]> pere.pagekite.me Git - text-free-culture-lessig.git/blob - freeculture.xml
More indexes and clean up XML.
[text-free-culture-lessig.git] / freeculture.xml
1 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='ISO-8859-1' ?>
2 <!-- Converted to DocBook by Hans Schou 2004-03-29 -->
3 <!--
4 TODO
5 * indexterm primary
6 * replace '. . .' with something else
7 * emphasis ?
8 * quotes ?
9 -->
10 <!DOCTYPE book PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
11 "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd"
12 [
13 <!ENTITY copy "©">
14 <!ENTITY translationblock "">
15 ]>
16 <!--
17 -->
18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 <sbr/>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
104 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
105 LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
106 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
107 CREATIVITY
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 <sbr/>LAWRENCE LESSIG
110 </para>
111
112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
113 <para>
114 THE PENGUIN PRESS
115 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
116 York, New York
117 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
118 <sbr/>All rights reserved
119 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
120 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
121 Reprinted with permission.
122 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
123 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
124 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
125 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
126 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
127 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
128 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
129 <sbr/>p. cm.
130 <sbr/>Includes index.
131 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
132 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
133 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
134 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
135 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
136 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
137 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
138 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
139 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
140 </para>
141
142 <para>
143 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
144 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
145 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
146 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
147 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
148 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
149 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
150 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
151 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
152 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
153 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
154 </para>
155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
156
157 <para>
158 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
159 it continues still.
160 </para>
161
162 <para>&translationblock;</para>
163
164 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
165 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
166 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
167 </figure>
168
169 <toc id="toc"></toc>
170
171 <lot>
172 <title>List of figures</title>
173 </lot>
174
175 <!--
176 c PREFACE xiii
177 c INTRODUCTION
178 c "PIRACY"
179 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
180 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
181 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
182 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
183 2 Film
184 2 Recorded Music
185 2 Radio
186 2 Cable TV
187 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
188 2 Piracy I
189 2 Piracy II
190 c "PROPERTY"
191 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
192 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
193 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
194 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
195 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
196 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
197 2 Beginnings
198 2 Law: Duration
199 2 Law: Scope
200 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
201 2 Architecture and Law: Force
202 2 Market: Concentration
203 2 Together
204 c PUZZLES
205 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
206 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
207 2 Constraining Creators
208 2 Constraining Innovators
209 2 Corrupting Citizens
210 c BALANCES
211 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
212 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
213 c CONCLUSION
214 c AFTERWORD
215 1 Us, Now
216 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
217 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
218 1 Them, Soon
219 2 1. More Formalities
220 3 Registration and Renewal
221 3 Marking
222 2 2. Shorter Terms
223 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
224 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
225 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
226 c NOTES
227 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
228 c INDEX
229 -->
230
231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
232
233 </chapter>
234 <chapter id="c-preface">
235 <title>PREFACE</title>
236 <para>
237 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
238 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
239 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
240 </para>
241 <blockquote>
242 <para>
243 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
244 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
245 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
246 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
247 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
248 </para></footnote>
249 </para>
250 </blockquote>
251 <para>
252 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
253 software,
254 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
255 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
256 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
257 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
258 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
259 </para>
260 <para>
261 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
262 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
263 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
265 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
266 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
267 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
268 </para>
269 <para>
270 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
271 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
272 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
273 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
274 </para>
275 <para>
276 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
277 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
278 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
279 freesoftware movement<footnote>
280 <para>
281 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
282 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
283 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
284 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
285 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
286 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
287 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
288 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
289 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
290 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
291 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
292 or of creators from the past.
293 </para>
294 <para>
295 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
296 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
297 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
298 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
299 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
300 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
301 culture deem fundamental.
302 </para>
303 <para>
304 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
305 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
306 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
307 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
308 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
309 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
310 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
311 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
312 he asked,
313 </para>
314 <blockquote>
315 <para>
316 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
317 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
318 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
319 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
320 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
321 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
322 </para></footnote>
323 </para>
324 </blockquote>
325 <para>
326 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
327 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
328 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
329 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
330 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
331 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
332 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
333 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
334 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
335 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
336 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
337 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
338 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
339 that this work is "merely" derivative.
340 </para>
341 <para>
342 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
343 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
344 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
345 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
346 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
347 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
348 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
349 future
350 if we change the path we are on right now.
351 xv
352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
353 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
354 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
355 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
356 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
357 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
358 what I advance here.
359 </para>
360 <para>
361 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
362 between
363 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
364 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
365 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
366 property
367 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
368 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
369 culture
370 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
371 </para>
372
373 </chapter>
374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
375
376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
377 <chapter id="c-introduction">
378 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
379 <para>
380 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
381 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
382 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
383 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
384 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
385 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
386 </para>
387 <para>
388 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
389 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
390 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
391 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
392 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
393 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
394 </para></footnote>
395 For many
396 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
397 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
398 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
399 </para>
400 <para>
401 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
402 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
403 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
404 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
405 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
406 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
407 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
408 </para>
409 <para>
410 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
411 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
412 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
413 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
414 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
415 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
416 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
417 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
418 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
419 </para>
420 <para>
421 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
422 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
423 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
424 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
425 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
426 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
427 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
428 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
429 </para>
430 <blockquote>
431 <para>
432 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
433 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
434 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
435 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
436 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
437 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
438 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
439 the public has a just claim.<footnote><para>
440 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find that
441 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
442 destroyed
443 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
444 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
445 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
446 Review
447 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
448 (Mineola,
449 N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984), 1112&ndash;13.
450 </para></footnote>
451 </para>
452 </blockquote>
453 <para>
454 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
455 </para>
456 <para>
457 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
458 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
459 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
461 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
462 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
463 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
464 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
465 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
466 </para>
467 <para>
468 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
469 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
470 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
471 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
472 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
473 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
474 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
475 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
476 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
477 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
478 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
479 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
480 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
481 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
482 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
483 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
484 </para>
485 <para>
486 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
487 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
488 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
489 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
490 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
491 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
492 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
493 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
494 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
495 understanding of radio.
496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
497 </para>
498 <para>
499 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
500 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
501 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
502 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
503 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
504 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
505 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
506 much less transmitter power and static.
507 </para>
508 <para>
509 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
510 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
511 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
512 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
513 seventeen
514 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
515 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
516 device,
517 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
518 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
519 modulation
520 at two and a half meters."
521 </para>
522 <para>
523 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
524 </para>
525 <blockquote>
526 <para>
527 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
528 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
529 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
530 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
531 piano
532 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
533 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
534 "music box."<footnote><para>
535 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
536 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
537 </para></footnote>
538 </para>
539 </blockquote>
540 <para>
541 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
542 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
543 Armstrong
544 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
545 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
546 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
547 owned by a handful of networks.
548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
549 </para>
550 <para>
551 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
552 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
553 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
554 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
555 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
556 </para>
557 <blockquote>
558 <para>
559 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
560 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
561 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
562 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
563 Electronic
564 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
565
566 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
567 </para></footnote>
568 </para>
569 </blockquote>
570 <para>
571 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
572 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
573 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
574 described,
575 </para>
576 <blockquote>
577 <para>
578 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
579 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
580 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
581 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
582 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
583 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
584 </para></footnote>
585 </para>
586 </blockquote>
587 <para>
588 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
589 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
590 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
591 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
592 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
593 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
594 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
595 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
596 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
597 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
598 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
599 </para>
600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
601 <blockquote>
602 <para>
603 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
604 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
605 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
606 deviousness.<footnote><para>
607 Lessing, 256.
608 </para></footnote>
609 </para>
610 </blockquote>
611 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
612 <para>
613 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
614 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
615 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
616 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
617 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
618 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
619 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
620 least temporarily.
621 </para>
622 <para>
623 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
624 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
625 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
626 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
627 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
628 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
629 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
630 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
631 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
632 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
633 </para>
634 <para>
635 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
636 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
637 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
638 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
639 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
640 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
641 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
642 course always public spirited; the reality is something
643 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
644 to themselves, would crumble in
645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
646 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
647 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
648 effect
649 of technological change.
650 </para>
651 <para>
652 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
653 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
654 Internet
655 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
656 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
657 access
658 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
659 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
660 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
661 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
662 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
663 </para></footnote>
664 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
665 of 2004.
666 </para>
667 <para>
668 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
669 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
670 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
671 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
672 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
673 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
674 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
675 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
676 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
677 </para>
678 <para>
679 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
680 Internet
681 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
682 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
683 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
684 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
685 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
686 </para>
687 <para>
688 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
689 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
690 regulation
691 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
692 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
693 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
695 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
696 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
697 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
698 </para>
699 <para>
700 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
701 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
702 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
703 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
704 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
705 culture
706 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
707 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
708 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
709 left alone by the law.
710 </para>
711 <para>
712 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
713 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
714 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
715 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
716 marketplace.<footnote>
717 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
718 <para>
719 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
720 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
721 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
722 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
723 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
724 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
725 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
726 198&ndash;200.
727 </para></footnote>
728 This is also, of
729 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
730 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
731 dominant
732 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
733 part, balanced with the free.
734 </para>
735 <para>
736 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
737 been erased.<footnote><para>
738 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
739 2001), ch. 13.
740 </para></footnote>
741 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
742 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
743 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
744 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
745 expanded
746 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
747 creativity
748 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
749 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
750 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
751 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
752 more a permission culture.
753 </para>
754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
755 <para>
756 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
757 creativity.
758 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
759 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
760 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
761 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
762 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
763 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
764 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
765 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
766 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
767 </para>
768 <para>
769 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
770 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
771 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
772 marketplace
773 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
774 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
775 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
776 century
777 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
778 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
779 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
780 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
781 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
782 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
783 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
784 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
785 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
786 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
787 </para>
788 <para>
789 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
790 happening
791 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
792 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
793 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
794 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
795 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
796 </para>
797 <para>
798 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
800 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
801 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
802 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
803 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
804 Motion
805 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
806 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
807 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
808 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
809 Times, 17 January 2002.
810 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
811 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
812 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
813 against it.
814 </para>
815 <para>
816 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
817 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
818 especially
819 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
820 property."
821 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
822 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
823 </para>
824 <para>
825 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
826 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
827 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
828 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
829 </para>
830 <para>
831 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
832 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
833 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
834 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
835 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote><para>
836 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
837 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
838 </para></footnote>
839 copyright law,
840 properly
841 balanced, protected creators against private control. Our tradition
842 was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of patrons. It instead carved out
843 a wide berth within which creators could cultivate and extend our culture.
844 </para>
845 <para>
846 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
847 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective
848 regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or critique the
849 culture
850 around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like, for permission first.
851 Permission is, of course, often granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to
852 the critical or the independent. We have built a kind of cultural
853 nobility;
854 those within the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it
855 is nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
856 </para>
857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
858 <para>
859 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
860 "centrality
861 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
862 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
863 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
864 morality
865 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
866 </para>
867 <para>
868 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
869 inspired
870 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
871 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
872 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
873 technologies
874 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
875 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
876 understand
877 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
878 </para>
879 <para>
880 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
881 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
882 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
883 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
884 sacredness
885 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
886 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
887 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
888 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
889 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
890 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
891 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
892 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
893 </para>
894 <para>
895 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
896 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
897 Common
898 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
899 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
901 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
902 on its side.
903 </para>
904 <para>
905 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
906 increasingly
907 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
908 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
909 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
910 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
911 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
912 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
913 </para>
914 <para>
915 The puzzle is, Why?
916 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
917 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
918 because
919 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
920 absolute
921 claim was wrong?
922 </para>
923 <para>
924 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
925 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
926 </para>
927 <para>
928 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
929 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
930 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
931 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
932 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
933 </para>
934 <para>
935 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
936 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
937 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
938 Armstrong
939 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
940 more powerful view?
941 </para>
942 <para>
943 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
944 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
945 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
946 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
947 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
948 arresting
949 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
950 be much more profound.
951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
952 </para>
953 <para>
954 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
955 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
956 ideas.
957 </para>
958 <para>
959 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
960 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
961 obscure
962 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
963 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
964 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
965 can be more fully understood.
966 </para>
967 <para>
968 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
969 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
970 government,
971 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
972 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
973 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
974 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
975 threatened
976 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
977 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
978 who we have always been.
979 </para>
980 <para>
981 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
982 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
983 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
984 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
985 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
986 to which most of us remain oblivious.
987 </para>
988 </chapter>
989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
990 <chapter id="c-piracy">
991 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
992
993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
994 <para>
995 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
996 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
997 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
998 capture.
