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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 </para>
90 <para>
91 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
92 in a Connected World
93 </para>
94 <para>
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
96 </para>
97
98 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
99 <para>
100 THE PENGUIN PRESS
101 </para>
102 <para>
103 NEW YORK
104 </para>
105
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
107 <para>
108 FREE CULTURE
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
115 </para>
116
117 <para>
118 LAWRENCE LESSIG
119 </para>
120
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
122 <para>
123 THE PENGUIN PRESS
124 </para>
125 <para>
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
127 York, New York
128 </para>
129 <para>
130 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
131 </para>
132 <para>
133 All rights reserved
134 </para>
135 <para>
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
139 </para>
140 <para>
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
145 </para>
146 <para>
147 Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
148 </para>
149 <para>
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 Lessig, Lawrence.
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
156 </para>
157 <para>
158 p. cm.
159 </para>
160 <para>
161 Includes index.
162 </para>
163 <para>
164 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
165 </para>
166 <para>
167 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
168 </para>
169 <para>
170 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
171 </para>
172 <para>
173 KF2979.L47
174 </para>
175 <para>
176 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
177 </para>
178 <para>
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
180 </para>
181 <para>
182 Printed in the United States of America
183 </para>
184 <para>
185 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
186 </para>
187 <para>
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
189 </para>
190
191 <para>
192 &translationblock;
193 </para>
194
195 <para>
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
207 </para>
208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
209
210 <para>
211 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
212 it continues still.
213 </para>
214
215 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
216 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
217 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
218 </figure>
219
220 <toc id="toc"></toc>
221
222 <lot>
223 <title>List of figures</title>
224 </lot>
225
226 <!--
227 c PREFACE xiii
228 c INTRODUCTION
229 c "PIRACY"
230 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
231 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
232 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
233 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
234 2 Film
235 2 Recorded Music
236 2 Radio
237 2 Cable TV
238 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
239 2 Piracy I
240 2 Piracy II
241 c "PROPERTY"
242 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
243 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
244 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
245 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
246 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
247 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
248 2 Beginnings
249 2 Law: Duration
250 2 Law: Scope
251 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
252 2 Architecture and Law: Force
253 2 Market: Concentration
254 2 Together
255 c PUZZLES
256 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
257 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
258 2 Constraining Creators
259 2 Constraining Innovators
260 2 Corrupting Citizens
261 c BALANCES
262 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
263 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
264 c CONCLUSION
265 c AFTERWORD
266 1 Us, Now
267 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
268 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
269 1 Them, Soon
270 2 1. More Formalities
271 3 Registration and Renewal
272 3 Marking
273 2 2. Shorter Terms
274 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
275 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
276 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
277 c NOTES
278 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
279 c INDEX
280 -->
281
282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
283
284 </chapter>
285 <chapter id="c-preface">
286 <title>PREFACE</title>
287 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
288 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
289 </indexterm>
290 <para>
291 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
292 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
293 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
294 </para>
295 <blockquote>
296 <para>
297 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
298 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
299 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
300 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
301 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
302 </para></footnote>
303 </para>
304 </blockquote>
305 <para>
306 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
307 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
308 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
309 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
310 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
311 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
312 </para>
313 <para>
314 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
315 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
316 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
318 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
319 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
320 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
321 </para>
322 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
323 <para>
324 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
325 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
326 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
327 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
328 </para>
329 <para>
330 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
331 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
332 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
333 free software movement<footnote>
334 <para>
335 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
336 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
337 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
338 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
339 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
340 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
341 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
342 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
343 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
344 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
345 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
346 or of creators from the past.
347 </para>
348 <para>
349 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
350 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
351 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
352 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
353 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
354 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
355 culture deem fundamental.
356 </para>
357 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
358 <para>
359 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
360 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
361 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
362 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
363 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
364 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
365 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
366 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
367 he asked,
368 </para>
369 <blockquote>
370 <para>
371 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
372 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
373 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
374 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
375 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
376 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
377 </para></footnote>
378 </para>
379 </blockquote>
380 <para>
381 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
382 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
383 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
384 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
385 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
386 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
387 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
388 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
389 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
390 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
391 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
392 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
393 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
394 that this work is "merely" derivative.
395 </para>
396 <para>
397 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
398 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
399 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
400 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
401 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
402 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
403 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
404 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
405
406 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
407 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
408 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
409 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
410 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
411 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
412 what I advance here.
413 </para>
414 <para>
415 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
416 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
417 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
418 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
419 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
420 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
421 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
422 book is written.
423 </para>
424
425 </chapter>
426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
427
428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
429 <chapter id="c-introduction">
430 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
431 <para>
432 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
433 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
434 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
435 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
436 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
437 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
438 </para>
439 <para>
440 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
441 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
442 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
443 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
444 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
445 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
446 </para></footnote>
447 For many
448 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
449 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
450 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
451 </para>
452 <para>
453 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
454 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
455 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
456 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
457 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
458 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
459 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
460 </para>
461 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
462 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
463 <para>
464 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
465 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
466 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
467 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
468 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
469 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
470 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
471 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
472 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
473 </para>
474 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
475 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
476 <para>
477 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
478 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
479 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
480 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
481 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
482 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
483 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
484 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
485 </para>
486 <blockquote>
487 <para>
488 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
489 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
490 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
491 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
492 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
493 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
494 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
495 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
496 <para>
497 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
498 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
499 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
500 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
501 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
502 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
503 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
504 1112&ndash;13.
505 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
506 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
507 </para></footnote>
508 </para>
509 </blockquote>
510 <para>
511 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
512 </para>
513 <para>
514 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
515 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
516 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
518 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
519 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
520 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
521 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
522 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
523 </para>
524 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
525 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
526 <para>
527 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
528 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
529 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
530 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
531 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
532 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
533 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
534 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
535 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
536 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
537 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
538 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
539 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
540 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
541 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
542 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
543 </para>
544 <para>
545 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
546 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
547 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
548 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
549 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
550 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
551 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
552 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
553 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
554 understanding of radio.
555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
556 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
557 </para>
558 <para>
559 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
560 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
561 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
562 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
563 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
564 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
565 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
566 much less transmitter power and static.
567 </para>
568 <para>
569 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
570 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
571 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
572 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
573 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
574 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
575 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
576 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
577 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
578 </para>
579 <para>
580 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
581 </para>
582 <blockquote>
583 <para>
584 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
585 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
586 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
587 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
588 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
589 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
590 box."<footnote><para>
591 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
592 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
593 </para></footnote>
594 </para>
595 </blockquote>
596 <para>
597 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
598 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
599 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
600 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
601 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
602 a handful of networks.
603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
604 </para>
605 <para>
606 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
607 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
608 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
609 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
610 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
611 </para>
612 <blockquote>
613 <para>
614 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
615 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
616 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
617 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
618 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
619 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
620
621 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
622 </para></footnote>
623 </para>
624 </blockquote>
625 <para>
626 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
627 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
628 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
629 described,
630 </para>
631 <blockquote>
632 <para>
633 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
634 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
635 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
636 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
637 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
638 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
639 </para></footnote>
640 </para>
641 </blockquote>
642 <para>
643 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
644 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
645 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
646 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
647 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
648 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
649 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
650 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
651 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
652 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
653 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
654 </para>
655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
656 <blockquote>
657 <para>
658 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
659 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
660 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
661 deviousness.<footnote><para>
662 Lessing, 256.
663 </para></footnote>
664 </para>
665 </blockquote>
666 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
667 <para>
668 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
669 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
670 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
671 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
672 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
673 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
674 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
675 least temporarily.
676 </para>
677 <para>
678 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
679 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
680 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
681 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
682 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
683 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
684 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
685 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
686 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
687 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
688 </para>
689 <para>
690 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
691 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
692 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
693 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
694 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
695 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
696 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
697 course always public spirited; the reality is something
698 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
699 to themselves, would crumble in
700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
701 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
702 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
703 effect of technological change.
704 </para>
705 <para>
706 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
707 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
708 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
709 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
710 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
711 before.<footnote><para>
712 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
713 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
714 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
715 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
716 </para></footnote>
717 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
718 of 2004.
719 </para>
720 <para>
721 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
722 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
723 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
724 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
725 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
726 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
727 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
728 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
729 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
730 </para>
731 <para>
732 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
733 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
734 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
735 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
736 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
737 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
738 has introduced.
739 </para>
740 <para>
741 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
742 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
743 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
744 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
745 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
746 parks or on
747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
748 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
749 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
750 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
751 </para>
752 <para>
753 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
754 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
755 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
756 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
757 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
758 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
759 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
760 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
761 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
762 </para>
763 <para>
764 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
765 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
766 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
767 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
768 marketplace.<footnote>
769 <para>
770 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
771 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
772 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
773 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
774 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
775 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
776 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
777 198&ndash;200.
778 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
779 </para></footnote>
780 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
781 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
782 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
783 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
784 </para>
785 <para>
786 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
787 been erased.<footnote><para>
788 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
789 2001), ch. 13.
790 </para></footnote>
791 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
792 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
793 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
794 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
795 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
796 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
797 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
798 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
799 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
800 culture, more and more a permission culture.
801 </para>
802 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
803 <para>
804 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
805 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
806 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
807 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
808 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
809 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
810 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
811 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
812 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
813 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
814 Causbys.
815 </para>
816 <para>
817 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
818 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
819 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
820 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
821 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
822 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
823 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
824 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
825 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
826 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
827 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
828 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
829 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
830 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
831 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
832 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
833 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
834 </para>
835 <para>
836 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
837 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
838 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
839 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
840 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
841 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
842 remakes them.
843 </para>
844 <para>
845 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
847 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
848 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
849 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
850 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
851 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
852 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
853 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
854 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
855 Times, 17 January 2002.
856 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
857 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
858 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
859 against it.
860 </para>
861 <para>
862 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
863 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
864 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
865 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
866 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
867 Internet.
868 </para>
869 <para>
870 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
871 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
872 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
873 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
874 </para>
875 <para>
876 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
877 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
878 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
879 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
880 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
881 <para>
882 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
883 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
884 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
885 </para></footnote>
886 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
887 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
888 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
889 could cultivate and extend our culture.
890 </para>
891 <para>
892 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
893 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
894 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
895 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
896 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
897 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
898 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
899 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
900 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
901 </para>
902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
903 <para>
904 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
905 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
906 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
907 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
908 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
909 against an industry.
910 </para>
911 <para>
912 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
913 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
914 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
915 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
916 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
917 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
918 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
919 </para>
920 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
921 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
922 <para>
923 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
924 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
925 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
926 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
927 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
928 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
929 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
930 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
931 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
932 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
933 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
934 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
935 trespass.
936 </para>
937 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
938 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
939 <para>
940 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
941 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
942 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
943 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
944 war. Unlike
945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
946 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
947 on its side.
948 </para>
949 <para>
950 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
951 increasingly
952 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
953 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
954 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
955 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
956 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
957 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
958 </para>
959 <para>
960 The puzzle is, Why?
961 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
962 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
963 because
964 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
965 absolute
966 claim was wrong?
967 </para>
968 <para>
969 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
970 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
971 </para>
972 <para>
973 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
974 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
975 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
976 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
977 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
978 </para>
979 <para>
980 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
981 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
982 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
983 Armstrong
984 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
985 more powerful view?
986 </para>
987 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
988 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
989 <para>
990 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
991 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
992 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
993 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
994 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
995 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
996 this silliness will be much more profound.
997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
998 </para>
999 <para>
1000 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1001 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1002 ideas.
1003 </para>
1004 <para>
1005 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1006 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1007 obscure
1008 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
1009 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
1010 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
1011 can be more fully understood.
1012 </para>
1013 <para>
1014 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1015 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1016 government,
1017 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1018 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1019 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1020 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1021 threatened
1022 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
1023 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
1024 who we have always been.
1025 </para>
1026 <para>
1027 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1028 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1029 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1030 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1031 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1032 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1033 </para>
1034 </chapter>
1035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1036 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1037 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1038
1039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1040 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1041 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1042 </indexterm>
1043 <para>
1044 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1045 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1046 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1047 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1048 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1049 </para>
1050 <blockquote>
1051 <para>
1052 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1053 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1054 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1055 <!-- f1 -->
1056 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1057 </para></footnote>
1058 </para>
1059 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1060 </blockquote>
1061 <para>
1062 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1063 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1064 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1065 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1066 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1067 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1069 </para>
1070 <para>
1071 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1072 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1073 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1074 sharing
1075 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1076 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1077 </para>
1078 <para>
1079 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1080 increasingly
1081 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1082 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1083 believe
1084 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1085 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1086 </para>
1087 <para>
1088 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1089 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1090 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1091 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1092 </para>
1093 <para>
1094 The idea goes something like this:
1095 </para>
1096 <blockquote>
1097 <para>
1098 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1099 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1100 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1101 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1102 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1103 piracy.
1104 </para>
1105 </blockquote>
1106 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1107 <para>
1108 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1109 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1110 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1111 <!-- f2 -->
1112 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1113 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1114 </para></footnote>
1115 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1116 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1117 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1118 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1119 <!-- f3 -->
1120 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1121 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1122 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1123 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1124 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1125 </para></footnote>
1126 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1127 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1128 </para>
1129 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1130 <para>
1131 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1132 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1134 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1135 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1136 property.
1137 It has never taken hold within our law.
1138 </para>
1139 <para>
1140 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1141 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1142 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1143 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1144 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1145 </para>
1146 <para>
1147 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1148 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1149 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1150 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1151 copyright law today regulates both.
1152 </para>
1153 <para>
1154 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1155 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1156 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1157 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1158 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1159 more expense of doing business.
1160 </para>
1161 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1162 <para>
1163 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1164 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1165 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1166 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1167 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1168 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1169 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1170 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1171 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1172 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1173 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1174 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1175 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1176 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1177 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1179 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1180 <para>
1181 <!-- f4 -->
1182 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1183 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1184 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1185 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1186 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1187 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1188 enabled are much more tenuous.
1189 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1190 </para></footnote>
1191 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1192 this creative class.
1193 </para>
1194 <para>
1195 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1196 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1197 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1198 </para>
1199
1200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1201 <sect1 id="creators">
1202 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1203 <para>
1204 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1205 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1206 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1207 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1208 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1209 </para>
1210 <para>
1211 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1212 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1213 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1214 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1215 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1216 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1217 </para>
1218 <blockquote>
1219 <para>
1220 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1221 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1222 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1223 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1225 </para>
1226 <para>
1227 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1228 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1229 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1230 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1231 synchronization was pretty close.
1232 </para>
1233 <para>
1234 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1235 electric.
1236 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1237 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1238 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1239 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1240 <!-- f1 -->
1241 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1242 Cartoons
1243 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1244 </para></footnote>
1245 </para>
1246 </blockquote>
1247 <para>
1248 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1249 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1250 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1251 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1252 </para>
1253 <para>
1254 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1255 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1256 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1257 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1258 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1259 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1260 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1261 </para>
1262 <para>
1263 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1264 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1265 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1266 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1267 </para>
1268 <para>
1269 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1270 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1271 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1272 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1273 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1274 genre.
1275 </para>
1276 <para>
1277 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1279 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1280 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1281 <!-- f2 -->
1282 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1283 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1284 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1285 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1286 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1287 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1288 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1289 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1290 </para></footnote>
1291 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1292 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1293 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1294 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1295 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1296 Mouse.
1297 </para>
1298 <para>
1299 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1300 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1301 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1302 <!-- f3 -->
1303 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1304 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1305 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1306 </para></footnote>
1307 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1308 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1309 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1310 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1311 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1312 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1313 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1314 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1315 old.
1316 </para>
1317 <para>
1318 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1319 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1320 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1321 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1322 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1323 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1324 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1325 </para>
1326 <para>
1327 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1328 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1329 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1330 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1331 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1332 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1333 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1334 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1335 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1336 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1338 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1339 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1340 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1341 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1342 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1343 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1344 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1345 </para>
1346 <para>
1347 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1348 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1349 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1350 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1351 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1352 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1353 culture around us and makes it something different.
1354 </para>
1355 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1356 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1357 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1358 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1359 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1360 <!-- f4 -->
1361 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1362 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1363 determining
1364 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1365 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1366 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1367 average
1368 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1369 Web site associated with this book, available at
1370 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1371 </para></footnote>
1372 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1373 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1374 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1375 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1376 </para>
1377 <para>
1378 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1379 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1380 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1381 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1382 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1383 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1384 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1385 </para>
1386 <para>
1387 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1388 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1389 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1390 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1391
1392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1393 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1394 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1395 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1396 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1397 content from before the Great Depression.
1398 </para>
1399 <para>
1400 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1401 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1402 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1403 universal.
1404 </para>
1405 <para>
1406 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1407 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1408 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1409 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1410 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1411 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1412 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1413 </para>
1414 <para>
1415 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1416 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1417 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1418 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1419 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1420 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1421 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1422 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1423 interestingly different way.
1424 </para>
1425 <para>
1426 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1427 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1428 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1429 </para>
1430 <para>
1431 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1432 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1433 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1434 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1436 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1437 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1438 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1439 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1440 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1441 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1442 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1443 </para>
1444 <para>
1445 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1446 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1447 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1448 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1449 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1450 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1451 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1452 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1453 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1454 </para>
1455 <para>
1456 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1457 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1458 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1459 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1460 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1461 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1462 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1463 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1464 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1465 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1466 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1467 original copyright owner's permission.
1468 </para>
1469 <para>
1470 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1471 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1472 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1473 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1474 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1475
1476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1477 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1478 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1479 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1480 <!-- f5 -->
1481 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1482 York: Perennial, 2000).
1483 </para></footnote>
1484 </para>
1485 <para>
1486 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1487 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1488 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1489 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1490 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1491 which are fifty years old."
1492 </para>
1493 <para>
1494 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1495 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1496 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1497 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1498 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1499 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1500 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1501 <!-- f6 -->
1502 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1503 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1504 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1505 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1506 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1507 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1508 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1509 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1510 </para></footnote>
1511 </para>
1512 <para>
1513 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1514 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1515 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1516 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1517 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1518 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1519 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1520 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1521 culture?
1522 </para>
1523 <para>
1524 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1525 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1526 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1527 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1528 to prosecute cases like this."
1529 </para>
1530 <para>
1531 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1532 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1533 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1534 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1535 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1536 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1537 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1538 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1539 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1540 their clients or hurt them?
1541 Let's pause for a moment.
1542 </para>
1543 <para>
1544 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1545 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1546 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1547 </para>
1548 <para>
1549 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1550 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1551 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1552 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1553 <!-- f7 -->
1554 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1555 Vaidhyanathan,
1556 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1557 University
1558 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1559 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1560 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1561 nature of those rights is very different.
1562 </para></footnote>
1563 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1564 property;
1565 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1566 intellectual property.
1567 </para>
1568 <para>
1569 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1570 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1571 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1572 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1573 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1574 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1575 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1576 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1577 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1578 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1579 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1580 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1581 the public domain.
1582 </para>
1583 <para>
1584 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1585 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1586 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1587
1588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1589 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1590 freedom is good.
1591 </para>
1592 <para>
1593 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1594 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1595 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1596 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1597 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1598 form, whether large or small.
1599 </para>
1600 <para>
1601 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1602 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1603 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1604 particular find it hard to say why.
1605 </para>
1606 <para>
1607 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1608 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1609 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1610 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1611 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1612 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1613 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1614 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1615 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1616 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1617 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1618 films in 1997.
1619 </para>
1620 <para>
1621 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1622 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1623 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1624 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1625 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1626 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1627 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1628 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1630 </para>
1631 <para>
1632 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1633 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1634 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1635 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1636 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1637 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1638 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1639 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1640 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1641 </para>
1642 <para>
1643 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1644 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1645 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1646 </para>
1647
1648 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1649 </sect1>
1650 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1651 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1652 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1653 <para>
1654 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1655 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1656 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1657 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1658 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1659 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1660 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1661 </para>
1662 <para>
1663 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1664 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1665 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1666 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1667 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1668 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1669 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1670 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1671 amateurs.
1672 </para>
1673 <para>
1674 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1675 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1677 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1678 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1679 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1680 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1681 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1682 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1683 population of photographers.
1684 </para>
1685 <para>
1686 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1687 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1688 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1689 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1690 <!-- f1 -->
1691 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1692 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1693 </para>
1694 <blockquote>
1695 <para>
1696 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1697 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1698 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1699 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1700 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1701 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1702 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1703 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1704 chemicals.<footnote>
1705 <para>
1706 <!-- f2 -->
1707 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1708 1977), 53.
1709 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1710 </para></footnote>
1711 </para>
1712 </blockquote>
1713 <para>
1714 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1715 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1716 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1717 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1718 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1719 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1720 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1721 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1722 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1723 percent.<footnote><para>
1724 <!-- f3 -->
1725 Jenkins, 177.
1726 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1727 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1728 <!-- f4 -->
1729 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1730 </para></footnote>
1731 </para>
1732 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1733 <para>
1734
1735 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1736 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1737 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1738 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1739 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1740 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1741 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1742 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1743 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1744 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1745 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1746 <!-- f5 -->
1747 Coe, 58.
1748 </para></footnote>
1749 </para>
1750 <para>
1751 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1752 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1753 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1754 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1755 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1756 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1757 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1758 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1759 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1760 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1761 have before.
1762 </para>
1763 <para>
1764 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1765 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1766 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1767 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1768 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1769 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1770 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1771 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1772 <!-- f6 -->
1773 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1774 </para></footnote>
1775 </para>
1776 <para>
1777 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1778 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1779 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1780 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1781 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1782 draw
1783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1784 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1785 that they thought valuable.
1786 </para>
1787 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1788 <para>
1789 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1790 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1791 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1792 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1793 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1794 <para>
1795 <!-- f7 -->
1796 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1797 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1798 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1799 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1800 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1801 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1802 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1803 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1804 </para>
1805 <para>
1806 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1807 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1808 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1809 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1810 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1811 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1812 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1813 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1814 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1815 <!-- f8 -->
1816 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1817 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1818 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1819 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1820 (1993).
1821 </para></footnote>)
1822 </para>
1823 <para>
1824 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1825 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1826 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1827 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1828 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1829 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1830 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1831 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1832 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1833 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1834 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1835 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1836 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1837 </para>
1838 <para>
1839
1840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1841 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1842 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1843 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1844 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1845 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1846 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1847 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1848 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1849 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1850 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1851 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1852 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1853 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1854 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1855 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1856 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1857 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1858 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1859 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1860 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1861 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1862 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1863 learn.
1864 </para>
1865 <para>
1866 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1867 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1868 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1869 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1870 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1871 <!-- f9 -->
1872 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1873 Software
1874 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1875 February 2002, available at
1876 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1877 </para></footnote>
1878 These buses are filled with technology that
1879 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1880 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1881 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1882 teachers call "media literacy."
1883 </para>
1884 <para>
1885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1886 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1887 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1888 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1889 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1890 the way people access it."
1891 </para>
1892 <para>
1893 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1894 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1895 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1896 about.
1897 </para>
1898 <para>
1899 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1900 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1901 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1902 <!-- f10 -->
1903 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1904 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1905 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1906 </para></footnote>
1907 it is increasingly important to understand the
1908 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1909 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1910 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1911 constructing
1912 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1913 </para>
1914 <para>
1915 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1916 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1917 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1918 sequence
1919 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1920 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1921 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1922 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1923 emotion or builds suspense.
