 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4291 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4292 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4293 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4294 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4295 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4296 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,
</quote>
4297 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4298 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
4299 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4301 In each case, throughout our history,
4302 that change meant that someone got a
<quote>free ride
</quote> on someone else's
4306 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4307 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4308 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4309 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4310 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
4311 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4312 the behavior of the
<quote>pirates.
</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4313 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4318 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4319 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4320 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4321 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4322 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4324 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4325 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4326 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4327 permission to record a song?
4330 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4331 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4332 copyright
<quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4333 over all possible uses of his work.
</quote><footnote><para>
4335 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4338 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4339 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4340 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4341 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4342 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4343 facilitate the distribution of content.
4346 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4347 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4348 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4349 should not become a tool for
<quote>stealing
</quote> from artists. But neither
4350 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4351 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4352 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4353 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4354 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4355 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4356 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4357 public interest that innovation continue.
4361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4362 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4363 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4364 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4365 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4366 efficient. Yet these
<quote>potential public benefits,
</quote> as John Schwartz
4367 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
<quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4368 fight.
</quote><footnote><para>
4370 John Schwartz,
<quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4371 Echoes Past Efforts,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4373 Yet when anyone begins to talk about
<quote>balance,
</quote> the copyright warriors
4374 raise a different argument.
<quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4375 incentives,
</quote> they say,
<quote>misses a fundamental point. Our content,
</quote> the
4376 warriors insist,
<quote>is our
<emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we
4377 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4378 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4379 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4380 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4384 <quote>It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>,
</quote> the warriors
4385 insist.
<quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4386 is protected.
</quote>
4388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4392 <part id=
"c-property">
4393 <title><quote>PROPERTY
</quote></title>
4397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4398 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4399 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4400 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4401 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4402 the price she can get.
4405 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a
<quote>property
</quote> right is a
4406 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4407 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4408 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4409 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4410 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4411 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4412 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4413 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4417 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4418 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4420 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4422 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4423 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4424 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4425 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4426 when I copy the way someone else dresses),
<quote>He who receives an idea
4427 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4428 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
</quote><footnote><para>
4430 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4431 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4432 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4436 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4437 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4438 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4440 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4444 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4445 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4446 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4447 <quote>property
</quote> in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4449 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4450 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4451 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4452 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4453 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4454 Adam Mossoff,
<quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,
</quote>
4455 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4459 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4460 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4461 <quote>copyright material is property
</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4462 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4463 these stories, the significance of this true
4464 statement
—<quote>copyright material is property
</quote>— will be a bit
4465 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4466 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4471 <chapter label=
"6" id=
"founders">
4472 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4473 <indexterm><primary>Henry V
</primary></indexterm>
4474 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4476 William Shakespeare wrote
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play
4477 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4478 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4479 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4480 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4481 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4482 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4483 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V:
<quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare
4484 is so full of clichés.
</quote>
4487 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4488 <quote>copy-right
</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4489 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4491 <indexterm><primary>Jonson, Ben
</primary></indexterm>
4492 <indexterm><primary>Dryden, John
</primary></indexterm>
4493 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4494 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4495 handsome
<quote>definitive editions
</quote> of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4496 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4497 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4498 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker,
<quote>Jacob Tonson,
4499 Bookseller,
</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4501 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4502 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4504 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4505 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4507 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4508 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the
<quote>copy
</quote> of
4509 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4512 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4513 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4514 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4517 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4518 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4519 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4520 adopted the first
<quote>copyright
</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4521 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4522 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4523 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4524 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4526 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4527 <quote>copyright law.
</quote> See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4528 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4529 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4530 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4531 Tonson's control in
1774?
4534 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
<quote>copyright
</quote>
4535 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4536 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4537 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4538 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4539 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4540 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4541 that the publishers, or
<quote>Stationers,
</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4543 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4546 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4547 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4548 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4549 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4550 from legislatures
<quote>positive law.
</quote> We call the words from judges
4551 <quote>common law.
</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4552 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4553 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4554 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4555 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4558 This question was important to the publishers, or
<quote>booksellers,
</quote> as
4559 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4560 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4561 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4564 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4565 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4567 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4570 The Statute of Anne granted the author or
<quote>proprietor
</quote> of a book an
4571 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4572 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4573 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4574 copyright
<quote>expired,
</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4575 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4579 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4580 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4581 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4582 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4585 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4586 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4587 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4588 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4589 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4590 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4591 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4592 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4593 reason is there to allow someone else to
<quote>steal
</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4596 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4597 about the notion of
<quote>copyright
</quote> that existed at the time of the
4598 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4599 <quote>booksellers.
</quote>
4602 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4603 to apply the concept of
<quote>copyright
</quote> ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4604 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4605 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4606 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was a right
4607 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4608 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4611 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4612 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4613 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4614 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4616 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4618 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4619 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4620 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4621 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4622 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4623 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4624 allowed to make his films. The
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was only an exclusive
4625 right to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4627 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England
</primary></indexterm>
4628 <indexterm><primary>Statute of Monopolies (
1656)
</primary></indexterm>
4630 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4631 They had had a long and ugly experience with
<quote>exclusive rights,
</quote>
4632 especially
<quote>exclusive rights
</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4633 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4634 monopolies
—especially monopolies for works that already
4635 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4636 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4637 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the
4638 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4639 inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4640 monopoly in publishing.
4643 Thus the
<quote>copy-right,
</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4644 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4645 claim that
<quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,
</quote> try
4646 sounding convincing when uttering,
<quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4647 have it forever.
</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4648 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4649 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4652 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4653 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4654 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4655 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4658 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4659 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4660 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4661 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as
<quote>old patentees
4662 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling
</quote>; they were
<quote>men who do
4663 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4664 indetted.
</quote><footnote><para>
4667 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4668 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4672 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4673 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4674 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4675 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4676 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4680 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4681 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4682 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4683 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4684 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4685 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4687 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4688 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4689 construction and spread of culture.
4692 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4693 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4694 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4695 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4696 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4697 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4698 they said; they needed more time.
4701 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4702 words that echo today,
4706 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4707 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4709 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4710 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4711 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4712 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4713 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4714 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4716 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4717 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4718 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4719 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4720 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4721 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4722 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4727 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4728 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4729 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4730 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4731 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4732 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4733 creative
<quote>property
</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4734 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4735 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4736 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4737 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4738 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4739 way to protect authors.
4742 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4743 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4744 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4745 <quote>The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4746 rancher has for cattle.
</quote><footnote><para>
4748 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4749 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4750 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4751 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4753 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4754 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4757 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4758 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4759 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4761 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4762 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4766 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4767 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4768 reprints
<quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,
</quote> at least
4769 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4771 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4773 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
4775 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4777 and became
<quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.
</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4778 them,
</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was
<quote>the young James Boswell
4779 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4780 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.
</quote><footnote><para>
4784 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4785 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4788 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4789 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4790 inexpensive editions
<quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4791 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4792 Property.
</quote><footnote><para>
4794 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4797 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4798 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4799 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4802 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block
<quote>piracy
</quote> like
4803 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the
<quote>pirates,
</quote>
4804 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4806 <indexterm><primary>Taylor, Robert
</primary></indexterm>
4808 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4809 Thomson's poem
<quote>The Seasons.
</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4810 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4811 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4812 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4813 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4815 Howard B. Abrams,
<quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4816 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4820 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4821 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4824 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4825 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4826 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4827 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4828 law would protect the author against subsequent
<quote>pirates.
</quote>
4829 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4830 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4831 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4832 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4835 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4836 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4837 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4838 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4839 with in
1710: How best to limit
4840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4841 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4842 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4843 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4844 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4845 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4846 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4848 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4850 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4851 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4853 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4855 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4856 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4857 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4861 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4862 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4863 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4864 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4865 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4866 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4869 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4870 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4871 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4872 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4873 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4874 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4875 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4876 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4879 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4880 presented to the House and voted upon first by the
<quote>law lords,
</quote>
4881 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4882 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4883 House of Lords generally voted.
4886 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4887 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4889 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4890 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4891 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4892 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4893 passed into the public domain.
4896 <quote>The public domain.
</quote> Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4897 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4898 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4899 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4900 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4901 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4902 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4903 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4904 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4905 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4906 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4907 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4908 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4911 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4912 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4913 where most of the
<quote>pirate publishers
</quote> did their work, people
4914 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4915 reported,
<quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4916 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4917 decision of which so many individuals were interested.
</quote> <quote>Great
4918 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4919 and illuminations.
</quote><footnote><para>
4925 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4926 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4931 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4932 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4933 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4934 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4935 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4936 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4937 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4938 successors.
<footnote><para>
4945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4946 <quote>Ruined
</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4947 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4948 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4949 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4950 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4951 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4952 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4953 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4954 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4955 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4956 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4957 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4958 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4959 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4960 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4961 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4962 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4963 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4964 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4967 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4968 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4969 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4974 <chapter label=
"7" id=
"recorders">
4975 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4977 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4978 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4979 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4980 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4984 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4985 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4989 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4990 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4991 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4992 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4993 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4995 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4998 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4999 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
5000 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
5001 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
5002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5003 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5007 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5008 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
5009 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5010 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5011 unless
<quote>fair use
</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5014 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5015 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5016 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5017 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5018 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5019 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5022 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5023 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5024 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5025 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5026 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5027 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5030 Then, as Else told me,
<quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5031 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
5032 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.
</quote>
5033 And second, Fox
<quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5034 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
5035 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.
</quote>
5037 <indexterm><primary>Herrera, Rebecca
</primary></indexterm>
5039 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5040 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5041 explained to her,
<quote>There must be some mistake here.
… We're
5042 asking for your educational rate on this.
</quote> That was the educational
5043 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5044 confirm what he had been told.
5047 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>Yes, you
5048 have your facts straight,
</quote> she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
5049 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5053 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
<quote>And
5054 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.
</quote> As an assistant
5055 to Herrera told Else later on,
<quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5059 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5060 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5061 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5062 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5063 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5064 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5065 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5066 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
5069 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5070 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5071 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5072 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5073 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5074 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5075 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5076 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5077 says the owner gets to control.
5080 For example,
<quote>public performance
</quote> is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
5081 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5082 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see
<quote>My
5083 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>,
</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5084 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5085 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5089 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5090 thought is
<quote>fair use.
</quote><footnote><para>
5092 For an excellent argument that such use is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> but that
5093 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> see Richard
5094 A. Posner with William F. Patry,
<quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5095 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5096 Law School,
5 August
2003.
5098 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>
5099 episode is clearly a fair use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>—and fair use does
5100 not require the permission of anyone.
5103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5104 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon
<quote>fair use.
</quote> Here's his reply:
5108 The
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5109 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5110 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5111 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was
<quote>clearly
5112 fair use
</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5113 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5115 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5118 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5119 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5120 <quote>visual cue sheet
</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5121 shot in the film. They take a dim view of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and a claim of
5122 <quote>fair use
</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5125 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle></primary></indexterm>
5128 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5129 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5130 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5131 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5132 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5133 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5134 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5135 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5137 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5141 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5142 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5143 that Fox would
<quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5144 life,
</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5145 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5146 pockets, me or them.
5147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5151 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5152 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5158 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5159 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5160 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5161 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5162 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5163 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5166 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5167 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5168 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5169 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5174 <chapter label=
"8" id=
"transformers">
5175 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5176 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5177 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'
>
5178 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
5180 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary></indexterm>
5182 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5183 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5184 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5185 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5186 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5188 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'
>
5189 <primary>artists
</primary>
5190 <secondary>retrospective compilations on
</secondary>
5193 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5194 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5195 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5196 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5197 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5198 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5199 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5200 important to his career.
5203 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5204 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5205 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5206 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5210 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5211 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5212 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5213 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5214 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5217 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips.
<quote>Our
5218 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5219 Eastwood's films,
</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5220 arose.
<quote>No one had ever really done this before,
</quote> Alben explained.
<quote>No
5221 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5222 actor's career.
</quote>
5225 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5226 Slade asked,
<quote>Well, what will it take?
</quote>
5229 Alben replied,
<quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5230 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5231 else that we want to use in these film clips.
</quote> Slade said,
<quote>Great! Go
5232 for it.
</quote><footnote>
5235 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5236 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5237 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden
<quote>Rip, Mix,
5238 Burn
</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5240 <primary>artists
</primary>
5241 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5243 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5247 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5248 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5249 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5250 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5251 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5254 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5255 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5256 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5260 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5261 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5262 course we were going to use the
<quote>Make my day
</quote> clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5263 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5264 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5265 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5269 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5270 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5271 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5272 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5273 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5274 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5275 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5276 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5277 started calling people.
5280 <indexterm><primary>Sutherland, Donald
</primary></indexterm>
5282 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5283 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5284 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5285 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5286 know, $
1,
200?
</quote> And they would say,
<quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5287 to get $
1,
200.
</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5288 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5289 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5293 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—<quote>and even then we
5294 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.
</quote>
5297 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5298 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5299 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5303 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5304 hands and said,
<quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5305 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5306 actors.
</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5307 constituent parts and said,
<quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5308 directors,
… this many musicians,
</quote> and we just went at it very
5309 systematically and cleared the rights.
5314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5315 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5316 loved it, and it sold very well.
5318 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5320 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5321 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5322 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped,
<quote>There is
5323 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5324 at all.
</quote><footnote><para>
5326 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5327 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5328 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5330 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5334 For, as he acknowledged,
<quote>very few
… have the time and resources,
5335 and the will to do this,
</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5336 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5337 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5338 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5342 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5343 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5344 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5345 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5346 compensated for that.
5350 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5351 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5352 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5353 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5354 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5355 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5356 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5357 made to be more clean?
5361 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5362 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5363 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5364 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5366 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5367 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5368 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5369 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5370 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5371 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5372 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5373 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5374 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say,
<quote>Oh, I
5375 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5376 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5377 money,
</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5381 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5382 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5383 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5384 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5385 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5387 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'
/>
5389 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5390 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5391 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5392 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5393 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5394 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5395 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5396 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5397 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5398 <quote>Does this still make sense?
</quote>
5400 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'
/>
5402 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5403 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5404 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5405 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5408 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5409 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5412 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5413 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5414 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5415 judges loved every minute of it.
5417 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5419 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5420 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5421 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5422 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5423 began his talk with a question:
<quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5424 were just violated in this room?
</quote>
5426 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5427 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5429 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5430 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5431 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5432 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5433 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5434 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5435 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5436 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5437 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5438 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5439 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5440 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5441 couldn't easily do them legally.
5444 We live in a
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5445 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5446 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5447 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5448 planted in your presentation.
5450 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5452 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5454 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5455 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5456 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5457 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5458 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5459 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5460 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5463 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5464 wanted to be
<quote>legal,
</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5465 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5466 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5467 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5470 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5471 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5472 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5473 necessarily requiring that the
<quote>free
</quote> use be free as in
<quote>free beer.