999 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1000 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1001 </para>
1002 <blockquote>
1003 <para>
1004 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1005 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1006 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1007 <!-- f1 -->
1008 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1009 </para></footnote>
1010 </para>
1011 </blockquote>
1012 <para>
1013 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1014 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1015 efficient
1016 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1017 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1018 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1019 content
1020 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1022 </para>
1023 <para>
1024 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1025 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1026 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1027 sharing
1028 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1029 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1030 </para>
1031 <para>
1032 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1033 increasingly
1034 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1035 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1036 believe
1037 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1038 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1039 </para>
1040 <para>
1041 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1042 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1043 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1044 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1045 </para>
1046 <para>
1047 The idea goes something like this:
1048 </para>
1049 <blockquote>
1050 <para>
1051 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1052 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1053 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1054 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1055 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1056 piracy.
1057 </para>
1058 </blockquote>
1059 <para>
1060 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1061 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1062 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1063 <!-- f2 -->
1064 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1065 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1066 </para></footnote>
1067 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1068 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1069 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1070 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1071 <!-- f3 -->
1072 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1073 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1074 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1075 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1076 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1077 </para></footnote>
1078 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1079 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1080 </para>
1081 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1082 <para>
1083 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1084 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1086 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1087 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1088 property.
1089 It has never taken hold within our law.
1090 </para>
1091 <para>
1092 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1093 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1094 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1095 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1096 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1097 </para>
1098 <para>
1099 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1100 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1101 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1102 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1103 copyright law today regulates both.
1104 </para>
1105 <para>
1106 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1107 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1108 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1109 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1110 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1111 more expense of doing business.
1112 </para>
1113 <para>
1114 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1115 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1116 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1117 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1118 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1119 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1120 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1121 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1122 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1123 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1124 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1125 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1126 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1127 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1128 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1130 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote><para>
1131 <!-- f4 -->
1132 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1133 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1134 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1135 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1136 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1137 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1138 enabled are much more tenuous.
1139 </para></footnote>
1140 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1141 this creative class.
1142 </para>
1143 <para>
1144 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1145 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1146 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1147 </para>
1148
1149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1150 <sect1 id="creators">
1151 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1152 <para>
1153 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1154 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1155 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1156 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1157 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1158 </para>
1159 <para>
1160 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1161 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1162 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1163 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1164 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1165 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1166 </para>
1167 <blockquote>
1168 <para>
1169 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1170 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1171 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1172 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1174 </para>
1175 <para>
1176 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1177 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1178 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1179 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1180 synchronization was pretty close.
1181 </para>
1182 <para>
1183 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1184 electric.
1185 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1186 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1187 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1188 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1189 <!-- f1 -->
1190 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1191 Cartoons
1192 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1193 </para></footnote>
1194 </para>
1195 </blockquote>
1196 <para>
1197 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1198 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1199 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1200 </para>
1201 <para>
1202 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1203 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1204 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1205 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1206 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1207 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1208 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1209 </para>
1210 <para>
1211 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1212 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1213 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1214 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1215 </para>
1216 <para>
1217 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1218 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1219 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1220 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1221 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1222 genre.
1223 </para>
1224 <para>
1225 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1227 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1228 direct
1229 cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1230 <!-- f2 -->
1231 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1232 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1233 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1234 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1235 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1236 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1237 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1238 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1239 </para></footnote>
1240 and both are built upon a
1241 common
1242 song as a source. It is not just from the invention of synchronized
1243 sound in The Jazz Singer that we get Steamboat Willie. It is also from
1244 Buster Keaton's invention of Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the
1245 song "Steamboat Bill," that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from
1246 Steamboat Willie, Mickey Mouse.
1247 </para>
1248 <para>
1249 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1250 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1251 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1252 <!-- f3 -->
1253 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1254 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1255 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1256 </para></footnote>
1257 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1258 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1259 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1260 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1261 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1262 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1263 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1264 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1265 old.
1266 </para>
1267 <para>
1268 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1269 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1270 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1271 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1272 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1273 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1274 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1275 </para>
1276 <para>
1277 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1278 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1279 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1280 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1281 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1282 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1283 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1284 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1285 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1286 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1288 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1289 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1290 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1291 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1292 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1293 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1294 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1295 </para>
1296 <para>
1297 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1298 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1299 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1300 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1301 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1302 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1303 culture around us and makes it something different.
1304 </para>
1305 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1306 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1307 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1308 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1309 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1310 <!-- f4 -->
1311 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1312 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1313 determining
1314 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1315 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1316 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1317 average
1318 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1319 Web site associated with this book, available at
1320 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1321 </para></footnote>
1322 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1323 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1324 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1325 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1326 </para>
1327 <para>
1328 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1329 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1330 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1331 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1332 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1333 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1334 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1335 </para>
1336 <para>
1337 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1338 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1339 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1340 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1341
1342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1343 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1344 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1345 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1346 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1347 content from before the Great Depression.
1348 </para>
1349 <para>
1350 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1351 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1352 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1353 universal.
1354 </para>
1355 <para>
1356 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1357 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1358 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1359 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1360 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1361 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1362 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1363 </para>
1364 <para>
1365 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1366 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1367 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1368 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1369 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1370 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1371 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1372 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1373 interestingly different way.
1374 </para>
1375 <para>
1376 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1377 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1378 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1379 </para>
1380 <para>
1381 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1382 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1383 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1384 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1386 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1387 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1388 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1389 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1390 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1391 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1392 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1393 </para>
1394 <para>
1395 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1396 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1397 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1398 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1399 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1400 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1401 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1402 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1403 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1404 </para>
1405 <para>
1406 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1407 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1408 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1409 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1410 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1411 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1412 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1413 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1414 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1415 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1416 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1417 original copyright owner's permission.
1418 </para>
1419 <para>
1420 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1421 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1422 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1423 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1424 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1425
1426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1427 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1428 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1429 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1430 <!-- f5 -->
1431 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1432 York: Perennial, 2000).
1433 </para></footnote>
1434 </para>
1435 <para>
1436 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1437 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1438 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1439 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1440 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1441 which are fifty years old."
1442 </para>
1443 <para>
1444 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1445 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1446 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1447 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1448 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1449 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1450 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1451 <!-- f6 -->
1452 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1453 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1454 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1455 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1456 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1457 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1458 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1459 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1460 </para></footnote>
1461 </para>
1462 <para>
1463 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1464 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1465 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1466 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1467 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1468 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1469 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1470 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1471 culture?
1472 </para>
1473 <para>
1474 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1475 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1476 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1477 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1478 to prosecute cases like this."
1479 </para>
1480 <para>
1481 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1482 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1483 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1484 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1485 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1486 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1487 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1488 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1489 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1490 their clients or hurt them?
1491 Let's pause for a moment.
1492 </para>
1493 <para>
1494 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1495 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1496 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1497 </para>
1498 <para>
1499 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1500 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1501 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1502 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1503 <!-- f7 -->
1504 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1505 Vaidhyanathan,
1506 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1507 University
1508 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1509 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1510 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1511 nature of those rights is very different.
1512 </para></footnote>
1513 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1514 property;
1515 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1516 intellectual property.
1517 </para>
1518 <para>
1519 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1520 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1521 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1522 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1523 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1524 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1525 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1526 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1527 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1528 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1529 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1530 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1531 the public domain.
1532 </para>
1533 <para>
1534 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1535 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1536 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1537
1538 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1539 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1540 freedom is good.
1541 </para>
1542 <para>
1543 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1544 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1545 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1546 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1547 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1548 form, whether large or small.
1549 </para>
1550 <para>
1551 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1552 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1553 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1554 particular find it hard to say why.
1555 </para>
1556 <para>
1557 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1558 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1559 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1560 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1561 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1562 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1563 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1564 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1565 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1566 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1567 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1568 films in 1997.
1569 </para>
1570 <para>
1571 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1572 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1573 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1574 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1575 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1576 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1577 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1578 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1579 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1580 </para>
1581 <para>
1582 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1583 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1584 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1585 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1586 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1587 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1588 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1589 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1590 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1591 </para>
1592 <para>
1593 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1594 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1595 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1596 </para>
1597
1598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1599 </sect1>
1600 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1601 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1602 <para>
1603 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1604 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1605 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1606 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1607 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1608 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1609 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1610 </para>
1611 <para>
1612 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1613 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1614 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1615 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1616 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1617 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1618 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1619 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1620 amateurs.
1621 </para>
1622 <para>
1623 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1624 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1626 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1627 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1628 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1629 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1630 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1631 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1632 population of photographers.
1633 </para>
1634 <para>
1635 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1636 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1637 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1638 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1639 <!-- f1 -->
1640 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1641 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1642 </para>
1643 <blockquote>
1644 <para>
1645 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1646 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1647 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1648 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1649 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1650 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1651 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1652 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1653 chemicals.<footnote>
1654 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1655 <para>
1656 <!-- f2 -->
1657 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1658 1977), 53.
1659 </para></footnote>
1660 </para>
1661 </blockquote>
1662 <para>
1663 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1664 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1665 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1666 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1667 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1668 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1669 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1670 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1671 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1672 percent.<footnote><para>
1673 <!-- f3 -->
1674 Jenkins, 177.
1675 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1676 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1677 <!-- f4 -->
1678 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1679 </para></footnote>
1680 </para>
1681 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1682 <para>
1683
1684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1685 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1686 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1687 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1688 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1689 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1690 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1691 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1692 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1693 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1694 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1695 <!-- f5 -->
1696 Coe, 58.
1697 </para></footnote>
1698 </para>
1699 <para>
1700 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1701 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1702 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1703 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1704 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1705 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1706 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1707 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1708 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1709 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1710 have before.
1711 </para>
1712 <para>
1713 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1714 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1715 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1716 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1717 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1718 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1719 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1720 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1721 <!-- f6 -->
1722 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1723 </para></footnote>
1724 </para>
1725 <para>
1726 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1727 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1728 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1729 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1730 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1731 draw
1732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1733 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1734 that they thought valuable.
1735 </para>
1736 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1737 <para>
1738 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1739 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1740 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1741 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1742 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1743 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1744 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1745 <para>
1746 <!-- f7 -->
1747 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1748 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1749 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1750 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1751 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1752 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1753 </para>
1754 <para>
1755 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1756 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1757 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1758 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1759 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1760 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1761 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1762 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1763 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1764 <!-- f8 -->
1765 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1766 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1767 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1768 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1769 (1993).
1770 </para></footnote>)
1771 </para>
1772 <para>
1773 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1774 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1775 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1776 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1777 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1778 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1779 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1780 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1781 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1782 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1783 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1784 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1785 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1786 </para>
1787 <para>
1788
1789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1790 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1791 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1792 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1793 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1794 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1795 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1796 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1797 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1798 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1799 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1800 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1801 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1802 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1803 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1804 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1805 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1806 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1807 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1808 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1809 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1810 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1811 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1812 learn.
1813 </para>
1814 <para>
1815 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1816 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1817 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1818 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1819 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1820 <!-- f9 -->
1821 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1822 Software
1823 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1824 February 2002, available at
1825 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1826 </para></footnote>
1827 These buses are filled with technology that
1828 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1829 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1830 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1831 teachers call "media literacy."
1832 </para>
1833 <para>
1834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1835 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1836 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1837 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1838 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1839 the way people access it."
1840 </para>
1841 <para>
1842 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1843 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1844 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1845 about.
1846 </para>
1847 <para>
1848 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1849 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1850 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1851 <!-- f10 -->
1852 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1853 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1854 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1855 </para></footnote>
1856 it is increasingly important to understand the
1857 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1858 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1859 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1860 constructing
1861 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1862 </para>
1863 <para>
1864 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1865 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1866 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1867 sequence
1868 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1869 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1870 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1871 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1872 emotion or builds suspense.
1873 </para>
1874 <para>
1875 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1876 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1877 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1878 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1879 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1880 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1881 </para>
1882 <para>
1883 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1884 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1885 Southern
1886 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1887
1888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1889 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1890 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1891 texture."<footnote>
1892 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1893 <para>
1894 <!-- f11 -->
1895 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1896 2002.
1897 </para></footnote>
1898 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1899 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1900 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1901 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1902 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1903 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1904 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1905 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1906 <!-- f12 -->
1907 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1908 November 2000, available at
1909 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1910 available at
1911 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1912 </para></footnote>
1913 </para>
1914 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1915 <para>
1916 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1917 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1918 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1919 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1920 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1921 </para>
1922 <para>
1923 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1924 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1925 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1926 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1927 </para>
1928 <blockquote>
1929 <para>
1930 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1931 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1932 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1933 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1934 being read-only.
1935 </para>
1936 </blockquote>
1937 <para>
1938 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1939 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1940 twentieth century.