1924 </para>
1925 <para>
1926 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1927 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1928 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1929 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1930 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1931 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1932 </para>
1933 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1934 <para>
1935 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1936 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1937 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1938
1939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1940 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1941 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1942 texture."<footnote>
1943 <para>
1944 <!-- f11 -->
1945 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1946 2002.
1947 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1948 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1949 </para></footnote>
1950 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1951 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1952 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1953 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1954 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1955 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1956 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1957 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1958 <!-- f12 -->
1959 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1960 November 2000, available at
1961 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1962 available at
1963 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1964 </para></footnote>
1965 </para>
1966 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1967 <para>
1968 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1969 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1970 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1971 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1972 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1973 </para>
1974 <para>
1975 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1976 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1977 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1978 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1979 </para>
1980 <blockquote>
1981 <para>
1982 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1983 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1984 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1985 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1986 being read-only.
1987 </para>
1988 </blockquote>
1989 <para>
1990 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1991 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1992 twentieth century.
1993 </para>
1994 <para>
1995 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1996 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1997 understanding
1998 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1999 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
2000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2001 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2002 appropriate
2003 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
2004 <para>
2005 <!-- f13 -->
2006 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2007 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2008 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2009 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2010 <!-- f14 -->
2011 Ibid.
2012 </para></footnote>
2013 </para>
2014 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2015 <para>
2016 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2017 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2018 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2019 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2020 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2021 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2022 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2023 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2024 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2025 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2026 </para>
2027 <para>
2028 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2029 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2030 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2031 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2032 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2033 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2034 </para>
2035 <para>
2036 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2037 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2038 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2039 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2040 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2041 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2042 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2043 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2044 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2045 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2046 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2047 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2048 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2049 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2050 to this form of expression.
2051 </para>
2052 <para>
2053
2054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2055 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2056 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2057 Daley
2058 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2059 meaning."
2060 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2061 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2062 increasingly,
2063 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2064 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2065 </para>
2066 <blockquote>
2067 <para>
2068 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2069 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2070 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2071 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2072 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2073 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2074 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2075 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2076 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2077 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2078 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2079 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2080 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2081 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2082 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2083 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2084 about the topic. . . .
2085 </para>
2086 <para>
2087 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2088 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2089 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2090 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2091 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2092 </para>
2093 <para>
2094 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2095 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2096 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2098 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2099 had a lot of power with this language."
2100 </para>
2101 </blockquote>
2102 <para>
2103 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2104 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2105 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2106 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2107 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2108 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2109 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2110 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2111 world would be watching.
2112 </para>
2113 <para>
2114 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2115 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2116 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2117 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2118 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2119 entertainment is tragedy.
2120 </para>
2121 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2122 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2123 <para>
2124 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2125 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2126 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2127 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2128 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2129 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2130 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2131 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2132 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2133 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2134 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2135 was also the Internet.
2136 </para>
2137 <para>
2138 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2139 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2140 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2141 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2142 movie
2143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2144 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2145 with sound or text.
2146 </para>
2147 <para>
2148 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2149 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2150 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2151 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2152 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2153 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2154 spread practically instantaneously.
2155 </para>
2156 <para>
2157 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2158 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2159 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2160 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2161 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2162 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2163 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2164 </para>
2165 <para>
2166 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2167 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2168 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2169 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2170 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2171 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2172 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2173 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2174 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2175 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2176 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2177 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2178 </para>
2179 <para>
2180 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2181 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2182 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2183 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2184 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2185 people vote
2186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2187 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2188 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2189 </para>
2190 <para>
2191 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2192 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2193 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2194 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2195 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2196 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2197 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2198 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2199 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2200 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2201 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2202 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2203 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2204 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2205 <!-- f15 -->
2206 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2207 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2208 </para></footnote>
2209 </para>
2210 <para>
2211 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2212 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2213 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2214 <!-- f16 -->
2215 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2216 Political
2217 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2218 </para></footnote>
2219 And in some towns in
2220 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2221 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2222 deliberation"
2223 to occur.
2224 </para>
2225 <para>
2226 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2227 occur.
2228 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2229 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2230 politics
2231 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2232 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2233 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2234 <!-- f17 -->
2235 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2236 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2237 </para></footnote> We say what our
2238 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2239 </para>
2240 <para>
2241 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2242 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2243 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2244 Technologies
2245 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2246 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2247
2248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2249 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2250 place.
2251 </para>
2252 <para>
2253 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2254 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2255 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2256 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2257 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2258 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2259 </para>
2260 <para>
2261 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2262 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2263 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2264 reading
2265 is having an effect.
2266 </para>
2267 <para>
2268 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2269 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2270 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2271 praising
2272 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2273 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2274 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2275 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2276 instances
2277 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2278 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2279 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2280 <!-- f18 -->
2281 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2282 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2283 </para></footnote>
2284 </para>
2285 <para>
2286 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2287 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2288 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2289 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2290 on.
2291 </para>
2292 <para>
2293 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2294 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2295 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2296 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2297 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2298 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2299 peer-generated rankings.
2300 </para>
2301 <para>
2302 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2304 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2305 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2306 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2307 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2308 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2309 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2310 get it out of the way."
2311 </para>
2312 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2313 <para>
2314 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2315 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2316 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2317 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2318 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2319 <!-- f19 -->
2320 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2321 </para></footnote>
2322 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2323 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2324 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2325 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2326 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2327 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2328 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2329 </para>
2330 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2331 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2332 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2333 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2334 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2335 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2336 had seen.<footnote><para>
2337 <!-- f20 -->
2338 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2339 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2340 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2341 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2342 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2343 </para></footnote>
2344 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2345 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2346 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2347 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2348 </para>
2349 <para>
2350 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2351 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2352 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2353 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2354 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2355 <para>
2356 <!-- f21 -->
2357 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2358 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2359 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2360 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2361 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2362 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2363 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2364 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2365 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2366 </para></footnote>
2367 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2368
2369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2370 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2371 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2372 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2373 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2374 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2375 </para>
2376 <para>
2377 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2378 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2379 gatekeeper."
2380 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2381 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2382 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2383 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2384 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2385 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2386 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2387 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2388 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2389 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2390 extraordinary
2391 to report.
2392 </para>
2393 <para>
2394 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2395 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2396 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2397 </para>
2398 <para>
2399 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2400 differently
2401 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2402 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2403 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2404 </para>
2405 <para>
2406 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2407 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2408 lawnmower
2409 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2410 technologies
2411 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2412 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2413 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2415 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2416 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2417 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2418 tinkering of many others.
2419 </para>
2420 <para>
2421 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2422 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2423 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2424 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2425 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2426 </para>
2427 <para>
2428 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2429 platform,"
2430 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2431 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2432 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2433 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2434 becomes
2435 a major apprenticeship platform."
2436 </para>
2437 <para>
2438 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2439 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2440 abstract,
2441 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2442 doing
2443 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2444 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2445 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2446 </para>
2447 <para>
2448 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2449 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2450 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2451 multiple
2452 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2453 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2454 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2455 artistic,
2456 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2457 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2458 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2459 </para>
2460 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2461 <para>
2462 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2463 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2464
2465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2466 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2467 of recognition.
2468 </para>
2469 <para>
2470 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2471 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2472 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2473 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2474 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2475 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2476 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2477 </para>
2478 <para>
2479 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2480 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2481 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2482 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2483 general.<footnote><para>
2484 <!-- f22 -->
2485 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2486 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2487 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2488 </para></footnote>
2489 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2490 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2491 </para>
2492 <para>
2493 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2494 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2495 and want to learn."
2496 </para>
2497 <para>
2498 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2499 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2500 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2501 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2502 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2503 </para>
2504 <para>
2505 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2506 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2507 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2508 the law to close down that technology.
2509 </para>
2510 <para>
2511 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2512 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2513 </para>
2514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2515 </sect1>
2516 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2517 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2518 <para>
2519 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2520 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2521 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2522 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2523 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2524 </para>
2525 <para>
2526 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2527 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2528 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2529 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2530 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2531 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2532 </para>
2533 <para>
2534 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2535 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2536 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2537 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2538 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2539 </para>
2540 <para>
2541 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2542 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2543 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2544 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2545 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2546 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2547 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2548 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2549 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2550 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2551 </para>
2552 <para>
2553 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2554 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2555 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2556 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2557 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2558 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2559 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2560 </para>
2561 <para>
2562 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2563 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2564 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2565 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2566 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2567 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2568 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2569 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2570 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2571 on-line.
2572 </para>
2573 <para>
2574 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2575 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2576 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2577 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2578 be on users' computers.
2579 </para>
2580 <para>
2581 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2582 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2583 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2584 students
2585 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2587 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2588 computer.
2589 </para>
2590 <para>
2591 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2592 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2593 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2594 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2595 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2596 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2597 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2598 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2599 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2600 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2601 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2602 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2603 supposed to do.
2604 </para>
2605 <para>
2606 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2607 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2608 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2609 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2610 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2611 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2612 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2613 </para>
2614 <para>
2615 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2616 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2617 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2618 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2619 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2620 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2621 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2622 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2623 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2624 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2625 </para>
2626 <para>
2627 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2628 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2630 demanded
2631 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2632 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2633 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2634 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2635 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2636 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2637 </para>
2638 <para>
2639 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2640 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2641 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2642 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2643 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2644 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2645 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2646 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2647 <!-- f1 -->
2648 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2649 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2650 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2651 </para></footnote>
2652 </para>
2653 <para>
2654 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2655 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2656 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2657 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2658 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2659 </para>
2660 <para>
2661 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2662 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2663 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2664 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2665 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2666 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2667 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2668 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2669 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2670 </para>
2671 <para>
2672 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2673 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2674 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2675 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2676 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2678 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2679 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2680 </para>
2681 <para>
2682 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2683 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2684 </para>
2685 <para>
2686 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2687 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2688 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2689 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2690 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2691 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2692 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2693 <!-- f2 -->
2694 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2695 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2696 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2697 </para></footnote>
2698 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2699 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2700 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2701 <!-- f3 -->
2702 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2703 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2704 </para></footnote>
2705 </para>
2706 <para>
2707 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2708 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2709 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2710 activist:
2711 </para>
2712 <blockquote>
2713 <para>
2714 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2715 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2716 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2717 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2718 </para>
2719 </blockquote>
2720 <para>
2721 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2722 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2723 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2724 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2725 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2726 </para>
2727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2728 </sect1>
2729 <sect1 id="pirates">
2730 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2731 <para>
2732 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2733 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2734 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2735 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2736 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2737 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2738 </para>
2739 <sect2 id="film">
2740 <title>Film</title>
2741 <para>
2742 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2743 <!-- f1 -->
2744 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2745 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2746 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2747 </para></footnote>
2748 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2749 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2750 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2751 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2752 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2753 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2754 this creative property
2755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2756 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2757 </para>
2758 <para>
2759 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2760 </para>
2761 <blockquote>
2762 <para>
2763 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2764 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2765 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2766 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2767 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2768 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2769 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2770 </para>
2771 <para>
2772 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2773 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2774 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2775 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2776 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2777 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2778 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2779 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2780 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2781 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2782 <!-- f2 -->
2783 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2784 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2785 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2786 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2787 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2788 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2789 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2790 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2791 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2792 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2793 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2794 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2795 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2796 </para>
2797 </blockquote>
2798 <para>
2799 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2800 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2801 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2802 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2803 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2804 <!-- f3 -->
2805 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2806 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2807 </para></footnote>
2808 That led the independents to flee the East
2809 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2810 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2811 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2812 did just that.
2813 </para>
2814 <para>
2815 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2816 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2817 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2818
2819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2820 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2821 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2822 Edison's creative property.
2823 </para>
2824 </sect2>
2825 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2826 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2827 <para>
2828 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2829 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2830 </para>
2831 <para>
2832 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2833 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2834 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2835 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2836 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2837 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2838 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2839 right to perform it publicly.
2840 </para>
2841 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2842 <para>
2843 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2844 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2845 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2846 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2847 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2848 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2849 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2850 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2851 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2852 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2853 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2854 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2855 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2856 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2857 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2858 its composer anything.
2859 </para>
2860 <para>
2861 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2863 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2864 put it,
2865 </para>
2866 <blockquote>
2867 <para>
2868 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2869 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2870 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2871 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2872 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2873 rights.<footnote><para>
2874 <!-- f4 -->
2875 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2876 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2877 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2878 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2879 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2880 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2881 </para></footnote>
2882 </para>
2883 </blockquote>
2884 <para>
2885 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2886 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2887 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2888 <!-- f5 -->
2889 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2890 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2891 </para></footnote>
2892 and the "music publishing industry"
2893 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2894 <!-- f6 -->
2895 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2896 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2897 </para></footnote>
2898 As John Philip
2899 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2900 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2901 <!-- f7 -->
2902 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2903 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2904 </para></footnote>
2905 </para>
2906 <para>
2907 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2908 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2909 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2910 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2911 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2912 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2913 <!-- f8 -->
2914 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2915 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2916 Perforating
2917 Company of New York).
2918 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2919 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2920 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2921 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2922 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2923 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2924 <!-- f9 -->
2925 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2926 (prepared
2927 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2928 American
2929 Graphophone Company Association).
2930 </para></footnote>
2931 </para>
2932 <para>
2933 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2934 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2935 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2936 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2937 control
2938 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2939 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2940 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2941
2942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2943 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2944 authorizes
2945 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2946 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2947 </para>
2948 <para>
2949 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2950 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2951 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2952 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2953 recordings
2954 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2955 by the statute.
2956 </para>
2957 <para>
2958 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2959 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2960 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2961 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2962 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2963 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2964 Grisham.
2965 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2966 </para>
2967 <para>
2968 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2969 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2970 kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2971 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2972 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2973 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2974 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2975 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2976 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2977 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2978 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2979 creativity.<footnote><para>
2980 <!-- f10 -->
2981 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2982 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2983 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2984 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2985 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2986 </para></footnote>
2987 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2988 </para>
2989 <para>
2990 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2991 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2992 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2993 relates,
2994 </para>
2995 <blockquote>
2996 <para>
2997 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2999 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3000 industry
3001 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3002 importance
3003 in the United States and throughout the world; records
3004 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3005 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3006 access
3007 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3008 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3009 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3010 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3011 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3012 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3013 improved
3014 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
3015 <!-- f11 -->
3016 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3017 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3018 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3019 this report.</para></footnote>
3020 </para>
3021 </blockquote>
3022 <para>
3023 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3024 creative
3025 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3026 </para>
3027 </sect2>
3028 <sect2 id="radio">
3029 <title>Radio</title>
3030 <para>
3031 Radio was also born of piracy.
3032 </para>
3033 <para>
3034 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3035 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3036 <!-- f12 -->
3037 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3038 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3039 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3040 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3041 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3042 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3043 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3044 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3045 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 281.
3046 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3047 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3048 </para></footnote>
3049 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3050 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3051 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3052 </para>
3053 <para>
3054 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3055 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3056 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3057 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3058 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3059 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3060 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3061 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3062 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3063
3064 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3065 </para>
3066 <para>
3067 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3068 radio
3069 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3070 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3071 something
3072 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3073 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3074 playing the song.
3075 </para>
3076 <para>
3077 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3078 music.
3079 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3080 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3081 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3082 </para>
3083 <para>
3084 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3085 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3086 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3087 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3088 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3089 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3090 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3091 </para>
3092 <para>
3093 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3094 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3095 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3096 ordinarily
3097 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3098 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3099 something for nothing.
3100 </para>
3101 </sect2>
3102 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3103 <title>Cable TV</title>
3104 <para>
3105
3106 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3107 </para>
3108 <para>
3109 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3110 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3111 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3112 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3114 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3115 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3116 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3117 give away.
3118 </para>
3119 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3120 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3121 <para>
3122 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3123 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3124 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3125 <!-- f13 -->
3126 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3127 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3128 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3129 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3130 Commission).
3131 </para></footnote>
3132 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3133 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3134 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3135 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3136 <!-- f14 -->
3137 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3138 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3139 </para></footnote>
3140 As another broadcaster put it,
3141 </para>
3142 <blockquote>
3143 <para>
3144 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3145 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3146 paid for.<footnote><para>
3147 <!-- f15 -->
3148 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3149 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3150 </para></footnote>
3151 </para>
3152 </blockquote>
3153 <para>
3154 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3155 </para>
3156 <blockquote>
3157 <para>
3158 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3159 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3160 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3161 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3162 <!-- f16 -->
3163 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3164 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3165 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3166 </para></footnote>
3167 </para>
3168 </blockquote>
3169 <para>
3170 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3171 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3172 compensation."<footnote><para>
3173 <!-- f17 -->
3174 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3175 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3176 </para></footnote>
3177 </para>
3178 <para>
3179 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3180 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3181 </para>
3182 <blockquote>
3183 <para>
3184 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3185 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3186 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3187 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3188
3189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3190 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3191 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3192 <!-- f18 -->
3193 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3194 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3195 </para></footnote>
3196 </para>
3197 </blockquote>
3198 <para>
3199 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3200 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3201 </para>
3202 <para>
3203 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3204 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3205 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3206 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3207 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3208 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3209 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3210 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3211 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3212 created by broadcasters' content.
3213 </para>
3214 <para>
3215 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3216 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3217 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3218 today<footnote><para>
3219 <!-- f19 -->
3220 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3221 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3222 Information, available at
3223 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3224 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3225 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3226 </para></footnote>
3227 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3228 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3229 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3230 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3231 generation&mdash;until now.
3232 </para>
3233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3234 </sect2>
3235 </sect1>
3236 <sect1 id="piracy">
3237 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3238 <para>
3239 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3240 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3241 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3242 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3243 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3244 should stop it.
3245 </para>
3246 <para>
3247 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3248 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3249 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3250 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3251 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3252 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3253 has so often done in the past.
3254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3255 </para>
3256 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3257 <title>Piracy I</title>
3258 <para>
3259 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3260 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3261 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3262 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3263 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3264 <!-- f1 -->
3265 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3266 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3267
3268 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3269 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3270 </para></footnote>
3271 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3272 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3273 worldwide to piracy.
3274 </para>
3275 <para>
3276 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3277 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3278 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3279 This piracy is wrong.
3280 </para>
3281 <para>
3282 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3283 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3284 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3285 foreign
3286 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3287 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3288 developing
3289 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3290 existence, treated as right.
3291 </para>
3292 <para>
3293 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3294 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3295 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3296 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3297 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3298 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3299 violate
3300 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3301 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3302 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3303 </para>
3304 <para>
3305 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3306 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3307 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3308 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3309 pirate
3310 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3311 childhood.
3312 </para>
3313 <para>
3314 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3315 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3316 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3317 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3318 <!-- f2 -->
3319 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3320 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3321 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3322 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3323 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3324 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3325 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3326 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3327 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3328 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3329 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3330 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3331 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3332 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3333 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3334 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3335 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3336 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3337 is wrong.
3338 </para>
3339 <para>
3340 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3341 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3342 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3343 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3344 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3345 <!-- f3 -->
3346 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3347 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3348 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3349 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3350 instance
3351 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3352 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3353 </para></footnote>
3354 </para>
3355 <para>
3356 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3357 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3358 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3359 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3360 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3361 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3362 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3363 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3364 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3365 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3366 piracy of the tangible.
3367 </para>
3368 <para>
3369 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3370 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3371 property
3372 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3373 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3374 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3375 licenses
3376 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3377 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3378 copyrighted
3379 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3380
3381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3382 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3383 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3384 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3385 technology
3386 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3387 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3388 </para>
3389 <para>
3390 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3391 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3392 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3393 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3394 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3395 nation
3396 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3397 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3398 benefit
3399 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3400 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3401 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3402 Microsoft.
3403 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3404 </para>
3405 <para>
3406 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3407 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3408 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3409 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3410 become
3411 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3412 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3413 </para>
3414 <para>
3415 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3416 alcoholic
3417 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3418 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3419 ordinarily
3420 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3421 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3422 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3423 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3424 giving
3425 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3426 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3427 copyright
3428 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3429 wrong.
3430 </para>
3431 <para>
3432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3433 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3434 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3435 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3436 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3437 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3438 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3439 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3440 is flat out wrong.
3441 </para>
3442 <para>
3443 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3444 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3445 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3446 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3447 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3448 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3449 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3450 </para>
3451 <para>
3452 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3453 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3454 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3455 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3456 </para>
3457 <para>
3458 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3459 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3460 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3461 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3462 </para>
3463 <para>
3464 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3465 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3466 sharing
3467 to survive.
3468 </para>
3469 </sect2>
3470 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3471 <title>Piracy II</title>
3472 <para>
3473 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3474 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3475 <!-- f4 -->
3476 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3477 </para></footnote>
3478 This means we must determine whether
3479 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3481 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3482 author of his profit.
3483 </para>
3484 <para>
3485 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3486 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3487 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3488 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3489 <!-- f5 -->
3490 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3491 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3492 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3493 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3494 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3495 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3496 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3497 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3498 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3499 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3500 put together components that had been developed independently.
3501 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3502 </para>
3503 <para>
3504 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3505 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3506 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3507 system.<footnote><para>
3508 <!-- f6 -->
3509 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3510 Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3511 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3512 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3513 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3514 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3515 </para></footnote>
3516 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3517 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3518 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3519 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3520 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3521 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3522 or your 20,000 best friends.
3523 </para>
3524 <para>
3525 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3526 Americans
3527 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3528 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3529 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3530 <!-- f7 -->
3531 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3532 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3533 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3534 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3535 </para></footnote>
3536 A survey by the NPD
3537 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3538 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3539 <!-- f8 -->
3540 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3541 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3542 </para></footnote>
3543 The vast
3544 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3545 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3546 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3547 enjoy
3548 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3549 </para>
3550 <para>
3551 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3552 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3553 infringement,
3554 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3555 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3556 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3557 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3558 </para>
3559 <para>
3560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3561 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3562 different kinds into four types.
3563 </para>
3564 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3565 <listitem><para>
3566 <!-- A. -->
3567 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3568 purchasing
3569 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3570 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3571 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3572 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3573 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3574 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3575 instead
3576 of purchasing.
3577 </para></listitem>
3578 <listitem><para>
3579 <!-- B. -->
3580 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3581 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3582 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3583 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3584 succeed.
3585 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3586 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3587 recommendations
3588 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3589 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3590 </para></listitem>
3591 <listitem><para>
3592 <!-- C. -->
3593 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3594 copyrighted
3595 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3596 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3597 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3598 rewarding
3599 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3600 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3601 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3602 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3603 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3604 available.)
3605 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3606 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3607 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3608 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3609 a local collector.
3610 </para></listitem>
3611 <listitem><para>
3612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3613 <!-- D. -->
3614 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3615 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3616 wants to give away.
3617 </para></listitem>
3618 </orderedlist>
3619 <para>
3620 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3621 </para>
3622 <para>
3623 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3624 perspective
3625 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3626 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3627 <!-- f9 -->
3628 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3629 </para></footnote>
3630 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3631 illegal,
3632 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3633 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3634 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3635 certainly
3636 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3637 suggests.
3638 </para>
3639 <para>
3640 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3641 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3642 Hollywood,
3643 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3644 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3645 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3646 that is "devastating" the industry.