</quote>
5474 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5475 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5476 along: a rule, for example, that says
<quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5477 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5478 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5479 copyright owner.
</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5480 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5481 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5485 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5486 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5487 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5488 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5491 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5492 Myers, the comic genius of
<citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5494 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5495 would work together to form a
<quote>unique filmmaking pact.
</quote> Under the
5496 agreement, DreamWorks
<quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5497 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5498 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5499 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5500 entertainment.
</quote>
5503 The announcement called this
<quote>film sampling.
</quote> As Myers explained,
5504 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5505 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5506 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5507 to take that same concept and apply it to film.
</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5508 quoted as saying,
<quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5509 new audiences, it is Mike.
</quote>
5512 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5513 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5514 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5515 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5516 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5517 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5518 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5519 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5522 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5523 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of
<quote>fair use.
</quote>
5524 Much of
<quote>sampling
</quote> should be considered
<quote>fair use.
</quote> But few would
5525 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5526 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5527 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5528 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5529 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5530 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5531 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5532 curse, reserved for the few.
5534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5536 <chapter label=
"9" id=
"collectors">
5537 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5538 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'
>
5539 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
5542 In April
1996, millions of
<quote>bots
</quote>—computer codes designed to
5543 <quote>spider,
</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5544 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5545 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5546 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5547 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5548 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5551 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5552 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5553 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5554 the world. Using a technology called
<quote>the Way Back Machine,
</quote> you could
5555 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5556 well as when those pages changed.
5558 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'
>
5559 <primary>Orwell, George
</primary>
5562 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5563 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5564 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5565 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5570 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5571 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5572 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5575 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5576 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5577 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5578 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5579 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5581 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'
/>
5583 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5584 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5585 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5586 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5587 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5589 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
5590 <indexterm><primary>White House press releases
</primary></indexterm>
5591 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5592 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5593 press release stated,
<quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.
</quote> That was
5594 later changed, without notice, to
<quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5595 Have Ended.
</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5598 <indexterm><primary>history, records of
</primary></indexterm>
5600 <emphasis role=
"strong">We take it
</emphasis> for granted that we can
5601 go back to see what we remember reading. Think about newspapers. If
5602 you wanted to study the reaction of your hometown newspaper to the
5603 race riots in Watts in
1965, or to Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963,
5604 you could go to your public library and look at the newspapers. Those
5605 papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in
5606 paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back and
5607 remember
—not just what it is convenient to remember, but
5608 remember something close to the truth.
5611 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5612 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5613 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5614 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5615 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5616 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5617 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5620 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5621 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5622 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5623 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5625 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5626 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5627 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5628 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5631 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5632 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5633 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5634 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5635 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5636 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5637 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5638 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5640 <indexterm><primary>Vanderbilt University
</primary></indexterm>
5642 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5643 human history. At the end of
2002, it held
<quote>two hundred and thirty
5644 terabytes of material
</quote>—and was
<quote>ten times larger than the
5645 Library of Congress.
</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5646 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5647 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5648 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5649 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5650 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5651 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5652 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5653 is available to scholars for a very low fee.
<quote>But other than that,
5654 [television] is almost unavailable,
</quote> Kahle told me.
<quote>If you were
5655 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5656 just a graduate student?
</quote> As Kahle put it,
5659 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
5661 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5662 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5663 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5664 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5665 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5668 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5669 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5673 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5674 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5675 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5676 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5677 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5678 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5681 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5682 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5683 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5684 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5685 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5689 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5690 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5691 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5692 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5693 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and
<quote>borrowed
5694 back.
</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5695 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5696 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5698 Doug Herrick,
<quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5699 the Library of Congress,
</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5700 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5701 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5706 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5707 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5708 broadcasts, so there was no fear of
<quote>theft.
</quote> But as technology enabled
5709 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5710 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5711 <quote>copyrighted.
</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5712 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5713 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5714 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5717 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5719 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5720 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5721 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5722 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5723 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5724 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5727 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5729 <primary>archive.org
</primary>
5730 <seealso>Internet Archive
</seealso>
5733 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5734 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 <quote>ephemeral films
</quote> (meaning
5735 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5736 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5737 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5738 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5739 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5740 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5741 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5742 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5743 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5744 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5745 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
<quote>Duck and Cover
</quote> film
5746 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5747 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5748 few minutes
—for free.
5751 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5752 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5753 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5754 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5755 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5759 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5760 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5761 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5762 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5763 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5764 has
—a noncommercial life.
5767 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5768 of creative property goes through different
<quote>lives.
</quote> In its first
5771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5772 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5773 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5774 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5775 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5776 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5779 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5780 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5781 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5782 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5783 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5784 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5788 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5789 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5791 Dave Barns,
<quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5792 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5793 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5794 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5795 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5796 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5797 </para></footnote>). After
5798 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5799 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5800 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5801 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5802 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5805 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5806 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5807 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5808 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5809 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5810 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5811 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5812 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5816 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5817 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5818 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5819 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5820 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5823 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5824 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5825 little practical effect.
5828 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5829 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5830 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5831 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5832 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5833 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5836 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5837 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5838 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5843 <primary>books
</primary>
5844 <secondary>total number of
</secondary>
5847 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5848 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5849 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5850 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5851 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5852 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5853 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5854 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5855 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5856 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5857 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5861 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5862 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5863 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5864 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5865 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5866 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5867 will draw upon it to understand it;
5868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5869 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5870 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5871 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5872 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5873 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5876 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5877 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5878 call these
<quote>archives,
</quote> as warm as the idea of a
<quote>library
</quote> might seem,
5879 the
<quote>content
</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5880 someone's
<quote>property.
</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5881 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5883 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'
/>
5884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5886 <chapter label=
"10" id=
"property-i">
5887 <title>CHAPTER TEN:
<quote>Property
</quote></title>
5889 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5890 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5891 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5892 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5893 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5894 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5895 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5896 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5897 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5900 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5901 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5902 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5903 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5904 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5905 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5906 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5907 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5908 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5910 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5911 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5912 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5913 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5914 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5915 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5916 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5919 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5920 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5921 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5922 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5923 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5924 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5925 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5926 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5927 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5928 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5932 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5933 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5934 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5935 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5936 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5937 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5938 redefine the meaning of
<quote>creative property.
</quote>
5941 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5946 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5947 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5948 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5949 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5950 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5951 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5952 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5953 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5955 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5956 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5957 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5958 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5959 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5965 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5966 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5967 <quote>central theme
</quote> to which
<quote>reasonable men and women
</quote> will return is
5969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5970 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5971 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.
</quote>
5972 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5973 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5976 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5977 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5978 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5979 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
5980 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5981 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5982 it comes to the nature and scope of
<quote>creative property.
</quote> His views
5983 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5984 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5985 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5988 While
<quote>creative property
</quote> is certainly
<quote>property
</quote> in a nerdy and
5989 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5991 Lawyers speak of
<quote>property
</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5992 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5993 object. Thus, my
<quote>property right
</quote> to my car gives me the right to
5994 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5995 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of
<quote>property
</quote> to
5996 <quote>lawyer talk,
</quote> see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
5997 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5998 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5999 <quote>creative property owners
</quote> have been
<quote>accorded the same rights and
6000 protection resident in all other property owners.
</quote> Indeed, if creative
6001 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
6002 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
6006 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
6007 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6008 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6009 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
6010 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6011 culture would develop.
6014 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6015 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
6016 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6017 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
6018 differently from the rights resident in all other property
6019 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
6020 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
6021 the same would be to
6023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6024 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6025 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6029 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6030 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6031 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6032 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6033 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6034 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6035 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
6036 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
6037 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
6038 Constitution itself.
6041 The framers of our Constitution loved
<quote>property.
</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6042 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6043 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
6044 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6045 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's
<quote>Takings
6046 Clause,
</quote> to pay you
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for that taking. The
6047 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6048 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
6049 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6052 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6053 Valenti calls
<quote>creative property.
</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6054 power to create
<quote>creative property,
</quote> the Constitution
6055 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a
<quote>limited time,
</quote> Congress
6056 take back the rights that it has granted and set the
<quote>creative
6057 property
</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6058 the expiration of a copyright term
<quote>takes
</quote> your copyright and turns it
6059 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6060 pay
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for this
<quote>taking.
</quote> Instead, the same
6061 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6063 requires that you lose your
<quote>creative property
</quote> right without any
6064 compensation at all.
6067 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6068 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6069 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6070 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6071 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6072 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6076 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6077 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6078 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6079 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6080 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6081 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
6082 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6083 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6084 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6085 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6088 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6089 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6090 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6091 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6092 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6096 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6097 history of these
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights, and the control that they
6098 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6099 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6100 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
6101 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6102 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6103 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6104 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6105 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6106 also control how culture develops.
6110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6111 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6112 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6113 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6114 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6115 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6116 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6117 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6119 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6120 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6121 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6124 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6125 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6126 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6127 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6128 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6129 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6130 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6131 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6132 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6133 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6134 Web, you can be punished
6135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6136 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6137 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6138 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6140 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6142 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6143 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6144 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6145 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6146 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6147 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6148 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6149 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6150 the source of the enforcement.
6152 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6154 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6155 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6156 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6157 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6158 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6159 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6160 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6161 individual or group might behave.
6163 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6165 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6166 <quote>architecture
</quote>—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6167 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6168 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6169 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6170 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6171 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6172 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6173 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6174 theft, but by nature, by
<quote>architecture.
</quote> If a
500-pound boulder
6175 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6176 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6177 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6182 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6183 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6184 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6185 undermined by another.
6188 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6189 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6190 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6191 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6192 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6193 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6194 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6196 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6197 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6199 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6200 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6201 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6203 So, for example, consider the
<quote>freedom
</quote> to drive a car at a high
6204 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6205 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6206 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6207 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6208 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6209 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6210 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6211 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6212 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6213 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6214 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6217 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6218 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6219 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6221 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6222 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6223 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6224 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6225 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6226 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6227 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>The New Chicago School,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6230 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6231 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6232 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6233 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6234 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6235 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6236 used to require that other laws be more
6237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6238 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6239 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6242 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6244 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6245 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6246 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6248 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6250 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6251 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6252 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6253 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6254 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6258 Some people object to this way of talking about
<quote>liberty.
</quote> They object
6259 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6260 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6261 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6262 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6263 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6264 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6265 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6266 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6267 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6268 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6269 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a
6270 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6271 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6272 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6273 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6274 <citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6275 1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6276 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons,
<quote>The
6277 Right to Work,
</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6278 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6279 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6280 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6281 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6282 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6283 12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6284 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6285 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6286 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6287 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990)
</primary></indexterm>
6288 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6289 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6290 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6293 <section id=
"hollywood">
6294 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6296 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6297 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6298 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6299 rallying makes sense.
6302 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6305 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6306 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6307 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6309 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6310 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6313 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6314 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6315 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6316 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6317 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6318 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6319 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6320 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6321 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6322 this form of infringement.
6325 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6326 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6327 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6328 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6329 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6330 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6333 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6334 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6335 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6336 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6339 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6340 looting that results.
6342 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6343 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6344 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6347 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6348 warriors. Indeed, in a
<quote>White Paper
</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6349 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6350 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6351 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6352 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6353 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6354 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6355 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6356 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6358 <indexterm><primary>steel industry
</primary></indexterm>
6360 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6361 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6362 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6363 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6364 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6365 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6366 life. Homeowners living in a
6368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6369 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6370 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6371 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6372 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6373 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6374 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6377 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6378 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6379 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6380 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6381 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6382 Brown describes it, its
<quote>architecture of revenue.
</quote>
6384 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry
</primary></indexterm>
6385 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
6387 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6388 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6389 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6390 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6391 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6392 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6393 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6395 See Geoffrey Smith,
<quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?
</quote>
6396 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6397 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6398 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6399 R. Schoenberger,
<quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?
</quote> Forbes.com,
6
6400 October
2003, available at
6401 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6404 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6405 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6406 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6407 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6408 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6409 weakened the
<quote>stickiness
</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6410 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6411 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6412 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6413 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6414 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6416 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
6417 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6419 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6420 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6421 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6423 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6424 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6425 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6426 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents,
<quote>established companies
6427 have an interest in excluding future competitors.
</quote><footnote><para>
6429 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6432 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6433 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6434 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6435 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6436 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6440 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6441 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6442 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6443 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6444 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6445 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6446 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6447 opportunities for innovation and change.
6450 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6451 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6452 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6453 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6454 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6455 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6456 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6457 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution:
<quote>Congress
6458 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech.
</quote> So when
6459 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would
<quote>abridge
</quote> the freedom
6460 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6461 regulation is justified.
6464 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6466 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6467 <quote>justified.
</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6468 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6469 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6470 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6473 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6475 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6476 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6479 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6480 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6481 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6482 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6483 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6484 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6487 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6488 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6489 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6491 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6492 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6494 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6495 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6496 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6497 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6500 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6501 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6502 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6503 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6504 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6505 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6506 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6508 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James
</primary></indexterm>
6510 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6511 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an
<quote>environmentalism
</quote> for
6512 culture.
<footnote><para>
6514 See, for example, James Boyle,
<quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6515 Environmentalism for the Net?
</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6517 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6518 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6519 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6520 <quote>for free.
</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6521 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6522 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6524 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6525 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6526 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6527 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6528 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6531 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6532 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6533 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6534 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6535 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6536 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6537 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6538 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6539 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6542 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6543 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6546 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6548 <section id=
"beginnings">
6549 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6551 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6552 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
<quote>creative
6553 property
</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6554 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6557 The power to establish
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights is granted to
6558 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6559 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6562 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6563 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6564 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6567 We can call this the
<quote>Progress Clause,
</quote> for notice what this clause
6568 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6569 <quote>creative property rights.
</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6570 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6571 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6572 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6575 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6576 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6577 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6578 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6579 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6580 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6581 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6582 copyrights extend
<quote>to Authors
</quote> only.
6585 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6586 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6587 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6588 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6589 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6590 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6591 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6592 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6593 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6594 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6595 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6596 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6597 concentrations of power.
6600 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
<quote>copyright
</quote>
6601 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6602 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6603 <quote>copyright
</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6604 years since they first struck its design.
6607 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6608 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6610 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6613 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6614 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6615 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6620 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6621 <title><quote>Copyright
</quote> today.
</title>
6622 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6629 <section id=
"lawduration">
6630 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6632 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6633 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6634 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6635 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6636 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6637 authorship.
<footnote>
6640 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6641 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6642 485–86:
<quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6643 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6644 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis></quote>
6646 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6648 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6649 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6650 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6651 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6652 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6653 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6656 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6657 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6658 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6659 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6660 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6661 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6664 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6665 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6666 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6667 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6668 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6671 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6672 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6673 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6674 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6675 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6676 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6677 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6679 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6680 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel,
<citetitle>A
6681 History of Book Publishing in the United States
</citetitle>, vol.