1941 </para>
1942 <para>
1943 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1944 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1945 understanding
1946 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1947 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1949 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1950 appropriate
1951 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
1952 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1953 <para>
1954 <!-- f13 -->
1955 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1956 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1957 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
1958 <!-- f14 -->
1959 Ibid.
1960 </para></footnote>
1961 </para>
1962 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1963 <para>
1964 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1965 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1966 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1967 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1968 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1969 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1970 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1971 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1972 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1973 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
1974 </para>
1975 <para>
1976 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1977 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1978 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1979 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
1980 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
1981 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
1982 </para>
1983 <para>
1984 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
1985 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
1986 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
1987 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
1988 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
1989 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
1990 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
1991 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
1992 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
1993 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
1994 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
1995 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
1996 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
1997 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
1998 to this form of expression.
1999 </para>
2000 <para>
2001
2002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2003 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2004 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2005 Daley
2006 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2007 meaning."
2008 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2009 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2010 increasingly,
2011 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2012 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2013 </para>
2014 <blockquote>
2015 <para>
2016 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2017 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2018 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2019 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2020 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2021 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2022 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2023 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2024 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2025 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2026 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2027 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2028 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2029 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2030 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2031 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2032 about the topic. . . .
2033 </para>
2034 <para>
2035 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2036 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2037 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2038 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2039 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2040 </para>
2041 <para>
2042 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2043 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2044 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2046 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2047 had a lot of power with this language."
2048 </para>
2049 </blockquote>
2050 <para>
2051 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2052 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2053 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2054 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2055 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2056 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2057 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2058 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2059 world would be watching.
2060 </para>
2061 <para>
2062 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2063 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2064 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2065 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2066 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2067 entertainment is tragedy.
2068 </para>
2069 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2070 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2071 <para>
2072 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2073 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2074 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2075 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2076 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2077 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2078 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2079 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2080 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2081 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2082 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2083 was also the Internet.
2084 </para>
2085 <para>
2086 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2087 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2088 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2089 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2090 movie
2091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2092 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2093 with sound or text.
2094 </para>
2095 <para>
2096 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2097 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2098 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2099 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2100 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2101 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2102 spread practically instantaneously.
2103 </para>
2104 <para>
2105 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2106 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2107 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2108 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2109 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2110 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2111 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2112 </para>
2113 <para>
2114 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2115 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2116 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2117 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2118 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2119 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2120 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2121 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2122 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2123 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2124 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2125 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2126 </para>
2127 <para>
2128 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2129 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2130 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2131 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2132 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2133 people vote
2134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2135 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2136 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2137 </para>
2138 <para>
2139 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2140 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2141 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2142 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2143 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2144 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2145 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2146 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2147 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2148 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2149 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2150 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2151 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2152 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2153 <!-- f15 -->
2154 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2155 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2156 </para></footnote>
2157 </para>
2158 <para>
2159 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2160 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2161 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2162 <!-- f16 -->
2163 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2164 Political
2165 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2166 </para></footnote>
2167 And in some towns in
2168 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2169 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2170 deliberation"
2171 to occur.
2172 </para>
2173 <para>
2174 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2175 occur.
2176 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2177 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2178 politics
2179 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2180 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2181 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2182 <!-- f17 -->
2183 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2184 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2185 </para></footnote> We say what our
2186 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2187 </para>
2188 <para>
2189 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2190 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2191 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2192 Technologies
2193 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2194 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2195
2196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2197 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2198 place.
2199 </para>
2200 <para>
2201 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2202 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2203 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2204 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2205 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2206 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2207 </para>
2208 <para>
2209 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2210 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2211 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2212 reading
2213 is having an effect.
2214 </para>
2215 <para>
2216 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2217 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2218 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2219 praising
2220 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2221 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2222 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2223 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2224 instances
2225 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2226 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2227 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2228 <!-- f18 -->
2229 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2230 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2231 </para></footnote>
2232 </para>
2233 <para>
2234 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial
2235 pressures
2236 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2237 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2238 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
2239 </para>
2240 <para>
2241 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2242 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2243 particularly
2244 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as
2245 the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks
2246 of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been
2247 selected
2248 by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
2249 </para>
2250 <para>
2251 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2253 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2254 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2255 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2256 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2257 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2258 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2259 get it out of the way."
2260 </para>
2261 <para>
2262 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2263 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
2264 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN
2265 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the
2266 consequences
2267 to its own employees.<footnote><para>
2268 <!-- f19 -->
2269 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2270 </para></footnote>
2271 It also needs to sustain a more
2272 coherent
2273 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
2274 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite
2275 uplink
2276 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
2277 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
2278 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
2279 wasn't warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2280 </para>
2281 <para>
2282 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&mdash;"amateur" not
2283 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
2284 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
2285 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia
2286 disaster
2287 revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
2288 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.<footnote><para>
2289 <!-- f20 -->
2290 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2291 Information
2292 Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
2293 "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2294 Journalism
2295 Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2296 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2297 </para></footnote>
2298 And it drives
2299 readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as Winer
2300 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly with
2301 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&mdash;with all the
2302 benefits,
2303 and costs, that might entail.
2304 </para>
2305 <para>
2306 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
2307 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for
2308 public
2309 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
2310 "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists have been told to
2311 curtail their blogging.<footnote><para>
2312 <!-- f21 -->
2313 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2314 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2315 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2316 correspondent
2317 in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March 9,
2318 stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve
2319 Olafson,
2320 a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2321 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and
2322 people he was covering.")
2323 </para></footnote>
2324 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2325
2326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2327 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2328 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2329 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2330 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2331 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2332 </para>
2333 <para>
2334 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2335 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2336 gatekeeper."
2337 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2338 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2339 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2340 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2341 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2342 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2343 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2344 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2345 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2346 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2347 extraordinary
2348 to report.
2349 </para>
2350 <para>
2351 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2352 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2353 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2354 </para>
2355 <para>
2356 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2357 differently
2358 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2359 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2360 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2361 </para>
2362 <para>
2363 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2364 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2365 lawnmower
2366 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2367 technologies
2368 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2369 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2370 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2372 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2373 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2374 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2375 tinkering of many others.
2376 </para>
2377 <para>
2378 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2379 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2380 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2381 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2382 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2383 </para>
2384 <para>
2385 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2386 platform,"
2387 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2388 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2389 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2390 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2391 becomes
2392 a major apprenticeship platform."
2393 </para>
2394 <para>
2395 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2396 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2397 abstract,
2398 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2399 doing
2400 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2401 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2402 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2403 </para>
2404 <para>
2405 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2406 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2407 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2408 multiple
2409 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2410 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2411 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2412 artistic,
2413 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2414 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2415 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2416 </para>
2417 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2418 <para>
2419 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2420 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2421
2422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2423 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2424 of recognition.
2425 </para>
2426 <para>
2427 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2428 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2429 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2430 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2431 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2432 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2433 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2434 </para>
2435 <para>
2436 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2437 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2438 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2439 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2440 general.<footnote><para>
2441 <!-- f22 -->
2442 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological
2443 Access
2444 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2445 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2446 </para></footnote>
2447 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2448 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2449 </para>
2450 <para>
2451 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,"
2452 Brown explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up
2453 digital
2454 think and want to learn."
2455 </para>
2456 <para>
2457 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2458 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2459 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2460 architecture
2461 that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that
2462 closes down that part of the brain."
2463 </para>
2464 <para>
2465 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2466 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2467 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2468 the law to close down that technology.
2469 </para>
2470 <para>
2471 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2472 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2473 </para>
2474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2475 </sect1>
2476 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2477 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2478 <para>
2479 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled
2480 as a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2481 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2482 programmer,
2483 in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2484 engine
2485 technology that was available on the RPI network.
2486 </para>
2487 <para>
2488 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research
2489 institutions.
2490 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and
2491 engineering
2492 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five
2493 thousand undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high
2494 school class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience
2495 to imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2496 </para>
2497 <para>
2498 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration
2499 to one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2500 available
2501 on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network
2502 is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as
2503 more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2504 </para>
2505 <para>
2506 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2508 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving
2509 the quality of search on the network. Specialty search engines can do
2510 this even better. The idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines
2511 that search within the network of a particular institution, is to provide
2512 users of that institution with better access to material from that
2513 institution.
2514 Businesses do this all the time, enabling employees to have
2515 access
2516 to material that people outside the business can't get. Universities
2517 do it as well.
2518 </para>
2519 <para>
2520 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2521 Microsoft,
2522 for example, has a network file system that makes it very easy
2523 for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2524 information
2525 about the publicly (within that network) available content.
2526 Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this technology. It
2527 used Microsoft's network file system to build an index of all the files
2528 available within the RPI network.
2529 </para>
2530 <para>
2531 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2532 Indeed,
2533 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had
2534 built. His single most important improvement over those engines was
2535 to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a
2536 user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed before, if you
2537 tried to access a file through a Windows browser that was on a
2538 computer
2539 that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse modified the
2540 system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that a user could
2541 click to see if the machine holding the file was still on-line.
2542 </para>
2543 <para>
2544 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2545 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2546 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2547 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2548 be on users' computers.
2549 </para>
2550 <para>
2551 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2552 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2553 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2554 students
2555 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2557 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2558 computer.
2559 </para>
2560 <para>
2561 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2562 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means,
2563 of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this point is
2564 absolutely
2565 clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files in
2566 their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
2567 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a
2568 university
2569 where he was studying information science, and hence,
2570 tinkering
2571 was the aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made
2572 no money from this tinkering; he was not connected to any business
2573 that would make any money from this experiment. He was a kid
2574 tinkering
2575 with technology in an environment where tinkering with
2576 technology
2577 was precisely what he was supposed to do.
2578 </para>
2579 <para>
2580 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2581 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2582 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2583 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2584 universities.
2585 A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from the suit.
2586 As he read these papers and watched the news reports about them, he
2587 was increasingly astonished.
2588 </para>
2589 <para>
2590 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong. . . .
2591 I don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran
2592 or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way
2593 that promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the
2594 search engine in a way that would make it easier to use"&mdash;again, a
2595 search engine, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows
2596 filesharing
2597 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members
2598 of the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not
2599 himself created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing
2600 to do with music.
2601 </para>
2602 <para>
2603 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2604 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2606 demanded
2607 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2608 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2609 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2610 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2611 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2612 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2613 </para>
2614 <para>
2615 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2616 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2617 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2618 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2619 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2620 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2621 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2622 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2623 <!-- f1 -->
2624 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2625 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2626 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2627 </para></footnote>
2628 </para>
2629 <para>
2630 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2631 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2632 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2633 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2634 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2635 </para>
2636 <para>
2637 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2638 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2639 essentially
2640 make it impossible for him to work in many fields of technology
2641 for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him understand that this
2642 process of being sued was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father
2643 recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told
2644 Jesse, "You don't want to pay another visit to a dentist like me.") And
2645 throughout, the RIAA insisted it would not settle the case until it took
2646 every penny Jesse had saved.
2647 </para>
2648 <para>
2649 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2650 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2651 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2652 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2653 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2655 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2656 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2657 </para>
2658 <para>
2659 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at
2660 winning,
2661 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2662 </para>
2663 <para>
2664 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2665 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2666 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2667 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2668 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2669 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2670 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2671 <!-- f2 -->
2672 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2673 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2674 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2675 </para></footnote>
2676 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2677 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2678 student
2679 for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2680 <!-- f3 -->
2681 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2682 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2683 </para></footnote>
2684 </para>
2685 <para>
2686 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2687 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2688 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2689 activist:
2690 </para>
2691 <blockquote>
2692 <para>
2693 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2694 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2695 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2696 absurd
2697 what the RIAA has done.
2698 </para>
2699 </blockquote>
2700 <para>
2701 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2702 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2703 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2704 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2705 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2706 </para>
2707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2708 </sect1>
2709 <sect1 id="pirates">
2710 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2711 <para>
2712
2713 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2714 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2715 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2716 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2717 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2718 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2719 </para>
2720 <sect2 id="film">
2721 <title>Film</title>
2722 <para>
2723 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2724 <!-- f1 -->
2725 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2726 history.
2727 See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2728 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2729 </para></footnote>
2730 Creators
2731 and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in the early
2732 twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents granted the
2733 inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2734 exercised
2735 through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2736 Company,
2737 and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property&mdash;patents.
2738 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property
2739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2740 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2741 </para>
2742 <para>
2743 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2744 </para>
2745 <blockquote>
2746 <para>
2747 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2748 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2749 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2750 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2751 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2752 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2753 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2754 </para>
2755 <para>
2756 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the
2757 number of nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the
2758 independent
2759 movement by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known
2760 as the General Film Company to block the entry of non-licensed
2761 independents. With coercive tactics that have become legendary,
2762 General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment, discontinued
2763 product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
2764 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all
2765 U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent
2766 William Fox who defied the Trust even after his license was
2767 revoked.<footnote><para>
2768 <!-- f2 -->
2769 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2770 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2771 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2772 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2773 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2774 discussion
2775 of the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits
2776 imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison
2777 to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the
2778 Propertization
2779 of Copyright" (September 2002), University of Chicago Law
2780 School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper
2781 No. 159.
2782 </para></footnote>
2783 </para>
2784 </blockquote>
2785 <para>
2786 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2787 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2788 resisted.