3647 </para>
3648 <para>
3649 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3650 harmful
3651 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3652 practice
3653 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3654 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3655 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3656 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3657 <!-- f10 -->
3658 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3659 Industry's
3660 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3661 industry's
3662 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3663 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3664 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3665 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3666 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3667 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3668 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3669 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3670 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3671 </para></footnote>
3672 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3673 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3674 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3675 problem,
3676 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3677 </para>
3678 <para>
3679 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3680 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3681 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3682 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3683 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3684 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3685 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3686 <!-- f11 -->
3687 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3688 </para></footnote>
3689 </para>
3690 <para>
3691 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3692 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3693 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3694 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3695 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3696 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3697 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3698 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3699 </para>
3700 <para>
3701 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3702 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3703 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3704 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3705 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3706 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3707 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3708 </para>
3709 <para>
3710 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3711 because
3712 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3713 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3714 </para>
3715 <para>
3716 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3717 percent,
3718 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3719 <!-- f12 -->
3720 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3721 available at
3722 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3723 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3724 25 June 2003, available at
3725 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3726 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3727 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3728 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3729 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3730 music
3731 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3732 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3733 </para></footnote>
3734 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3735 Internet
3736 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3737 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3738 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3739 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3740 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3741 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3742 <!-- f13 -->
3743 <para>
3744 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3745 February 2003, available at
3746 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3747 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3748 </para>
3749 </footnote>
3750 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3751 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3752 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3753 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3754 <!-- f14 -->
3755 Ibid.
3756 </para></footnote>
3757 </para>
3758 <para>
3759
3760 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3761 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3762 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3763 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3764 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3765 although
3766 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3767 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3768 </para>
3769 <para>
3770 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3771 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3772 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3773 between
3774 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3775 numbers
3776 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3777 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3778 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3779 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3780 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3781 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3782 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3783 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3784 between
3785 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3786 </para>
3787 <para>
3788 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3789 assume,
3790 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3791 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3792 costs?
3793 </para>
3794 <para>
3795 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3796 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3797 available.
3798 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3799 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3800 <!-- f15 -->
3801 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3802 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3803 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3804 Committee
3805 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3806 statement
3807 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3808 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3809 </para></footnote>
3810 And while it's
3811 conceivable
3812 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3813 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3814 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3815 distributor
3816 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3817 make it available.
3818 </para>
3819 <para>
3820 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3822 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3823 thousands
3824 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3825 <!-- f16 -->
3826 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3827 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3828 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3829 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3830 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3831 National
3832 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3833 Results,"
3834 available at
3835 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3836 </para></footnote>
3837 These
3838 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3839 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3840 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3841 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3842 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3843 companies
3844 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3845 owner for the content they sell.
3846 </para>
3847 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3848 <para>
3849 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3850 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3851 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3852 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3853 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3854 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3855 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3856 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3857 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3858 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3859 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3860 </para>
3861 <para>
3862 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3863 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3864 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3865 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3866 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3867 shut as well?
3868 </para>
3869 <para>
3870 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3871 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3872 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3873 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3874 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3875 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3876
3877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3878 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3879 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3880 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3881 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3882 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3883 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3884 great book!)
3885 </para>
3886 <para>
3887 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3888 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3889 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3890 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3891 </para>
3892 <para>
3893 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3894 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3895 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3896 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3897 unavailable?"
3898 </para>
3899 <para>
3900 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3901 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3902 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3903 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3904 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3905 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3906 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3907 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3908 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3909 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3910 found only with time.
3911 </para>
3912 <para>
3913 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3914 just what you call type A sharing?"
3915 </para>
3916 <para>
3917 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3918 effect
3919 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3920 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3921 Napster
3922 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3923 developed
3924 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3926 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3927 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3928 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3929 <!-- f17 -->
3930 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3931 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3932 MHP, available at
3933 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3934 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3935 Fanning's
3936 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3937 </para></footnote>
3938 </para>
3939 <para>
3940 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3941 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3942 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3943 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3944 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3945 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3946 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3947 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3948 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3949 </para>
3950 <para>
3951 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3952 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3953 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3954 content
3955 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3956 technology.
3957 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3958 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3959 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3960 </para>
3961 <para>
3962 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3963 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3964 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3965 composers,
3966 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3967 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3968 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3969 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3970 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3971 broadcast),
3972 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3973 </para>
3974 <para>
3975 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3976 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3977 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3978 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3979 companies
3980 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3981 </para>
3982 <para>
3983
3984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3985 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3986 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3987 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3988 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3989 Second,
3990 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3991 content
3992 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3993 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3994 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3995 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3996 Congress
3997 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3998 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3999 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
4000 control
4001 over the future (cable).
4002 </para>
4003 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
4004 <para>
4005 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4006 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4007 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4008 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4009 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4010 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4011 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4012 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4013 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4014 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4015 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4016 </para>
4017 <para>
4018 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4019 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4020 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4021 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4022 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4023 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4024 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4025 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4027 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4028 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4029 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4030 for the architecture it chose.
4031 </para>
4032 <para>
4033 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4034 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4035 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4036 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4037 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4038 copyright."<footnote><para>
4039 <!-- f18 -->
4040 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4041 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4042 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4043 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4044 </para></footnote>
4045 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4046 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4047 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4048 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4049 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4050 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4051 <!-- f19 -->
4052 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4053 </para></footnote>
4054 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4055 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4056 <!-- f20 -->
4057 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4058 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4059 </para></footnote>
4060 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4061 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4062 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4063 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4064 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4065 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4066 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4067 <!-- f21 -->
4068 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4069 of Jack Valenti).
4070 </para></footnote>
4071 </para>
4072 <para>
4073 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4074 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4075 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4076 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4077 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4078 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4079 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4080 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4081 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4082 technology.<footnote><para>
4083 <!-- f22 -->
4084 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4085 1981).
4086 </para></footnote>
4087 </para>
4088 <para>
4089 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4090
4091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4092 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4093 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4094 Court wrote,
4095 </para>
4096 <blockquote>
4097 <para>
4098 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4099 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4100 market
4101 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4102 authority
4103 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4104 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4105 implicated
4106 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4107 <!-- f23 -->
4108 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4109 </para></footnote>
4110 </para>
4111 </blockquote>
4112 <para>
4113 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4114 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4115 Congress
4116 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4117 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4118 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4119 </para>
4120
4121 <table id="t1">
4122 <title>Table</title>
4123 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4124 <thead>
4125 <row>
4126 <entry>CASE</entry>
4127 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4128 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4129 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4130 </row>
4131 </thead>
4132 <tbody>
4133 <row>
4134 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4135 <entry>Composers</entry>
4136 <entry>No protection</entry>
4137 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4138 </row>
4139 <row>
4140 <entry>Radio</entry>
4141 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4142 <entry>N/A</entry>
4143 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4144 </row>
4145 <row>
4146 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4147 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4148 <entry>No protection</entry>
4149 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4150 </row>
4151 <row>
4152 <entry>VCR</entry>
4153 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4154 <entry>No protection</entry>
4155 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4156 </row>
4157 </tbody>
4158 </tgroup>
4159 </table>
4160
4161 <para>
4162 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4163 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4164 <!-- f24 -->
4165 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4166 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4167 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4168 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4169 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4170 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4171 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4172 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4173 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4174 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4175 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4176 </para></footnote>
4177 In each case, throughout our history,
4178 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4179 work.
4180 </para>
4181 <para>
4182 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4183 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4184 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4185 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4186 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4187 legitimacy
4188 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4189 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4190 the interests at stake.
4191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4192 </para>
4193 <para>
4194 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4195 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4196 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4197 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4198 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4199 regulated?
4200 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4201 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4202 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4203 permission to record a song?
4204 </para>
4205 <para>
4206 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4207 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4208 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4209 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4210 <!-- f25 -->
4211 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4212 (1984).
4213 </para></footnote>
4214 Instead, the particular uses that the
4215 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4216 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4217 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4218 technology
4219 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4220 the distribution of content.
4221 </para>
4222 <para>
4223 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4224 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4225 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4226 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4227 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4228 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4229 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4230 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4231 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4232 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4233 protection
4234 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4235 continue.
4236 </para>
4237 <para>
4238
4239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4240 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4241 superior
4242 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4243 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4244 network.
4245 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4246 efficient.
4247 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4248 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4249 <!-- f26 -->
4250 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4251 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4252 </para></footnote>
4253 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4254 warriors
4255 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4256 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4257 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4258 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4259 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4260 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4261 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4262 </para>
4263 <para>
4264 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4265 just as any other property is protected."
4266 </para>
4267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4268 </sect2>
4269 </sect1>
4270 </chapter>
4271 <chapter id="c-property">
4272 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4273 <para>
4274
4275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4276 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4277 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4278 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4279 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4280 the price she can get.
4281 </para>
4282 <para>
4283 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4284 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4285 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4286 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4287 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4288 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4289 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4290 going
4291 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4292 thing I am taking then?
4293 </para>
4294 <para>
4295 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4296 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4298 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4299 narrow
4300 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4301 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4302 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4303 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4304 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4305 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4306 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4307 <!-- f1 -->
4308 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4309 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4310 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4311 </para></footnote>
4312 </para>
4313 <para>
4314 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4315 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4316 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4317 expression
4318 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4319 property.
4320 </para>
4321 <para>
4322 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4323 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4324 turning
4325 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4326 "property"
4327 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4328 <!-- f2 -->
4329 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4330 intangible.
4331 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4332 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4333 physical
4334 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4335 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4336 Property?
4337 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4338 373, 429 n. 241.
4339 </para></footnote>
4340 </para>
4341 <para>
4342 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4343 preceding
4344 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4345 material
4346 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4347 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4348 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4349 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4350 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4351 us draw.
4352 </para>
4353
4354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4355 <sect1 id="founders">
4356 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4357 <para>
4358 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4359 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4360 Shakespeare
4361 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4362 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4363 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4364 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4365 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4366 adaptation
4367 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4368 </para>
4369 <para>
4370 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4371 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4372 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4373 <!-- f1 -->
4374 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4375 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4376 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4377 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4378 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4379 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4380 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4381 </para></footnote>
4382 Tonson was the
4383 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4384 <!-- f2 -->
4385 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4386 Vanderbilt
4387 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4388 </para></footnote>
4389 who
4390 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4391 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4392 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4394 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4395 copyright.
4396 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4397 produce
4398 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4399 </para>
4400 <para>
4401 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4402 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4403 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4404 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4405 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4406 renewable
4407 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4408 published
4409 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4410 <!-- f3 -->
4411 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4412 "copyright
4413 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4414 </para></footnote>
4415 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4416 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4417 </para>
4418 <para>
4419 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4420 "copyright"
4421 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4422 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4423 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4424 expired
4425 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4426 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4427 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4428 publishers,
4429 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4430 </para>
4431 <para>
4432 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4433 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4434 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4435 govern
4436 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4437 "positive
4438 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4439 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4440 legislature,
4441 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4442 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4443 expired
4444 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4445 independent
4446 of any positive law.
4447 </para>
4448 <para>
4449 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4450 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4451 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4452 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4453
4454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4455 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4456 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4457 ultimately
4458 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4459 </para>
4460 <para>
4461 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4462 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4463 however,
4464 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4465 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4466 "expired,"
4467 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4468 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4469 </para>
4470 <para>
4471 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4472 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4473 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4474 </para>
4475 <para>
4476 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4477 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4478 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4479 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4480 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4481 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4482 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4483 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4484 reason
4485 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4486 </para>
4487 <para>
4488 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4489 special
4490 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4491 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4492 "booksellers."
4493 </para>
4494 <para>
4495 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4496 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4497 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4498 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4499 others
4500 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4501 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4502 beyond
4503 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4505 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4506 restrictions
4507 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4508 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4509 perform, and so on.
4510 </para>
4511 <para>
4512 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4513 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4514 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4515 permission
4516 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4517 anything,
4518 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4519 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4520 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4521 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4522 </para>
4523 <para>
4524 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4525 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4526 especially
4527 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4528 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4529 monopolies&mdash;especially
4530 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4531 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4532 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4533 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4534 Monopolies,
4535 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4536 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4537 publishing.
4538 </para>
4539 <para>
4540 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4541 naturally
4542 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4543 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4544 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4545 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4546 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4547 specialinterest
4548 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4549 </para>
4550 <para>
4551 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4552 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4553 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4554 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4556 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4557 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4558 themselves
4559 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4560 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4561 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4562 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4563 <!-- f4 -->
4564 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4565 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4566 </para></footnote>
4567 </para>
4568 <para>
4569 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4570 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4571 Enlightenment
4572 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4573 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4574 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4575 that idea.
4576 </para>
4577 <para>
4578 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4579 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4580 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4581 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4582 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4583 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4584 compromise
4585 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4586 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4587 construction and spread of culture.
4588 </para>
4589 <para>
4590 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4591 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4592 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4593 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4594 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4595 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4596 they said; they needed more time.
4597 </para>
4598 <para>
4599 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4600 words that echo today,
4601 </para>
4602 <blockquote>
4603 <para>
4604 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4605 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4607 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4608 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4609 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4610 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4611 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4612 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4613 <!-- f5 -->
4614 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4615 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4616 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4617 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4618 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4619 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4620 al., 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4621 </para></footnote>
4622 </para>
4623 </blockquote>
4624 <para>
4625 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4626 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4627 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4628 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4629 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4630 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4631 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4632 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4633 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4634 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4635 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4636 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4637 way to protect authors.
4638 </para>
4639 <para>
4640 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4641 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4642 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4643 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4644 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4645 <!-- f6 -->
4646 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4647 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4648 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4649 </para></footnote>
4650 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4651 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4652 </para>
4653 <para>
4654 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4655 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4656 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4657 <!-- f7 -->
4658 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4659 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4660 </para></footnote>
4661 </para>
4662 <para>
4663 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4664 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4665 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4666 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4667 <!-- f8 -->
4668 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4669 1993), 92.
4670 </para></footnote>
4671 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4673 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4674 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4675 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4676 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4677 <!-- f9 -->
4678 Ibid., 93.
4679 </para></footnote>
4680 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4681 </para>
4682 <para>
4683 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4684 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4685 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4686 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4687 Property."<footnote><para>
4688 <!-- f10 -->
4689 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4690 Borwell).
4691 </para></footnote>
4692 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4693 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4694 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4695 </para>
4696 <para>
4697 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4698 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4699 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4700 </para>
4701 <para>
4702 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4703 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4704 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4705 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4706 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4707 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4708 <!-- f11 -->
4709 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4710 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29
4711 (1983): 1152.
4712 </para></footnote>
4713 </para>
4714 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4715 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4716 </indexterm>
4717 <para>
4718 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4719 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4720 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4721 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4722 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4723 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4724 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4725 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4726 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4727 </para>
4728 <para>
4729 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4730 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4731 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4732 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4733 with in 1710: How best to limit
4734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4735 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4736 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4737 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4738 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4739 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4740 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4741 </para>
4742 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4743 <para>
4744 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4745 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4746 </para>
4747 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4748 <para>
4749 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4750 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4751 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4752 <!-- f12 -->
4753 Ibid., 1156.
4754 </para></footnote>
4755 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4756 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4757 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4758 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4759 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4760 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4761 </para>
4762 <para>
4763 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4764 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4765 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4766 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4767 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4768 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4769 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4770 statute were no longer protected.
4771 </para>
4772 <para>
4773 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4774 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4775 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4776 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4777 House of Lords generally voted.
4778 </para>
4779 <para>
4780 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4781 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4783 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4784 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4785 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4786 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4787 passed into the public domain.
4788 </para>
4789 <para>
4790 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4791 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4792 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4793 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4794 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4795 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4796 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4797 legal restraint.
4798 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4799 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4800 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4801 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4802 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4803 </para>
4804 <para>
4805 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4806 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4807 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4808 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4809 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4810 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4811 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4812 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4813 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4814 <!-- f13 -->
4815 Rose, 97.
4816 </para></footnote>
4817 </para>
4818 <para>
4819 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4820 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4821 reported:
4822 </para>
4823 <blockquote>
4824 <para>
4825 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4826 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4827 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4828 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4829 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4830 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4831 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4832 successors.<footnote><para>
4833 <!-- f14 -->
4834 Ibid.
4835 </para></footnote>
4836 </para>
4837 </blockquote>
4838 <para>
4839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4840 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4841 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4842 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4843 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4844 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4845 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4846 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4847 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4848 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4849 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4850 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4851 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4852 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4853 readers chose to let it develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought
4854 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4855 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4856 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4857 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4858 </para>
4859 <para>
4860 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4861 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4862 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4863 protected.
4864 </para>
4865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4866 </sect1>
4867 <sect1 id="recorders">
4868 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4869 <para>
4870 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4871 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4872 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4873 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4874 He was their god.)
4875 </para>
4876 <para>
4877 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4878 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4879 today.
4880 </para>
4881 <para>
4882 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4883 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4884 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4885 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4886 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4887 stage.
4888 </para>
4889 <para>
4890 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4891 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4892 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4893 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4895 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4896 about the scene.
4897 </para>
4898 <para>
4899 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4900 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4901 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4902 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4903 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4904 </para>
4905 <para>
4906 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4907 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4908 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4909 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4910 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4911 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4912 </para>
4913 <para>
4914 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4915 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4916 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4917 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4918 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4919 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4920 </para>
4921 <para>
4922 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4923 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4924 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4925 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4926 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4927 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4928 </para>
4929 <para>
4930 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4931 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4932 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4933 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4934 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4935 confirm what he had been told.
4936 </para>
4937 <para>
4938 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4939 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4940 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4941 about
4942
4943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4944 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4945 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4946 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4947 the money."
4948 </para>
4949 <para>
4950 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4951 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4952 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4953 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4954 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4955 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4956 </para>
4957 <para>
4958 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4959 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4960 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4961 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4962 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4963 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4964 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4965 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4966 says the owner gets to control.
4967 </para>
4968 <para>
4969 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4970 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4971 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4972 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4973 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4974 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4975 by the law.
4976 </para>
4977 <para>
4978 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4979 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4980 <!-- f1 -->
4981 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4982 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4983 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4984 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4985 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4986 </para></footnote>
4987 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4988 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use does
4989 not require the permission of anyone.
4990 </para>
4991 <para>
4992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4993 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4994 </para>
4995 <blockquote>
4996 <para>
4997 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4998 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4999 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5000 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
5001 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5002 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5003 </para>
5004 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5005 <listitem><para>
5006 <!-- 1. -->
5007 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5008 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5009 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5010 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5011 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5012 </para></listitem>
5013 <listitem><para>
5014 <!-- 2. -->
5015 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5016 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5017 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
5018 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
5019 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5020 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
5021 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5022 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5023 principle.
5024 </para></listitem>
5025 <listitem><para>
5026 <!-- 3. -->
5027 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5028 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5029 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5030 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5031 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5032 pockets, me or them.
5033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5034 </para></listitem>
5035 <listitem><para>
5036 <!-- 4. -->
5037 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5038 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5039 money.
5040 </para></listitem>
5041 </orderedlist>
5042 </blockquote>
5043 <para>
5044 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5045 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5046 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5047 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5048 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5049 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5050 </para>
5051 <para>
5052 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5053 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5054 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5055 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5056 not.
5057 </para>
5058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5059 </sect1>
5060 <sect1 id="transformers">
5061 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5062 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5063 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5064 <para>
5065 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5066 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5067 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5068 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5069 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5070 </para>
5071 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5072 <para>
5073 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5074 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5075 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5076 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5077 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5078 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5079 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5080 important to his career.
5081 </para>
5082 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5083 <para>
5084 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5085 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5086 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5087 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5088 </para>
5089 <para>
5090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5091 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5092 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5093 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5094 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5095 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5096 </para>
5097 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5098 <para>
5099 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5100 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5101 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5102 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5103 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5104 actor's career."
5105 </para>
5106 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5107 <para>
5108 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5109 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5110 </para>
5111 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5112 <para>
5113 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5114 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5115 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5116 for it."<footnote>
5117 <para>
5118 <!-- f1 -->
5119 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5120 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5121 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5122 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5123 <indexterm>
5124 <primary>artists</primary>
5125 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5126 </indexterm>
5127 </para></footnote>
5128 </para>
5129 <para>
5130 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5131 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5132 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5133 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5134 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5135 </para>
5136 <para>
5137 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5138 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5139 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5140 </para>
5141 <blockquote>
5142 <para>
5143 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5144 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5145 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5146 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5147 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5148 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5149 </para>
5150 <para>
5151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5152 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5153 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5154 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5155 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5156 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5157 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5158 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5159 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5160 started calling people.
5161 </para>
5162 </blockquote>
5163 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5164 <para>
5165 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5166 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5167 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5168 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5169 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5170 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5171 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5172 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5173 career.
5174 </para>
5175 <para>
5176 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5177 were totally in the clear."
5178 </para>
5179 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5180 <para>
5181 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5182 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5183 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5184 </para>
5185 <blockquote>
5186 <para>
5187 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5188 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5189 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5190 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5191 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5192 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5193 systematically and cleared the rights.
5194 </para>
5195 </blockquote>
5196 <para>
5197
5198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5199 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5200 loved it, and it sold very well.
5201 </para>
5202 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5203 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5204 <para>
5205 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5206 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5207 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5208 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5209 at all."<footnote><para>
5210 <!-- f2 -->
5211 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5212 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5213 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5214 </para></footnote>
5215 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5216 has to be made?
5217 </para>
5218 <para>
5219 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5220 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5221 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5222 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5223 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5224 </para>
5225 <blockquote>
5226 <para>
5227 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5228 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5229 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5230 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5231 compensated for that.
5232 </para>
5233 </blockquote>
5234 <para>
5235 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5236 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5237 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5238 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5239 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5240 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5241 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5242 </para>
5243 <blockquote>
5244 <para>
5245 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5246 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5247 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5248 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5250 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5251 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5252 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5253 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5254 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5255 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5256 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5257 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5258 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5259 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5260 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5261 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5262 </para>
5263 </blockquote>
5264 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5265 <para>
5266 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5267 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5268 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5269 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5270 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5271 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5272 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5273 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5274 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5275 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5276 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5277 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5278 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5279 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5280 "Does this still make sense?"
5281 </para>
5282 <para>
5283 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5284 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5285 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5286 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5287
5288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5289 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5290 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5291 </para>
5292 <para>
5293 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5294 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5295 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5296 judges loved every minute of it.
5297 </para>
5298 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5299 <para>
5300 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5301 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5302 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5303 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5304 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5305 were just violated in this room?"
5306 </para>
5307 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5308 <para>
5309 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5310 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5311 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5312 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5313 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5314 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5315 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5316 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5317 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5318 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5319 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5320 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5321 couldn't easily do them legally.
5322 </para>
5323 <para>
5324 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5325 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5326 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5327 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5328 planted in your presentation.
5329 </para>
5330 <para>
5331 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5333 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5334 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5335 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5336 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5337 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5338 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5339 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5340 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5341 </para>
5342 <para>
5343 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5344 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5345 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5346 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5347 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5348 </para>
5349 <para>
5350 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5351 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5352 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5353 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5354 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5355 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5356 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5357 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5358 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5359 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5360 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5361 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5362 registers the work.
5363 </para>
5364 <para>
5365 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5366 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5367 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5368 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5369 </para>
5370 <para>
5371 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5372 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5374 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5375 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5376 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5377 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5378 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5379 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5380 entertainment."
5381 </para>
5382 <para>
5383 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5384 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5385 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5386 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5387 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5388 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5389 new audiences, it is Mike."
5390 </para>
5391 <para>
5392 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5393 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5394 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5395 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5396 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5397 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5398 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5399 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5400 </para>
5401 <para>
5402 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5403 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5404 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5405 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5406 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5407 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5408 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5409 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5410 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5411 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5412 curse, reserved for the few.