1,
<citetitle>The Creation
6682 of an Industry,
1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6683 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6684 1790 act; William J. Maher,
<citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6685 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context
</citetitle>,
7–10 (
2002),
6686 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6687 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6688 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6689 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6690 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6691 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6692 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6695 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6696 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6698 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6699 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6700 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6704 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6705 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6706 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6707 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6708 domain.
<footnote><para>
6710 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6711 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6712 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6713 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
<quote>Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
</quote>
6714 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright
</citetitle>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6715 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6716 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote>
6717 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6718 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6721 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6722 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6723 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6725 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6726 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6727 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6728 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6729 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6730 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6733 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6734 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6735 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6736 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6737 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6738 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6741 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6742 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6743 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6744 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6745 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6746 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6747 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6748 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6751 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6752 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6753 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6754 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6756 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6757 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6758 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6759 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6762 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6763 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6764 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6765 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6766 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6767 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6768 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6772 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6773 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6774 maximum term. For
<quote>natural
</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6775 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6776 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6777 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6778 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6779 was ninety-five years.
6782 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6783 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6784 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6785 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6786 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6787 that terms be
<quote>limited,
</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6791 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6792 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6793 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6794 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6795 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6796 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6797 years.
<footnote><para>
6799 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6800 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6801 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6802 Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote> loc. cit.
6805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6807 <section id=
"lawscope">
6808 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6810 The
<quote>scope
</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6811 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6812 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6813 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6816 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only
<quote>maps,
6817 charts, and books.
</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6818 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6819 the author the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> copyrighted works. That
6820 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6821 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6822 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6823 did not extend to what lawyers call
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> It would not,
6824 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6825 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6826 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6829 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6830 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6831 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6832 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6833 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6834 work not only the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> the work, but also the
6835 exclusive right of control over any
<quote>copies
</quote> of that work. And most
6836 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6837 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6838 <quote>derivative work
</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6839 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6840 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6841 on the initial creative work.
6844 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6845 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6846 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6848 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6849 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6850 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6851 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6852 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6853 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6854 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6858 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6859 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6860 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6861 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6862 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6863 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6864 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6865 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6866 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6867 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6868 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6872 All of these
<quote>formalities
</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6873 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6874 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6875 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6876 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6877 copy available for others to copy.
6880 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6884 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6885 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6886 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6887 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6888 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6889 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6891 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner,
<quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6892 Creation of American Literature,
</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6893 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6894 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6897 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6898 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6899 the United States
—publishers.
6902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6903 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6904 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6905 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6906 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6907 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6908 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6912 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6913 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6914 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6915 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6916 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6917 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6921 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6922 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6923 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6926 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6928 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6929 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of
<quote>derivative
6930 rights.
</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6931 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6932 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6933 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6934 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6936 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6937 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6940 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6941 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6943 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6945 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6946 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6947 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6948 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6952 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6953 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6954 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6955 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6956 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6957 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6958 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6959 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6960 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6962 Jonathan Zittrain,
<quote>The Copyright Cage,
</quote> <citetitle>Legal
6963 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
6964 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6965 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6967 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6968 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6969 the wrong of direct piracy.
6972 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6973 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6974 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6975 of my book.
<footnote><para>
6977 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6978 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6979 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere
<quote>copies
</quote> and
6980 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld,
<quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
6981 Copyright's Constitutionality,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
6982 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
6984 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb
</primary></indexterm>
6986 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6989 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6990 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6991 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6992 called
<quote>Mickey Mouse,
</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6993 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6997 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6998 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6999 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
7000 the rights originally granted.
7003 <section id=
"lawreach">
7004 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
7006 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7007 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7008 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7009 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
7011 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
7012 certainly regulates more than
<quote>copies
</quote>—a public performance of a
7013 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
7014 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7015 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a
<quote>copy
</quote>;
17
7016 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
7017 existing law (which regulates
<quote>copies;
</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7018 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7023 <quote>Copies.
</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
7024 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
7025 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that
<quote>creative
7026 property
</quote> deserves the
<quote>same rights
</quote> as all other property, it is the
7027 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7028 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7029 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7030 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7031 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7032 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
7033 the trigger for copyright law.
7036 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7037 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7038 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7039 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
7041 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7042 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7043 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7044 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7047 because it is clear that the
7048 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7049 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7052 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7055 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
7056 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
7057 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
7060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7061 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7062 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7063 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7064 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7065 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7066 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7067 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7068 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7069 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7070 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7071 acts do not make a copy.
7073 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
7074 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
7075 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
7078 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7079 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7080 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7081 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7082 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7083 diagram on next page).
7086 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7087 that remain unregulated because the law considers these
<quote>fair uses.
</quote>
7089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7090 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
7091 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
7092 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
7095 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7096 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7097 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7098 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7099 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7100 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7101 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such
<quote>fair uses
</quote>
7102 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7104 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7105 <title>Unregulated copying considered
<quote>fair uses.
</quote></title>
7106 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7109 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7110 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7111 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7115 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7116 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7117 are nonetheless deemed
<quote>fair
</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7120 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7121 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7123 I don't mean
<quote>nature
</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7124 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7125 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7126 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7129 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7130 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7131 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7132 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7133 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7134 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7135 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7136 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7137 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7141 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7142 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7143 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7144 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7145 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7146 the book once, ten times, or every
7147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7148 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7149 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7150 none of those uses produced a copy.
7153 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7154 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7155 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7156 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7157 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7158 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7159 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7160 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7161 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7162 copyright owner's wish.
7165 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7166 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7167 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7168 points also become clear:
7171 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7172 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7173 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7174 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7175 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7176 part of free culture before the Internet.
7179 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7180 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7181 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7182 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7183 using a machine.
<quote>Copy and paste
</quote> and
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> become
7184 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7185 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7186 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7187 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7191 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7194 burden on category
3 (
<quote>fair use
</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7195 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7196 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7197 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7198 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7199 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7200 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7201 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7205 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7206 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7207 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7208 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7209 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7210 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7211 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7214 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'
>
7215 <primary>advertising
</primary>
7218 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7219 in the business of making
<quote>trailer
</quote> advertisements for movies available
7220 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7221 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7222 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7225 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7226 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7227 previews. The idea was to expand their
<quote>selling by sampling
</quote>
7228 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7229 <quote>browsing.
</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7230 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7231 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7234 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7235 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7236 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7237 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7239 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7240 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7241 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7242 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7243 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7244 <quote>fair use
</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7245 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7249 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7250 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had
<quote>willfully
7251 infringed
</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7252 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7253 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7254 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7255 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7256 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7259 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7260 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7261 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7262 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7263 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7264 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7265 Disney's permission.
7267 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'
/>
7269 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7270 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7271 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7272 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7273 was in the marketplace, the
<quote>first-sale doctrine
</quote> would free the
7274 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7275 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7276 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7277 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7278 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7279 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7280 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7282 <indexterm><primary>Barnes
& Noble
</primary></indexterm>
7284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7285 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7286 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7287 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7288 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7289 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7290 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7291 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7292 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7293 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7294 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7295 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7296 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7297 happening are quite slight.
7300 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7301 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7302 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7303 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7304 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7305 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7308 <section id=
"lawforce">
7309 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7311 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7312 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7313 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7314 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7317 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7318 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7319 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7320 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7321 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7324 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7325 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7326 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7328 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7329 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7332 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7333 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7335 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7336 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7337 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7338 plan.
<footnote><para>
7340 See David Lange,
<quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7341 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7345 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7346 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers
<quote>were brothers long before
7347 you were.
</quote><footnote><para>
7349 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7350 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7351 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7353 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7354 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7355 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7356 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7359 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7360 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7361 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7362 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7365 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7366 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7367 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7368 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7369 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7370 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7371 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7372 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7374 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7375 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7377 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7378 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7381 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7384 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7385 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7386 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7387 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7391 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7395 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7396 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7397 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7398 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7399 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7400 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7401 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7404 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7405 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7407 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7408 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7409 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7412 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7413 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7415 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7416 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7417 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7421 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7422 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7423 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7424 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7425 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7426 read aloud through the computer.
7429 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7430 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7431 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7432 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7434 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7435 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote></title>
7436 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7439 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7440 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7443 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7444 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote>.
</title>
7445 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7448 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7449 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7453 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7454 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>The Future of Ideas
</quote>.
</title>
7455 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7458 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7461 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7462 <quote>permissions
</quote>— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7463 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7464 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7465 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7466 power.
<footnote><para>
7468 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7469 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7470 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7471 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7472 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7473 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7474 subsequently acquired the book.
7476 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7477 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7478 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7479 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7480 control that the law would enable.
7483 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7484 within which the e-book
<quote>lives.
</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7485 permissions, they are not the sort of
<quote>permissions
</quote> that most of us
7486 deal with. When a teenager gets
<quote>permission
</quote> to stay out till
7487 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7488 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7489 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7490 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7491 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7492 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7493 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7494 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7495 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7496 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7501 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7502 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7503 you tried to type
<quote>Warner Brothers,
</quote> erased
<quote>Brothers
</quote> from the
7505 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7508 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7509 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7510 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7511 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7512 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7513 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7514 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7517 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7518 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7519 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7520 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7521 to defeat these protections as well?
7524 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7528 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7529 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7530 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7531 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7532 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7534 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7536 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7537 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>Alice's Adventures in
7538 Wonderland
</quote>.
</title>
7539 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7541 <beginpage pagenum=
"164"/>
7543 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7544 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7545 <quote>permissions
</quote> indicated, not allowed to
<quote>read aloud
</quote>!
7548 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7549 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7550 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7551 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7552 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7553 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7556 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7557 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7558 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7559 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7560 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7561 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7562 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7563 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7564 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7565 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7566 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7569 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7570 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7571 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7572 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7573 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7576 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7578 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7579 story of mine that makes the same point.
7581 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7582 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7584 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'
>
7585 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7587 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7588 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7589 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7592 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named
<quote>Aibo.
</quote> The Aibo
7593 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7594 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7597 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7598 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7599 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7600 <beginpage pagenum=
"165"/>
7601 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7602 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7603 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7606 <quote>Teach
</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7607 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7608 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7609 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7610 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7611 their computer
<quote>dog
</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7613 <indexterm><primary>hacks
</primary></indexterm>
7615 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7616 <citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7617 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7618 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7619 them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much more positive
7620 term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7621 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7622 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7623 old computer doesn't run, or
<quote>drive,
</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7624 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7625 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7629 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7630 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7631 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7632 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7636 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7637 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7638 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7639 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7640 than Sony had built.
7642 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7643 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'
/>
7644 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7646 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7647 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7648 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7649 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7653 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7654 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7655 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7656 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7657 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7658 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7659 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7662 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7663 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7664 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7665 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7666 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7667 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7668 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7669 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7670 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7673 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7675 See Pamela Samuelson,
<quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,
</quote>
7676 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
<quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7677 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,
</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7678 January
2002;
<quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7679 DMCA,
</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7680 Holland,
<quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,
</quote> <citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7681 May
2001; Janelle Brown,
<quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?
</quote> Salon.com,
7682 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<quote>Frequently Asked
7683 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case,
</quote> available at
7684 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7685 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7687 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7688 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7689 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7690 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7693 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7694 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7695 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7696 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7697 <quote>this music cannot be copied,
</quote> and have a computer respect that
7698 command. The technology was to be part of a
<quote>trusted system
</quote> of
7699 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7703 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7704 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7705 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7706 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7710 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7711 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7712 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7713 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7716 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7717 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7718 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7719 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7720 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7721 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7724 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7725 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7726 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7727 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7728 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7729 constituted, succeed.
7731 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7732 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7734 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'
>
7735 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7737 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7738 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7739 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7742 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7743 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7744 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7749 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7750 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7751 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7754 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7755 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'
/>
7756 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7758 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7759 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7760 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7764 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7766 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7767 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7768 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (
<quote>DMCA
</quote>).
7772 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7773 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7774 spreading such information an offense.
7777 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7778 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7779 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7780 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7781 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7782 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7783 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7784 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7785 protection for copyright owners.
7788 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7789 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7790 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7791 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7792 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7795 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7796 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7797 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7798 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7799 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7800 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7801 have been a copyright violation.
7803 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7804 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7806 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7807 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7810 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7811 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7812 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7813 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7814 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7815 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7816 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7818 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7819 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7822 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7823 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7824 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7825 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7826 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7827 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7829 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7831 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7832 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7833 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7834 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7835 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7836 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
<quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,
</quote>
7837 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7838 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7839 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7843 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7844 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7845 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7846 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7847 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7848 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the
<quote>Neighborhood
</quote>
7849 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7850 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7851 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7852 broadcasting has always been
<quote>You are an important person just the way
7853 you are. You can make healthy decisions.
</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7854 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7855 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7856 important.
<footnote><para>
7858 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7859 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7860 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7861 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7862 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7868 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7869 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7870 the VCR responsible.
7873 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7875 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7878 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7881 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7882 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7883 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7884 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7885 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7886 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7888 <indexterm id='idxhandguns' class='startofrange'
>
7889 <primary>handguns
</primary>
7892 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7894 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7895 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7896 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7899 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7900 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7901 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7903 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7905 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7906 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7907 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7908 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7909 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7910 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7912 <indexterm startref='idxhandguns' class='endofrange'
/>
7913 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7914 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7916 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7917 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7920 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7921 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7922 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7923 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7924 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7925 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7928 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7929 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7930 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7931 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7932 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7933 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7934 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7935 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7936 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7937 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7940 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7941 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7942 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7943 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7944 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7945 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7946 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7947 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7948 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7953 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7954 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7955 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7956 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7957 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7959 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet,
<quote>Legal Fictions,
7960 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7961 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7965 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7966 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7967 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7968 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7969 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7972 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7973 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7974 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7975 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7976 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7977 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7978 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7979 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7982 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7983 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7984 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7985 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7986 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7987 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7990 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
7991 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7993 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7994 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7995 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7996 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7997 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
8000 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
8001 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
8002 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
8003 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
8004 market for creative work, has become the single most important
8005 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
8006 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
8007 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
8011 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8012 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8013 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8014 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8015 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8018 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8019 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8020 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8021 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8022 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8023 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8024 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8025 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8029 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8033 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8034 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8035 ownership,
<quote>five companies control
85 percent of our media sources.
</quote><footnote><para>
8037 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8038 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
8039 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
8040 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8041 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
8042 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
8044 Lynette Holloway,
<quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8045 Slide,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
8047 The
<quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8048 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.
</quote><footnote><para>
8050 Molly Ivins,
<quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,
</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
8053 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
8054 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
8055 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
8056 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8057 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8060 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8061 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8063 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
8064 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8065 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
8066 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
8067 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
8068 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8071 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8072 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8073 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8074 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8075 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
8076 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
8077 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8078 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8079 protected
— by the market.