2789 "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents'
2790 resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life
2791 and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2792 <!-- f3 -->
2793 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2794
2795 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2796 </para></footnote>
2797 That led the independents to flee the
2798 East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2799 filmmakers
2800 there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And the
2801 leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
2802 </para>
2803 <para>
2804 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2805 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2806 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2807
2808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2809 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2810 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2811 Edison's
2812 creative property.
2813 </para>
2814 </sect2>
2815 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2816 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2817 <para>
2818 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2819 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2820 </para>
2821 <para>
2822 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2823 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2824 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2825 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2826 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2827 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2828 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2829 right to perform it publicly.
2830 </para>
2831 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2832 <para>
2833 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2834 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2835 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2836 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2837 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2838 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2839 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2840 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2841 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2842 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2843 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2844 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2845 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2846 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2847 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2848 its composer anything.
2849 </para>
2850 <para>
2851 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2853 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2854 put it,
2855 </para>
2856 <blockquote>
2857 <para>
2858 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2859 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2860 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and
2861 companies
2862 who cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain
2863 of the composer and publisher without any regard for [their] rights.<footnote><para>
2864 <!-- f4 -->
2865 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2866 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2867 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of
2868 South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2869 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2870 Hackensack,
2871 N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2872 </para></footnote>
2873 </para>
2874 </blockquote>
2875 <para>
2876 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2877 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2878 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2879 <!-- f5 -->
2880 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2881 (statement
2882 of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2883 </para></footnote>
2884 and the "music publishing industry"
2885 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2886 <!-- f6 -->
2887 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2888 (statement
2889 of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2890 </para></footnote>
2891 As John Philip
2892 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2893 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2894 <!-- f7 -->
2895 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2896 (statement
2897 of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2898 </para></footnote>
2899 </para>
2900 <para>
2901 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So,
2902 too, do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who
2903 developed
2904 the player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2905 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any
2906 composer
2907 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the
2908 machines
2909 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2910 <!-- f8 -->
2911 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2912 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2913 Perforating
2914 Company of New York).
2915 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2916 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2917 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2918 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2919 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2920 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2921 <!-- f9 -->
2922 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2923 (prepared
2924 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2925 American
2926 Graphophone Company Association).
2927 </para></footnote>
2928 </para>
2929 <para>
2930 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2931 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2932 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2933 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2934 control
2935 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2936 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2937 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2938
2939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2940 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2941 authorizes
2942 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2943 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2944 </para>
2945 <para>
2946 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2947 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2948 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2949 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2950 recordings
2951 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2952 by the statute.
2953 </para>
2954 <para>
2955 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2956 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2957 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2958 whatever
2959 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2960 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2961 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2962 </para>
2963 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2964 <para>
2965 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2966 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2967 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2968 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2969 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2970 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2971 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2972 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2973 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2974 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2975 stifle
2976 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
2977 <!-- f10 -->
2978 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2979 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2980 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2981 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2982 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2983 </para></footnote>
2984 </para>
2985 <para>
2986 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2987 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2988 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2989 relates,
2990 </para>
2991 <blockquote>
2992 <para>
2993 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2995 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2996 industry
2997 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2998 importance
2999 in the United States and throughout the world; records
3000 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3001 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3002 access
3003 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3004 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3005 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3006 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3007 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3008 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3009 improved
3010 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
3011 <!-- f11 -->
3012 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House
3013 Committee
3014 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83,
3015 (8 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention
3016 to this report.
3017 </para></footnote>
3018 </para>
3019 </blockquote>
3020 <para>
3021 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3022 creative
3023 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3024 </para>
3025 </sect2>
3026 <sect2 id="radio">
3027 <title>Radio</title>
3028 <para>
3029 Radio was also born of piracy.
3030 </para>
3031 <para>
3032 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3033 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3034 <!-- f12 -->
3035 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
3036 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3037 messages
3038 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3039 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3040 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3041 Manufacturing
3042 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
3043 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3044 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3045 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3046 </para></footnote>
3047 As I described above,
3048 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3049 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3050 composer
3051 money for that performance.
3052 </para>
3053 <para>
3054 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3055 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3056 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3057 Birthday"
3058 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3059 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3060 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3061 station.
3062 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3063 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3064 composer
3065 of the music for his work.
3066
3067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3068 </para>
3069 <para>
3070 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3071 radio
3072 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3073 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3074 something
3075 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3076 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3077 playing the song.
3078 </para>
3079 <para>
3080 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3081 music.
3082 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3083 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3084 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3085 </para>
3086 <para>
3087 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3088 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3089 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3090 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3091 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3092 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3093 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3094 </para>
3095 <para>
3096 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3097 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3098 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3099 ordinarily
3100 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3101 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3102 something for nothing.
3103 </para>
3104 </sect2>
3105 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3106 <title>Cable TV</title>
3107 <para>
3108
3109 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3110 </para>
3111 <para>
3112 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
3113 cable television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
3114 content
3115 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
3116 companies
3117 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3119 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3120 broadcasters'
3121 content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did&mdash;
3122 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3123 </para>
3124 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3125 <para>
3126 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3127 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3128 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3129 <!-- f13 -->
3130 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Subcommittee
3131 on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
3132 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966) (statement of
3133 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3134 </para></footnote>
3135 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3136 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3137 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3138 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3139 <!-- f14 -->
3140 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3141 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3142 </para></footnote>
3143 As another broadcaster put it,
3144 </para>
3145 <blockquote>
3146 <para>
3147 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3148 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3149 paid for.<footnote><para>
3150 <!-- f15 -->
3151 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3152 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3153 </para></footnote>
3154 </para>
3155 </blockquote>
3156 <para>
3157 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3158 enough:
3159 </para>
3160 <blockquote>
3161 <para>
3162 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3163 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3164 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3165 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3166 <!-- f16 -->
3167 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3168 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3169 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3170 </para></footnote>
3171 </para>
3172 </blockquote>
3173 <para>
3174 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3175 Charlton
3176 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."<footnote><para>
3177 <!-- f17 -->
3178 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3179 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3180 </para></footnote>
3181 </para>
3182 <para>
3183 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3184 Attorney
3185 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3186 </para>
3187 <blockquote>
3188 <para>
3189 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3190 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3191 copyright
3192 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3193 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3194
3195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3196 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3197 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3198 <!-- f18 -->
3199 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3200 Zimmerman,
3201 acting assistant attorney general).
3202 </para></footnote>
3203 </para>
3204 </blockquote>
3205 <para>
3206 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3207 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3208 owners nothing.
3209 </para>
3210 <para>
3211 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3212 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3213 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3214 resolved
3215 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3216 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3217 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3218 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3219 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3220 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3221 broadcasters'
3222 content.
3223 </para>
3224 <para>
3225 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3226 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3227 permission
3228 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
3229 <!-- f19 -->
3230 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3231 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3232 Information, available at
3233 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3234 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3235 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3236 </para></footnote>
3237 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3238 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3239 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3240 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3241 generation&mdash;until now.
3242 </para>
3243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3244 </sect2>
3245 </sect1>
3246 <sect1 id="piracy">
3247 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3248 <para>
3249
3250 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3251 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3252 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3253 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3254 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3255 stop it.
3256 </para>
3257 <para>
3258 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3259 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3260 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3261 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3262 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3263 outright
3264 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3265 so often done in the past.
3266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3267 </para>
3268 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3269 <title>Piracy I</title>
3270 <para>
3271 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3272 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3273 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3274 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3275 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3276 <!-- f1 -->
3277 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3278 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3279
3280 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3281 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3282 </para></footnote>
3283 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3284 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3285 worldwide to piracy.
3286 </para>
3287 <para>
3288 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3289 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3290 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3291 This piracy is wrong.
3292 </para>
3293 <para>
3294 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3295 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3296 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3297 foreign
3298 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3299 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3300 developing
3301 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3302 existence, treated as right.
3303 </para>
3304 <para>
3305 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3306 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3307 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3308 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3309 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3310 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3311 violate
3312 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3313 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3314 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3315 </para>
3316 <para>
3317 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3318 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3320 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3321 pirate
3322 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3323 childhood.
3324 </para>
3325 <para>
3326 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3327 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3328 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3329 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3330 <!-- f2 -->
3331 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3332 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3333 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3334 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3335 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3336 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3337 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3338 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3339 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3340 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3341 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3342 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3343 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3344 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3345 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3346 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3347 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3348 is wrong.
3349 </para>
3350 <para>
3351 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3352 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3353 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3354 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3355 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3356 <!-- f3 -->
3357 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3358 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3359 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3360 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3361 instance
3362 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3363 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3364 </para></footnote>
3365 </para>
3366 <para>
3367 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3368 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3369 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3370 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3371 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3372 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3373 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3374 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3375 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3376 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3377 piracy of the tangible.
3378 </para>
3379 <para>
3380 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3381 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3382 property
3383 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3384 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3385 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3386 licenses
3387 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3388 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3389 copyrighted
3390 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3391
3392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3393 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3394 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3395 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3396 technology
3397 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3398 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3399 </para>
3400 <para>
3401 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3402 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3403 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3404 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3405 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3406 nation
3407 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3408 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3409 benefit
3410 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3411 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3412 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3413 Microsoft.
3414 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3415 </para>
3416 <para>
3417 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3418 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3419 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3420 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3421 become
3422 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3423 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3424 </para>
3425 <para>
3426 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3427 alcoholic
3428 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3429 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3430 ordinarily
3431 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3432 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3433 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3434 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3435 giving
3436 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3437 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3438 copyright
3439 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3440 wrong.
3441 </para>
3442 <para>
3443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3444 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3445 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3446 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3447 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3448 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3449 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3450 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3451 is flat out wrong.
3452 </para>
3453 <para>
3454 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3455 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3456 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3457 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3458 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3459 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3460 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3461 </para>
3462 <para>
3463 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3464 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3465 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3466 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3467 </para>
3468 <para>
3469 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3470 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3471 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3472 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3473 </para>
3474 <para>
3475 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3476 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3477 sharing
3478 to survive.
3479 </para>
3480 </sect2>
3481 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3482 <title>Piracy II</title>
3483 <para>
3484 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3485 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3486 <!-- f4 -->
3487 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3488 </para></footnote>
3489 This means we must determine whether
3490 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3492 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3493 author of his profit.
3494 </para>
3495 <para>
3496 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3497 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3498 innovations.
3499 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3500 arguably,
3501 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3502 <!-- f5 -->
3503 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3504 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3505 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3506 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3507 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3508 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3509 technology
3510 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3511 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3512 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3513 put together components that had been developed independently.
3514 </para>
3515 <para>
3516 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3517 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3518 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3519 system.<footnote><para>
3520 <!-- f6 -->
3521 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3522 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3523 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3524 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3525 "Napster's
3526 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3527 "Hollywood
3528 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3529 </para></footnote>
3530 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3531 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3532 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3533 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3534 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3535 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3536 or your 20,000 best friends.
3537 </para>
3538 <para>
3539 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3540 Americans
3541 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3542 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3543 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3544 <!-- f7 -->
3545 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3546 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3547 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3548 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3549 </para></footnote>
3550 A survey by the NPD
3551 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3552 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3553 <!-- f8 -->
3554 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3555 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3556 </para></footnote>
3557 The vast
3558 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3559 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3560 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3561 enjoy
3562 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3563 </para>
3564 <para>
3565 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3566 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3567 infringement,
3568 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3569 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3570 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3571 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3572 </para>
3573 <para>
3574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3575 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3576 different kinds into four types.
3577 </para>
3578 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3579 <listitem><para>
3580 <!-- A. -->
3581 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3582 purchasing
3583 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3584 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3585 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3586 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3587 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3588 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3589 instead
3590 of purchasing.
3591 </para></listitem>
3592 <listitem><para>
3593 <!-- B. -->
3594 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3595 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3596 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3597 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3598 succeed.
3599 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3600 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3601 recommendations
3602 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3603 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3604 </para></listitem>
3605 <listitem><para>
3606 <!-- C. -->
3607 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3608 copyrighted
3609 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3610 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3611 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3612 rewarding
3613 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3614 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3615 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3616 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3617 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3618 available.)
3619 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3620 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3621 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3622 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3623 a local collector.
3624 </para></listitem>
3625 <listitem><para>
3626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3627 <!-- D. -->
3628 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3629 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3630 wants to give away.