5413 </para>
5414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5415 </sect1>
5416 <sect1 id="collectors">
5417 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5418 <para>
5419 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5420 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5421 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5422 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5423 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5424 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5425 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5426 </para>
5427 <para>
5428 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5429 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5430 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5431 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5432 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5433 well as when those pages changed.
5434 </para>
5435 <para>
5436 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5437 appreciated. In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5438 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5439 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5440 reports.
5441 </para>
5442 <para>
5443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5444 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5445 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5446 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5447 </para>
5448 <para>
5449 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5450 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5451 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5452 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5453 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5454 </para>
5455 <para>
5456 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5457 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5458 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5459 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5460 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5461 <!-- f1 -->
5462 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5463 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5464 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5465 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5466 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5467 </para></footnote>
5468 </para>
5469 <para>
5470 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5471 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5472 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5473 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5474 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5475 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5476 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5477 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5478 truth.
5479 </para>
5480 <para>
5481 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5482 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5483 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5484 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5485 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5486 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5487 presumes this knowedge.
5488 </para>
5489 <para>
5490 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5491 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5492 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5493 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5494 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5495 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5496 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5497 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5498 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5499 </para>
5500 <para>
5501 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5502 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5503 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5504 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5505 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5506 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5507 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5508 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5509 </para>
5510 <para>
5511 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5512 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5513 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5514 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5515 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5516 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5517 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5518 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5519 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5520 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5521 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5522 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5523 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5524 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5525 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5526 </para>
5527 <blockquote>
5528 <para>
5529 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5530 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5531 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5532 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5533 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5534
5535 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5536 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5537 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5538 </para>
5539 </blockquote>
5540 <para>
5541 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5542 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5543 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5544 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5545 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5546 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5547 </para>
5548 <para>
5549 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5550 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5551 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5552 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5553 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5554 work.
5555 </para>
5556 <para>
5557 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5558 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5559 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5560 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5561 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5562 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5563 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5564 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5565 <!-- f2 -->
5566 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5567 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5568 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5569 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5570 Co., 1992), 36.
5571 </para></footnote>
5572 </para>
5573 <para>
5574 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5575 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5576 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5577 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5578 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5579 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5580 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5581 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5582 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5583 </para>
5584 <para>
5585 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5587 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5588 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5589 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5590 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5591 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5592 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5593 events of that day.
5594 </para>
5595 <para>
5596 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5597 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5598 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5599 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5600 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5601 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5602 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5603 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5604 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5605 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5606 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5607 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5608 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5609 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5610 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5611 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5612 </para>
5613 <para>
5614 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5615 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5616 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5617 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5618 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5619 to find them.
5620 </para>
5621 <para>
5622 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5623 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5624 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5625 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5626 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5627 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5628 </para>
5629 <para>
5630 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5631 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5632 life, if the
5633
5634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5635 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5636 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5637 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5638 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5639 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5640 </para>
5641 <para>
5642 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5643 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5644 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5645 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5646 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5647 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5648 longer sold.
5649 </para>
5650 <para>
5651 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5652 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5653 <!-- f3 -->
5654 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5655 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5656 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5657 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5658 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5659 College Law Review 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5660 </para></footnote>). After
5661 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5662 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5663 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5664 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5665 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5666 </para>
5667 <para>
5668 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5669 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5670 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5671 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5672 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5673 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5674 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5675 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5676 disappears.
5677 </para>
5678 <para>
5679 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5680 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5681 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5682 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5683 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5684 generally, the
5685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5686 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5687 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5688 little practical effect.
5689 </para>
5690 <para>
5691 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5692 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5693 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5694 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5695 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5696 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5697 </para>
5698 <para>
5699 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5700 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5701 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5702 Kahle describes,
5703 </para>
5704 <blockquote>
5705 <para>
5706 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5707 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5708 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5709 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5710 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5711 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5712 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5713 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5714 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5715 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5716 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5717 </para>
5718 </blockquote>
5719 <para>
5720 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5721 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5722 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5723 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5724 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5725 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5726 it;
5727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5728 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5729 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5730 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5731 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5732 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5733 </para>
5734 <para>
5735 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5736 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5737 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5738 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5739 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5740 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5741 </para>
5742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5743 </sect1>
5744 <sect1 id="property-i">
5745 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5746 <para>
5747 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5748 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5749 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5750 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5751 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5752 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5753 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5754 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5755 </para>
5756 <para>
5757 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5758 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5759 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5760 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5761 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5762 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5763 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5764 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5765 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5766 Warner Brothers.
5767 </para>
5768 <para>
5769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5770 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5771 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5772 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5773 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5774 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5775 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5776 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5777 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5778 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5779 Washingtonian way.
5780 </para>
5781 <para>
5782 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5783 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5784 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5785 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5786 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5787 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5788 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5789 </para>
5790 <para>
5791 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5792 perfectly:
5793 </para>
5794 <blockquote>
5795 <para>
5796 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5797 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5798 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5799 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5800 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5801 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5802 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5803 debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5804 <!-- f1 -->
5805 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5806 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5807 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5808 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5809 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5810 Valenti).
5811 </para></footnote>
5812 </para>
5813 </blockquote>
5814 <para>
5815 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5816 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5817 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5818 this:
5819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5820 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5821 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5822 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5823 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5824 </para>
5825 <para>
5826 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5827 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5828 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5829 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5830 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5831 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5832 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5833 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5834 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5835 Washington.
5836 </para>
5837 <para>
5838 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5839 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5840 <!-- f2 -->
5841 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5842 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5843 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5844 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5845 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5846 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5847 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5848 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5849 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5850 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5851 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5852 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5853 in our tradition.
5854 </para>
5855 <para>
5856 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5857 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5858 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5859 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5860 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5861 culture would develop.
5862 </para>
5863 <para>
5864 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5865 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5866 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5867 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5868 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5869 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5870 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5871 the same would be to
5872
5873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5874 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5875 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5876 perfect control.
5877 </para>
5878 <para>
5879 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5880 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5881 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5882 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5883 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5884 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5885 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5886 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5887 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5888 Constitution itself.
5889 </para>
5890 <para>
5891 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5892 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5893 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5894 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5895 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5896 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5897 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5898 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5899 government pays for the privilege.
5900 </para>
5901 <para>
5902 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5903 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5904 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5905 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5906 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5907 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5908 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5909 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5910 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5911 compensation for your land
5912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5913 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5914 compensation at all.
5915 </para>
5916 <para>
5917 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5918 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5919 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5920 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5921 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5922 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5923 itself.
5924 </para>
5925 <para>
5926 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5927 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5928 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5929 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5930 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5931 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5932 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5933 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5934 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5935 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5936 </para>
5937 <para>
5938 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5939 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5940 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5941 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5942 creative property there must be a public domain?
5943 </para>
5944 <para>
5945 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5946 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5947 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5948 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5949 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5950 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5951 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5952 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5953 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5954 control how culture develops.
5955 </para>
5956 <para>
5957
5958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5959 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5960 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5961 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5962 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5963 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5964 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5965 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5966 </para>
5967 <figure id="fig-1331">
5968 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5969 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5970 </figure>
5971 <para>
5972 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5973 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5974 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5975 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5976 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5977 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5978 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5979 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5980 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5981 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5982 Web, you can be punished
5983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5984 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5985 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5986 </para>
5987 <para>
5988 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5989 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5990 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5991 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5992 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5993 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5994 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5995 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5996 the source of the enforcement.
5997 </para>
5998 <para>
5999 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6000 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6001 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6002 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6003 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6004 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6005 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6006 individual or group might behave.
6007 </para>
6008 <para>
6009 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6010 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
6011 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6012 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6013 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6014 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6015 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6016 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6017 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6018 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
6019 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6020 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6021 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6022 </para>
6023 <para>
6024
6025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6026 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6027 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6028 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6029 undermined by another.
6030 </para>
6031 <para>
6032 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6033 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6034 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6035 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6036 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6037 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6038 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6039 </para>
6040 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6041 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6042 </indexterm>
6043 <para>
6044 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6045 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6046 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6047 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6048 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6049 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6050 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6051 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6052 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6053 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6054 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6055 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6056 </para>
6057 <para>
6058 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6059 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6060 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6061 <!-- f3 -->
6062 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6063 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6064 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6065 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6066 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6067 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6068 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6069 June 1998.
6070 </para></footnote>
6071 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6072 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6073 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6074 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6075 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6076 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6077 used to require that other laws be more
6078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6079 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6080 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6081 driving.
6082 </para>
6083 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6084
6085 <figure id="fig-1361">
6086 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6087 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6088 </figure>
6089 <para>
6090 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6091 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6092 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6093 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6094 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6095 another.<footnote>
6096 <para>
6097 <!-- f4 -->
6098 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6099 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6100 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6101 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6102 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6103 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6104 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6105 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6106 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6107 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6108 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6109 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6110 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6111 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6112 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6113 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6114 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6115 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6116 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6117 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6118 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6119 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6120 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6121 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6122 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6123 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6124 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6125 of these groups might face.
6126 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6127 </para></footnote>
6128 </para>
6129 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6130 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6131 <para>
6132 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6133 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6134 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6135 rallying makes sense.
6136 </para>
6137 <para>
6138 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6139 Internet:
6140 </para>
6141 <figure id="fig-1371">
6142 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6143 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6144 </figure>
6145 <para>
6146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6147 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6148 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6149 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6150 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6151 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6152 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6153 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6154 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6155 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6156 this form of infringement.
6157 </para>
6158 <para>
6159 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6160 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6161 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6162 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6163 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6164 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6165 </para>
6166 <para>
6167 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6168 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6169 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6170 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6171 Iraq
6172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6173 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6174 looting that results.
6175 </para>
6176 <figure id="fig-1381">
6177 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6178 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6179 </figure>
6180 <para>
6181 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6182 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6183 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6184 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6185 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6186 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6187 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6188 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6189 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6190 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6191 </para>
6192 <para>
6193 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6194 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6195 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6196 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6197 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6198 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6199 life. Homeowners living in a
6200
6201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6202 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6203 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6204 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6205 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6206 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6207 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6208 </para>
6209 <para>
6210 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6211 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6212 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6213 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6214 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6215 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6216 </para>
6217 <para>
6218 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6219 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6220 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6221 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6222 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6223 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6224 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6225 <!-- f5 -->
6226 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6227 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6228 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6229 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6230 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6231 October 2003, available at
6232 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6233 </para></footnote>
6234
6235 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6236 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6237 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6238 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6239 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6240 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6241 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6242 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6243 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6244 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6245 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6246 </para>
6247 <para>
6248 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6249 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6250 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6252 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6253 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6254 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6255 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6256 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6257 <!-- f6 -->
6258 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6259 </para></footnote>
6260 And relative to a
6261 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6262 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6263 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6264 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6265 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6266 Brezhnev.
6267 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6268 </para>
6269 <para>
6270 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6271 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6272 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6273 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6274 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6275 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6276 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6277 opportunities for innovation and change.
6278 </para>
6279 <para>
6280 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6281 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6282 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6283 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6284 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6285 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6286 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6287 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6288 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6289 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6290 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6291 regulation is justified.
6292 </para>
6293 <para>
6294 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6296 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6297 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6298 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6299 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6300 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6301 </para>
6302 <para>
6303 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6304 </para>
6305 <para>
6306 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6307 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6308 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6309 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6310 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6311 </para>
6312 <para>
6313 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6314 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6315 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6316 </para>
6317 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6318 <para>
6319 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6320 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6321 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6322 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6323 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6324 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6325 </para>
6326 <para>
6327 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6328 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6329 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6330 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6331 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6332 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6333 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6334 </para>
6335 <para>
6336 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6337 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6338 culture.<footnote><para>
6339 <!-- f7 -->
6340 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6341 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6342 </para></footnote>
6343 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6344 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6345 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6346 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6347 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6348 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6350 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6351 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6352 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6353 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6354 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6355 </para>
6356 <para>
6357 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6358 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6359 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6360 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6361 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6362 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6363 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6364 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6365 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6366 </para>
6367 <para>
6368 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6369 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6370 be lost.
6371 </para>
6372 </sect2>
6373 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6374 <title>Beginnings</title>
6375 <para>
6376 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6377 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6378 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6379 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6380 </para>
6381 <para>
6382 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6383 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6384 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6385 </para>
6386 <para>
6387 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6388 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6389 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6390
6391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6392 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6393 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6394 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6395 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6396 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6397 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6398 </para>
6399 <para>
6400 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6401 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6402 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6403 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6404 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6405 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6406 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6407 </para>
6408 <para>
6409 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6410 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6411 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6412 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6413 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6414 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6415 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6416 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6417 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6418 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6419 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6420 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6421 power.
6422 </para>
6423 <para>
6424 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6425 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6426 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6427 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6428 years since they first struck its design.
6429 </para>
6430 <para>
6431 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6432 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6434 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6435 started here:
6436 </para>
6437 <figure id="fig-1441">
6438 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6439 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6440 </figure>
6441 <para>
6442 We will end here:
6443 </para>
6444 <figure id="fig-1442">
6445 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6446 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6447 </figure>
6448 <para>
6449 Let me explain how.
6450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6451 </para>
6452 </sect2>
6453 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6454 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6455 <para>
6456 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6457 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6458 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6459 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6460 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6461 authorship.<footnote>
6462 <para>
6463 <!-- f8 -->
6464 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6465 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6466 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6467 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6468 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6469 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6470 </para></footnote>
6471 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6472 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6473 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6474 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6475 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6476 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6477 </para>
6478 <para>
6479 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6480 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6481 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6482 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6483 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6484 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6485 </para>
6486 <para>
6487 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6488 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6489 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6490 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6491 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6492 </para>
6493 <para>
6494 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6495 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6496 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6497 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6498 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6499 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6500 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6501 <!-- f9 -->
6502 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6503 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6504 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6505 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6506 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6507 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6508 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6509 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6510 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6511 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6512 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6513 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6514 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6515 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6516 </para>
6517 <para>
6518 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6519 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6521 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6522 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6523 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6524 copyright, either.
6525 </para>
6526 <para>
6527 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6528 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6529 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6530 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6531 domain.<footnote><para>
6532 <!-- f10 -->
6533 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6534 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6535 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6536 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6537 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6538 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6539 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6540 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6541 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6542 </para>
6543 <para>
6544 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6545 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6546 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6547 <!-- f11 -->
6548 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6549 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6550 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6551 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6552 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6553 effectively free.
6554 </para>
6555 <para>
6556 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6557 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6558 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6559 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6560 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6561 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6562 </para>
6563 <para>
6564 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6565 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6566 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6567 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6568 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6569 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6570 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6571 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6572 </para>
6573 <para>
6574 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6575 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6576 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6577 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6578
6579 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6580 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6581 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6582 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6583 </para>
6584 <para>
6585 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6586 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6587 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6588 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6589 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6590 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6591 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6592 value.
6593 </para>
6594 <para>
6595 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6596 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6597 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6598 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6599 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6600 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6601 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6602 was ninety-five years.
6603 </para>
6604 <para>
6605 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6606 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6607 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6608 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6609 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6610 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6611 them.
6612 </para>
6613 <para>
6614 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6615 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6616 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6617 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6618 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6619 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6620 years.<footnote><para>
6621 <!-- f12 -->
6622 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6623 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6624 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6625 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6626 </para></footnote>
6627 </para>
6628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6629 </sect2>
6630 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6631 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6632 <para>
6633 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6634 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6635 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6636 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6637 </para>
6638 <para>
6639 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6640 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6641 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6642 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6643 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6644 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6645 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6646 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6647 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6648 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6649 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6650 </para>
6651 <para>
6652 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6653 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6654 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6655 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6656 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6657 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6658 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6659 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6660 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6661 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6662 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6663 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6664 on the initial creative work.
6665 </para>
6666 <para>
6667 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6668 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6669 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6671 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6672 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6673 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6674 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6675 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6676 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6677 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6678 </para>
6679 <para>
6680 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6681 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6682 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6683 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6684 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6685 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6686 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6687 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6688 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6689 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6690 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6691 original author.
6692 </para>
6693 <para>
6694 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6695 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6696 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6697 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6698 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6699 copy available for others to copy.
6700 </para>
6701 <para>
6702 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6703 differences.
6704 </para>
6705 <para>
6706 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6707 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6708 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6709 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6710 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6711 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6712 <!-- f13 -->
6713 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6714 Creation
6715 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6716 International
6717 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6718 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6719 </para></footnote>
6720 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6721 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6722 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6723 </para>
6724 <para>
6725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6726 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6727 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6728 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6729 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6730 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6731 creative
6732 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6733 restrained.
6734 </para>
6735 <para>
6736 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6737 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6738 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6739 reduced
6740 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6741 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6742 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6743 </para>
6744 <para>
6745 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6746 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6747 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6748 </para>
6749 <para>
6750 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6751 control
6752 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6753 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6754 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6755 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6756 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6757 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6758 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6759 exclusive
6760 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6761 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6762 </para>
6763 <para>
6764 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6765 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6766 expansion
6767 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6768 copyright.
6769 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6770 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6771 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6772 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6773 </para>
6774 <para>
6775
6776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6777 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6778 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6779 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6780 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6781 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6782 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6783 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6784 protect
6785 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6786 <!-- f14 -->
6787 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6788 2003, available at
6789 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6790 </para></footnote>
6791 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6792 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6793 the wrong of direct piracy.
6794 </para>
6795 <para>
6796 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6797 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6798 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6799 transformative
6800 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6801 <!-- f15 -->
6802 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6803 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6804 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6805 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6806 Constitutionality,"
6807 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6808 </para></footnote>
6809 These two different uses of my creative work are
6810 treated the same.
6811 </para>
6812 <para>
6813 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6814 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6815 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6816 creates
6817 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6818 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6819 originally created?
6820 </para>
6821 <para>
6822 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6823 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6824 simply
6825 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6826 rights originally granted.
6827 </para>
6828 </sect2>
6829 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6830 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6831 <para>
6832 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6833 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6834 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6835 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6836 <!-- f16 -->
6837 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6838 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6839 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6840 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6841 sometimes
6842 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6843 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6844 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6845 </para></footnote>
6846 </para>
6847 <para>
6848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6849 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6850 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6851 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6852 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6853 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6854 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6855 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6856 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6857 trigger for copyright law.
6858 </para>
6859 <para>
6860 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6861 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6862 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6863 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6864 <!-- f17 -->
6865 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6866 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6867 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6868 basis
6869 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6870 </para></footnote>
6871 because it is clear that the
6872 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6873 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6874 </para>
6875 <para>
6876 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6877 empty circle.
6878 </para>
6879 <figure id="fig-1521">
6880 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6881 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6882 </figure>
6883 <para>
6884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6885 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6886 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6887 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6888 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6889 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6890 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6891 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6892 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6893 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6894 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6895 not make a copy.
6896 </para>
6897 <figure id="fig-1531">
6898 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6899 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6900 </figure>
6901 <para>
6902 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6903 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6904 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6905 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6906 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6907 diagram on next page).
6908 </para>
6909 <para>
6910 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6911 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6912 </para>
6913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6914 <figure id="fig-1541">
6915 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6916 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6917 </figure>
6918 <para>
6919 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6920 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6921 unregulated.
6922 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6923 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6924 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6925 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6926 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6927 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6928 </para>
6929 <figure id="fig-1542">
6930 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6931 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6932 </figure>
6933 <para> </para>
6934 <figure id="fig-1551">
6935 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6936 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6937 </figure>
6938 <para>
6939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6940 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6941 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6942 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6943 </para>
6944 <para>
6945 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6946 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6947 <!-- f18 -->
6948 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6949 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6950 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6951 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6952 </para></footnote>
6953 And because of this single,
6954 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6955 category
6956 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6957 unregulated
6958 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6959 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6960 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6961 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6962 category
6963 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6964 copyrighted
6965 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6966 burden of this shift.
6967 </para>
6968 <para>
6969 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6970 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6971 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6972 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6973 nothing
6974 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6976 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6977 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6978 produced
6979 a copy.
6980 </para>
6981 <para>
6982 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6983 different
6984 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6985 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6986 copyright
6987 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6988 accidental
6989 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6990 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6991 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6992 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6993 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6994 </para>
6995 <para>
6996 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6997 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6998 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6999 points also become clear:
7000 </para>
7001 <para>
7002 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7003 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7004 presumptively
7005 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7006 evidence
7007 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7008 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7009 free culture before the Internet.
7010 </para>
7011 <para>
7012 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7013 transformative
7014 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7015 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7016 transformation
7017 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7018 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7019 releasing
7020 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7021 justification.
7022 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7023 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7024 transformative
7025 uses of creative work.
7026 </para>
7027 <para>
7028 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7029
7030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7031 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7032 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7033 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7034 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7035 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7036 Internet,
7037 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7038 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7039 protected
7040 before because reading was not regulated.
7041 </para>
7042 <para>
7043 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7044 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7045 depend
7046 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7047 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7048 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7049 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7050 protections
7051 of fair use are not enough.
7052 </para>
7053 <para>
7054 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7055 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7056 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7057 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7058 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7059 </para>
7060 <para>
7061 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7062 began
7063 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7064 previews.
7065 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7066 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7067 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7068 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7069 before
7070 you bought it.
7071 </para>
7072 <para>
7073 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7074 distributors
7075 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7076 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7077 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7079 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7080 business
7081 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7082 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7083 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7084 immediately.
7085 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7086 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7087 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7088 </para>
7089 <para>
7090 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7091 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7092 infringed"
7093 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7094 willful
7095 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7096 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7097 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7098 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7099 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7100 </para>
7101 <para>
7102 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7103 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7104 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7105 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7106 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7107 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7108 Disney's permission.
7109 </para>
7110 <para>
7111 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7112 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7113 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7114 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7115 marketplace,
7116 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7117 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7118 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7119 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7120 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7121 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7122 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7123 </para>
7124 <para>
7125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7126 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7127 control
7128 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7129 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7130 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7131 Noble
7132 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7133 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7134 argument
7135 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7136 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7137 exercising
7138 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7139 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7140 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7141 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7142 </para>
7143 <para>
7144 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7145 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7146 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7147 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7148 owners
7149 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7150 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7151 </para>
7152 </sect2>
7153 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7154 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7155 <para>
7156 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7157 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7158 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7159 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7160 </para>
7161 <para>
7162 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7163 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7164 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7165 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7166 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7167 your freedom.
7168 </para>
7169 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7170 <para>
7171 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7172 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7174 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7175 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7176 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7177 <!-- f19 -->
7178 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7179 Contemporary
7180 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7181 </para></footnote>
7182 </para>
7183 <para>
7184 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7185 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7186 you were."<footnote><para>
7187 <!-- f20 -->
7188 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7189 </para></footnote>
7190 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7191 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7192 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7193 </para>
7194 <para>
7195 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7196 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7197 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7198 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7199 </para>
7200 <para>
7201 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7202 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7203 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7204 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7205 copyrighted
7206 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7207 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7208 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7209 that is not at all funny.
7210 </para>
7211 <para>
7212 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7213 </para>
7214 <para>
7215 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7216 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7217 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7218 technology,
7219 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7220 </para>
7221 <para>
7222 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7223 Reader.
7224 </para>
7225 <para>
7226 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7227 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7228 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7229 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7230 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7231 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7233 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7234 called Permissions.