8082 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8083 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8084 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8085 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8089 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8090 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
8091 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8092 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8093 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8094 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8095 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8096 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8097 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8098 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
8100 James Fallows,
<quote>The Age of Murdoch,
</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
8102 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8107 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8108 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8109 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8110 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8112 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8113 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8114 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8118 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8119 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8123 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8124 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8125 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8126 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8129 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8130 integration may matter.
8132 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8133 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8134 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8136 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
8137 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8138 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8139 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8140 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8143 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8144 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8145 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8146 control.
<footnote><para>
8148 Leonard Hill,
<quote>The Axis of Access,
</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8149 Forum,
<quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,
</quote> St. Louis,
8150 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8151 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8152 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8153 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8159 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8160 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8161 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8162 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
8163 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8164 television
—75 percent of it
—was
<quote>independent
</quote> of the
8168 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8169 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8170 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8171 2002, only five independent television studios remained.
<quote>In
1992,
8172 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8173 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8174 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent.
</quote> <quote>In
1992,
16
8175 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8176 year there was one.
</quote><footnote><para>
8178 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8179 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8180 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8181 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8182 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8183 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8184 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8187 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8188 that ran it.
<quote>In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8189 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8190 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8191 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8192 63%.
</quote><footnote><para>
8197 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8199 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8200 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8201 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8202 owned by the network.
8205 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8206 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8207 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8208 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8209 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8213 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8214 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8215 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8216 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8218 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8219 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8220 handful.
<footnote><para>
8222 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,
</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8223 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8224 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8229 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8230 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8231 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8232 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8233 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8234 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8235 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8236 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8237 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8240 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8242 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8243 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the
<quote>Innovator's
8244 Dilemma
</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8245 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8246 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8247 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8249 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8250 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8251 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8252 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8253 Kim B. Clark,
<quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8254 Concepts in Technological Evolution,
</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8255 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8256 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8257 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8258 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8260 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8261 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8263 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8266 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8267 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8268 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8272 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8273 suggest the concern.
8276 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8277 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8278 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8281 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8282 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8283 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8286 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8287 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8288 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8289 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8290 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8291 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8292 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8293 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8294 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8295 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8296 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8297 outweigh these costs.
8300 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8301 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8302 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8305 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'
>
8306 <primary>advertising
</primary>
8309 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8310 a media campaign as part of the
<quote>war on drugs.
</quote> The campaign produced
8311 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8312 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8313 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8314 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8315 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8316 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8317 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8318 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8321 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8322 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8325 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8326 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8327 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8331 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8333 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8334 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8335 message will be heard then?
8338 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8339 <quote>controversial
</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8340 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8341 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8342 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8343 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8344 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8345 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8346 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8348 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8349 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8350 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as
<quote>against
8351 [their] policy.
</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8352 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8353 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8354 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8355 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8356 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives,
<quote>On the Issue of
8357 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>New
8358 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8359 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8360 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown,
<quote>Ad
8361 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8362 Radio,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8363 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8364 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8365 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8366 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8367 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8368 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross,
<quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8369 After Muni Rejects Ad,
</quote> SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8370 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8371 was that the criticism was
<quote>too controversial.
</quote>
8372 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8373 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8374 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8375 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8376 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8377 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8378 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
8382 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8383 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8384 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8385 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8386 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8387 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8388 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8389 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8390 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8392 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'
/>
8394 <section id=
"together">
8395 <title>Together
</title>
8397 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8398 copyright warriors that the government should
<quote>protect my property.
</quote>
8399 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8400 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8403 But when we see how dramatically this
<quote>property
</quote> has changed
—
8404 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8405 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8406 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8410 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8411 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8412 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8413 the massively expanded
<quote>property
</quote> rights granted by copyright
8414 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8415 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8419 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8420 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8421 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8425 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8426 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8427 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8428 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8429 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8430 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8431 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8432 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8433 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8434 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8437 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8438 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8439 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8440 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8441 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8442 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8443 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8444 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8445 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8446 in control that technology and the market enable.
8449 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8450 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8452 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8453 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8454 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8455 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8458 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8459 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8460 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8461 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8462 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8463 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8464 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8465 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8466 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8467 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8468 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8469 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8470 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8471 known.
<footnote><para>
8473 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his
<quote>four surrenders
</quote> of
8474 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8475 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8479 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8482 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8483 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8484 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8485 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8486 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8489 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8490 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8494 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8495 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8500 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8501 <entry>©</entry>
8505 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8514 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8515 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8516 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8519 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8520 noncommercial work was also free.
8523 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8526 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8527 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8531 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8532 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8537 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8538 <entry>©</entry>
8539 <entry>©</entry>
8542 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8551 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8552 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8553 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8554 transformation were still essentially free.
8557 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8558 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8559 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8560 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8561 we could say the law began to look like this:
8564 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8565 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8570 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8575 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8576 <entry>©</entry>
8577 <entry>©</entry>
8580 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8581 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8589 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8590 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8591 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8592 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8593 that the law now looks like this:
8596 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8597 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8602 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8607 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8608 <entry>©</entry>
8609 <entry>©</entry>
8612 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8613 <entry>©</entry>
8614 <entry>©</entry>
8621 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8622 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8625 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8626 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8629 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8630 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8631 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8632 these domains actually does any good.
8635 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8636 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8637 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8638 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8639 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8640 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8641 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8642 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8643 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8644 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8647 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8648 course copyright is a kind of
<quote>property,
</quote> and of course, as with any
8649 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8650 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8651 property rights
<footnote><para>
8653 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8654 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8655 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey,
<quote>The
8656 Disintegration of Property,
</quote> in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8657 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8659 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8661 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8662 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8663 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8664 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the
<quote>copyright
</quote>
8665 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8666 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8667 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8668 vibrant and rich free culture.
8670 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
8672 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8673 limits on the scope of the interests protected by
<quote>property.
</quote> The very
8674 birth of
<quote>copyright
</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8675 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8676 story of chapter
6). The tradition of
<quote>fair use
</quote> is animated by a
8677 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8678 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8681 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8682 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8683 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8684 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8685 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8686 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8687 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8688 dominates the debate today.
8691 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8692 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8693 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8694 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8695 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8696 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8697 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8698 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8699 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8700 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8707 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8708 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8711 <chapter label=
"11" id=
"chimera">
8712 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8713 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8714 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8716 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8717 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8719 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8720 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The
</quote> (Wells)
</primary>
8724 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8725 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8726 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8728 H. G. Wells,
<quote>The Country of the Blind
</quote> (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8729 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8730 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8732 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with
<quote>sweet water, pasture,
8733 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8734 that bore an excellent fruit.
</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8735 takes this as an opportunity.
<quote>In the Country of the Blind,
</quote> he tells
8736 himself,
<quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.
</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8737 villagers to explore life as a king.
8740 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8741 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8742 <quote>blind.
</quote> They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8743 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8744 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8745 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated.
<quote>`You
8746 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8747 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8752 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8753 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8754 affection, a young woman who to him seems
<quote>the most beautiful thing in
8755 the whole of creation,
</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8756 description of what he sees
<quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8757 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8758 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8759 indulgence.
</quote> <quote>She did not believe,
</quote> Wells tells us, and
<quote>she could
8760 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.
</quote>
8763 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his
<quote>mysteriously delighted
</quote>
8764 love, the father and the village object.
<quote>You see, my dear,
</quote> her
8765 father instructs,
<quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8766 anything right.
</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8769 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion.
<quote>His brain
8770 is affected,
</quote> he reports.
8773 <quote>What affects it?
</quote> the father asks.
<quote>Those queer things that are
8774 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8778 The doctor continues:
<quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8779 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8780 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8781 irritant bodies [the eyes].
</quote>
8784 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!
</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8785 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8786 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8787 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8788 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8789 womb. That fusion produces a
<quote>chimera.
</quote> A chimera is a single creature
8790 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8791 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8793 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8794 plot for murder mysteries.
<quote>But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8795 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8796 scene.
…</quote>
8798 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8799 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8801 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8802 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8803 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8804 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8805 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8806 understanding of a
<quote>person
</quote> should reflect this reality.
8809 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8810 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8811 unfairly enough,
<quote>the copyright wars,
</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8812 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question
<quote>What is
8813 p2p file sharing?
</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8814 wrong. One side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8815 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8816 thirty years without any question at all.
</quote> That's true, at least in
8817 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8818 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8819 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8820 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8823 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8824 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8825 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8826 <quote>friends
</quote> beyond recognition to say
<quote>my ten thousand best friends
</quote> can
8827 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8828 what
<quote>we have always been allowed to do,
</quote> we have not always been
8829 allowed to share music with
<quote>our ten thousand best friends.
</quote>
8832 Likewise, when the other side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like walking
8833 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8834 with it,
</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8835 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8836 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8838 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8843 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8844 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8845 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8846 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8847 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8848 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8849 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8850 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8853 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8854 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8855 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8856 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8857 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8860 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8861 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8862 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8863 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8864 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8865 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8866 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8867 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8869 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
8870 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8871 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8872 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
8874 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8875 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8876 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8877 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8878 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
<quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8879 Stakes on Piracy,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8880 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8881 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8882 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8883 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8884 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8885 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8886 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8887 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8888 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8889 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8890 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8891 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8892 Elizabeth Young,
<quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,
</quote> redandblack.com,
8893 August
2003, available at
8894 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8895 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8896 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8897 identities, see James Collins,
<quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8898 Name Students,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8899 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8900 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
8901 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8905 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8907 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8908 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8909 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8910 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8911 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8914 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8915 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8916 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8917 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8918 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8919 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8920 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8921 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8926 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8927 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8928 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8929 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8930 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8931 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8934 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to
<quote>steal
</quote> music. My
8935 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8936 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8937 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8938 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8939 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8940 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8941 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8942 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8943 protection for copyrighted material,
8947 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8948 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8951 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8952 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8953 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8954 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8955 produce a totally different industry model.
8958 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8959 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8960 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8961 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8962 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8963 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8964 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8965 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8966 interests.
<footnote><para>
8968 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8969 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8970 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8971 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8972 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8973 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8974 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8979 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8980 one of
<quote>the major labels.
</quote> Its position on these matters has now
8982 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8985 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8986 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8987 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8992 <chapter label=
"12" id=
"harms">
8993 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8995 To fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> to protect
<quote>property,
</quote> the content industry has
8996 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8997 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8998 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8999 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
9002 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
9003 particular, the consequences for
<quote>free culture.
</quote> But my aim now is to
9004 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9008 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9009 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9010 power of the property called
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> is at its greatest in
9013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
9014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
9016 Yet
<quote>common sense
</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
9017 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
9018 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9019 rejection of
<quote>piracy
</quote> still has play.
9021 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9024 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9025 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9026 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9027 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9028 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9030 <section id=
"constrain">
9031 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
9033 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9034 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9035 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9036 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9037 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9038 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9039 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9040 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9041 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9042 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9043 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9044 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
9045 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9048 This digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> is in part an extension of the
9049 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9050 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9051 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9052 of digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9053 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9054 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9055 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9056 the culture all around.
9059 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9060 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9064 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9065 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9066 storytelling extended across the globe.
9069 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9070 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9071 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9072 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9073 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9074 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9075 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9076 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9077 work is presumptively illegal.
9080 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9081 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9082 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9083 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9084 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9085 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
9086 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9087 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
9088 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9089 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
9090 million.
<footnote><para>
9092 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
9093 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
9094 the settlement, see MCI press release,
<quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9095 Approval for SEC Settlement
</quote> (
7 July
2003), available at
9096 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
9097 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9099 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9100 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9101 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
9102 suffering.
<footnote>
9104 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9105 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
9106 an overview, see Tanya Albert,
<quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9107 Say Tort Reformers,
</quote> amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
9108 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
9109 and
<quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,
</quote> CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
9111 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9113 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
9115 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9116 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9117 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9118 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9120 <indexterm><primary>art, underground
</primary></indexterm>
9122 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9123 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9124 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9125 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9126 Disneys
<quote>pirates.
</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9127 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9131 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9132 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9133 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9134 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
9135 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9136 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9137 fraught. Already, exhibits of
<quote>illegal art
</quote> tour the United
9138 States.
<footnote><para>
9141 See Danit Lidor,
<quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
9143 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9144 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9146 In what does their
<quote>illegality
</quote> consist?
9147 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9148 critical or reflective.
9150 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
9152 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9153 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9154 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
9155 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9156 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9157 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9158 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9159 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9160 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9161 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9163 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
9165 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9166 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9167 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9168 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9169 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9170 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9171 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9172 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9173 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9176 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9177 described in chapter
9178 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9179 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9180 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9181 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9187 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9188 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9189 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9190 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9191 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9192 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9193 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9194 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9197 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9198 <quote>breathing room
</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9199 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9200 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9201 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9202 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9203 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9204 these rules have little relationship to the
<quote>law
</quote> with which judges
9208 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9209 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9210 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9211 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9212 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9213 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9214 <quote>copyright
</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9215 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9216 culture that is free.
9219 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9223 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9224 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9225 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9226 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9227 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9229 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying,
<quote>This has been
9230 cleared.
</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9231 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9235 <section id=
"innovators">
9236 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9238 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9239 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9240 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9241 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9242 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9243 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9246 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9247 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9248 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9249 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9250 other aspect by substituting
<quote>free market
</quote> every place I've spoken of
9251 <quote>free culture.
</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9252 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9254 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9256 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9257 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9258 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9259 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9260 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9261 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9262 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9263 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9264 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9265 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9266 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9268 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9270 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9272 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9273 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9274 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9275 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9276 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9277 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9278 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9279 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9280 <quote>nuclear pall
</quote> that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9283 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9284 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9285 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9287 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
9289 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9290 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9291 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9292 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9293 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9294 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9297 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9298 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9299 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9300 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9302 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9305 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9306 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9307 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9308 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9309 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9310 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9311 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9312 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9313 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9314 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9317 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9318 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9320 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9321 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9322 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9323 the kind of content the users liked.
9326 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9327 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9328 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9329 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9330 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9331 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9332 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9333 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9334 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9335 they had already bought.
9337 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9338 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9341 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9342 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9343 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9344 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9345 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9346 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9347 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9348 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9351 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9354 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9355 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9356 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9357 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9358 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9359 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9360 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9364 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9365 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9366 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9369 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9370 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9371 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9372 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9374 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9375 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9376 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9377 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad
</primary></indexterm>
9379 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9380 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9381 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9382 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9383 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9385 See Joseph Menn,
<quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9386 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9387 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown,
<quote>The Music
9388 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,
</quote> Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9389 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9390 See also Jon Healey,
<quote>Online Music Services Besieged,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9391 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9393 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9394 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9395 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9396 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9397 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9398 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9399 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9400 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9401 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9402 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9403 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9404 discussion with BMW:
9405 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9406 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9409 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9411 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9412 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9413 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9414 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9415 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9416 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9417 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9420 Rafe Needleman,
<quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,
</quote> <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9422 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9423 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9424 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9429 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with
<quote>your money or your
9430 life
</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9431 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9432 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9433 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9434 constantly threatened by litigation.