3631 </para></listitem>
3632 </orderedlist>
3633 <para>
3634 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3635 </para>
3636 <para>
3637 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3638 perspective
3639 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3640 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3641 <!-- f9 -->
3642 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3643 </para></footnote>
3644 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3645 illegal,
3646 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3647 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3648 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3649 certainly
3650 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3651 suggests.
3652 </para>
3653 <para>
3654 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3655 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3656 Hollywood,
3657 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3658 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3659 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3660 that is "devastating" the industry.
3661 </para>
3662 <para>
3663 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3664 harmful
3665 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3666 practice
3667 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3668 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3669 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3670 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3671 <!-- f10 -->
3672 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3673 Industry's
3674 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3675 industry's
3676 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3677 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3678 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3679 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3680 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3681 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3682 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3683 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3684 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3685 </para></footnote>
3686 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3687 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3688 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3689 problem,
3690 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3691 </para>
3692 <para>
3693 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3694 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3695 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3696 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3698 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3699 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3700 <!-- f11 -->
3701 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3702 </para></footnote>
3703 </para>
3704 <para>
3705 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3706 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3707 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3708 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3709 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3710 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3711 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3712 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3713 </para>
3714 <para>
3715 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3716 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3717 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3718 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3719 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3720 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3721 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3722 </para>
3723 <para>
3724 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3725 because
3726 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3727 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3728 </para>
3729 <para>
3730 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3731 percent,
3732 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3733 <!-- f12 -->
3734 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3735 available at
3736 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3737 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3738 25 June 2003, available at
3739 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3740 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3741 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3742 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3743 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3744 music
3745 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3746 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3747 </para></footnote>
3748 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3749 Internet
3750 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3751 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3752 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3753 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3754 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3755 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote><para>
3756 <!-- f13 -->
3757 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3758 February
3759 2003, available at
3760 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3761 </para></footnote>
3762 Competition
3763 from other forms of media could also account for some of the decline.
3764 As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film High
3765 Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on
3766 DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3767 <!-- f14 -->
3768 Ibid.
3769 </para></footnote>
3770 </para>
3771 <para>
3772
3773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3774 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3775 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3776 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3777 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3778 although
3779 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3780 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3781 </para>
3782 <para>
3783 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3784 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3785 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3786 between
3787 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3788 numbers
3789 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3790 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3791 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3792 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3793 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3794 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3795 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3796 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3797 between
3798 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3799 </para>
3800 <para>
3801 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3802 assume,
3803 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3804 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3805 costs?
3806 </para>
3807 <para>
3808 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3809 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3810 available.
3811 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3812 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3813 <!-- f15 -->
3814 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3815 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3816 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3817 Committee
3818 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3819 statement
3820 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3821 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3822 </para></footnote>
3823 And while it's
3824 conceivable
3825 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3826 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3827 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3828 distributor
3829 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3830 make it available.
3831 </para>
3832 <para>
3833 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3835 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3836 thousands
3837 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3838 <!-- f16 -->
3839 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3840 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3841 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3842 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3843 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3844 National
3845 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3846 Results,"
3847 available at
3848 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3849 </para></footnote>
3850 These
3851 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3852 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3853 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3854 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3855 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3856 companies
3857 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3858 owner for the content they sell.
3859 </para>
3860 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3861 <para>
3862 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3863 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3864 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3865 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3866 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3867 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3868 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3869 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3870 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3871 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3872 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3873 </para>
3874 <para>
3875 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3876 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3877 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3878 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3879 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3880 shut as well?
3881 </para>
3882 <para>
3883 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3884 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3885 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3886 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3887 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3888 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3889
3890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3891 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3892 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3893 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3894 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3895 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3896 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3897 great book!)
3898 </para>
3899 <para>
3900 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3901 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3902 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3903 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3904 </para>
3905 <para>
3906 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3907 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3908 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3909 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3910 unavailable?"
3911 </para>
3912 <para>
3913 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3914 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3915 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3916 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3917 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3918 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3919 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3920 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3921 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3922 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3923 found only with time.
3924 </para>
3925 <para>
3926 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3927 just what you call type A sharing?"
3928 </para>
3929 <para>
3930 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3931 effect
3932 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3933 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3934 Napster
3935 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3936 developed
3937 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3939 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3940 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3941 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3942 <!-- f17 -->
3943 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3944 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3945 MHP, available at
3946 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3947 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3948 Fanning's
3949 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3950 </para></footnote>
3951 </para>
3952 <para>
3953 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3954 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3955 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3956 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3957 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3958 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3959 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3960 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3961 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3962 </para>
3963 <para>
3964 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3965 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3966 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3967 content
3968 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3969 technology.
3970 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3971 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3972 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3973 </para>
3974 <para>
3975 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3976 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3977 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3978 composers,
3979 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3980 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3981 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3982 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3983 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3984 broadcast),
3985 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3986 </para>
3987 <para>
3988 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3989 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3990 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3991 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3992 companies
3993 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3994 </para>
3995 <para>
3996
3997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3998 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3999 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
4000 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
4001 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
4002 Second,
4003 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
4004 content
4005 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
4006 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
4007 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
4008 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
4009 Congress
4010 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
4011 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
4012 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
4013 control
4014 over the future (cable).
4015 </para>
4016 <para>
4017 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4018 producers
4019 and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another
4020 technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today,
4021 VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's
4022 claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a device,
4023 Disney
4024 and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage in
4025 copyright
4026 infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a "record"
4027 button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies and
4028 shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright infringement
4029 of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and Universal claimed, be
4030 partially liable for that infringement.
4031 </para>
4032 <para>
4033 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4034 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4035 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4036 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4037 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4038 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4039 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4040 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4042 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4043 system
4044 to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4045 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4046 for the architecture it chose.
4047 </para>
4048 <para>
4049 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4050 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When
4051 there are 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be
4052 invaded
4053 by millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and
4054 essence of the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4055 copyright."<footnote><para>
4056 <!-- f18 -->
4057 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4058 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4059 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4060 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4061 </para></footnote>
4062 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing
4063 and creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the
4064 devastation
4065 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of
4066 millions
4067 of tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4068 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4069 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4070 <!-- f19 -->
4071 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4072 </para></footnote>
4073 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4074 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4075 <!-- f20 -->
4076 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4077 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4078 </para></footnote>
4079 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4080 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4081 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4082 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4083 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4084 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4085 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4086 <!-- f21 -->
4087 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4088 of Jack Valenti).
4089 </para></footnote>
4090 </para>
4091 <para>
4092 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4093 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4094 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4095 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4096 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4097 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4098 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4099 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4100 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4101 technology.<footnote><para>
4102 <!-- f22 -->
4103 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4104 1981).
4105 </para></footnote>
4106 </para>
4107 <para>
4108 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4109
4110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4111 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4112 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4113 Court wrote,
4114 </para>
4115 <blockquote>
4116 <para>
4117 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4118 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4119 market
4120 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4121 authority
4122 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4123 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4124 implicated
4125 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4126 <!-- f23 -->
4127 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4128 </para></footnote>
4129 </para>
4130 </blockquote>
4131 <para>
4132 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4133 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4134 Congress
4135 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4136 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4137 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4138 </para>
4139
4140 <table id="t1">
4141 <title>Table</title>
4142 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4143 <thead>
4144 <row>
4145 <entry>CASE</entry>
4146 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4147 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4148 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4149 </row>
4150 </thead>
4151 <tbody>
4152 <row>
4153 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4154 <entry>Composers</entry>
4155 <entry>No protection</entry>
4156 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4157 </row>
4158 <row>
4159 <entry>Radio</entry>
4160 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4161 <entry>N/A</entry>
4162 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4163 </row>
4164 <row>
4165 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4166 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4167 <entry>No protection</entry>
4168 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4169 </row>
4170 <row>
4171 <entry>VCR</entry>
4172 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4173 <entry>No protection</entry>
4174 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4175 </row>
4176 </tbody>
4177 </tgroup>
4178 </table>
4179
4180 <para>
4181 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4182 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4183 <!-- f24 -->
4184 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4185 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4186 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4187 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4188 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4189 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4190 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4191 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4192 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4193 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4194 </para></footnote>
4195 In each case, throughout our history,
4196 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4197 work.
4198 </para>
4199 <para>
4200 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4201 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4202 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4203 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4204 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4205 legitimacy
4206 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4207 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4208 the interests at stake.
4209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4210 </para>
4211 <para>
4212 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4213 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4214 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4215 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4216 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4217 regulated?
4218 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4219 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4220 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4221 permission to record a song?
4222 </para>
4223 <para>
4224 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4225 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4226 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4227 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4228 <!-- f25 -->
4229 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4230 (1984).
4231 </para></footnote>
4232 Instead, the particular uses that the
4233 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4234 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4235 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4236 technology
4237 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4238 the distribution of content.
4239 </para>
4240 <para>
4241 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4242 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4243 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4244 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4245 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4246 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4247 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4248 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4249 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4250 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4251 protection
4252 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4253 continue.
4254 </para>
4255 <para>
4256
4257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4258 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4259 superior
4260 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4261 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4262 network.
4263 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4264 efficient.
4265 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4266 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4267 <!-- f26 -->
4268 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4269 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4270 </para></footnote>
4271 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4272 warriors
4273 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4274 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4275 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4276 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4277 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4278 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4279 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4280 </para>
4281 <para>
4282 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4283 just as any other property is protected."
4284 </para>
4285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4286 </sect2>
4287 </sect1>
4288 </chapter>
4289 <chapter id="c-property">
4290 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4291 <para>
4292
4293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4294 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4295 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4296 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4297 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4298 the price she can get.
4299 </para>
4300 <para>
4301 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4302 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4303 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4304 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4305 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4306 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4307 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4308 going
4309 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4310 thing I am taking then?
4311 </para>
4312 <para>
4313 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4314 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4316 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4317 narrow
4318 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4319 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4320 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4321 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4322 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4323 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4324 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4325 <!-- f1 -->
4326 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4327 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4328 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4329 </para></footnote>
4330 </para>
4331 <para>
4332 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4333 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4334 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4335 expression
4336 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4337 property.
4338 </para>
4339 <para>
4340 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4341 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4342 turning
4343 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4344 "property"
4345 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4346 <!-- f2 -->
4347 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4348 intangible.
4349 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4350 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4351 physical
4352 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4353 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4354 Property?
4355 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4356 373, 429 n. 241.
4357 </para></footnote>
4358 </para>
4359 <para>
4360 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4361 preceding
4362 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4363 material
4364 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4365 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4366 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4367 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4368 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4369 us draw.
4370 </para>
4371
4372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4373 <sect1 id="founders">
4374 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4375 <para>
4376 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4377 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4378 Shakespeare
4379 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4380 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4381 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4382 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4383 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4384 adaptation
4385 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4386 </para>
4387 <para>
4388 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4389 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4390 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4391 <!-- f1 -->
4392 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4393 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4394 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4395 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4396 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4397 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4398 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4399 </para></footnote>
4400 Tonson was the
4401 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4402 <!-- f2 -->
4403 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4404 Vanderbilt
4405 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4406 </para></footnote>
4407 who
4408 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4409 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4410 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4412 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4413 copyright.
4414 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4415 produce
4416 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4417 </para>
4418 <para>
4419 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4420 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4421 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4422 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4423 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4424 renewable
4425 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4426 published
4427 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4428 <!-- f3 -->
4429 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4430 "copyright
4431 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4432 </para></footnote>
4433 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4434 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4435 </para>
4436 <para>
4437 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4438 "copyright"
4439 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4440 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4441 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4442 expired
4443 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4444 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4445 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4446 publishers,
4447 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4448 </para>
4449 <para>
4450 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4451 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4452 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4453 govern
4454 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4455 "positive
4456 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4457 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4458 legislature,
4459 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4460 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4461 expired
4462 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4463 independent
4464 of any positive law.
4465 </para>
4466 <para>
4467 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4468 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4469 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4470 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4471
4472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4473 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4474 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4475 ultimately
4476 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4477 </para>
4478 <para>
4479 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4480 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4481 however,
4482 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4483 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4484 "expired,"
4485 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4486 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4487 </para>
4488 <para>
4489 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4490 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4491 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4492 </para>
4493 <para>
4494 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4495 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4496 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4497 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4498 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4499 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4500 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4501 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4502 reason
4503 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4504 </para>
4505 <para>
4506 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4507 special
4508 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4509 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4510 "booksellers."
4511 </para>
4512 <para>
4513 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4514 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4515 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4516 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4517 others
4518 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4519 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4520 beyond
4521 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4523 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4524 restrictions
4525 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4526 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4527 perform, and so on.
4528 </para>
4529 <para>
4530 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4531 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4532 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4533 permission
4534 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4535 anything,
4536 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4537 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4538 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4539 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4540 </para>
4541 <para>
4542 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4543 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4544 especially
4545 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4546 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4547 monopolies&mdash;especially
4548 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4549 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4550 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4551 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4552 Monopolies,
4553 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4554 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4555 publishing.