7235 </para>
7236 <figure id="fig-1611">
7237 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7238 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7239 </figure>
7240 <para>
7241 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7242 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7243 </para>
7244 <figure id="fig-1612">
7245 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7246 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7247 </figure>
7248 <para>
7249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7250 According to my eBook
7251 Reader, I have the permission
7252 to copy to the clipboard of the
7253 computer ten text selections
7254 every ten days. (So far, I've
7255 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7256 I also have the permission to
7257 print ten pages from the book
7258 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7259 the permission to use the Read
7260 Aloud button to hear
7261 Middlemarch
7262 read aloud through the
7263 computer.
7264 </para>
7265 <para>
7266 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7267 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7268 </para>
7269 <figure id="fig-1621">
7270 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7271 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7272 </figure>
7273 <para>
7274 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7275 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7276 the book.
7277 </para>
7278 <figure id="fig-1622">
7279 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7280 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7281 </figure>
7282 <para>
7283 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7284 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7285 </para>
7286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7287 <figure id="fig-1631">
7288 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7289 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7290 </figure>
7291 <para>
7292 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7293 </para>
7294 <para>
7295 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7296 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7297 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7298 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7299 under
7300 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7301 <!-- f21 -->
7302 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7303 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7304 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7305 obligation
7306 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7307 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7308 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7309 </para></footnote>
7310 When my e-book of
7311 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7312 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7313 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7314 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7315 </para>
7316 <para>
7317 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7318 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7319 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7320 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7321 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7322 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7323 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7324 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7325 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7326 restrictions:
7327 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7328 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7329 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7330 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7331 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7332 </para>
7333 <para>
7334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7335 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7336 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7337 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7338 </para>
7339 <para>
7340 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7341 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7342 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7343 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7344 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7345 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7346 </para>
7347 <para>
7348 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7349 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7350 technologies
7351 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7352 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7353 protections as well?
7354 </para>
7355 <para>
7356 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7357 eBook Reader.
7358 </para>
7359 <para>
7360 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7361 public
7362 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7363 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7364 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7365 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7366 </para>
7367 <figure id="fig-1641">
7368 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7369 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7370 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7371 </figure>
7372 <para>
7373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7374 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7375 allowed
7376 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7377 "permissions"
7378 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7379 </para>
7380 <para>
7381 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7382 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7383 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7384 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7385 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7386 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7387 </para>
7388 <para>
7389 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7390 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7391 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7392 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7393 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7394 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7395 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7396 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7397 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7398 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7399 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7400 </para>
7401 <para>
7402 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7403 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7404 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7405 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7406 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7407 often crazy.
7408 </para>
7409 <para>
7410 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7411 story of mine that makes the same point.
7412 </para>
7413 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7414 <para>
7415 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7416 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7417 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7418 </para>
7419 <para>
7420 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7421 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7422 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7424 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7425 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7426 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7427 </para>
7428 <para>
7429 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7430 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7431 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7432 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7433 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7434 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7435 </para>
7436 <para>
7437 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7438 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7439 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7440 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7441 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7442 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7443 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7444 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7445 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7446 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7447 </para>
7448 <para>
7449 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7450 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7451 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7452 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7453 ethically.
7454 </para>
7455 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7456 <para>
7457 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7458 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7459 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7460 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7461 than Sony had built.
7462 </para>
7463 <para>
7464 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7465 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7466 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7467 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7468 the
7469
7470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7471 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7472 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7473 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7474 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7475 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7476 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7477 dog to dance?
7478 </para>
7479 <para>
7480 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7481 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7482 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7483 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7484 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7485 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7486 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7487 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7488 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7489 </para>
7490 <para>
7491 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7492 <!-- f22 -->
7493 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7494 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7495 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7496 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7497 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7498 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7499 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7500 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7501 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7502 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7503 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7504 </para></footnote>
7505 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7506 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7507 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7508 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7509 </para>
7510 <para>
7511 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7512 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7513 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7514 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7515 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7516 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7517 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7518 Internet much more.
7519 </para>
7520 <para>
7521 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7522 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7523 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7524 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7525 </para>
7526 <para>
7527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7528 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7529 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7530 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7531 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7532 </para>
7533 <para>
7534 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7535 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7536 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7537 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7538 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7539 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7540 </para>
7541 <para>
7542 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7543 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7544 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7545 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7546 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7547 constituted, succeed.
7548 </para>
7549 <para>
7550 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7551 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7552 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7553 wrote:
7554 </para>
7555 <blockquote>
7556 <para>
7557 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7558 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7559 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7560 </para>
7561 </blockquote>
7562 <para>
7563 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7564 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7565 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7566 </para>
7567 <blockquote>
7568 <para>
7569 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7571 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7572 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7573 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7574 </para>
7575 </blockquote>
7576 <para>
7577 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7578 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7579 spreading such information an offense.
7580 </para>
7581 <para>
7582 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7583 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7584 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7585 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7586 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7587 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7588 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7589 </para>
7590 <para>
7591 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7592 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7593 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7594 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7595 </para>
7596 <para>
7597 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7598 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7599 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7600 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7601 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7602 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7603 have been a copyright violation.
7604 </para>
7605 <para>
7606 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7607 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7608 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7609 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7610 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7611 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7612 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7614 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7615 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7616 </para>
7617 <para>
7618 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7619 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7620 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7621 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7622 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7623 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7624 </para>
7625 <para>
7626 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7627 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7628 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7629 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7630 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7631 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7632 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7633 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7634 </para>
7635 <blockquote>
7636 <para>
7637 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7638 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7639 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7640 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7641 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7642 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7643 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7644 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7645 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7646 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7647 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7648 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7649 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7650 important.<footnote><para>
7651 <!-- f23 -->
7652 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7653 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7654 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7655 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7656 </para></footnote>
7657 </para>
7658 </blockquote>
7659 <para>
7660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7661 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7662 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7663 the VCR responsible.
7664 </para>
7665 <para>
7666 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7667 the DMCA.
7668 </para>
7669 <para>
7670 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7671 </para>
7672 <para>
7673 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7674 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7675 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7676 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7677 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7678 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7679 </para>
7680 <para>
7681 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7683 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7684 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7685 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7686 and bad uses.
7687 </para>
7688 <figure id="fig-1711">
7689 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7690 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7691 </figure>
7692 <para>
7693 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7694 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7695 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7696 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7697 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7698 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7699 </para>
7700 <para>
7701 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7702 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7703 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7704 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7705 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7706 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7707 </para>
7708 <para>
7709 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7710 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7711 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7712 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7713 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7714 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7715 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7716 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7717 </para>
7718 <para>
7719 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7720 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7721 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7722 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7723 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7724 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7725 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7726 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7727 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7728 </para>
7729 <para>
7730
7731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7732 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7733 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7734 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7735 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7736 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7737 <!-- f24 -->
7738 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7739 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7740 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7741 </para></footnote>
7742 </para>
7743 <para>
7744 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7745 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7746 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7747 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7748 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7749 </para>
7750 <para>
7751 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7752 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7753 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7754 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7755 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7756 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7757 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7758 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7759 </para>
7760 <para>
7761 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7762 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7763 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7764 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7765 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7766 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7767 </para>
7768 </sect2>
7769 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7770 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7771 <para>
7772 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7773 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7774 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7775 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7776 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7777 find better ways
7778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7779 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7780 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7781 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7782 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7783 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7784 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7785 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7786 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7787 control.
7788 </para>
7789 <para>
7790 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7791 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7792 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7793 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7794 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7795 </para>
7796 <para>
7797 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7798 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7799 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7800 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7801 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7802 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7803 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7804 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7805 of the media.
7806 </para>
7807 <para>
7808 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7809 nature.
7810 </para>
7811 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7812 <para>
7813 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7814 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7815 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7816 <!-- f25 -->
7817 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7818 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7819 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7820 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7821 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7822 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7823 <!-- f26 -->
7824 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7825 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7826 </para></footnote>
7827 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7828 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7829 <!-- f27 -->
7830 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7831 31 May 2003.
7832 </para></footnote>
7833 </para>
7834 <para>
7835 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7836 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7838 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7839 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7840 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7841 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7842 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7843 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7844 </para>
7845 <para>
7846 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7847 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7848 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7849 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7850 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7851 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7852 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7853 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7854 protected&mdash; by the market.
7855 </para>
7856 <para>
7857 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7858 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7859 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7860 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7861 </para>
7862 <blockquote>
7863 <para>
7864 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7865 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7866 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7867 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7868 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7869 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7870 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7871 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7872 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7873 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7874 <!-- f28 -->
7875 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7876 2003): 89.
7877 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7878 </para></footnote>
7879 </para>
7880 </blockquote>
7881 <para>
7882 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7883 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7884 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7885 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7886 </para>
7887 <figure id="fig-1761">
7888 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7889 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7890 </figure>
7891 <para>
7892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7893 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7894 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7895 distribute content?
7896 </para>
7897 <para>
7898 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7899 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7900 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7901 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7902 </para>
7903 <para>
7904 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7905 integration may matter.
7906 </para>
7907 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7908 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7909 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7910 <para>
7911 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7912 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7913 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7914 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7915 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7916 </para>
7917 <para>
7918 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7919 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7920 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7921 control.<footnote><para>
7922 <!-- f29 -->
7923 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7924 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7925 Missouri,
7926 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7927 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7928 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7929 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7930 </para></footnote>
7931 </para>
7932 <para>
7933
7934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7935 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7936 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7937 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7938 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7939 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7940 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7941 networks.
7942 </para>
7943 <para>
7944 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7945 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7946 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7947 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7948 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7949 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7950 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7951 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7952 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7953 <!-- f30 -->
7954 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7955 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7956 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7957 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7958 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7959 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7960 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7961 2003.
7962 </para></footnote>
7963 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7964 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7965 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7966 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7967 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7968 63%."<footnote><para>
7969 <!-- f31 -->
7970 Ibid.
7971 </para></footnote>
7972 </para>
7973 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7974 <para>
7975 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7976 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7977 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7978 owned by the network.
7979 </para>
7980 <para>
7981 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7982 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7983 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7984 </para>
7985 <blockquote>
7986 <para>
7987 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7988 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7989 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7990 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7992 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7993 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7994 handful.<footnote><para>
7995 <!-- f32 -->
7996 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7997 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7998 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7999 </para></footnote>
8000 </para>
8001 </blockquote>
8002 <para>
8003 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8004 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8005 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8006 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8007 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8008 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8009 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8010 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8011 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8012 democracy.
8013 </para>
8014 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8015 <para>
8016 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8017 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8018 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8019 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8020 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8021 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8022 <!-- f33 -->
8023 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8024 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
8025 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8026 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8027 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8028 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy 14 (1985):
8029 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8030 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8031 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them
8032 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8033
8034 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8035 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8036 sprinting.
8037 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8038 </para>
8039 <para>
8040 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8041 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8042 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8043 measure.
8044 </para>
8045 <para>
8046 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8047 suggest the concern.
8048 </para>
8049 <para>
8050 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8051 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8052 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8053 </para>
8054 <para>
8055 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8056 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8057 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8058
8059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8060 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8061 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8062 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8063 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8064 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8065 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8066 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8067 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8068 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8069 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8070 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8071 outweigh these costs.
8072 </para>
8073 <para>
8074 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8075 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8076 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8077 these issues.
8078 </para>
8079 <para>
8080 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8081 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8082 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8083 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8084 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8085 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8086 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8087 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8088 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8089 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8090 </para>
8091 <para>
8092 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8093 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8094 </para>
8095 <para>
8096 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8097 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8098 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8099 war. Can you do it?
8100 </para>
8101 <para>
8102 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8104 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8105 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8106 message will be heard then?
8107 </para>
8108 <para>
8109 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8110 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8111 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8112 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8113 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8114 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8115 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8116 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8117 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8118 <!-- f34 -->
8119 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8120 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8121 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8122 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8123 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8124 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8125 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8126 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8127 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8128 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8129 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8130 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8131 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8132 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8133 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8134 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8135 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8136 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8137 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8138 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8139 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8140 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8141 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8142 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8143 </para></footnote>
8144 </para>
8145 <para>
8146 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8147 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8148 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8149 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8150 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8151 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8152 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8153 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8154 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8155 </para>
8156 </sect2>
8157 <sect2 id="together">
8158 <title>Together</title>
8159 <para>
8160 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8161 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8162 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8163 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8164 </para>
8165 <para>
8166 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8167 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8168 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8169 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8170 to seem
8171
8172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8173 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8174 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8175 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8176 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8177 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8178 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8179 be redefined.
8180 </para>
8181 <para>
8182 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8183 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8184 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8185 our culture today.
8186 </para>
8187 <para>
8188 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8189 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8190 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8191 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8192 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8193 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8194 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8195 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8196 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8197 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8198 </para>
8199 <para>
8200 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8201 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8202 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8203 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8204 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8205 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8206 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8207 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8208 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8209 technology and the market enable.
8210 </para>
8211 <para>
8212 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8213 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8215 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8216 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8217 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8218 the development of our culture than now.
8219 </para>
8220 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8221 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8222 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8223 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8224 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8225 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8226 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8227 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8228 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8229 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8230 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8231 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8232 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8233 <!-- f35 -->
8234 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8235 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8236 </para></footnote>
8237 </para>
8238 <para>
8239 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8240 </para>
8241 <para>
8242 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8243 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8244 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8245 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8246 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8247 </para>
8248
8249 <table id="t2">
8250 <title></title>
8251 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8252 <thead>
8253 <row>
8254 <entry></entry>
8255 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8256 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8257 </row>
8258 </thead>
8259 <tbody>
8260 <row>
8261 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8262 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8263 <entry>Free</entry>
8264 </row>
8265 <row>
8266 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8267 <entry>Free</entry>
8268 <entry>Free</entry>
8269 </row>
8270 </tbody>
8271 </tgroup>
8272 </table>
8273
8274 <para>
8275 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8276 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8277 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8278
8279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8280 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8281 noncommercial work was also free.
8282 </para>
8283 <para>
8284 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8285 </para>
8286
8287 <table id="t3">
8288 <title></title>
8289 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8290 <thead>
8291 <row>
8292 <entry></entry>
8293 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8294 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8295 </row>
8296 </thead>
8297 <tbody>
8298 <row>
8299 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8300 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8301 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8302 </row>
8303 <row>
8304 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8305 <entry>Free</entry>
8306 <entry>Free</entry>
8307 </row>
8308 </tbody>
8309 </tgroup>
8310 </table>
8311
8312 <para>
8313 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8314 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8315 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8316 transformation were still essentially free.
8317 </para>
8318 <para>
8319 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8320 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8321 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8322 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8323 we could say the law began to look like this:
8324 </para>
8325
8326 <table id="t4">
8327 <title></title>
8328 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8329 <thead>
8330 <row>
8331 <entry></entry>
8332 <entry>COPY</entry>
8333 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8334 </row>
8335 </thead>
8336 <tbody>
8337 <row>
8338 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8339 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8340 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8341 </row>
8342 <row>
8343 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8344 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8345 <entry>Free</entry>
8346 </row>
8347 </tbody>
8348 </tgroup>
8349 </table>
8350
8351 <para>
8352 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8353 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8354 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8355 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8356 that the law now looks like this:
8357 </para>
8358
8359 <table id="t5">
8360 <title></title>
8361 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8362 <thead>
8363 <row>
8364 <entry></entry>
8365 <entry>COPY</entry>
8366 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8367 </row>
8368 </thead>
8369 <tbody>
8370 <row>
8371 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8372 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8373 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8374 </row>
8375 <row>
8376 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8377 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8378 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8379 </row>
8380 </tbody>
8381 </tgroup>
8382 </table>
8383
8384 <para>
8385 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8386 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8387 creativity&mdash;
8388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8389 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8390 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8391 </para>
8392 <para>
8393 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8394 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8395 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8396 these domains actually does any good.
8397 </para>
8398 <para>
8399 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8400 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8401 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8402 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8403 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8404 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8405 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8406 rights were more sharply restricted.
8407 </para>
8408 <para>
8409 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8410 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8411 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8412 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8413 property rights<footnote><para>
8414 <!-- f36 -->
8415 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8416 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8417 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8418 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8419 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8420 Press, 1980).
8421 </para></footnote>)
8422 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8423 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8424 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8425 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8426 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8427 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8428 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8429 free culture.
8430 </para>
8431 <para>
8432 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8433 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8434 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8435 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8436 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8437 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8438 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8439 chapter 7). Adding
8440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8441 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8442 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8443 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8444 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8445 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8446 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8447 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8448 dominates the debate today.
8449 </para>
8450 <para>
8451 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8452 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8453 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8454 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8455 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8456 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8457 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8458 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8459 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8460 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8461 lawyer.
8462 </para>
8463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8464 </sect2>
8465 </sect1>
8466 </chapter>
8467 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8468 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8469 <para></para>
8470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8471 <sect1 id="chimera">
8472 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8473 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8474 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8475 </indexterm>
8476 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8477 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8478 </indexterm>
8479 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8480 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8481 </indexterm>
8482
8483 <para>
8484 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8485 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8486 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8487 <!-- f1. -->
8488 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8489 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8490 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8491 </para></footnote>
8492 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8493 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8494 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8495 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8496 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8497 villagers to explore life as a king.
8498 </para>
8499 <para>
8500 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8501 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8502 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8503 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8504 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8505 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8506 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8507 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8508 alone!'"
8509 </para>
8510 <para>
8511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8512 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8513 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8514 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8515 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8516 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8517 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8518 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8519 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8520 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8521 </para>
8522 <para>
8523 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8524 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8525 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8526 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8527 </para>
8528 <para>
8529 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8530 is affected," he reports.
8531 </para>
8532 <para>
8533 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8534 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8535 his brain."
8536 </para>
8537 <para>
8538 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8539 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8540 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8541 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8542 </para>
8543 <para>
8544 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8545 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8546 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8547 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8548 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8549 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8550 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8551 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8552
8553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8554 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8555 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8556 scene. . . ."
8557 </para>
8558 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8559 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8560 <para>
8561 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8562 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8563 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8564 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8565 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8566 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8567 </para>
8568 <para>
8569 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8570 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8571 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8572 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8573 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8574 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8575 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8576 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8577 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8578 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8579 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8580 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8581 </para>
8582 <para>
8583 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8584 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8585 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8586 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8587 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8588 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8589 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8590 </para>
8591 <para>
8592 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8593 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8594 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8595 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8596 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8597 from Tower.
8598 </para>
8599 <para>
8600
8601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8602 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8603 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8604 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8605 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8606 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8607 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8608 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8609 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8610 </para>
8611 <para>
8612 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8613 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8614 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8615 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8616 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8617 </para>
8618 <para>
8619 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8620 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8621 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8622 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8623 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8624 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8625 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8626 implemented.<footnote><para>
8627 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8628 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8629 "Copyright
8630 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8631 at
8632 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8633 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8634 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8635 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8636 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8637 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8638 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8639 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8640 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8641 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8642 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8643 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8644 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8645 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8646 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8647 billion
8648 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8649 Elizabeth
8650 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8651 August 2003, available at
8652 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8653 targeting
8654 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8655 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8656 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8657 D3, available at
8658 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8659 </para></footnote>
8660
8661 </para>
8662 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8663 <para>
8664 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8665 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8666 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8667 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8668 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8669 </para>
8670 <para>
8671 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8672 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8673 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8674 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8675 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8676 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8677 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8678 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8679 </para>
8680 <para>
8681
8682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8683 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8684 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8685 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8686 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8687 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8688 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8689 </para>
8690 <para>
8691 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8692 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8693 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8694 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8695 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8696 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8697 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8698 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8699 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8700 protection for copyrighted material,
8701 </para>
8702 <blockquote>
8703 <para>
8704 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8705 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8706 </para>
8707 <para>
8708 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8709 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8710 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8711 answer
8712 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8713 well produce a totally different industry model.
8714 </para>
8715 <para>
8716 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8717 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8718 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8719 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8720 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8721 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8722 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8723 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8724 interests.<footnote><para>
8725 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8726 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8727 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8728 Protection,
8729 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8730 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8731 EMusic.com),
8732 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8733 Congressional
8734 Testimony File.
8735 </para></footnote>
8736 </para>
8737 </blockquote>
8738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8739 <para>
8740 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8741 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8742 changed.
8743 </para>
8744 <para>
8745 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8746 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8747 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8748 </para>
8749
8750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8751 </sect1>
8752 <sect1 id="harms">
8753 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8754 <para>
8755
8756 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8757 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8758 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8759 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8760 prohibition,
8761 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8762 </para>
8763 <para>
8764 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8765 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8766 extend
8767 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8768 justified?
8769 </para>
8770 <para>
8771 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8772 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8773 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8774 our history.
8775 </para>
8776 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8777 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8778 <para>
8779 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8780 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8781 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8782 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8783 </para>
8784 <para>
8785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8786 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8787 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8788 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8789 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8790 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8791 </para>
8792 <sect2 id="constrain">
8793 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8794 <para>
8795 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8796 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8797 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8798 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8799 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8800 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8801 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8802 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8803 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8804 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8805 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8806 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8807 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8808 </para>
8809 <para>
8810 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8811 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8812 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8813 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8814 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8815 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8816 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8817 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8818 the culture all around.
8819 </para>
8820 <para>
8821 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8822 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8823
8824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8825
8826 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8827 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8828 storytelling extended across the globe.
8829 </para>
8830 <para>
8831 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8832 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8833 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8834 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8835 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8836 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8837 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8838 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8839 work is presumptively illegal.
8840 </para>
8841 <para>
8842 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8843 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8844 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8845 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8846 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8847 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8848 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8849 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8850 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8851 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8852 million.<footnote><para>
8853 <!-- f1. -->
8854 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8855 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8856 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8857 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8858 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8859 </para></footnote>
8860 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8861 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8862 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8863 suffering.<footnote>
8864 <para>
8865 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8866 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8867 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8868 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8869 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8870 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8871 available at
8872 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8873 recent months.
8874 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8875 </para></footnote>
8876 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8877 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8878 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8879 </para>
8880 <para>
8881 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8882 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8883 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8884 creative
8885 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8886 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8887 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8888
8889 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8890 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8891 create,
8892 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8893 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8894 begin
8895 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8896 necessarily
8897 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8898 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8899 "illegal
8900 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8901 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8902 available
8903 at
8904 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8905 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8906 </para></footnote>
8907 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8908 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8909 critical or reflective.
8910 </para>
8911 <para>
8912 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8913 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8914 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8915 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8916 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8917 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8918 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8919 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8920 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8921 </para>
8922 <para>
8923 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8924 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8925 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8926 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8927 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8928 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8929 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8930 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8931 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8932 </para>
8933 <para>
8934 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8935 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
8936 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8937 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8938 law regulates such a use.
8939 </para>
8940 <para>
8941
8942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8943 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8944 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8945 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8946 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8947 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8948 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8949 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8950 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8951 </para>
8952 <para>
8953 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8954 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8955 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8956 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8957 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8958 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8959 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8960 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8961 comfort themselves.
8962 </para>
8963 <para>
8964 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8965 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8966 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8967 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8968 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8969 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8970 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8971 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8972 culture that is free.