9438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9439 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9440 enterprises. The point is the definition of
<quote>illegal.
</quote> The law is a
9441 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9442 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9443 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9444 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9445 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9446 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9447 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9448 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9449 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9450 much less creativity.
9452 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9454 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9455 use. Whatever the
<quote>real
</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9456 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9457 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9458 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9459 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9460 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9461 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9462 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9463 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9466 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9467 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9468 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9469 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9470 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9471 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9472 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9473 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9474 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9475 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9476 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9477 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9479 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9480 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9481 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9482 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9483 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9484 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9485 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9488 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9489 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9490 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9491 this feature is a
<quote>bug.
</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9492 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9493 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9494 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables
<quote>piracy,
</quote> then,
9495 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9497 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9499 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9500 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9501 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9502 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9503 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> GartnerG2 and
9504 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9505 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9506 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9508 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9509 <quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9510 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9511 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9512 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9513 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9514 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9516 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9520 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9521 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9522 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9523 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9526 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9530 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9531 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9532 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9534 See David McGuire,
<quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,
</quote> Newsbytes,
9535 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9537 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9538 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9540 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9543 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9544 innovation
—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9548 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9549 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9550 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9551 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9554 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9555 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9556 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9557 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9558 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9560 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9561 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9562 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9564 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9565 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9566 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9567 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9568 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9571 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9572 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9573 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9574 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9575 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9578 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9580 <indexterm><primary>Grokster, Ltd.
</primary></indexterm>
9581 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9582 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9583 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9584 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9585 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9586 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9587 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9588 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9589 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9590 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9591 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9592 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9595 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9596 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9597 here.
<footnote><para>
9599 <indexterm><primary>Tauzin, Billy
</primary></indexterm>
9600 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9601 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9602 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9603 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9604 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9605 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9606 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a
<quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that
9607 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9608 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9609 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9610 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2,
<quote>Copyright and
9611 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
33–34,
9613 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9614 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9615 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz
</primary></indexterm>
9616 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9618 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9619 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9622 <primary>artists
</primary>
9623 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9628 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9629 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9630 artist doesn't get paid for that
<quote>radio performance
</quote> unless he or she
9631 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9632 version of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote>—to memorialize her famous
9633 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9634 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9635 copyright owners of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> would get some money, whereas
9636 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9637 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9640 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9641 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9642 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9643 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9644 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9645 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9646 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9647 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9651 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9652 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9653 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9654 spectrum. Thus, I can
<quote>tune in
</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9655 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9656 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9660 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9661 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9662 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9663 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9664 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9665 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9666 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9667 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9668 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9669 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9670 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9672 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9676 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9677 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9678 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9679 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9680 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9681 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9686 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9687 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9688 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9689 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9690 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9691 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9692 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9693 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9694 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9695 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9696 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9697 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9698 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9705 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9706 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9707 underestimated the power of
<quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9708 legislation
</quote><footnote><para>
9712 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9715 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9716 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9717 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9718 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9719 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9722 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'
>
9723 <primary>artists
</primary>
9724 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9727 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9728 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9731 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9732 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9733 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9734 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9735 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9736 of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9737 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9738 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9739 burdens terrestrial radio.
9742 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9743 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9744 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9745 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9746 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9749 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9750 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9751 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9752 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9753 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9754 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9755 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9756 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9757 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9758 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9759 C. Picker,
<quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9760 Distribution,
</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461:
<quote>This was
9761 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9762 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9763 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9764 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9765 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.
</quote>
9766 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9767 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9769 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9772 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'
/>
9774 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9775 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9776 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9777 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9780 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9782 name of the service;
9785 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9788 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9791 date of transmission;
9794 time of transmission;
9797 time zone of origination of transmission;
9800 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9803 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9806 sound recording title;
9809 ISRC code of the recording;
9812 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9815 featured recording artist;
9824 UPC code of the retail album;
9830 copyright owner information;
9833 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9836 name of the service or entity;
9842 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9845 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9848 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9851 unique user identifier;
9854 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9859 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9860 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9861 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9862 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9863 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9864 that terrestrial radio does not.
9867 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9868 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9869 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9871 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
9872 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'
>
9873 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
9876 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9877 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9878 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9882 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9883 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9884 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9885 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9886 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9887 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… <quote>How do you come up with a
9889 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9890 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9891 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9892 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9893 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9894 business.
…</quote>
9897 <primary>artists
</primary>
9898 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9901 And the RIAA experts said,
<quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
9902 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9903 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9904 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>.
</quote> (Emphasis
9908 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'
/>
9910 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9911 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9912 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9913 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9914 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9915 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9916 effective to prevent it.
9919 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9920 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9922 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9924 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9925 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9928 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9929 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9930 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9933 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9934 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9935 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9936 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9937 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie,
<quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,
</quote> Pew
9938 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9939 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9940 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9941 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9943 According to the RIAA,
9944 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9945 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9948 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9949 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9951 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9952 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9953 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9955 response by the other.
9958 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9959 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9960 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9961 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9962 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9963 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9964 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9965 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9966 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9967 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9968 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9969 was.
<footnote><para>
9971 Alex Pham,
<quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,
</quote> <citetitle>Los
9972 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
9974 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9975 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9976 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9977 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9978 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9979 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9983 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9984 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9985 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9986 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9987 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9988 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9989 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9990 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9991 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9993 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel,
<quote>Alcohol Consumption During
9994 Prohibition,
</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9998 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9999 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
10001 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
10002 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
10003 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
10005 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
10006 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
10007 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
10008 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
10009 cheat.
<footnote><para>
10011 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein,
<quote>Tax
10012 Compliance,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
10013 compliance literature).
10015 We pride ourselves on our
<quote>free society,
</quote> but an endless array of
10016 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
10017 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10018 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
10021 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10022 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
10023 students about the importance of
<quote>ethics.
</quote> As my colleague Charlie
10024 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
10025 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
10026 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
10027 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
10028 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
10029 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
10030 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
10031 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
10032 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
10033 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
10034 lives both normally and legally, since
<quote>normally
</quote> entails a certain
10035 degree of illegality.
10036 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
10039 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10040 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10041 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10042 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10043 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10044 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10045 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10046 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10047 to consider the alternative.
10051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10052 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10053 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10054 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10055 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10056 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10059 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10060 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10061 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10062 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10063 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10064 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10065 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10066 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10067 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10068 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10069 introduced this different idea of
<quote>sharing.
</quote> We need to be able to
10070 call these twenty million Americans
<quote>citizens,
</quote> not
<quote>felons.
</quote>
10073 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10074 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10075 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10076 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10077 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10078 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10079 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10080 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10081 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10082 a nation of felons?
10085 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10088 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10089 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10090 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10091 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10095 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That
<quote>use
</quote> of the
10096 recordings is free.
10099 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10100 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10101 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am
<quote>free
</quote> to copy,
10102 or
<quote>rip,
</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10103 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that
<quote>freedom
</quote> was a
10104 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the
<quote>Rip, Mix, Burn
</quote>
10105 capacities of digital technologies.
10107 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
10109 This
<quote>use
</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10110 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10111 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10112 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10113 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10114 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10115 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10116 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10117 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10120 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
10121 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10122 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10123 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10124 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10125 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10126 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10127 on people's machines.
10130 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10131 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10132 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10133 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10134 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10135 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10138 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10139 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10140 plastic or were part of a massively complex
<quote>digital rights
10141 management
</quote> system.
10144 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10145 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10146 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10147 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10148 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10149 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10150 freedom to move content easily?
10153 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10154 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10155 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10156 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10157 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10158 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10159 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10160 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10161 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10164 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10165 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10166 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10167 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10168 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10169 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10170 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10173 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10174 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10175 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10176 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10179 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10180 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10184 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10185 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10187 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
10188 <indexterm id='idxisps' class='startofrange'
>
10189 <primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary>
10192 <emphasis role=
"strong">There's one
</emphasis> more aspect to this
10193 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and
10194 follows directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier
10195 Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the
10196 <quote>collateral damage
</quote> that
<quote>arises whenever you turn
10197 a very large percentage of the population into criminals.
</quote> This
10198 is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10201 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,
</quote> von Lohmann
10203 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10207 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10208 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10209 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10210 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10211 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10212 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think,
<quote>Oh, well,
10213 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.
</quote> Well, what this campaign
10214 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10215 American Internet-using population into
<quote>lawbreakers.
</quote>
10219 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10220 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10221 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10224 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10225 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10226 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10227 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10228 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10229 an Internet user is revealed.
10232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10233 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10234 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10235 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10236 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10237 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10238 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10239 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10240 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10242 See Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10243 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,
</quote>
10244 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs,
<quote>Worried Parents
10245 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10246 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10247 Being Sued,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10248 Graham,
<quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10249 2003,
4D; John Schwartz,
<quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10250 Fan, Either,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi,
<quote>Is
10251 Brianna a Criminal?
</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10256 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10257 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10258 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10260 See
<quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10261 Some Methods Used,
</quote> CNN.com, available at
10262 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10264 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10265 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10266 one of those MP3s will have the same
<quote>fingerprint.
</quote>
10269 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10270 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10271 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10272 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10273 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10274 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10275 network is
<quote>cooperating
</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10276 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10277 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10278 as a
<quote>criminal.
</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10279 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10281 See Jeff Adler,
<quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,
</quote>
10282 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>Four
10283 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10284 Colleges,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10285 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10286 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas,
<quote>Music
10287 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10288 Lawsuit Possible,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox,
<quote>RIAA
10289 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10290 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10291 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Download Warning
101: Freshman
10292 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10293 Sharing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11;
<quote>Raid, Letters
10294 Are Weapons at Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10296 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10297 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10299 <indexterm startref='idxisps' class='endofrange'
/>
10301 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10302 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10303 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10304 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10305 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10306 this
<quote>contraband
</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10310 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10311 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10313 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10317 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10318 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10319 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10320 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10321 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10322 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10323 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10324 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10325 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10326 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10327 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10328 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10329 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10330 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10331 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10332 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10337 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered
<quote>criminals
</quote> under
10338 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10339 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10340 considered
<quote>criminals,
</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10341 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10342 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10349 <part id=
"c-balances">
10350 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10355 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10356 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10357 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10358 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10361 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10362 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10363 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10364 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10365 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10369 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10370 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10371 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10372 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10373 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10374 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10378 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10379 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10380 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10381 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10382 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10383 made that is happening all around.
10386 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10387 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10388 gasoline onto this fire.
10391 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10392 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10393 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10394 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10397 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10398 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10399 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10400 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10401 success will require.
10405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10406 <chapter label=
"13" id=
"eldred">
10407 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10408 <indexterm id=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'
>
10409 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel
</primary>
10412 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10413 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10414 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10415 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10416 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10417 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10421 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10422 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10423 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10424 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10425 them available for free.
10428 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10429 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10430 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10431 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10432 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10434 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10435 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10436 accessible
—today.
10439 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10440 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10441 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10442 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10443 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10444 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10445 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10446 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10447 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10448 commercial publications of public domain works.
10450 <indexterm startref=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'
/>
10452 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10453 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10454 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10455 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10456 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10457 call the
<quote>noncommercial publishing industry,
</quote> which before the
10458 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10459 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10460 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10461 generally.
<footnote><para>
10463 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10464 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10465 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10466 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10467 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10468 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10469 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10470 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10471 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10472 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10473 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10474 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10475 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10476 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10477 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10480 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10481 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10482 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10483 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10484 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10485 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10486 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10487 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10488 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10489 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10490 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10491 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10493 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10494 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10498 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10499 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10500 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10501 <quote>copyrights should be forever.
</quote><footnote><para>
10503 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10504 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10505 The full text is:
<quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10506 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10507 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10508 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10509 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10510 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10511 Congress,
</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10516 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10517 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10518 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10519 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10520 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10521 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10525 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10527 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10529 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10530 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10532 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10536 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10537 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10538 their
… Writings.
…
10542 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10543 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10544 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10545 something
—for example, to regulate
<quote>commerce among the several
10546 states
</quote> or
<quote>declare War.
</quote> But here, the
<quote>something
</quote> is something quite
10547 specific
—to
<quote>promote
… Progress
</quote>—through means that
10548 are also specific
— by
<quote>securing
</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights
</quote> (i.e.,
10549 copyrights)
<quote>for limited Times.
</quote>
10552 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10553 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10554 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10555 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be
<quote>limited
</quote> will have
10556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10557 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10558 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10559 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms
<quote>on the
10560 installment plan,
</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10561 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10564 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10565 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10566 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10567 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10568 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10569 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10570 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10571 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10572 this gravy train going.
10575 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10576 government.
<quote>Corruption
</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10577 bribed. Rather,
<quote>corruption
</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10578 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10579 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10580 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10581 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10584 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10585 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10586 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10587 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10588 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10589 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10590 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10591 published by anyone for free.
10594 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10595 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10596 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10597 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10601 <quote>Next year,
</quote> the adviser announces,
<quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10604 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10605 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10606 those works.
</quote>
10609 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,
</quote> she continues,
<quote>that
10610 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10611 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10612 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.
</quote>
10615 <quote>Hope?
</quote> a fellow board member says.
<quote>Can't we be doing something
10619 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>We could contribute
10620 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10621 they support the bill.
</quote>
10624 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10625 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it.
<quote>How much
10626 would we get if this extension were passed?
</quote> you ask the adviser.
<quote>How
10627 much is it worth?
</quote>
10630 <quote>Well,
</quote> the adviser says,
<quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10631 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10632 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10633 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate.
</quote>
10636 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10637 correct conclusion:
10640 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10641 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10643 would assure that the bill was passed?
</quote>
10646 <quote>Absolutely,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>It is worth it to you to
10648 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10649 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000.
</quote>
10652 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10653 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10654 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10655 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10657 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10659 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10660 the copyright term extended.
10663 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10664 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10665 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10668 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10670 Term Extension Act, this
<quote>theory
</quote> about incentives was proved
10671 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10672 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10673 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10674 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10675 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press,
<quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10676 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,
</quote>
10677 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10679 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10680 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10681 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10682 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown,
<quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10683 Age,
</quote> available at
10684 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10686 Disney is estimated to have
10687 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10688 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10690 Alan K. Ota,
<quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,
</quote>
10691 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10692 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10697 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10698 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10700 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10701 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10702 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10703 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10704 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10705 <quote>limited.