4556 </para>
4557 <para>
4558 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4559 naturally
4560 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4561 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4562 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4563 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4564 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4565 specialinterest
4566 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4567 </para>
4568 <para>
4569 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4570 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4571 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4572 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4574 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4575 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4576 themselves
4577 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4578 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4579 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4580 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4581 <!-- f4 -->
4582 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4583 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4584 </para></footnote>
4585 </para>
4586 <para>
4587 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4588 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4589 Enlightenment
4590 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4591 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4592 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4593 that idea.
4594 </para>
4595 <para>
4596 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4597 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4598 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4599 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4600 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4601 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4602 compromise
4603 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4604 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4605 construction and spread of culture.
4606 </para>
4607 <para>
4608 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4609 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4610 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4611 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4612 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4613 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4614 they said; they needed more time.
4615 </para>
4616 <para>
4617 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4618 words that echo today,
4619 </para>
4620 <blockquote>
4621 <para>
4622 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4623 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4625 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4626 establishing
4627 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4628 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4629 Discouragement
4630 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4631 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4632 of the Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4633 <!-- f5 -->
4634 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4635 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4636 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4637 Encouragement
4638 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4639 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4640 mentioned
4641 (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
4642 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4643 </para></footnote>
4644 </para>
4645 </blockquote>
4646 <para>
4647 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4648 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4649 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4650 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4651 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4652 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4653 creative
4654 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4655 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4656 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4657 protections
4658 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4659 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4660 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4661 authors.
4662 </para>
4663 <para>
4664 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4665 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4666 chutzpah.
4667 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4668 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4669 for cattle."<footnote><para>
4670 <!-- f6 -->
4671 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4672 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4673 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4674 </para></footnote>
4675 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4676 author.
4677 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4678 </para>
4679 <para>
4680 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4681 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4682 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4683 <!-- f7 -->
4684 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4685 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4686 </para></footnote>
4687 </para>
4688 <para>
4689 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4690 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4691 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4692 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4693 <!-- f8 -->
4694 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4695 1993), 92.
4696 </para></footnote>
4697 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4699 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4700 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4701 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4702 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4703 <!-- f9 -->
4704 Ibid., 93.
4705 </para></footnote>
4706 </para>
4707 <para>
4708 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4709 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4710 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4711 defiance
4712 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."<footnote><para>
4713 <!-- f10 -->
4714 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4715 Borwell).
4716 </para></footnote>
4717 His
4718 books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
4719 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4720 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4721 </para>
4722 <para>
4723 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4724 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4725 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4726 </para>
4727 <para>
4728 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to
4729 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4730 requirements
4731 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4732 protection
4733 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4734 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4735 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4736 <!-- f11 -->
4737 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4738 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4739 Review
4740 29 (1983): 1152.
4741 </para></footnote>
4742 </para>
4743 <para>
4744 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4745 English
4746 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4747 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4748 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4749 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4750 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4751 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4752 common
4753 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4754 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4755 </para>
4756 <para>
4757 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if justice
4758 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles&mdash;Mansfield's
4759 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4760 issue that Parliament had struggled with in 1710: How best to limit
4761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4762 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4763 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4764 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4765 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4766 believed,
4767 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4768 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4769 </para>
4770 <para>
4771 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4772 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4773 </para>
4774 <para>
4775 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4776 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4777 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4778 <!-- f12 -->
4779 Ibid., 1156.
4780 </para></footnote>
4781 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4782 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4783 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4784 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4785 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4786 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4787 </para>
4788 <para>
4789 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4790 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4791 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4792 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4793 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4794 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4795 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4796 statute were no longer protected.
4797 </para>
4798 <para>
4799 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4800 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4801 members
4802 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4803 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4804 Lords generally voted.
4805 </para>
4806 <para>
4807 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4808 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4810 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4811 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4812 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4813 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4814 passed into the public domain.
4815 </para>
4816 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4817 <para>
4818 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4819 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4820 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4821 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4822 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4823 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4824 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4825 legal restraint.
4826 </para>
4827 <para>
4828 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4829 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4830 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4831 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4832 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4833 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4834 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4835 Edinburgh
4836 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4837 illuminations."<footnote><para>
4838 <!-- f13 -->
4839 Rose, 97.
4840 </para></footnote>
4841 </para>
4842 <para>
4843 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4844 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4845 reported:
4846 </para>
4847 <blockquote>
4848 <para>
4849 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what
4850 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4851 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4852 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4853 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4854 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4855 competency
4856 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4857 shilling to devise to their successors.<footnote><para>
4858 <!-- f14 -->
4859 Ibid.
4860 </para></footnote>
4861 </para>
4862 </blockquote>
4863 <para>
4864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4865 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4866 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4867 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4868 England
4869 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4870 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4871 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4872 exclusive
4873 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4874 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4875 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4876 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4877 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4878 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4879 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop&mdash;
4880 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4881 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4882 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4883 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4884 the many.
4885 </para>
4886 <para>
4887 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4888 antimonopoly,
4889 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4890 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4891 protected.
4892 </para>
4893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4894 </sect1>
4895 <sect1 id="recorders">
4896 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4897 <para>
4898 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4899 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4900 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4901 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4902 He was their god.)
4903 </para>
4904 <para>
4905 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4906 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4907 today.
4908 </para>
4909 <para>
4910 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4911 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4912 Stagehands
4913 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4914 During
4915 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
4916 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
4917 </para>
4918 <para>
4919 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
4920 stagehands
4921 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4922 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
4923 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4925 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4926 about the scene.
4927 </para>
4928 <para>
4929 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4930 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4931 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4932 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4933 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4934 </para>
4935 <para>
4936 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
4937 permission.
4938 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
4939 four-and-a-halfsecond
4940 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
4941 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
4942 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4943 </para>
4944 <para>
4945 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4946 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4947 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4948 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4949 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4950 </para>
4951 <para>
4952 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
4953 discovered
4954 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at least
4955 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
4956 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
4957 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
4958 was in the corner of the shot."
4959 </para>
4960 <para>
4961 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
4962 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
4963 Herrera.
4964 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
4965 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
4966 educational
4967 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4968 confirm what he had been told.
4969 </para>
4970 <para>
4971 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
4972 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4973 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
4974
4975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4976 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4977 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
4978 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
4979 money."
4980 </para>
4981 <para>
4982 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
4983 playing
4984 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4985 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
4986 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
4987 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
4988 Trinity, from ten years before.
4989 </para>
4990 <para>
4991 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
4992 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
4993 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
4994 permission
4995 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4996 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4997 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4998 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
4999 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
5000 owner gets to control.
5001 </para>
5002 <para>
5003 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
5004 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5005 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
5006 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
5007 copyright
5008 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5009 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set by
5010 the law.
5011 </para>
5012 <para>
5013 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5014 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
5015 <!-- f1 -->
5016 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
5017 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
5018 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
5019 file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
5020 </para></footnote>
5021 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
5022 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use
5023 does not require the permission of anyone.
5024 </para>
5025 <para>
5026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5027 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
5028 </para>
5029 <blockquote>
5030 <para>
5031 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
5032 between
5033 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
5034 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
5035 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
5036 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
5037 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5038 </para>
5039 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5040 <listitem><para>
5041 <!-- 1. -->
5042 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
5043 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
5044 require
5045 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5046 licensing
5047 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5048 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5049 process to a halt.
5050 </para></listitem>
5051 <listitem><para>
5052 <!-- 2. -->
5053 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5054 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5055 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5056 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5057 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5058 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5059 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5060 exhaustion
5061 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5062 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5063 principle.
5064 </para></listitem>
5065 <listitem><para>
5066 <!-- 3. -->
5067 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5068 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5069 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5070 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5071 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5072 legal
5073 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5074 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5075 </para></listitem>
5076 <listitem><para>
5077 <!-- 4. -->
5078 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5079 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5080 money.
5081 </para></listitem>
5082 </orderedlist>
5083 </blockquote>
5084 <para>
5085 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5086 therefore
5087 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5088 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5089 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5090 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5091 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5092 </para>
5093 <para>
5094 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5095 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5096 publishers'
5097 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5098 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5099 </para>
5100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5101 </sect1>
5102 <sect1 id="transformers">
5103 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5104 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5105 <para>
5106 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5107 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5108 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5109 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5110 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5111 </para>
5112 <para>
5113 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5114 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5115 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.
5116 In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to build
5117 retrospectives
5118 on the work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was
5119 Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5120 Eastwood,
5121 with clips from his films and interviews with figures important
5122 to his career.
5123 </para>
5124 <para>
5125 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor
5126 and as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with
5127 Eastwood,
5128 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5129 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5130 </para>
5131 <para>
5132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5133 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5134 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5135 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5136 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5137 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5138 </para>
5139 <para>
5140 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5141 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5142 Eastwood's
5143 films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No
5144 one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No one had
5145 ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an actor's
5146 career."
5147 </para>
5148 <para>
5149 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5150 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5151 </para>
5152 <para>
5153 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5154 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5155 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5156 for it."<footnote>
5157 <indexterm>
5158 <primary>artists</primary>
5159 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5160 </indexterm>
5161 <para>
5162 <!-- f1 -->
5163 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5164 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5165 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5166 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5167 </para></footnote>
5168 </para>
5169 <para>
5170 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5171 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5172 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5173 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5174 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5175 </para>
5176 <para>
5177 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5178 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5179 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5180 </para>
5181 <blockquote>
5182 <para>
5183 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.
5184 We made some artistic decisions about what film clips to
5185 include&mdash;of
5186 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip
5187 from Dirty Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground
5188 who's wiggling under the gun and you need to get his
5189 permission.
5190 And then you have to decide what you are going to pay
5191 him.
5192 </para>
5193 <para>
5194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5195 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5196 dayplayer
5197 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5198 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5199 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5200 So we had to identify the people&mdash;some of them were hard to
5201 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5202 crashing through the glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5203 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5204 others, and we just started calling people.
5205 </para>
5206 </blockquote>
5207 <para>
5208 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5209 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5210 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5211 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5212 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5213 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5214 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5215 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5216 career.
5217 </para>
5218 <para>
5219 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5220 were totally in the clear."
5221 </para>
5222 <para>
5223 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5224 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5225 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5226 </para>
5227 <blockquote>
5228 <para>
5229 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up
5230 their hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many
5231 copyrights,
5232 there's the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director,
5233 there's the actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into
5234 its constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this
5235 many directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it
5236 very systematically and cleared the rights.
5237 </para>
5238 </blockquote>
5239 <para>
5240
5241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5242 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5243 loved it, and it sold very well.
5244 </para>
5245 <para>
5246 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5247 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
5248 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5249 nothing
5250 so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
5251 all."<footnote><para>
5252 <!-- f2 -->
5253 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5254 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5255 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5256 </para></footnote>
5257 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5258 has to be made?
5259 </para>
5260 <para>
5261 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5262 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5263 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5264 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5265 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5266 </para>
5267 <blockquote>
5268 <para>
5269 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5270 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5271 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5272 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5273 compensated for that.
5274 </para>
5275 </blockquote>
5276 <para>
5277 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5278 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5279 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5280 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5281 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5282 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5283 creative
5284 process could be made to be more clean?
5285 </para>
5286 <blockquote>
5287 <para>
5288 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5289 mechanism&mdash;where
5290 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5291 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5292 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5294 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5295 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5296 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5297 paying
5298 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5299 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5300 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5301 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5302 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5303 investments
5304 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5305 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5306 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5307 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5308 one of these things together.
5309 </para>
5310 </blockquote>
5311 <para>
5312 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some
5313 of the richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and
5314 access that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him
5315 a year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity
5316 is never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5317 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5318 Republican
5319 hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5320 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5321 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea
5322 that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing
5323 flythrough
5324 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5325 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5326 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5327 regulationminimizing
5328 Republican should look at the rights and ask, "Does this
5329 still make sense?"
5330 </para>
5331 <para>
5332 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5333 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5334 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5335 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5336
5337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5338 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5339 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5340 </para>
5341 <para>
5342 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5343 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5344 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5345 judges loved every minute of it.
5346 </para>
5347 <para>
5348 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5349 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5350 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5351 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5352 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5353 were just violated in this room?"
5354 </para>
5355 <para>
5356 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5357 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5358 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.
5359 Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for
5360 this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle of federal
5361 marshals
5362 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point:
5363 A year before anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two
5364 years before another member of our panel, David Boies, would defend
5365 Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was
5366 trying
5367 to get the judges to see that the law would not be friendly to the
5368 capacities that this technology would enable. Technology means you
5369 can now do amazing things easily; but you couldn't easily do them
5370 legally.