8973 </para>
8974 <para>
8975 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8976 </para>
8977 <blockquote>
8978 <para>
8979 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8980 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8981 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8982 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8983 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8985 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8986 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8987 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8988 </para>
8989 </blockquote>
8990 </sect2>
8991 <sect2 id="innovators">
8992 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8993 <para>
8994 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8995 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8996 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8997 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8998 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8999 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9000 </para>
9001 <para>
9002 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9003 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9004 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9005 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9006 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9007 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9008 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9009 </para>
9010 <para>
9011 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9012 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9013 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9014 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9015 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9016 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9017 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9018 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9019 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9020 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9021 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9022 </para>
9023 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9024 <para>
9025 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9027 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9028 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9029 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9030 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9031 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9032 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9033 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9034 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9035 </para>
9036 <para>
9037 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9038 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9039 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9040 </para>
9041 <para>
9042 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9043 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9044 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9045 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9046 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9047 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9048 </para>
9049 <para>
9050 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9051 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9052 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9053 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9054 Raitt. And so on.
9055 </para>
9056 <para>
9057 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9058 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9059 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9060 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9061 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9062 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9063 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9064 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9065 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9066 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9067 </para>
9068 <para>
9069 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9070 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9071
9072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9073 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9074 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9075 the kind of content the users liked.
9076 </para>
9077 <para>
9078 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9079 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9080 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9081 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9082 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9083 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9084 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9085 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9086 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9087 they had already bought.
9088 </para>
9089 <para>
9090 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9091 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9092 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9093 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9094 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9095 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9096 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9097 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9098 </para>
9099 <para>
9100 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9101 </para>
9102 <para>
9103 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9104 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9105 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9106 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9107 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9108 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9109 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9110 demanded.
9111 </para>
9112 <para>
9113 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9114 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9115 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9116 clients in this
9117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9118 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9119 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9120 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9121 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9122 </para>
9123 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9124 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9125 <para>
9126 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9127 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9128 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9129 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9130 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9131 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9132 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9133 innovation
9134 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9135 Revolution
9136 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9137 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9138 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9139 Times, 28 May 2001.
9140 </para></footnote>
9141 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9142 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9143 industry
9144 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9145 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9146 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9147 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9148 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9149 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9150 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9151 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9152 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9153 </para>
9154 <blockquote>
9155 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9156 <para>
9157 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9158 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9159 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9160 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9161 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9162 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9163 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9164 <para>
9165 <!-- f5. -->
9166 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9167 2003, available at
9168 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9169 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9170 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9171 </para></footnote>
9172 </para>
9173 </blockquote>
9174 <para>
9175 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9176 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9177 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9178 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9179 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9180 constantly threatened by litigation.
9181 </para>
9182 <para>
9183
9184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9185 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9186 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9187 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9188 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9189 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9190 imposes,
9191 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9192 conservative
9193 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9194 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9195 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9196 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9197 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9198 </para>
9199 <para>
9200 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9201 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9202 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9203 systematically
9204 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9205 industries
9206 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9207 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9208 competition.
9209 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9210 competition.
9211 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9212 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9213 overregulatedregulated
9214 market.
9215 </para>
9216 <para>
9217 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9218 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9219 burden
9220 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9221 culture
9222 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9223 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9224 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9225 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9226 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9227 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9228 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9229 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9231 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9232 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9233 creativity.
9234 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9235 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9236 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9237 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9238 technology
9239 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9240 </para>
9241 <para>
9242 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9243 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9244 Internet's
9245 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9246 feature
9247 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9248 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9249 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9250 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9251 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9252 </para>
9253 <para>
9254 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9255 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9256 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9257 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9258 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9259 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9260 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9261 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9262 </para></footnote>
9263
9264 Congress
9265 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9266 "broadcast
9267 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9268 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9269 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9270 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9271 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9272 violators
9273 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9274 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9275 </para></footnote>
9276
9277 </para>
9278 <para>
9279 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9280 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9281 regulation
9282 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9283 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9284
9285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9286 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9287 those requirements.
9288 </para>
9289 <para>
9290 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9291 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9292 impose.<footnote><para>
9293 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9294 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9295 </para></footnote>
9296 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9297 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9298 harm than good.
9299 </para>
9300 <para>
9301 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9302 innovation&mdash;again,
9303 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9304 crowd.
9305 </para>
9306 <para>
9307 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9308 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9309 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9310 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9311 </para>
9312 <para>
9313 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9314 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9315 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9316 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9317 2001).
9318 </para></footnote>
9319 overall this history of copyright
9320 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9321 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9322 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9323 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9324 </para>
9325 <para>
9326 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9327 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9328 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9329 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9330 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9331 </para>
9332 <para>
9333 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9334 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9335 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9336 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9337 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9338 copyright
9339 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9340 music
9341 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9342 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9343 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9344 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9345 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9346 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9347 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9348 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9349 </para></footnote>
9350 It has been
9351 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9352 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9353 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9354 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9355 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9356 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9357 August
9358 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9359 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9360 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9361 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9362 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9363 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9364 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9365 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9366 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9367 </para></footnote>
9368 But there is one
9369 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9370 demise
9371 of Internet radio.
9372 </para>
9373 <para>
9374
9375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9376 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9377 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9378 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9379 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9380 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9381 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9382 copyright
9383 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9384 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9385 </para>
9386 <para>
9387 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9388 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9389 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9390 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9391 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9392 Probably
9393 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9394 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9395 efforts
9396 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9397 </para>
9398 <para>
9399 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9400 technology
9401 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9402 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9403 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9404 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9405 regular
9406 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9407 </para>
9408 <para>
9409 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9410 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9411 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9412 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9413 broadcasters
9414 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9415 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9416 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9417 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9418 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9419 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9420 in to this new form of radio.
9421 </para>
9422 <para>
9423
9424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9425 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9426 improvement
9427 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9428 improvement
9429 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9430 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9431 establish
9432 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9433 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9434 </para>
9435 <blockquote>
9436 <para>
9437 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9438 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9439 radio
9440 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9441 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9442 competition
9443 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9444 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9445 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9446 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9447 communications
9448 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9449 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9450 acquire
9451 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9452 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9453 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9454 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9455 </para></footnote>
9456 </para>
9457 </blockquote>
9458 <para>
9459 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9460 Armstrong
9461 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9462 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9463 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9464 </para></footnote>
9465 to
9466 retard
9467 the growth of this competing technology.
9468 </para>
9469 <para>
9470 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9471 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9472 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9473 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9474 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9475 radio?
9476 </para>
9477 <para>
9478 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9479 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9480
9481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9482 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9483 phenomenon
9484 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9485 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9486 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9487 hypothetical
9488 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9489 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9490 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9491 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9492 </para>
9493 <para>
9494 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9495 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9496 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9497 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9498 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9499 <para>
9500 <!-- f14. -->
9501 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9502 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9503 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9504 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9505 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9506 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9507 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9508 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9509 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9510 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9511 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9512 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9513 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9514 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9515 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9516 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9517 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9518 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9519 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9520 </para></footnote>
9521 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9522 equivalent fee.
9523 </para>
9524 <para>
9525 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9526 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9527 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9528 </para>
9529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9530 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9531 <listitem><para>
9532 name of the service;
9533 </para></listitem>
9534 <listitem><para>
9535 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9536 </para></listitem>
9537 <listitem><para>
9538 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9539 </para></listitem>
9540 <listitem><para>
9541 date of transmission;
9542 </para></listitem>
9543 <listitem><para>
9544 time of transmission;
9545 </para></listitem>
9546 <listitem><para>
9547 time zone of origination of transmission;
9548 </para></listitem>
9549 <listitem><para>
9550 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9551 </para></listitem>
9552 <listitem><para>
9553 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9554 </para></listitem>
9555 <listitem><para>
9556 sound recording title;
9557 </para></listitem>
9558 <listitem><para>
9559 ISRC code of the recording;
9560 </para></listitem>
9561 <listitem><para>
9562 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9563 </para></listitem>
9564 <listitem><para>
9565 featured recording artist;
9566 </para></listitem>
9567 <listitem><para>
9568 retail album title;
9569 </para></listitem>
9570 <listitem><para>
9571 recording label;
9572 </para></listitem>
9573 <listitem><para>
9574 UPC code of the retail album;
9575 </para></listitem>
9576 <listitem><para>
9577 catalog number;
9578 </para></listitem>
9579 <listitem><para>
9580 copyright owner information;
9581 </para></listitem>
9582 <listitem><para>
9583 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9584 </para></listitem>
9585 <listitem><para>
9586 name of the service or entity;
9587 </para></listitem>
9588 <listitem><para>
9589 channel or program;
9590 </para></listitem>
9591 <listitem><para>
9592 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9593 </para></listitem>
9594 <listitem><para>
9595 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9596 </para></listitem>
9597 <listitem><para>
9598 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9599 </para></listitem>
9600 <listitem><para>
9601 Unique User identifier;
9602 </para></listitem>
9603 <listitem><para>
9604 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9605 </para></listitem>
9606 </orderedlist>
9607
9608 <para>
9609 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9610 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9611 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9612 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9613 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9614 does not.
9615 </para>
9616 <para>
9617 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9618 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9619 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9620 </para>
9621 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9622 <para>
9623 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9624 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9625 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9626 </para>
9627 <blockquote>
9628 <para>
9629 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9630 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9631 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9632 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9633 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9634 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9635
9636 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9637 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9638 Because
9639 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9640 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9641 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9642 of business. . . ."
9643 </para>
9644 <para>
9645 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9646 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9647 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9648 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9649 </para>
9650 </blockquote>
9651 <para>
9652 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9653 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9654 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9655 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9656 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9657 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9658 effective to prevent it.
9659 </para>
9660 </sect2>
9661 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9662 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9663 <para>
9664 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9665 dinosaurs
9666 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9667 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9668 </para>
9669 <para>
9670 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9671 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9672 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9673 </para>
9674 <para>
9675 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9676 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9677 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9678 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9679 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9680 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9681 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9682 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9683 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9684 </para></footnote>
9685 According to the RIAA,
9686 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9687 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9688
9689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9690 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9691 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9692 increasingly
9693 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9694 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9695 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9696 extreme
9697 response by the other.
9698 </para>
9699 <para>
9700 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9701 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9702 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9703 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9704 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9705 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9706 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9707 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9708 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9709 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9710 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9711 was.<footnote><para>
9712 <!-- f16. -->
9713 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9714 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9715 </para></footnote>
9716 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9717 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9718 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9719 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9720 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9721 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9722 they oppose.
9723 </para>
9724 <para>
9725 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9726 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9727 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9728 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9729 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9730 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9731 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9732 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9733 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9734 <!-- f17. -->
9735 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9736 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9737 </para></footnote>
9738 We have
9739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9740 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9741 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9742 <!-- f18. -->
9743 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9744 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9745 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9746 </para></footnote>
9747 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9748 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9749 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9750 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9751 cheat.<footnote><para>
9752 <!-- f19. -->
9753 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9754 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9755 compliance literature).
9756 </para></footnote>
9757 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9758 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9759 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9760 </para>
9761 <para>
9762 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9763 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9764 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9765 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9766 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9767 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9768 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9769 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9770 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9771 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9772 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9773 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9774 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9775 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9776 degree of illegality.
9777 </para>
9778 <para>
9779 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9780 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9781 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9782 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9783 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9784 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9785 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9786 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9787 to consider the alternative.
9788 </para>
9789 <para>
9790
9791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9792 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9793 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9794 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9795 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9796 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9797 </para>
9798 <para>
9799 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9800 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9801 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9802 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9803 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9804 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9805 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9806 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9807 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9808 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9809 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9810 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9811 </para>
9812 <para>
9813 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9814 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9815 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9816 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9817 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9818 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9819 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9820 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9821 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9822 a nation of felons?
9823 </para>
9824 <para>
9825 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9826 </para>
9827 <para>
9828 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9829 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9830 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9831 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9832 used
9833
9834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9835 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9836 recordings is free.
9837 </para>
9838 <para>
9839 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9840 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9841 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9842 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9843 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9844 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9845 capacities of digital technologies.
9846 </para>
9847 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9848 <para>
9849 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9850 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9851 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9852 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9853 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9854 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9855 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9856 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9857 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9858 </para>
9859 <para>
9860 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9861 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9862 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9863 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9864 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9865 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9866 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9867 on people's machines.
9868 </para>
9869 <para>
9870 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9871 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9872 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9873 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9874 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9875 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9876
9877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9878 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9879 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9880 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9881 management" system.
9882 </para>
9883 <para>
9884 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9885 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9886 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9887 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9888 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9889 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9890 freedom to move content easily?
9891 </para>
9892 <para>
9893 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9894 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9895 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9896 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9897 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9898 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9899 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9900 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9901 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9902 </para>
9903 <para>
9904 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9905 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9906 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9907 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9908 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9909 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9910 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9911 </para>
9912 <para>
9913 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9914 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9915 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9916 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9917 </para>
9918 <para>
9919 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9920 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9921
9922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9923
9924 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9925 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9926 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9927 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9928 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9929 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9930 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9931 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9932 generally.
9933 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9934 </para>
9935 <para>
9936 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9937 explains,
9938 </para>
9939 <blockquote>
9940 <para>
9941 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9942 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9943 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9944 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9945 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9946 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9947 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9948 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9949 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9950 </para>
9951 </blockquote>
9952 <para>
9953 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9954 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9955 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9956 </para>
9957 <para>
9958 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9959 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9960 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9961 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9962 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9963 an Internet user is revealed.
9964 </para>
9965 <para>
9966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9967 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9968 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9969 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9970 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9971 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9972 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9973 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9974 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9975 <!-- f20. -->
9976 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9977 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9978 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9979 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9980 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9981 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9982 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
9983 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9984 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9985 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
9986 </para></footnote>
9987
9988 </para>
9989 <para>
9990 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9991 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9992 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9993 <!-- f21. -->
9994 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9995 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9996 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9997 </para></footnote>
9998 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9999 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10000 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10001 </para>
10002 <para>
10003 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10004 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10005 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10006 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10007 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10008 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10009 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10010 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10011 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10012 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10013 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10014 <!-- f22. -->
10015 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10016 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10017 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10018 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10019 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10020 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10021 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10022 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10023 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
10024 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10025 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10026 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10027 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10028 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10029 </para></footnote>
10030 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10031 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10032 </para>
10033 <para>
10034 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10035 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10036 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10037 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10038 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10039 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10040 college students
10041
10042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10043 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10044 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10045 Says von Lohmann,
10046 </para>
10047 <blockquote>
10048 <para>
10049 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10050 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10051 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10052 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10053 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10054 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10055 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10056 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10057 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10058 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10059 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10060 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10061 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10062 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10063 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10064 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10065 million of them.
10066 </para>
10067 </blockquote>
10068 <para>
10069 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10070 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10071 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10072 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10073 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10074 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10075 </para>
10076
10077 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10078 </sect2>
10079 </sect1>
10080 </chapter>
10081 <chapter id="c-balances">
10082 <title>BALANCES</title>
10083
10084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10085 <para>
10086 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10087 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10088 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10089 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10090 </para>
10091 <para>
10092 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10093 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10094 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10095 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10096 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10097 everything around.
10098 </para>
10099 <para>
10100 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10101 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10102 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10103 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10104 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10105 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10106 </para>
10107 <para>
10108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10109 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10110 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10111 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10112 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10113 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10114 made that is happening all around.
10115 </para>
10116 <para>
10117 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10118 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10119 gasoline onto this fire.
10120 </para>
10121 <para>
10122 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10123 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10124 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10125 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10126 </para>
10127 <para>
10128 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10129 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10130 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10131 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10132 success will require.
10133 </para>
10134
10135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10136 <sect1 id="eldred">
10137 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10138 <para>
10139 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10140 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10141 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10142 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10143 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10144 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10145 come alive.
10146 </para>
10147 <para>
10148 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10149 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10150 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10151 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10152 them available for free.
10153 </para>
10154 <para>
10155 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10156 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10157 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10158 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10159 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10161 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10162 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10163 accessible&mdash;today.
10164 </para>
10165 <para>
10166 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10167 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10168 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10169 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10170 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10171 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10172 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10173 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10174 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10175 commercial publications of public domain works.
10176 </para>
10177 <para>
10178 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10179 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10180 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10181 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10182 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10183 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10184 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10185 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10186 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10187 generally.<footnote><para>
10188 <!-- f1. -->
10189 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10190 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10191 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10192 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10193 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10194 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10195 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10196 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10197 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10198 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10199 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10200 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10201 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10202 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10203 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10204 </para>
10205 <para>
10206 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10207 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10208 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10209 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10210 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10211 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10212 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10213 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10214 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10215 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10216 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10217 </para>
10218 <para>
10219
10220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10221 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10222 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10223 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10224 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10225 <!-- f2. -->
10226 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10227 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10228 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10229 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10230 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10231 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10232 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10233 </para></footnote>
10234
10235 </para>
10236 <para>
10237 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10238 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10239 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10240 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10241 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10242 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10243 to undertake.
10244 </para>
10245 <para>
10246 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10247 constitutional
10248 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10249 interpretation.
10250 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10251 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10252 importantly
10253 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10254 </para>
10255 <blockquote>
10256 <para>
10257 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10258 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10259 their . . . Writings. . . .
10260 </para>
10261 </blockquote>
10262 <para>
10263 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10264 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10265 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10266 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10267 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10268 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10269 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10270 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10271 </para>
10272 <para>
10273 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10274 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10275 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10276 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10278 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10279 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10280 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10281 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10282 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10283 </para>
10284 <para>
10285 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10286 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10287 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10288 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10289 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10290 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10291 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10292 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10293 this gravy train going.
10294 </para>
10295 <para>
10296 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10297 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10298 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10299 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10300 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10301 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10302 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10303 </para>
10304 <para>
10305 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10306 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10307 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10308 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10309 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10310 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10311 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10312 published by anyone for free.
10313 </para>
10314 <para>
10315 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10316 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10317 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10318 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10319 report:
10320 </para>
10321 <para>
10322 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10323
10324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10325 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10326 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10327 those works.
10328 </para>
10329 <para>
10330 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10331 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10332 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10333 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10334 </para>
10335 <para>
10336 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10337 about it?"
10338 </para>
10339 <para>
10340 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10341 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10342 they support the bill."
10343 </para>
10344 <para>
10345 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10346 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10347 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10348 much is it worth?"
10349 </para>
10350 <para>
10351 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10352 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10353 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10354 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10355 </para>
10356 <para>
10357 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10358 correct conclusion:
10359 </para>
10360 <para>
10361 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10362 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10363 contributions
10364 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10365 </para>
10366 <para>
10367 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10368 contribute
10369 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10370 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10371 </para>
10372 <para>
10373 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10374 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10375 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10376 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10378 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10379 copyrights
10380 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10381 the copyright term extended.
10382 </para>
10383 <para>
10384 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10385 legislation
10386 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10387 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10388 </para>
10389 <para>
10390 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10391 Copyright
10392 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10393 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10394 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10395 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10396 contributions.<footnote><para>
10397 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10398 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10399 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10400 </para></footnote>
10401 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10402 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10403 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10404 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10405 Age," available at
10406 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10407 </para></footnote>
10408 Disney is estimated to have
10409 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10410 cycle.<footnote><para>
10411 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10412 Congressional
10413 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10414 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10415 </para></footnote>
10416
10417 </para>
10418 <para>
10419 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10420 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10421 reality
10422 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10423 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10424 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10425 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10426 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10427 "limited."
10428 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10429 and again.
10430 </para>
10431 <para>
10432 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10433 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10434 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10435 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10436 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10437 scholars,
10438 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10439
10440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10441 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10442 guns near schools.
10443 </para>
10444 <para>
10445 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10446 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10447 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10448 "interstate
10449 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10450 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10451 interstate
10452 commerce.
10453 </para>
10454 <para>
10455 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10456 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10457 activity,
10458 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10459 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10460 interpreted
10461 to impose no limit.
10462 </para>
10463 <para>
10464 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10465 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10466 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10467 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10468 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10469 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10470 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10471 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10472 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10473 government
10474 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10475 </para>
10476 <para>
10477 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10478 arguments,"
10479 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10480 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10481 </para></footnote>
10482 If anything Congress says is interstate
10483 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10484 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10485 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10486 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10487 </para></footnote>
10488
10489 </para>
10490 <para>
10491 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10492 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10493 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10494 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10495 context
10496 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10497 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10498 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10499 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10500 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10501 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10502 </para></footnote>
10503 And if it is applied to the
10504 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10505 Congress
10506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10507 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10508 existing
10509 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10510 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10511 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10512 copyrights
10513 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10514 existing copyrights.
10515 </para>
10516 <para>
10517 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10518 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10519 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10520 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10521 rejected
10522 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10523 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10524 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10525 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10526 boring.
10527 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10528 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10529 </para>
10530 <para>
10531 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10532 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10533 Constitution's
10534 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10535 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10536 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10537 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10538 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10539 already
10540 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10541 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10542 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10543 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10544 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10545 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10546 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10547 </para>
10548 <para>
10549 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10550
10551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10552 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10553 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10554 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10555 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10556 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10557 </para></footnote>
10558 But
10559 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10560 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10561 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10562 </para>
10563 <para>
10564 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10565 copyright
10566 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10567 influence
10568 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10569 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10570 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10571 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10572 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10573 bought to extend them again.
10574 </para>
10575 <para>
10576 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10577 extended.
10578 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10579 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10580 society
10581 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10582 Disney's.
10583 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10584 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10585 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10586 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10587 exploited,
10588 and no longer available as a result.
10589 </para>
10590 <para>
10591 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10592 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10593 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10594 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10595 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10596 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10597 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10598 Congressional
10599 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10600 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10601 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10602 </para></footnote>
10603
10604 </para>
10605 <para>
10606 Think practically about the consequence of this
10607 extension&mdash;practically,
10608 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10609
10610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10611 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10612 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10613 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10614 remaining
10615 9,873. What would you have to do?
10616 </para>
10617 <para>
10618 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10619 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10620 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10621 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10622 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10623 list of books still under copyright.
10624 </para>
10625 <para>
10626 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10627 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10628 </para>
10629 <para>
10630 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10631 owners
10632 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10633 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10634 being at least a list?
10635 </para>
10636 <para>
10637 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10638 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10639 practically
10640 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10641 thousands
10642 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10643 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10644 </para>
10645 <para>
10646 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10647 apologists
10648 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10649 owners?"
10650 </para>
10651 <para>
10652 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10653 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10654 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10655 suggesting
10656 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10657 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10658 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10659 </para>
10660 <para>
10661 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10662 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10663 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10664
10665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10666 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10667 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10668 happen
10669 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10670 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10671 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10672 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10673 know quite well who owns what property.
10674 </para>
10675 <para>
10676 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10677 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10678 already
10679 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10680 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10681 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10682 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10683 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10684 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10685 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10686 </para>
10687 <para>
10688 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10689 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10690 consequence
10691 for other creative works is much more dire.
10692 </para>
10693 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10694 <para>
10695 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10696 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10697 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10698 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10699 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10700 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10701 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10702 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10703 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10704 films."<footnote><para>
10705 <!-- f11. -->
10706 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10707 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10708 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10709 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10710 </para></footnote>
10711
10712 </para>
10713 <para>
10714 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10715 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10716 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10717 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10718 </para>
10719 <para>
10720 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10721
10722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10723 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10724 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10725 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10726 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10727 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10728 work available for distribution.
10729 </para>
10730 <para>
10731 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10732 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10733 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10734 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10735 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10736 mm film.<footnote><para>
10737 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10738 Supporting
10739 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10740 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10741 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10742 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10743 </para></footnote>
10744
10745 </para>
10746 <para>
10747 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10748 important.
10749 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10750 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10751 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10752 locate the copyright owner.
10753 </para>
10754 <para>
10755 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10756 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10757 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10758 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10759 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10760 exceptionally
10761 high.