</quote>
10706 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10710 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10711 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10712 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10713 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10714 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10715 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10719 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10723 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10724 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10725 power to regulate only
<quote>commerce among the several states
</quote> (aka
10727 commerce
</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10728 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10733 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10734 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10735 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10736 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10737 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10739 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
10741 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10742 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10743 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10744 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10745 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10746 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10747 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10748 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10749 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10750 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10751 position to second-guess Congress.
10754 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,
</quote>
10755 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10756 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10758 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10759 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10760 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10761 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10763 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10767 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10768 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10770 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10771 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10772 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10773 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10774 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10775 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10776 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10777 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10778 limitation to
<quote>limited times
</quote> notwithstanding.
10780 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10781 yield the conclusion that Congress
10782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10783 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10784 term, then there would be no
<quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power over
10785 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10786 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10787 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10788 term of existing copyrights.
10791 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10792 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10793 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10794 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10795 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10796 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10797 demonstrating the
<quote>fidelity
</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10798 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10799 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10800 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10801 were going to be petty politicians.
10804 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10805 argument in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10806 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10807 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10808 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10809 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10810 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10811 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10812 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10813 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10814 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10815 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10816 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10817 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10818 piracy that affects us all.
10821 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10824 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10825 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than
<quote>legal piracy.
</quote><footnote><para>
10827 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10828 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10829 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10831 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10832 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10833 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10835 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10838 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10840 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10842 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10843 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10844 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10845 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10846 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10847 bought to extend them again.
10850 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10852 Mickey Mouse and
<quote>Rhapsody in Blue.
</quote> These works are too
10853 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10855 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10857 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10858 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10859 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10860 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10862 and no longer available as a result.
10865 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10866 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10867 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10868 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10869 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10870 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10871 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10873 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10874 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10875 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10880 Think practically about the consequence of this
10881 extension
—practically,
10882 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10885 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10886 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10887 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10889 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10891 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
10893 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10894 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10895 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10896 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10897 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10898 list of books still under copyright.
10901 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10902 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10905 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10907 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10908 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10909 being at least a list?
10912 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10913 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10915 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10917 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10918 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10921 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,
</quote> the
10922 apologists for the system respond.
<quote>Why should there be a list of
10923 copyright owners?
</quote>
10926 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10927 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10928 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10929 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10930 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10931 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10932 what tangible property.
10935 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10936 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10937 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10940 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10941 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10943 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10944 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10945 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10946 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10947 know quite well who owns what property.
10950 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10951 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10953 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10954 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10955 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10956 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10957 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10958 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10959 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10962 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10963 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10965 for other creative works is much more dire.
10967 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'
>
10968 <primary>Agee, Michael
</primary>
10970 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
10971 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
10973 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10974 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10975 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10976 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
10977 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10978 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10979 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10980 money. According to one estimate,
<quote>Roach has sold about
60,
000
10981 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10982 films.
</quote><footnote><para>
10984 See David G. Savage,
<quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,
</quote>
10985 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
<quote>Classic Movies,
10986 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10987 Down Copyright Extension,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
10990 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10993 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10994 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10995 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10996 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10999 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
11001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
11002 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
11003 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
11004 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
11005 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
11006 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
11007 work available for distribution.
11010 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11011 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11012 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11013 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11014 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
11015 mm film.
<footnote><para>
11017 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11018 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11019 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
11020 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
11021 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
11022 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
11027 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11029 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11030 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11031 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11032 locate the copyright owner.
11035 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
11036 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
11037 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
11038 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
11039 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
11040 to these films is exceptionally high.
11043 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11044 copyright owner when she shows up?
</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11045 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11046 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11047 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11048 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11049 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11050 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11051 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11054 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11057 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11059 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11060 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11061 the copyright expires.
11063 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'
/>
11065 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11066 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11067 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11069 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11073 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
11074 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
11075 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
11076 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
11078 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an
<quote>engine of
11079 free expression.
</quote>
11082 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11083 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11085 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11086 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11087 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11089 the commercial life ends.
11092 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11093 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
11094 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11096 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11098 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11099 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
11100 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11101 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11102 have, we need to have access to this history.
11105 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11108 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11109 this context do no good.
11112 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11113 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11114 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11115 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11116 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11117 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11118 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11119 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11120 was independent of copyright law.
11123 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11124 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
11125 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11126 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11127 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11128 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11129 market didn't have more to offer.
11132 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11133 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11134 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11135 would not have interfered with anything.
11138 But this situation has now changed.
11140 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'
>
11141 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
11144 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11145 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11146 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11147 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11148 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11149 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11150 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11151 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11152 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11153 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11157 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11158 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11159 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11160 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11161 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11162 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11163 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11164 written for a radically different context.
11167 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11168 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11169 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11170 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11171 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11172 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11173 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
11174 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11175 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11178 You may well ask,
<quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11179 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11180 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11181 culture widely?
</quote>
11184 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11185 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11186 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11187 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11188 of a library is to serve what
<quote>the market
</quote> would demand. But if you
11189 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11190 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11191 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11192 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11194 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'
/>
11196 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11197 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11198 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11199 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11202 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11203 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11204 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11205 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11206 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11208 Jason Schultz,
<quote>The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,
</quote> 20
11209 December
2002, available at
11210 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11215 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11216 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11217 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11218 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
11219 violated the Constitution's
<quote>limited Times
</quote> requirement, and (
2) that
11220 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11223 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11224 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11225 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11226 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11227 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11230 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11231 copyrights be for
<quote>limited Times
</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11232 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11233 <quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11234 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11235 terms that are
<quote>limited.
</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11236 to interpret the term
<quote>limited Times
</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11237 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11238 power to extend existing terms.
11241 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11242 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11243 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11244 whole, where the court will sit
<quote>en banc
</quote> to hear the case.
11246 <indexterm><primary>Tatel, David
</primary></indexterm>
11248 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11249 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11252 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11253 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11254 overstepped its bounds.
11257 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11258 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11259 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11260 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11261 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11264 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11265 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11266 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11267 briefs and preparing for argument.
11270 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11271 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11272 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11273 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11274 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11275 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11276 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11277 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11280 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11281 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11282 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11285 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11287 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11288 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11289 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11290 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11293 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11294 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11295 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11297 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11298 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11299 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11301 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11302 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11303 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11304 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11305 told me, if we could make the issue seem
<quote>important
</quote> to the Supreme
11306 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11307 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against
<quote>the
11308 most powerful media companies in the world.
</quote>
11311 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11312 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11313 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11314 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11315 <quote>right
</quote> as in
<quote>true,
</quote> I thought, but it is
<quote>wrong
</quote> as in
<quote>it just shouldn't be
11316 that way.
</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11317 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11318 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11320 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11321 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11323 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11324 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11325 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11327 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11328 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11329 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11332 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11333 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11334 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11335 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11336 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11337 why it was unconstitutional.
11340 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11343 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11344 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11345 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11346 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11347 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11348 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11349 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11350 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11351 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11352 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11353 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11354 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11355 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11356 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11359 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11360 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11361 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11362 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11363 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11364 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11365 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11366 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11367 to get bogged down?
</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11368 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11369 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11370 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11371 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11372 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11375 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11376 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11377 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11378 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11379 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11380 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11383 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11384 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11387 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11388 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11389 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11390 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11391 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11392 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11393 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11394 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11395 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11396 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11397 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11400 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11401 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11402 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11403 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11404 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11405 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11407 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11409 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11410 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11411 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11412 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11415 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11416 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11417 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11418 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11419 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11421 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11422 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11423 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11424 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11425 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11426 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11427 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11428 nothing more than
<quote>rent-seeking
</quote>—the fancy term economists use
11429 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11432 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11433 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11434 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11435 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11436 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11437 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11438 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11439 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11442 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11443 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11444 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11445 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan
</primary></indexterm>
11446 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen
</primary></indexterm>
11447 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11450 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11451 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11452 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11453 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11454 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11455 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11456 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11457 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11458 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11459 confidence in our argument.
11460 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11463 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11464 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these
<quote>friends
</quote> included
11465 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11466 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11470 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11471 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11472 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11473 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11474 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11475 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11479 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11480 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11481 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11482 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11483 domain, then people could use it to
<quote>glorify drugs or to create
11484 pornography.
</quote><footnote><para>
11486 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11487 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11489 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11490 <quote>protection
</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11491 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11492 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11494 Dinitia Smith,
<quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11495 Mouse Joins the Fray,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11499 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11500 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11501 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11504 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11505 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11506 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11507 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11508 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say,
<quote>Give us twenty years
11509 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11510 better with them than anyone else.
</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11511 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11512 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11513 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11516 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11517 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11518 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11519 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11520 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11521 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11522 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11524 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
11525 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11527 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11528 called
<quote>the Conservatives.
</quote> The other we called
<quote>the Rest.
</quote> The
11529 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11530 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11531 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11532 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line
11533 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11534 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11536 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11537 <indexterm id='idxginsburg' class='startofrange'
>
11538 <primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
</primary>
11541 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11542 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11543 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11546 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11547 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11548 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11549 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11550 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11553 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11554 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11555 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11556 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11557 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11558 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11559 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11560 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11563 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11565 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11566 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11567 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11568 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11569 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11570 these retrospective extensions.
11572 <indexterm startref='idxginsburg' class='endofrange'
/>
11574 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11575 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11576 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11577 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11578 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11579 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11582 This analysis of
<quote>the Rest
</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11583 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11584 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11585 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11586 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation
—the
11587 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11588 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11589 powers have limits.
11592 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11593 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11594 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11596 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11597 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11598 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11599 supposed to be
<quote>limited.
</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11600 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
11601 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11602 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11606 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11607 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11608 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11609 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11610 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11613 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11614 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831
11615 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11617 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11620 But this
<quote>consistency
</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11622 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11623 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11624 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11626 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11628 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11629 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11631 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11632 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11633 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11635 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11636 weeks, I was repeatedly
<quote>mooted
</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11639 help in the case. Such
<quote>moots
</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11640 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11643 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11644 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11645 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11646 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11648 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11649 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11652 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11653 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11655 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11656 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11657 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11658 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11659 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11662 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11663 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11664 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11665 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11666 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.
</quote>
11668 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11670 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11671 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11672 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11673 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11674 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11675 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11676 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11677 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11678 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11679 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11680 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11683 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11684 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11687 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11688 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11689 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11690 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11692 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11693 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11694 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11695 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11696 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11697 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11698 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11699 family of the Justices.
11702 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11703 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11704 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11705 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11707 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11709 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11710 The history was bothering her.
11714 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11715 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11716 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11717 practice that began with the very first act.
11721 She was quite willing to concede
<quote>that this flies directly in the face
11722 of what the framers had in mind.
</quote> But my response again and again
11723 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11727 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11728 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11730 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11735 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11736 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11737 Kennedy, who observed,
11741 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11742 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11743 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11744 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11745 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11749 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11755 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11756 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11757 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11758 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11759 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11762 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11764 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11765 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11766 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11767 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11768 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11771 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11772 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11773 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11776 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11777 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11783 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11784 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11787 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11788 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11790 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11791 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11792 into the Copyright Clause.
11795 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.
</primary></indexterm>
11797 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11798 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11799 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11803 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11804 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11805 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11806 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11811 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11812 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11813 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11814 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11815 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11816 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11817 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11818 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11819 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11820 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11824 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11825 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11828 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11832 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11833 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11834 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11835 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11836 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11837 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11838 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11839 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11840 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11841 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11842 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11843 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11844 law that it had established elsewhere.
11847 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11848 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11849 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11850 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11851 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11854 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11855 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11856 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11859 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11860 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11861 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11865 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11866 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11867 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11868 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11869 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11871 <indexterm><primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
</primary></indexterm>
11874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11875 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11876 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11877 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11880 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11881 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11882 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11883 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11886 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11887 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11888 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11889 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11890 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11891 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11892 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11893 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11894 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11897 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11898 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11899 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11900 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11901 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11902 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11903 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11904 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11905 the system we have.
11907 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11909 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11910 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11911 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11912 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11913 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11914 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11915 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11916 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11917 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11919 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11922 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11923 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11924 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11925 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11926 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11927 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11928 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11929 <quote>limited,
</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11930 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11933 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11934 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11935 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11936 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11937 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11940 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11941 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11942 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11944 <indexterm><primary>originalism
</primary></indexterm>
11946 It was first anger with the five
<quote>Conservatives.
</quote> It would have been
11947 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11948 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11949 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11950 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11951 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11952 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is
<quote>originalism
</quote>—to
11953 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11954 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11955 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other
<quote>originalist
</quote> rulings. Where was their
11956 <quote>originalism
</quote> now?
11959 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11960 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11961 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11962 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11965 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11966 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11967 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11968 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11969 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11970 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11974 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11976 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11979 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11981 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11982 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11983 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11984 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11985 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11986 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11987 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11988 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11989 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11992 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11993 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11994 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11995 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11996 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11997 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11998 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11999 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
12000 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
12001 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
12002 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
12003 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
12004 effort to persuade; but I
12005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
12006 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
12007 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
12008 should decide the issue.
12010 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12012 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
12013 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12015 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
12018 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12019 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12020 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12021 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12024 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12025 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12026 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12027 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12031 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12032 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12033 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
12034 case was a mistake.
<quote>The Court is not ready,
</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
12035 issue should not be raised until it is.
12036 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12039 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12040 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12041 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12042 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12043 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12044 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12045 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
12046 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
12047 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
12048 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
12049 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
12051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12052 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12053 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12054 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12055 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12056 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12060 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12061 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12062 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12063 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12064 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12065 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12069 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12070 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12071 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12072 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The
<quote>powerful and wealthy
</quote> line is a bit
12073 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12074 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12076 <figure id=
"fig-18">
12077 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
12078 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
12079 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12082 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12083 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That
<quote>grand experiment
</quote> we call the
12084 <quote>public domain
</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think,
<quote>Honey,
12085 I shrunk the Constitution.
</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12086 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12087 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12088 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12092 <chapter label=
"14" id=
"eldred-ii">
12093 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
12095 The day
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
12096 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was
12097 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
12098 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
12099 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
12100 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
12101 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
12103 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12105 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12106 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12107 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12108 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12109 Justice Kennedy:
<quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12110 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12111 that.
</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12112 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12115 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12116 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12118 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12119 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12120 the work passed into the public domain.
12123 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12124 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12125 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12128 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12129 is either the
<quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act
</quote> or the
<quote>Copyright
12130 Term Deregulation Act.
</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12131 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12132 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12133 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
12134 everything else, let the content go.
12136 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12138 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12139 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12140 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12141 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12142 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12143 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12144 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12145 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12146 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12147 the stupid harm of the present system.
12150 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12151 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12152 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12153 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12154 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12155 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12156 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12157 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12158 where copyright owners could be identified.
12160 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12161 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12164 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
12165 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12166 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12167 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12169 <indexterm><primary>German copyright law
</primary></indexterm>
12170 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12171 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12172 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12173 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
12174 every text of the Convention has provided that
<quote>the enjoyment and the
12175 exercise
</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention
<quote>shall not be subject
12176 to any formality.