5371 </para>
5372 <para>
5373 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5374 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5375 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5376 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5377 planted in your presentation.
5378 </para>
5379 <para>
5380 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5382 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never
5383 before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on
5384 computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes
5385 images of politicians and blends them with music to create biting
5386 political
5387 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of
5388 the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is through
5389 the mixing of Flash! and music.
5390 </para>
5391 <para>
5392 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5393 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5394 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5395 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5396 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5397 </para>
5398 <para>
5399 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5400 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or
5401 mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5402 necessarily
5403 requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the
5404 system
5405 could simply make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate
5406 artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for
5407 example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright owner of an
5408 unregistered
5409 work for the derivative reuse of his work will be a flat 1 percent
5410 of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the copyright owner." Under
5411 this rule, the copyright owner could benefit from some royalty, but he
5412 would not have the benefit of a full property right (meaning the right
5413 to name his own price) unless he registers the work.
5414 </para>
5415 <para>
5416 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5417 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5418 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5419 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5420 </para>
5421 <para>
5422 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an
5423 agreement
5424 with Mike Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5426 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and
5427 Dream-Works
5428 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under
5429 the agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5430 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use of
5431 stateof-the-art
5432 digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other actors into the
5433 film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
5434 </para>
5435 <para>
5436 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers
5437 explained,
5438 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on
5439 existing films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5440 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5441 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5442 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to new
5443 audiences, it is Mike."
5444 </para>
5445 <para>
5446 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5447 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5448 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5449 remains
5450 under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5451 announcement
5452 is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5453 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5454 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5455 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5456 </para>
5457 <para>
5458 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5459 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5460 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5461 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5462 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5463 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5464 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5465 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5466 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5467 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5468 curse, reserved for the few.
5469 </para>
5470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5471 </sect1>
5472 <sect1 id="collectors">
5473 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5474 <para>
5475 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5476 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5477 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5478 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5479 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5480 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5481 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5482 </para>
5483 <para>
5484 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5485 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5486 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5487 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5488 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
5489 as when those pages changed.
5490 </para>
5491 <para>
5492 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5493 appreciated.
5494 In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5495 constantly
5496 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5497 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5498 </para>
5499 <para>
5500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5501 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5502 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5503 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5504 </para>
5505 <para>
5506 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5507 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5508 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5509 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5510 library&mdash;constantly
5511 updated, without any reliable memory.
5512 </para>
5513 <para>
5514 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5515 Machine,
5516 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5517 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5518 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5519 remember and what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5520 <!-- f1 -->
5521 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5522 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
5523 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5524 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5525 E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5526 </para></footnote>
5527 </para>
5528 <para>
5529 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5530 remember
5531 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5532 reaction
5533 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965,
5534 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5535 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5536 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5537 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what it is
5538 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5539 </para>
5540 <para>
5541 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5542 repeat
5543 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5544 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5545 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5546 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5547 researchers,
5548 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5549 </para>
5550 <para>
5551 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5552 Internet
5553 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5554 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5555 important
5556 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5558 important
5559 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5560 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5561 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the one kept by the
5562 Internet
5563 Archive.
5564 </para>
5565 <para>
5566 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5567 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5568 researcher.
5569 In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5570 success.
5571 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5572 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5573 Internet
5574 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5575 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
5576 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5577 </para>
5578 <para>
5579 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5580 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5581 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5582 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5583 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5584 constructing
5585 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5586 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5587 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5588 culture
5589 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5590 recorded
5591 each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a specific
5592 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5593 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5594 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5595 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5596 put it,
5597 </para>
5598 <blockquote>
5599 <para>
5600 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5601 Murphy
5602 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5603 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5604 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5605 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5606
5607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5608 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5609 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5610 </para>
5611 </blockquote>
5612 <para>
5613 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5614 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5615 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5616 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5617 nineteenthcentury
5618 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5619 understand
5620 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5621 </para>
5622 <para>
5623 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5624 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5625 libraries.
5626 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5627 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5628 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5629 </para>
5630 <para>
5631 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of
5632 Congress
5633 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5634 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5635 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915
5636 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5637 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5638 library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at all&mdash;in the library archive of the
5639 film company.<footnote><para>
5640 <!-- f2 -->
5641 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5642 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3 (1980): 5;
5643 Anthony
5644 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5645 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
5646 </para></footnote>
5647 </para>
5648 <para>
5649 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5650 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5651 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5652 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5653 required
5654 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5655 "copyrighted."
5656 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5657 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5658 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5659 anyone who would look.
5660 </para>
5661 <para>
5662 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5664 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5665 stations
5666 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5667 September
5668 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5669 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
5670 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5671 Anyone
5672 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5673 events of that day.
5674 </para>
5675 <para>
5676 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5677 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films"
5678 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5679 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5680 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5681 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5682 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5683 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5684 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5685 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5686 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5687 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5688 culture.
5689 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5690 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5691 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes&mdash;for free.
5692 </para>
5693 <para>
5694 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5695 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5696 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5697 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5698 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5699 </para>
5700 <para>
5701 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5702 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5703 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5704 culture.
5705 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5706 during
5707 a second life that all creative property has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5708 </para>
5709 <para>
5710 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5711 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5712
5713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5714 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5715 market
5716 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5717 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5718 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5719 market,
5720 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5721 </para>
5722 <para>
5723 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5724 tradition
5725 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5726 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5727 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5728 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5729 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5730 </para>
5731 <para>
5732 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5733 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5734 <!-- f3 -->
5735 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5736 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5737 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5738 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5739 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5740 Review
5741 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5742 </para></footnote>). After it is
5743 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5744 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5745 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5746 second
5747 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5748 spread and stability of culture.
5749 </para>
5750 <para>
5751 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5752 creative
5753 property does not hold true with the most important components
5754 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5755 these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&mdash;there is no
5756 guarantee
5757 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5758 libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5759 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5760 Beyond
5761 that, culture disappears.
5762 </para>
5763 <para>
5764 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5765 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5766 accessible
5767 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5768 extraordinarily
5769 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5770 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5772 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5773 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5774 practical
5775 effect.
5776 </para>
5777 <para>
5778 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5779 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5780 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5781 distributed
5782 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5783 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5784 archive of all moving images and sound.
5785 </para>
5786 <para>
5787 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5788 imagined
5789 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5790 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5791 Kahle describes,
5792 </para>
5793 <blockquote>
5794 <para>
5795 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5796 music.
5797 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5798 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5799 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5800 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5801 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5802 company.
5803 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5804 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5805 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5806 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5807 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5808 press.
5809 </para>
5810 </blockquote>
5811 <para>
5812 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5813 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5814 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5815 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5816 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5817 remains
5818 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5820 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5821 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5822 become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a future for our past. The
5823 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5824 Alexandria real again.
5825 </para>
5826 <para>
5827 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5828 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5829 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5830 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5831 someone's
5832 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5833 Kahle and others would exercise.
5834 </para>
5835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5836 </sect1>
5837 <sect1 id="property-i">
5838 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5839 <para>
5840 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5841 Association
5842 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5843 with Lyndon Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture
5844 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5845 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5846 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5847 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5848 </para>
5849 <para>
5850 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5851 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
5852 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5853 criticism.
5854 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5855 producers
5856 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5857 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5858 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5859 programs
5860 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5861 Entertainment,
5862 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5863 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5864 </para>
5865 <para>
5866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5867 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5868 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5869 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5870 important
5871 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5872 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5873 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5874 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5875 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5876 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5877 Washingtonian way.
5878 </para>
5879 <para>
5880 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5881 culture
5882 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5883 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5884 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5885 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5886 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5887 the meaning of "creative property."
5888 </para>
5889 <para>
5890 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5891 perfectly:
5892 </para>
5893 <blockquote>
5894 <para>
5895 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5896 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5897 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5898 fundamental
5899 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5900 Creative
5901 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5902 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5903 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5904 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5905 <!-- f1 -->
5906 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5907 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5908 Subcommittee
5909 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5910 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th
5911 Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5912 </para></footnote>
5913 </para>
5914 </blockquote>
5915 <para>
5916 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5917 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5918 "central
5919 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5921 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5922 protections
5923 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5924 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5925 be no second-class property owners.
5926 </para>
5927 <para>
5928 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5929 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5930 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5931 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5932 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5933 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5934 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5935 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5936 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5937 </para>
5938 <para>
5939 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5940 precise
5941 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5942 <!-- f2 -->
5943 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5944 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5945 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5946 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5947 ordinary
5948 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5949 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
5950 26&ndash;27.
5951 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5952 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5953 "accorded
5954 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5955 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5956 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5957 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5958 </para>
5959 <para>
5960 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5961 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5962 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5963 overturned
5964 in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5965 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5966 culture would develop.
5967 </para>
5968 <para>
5969 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5970 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5971 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5972 history.
5973 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5974 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5975 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5976 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5977
5978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5979 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5980 Creativity
5981 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5982 control.
5983 </para>
5984 <para>
5985 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5986 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5987 notwithstanding,
5988 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5989 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5990 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5991 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5992 opportunity
5993 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5994 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5995 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5996 Constitution itself.
5997 </para>
5998 <para>
5999 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
6000 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6001 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if it
6002 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&mdash;it is
6003 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
6004 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
6005 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
6006 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6007 </para>
6008 <para>
6009 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6010 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
6011 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
6012 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
6013 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
6014 Congress
6015 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
6016 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
6017 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
6018 Instead,
6019 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6021 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
6022 compensation
6023 at all.
6024 </para>
6025 <para>
6026 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6027 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
6028 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
6029 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
6030 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
6031 effectively
6032 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
6033 </para>
6034 <para>
6035 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6036 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6037 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6038 appointed
6039 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
6040 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
6041 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
6042 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
6043 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
6044 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
6045 it, we should, too.
6046 </para>
6047 <para>
6048 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6049 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
6050 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
6051 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
6052 creative
6053 property there must be a public domain?
6054 </para>
6055 <para>
6056 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6057 history
6058 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6059 enabled.
6060 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6061 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6062 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6063 protected,
6064 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6065 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6066 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6067 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6068 </para>
6069 <para>
6070
6071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6072 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6073 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6074 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6075 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6076 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6077 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6078 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6079 </para>
6080 <figure id="fig-1331">
6081 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6082 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6083 </figure>
6084 <para>
6085 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6086 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6087 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6088 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6089 represent
6090 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&mdash;
6091 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6092 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6093 punishments
6094 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6095 example,
6096 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6097 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6099 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6100 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6101 </para>
6102 <para>
6103 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6104 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6105 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6106 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6107 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6108 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6109 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6110 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6111 the source of the enforcement.
6112 </para>
6113 <para>
6114 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6115 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6116 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6117 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6118 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6119 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6120 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6121 group might behave.
6122 </para>
6123 <para>
6124 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6125 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a constraint on
6126 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6127 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6128 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6129 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6130 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6131 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6132 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6133 "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6134 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket
6135 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6136 enforces this constraint.
6137 </para>
6138 <para>
6139
6140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6141 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6142 obvious:
6143 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6144 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6145 another.
6146 </para>
6147 <para>
6148 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6149 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6150 particular
6151 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6152 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6153 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6154 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6155 consider how these four in particular interact.
6156 </para>
6157 <para>
6158 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6159 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6160 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6161 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6162 rational
6163 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6164 maximum
6165 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6166 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6167 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6168 community
6169 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50
6170 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6171 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6172 a different town, or at night.
6173 </para>
6174 <para>
6175 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6176 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6177 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6178 <!-- f3 -->
6179 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6180 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6181 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6182 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6183 expressed.
6184 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6185 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6186 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6187 </para></footnote>
6188 The law, in other words, sometimes
6189 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6190 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6191 increase
6192 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6193 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6194 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6195 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6197 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6198 example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6199 </para>
6200 <figure id="fig-1361">
6201 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6202 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6203 </figure>
6204 <para>
6205 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6206 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6207 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6208 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6209 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6210 another.<footnote><para>
6211 <!-- f4 -->
6212 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6213 because
6214 their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6215 particular
6216 moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6217 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6218 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6219 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss of
6220 freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of
6221 ordinary
6222 life.
6223 I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which depends
6224 upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue against any
6225 insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of liberty. As I
6226 argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political thought with a
6227 broader focus than the narrow question of what the government did when.
6228 John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from the
6229 tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
6230 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.
6231 John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor
6232 from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The Right
6233 to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.
6234 Commons: Selected Essays (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans
6235 with Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical
6236 disabilities
6237 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making
6238 access to those places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000).
6239 Each of these interventions to change existing conditions changes the
6240 liberty of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6241 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these
6242 groups might face.
6243 </para></footnote>
6244 </para>
6245 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6246 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6247 <para>
6248
6249 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6250 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6251 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6252 rallying makes sense.