10762 </para>
10763 <para>
10764 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10765 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10766 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10767 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10768 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10769 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10770 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10771 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10772 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10773 </para>
10774 <para>
10775 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10776
10777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10778 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10779 benefit
10780 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10781 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10782 the copyright expires.
10783 </para>
10784 <para>
10785 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10786 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10787 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10788 canisters
10789 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10790 than dust.
10791 </para>
10792 <para>
10793 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10794 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10795 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10796 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10797 creative
10798 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10799 free expression."
10800 </para>
10801 <para>
10802 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10803 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10804 indicated,
10805 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10806 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10807 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10808 distributors,
10809 the commercial life ends.
10810 </para>
10811 <para>
10812 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10813 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10814 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10815 between
10816 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10817 Friday
10818 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10819 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10820 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10821 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10822 have, we need to have access to this history.
10823 </para>
10824 <para>
10825 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10826
10827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10828 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10829 this context do no good.
10830 </para>
10831 <para>
10832 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10833 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10834 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10835 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10836 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10837 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10838 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10839 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10840 </para>
10841 <para>
10842 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10843 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10844 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10845 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10846 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10847 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10848 market didn't have more to offer.
10849 </para>
10850 <para>
10851 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10852 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10853 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10854 would not have interfered with anything.
10855 </para>
10856 <para>
10857 But this situation has now changed.
10858 </para>
10859 <para>
10860 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10861 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10862 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10863 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10864 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10865 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10866 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10867 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10868 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10869 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10870 </para>
10871 <para>
10872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10873 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10874 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10875 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10876 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10877 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10878 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10879 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10880 written for a radically different context.
10881 </para>
10882 <para>
10883 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10884 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10885 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10886 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10887 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10888 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10889 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10890 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10891 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10892 </para>
10893 <para>
10894 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10895 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10896 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10897 culture widely?"
10898 </para>
10899 <para>
10900 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10901 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10902 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10903 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10904 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10905 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10906 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10907 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10908 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10909 </para>
10910 <para>
10911 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10912 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10913 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10914 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10915
10916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10917 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10918 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10919 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10920 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10921 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10922 <!-- f13. -->
10923 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10924 December 2002, available at
10925 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10926 </para></footnote>
10927
10928 </para>
10929 <para>
10930 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10931 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10932 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10933 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10934 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10935 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10936 </para>
10937 <para>
10938 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10939 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10940 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10941 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10942 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10943 </para>
10944 <para>
10945 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10946 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10947 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10948 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10949 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10950 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10951 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10952 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10953 power to extend existing terms.
10954 </para>
10955 <para>
10956 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10957 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10958 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10959 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10960 </para>
10961 <para>
10962 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10963 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10964
10965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10966 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10967 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10968 overstepped its bounds.
10969 </para>
10970 <para>
10971 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10972 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10973 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10974 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10975 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10976 </para>
10977 <para>
10978 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10979 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10980 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10981 briefs and preparing for argument.
10982 </para>
10983 <para>
10984 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10985 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10986 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10987 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10988 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10989 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10990 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10991 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10992 </para>
10993 <para>
10994 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10995 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10996 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10997 mistake lost it.
10998 </para>
10999 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11000 <para>
11001 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11002 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11003 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11004 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11005 heat
11006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11007 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11008 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11009 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11010 </para>
11011 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11012 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11013 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11014 <para>
11015 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11016 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11017 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11018 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11019 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11020 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11021 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11022 most powerful media companies in the world."
11023 </para>
11024 <para>
11025 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11026 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11027 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11028 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11029 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11030 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11031 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11032 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11033 interpretation
11034 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11035 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11036 unconstitutional,
11037 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11038 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11039 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11040 Constitution,
11041 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11042 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11043 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11044 </para>
11045 <para>
11046 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11047 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11048 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11049 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11050 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11051 why it was unconstitutional.
11052 </para>
11053 <para>
11054 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11055
11056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11057 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11058 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11059 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11060 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11061 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11062 minority.
11063 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11064 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11065 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11066 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11067 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11068 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11069 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11070 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11071 </para>
11072 <para>
11073 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11074 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11075 beginning.
11076 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11077 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11078 Republican
11079 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11080 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11081 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11082 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11083 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11084 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11085 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11086 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11087 </para>
11088 <para>
11089 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11090 supporting
11091 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11092 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11093 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11094 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11095 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11096 </para>
11097 <para>
11098 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11099 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11100
11101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11102 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11103 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11104 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11105 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11106 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11107 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11108 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11109 </para>
11110 <para>
11111 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11112 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11113 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11114 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11115 </para>
11116 <para>
11117 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11118 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11119 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11120 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11121 clear.
11122 </para>
11123 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11124 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11125 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11126 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11127 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11128 <para>
11129 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11130 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11131 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11132 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11133 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11134 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11135 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11136 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11137 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11138 </para>
11139 <para>
11140 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11141 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11142 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11143 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11144 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11145 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11146 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11147 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11148
11149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11150 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11151 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11152 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11153 </para>
11154 <para>
11155 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11156 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11157 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11158 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11159 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11160 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11161 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11162 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11163 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11164 confidence in our argument.
11165 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11166 </para>
11167 <para>
11168 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11169 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11170 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11171 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11172 copyright holders.
11173 </para>
11174 <para>
11175 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11176 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11177 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11178 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11179 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11180 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11181 wanted to control.
11182 </para>
11183 <para>
11184 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11185 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11186 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11187 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11188 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11189 pornography."<footnote><para>
11190 <!-- f14. -->
11191 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11192 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11193 </para></footnote>
11194 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11195 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11196 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11197 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11198 <!-- f15. -->
11199 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11200 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11201 </para></footnote>
11202 That's
11203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11204 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11205 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11206 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11207 </para>
11208 <para>
11209 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11210 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11211 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11212 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11213 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11214 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11215 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11216 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11217 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11218 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11219 </para>
11220 <para>
11221 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11222 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11223 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11224 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11225 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11226 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11227 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11228 </para>
11229 <para>
11230 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11231 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11232 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11233 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11234 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11235 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11236 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11237 powers had limits.
11238 </para>
11239 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11240 <para>
11241 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11242 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11243 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11244 the Constitution
11245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11246 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11247 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11248 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11249 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11250 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11251 </para>
11252 <para>
11253 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11254 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11255 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11256 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11257 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11258 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11259 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11260 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11261 sense.
11262 </para>
11263 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11264 <para>
11265 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11266 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11267 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11268 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11269 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11270 these retrospective extensions.
11271 </para>
11272 <para>
11273 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11274 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11275 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11276 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11277 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11278 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11279 </para>
11280 <para>
11281 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11282 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11283 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11284 overriding
11285 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11286 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11287 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11288 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11289 </para>
11290 <para>
11291 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11292 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11293
11294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11295 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11296 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11297 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11298 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11299 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11300 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11301 copyright be limited.
11302 </para>
11303 <para>
11304 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11305 Congress
11306 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11307 government
11308 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11309 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11310 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11311 </para>
11312 <para>
11313 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11314 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11315 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11316 existing
11317 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11318 </para>
11319 <para>
11320 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11321 extended
11322 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11323 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11324 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11325 existing
11326 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11327 restraint
11328 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11329 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11330 hesitated
11331 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11332 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11333 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11334 arrived
11335 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11336 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11337
11338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11339 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11340 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11341 </para>
11342 <para>
11343 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11344 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11345 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11346 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11347 Congress
11348 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11349 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11350 this central idea.
11351 </para>
11352 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11353 <para>
11354 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11355 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11356 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11357 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11358 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11359 </para>
11360 <para>
11361 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11362 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11363 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11364 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11365 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11366 </para>
11367 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11368 <para>
11369 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11370 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11371 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11372 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11373 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11374 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11375 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11376 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11377 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11378 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11379 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11380
11381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11382 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11383 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11384 </para>
11385 <para>
11386 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11387 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11388 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11389 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11390 congressmen
11391 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11392 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11393 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11394 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11395 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11396 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11397 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11398 family of the Justices.
11399 </para>
11400 <para>
11401 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11402 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11403 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11404 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11405 </para>
11406 <para>
11407 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11408 The history was bothering her.
11409 </para>
11410 <blockquote>
11411 <para>
11412 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11413 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11414 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11415 practice that began with the very first act.
11416 </para>
11417 </blockquote>
11418 <para>
11419 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11420 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11421 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11422 </para>
11423 <blockquote>
11424 <para>
11425 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11426 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11428 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11429 is yes.
11430 </para>
11431 </blockquote>
11432 <para>
11433 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11434 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11435 Kennedy, who observed,
11436 </para>
11437 <blockquote>
11438 <para>
11439 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11440 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11441 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11442 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11443 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11444 </para>
11445 </blockquote>
11446 <para>
11447 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11448 student,
11449 I answered,
11450 </para>
11451 <blockquote>
11452 <para>
11453 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11454 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11455 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11456 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11457 effectively
11458 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11459 </para>
11460 </blockquote>
11461 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11462 <para>
11463 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11464 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11465 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11466 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11467 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11468 </para>
11469 <para>
11470 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11471 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11472 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11473 </para>
11474 <para>
11475 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11476 sympathetic.
11477 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11478
11479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11480 </para>
11481 <blockquote>
11482 <para>
11483 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11484 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11485 </para>
11486 <para>
11487 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11488 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11489 domain
11490 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11491 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11492 into the Copyright Clause.
11493 </para>
11494 </blockquote>
11495 <para>
11496 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11497 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11498 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11499 </para>
11500 <blockquote>
11501 <para>
11502 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11503 unlimited
11504 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11505 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11506 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11507 an unlimited time.
11508 </para>
11509 </blockquote>
11510 <para>
11511 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11512 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11513 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11514 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11515 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11516 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11517 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11518 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11519 specific
11520 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11521 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11522 </para>
11523 <para>
11524 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11525 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11526
11527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11528 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11529 optimistic.
11530 </para>
11531 <para>
11532 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11533 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11534 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11535 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11536 believed
11537 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11538 Copyright
11539 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11540 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11541 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11542 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11543 Copyright
11544 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11545 believe
11546 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11547 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11548 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11549 </para>
11550 <para>
11551 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11552 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11553 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11554 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11555 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11556 </para>
11557 <para>
11558 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11559 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11560 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11561 </para>
11562 <para>
11563 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11564 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11565 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11566 </para>
11567 <para>
11568 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11569 distinguish
11570 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11571 argument
11572 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11573 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11574 in the Court's opinion.
11575 </para>
11576 <para>
11577
11578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11579 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11580 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11581 generally,
11582 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11583 </para>
11584 <para>
11585 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11586 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11587 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11588 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11589 </para>
11590 <para>
11591 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11592 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11593 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11594 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11595 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11596 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11597 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11598 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11599 would not.
11600 </para>
11601 <para>
11602 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11603 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11604 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11605 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11606 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11607 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11608 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11609 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11610 the system we have.
11611 </para>
11612 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11613 <para>
11614 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11615 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11616 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11617 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11618 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11619 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11620 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11621 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11622 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11623 </para>
11624 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11625 <para>
11626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11627 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11628 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11629 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11630 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11631 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11632 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11633 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11634 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11635 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11636 </para>
11637 <para>
11638 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11639 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11640 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11641 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11642 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11643 </para>
11644 <para>
11645 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11646 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11647 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11648 </para>
11649 <para>
11650 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11651 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11652 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11653 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11654 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11655 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11656 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11657 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11658 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11659 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11660 "originalism" now?
11661 </para>
11662 <para>
11663 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11664 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11665 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11666 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11667
11668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11669 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11670 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11671 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11672 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11673 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11674 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11675 own principles.
11676 </para>
11677 <para>
11678 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11679 myself.
11680 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11681 the law as it is.
11682 </para>
11683 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11684 <para>
11685 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11686 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11687 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11688 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11689 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11690 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11691 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11692 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11693 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11694 </para>
11695 <para>
11696 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11697 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11698 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11699 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11700 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11701 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11702 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11703 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11704 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11705 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11706 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11707 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11708 effort to persuade; but I
11709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11710 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11711 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11712 should decide the issue.
11713 </para>
11714 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11715 <para>
11716 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11717 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11718 Kathleen Sullivan?
11719 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11720 </para>
11721 <para>
11722 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11723 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11724 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11725 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11726 </para>
11727 <para>
11728 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11729 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11730 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11731 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11732 have persuaded.
11733 </para>
11734 <para>
11735 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11736 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11737 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11738 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11739 issue should not be raised until it is.
11740 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11741 </para>
11742 <para>
11743 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11744 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11745 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11746 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11747 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11748 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11749 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11750 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11751 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11752 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11753 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11754
11755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11756 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11757 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11758 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11759 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11760 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11761 </para>
11762 <blockquote>
11763 <para>
11764 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11765 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11766 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11767 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11768 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11769 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11770 </para>
11771 </blockquote>
11772 <para>
11773 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11774 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11775 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11776 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11777 in the face felt exactly like that.
11778 </para>
11779 <para>
11780 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11781 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11782 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11783 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11784 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11785 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11786 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11787 </para>
11788 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11789 </sect1>
11790 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11791 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11792 <para>
11793 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11794 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11795 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11796 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11797 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11798 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11799 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11800 </para>
11801 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11802 <para>
11803 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11804 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11805 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11806 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11807 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11808 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11809 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11810 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11811 </para>
11812 <para>
11813 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11814 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11816 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11817 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11818 the work passed into the public domain.
11819 </para>
11820 <para>
11821 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11822 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11823 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11824 </para>
11825 <para>
11826 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11827 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11828 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11829 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11830 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11831 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11832 everything else, let the content go.
11833 </para>
11834 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11835 <para>
11836 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11837 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11838 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11839 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11840 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11841 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11842 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11843 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11844 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11845 the stupid harm of the present system.
11846 </para>
11847 <para>
11848 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11849 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11850 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11851 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11852 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11853 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11854 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11855 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11856 where copyright owners could be identified.
11857 </para>
11858 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11859 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11860 <para>
11861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11862 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11863 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11864 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11865 <!-- f1. -->
11866 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11867 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11868 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11869 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11870 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11871 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11872 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11873 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11874 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11875 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11876 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11877 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11878 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11879 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11880 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11881 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11882 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11883 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11884 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11885 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11886 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11887 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11888 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11889 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11890 </para>
11891 <para>
11892 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11893 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11894 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11895 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11896 know what's protected and what's not.
11897 </para>
11898 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11899 <para>
11900 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11901 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11902 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11903 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11904 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11905 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11906 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11907 in the loss of widows' only income.
11908 </para>
11909 <para>
11910 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11911 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11912 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11913 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11914 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11915 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11916 </para>
11917 <para>
11918 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11919 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11920 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11921 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11922 burden
11923 imposed upon creators.
11924 </para>
11925 <para>
11926 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11927 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11928
11929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11930 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11931 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11932 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11933 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11934 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11935 table.
11936 </para>
11937 <para>
11938 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11939 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11940 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11941 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11942 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11943 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11944 spread.
11945 </para>
11946 <para>
11947 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11948 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11949 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11950 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11951 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11952 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11953 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11954 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11955 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11956 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11957 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11958 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11959 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11960 system of protection for property generally.
11961 </para>
11962 <para>
11963 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11964 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11965 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11966 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11967 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11968 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11969 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11970 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11971
11972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11973 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11974 take their place.
11975 </para>
11976 <para>
11977 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11978 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11979 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11980 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11981 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11982 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11983 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11984 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11985 </para>
11986 <para>
11987 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11988 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11989 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11990 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11991 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11992 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11993 seen before because there are no formalities.
11994 </para>
11995 <para>
11996 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11997 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11998 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11999 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12000 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12001 </para>
12002 <para>
12003 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12004 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12005 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12006 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12007 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12008 </para>
12009 <para>
12010 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12011 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12012 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12013 registration?
12014 </para>
12015 <para>
12016 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12017 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12018 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12019
12020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12021 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12022 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12023 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12024 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12025 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12026 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12027 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12028 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12029 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12030 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12031 </para>
12032 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12033 <para>
12034 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12035 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12036 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12037 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12038 </para>
12039 <para>
12040 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12041 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12042 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12043 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12044 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12045 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12046 something good might happen here.
12047 </para>
12048 <para>
12049 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12050 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12051 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12052 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12053 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12054 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12055 </para>
12056 <para>
12057 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12058 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12059 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12061 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12062 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12063 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12064 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12065 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12066 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12067 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12068 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12069 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12070 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12071 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12072 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12073 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12074 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12075 film is a valid derivative use.
12076 </para>
12077 <para>
12078 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12079 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12080 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12081 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12082 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12083 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12084 </para>
12085 <para>
12086 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12087 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12088 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12089 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12090 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12091 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12092 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12093 threat.
12094 </para>
12095 <para>
12096 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12097 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12098 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12099 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12100 sense?
12101 </para>
12102 <para>
12103
12104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12105 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12106 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12107 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12108 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12109 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12110 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12111 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12112 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12113 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12114 </para>
12115 <para>
12116 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12117 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12118 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12119 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12120 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12121 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12122 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12123 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12124 </para>
12125 <para>
12126 What does this industry really want?
12127 </para>
12128 <para>
12129 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12130 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12131 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12132 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12133 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12134 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12135 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12136 permission first.
12137 </para>
12138 <para>
12139 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12140 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12141 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12142 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12143 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12144 </para>
12145 <para>
12146 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12147 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12148
12149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12150 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12151 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12152 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12153 and to share its own creation.
12154 </para>
12155 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12156 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12157 <para>
12158 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12159 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12160 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12161 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12162 block the progress of others.
12163 </para>
12164 <para>
12165 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12166 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12167 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12168 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12169 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12170 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12171 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12172 </para>
12173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12174 </sect1>
12175 </chapter>
12176 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12177 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12178 <para>
12179 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12180 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12181 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12182 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12183 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12184 </para>
12185 <para>
12186 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12187 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12188 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12189 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12190 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12191 the disease almost invisible.
12192 </para>
12193 <para>
12194 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12195 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12196 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12197 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12198 population:
12199 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12200 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12201 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12202 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12203 available at
12204 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12205 release
12206 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12207 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12208 </para></footnote>
12209 </para>
12210 <para>
12211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12212 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12213 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12214 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12215 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12216 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12217 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12218 </para>
12219 <para>
12220 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12221 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12222 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12223 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12224 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12225 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12226 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12227 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12228 changes.
12229 </para>
12230 <para>
12231 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12232 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12233 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12234 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12235 costs significantly below the market price.
12236 </para>
12237 <para>
12238 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12239 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12240 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12241 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12242 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12243 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12244 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12245 <para>
12246 <!-- f2. -->
12247 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12248 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12249 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12250 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12251 </para></footnote>
12252 </para>
12253 <para>
12254 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12255 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12256 Association
12257 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12258 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12259 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12260 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12261 Prepared
12262 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12263 2000), 14, available at
12264 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12265 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12266 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12267 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12268 (statement of James Love).
12269 </para></footnote>
12270 Through the
12271 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12272 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12273 request,
12274 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12276 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12277 began
12278 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12279 government's
12280 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12281 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12282 companies,
12283 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12284 international
12285 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12286 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12287 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12288 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12289 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12290 <!-- f4. -->
12291 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12292 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12293 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12294 Organization (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12295 </para>
12296 <para>
12297 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12298 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12299 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12300 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12301 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12302 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12303 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12304 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12305 </para>
12306 <para>
12307 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12308 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12309 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12310 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12311 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12312 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12313 </para>
12314 <para>
12315 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12316 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12317 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12318 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12319 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12320 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12321 by U.S. companies.
12322 </para>
12323 <para>
12324 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12325 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12326 argument
12327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12328 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12329 <!-- f5. -->
12330 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12331 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12332 May 1999, A1, available at
12333 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12334 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12335 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12336 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12337 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12338 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12339 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12340 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12341 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12342 Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12344 </para></footnote>
12345 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12346 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12347 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12348 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12349 </para>
12350 <para>
12351 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12352 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12353 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12354 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12355 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12356 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12357 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12358 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12359 </para>
12360 <para>
12361 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12362 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12363 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12364 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12365 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12366 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12367 </para>
12368 <para>
12369 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12370 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12371 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12372 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12373 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12374 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12375 </para>
12376 <para>
12377 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12378 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12379 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12380 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12381 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12382 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12383 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12384 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12386 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12387 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12388 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12389 idea called "intellectual property."
12390 </para>
12391 <para>
12392 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12393 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12394 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12395 What is the argument?
12396 </para>
12397 <para>
12398 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12399 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12400 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12401 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12402 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12403 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12404 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12405 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12406 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12407 were balanced in just this sense.
12408 </para>
12409 <para>
12410 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12411 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12412 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12413 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12414 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12415 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12416 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12417 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12418 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12419 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12420 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12421 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12422 our
12423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12424 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12425 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12426 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12427 this common sense open its eyes.
12428 </para>
12429 <para>
12430 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12431 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12432 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12433 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12434 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12435 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12436 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12437 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12438 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12439 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12440 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12441 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12442 </para>
12443 <para>
12444 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12445 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12446 meeting.<footnote><para>
12447 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12448 August 2003, E1, available at
12449 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12450 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12451 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12452 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12453 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12454 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12455 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12456 </para></footnote>
12457 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12458 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12459 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12460 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12461 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12462 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12463 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12464 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12465 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12466 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12467 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12468 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12469 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12471 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12472 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12473 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12474 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12475 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12476 </para>
12477 <para>
12478 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12479 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12480 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12481 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12482 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12483 </para>
12484 <para>
12485 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12486 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12487 meeting.
12488 </para></footnote>
12489 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12490 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12491 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12492 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12493 property issues.
12494 </para>
12495 <para>
12496 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12497 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12498 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12499 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12500 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12501 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12502 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12503 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12504 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12505 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12506 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12507 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12508 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12509 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12510 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12511 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12512 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12513 stuff of
12514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12515 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12516 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12517 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12518 </para>
12519 <para>
12520 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12521 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12522 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12523 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12524 </para>
12525 <para>
12526 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12527 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12528 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12529 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12530 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12531 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12532 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12533 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12534 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12535 </para>
12536 <para>
12537 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12538 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12539 noncommercial
12540 software. There are many important companies that depend
12541 fundamentally
12542 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12543 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12544 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12545 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12546 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12547 support a mode of software development that is different from
12548 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12549 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12550 sophisticated.
12551 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12552 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12553 opposition
12554 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12555 license
12556 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12557 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12558 Marketplace
12559 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12560 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12561 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12562 available at
12563 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12564 president,
12565 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12566 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12567 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12568 </para></footnote>
12569 </para>
12570 <para>
12571 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12572 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12573 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12574 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12575 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12576 by
12577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12578 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12579 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12580 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12581 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12582 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12583 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12584 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12585 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12586 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12587 </para>
12588 <para>
12589 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12590 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12591 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12592 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12593 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12594 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12595 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12596 <!-- f9. -->
12597 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12598 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12599 </para></footnote>
12600 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12601 </para>
12602 <para>
12603 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12604 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12605 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12606 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12607 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12608 its lobbying efforts.
12609 </para>
12610 <para>
12611 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12612 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12613 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12614 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12615 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12616 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12617 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12618 goals of WIPO."