</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12177 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12178 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12179 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12180 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12181 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12182 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12183 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12184 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12185 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
12186 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12187 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
12188 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a
<quote>natural right.
</quote> Natural
12189 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12190 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12191 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12192 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12193 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12196 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12197 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12198 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12199 <quote>Walt Disney creativity
</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12200 know what's protected and what's not.
12202 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12204 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12205 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12206 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12207 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12208 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12209 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12210 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
12211 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12214 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12215 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12216 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12217 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12218 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12219 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12222 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12223 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12224 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12225 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12227 imposed upon creators.
12230 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12231 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12234 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12235 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12236 the government. He has a property right over the table
<quote>naturally,
</quote>
12237 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12238 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12242 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12243 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12244 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12245 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12246 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12247 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12251 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12252 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12253 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12254 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12255 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12256 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12257 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12258 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12259 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12260 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12261 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12262 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12263 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12264 system of protection for property generally.
12267 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12268 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12269 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12270 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12271 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12272 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12273 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12274 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12277 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12278 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12279 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12282 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12283 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12284 didn't
<quote>get.
</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12285 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12286 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be,
<quote>short,
</quote> then this
12287 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12288 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12289 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12292 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12293 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12294 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12295 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12296 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12297 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12298 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12301 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12302 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12303 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12304 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12305 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12308 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12309 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12310 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12311 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12312 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12315 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12316 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12317 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12321 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12322 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12323 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12326 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12327 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12328 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12329 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12330 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12331 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12332 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12333 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12334 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12335 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12337 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12339 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12340 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12341 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12342 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12345 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12346 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12347 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12348 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12349 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog,
<quote>we are
12350 close.
</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12351 something good might happen here.
12352 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12355 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12356 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12357 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12358 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12359 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12360 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12363 The MPAA argued first that Congress had
<quote>firmly rejected the central
12364 concept in the proposed bill
</quote>—that copyrights be renewed. That
12365 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's
<quote>firm rejection
</quote> had occurred
12366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12367 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12368 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12369 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12370 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12371 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12372 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12373 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12374 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12375 argued that the bill would impose
<quote>enormous
</quote> costs, since a
12376 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12377 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12378 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12379 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12380 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12381 film is a valid derivative use.
12384 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12385 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12386 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12387 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12388 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12389 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12392 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12393 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12394 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12395 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12396 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12397 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12398 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12402 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12403 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12404 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12405 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12411 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12412 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12413 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12414 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12415 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12416 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12417 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12418 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12419 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12421 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12423 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12424 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12425 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12426 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12427 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12428 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the
<quote>Dark
12429 Content
</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12430 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12433 What does this industry really want?
12436 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12437 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12438 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12439 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12440 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12441 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12442 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12443 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12447 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12448 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12449 its aim not the protection of
<quote>property
</quote> but the rejection of a
12450 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12451 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12455 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12456 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12459 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12460 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12461 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12462 and to share its own creation.
12464 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12465 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12467 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12468 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12469 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12470 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12471 block the progress of others.
12474 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12475 <quote>property
</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12476 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12477 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing
<quote>permission
12478 society.
</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12479 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12480 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12485 <chapter label=
"15" id=
"c-conclusion">
12486 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12487 <indexterm id=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'
>
12488 <primary>antiretroviral drugs
</primary>
12490 <indexterm id=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'
>
12491 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies
</primary>
12493 <indexterm id=
"idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'
>
12494 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in
</primary>
12497 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12498 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12499 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12500 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12501 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12504 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12505 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12506 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12507 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12508 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12509 the disease almost invisible.
12512 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12513 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12514 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12515 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12517 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12518 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12519 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
<quote>Final Report: Integrating
12520 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy
</quote> (London,
2002),
12522 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12524 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12525 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12530 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12531 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12532 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12533 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12534 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12535 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12538 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12539 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12540 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12541 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12542 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12543 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12544 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12545 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12549 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12550 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12551 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12552 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12553 costs significantly below the market price.
12556 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12557 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12558 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12559 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12560 Africa from India. This is called
<quote>parallel importation,
</quote> and it is
12561 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12562 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12565 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12566 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12567 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12568 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12572 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12573 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12574 characterized it,
<quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12575 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12576 imports.
</quote><footnote><para>
12578 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12579 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12580 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12581 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12582 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12583 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12584 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12585 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12586 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12589 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12590 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12591 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12592 possible trade sanctions.
12593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12594 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12595 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12596 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12597 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12598 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12599 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12600 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12601 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12602 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12603 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12605 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12606 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12607 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12608 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12611 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12612 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12613 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12614 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12615 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12616 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12617 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12618 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12621 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12622 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12623 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12624 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12625 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12626 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12629 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12630 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12631 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12632 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12633 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12634 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12638 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12639 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12642 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12644 See Sabin Russell,
<quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12645 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12646 May
1999, A1, available at
12647 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12648 (
<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12649 system of intellectual property protection
</quote>); Robert Weissman,
<quote>AIDS
12650 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12651 Medicines,
</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12652 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12653 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson,
<quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12654 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12655 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,
</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12656 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12659 It was because
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> would be violated that these
12660 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12661 importance of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> that led these government actors
12662 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12665 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12666 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12667 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12668 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12669 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the
<quote>sanctity
</quote> of an
12670 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12671 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12672 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12675 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12676 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12677 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12678 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12679 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12680 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12683 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12684 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12685 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12686 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12687 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12688 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12691 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12692 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12693 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask,
<quote>How
12694 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12695 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?
</quote> Because there is no
<quote>sound
12696 bite
</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12697 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12698 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12700 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12701 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12702 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12703 idea called
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote>
12706 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12707 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12708 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12709 What is the argument?
12712 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12713 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12714 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12715 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12716 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12717 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12718 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12719 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12720 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12721 were balanced in just this sense.
12724 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12725 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12726 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12727 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12728 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12729 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12731 <indexterm startref=
"idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'
/>
12732 <indexterm startref=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'
/>
12733 <indexterm startref=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'
/>
12735 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12736 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12737 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12738 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12739 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12740 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12743 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12744 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12745 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12746 this common sense open its eyes.
12749 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12750 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12751 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12752 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12753 to fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12754 the idea of
<quote>creative property,
</quote> while transforming real creators into
12755 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12756 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12757 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12758 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12759 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12760 produce the
<quote>perfect storm
</quote> for free culture.
12762 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
12763 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'
>
12764 <primary>biomedical research
</primary>
12766 <indexterm><primary>Wellcome Trust
</primary></indexterm>
12768 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12769 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12770 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12771 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12772 August
2003, E1, available at
12773 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New,
<quote>Global Group's
12774 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12775 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12776 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New,
<quote>U.S. Official
12777 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12778 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12779 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12781 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12782 a meeting to discuss
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12783 goods.
</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12784 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12785 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12786 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12787 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12788 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12789 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12790 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12791 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12792 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12793 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12795 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12796 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12797 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12798 in the early
1980s. And it included
<quote>open source and free software.
</quote>
12799 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12800 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12801 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12803 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'
/>
12805 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12806 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12807 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12808 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12809 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12812 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12813 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12816 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12817 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12818 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12819 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12823 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12824 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12825 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12826 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12827 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12828 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12829 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12830 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12831 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12832 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12833 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12834 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12835 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12836 talk about an
<quote>Information Society
</quote> unless one also talked about the
12837 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12838 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12839 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12842 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12843 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12844 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12847 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12848 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12849 thus the meeting about
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12850 public goods
</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12853 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12854 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is
<quote>open source
12855 and free software.
</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12856 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12857 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12858 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12859 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12860 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12861 rather than
<quote>proprietary software,
</quote> for their own internal uses.
12864 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12865 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12866 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12867 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12868 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12869 operating system, the most famous bit of
<quote>free software
</quote>—and IBM
12870 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support
<quote>open source and
12871 free software
</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12872 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12873 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12875 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12876 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12877 <quote>open source
</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12878 principal opposition is to
<quote>free software
</quote> licensed under a
<quote>copyleft
</quote>
12879 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12880 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith,
<quote>The Future
12881 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,
</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
12882 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12883 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12884 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12885 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12886 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12887 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12888 May
2001), available at
12889 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12891 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12892 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft
</quote> licenses
</primary></indexterm>
12893 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12894 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12897 More important for our purposes, to support
<quote>open source and free
12898 software
</quote> is not to oppose copyright.
<quote>Open source and free software
</quote>
12899 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12900 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12901 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12904 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12905 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12906 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12907 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12908 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12909 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12910 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12911 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12912 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12915 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12916 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12917 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12918 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12919 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12920 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12921 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12923 Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> available at
<ulink
12924 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12926 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12927 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
12930 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12931 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12932 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12933 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12934 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12935 its lobbying efforts.
12938 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12939 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12940 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12941 Office, explained that
<quote>open-source software runs counter to the
12942 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.
</quote>
12943 She is quoted as saying,
<quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12944 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12945 goals of WIPO.
</quote>
12948 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12952 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12953 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12954 right called
<quote>copyright
</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12955 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it
<quote>runs counter
</quote> to the mission
12956 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12957 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12958 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12959 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12961 <indexterm><primary>generic drugs
</primary></indexterm>
12963 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to
<quote>promote
</quote>
12964 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12965 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12966 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12967 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12968 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12969 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12970 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12971 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12972 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12973 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12975 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12977 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12978 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12979 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12980 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12981 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to
<quote>waive
</quote> or
12982 <quote>disclaim
</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12983 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
12984 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12985 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12986 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12987 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
12990 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12991 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,
</quote> she's
12992 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12994 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12995 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from
<quote>waiving
</quote> or
12996 <quote>disclaiming
</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12997 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12998 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
13002 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
13003 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called
<quote>feudalism.
</quote> Under
13004 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
13005 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
13006 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
13007 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
13008 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
13009 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
13010 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
13013 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13014 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
13016 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13017 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
13019 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
13020 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13022 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13023 choice now is whether that information society will be
13024 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
13028 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13029 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13030 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13031 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13035 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13036 it should be (
<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13037 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
13038 not simply to promote intellectual property rights
</quote>), not as it is. If
13039 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13040 say anything wrong. But in the world
13041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13042 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13043 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13047 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13048 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13049 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13050 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13051 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13052 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13053 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13054 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13057 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13058 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13059 <quote>goal
</quote> of a government should be
<quote>to promote the right balance
</quote> of
13060 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13061 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism.
<quote>Typical for
13062 an academic,
</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13065 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13066 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13067 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13068 our own country's history).
13071 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13072 government should be to
<quote>seek balance,
</quote> then count me with the silly,
13073 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13074 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13075 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13076 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13077 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13078 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
13079 democracy in the world, become?
13082 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13083 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13084 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13086 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13087 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
13089 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
13090 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
13091 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
13093 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
13094 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
13095 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
13096 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
13097 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
13098 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
13099 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
13100 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
13101 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
13102 hearings and a different result.
13105 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13106 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13107 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13108 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13109 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13110 concentration in the media.
13113 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13114 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13115 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13116 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13117 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13120 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13121 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13122 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13123 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13124 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13125 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
13126 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
13128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13130 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13131 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13132 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13133 Americans have a long history of fighting
<quote>big,
</quote> wisely or not. That
13134 we could be motivated to fight
<quote>big
</quote> again is not something new.
13137 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13138 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13139 the idea of
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13140 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13141 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13142 called
<quote>property
</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13145 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13148 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
13150 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13151 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
13153 John Borland,
<quote>RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers,
</quote> CNET News.com, September
13155 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
13156 R. La Monica,
<quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,
</quote> CNN/Money,
8 September
13158 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
13159 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty,
<quote>Sued for a Song,
13160 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
13161 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13162 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13163 Defendants,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13164 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
13166 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
13168 Eminem has just been sued for
<quote>sampling
</quote> someone else's
13169 music.
<footnote><para>
13171 Jon Wiederhorn,
<quote>Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,
</quote>
13172 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
13173 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
13175 The story about Bob Dylan
<quote>stealing
</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13176 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
13178 Kenji Hall, Associated Press,
<quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13179 Dylan Songs,
</quote> Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
13180 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
13181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13183 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
13184 anonymous
—reports
<quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13185 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13186 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13187 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13188 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.
</quote> Congressmen are
13189 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13190 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13191 kids who use a computer to share content.
13193 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
13194 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
13195 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13196 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
13197 <indexterm><primary>BBC
</primary></indexterm>
13198 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in
</primary></indexterm>
13200 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13201 that it will build a
<quote>Creative Archive,
</quote> from which British citizens can
13202 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13203 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,
</quote> BBC press release,
13204 24 August
2003, available at
13205 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13207 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13208 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13209 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13210 country.
<footnote><para>
13212 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,
</quote> Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
13214 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13217 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13218 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13219 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13220 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13221 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13222 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13223 day into the Causbys.
13226 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13227 potential is ever to be realized.
13229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13233 <chapter label=
"16" id=
"c-afterword">
13234 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13238 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13239 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13240 maps what might be done.
13243 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13244 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13245 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13246 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13249 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13250 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13251 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13252 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13256 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13257 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13258 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13259 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13260 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13264 <section id=
"usnow">
13265 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13267 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13268 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
13269 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13270 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13273 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13274 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13275 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—<quote>All Rights
13276 Reserved
</quote>— and those who reject copyright
—<quote>No Rights
13277 Reserved.
</quote> The
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13278 permission before you
<quote>use
</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The
<quote>No
13279 Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13280 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13283 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13284 tilted in the
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13285 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13286 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13290 original design of the Internet was
<quote>no rights reserved.
</quote> Content was
13291 <quote>taken
</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13295 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13296 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13297 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13298 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13299 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13300 architecture made the effective default
<quote>no rights reserved,
</quote> the
13301 future architecture will make the effective default
<quote>all rights
13302 reserved.
</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13303 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13304 content requires permission. The
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> world that defines
13305 the Internet today will become a
<quote>get permission to cut and paste
</quote>
13306 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13309 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13310 <quote>all rights reserved
</quote> nor
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> but
<quote>some rights
13311 reserved
</quote>— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13312 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13313 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13317 <section id=
"examples">
13318 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13320 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13321 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13322 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13323 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13324 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13325 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13326 to your neighbors or boss. The
<quote>privacy
</quote> of your browsing habits was
13330 What made it assured?
13332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13334 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13335 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13336 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13337 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13338 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13339 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13340 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13341 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13342 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13343 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13344 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13345 (there is no law protecting
<quote>privacy
</quote> in public places), and in many
13346 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13347 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13349 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13351 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13352 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13353 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13354 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13355 <quote>recently viewed
</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13356 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13357 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13358 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13359 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13362 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13363 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13364 people should have the
<quote>right
</quote> to browse in a library without the
13365 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13366 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13367 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13368 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13372 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13373 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13374 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13375 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13378 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg,
<quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13379 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13380 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13382 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13383 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13384 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13385 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13386 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13387 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13388 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13391 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13392 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13393 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13396 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13397 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13398 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13399 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13400 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13401 care much about controlling their software.
13402 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13404 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13406 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13407 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13408 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13409 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13410 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13414 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13415 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13416 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13417 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13418 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13419 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13420 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13421 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13422 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13426 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13427 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13428 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13429 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13430 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13431 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13432 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13435 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13436 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13437 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13438 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13439 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13440 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13441 fundamentally weakened.
13443 <indexterm><primary>Torvalds, Linus
</primary></indexterm>
13445 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13446 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13447 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's
<quote>Linux
</quote>
13448 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13449 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13450 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13453 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13454 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13455 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13456 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13457 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13458 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13459 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13460 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13464 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13465 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13466 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13467 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13468 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13469 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13472 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13473 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13474 scientific journals are produced.
13476 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13477 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13480 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13481 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13482 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13483 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13484 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13485 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13486 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13487 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13488 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13489 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13490 and Westlaw are also free
13491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13492 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13493 Court opinion through their respective services.
13496 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13497 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13498 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13499 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13500 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13501 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13502 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13505 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13506 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13507 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13510 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13511 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13512 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13513 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13514 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13515 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13516 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13517 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13518 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13519 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13522 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13523 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13524 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13525 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13526 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13530 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13531 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13532 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13533 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13535 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13536 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13537 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13538 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13539 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13540 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13541 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13544 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13545 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13546 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13547 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13548 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13549 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13552 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13555 <section id=
"oneidea">
13556 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13557 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13558 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13561 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13562 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13564 <indexterm><primary>Stanford University
</primary></indexterm>
13566 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13567 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13568 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13569 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13570 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13571 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13572 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13573 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13574 make this possible.
13577 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13578 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13579 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13580 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13581 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13582 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13583 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13584 human-readable description, and
13585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13586 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13587 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13588 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13589 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13590 different than the
<quote>All
</quote> or
<quote>No
</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13591 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13592 certain freedoms are given.
13595 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13596 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13597 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13598 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13599 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13600 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (
<quote>share and share
13601 alike
</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13602 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13603 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13606 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13607 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13608 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13609 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13610 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13611 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13612 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13613 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13617 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13618 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13619 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13620 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13621 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13622 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13624 of content (
<quote>content conducers,
</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13625 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13626 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13627 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13630 The aim is not to fight the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13631 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13632 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13633 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13634 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13635 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13636 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13637 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13638 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13639 to begin to build those rules.
13642 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13643 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13644 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13645 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13646 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13649 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13650 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13651 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13652 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13653 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13654 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13655 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13656 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13657 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13658 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13661 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13662 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13663 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13664 was a total success.
13667 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13668 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13670 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13671 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13672 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13673 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13674 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13676 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13677 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13679 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy
</primary></indexterm>
13680 <indexterm><primary>rap music
</primary></indexterm>
13681 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13683 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13684 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13685 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13686 reasons. Many who use the
<quote>sampling license
</quote> do so because anything
13687 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13688 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13689 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13690 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13691 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13692 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13693 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13694 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not
<quote>allow
</quote>
13695 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13696 high
<footnote><para>
13698 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13699 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13700 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13701 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13702 </para></footnote>),
13703 these artists release into the creative environment content
13704 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13707 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13708 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13709 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13710 you are effectively saying you believe in the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote>
13711 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13712 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13713 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13714 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13715 this notion of
<quote>Some Rights Reserved,
</quote> and gives many the chance to
13719 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13720 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13721 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13722 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13725 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13726 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13729 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13730 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13731 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13732 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13733 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13734 steps are possible.
13737 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13738 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13739 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13740 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13741 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13742 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13743 creativity to spread more easily.
13745 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13750 <section id=
"themsoon">
13751 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13753 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13754 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13755 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13756 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13757 changes that we need.
13760 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13761 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13762 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13766 <section id=
"formalities">
13767 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13769 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13770 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13771 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13772 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13776 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13777 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13781 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13782 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13783 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13784 default is control, and
<quote>formalities
</quote> are banished.
13790 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13791 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13792 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13793 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13794 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13795 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13796 formalities were getting in the way.
13799 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13800 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13801 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13802 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13803 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13804 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13805 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13806 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13807 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13808 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13811 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13813 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13814 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13815 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13816 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13817 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13818 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13821 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13822 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13823 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13824 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13825 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13826 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13827 developed by others.
13830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13832 <section id=
"registration">
13833 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13835 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13836 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13837 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13838 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13839 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13840 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13841 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13842 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13843 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13844 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13845 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13848 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13849 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13850 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13851 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13852 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13853 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13854 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13857 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13858 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13859 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13860 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13861 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13862 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13863 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13864 with which registration occurs up.
13867 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13868 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13869 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13870 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13871 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13872 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13873 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13874 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13875 formality
—while producing a database
13876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13877 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13881 <section id=
"marking">
13882 <title>MARKING
</title>
13884 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13885 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13886 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13887 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13888 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13889 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13890 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13891 uniformly across all media.
13894 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13895 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13896 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13900 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13901 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13902 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13903 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13904 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13905 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13906 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13907 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13910 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13911 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13912 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13913 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13914 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13915 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13917 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13918 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13919 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13921 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be
<quote>use unless someone
13922 complains.
</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13923 stop using the work in any new
13924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13925 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13926 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13930 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13931 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13932 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13933 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13934 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13937 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13938 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13939 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13940 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13941 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13942 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13943 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13944 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13945 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13946 other important functions.
13949 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13950 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13951 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13952 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13953 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13954 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13957 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13958 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13959 make things unclear.
13962 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13963 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13964 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13965 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13966 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13967 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13973 <section id=
"shortterms">
13974 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13976 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13977 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13981 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13982 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13983 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13984 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13985 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13986 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13989 <quote>A Radical Rethink,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13991 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13993 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13996 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13997 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13998 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
14001 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14004 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
14005 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
14006 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
14007 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14008 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14009 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
14013 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
14014 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14015 fuzziness of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and the distinction between
<quote>ideas
</quote> and
14016 <quote>expression.
</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14017 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
14018 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
14019 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
14020 <quote>lawyer-free zone
</quote> makes the complexities of
<quote>fair use
</quote> and
14021 <quote>idea/expression
</quote> less necessary to navigate.
14022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14026 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
14027 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14028 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
14029 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
14030 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
14031 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
14032 pension.
<footnote><para>
14034 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14035 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
14037 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
14039 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
14040 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
14042 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
14046 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
14047 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
14048 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
14049 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
14050 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
14051 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
14052 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
14053 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
14054 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
14055 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14056 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14057 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14058 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14059 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
14062 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
14063 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
14064 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14068 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas
<quote>radical.
</quote> (After all, I
14069 call them
<quote>extremists.
</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14070 than the term under Richard Nixon. How
<quote>radical
</quote> can it be to ask for
14071 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14074 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14077 <section id=
"freefairuse">
14078 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
14079 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary></indexterm>
14081 <primary>property rights
</primary>
14082 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
14085 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14086 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14087 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14088 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14089 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14090 the emergence of that new technology.
14093 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
<quote>exclusive
14094 right
</quote> to
<quote>their writings.
</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14095 right to
<quote>their writings
</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14096 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14097 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14098 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14099 though that movie is not
<quote>my writing.
</quote>
14102 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
14103 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14104 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
14106 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14107 University Press,
1967),
32.
14109 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14110 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14111 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14112 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
14116 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14117 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14118 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14119 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
14120 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
14125 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14126 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14127 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14128 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14129 Consider each limitation in turn.
14132 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14133 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14134 sense to protect John
14136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14137 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14138 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14139 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14140 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14141 after the creative work is done.
14142 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
14145 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14146 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14147 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14148 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14149 material. When all
<quote>reuse
</quote> of creative material was within the control
14150 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14151 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14152 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14153 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14154 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14155 the creative process. Smothers it.
14157 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
14159 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14160 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14161 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
14162 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
14163 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14167 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14168 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14169 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14170 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
14173 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14174 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
14175 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
14177 His view is that the law should be written so that
14178 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14181 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14182 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14183 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14184 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14185 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14188 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14190 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14191 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14192 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14193 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14197 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
14198 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
14200 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14201 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14202 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
14203 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14204 battles around the sharing of music.
14207 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14208 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14209 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14210 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14211 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14212 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14213 innovation on the network.
14216 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14217 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14218 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14219 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14220 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14223 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14224 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14225 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14226 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
14227 four different kinds of sharing:
14229 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14232 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14233 for purchasing CDs.
14237 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14238 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14243 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14244 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14245 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14249 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14250 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14251 owner plainly endorses.
14255 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14256 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14257 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14258 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14259 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14260 significantly weakened.
14263 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14264 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14265 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14266 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14267 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14271 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14272 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14276 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14277 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14278 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14279 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14280 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14281 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14282 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14283 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14284 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14285 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14288 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14289 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14290 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14292 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14293 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14294 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14295 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14296 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14297 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14298 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14299 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14300 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14302 <indexterm><primary>cell phones, music streamed over
</primary></indexterm>
14304 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14305 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14306 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14307 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14308 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14309 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14310 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14311 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14312 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14313 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14314 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14315 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14316 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14317 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14318 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14319 paying for this content even though
<quote>free
</quote> content is available in the
14320 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14322 See, for example,
<quote>Music Media Watch,
</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14323 April
2002, available at
14324 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14329 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14330 present: It is emphatically temporary. The
<quote>problem
</quote> with file
14331 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14332 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14333 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14334 makers today to be
<quote>solving
</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14335 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14336 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14337 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14338 artists get paid, during
14340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14341 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14342 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14345 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different
<quote>problems
</quote>
14346 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14347 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14348 <quote>problem
</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14349 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14350 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14351 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14352 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14353 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14356 Type C content raises a different
<quote>problem.
</quote> This is content that was,
14357 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14358 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14359 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14360 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14361 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14362 way that returns something to the artist.
14365 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14366 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14367 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14368 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14369 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14370 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14371 from the author's perspective, this
<quote>sharing
</quote> of his content without
14372 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14375 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14376 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14377 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14378 providers would be free, under this rule, to
<quote>share
</quote> that content,
14379 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14380 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14381 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14386 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14387 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14388 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14389 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14390 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14391 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14392 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14396 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14397 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14398 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14399 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14400 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14401 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14402 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14403 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14406 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14407 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14408 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14409 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14410 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14411 delivering and accessing content.
14414 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14415 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14418 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14419 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14420 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14421 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14422 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14423 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14424 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14425 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14429 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14430 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14431 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14432 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14433 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14434 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14437 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14438 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14441 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'
>
14442 <primary>artists
</primary>
14443 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14445 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14446 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14447 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14448 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14449 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14450 2004), ch.
6, available at
14451 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14452 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14453 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14454 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
<quote>Impose a
14455 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,
</quote> available at
14456 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Who's Holding Back
14457 Broadband?
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14458 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14459 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14461 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14462 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14463 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14464 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14466 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry,
<quote>Getting Copyright Right,
</quote>
14467 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14468 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14469 McCullagh,
<quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,
</quote> CNET News.com,
27 August
14471 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14472 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14473 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14474 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14475 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14476 debate by about a decade. See
14477 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14478 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14479 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14480 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14481 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'
/>
14483 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14484 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14485 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14486 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14487 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14488 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14489 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14490 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14493 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14495 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14496 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14497 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14498 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14499 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14500 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14501 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14502 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14503 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14504 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14505 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14506 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14507 controlling access.
14510 <primary>artists
</primary>
14511 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14514 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14515 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14516 the system supports the widest range of
<quote>semiotic democracy
</quote>
14517 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14518 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14519 limits on derivative
14521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14522 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14523 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14524 allowed to do with the content itself.
14526 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
14528 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14529 <quote>harm
</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14530 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14531 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14532 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14533 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat
<quote>free
</quote> by being
14534 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14535 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14536 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14537 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14538 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14539 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14542 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
14544 This competition has already occurred against the background of
<quote>free
</quote>
14545 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14546 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14547 that, there is nothing impossible at all about
<quote>competing with free.
</quote>
14548 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14549 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14550 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14551 theaters are often luxurious
—with
<quote>first class
</quote> seats, and meals
14552 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14553 finding ways to compete with
<quote>free.
</quote>
14556 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14557 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14558 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14559 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14560 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14561 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14565 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14570 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14571 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14572 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14573 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14577 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14580 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14583 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14587 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14588 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14593 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14594 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14598 But what if
<quote>piracy
</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14599 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14600 consumers continue to
<quote>take
</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14604 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14605 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14606 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14607 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14608 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14609 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14610 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14611 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14612 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14613 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14614 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14618 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14619 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14620 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14623 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14624 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14628 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14629 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14631 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14632 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14633 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14634 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14637 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14638 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14639 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14640 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14641 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14642 strong view queers the law.
14645 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14646 <quote>radical
</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14647 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14648 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14649 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14650 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14651 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14652 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14654 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Copyright's First Amendment
</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14655 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14660 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14661 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14662 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14665 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14666 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14667 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14668 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14670 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14671 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14672 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14673 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14674 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14675 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14676 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14677 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14678 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14679 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?
</quote> working paper, June
2003,
14681 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14682 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14683 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14684 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14685 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14686 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14688 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14689 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14694 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14695 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14696 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14697 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14698 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14699 practically never be done.
14702 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14703 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14704 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14705 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14706 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14707 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14708 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14709 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14712 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14713 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14714 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14715 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14716 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14717 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14720 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14721 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14722 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14725 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
14727 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14728 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14729 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14730 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14731 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14732 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14733 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14736 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14737 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14740 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14741 simple pragmatic question:
<quote>Will it do good?
</quote> When challenged about
14742 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers,
<quote>Why not?
</quote>
14745 We should ask,
<quote>Why?
</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14746 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14747 keep your lawyers away.
14749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14753 <chapter label=
"17" id=
"c-notes">
14754 <title>NOTES
</title>
14756 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14757 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14758 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14759 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14760 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14761 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14762 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14763 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14764 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14767 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14770 <chapter label=
"18" id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14771 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14773 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14774 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14775 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14776 to him that this book is dedicated.
14778 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
14780 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14781 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14782 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14783 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14784 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14785 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14786 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14787 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14788 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14789 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14790 critical eye on much of this.
14793 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14794 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14795 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14796 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14797 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14798 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14799 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14800 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14801 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14804 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14805 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14806 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14807 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14808 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14809 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14810 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14811 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14812 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14813 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14814 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14815 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14816 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14817 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14818 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams,
<quote>Wink,
</quote> Roger Wood,
<quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,
</quote>
14819 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14820 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14821 a bunch of great replies.)
14824 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14825 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14826 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14827 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14828 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14829 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14830 throughout this book.
14833 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14834 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14835 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14836 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14838 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->