12619 </para>
12620 <para>
12621 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12622 </para>
12623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12624 <para>
12625 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12626 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12627 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12628 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12629 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12630 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12631 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12632 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12633 </para>
12634 <para>
12635 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12636 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12637 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12638 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12639 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12640 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12641 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12642 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12643 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12644 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12645 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12646 </para>
12647 <para>
12648 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12649 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12650 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12651 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12652 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12653 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12654 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12655 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12656 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12657 right to decide what to do with their property.
12658 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12659 </para>
12660 <para>
12661 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12662 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12663 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12664 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12665 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12666 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12667 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12668 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12669 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12670 way possible.
12671 </para>
12672 <para>
12673 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12674 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12675 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12676 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12677 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12678 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12679 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12680 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12681 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12682 that control.
12683 </para>
12684 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12685 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12686 <para>
12687 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12688 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12689 <!-- f10. -->
12690 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12691 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12692 </para></footnote>
12693 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12694 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12695 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12696 </para>
12697 <para>
12698 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12699 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12700 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12701 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12702 </para>
12703 <blockquote>
12704 <para>
12705 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12706 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12707 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12708 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12709 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12710 say anything wrong. But in the world
12711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12712 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12713 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12714 </para>
12715 </blockquote>
12716 <para>
12717 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12718 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12719 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12720 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12721 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12722 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12723 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12724 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12725 </para>
12726 <para>
12727 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12728 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12729 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12730 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12731 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12732 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12733 </para>
12734 <para>
12735 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12736 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12737 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12738 our own country's history).
12739 </para>
12740 <para>
12741 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12742 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12743 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12744 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12745 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12746 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12747 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12748 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12749 democracy in the world, become?
12750 </para>
12751 <para>
12752 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12753 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12754 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12756 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12757 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12758 </para>
12759 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12760 <para>
12761 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12762 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12763 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12764 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12765 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12766 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12767 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12768 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12769 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12770 hearings and a different result.
12771 </para>
12772 <para>
12773 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12774 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12775 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12776 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12777 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12778 concentration in the media.
12779 </para>
12780 <para>
12781 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12782 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12783 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12784 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12785 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12786 </para>
12787 <para>
12788 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12789 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12790 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12791 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12792 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12793 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12794 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12795 </para>
12796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12797 <para>
12798 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12799 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12800 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12801 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12802 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12803 </para>
12804 <para>
12805 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12806 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12807 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12808 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12809 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12810 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12811 </para>
12812 <para>
12813 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12814 of our tragedy.
12815 </para>
12816 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12817 <para>
12818 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12819 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12820 <!-- f11. -->
12821 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12822 2003, available at
12823 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12824 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12825 2003, available at
12826 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12827 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12828 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12829 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12830 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12831 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12832 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12833 available at
12834 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12835 </para></footnote>
12836 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12837 music.<footnote><para>
12838 <!-- f12. -->
12839 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12840 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12841 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12842 </para></footnote>
12843 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12844 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12845 <!-- f13. -->
12846 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12847 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12848 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12850 </para></footnote>
12851 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12852 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12853 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12854 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12855 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12856 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12857 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12858 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12859 kids who use a computer to share content.
12860 </para>
12861 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12862 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12863 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12864 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12865 <para>
12866 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12867 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12868 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12869 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12870 24 August 2003, available at
12871 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12872 </para></footnote>
12873 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12874 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12875 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12876 country.<footnote><para>
12877 <!-- f15. -->
12878 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12879 available at
12880 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12881 </para></footnote>
12882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12883 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12884 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12885 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12886 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12887 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12888 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12889 day into the Causbys.
12890 </para>
12891 <para>
12892 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12893 potential is ever to be realized.
12894
12895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12896
12897 </para>
12898 </chapter>
12899 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12900 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12901 <para>
12902
12903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12904 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12905 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12906 maps what might be done.
12907 </para>
12908 <para>
12909 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12910 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12911 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12912 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12913 </para>
12914 <para>
12915 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12916 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12917 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12918 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12919 is so important.
12920 </para>
12921 <para>
12922 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12923 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12924 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12925 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12926 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12927 </para>
12928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12929
12930 <sect1 id="usnow">
12931 <title>US, NOW</title>
12932 <para>
12933 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12934 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12935 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12936 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12937 </para>
12938 <para>
12939 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12940 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12941 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12942 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12943 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12944 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12945 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12946 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12947 </para>
12948 <para>
12949 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12950 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12951 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12952 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12953 the
12954
12955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12956 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12957 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12958 unprotected.
12959 </para>
12960 <para>
12961 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12962 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12963 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12964 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12965 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12966 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12967 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12968 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12969 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12970 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12971 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12972 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12973 </para>
12974 <para>
12975 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12976 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12977 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12978 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12979 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12980 before.
12981 </para>
12982
12983 <sect2 id="examples">
12984 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12985 <para>
12986 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12987 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12988 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12989 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12990 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12991 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12992 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12993 assured.
12994 </para>
12995 <para>
12996 What made it assured?
12997 </para>
12998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12999 <para>
13000 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13001 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
13002 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13003 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13004 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13005 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13006 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13007 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13008 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13009 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13010 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13011 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13012 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13013 </para>
13014 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13015 <para>
13016 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13017 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13018 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13019 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13020 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13021 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13022 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13023 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13024 </para>
13025 <para>
13026 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13027 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13028 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13029 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13030 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13031 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13032 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13033 disappears.
13034 </para>
13035 <para>
13036 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13037 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13038 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13039 friction did.<footnote><para>
13040 <!-- f1. -->
13041
13042 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13043 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13044 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13045
13046 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13047 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13048 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13049 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13050 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13051 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13052 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13053
13054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13055 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13056 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13057 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13058 </para>
13059 <para>
13060 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13061 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13062 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13063 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13064 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13065 care much about controlling their software.
13066 </para>
13067 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13068 <para>
13069 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13070 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13071 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13072 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13073 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13074 people's work.
13075 </para>
13076 <para>
13077 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13078 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13079 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13080 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13081 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13082 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13083 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13084 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13085 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13086 anything else?
13087 </para>
13088 <para>
13089 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13090 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13091 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13092 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13093 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13094 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13095 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13096 </para>
13097 <para>
13098 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13099 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13101 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13102 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13103 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13104 fundamentally weakened.
13105 </para>
13106 <para>
13107 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13108 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13109 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13110 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13111 </para>
13112 <para>
13113 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13114 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13115 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13116 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13117 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13118 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13119 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13120 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13121 byproduct.
13122 </para>
13123 <para>
13124 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13125 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13126 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13127 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13128 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13129 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13130 </para>
13131 <para>
13132 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13133 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13134 scientific journals are produced.
13135 </para>
13136 <para>
13137 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13138 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13139 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13140 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13141 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13142 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13143 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13144 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13145 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13146 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13147 and Westlaw are also free
13148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13149 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13150 Court opinion through their respective services.
13151 </para>
13152 <para>
13153 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13154 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13155 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13156 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13157 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13158 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13159 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13160 </para>
13161 <para>
13162 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13163 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13164 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13165 </para>
13166 <para>
13167 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13168 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13169 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13170 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13171 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13172 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13173 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13174 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13175 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13176 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13177 </para>
13178 <para>
13179 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13180 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13181 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13182 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13183 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13184 granted before.
13185 </para>
13186 <para>
13187 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13188 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13189 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13190 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13192 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13193 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13194 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13195 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13196 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13197 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13198 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13199 </para>
13200 <para>
13201 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13202 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13203 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13204 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13205 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13206 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13207 and science.
13208 </para>
13209
13210 </sect2>
13211 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13212 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13213 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13214 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13215 </indexterm>
13216 <para>
13217 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13218 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13219 </para>
13220 <para>
13221 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13222 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13223 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13224 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13225 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13226 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13227 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13228 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13229 </para>
13230 <para>
13231 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13232 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13233 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13234 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13235 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13236 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13237 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13238 description, and
13239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13240 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13241 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13242 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13243 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13244 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13245 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13246 certain freedoms are given.
13247 </para>
13248 <para>
13249 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13250 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13251 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13252 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13253 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13254 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13255 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13256 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13257 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13258 </para>
13259 <para>
13260 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13261 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13262 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13263 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13264 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13265 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13266 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13267 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13268 a public domain.
13269 </para>
13270 <para>
13271 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13272 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13273 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13274 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13275 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13276 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13278 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13279 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13280 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13281 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13282 </para>
13283 <para>
13284 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13285 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13286 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13287 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13288 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13289 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13290 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13291 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13292 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13293 to begin to build those rules.
13294 </para>
13295 <para>
13296 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13297 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13298 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13299 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13300 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13301 </para>
13302 <para>
13303 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13304 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13305 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13306 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13307 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13308 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13309 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13310 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13311 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13312 sales of Cory's book.
13313 </para>
13314 <para>
13315 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13316 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13317 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13318 was a total success.
13319 </para>
13320 <para>
13321 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13322 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13324 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13325 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13326 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13327 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13328 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13329 well.
13330 </para>
13331 <para>
13332 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13333 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13334 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13335 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13336 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13337 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13338 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13339 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13340 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13341 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13342 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13343 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13344 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13345 <!-- f2. -->
13346
13347 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13348 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13349 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13350 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13351 </para></footnote>),
13352 these artists release into the creative environment content
13353 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13354 </para>
13355 <para>
13356 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13357 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13358 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13359 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13360 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13361 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13362 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13363 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13364 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13365 say it to others.
13366 </para>
13367 <para>
13368 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13369 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13370 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13371 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13372
13373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13374 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13375 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13376 </para>
13377 <para>
13378 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13379 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13380 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13381 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13382 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13383 steps are possible.
13384 </para>
13385 <para>
13386 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13387 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13388 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13389 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13390 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13391 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13392 creativity to spread more easily.
13393 </para>
13394 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13395
13396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13397 </sect2>
13398 </sect1>
13399 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13400 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13401 <para>
13402 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13403 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13404 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13405 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13406 changes that we need.
13407 </para>
13408 <para>
13409 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13410 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13411 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13412 to our end.
13413 </para>
13414
13415 <sect2 id="formalities">
13416 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13417 <para>
13418 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13419 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13420 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13421 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13422 </para>
13423 <para>
13424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13425 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13426 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13427 protected.
13428 </para>
13429 <para>
13430 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13431 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13432 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13433 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13434 </para>
13435 <para>
13436 Why?
13437 </para>
13438 <para>
13439 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13440 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13441 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13442 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13443 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13444 formalities were getting in the way.
13445 </para>
13446 <para>
13447 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13448 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13449 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13450 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13451 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13452 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13453 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13454 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13455 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13456 they otherwise could speak.
13457 </para>
13458 <para>
13459 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13460 <!-- f1. -->
13461 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13462 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13463 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13464 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13465 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13466 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13467 </para>
13468 <para>
13469 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13470 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13471 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13472 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13473 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13474 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13475 developed by others.
13476 </para>
13477
13478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13479
13480 <sect3 id="registration">
13481 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13482 <para>
13483 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13484 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13485 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13486 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13487 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13488 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13489 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13490 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13491 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13492 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13493 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13494 </para>
13495 <para>
13496 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13497 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13498 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13499 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13500 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13501 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13502 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13503 </para>
13504 <para>
13505 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13506 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13507 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13508 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13509 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13510 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13511 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13512 with which registration occurs up.
13513 </para>
13514 <para>
13515 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13516 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13517 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13518 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13519 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13520 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13521 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13522 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13523 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13525 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13526 </para>
13527
13528 </sect3>
13529 <sect3 id="marking">
13530 <title>MARKING</title>
13531 <para>
13532 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13533 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13534 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13535 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13536 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13537 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13538 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13539 uniformly across all media.
13540 </para>
13541 <para>
13542 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13543 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13544 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13545 use the work.
13546 </para>
13547 <para>
13548 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13549 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13550 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13551 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13552 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13553 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13554 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13555 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13556 </para>
13557 <para>
13558 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13559 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13560 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13561 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13562 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13563 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13564 <!-- f2. -->
13565 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13566 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13567 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13568 </para></footnote>
13569 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13570 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13571 stop using the work in any new
13572 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13573 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13574 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13575 their work.
13576 </para>
13577 <para>
13578 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13579 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13580 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13581 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13582 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13583 </para>
13584 <para>
13585 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13586 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13587 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13588 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13589 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13590 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13591 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13592 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13593 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13594 </para>
13595 <para>
13596 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13597 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13598 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13599 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13600 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13601 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13602 </para>
13603 <para>
13604 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13605 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13606 make things unclear.
13607 </para>
13608 <para>
13609 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13610 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13611 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13612 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13613 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13614 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13615 </para>
13616
13617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13618 </sect3>
13619 </sect2>
13620 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13621 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13622 <para>
13623 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13624 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13625 natural authors.
13626 </para>
13627 <para>
13628 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13629 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13630 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13631 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13632 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13633 term.<footnote><para>
13634 <!-- f3. -->
13635 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13636 available at
13637 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13638 </para></footnote>
13639 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13640 </para>
13641 <para>
13642 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13643 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13644 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13645 terms.
13646 </para>
13647 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13648 <listitem><para>
13649 <!-- (1) -->
13650 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13651 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13652 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13653 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13654 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13655 regulations when it no longer benefits an author. </para></listitem>
13656 <listitem><para>
13657 <!-- (2) -->
13658 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13659 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13660 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13661 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13662 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13663 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13664 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13665 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13666 navigate.
13667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13668 </para></listitem>
13669 <listitem><para>
13670 <!-- (3) -->
13671 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13672 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13673 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13674 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13675 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13676 veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13677 <!-- f4. -->
13678 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13679 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13680 available at
13681 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13682 </para></footnote>
13683 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13684 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13685 single form.
13686 </para></listitem>
13687 <listitem><para>
13688 <!-- (4) -->
13689 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13690 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13691 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
13692 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13693 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13694 fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13695 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13696 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13697 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13698 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13699 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13700 not increase their creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done,
13701 and there's nothing we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13702 </orderedlist>
13703 <para>
13704 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13705 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13706 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13707 </para>
13708 <para>
13709 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13710 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13711 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13712 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13713 </para>
13714
13715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13716
13717 </sect2>
13718 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13719 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13720 <para>
13721 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13722 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13723 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13724 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13725 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13726 the emergence of that new technology.
13727 </para>
13728 <para>
13729 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13730 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13731 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13732 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13733 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13734 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13735 though that movie is not "my writing."
13736 </para>
13737 <para>
13738 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13739 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13740 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13741 <!-- f5. -->
13742 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13743 University Press, 1967), 32.
13744 </para></footnote>
13745 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13746 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13747 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13748 </para>
13749 <blockquote>
13750 <para>
13751 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13752 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13753 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13754 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13755 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13756 </para></footnote>
13757 </para>
13758 </blockquote>
13759 <para>
13760 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13761 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13762 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13763 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13764 Consider each limitation in turn.
13765 </para>
13766 <para>
13767 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13768 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13769
13770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13771 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13772 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13773 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13774 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13775 after the creative work is done.
13776 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13777 </para>
13778 <para>
13779 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13780 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13781 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13782 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13783 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13784 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13785 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13786 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13787 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13788 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13789 </para>
13790 <para>
13791 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13792 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13793 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13794 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13795 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13796 much more sense.
13797 </para>
13798 <para>
13799 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13800 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13801 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13802 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13803 <para>
13804 <!-- f7. -->
13805 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13806 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13807 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13808 </para></footnote>
13809 His view is that the law should be written so that
13810 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13811 </para>
13812 <para>
13813 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13814 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13815 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13816 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13817 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13818 </para>
13819 <para>
13820 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13822 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13823 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13824 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13825 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13826 </para>
13827 </sect2>
13828
13829 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13830 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13831 <para>
13832 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13833 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13834 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13835 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13836 battles around the sharing of music.
13837 </para>
13838 <para>
13839 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13840 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13841 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13842 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13843 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13844 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13845 innovation on the network.
13846 </para>
13847 <para>
13848 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13849 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13850 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13851 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13852 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13853 </para>
13854 <para>
13855 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13856 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13857 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13858 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13859 </para>
13860 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13861 <listitem><para>
13862 <!-- A. -->
13863 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13864 for purchasing CDs.
13865 </para></listitem>
13866 <listitem><para>
13867 <!-- B. -->
13868 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13869 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13870 </para></listitem>
13871 <listitem><para>
13872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13873 <!-- C. -->
13874 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13875 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13876 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13877 </para></listitem>
13878 <listitem><para>
13879 <!-- D. -->
13880 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13881 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13882 owner plainly endorses.
13883 </para></listitem>
13884 </orderedlist>
13885 <para>
13886 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13887 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13888 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13889 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13890 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13891 significantly weakened.
13892 </para>
13893 <para>
13894 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13895 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13896 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13897 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13898 networks.
13899 </para>
13900 <para>
13901 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13902 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13903 should respond.
13904 </para>
13905 <para>
13906 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13907 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13908 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13909 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13910 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13911 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13912 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13913 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13914 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13915 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13916 </para>
13917 <para>
13918 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13919 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13920 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13922 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13923 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13924 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13925 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13926 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13927 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13928 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13929 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13930 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13931 </para>
13932 <para>
13933 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13934 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
13935 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13936 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13937 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13938 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13939 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13940 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13941 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13942 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13943 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13944 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13945 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13946 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13947 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13948 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13949 <!-- f8. -->
13950 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13951 April 2002, available at
13952 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13953 </para></footnote>
13954
13955 </para>
13956 <para>
13957 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13958 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13959 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13960 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13961 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13962 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13963 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13964 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13965 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13966 artists get paid, during
13967
13968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13969 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13970 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13971 </para>
13972 <para>
13973 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13974 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13975 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13976 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13977 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13978 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13979 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13980 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13981 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13982 </para>
13983 <para>
13984 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13985 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13986 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13987 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13988 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13989 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13990 way that returns something to the artist.
13991 </para>
13992 <para>
13993 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13994 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13995 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13996 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13997 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13998 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13999 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14000 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14001 </para>
14002 <para>
14003 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14004 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14005 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14006 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14007 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14008 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14009 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14010 </para>
14011 <para>
14012
14013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14014 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14015 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14016 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14017 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14018 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14019 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14020 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14021 trade.
14022 </para>
14023 <para>
14024 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14025 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14026 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14027 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14028 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14029 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14030 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14031 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14032 </para>
14033 <para>
14034 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14035 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14036 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14037 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14038 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14039 delivering and accessing content.
14040 </para>
14041 <para>
14042 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14043 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14044 </para>
14045 <para>
14046 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14047 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14048 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14049 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14050 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14051 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14052 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14053 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14057 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14058 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14059 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14060 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14061 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14062 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14063 </para>
14064 <para>
14065 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14066 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14067 <para>
14068 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14069 10 October 2000), available at
14070 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14071 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14072 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14073 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14074 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14075 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14076 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14077 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14078 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14079 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14080 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14081 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14082 available at
14083 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14084 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14085 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14086 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14087 2002, available at
14088 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14089 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14090 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14091 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14092 2002, available at
14093 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14094 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14095 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14096 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14097 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14098 debate by about a decade. See
14099 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14100 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14101 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14102 </para></footnote>
14103 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14104 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14105 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14106 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14107 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14108 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14109 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14110 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14111 tax.
14112 </para>
14113 <para>
14114 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14115 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14116 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14117 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14118 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14119 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14120 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14121 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14122 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14123 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14124 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14125 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14126 controlling access.
14127 </para>
14128 <para>
14129 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14130 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14131 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14132 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14133 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14134 limits on derivative
14135
14136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14137 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14138 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14139 allowed to do with the content itself.
14140 </para>
14141 <para>
14142 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14143 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14144 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14145 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14146 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14147 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14148 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14149 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14150 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14151 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14152 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14153 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14154 on-line.
14155 </para>
14156 <para>
14157 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14158 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14159 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14160 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14161 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14162 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14163 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14164 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14165 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14166 finding ways to compete with "free."
14167 </para>
14168 <para>
14169 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14170 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14171 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14172 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14173 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14174 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14175 the law.
14176 </para>
14177 <para>
14178 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14179 </para>
14180 <para>
14181
14182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14183 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14184 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14185 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14186 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14187 create.
14188 </para>
14189 <para>
14190 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14191 by
14192 </para>
14193 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14194 <listitem><para>
14195 <!-- 1. -->
14196 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14197 </para></listitem>
14198 <listitem><para>
14199 <!-- 2. -->
14200 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14201 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14202 statute;
14203 </para></listitem>
14204 <listitem><para>
14205 <!-- 3. -->
14206 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14207 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14208 </para></listitem>
14209 </orderedlist>
14210 <para>
14211 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14212 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14213 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14214 something then?
14215 </para>
14216 <para>
14217 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14218 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14219 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14220 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14221 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14222 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14223 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14224 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14225 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14226 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14227 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14228 pirates.
14229 </para>
14230 <para>
14231 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14232 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14233 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14234
14235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14236 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14237 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14238 </para>
14239 </sect2>
14240
14241 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14242 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14243 <para>
14244 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14245 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14246 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14247 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14248 </para>
14249 <para>
14250 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14251 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14252 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14253 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14254 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14255 strong view queers the law.
14256 </para>
14257 <para>
14258 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14259 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14260 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14261 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14262 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14263 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14264 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14265 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14266 <!-- f10. -->
14267 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14268 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14269 </para></footnote>
14270
14271 </para>
14272 <para>
14273 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14274 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14275 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14276 </para>
14277 <para>
14278 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14279 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14280 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14281 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14282 <!-- f11. -->
14283 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14284 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14285 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14286 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14287 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14288 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14289 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14290 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14291 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14292 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14293 available at
14294 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14295 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14296 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14297 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14298 Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14299 </para></footnote>
14300 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14301 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14302 them it works.
14303 </para>
14304 <para>
14305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14306 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14307 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14308 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14309 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14310 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14311 practically never be done.
14312 </para>
14313 <para>
14314 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14315 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14316 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14317 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14318 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14319 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14320 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14321 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14322 </para>
14323 <para>
14324 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14325 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14326 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14327 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14328 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14329 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14330 </para>
14331 <para>
14332 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14333 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14334 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14335 its review.
14336 </para>
14337 <para>
14338 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14339 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14340 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14341 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14342 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14343 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14344 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14345 </para>
14346 <para>
14347 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14348 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14349
14350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14351 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14352 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14353 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14354 </para>
14355 <para>
14356 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14357 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14358 keep your lawyers away.
14359 </para>
14360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14361 </sect2>
14362 </sect1>
14363 </chapter>
14364 <chapter id="c-notes">
14365 <title>NOTES</title>
14366 <para>
14367 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14368 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14369 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14370 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14371 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14372 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14373 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14374 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14375 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14376 the material.
14377 </para>
14378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14379
14380 </chapter>
14381 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14382 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14383 <para>
14384 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14385 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14386 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14387 to him that this book is dedicated.
14388 </para>
14389 <para>
14390 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14391 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14392 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14393 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14394 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14395 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14396 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14397 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14398 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14399 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14400 critical eye on much of this.
14401 </para>
14402 <para>
14403 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14404 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14405 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14406 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14408 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14409 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14410 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14411 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14412 </para>
14413 <para>
14414 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14415 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14416 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14417 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14418 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14419 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14420 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14421 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14422 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14423 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14424 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14425 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14426 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14427 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14428 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14429 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14430 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14431 a bunch of great replies.)
14432 </para>
14433 <para>
14434 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14435 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14436 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14437 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14438 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14439 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14440 throughout this book.
14441 </para>
14442 <para>
14443 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14444 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14445 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14446 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14447 </para>
14448 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14449
14450 </chapter>
14451 </book>