6253 </para>
6254 <para>
6255 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6256 Internet:
6257 </para>
6258 <figure id="fig-1371">
6259 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6260 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6261 </figure>
6262 <para>
6263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6264 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The
6265 law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties
6266 on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6267 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture)
6268 and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those
6269 penalties
6270 are mitigated by norms we all recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping
6271 other kids' records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be
6272 infringement,
6273 but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least)
6274 had no problem with this form of infringement.
6275 </para>
6276 <para>
6277 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s
6278 and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes
6279 dramatically,
6280 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6281 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6282 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6283 becomes
6284 an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6285 </para>
6286 <para>
6287 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6288 Technology
6289 has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
6290 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of
6291 protection
6292 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq
6293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6294 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6295 looting that results.
6296 </para>
6297 <figure id="fig-1381">
6298 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6299 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6300 </figure>
6301 <para>
6302 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6303 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6304 Department
6305 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6306 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6307 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6308 Internet
6309 had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6310 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6311 innovative
6312 marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to develop
6313 code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should educate
6314 kids to better protect copyright.
6315 </para>
6316 <para>
6317 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6318 preserve
6319 the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
6320 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry
6321 to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life
6322 you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if
6323 something
6324 comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a
6325
6326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6327 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6328 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6329 property
6330 (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to
6331 bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions
6332 have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when
6333 imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6334 </para>
6335 <para>
6336 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6337 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6338 technological
6339 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the
6340 changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the
6341 content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown
6342 describes
6343 it, its "architecture of revenue."
6344 </para>
6345 <para>
6346 But just because a particular interest asks for government support,
6347 it doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6348 technology
6349 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6350 follow
6351 that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6352 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6353 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6354 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6355 <!-- f5 -->
6356 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6357 BusinessWeek
6358 online, 2 August 1999, available at
6359 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more recent
6360 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6361 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003,
6362 available
6363 at
6364 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6365 </para></footnote>
6366 Does anyone believe the government should ban
6367 digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the
6368 freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks
6369 from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the
6370 subject
6371 of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the
6372 "stickiness"
6373 of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the
6374 TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this
6375 change has weakened the television advertising market. But does
6376 anyone
6377 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial
6378 television?
6379 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to
6380 switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6381 </para>
6382 <para>
6383 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6384 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6385 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6387 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6388 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6389 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6390 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6391 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6392 <!-- f6 -->
6393 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6394 </para></footnote>
6395 And relative to a
6396 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6397 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6398 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6399 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6400 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6401 Brezhnev.
6402 </para>
6403 <para>
6404 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6405 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6406 government
6407 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6408 guarantee
6409 that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the
6410 duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they
6411 create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
6412 are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for
6413 innovation
6414 and change.
6415 </para>
6416 <para>
6417 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include, obviously,
6418 copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
6419 complaining
6420 about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in
6421 a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be
6422 especially
6423 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government
6424 to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and
6425 dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First
6426 Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .
6427 abridging the freedom of speech." So when Congress is being asked to
6428 pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom of speech, it should ask&mdash;
6429 carefully&mdash;whether such regulation is justified.
6430 </para>
6431 <para>
6432 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6434 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6435 "justified."
6436 My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the
6437 question
6438 of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon
6439 your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the
6440 changes the content industry wants.
6441 </para>
6442 <para>
6443 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6444 </para>
6445 <para>
6446 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6447 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6448 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6449 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6450 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6451 </para>
6452 <para>
6453 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6454 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6455 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6456 </para>
6457 <para>
6458 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued
6459 that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6460 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6461 reproduce.
6462 Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6463 </para>
6464 <para>
6465 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly
6466 did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of
6467 problems
6468 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse
6469 than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately,
6470 the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at
6471 least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways
6472 to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6473 </para>
6474 <para>
6475 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6476 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6477 culture.<footnote><para>
6478 <!-- f7 -->
6479 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6480 Environmentalism
6481 for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6482 </para></footnote>
6483 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of
6484 this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that
6485 authors
6486 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given
6487 away "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6488 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6489 environment,
6490 much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6492 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6493 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6494 protecting
6495 copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
6496 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware
6497 of our actions' effects on the environment.
6498 </para>
6499 <para>
6500 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6501 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6502 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6503 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6504 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6505 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6506 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6507 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6508 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6509 </para>
6510 <para>
6511 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6512 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6513 be lost.
6514 </para>
6515 </sect2>
6516 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6517 <title>Beginnings</title>
6518 <para>
6519 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and
6520 improved
6521 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
6522 "creative property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the
6523 English
6524 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6525 </para>
6526 <para>
6527 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6528 Congress
6529 in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I,
6530 section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6531 </para>
6532 <para>
6533 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6534 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6535 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6536
6537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6538 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does
6539 not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant "creative
6540 property
6541 rights." It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The
6542 grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the
6543 purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of
6544 rewarding
6545 authors.
6546 </para>
6547 <para>
6548 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we
6549 saw in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6550 assure
6551 that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture
6552 by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume
6553 the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike
6554 the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6555 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6556 </para>
6557 <para>
6558 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6559 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
6560 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built
6561 a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them
6562 short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the
6563 federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6564 concentrating
6565 power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce
6566 the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose members were
6567 at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected
6568 by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built
6569 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to
6570 prevent
6571 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
6572 </para>
6573 <para>
6574 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
6575 "copyright"
6576 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they
6577 ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put
6578 our "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
6579 210 years since they first struck its design.
6580 </para>
6581 <para>
6582 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6583 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6584 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6585 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6586 started here:
6587 </para>
6588 <figure id="fig-1441">
6589 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6590 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6591 </figure>
6592 <para>
6593 We will end here:
6594 </para>
6595 <figure id="fig-1442">
6596 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6597 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6598 </figure>
6599 <para>
6600 Let me explain how.
6601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6602 </para>
6603 </sect2>
6604 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6605 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6606 <para>
6607 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6608 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6609 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6610 protecting
6611 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6612 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6613 authorship.<footnote><para>
6614 <!-- f8 -->
6615 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6616 United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1, 485&ndash;86:
6617 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6618 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6619 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6620 </para></footnote>
6621 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6622 the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6623 common
6624 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6625 published
6626 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6627 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6628 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6629 </para>
6630 <para>
6631 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6632 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6633 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6634 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6635 copyrights
6636 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6637 state copyrights expired as well.
6638 </para>
6639 <para>
6640 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6641 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6642 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6643 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6644 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6645 </para>
6646 <para>
6647 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6648 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6649 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6650 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6651 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6652 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6653 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6654 <!-- f9 -->
6655 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6656 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6657 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6658 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6659 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6660 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6661 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6662 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6663 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6664 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6665 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6666 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6667 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6668 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6669 </para>
6670 <para>
6671 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6672 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6674 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6675 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6676 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6677 copyright, either.
6678 </para>
6679 <para>
6680 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6681 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6682 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6683 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6684 domain.<footnote><para>
6685 <!-- f10 -->
6686 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6687 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6688 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6689 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6690 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6691 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6692 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6693 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6694 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6695 </para>
6696 <para>
6697 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6698 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6699 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6700 <!-- f11 -->
6701 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6702 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6703 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6704 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6705 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6706 effectively free.
6707 </para>
6708 <para>
6709 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6710 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6711 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6712 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6713 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6714 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6715 </para>
6716 <para>
6717 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6718 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6719 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6720 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6721 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6722 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6723 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6724 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6725 </para>
6726 <para>
6727 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6728 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6729 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6730 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6731
6732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6733 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6734 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6735 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6736 </para>
6737 <para>
6738 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6739 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6740 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6741 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6742 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6743 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6744 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6745 value.
6746 </para>
6747 <para>
6748 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6749 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6750 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6751 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6752 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6753 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6754 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6755 was ninety-five years.
6756 </para>
6757 <para>
6758 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6759 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6760 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6761 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6762 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6763 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6764 them.
6765 </para>
6766 <para>
6767 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6768 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6769 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6770 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6771 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6772 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6773 years.<footnote><para>
6774 <!-- f12 -->
6775 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6776 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6777 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6778 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6779 </para></footnote>
6780 </para>
6781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6782 </sect2>
6783 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6784 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6785 <para>
6786 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6787 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6788 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6789 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6790 </para>
6791 <para>
6792 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6793 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6794 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6795 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6796 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6797 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6798 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6799 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6800 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6801 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6802 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6803 </para>
6804 <para>
6805 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6806 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6807 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6808 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6809 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6810 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6811 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6812 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6813 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6814 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6815 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6816 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6817 on the initial creative work.
6818 </para>
6819 <para>
6820 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6821 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6822 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6824 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6825 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6826 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6827 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6828 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6829 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6830 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6831 </para>
6832 <para>
6833 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6834 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6835 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6836 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6837 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6838 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6839 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6840 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6841 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6842 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6843 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6844 original author.
6845 </para>
6846 <para>
6847 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6848 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6849 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6850 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6851 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6852 copy available for others to copy.
6853 </para>
6854 <para>
6855 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6856 differences.
6857 </para>
6858 <para>
6859 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6860 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6861 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6862 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6863 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6864 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6865 <!-- f13 -->
6866 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6867 Creation
6868 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6869 International
6870 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6871 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6872 </para></footnote>
6873 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6874 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6875 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6876 </para>
6877 <para>
6878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6879 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6880 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6881 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6882 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6883 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6884 creative
6885 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6886 restrained.
6887 </para>
6888 <para>
6889 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6890 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6891 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6892 reduced
6893 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6894 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6895 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6896 </para>
6897 <para>
6898 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6899 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6900 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6901 </para>
6902 <para>
6903 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6904 control
6905 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6906 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6907 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6908 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6909 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6910 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6911 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6912 exclusive
6913 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6914 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6915 </para>
6916 <para>
6917 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6918 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6919 expansion
6920 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6921 copyright.
6922 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6923 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6924 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6925 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6926 </para>
6927 <para>
6928
6929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6930 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6931 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6932 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6933 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6934 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6935 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6936 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6937 protect
6938 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6939 <!-- f14 -->
6940 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6941 2003, available at
6942 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6943 </para></footnote>
6944 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6945 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6946 the wrong of direct piracy.
6947 </para>
6948 <para>
6949 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6950 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6951 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6952 transformative
6953 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6954 <!-- f15 -->
6955 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6956 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6957 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6958 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6959 Constitutionality,"
6960 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6961 </para></footnote>
6962 These two different uses of my creative work are
6963 treated the same.
6964 </para>
6965 <para>
6966 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6967 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6968 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6969 creates
6970 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6971 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6972 originally created?
6973 </para>
6974 <para>
6975 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6976 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6977 simply
6978 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6979 rights originally granted.
6980 </para>
6981 </sect2>
6982 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6983 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6984 <para>
6985 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6986 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6987 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6988 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6989 <!-- f16 -->
6990 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6991 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6992 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6993 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6994 sometimes
6995 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6996 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6997 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6998 </para></footnote>
6999 </para>
7000 <para>
7001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7002 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
7003 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
7004 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
7005 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
7006 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
7007 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
7008 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
7009 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
7010 trigger for copyright law.
7011 </para>
7012 <para>
7013 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7014 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7015 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7016 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
7017 <!-- f17 -->
7018 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
7019 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
7020 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
7021 basis
7022 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
7023 </para></footnote>
7024 because it is clear that the
7025 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7026 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7027 </para>
7028 <para>
7029 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7030 empty circle.
7031 </para>
7032 <figure id="fig-1521">
7033 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
7034 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
7035 </figure>
7036 <para>
7037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7038 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7039 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
7040 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
7041 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
7042 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
7043 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
7044 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
7045 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
7046 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
7047 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
7048 not make a copy.
7049 </para>
7050 <figure id="fig-1531">
7051 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
7052 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
7053 </figure>
7054 <para>
7055 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7056 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7057 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7058 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7059 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7060 diagram on next page).
7061 </para>
7062 <para>
7063 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7064 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
7065 </para>
7066 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7067 <figure id="fig-1541">
7068 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7069 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7070 </figure>
7071 <para>
7072 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
7073 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7074 unregulated.
7075 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
7076 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
7077 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
7078 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
7079 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
7080 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7081 </para>
7082 <figure id="fig-1542">
7083 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
7084 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7085 </figure>
7086 <para> </para>
7087 <figure id="fig-1551">
7088 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7089 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7090 </figure>
7091 <para>
7092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7093 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7094 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7095 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7096 </para>
7097 <para>
7098 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7099 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7100 <!-- f18 -->
7101 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7102 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7103 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7104 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7105 </para></footnote>
7106 And because of this single,
7107 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7108 category
7109 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7110 unregulated
7111 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7112 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7113 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7114 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
7115 category
7116 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7117 copyrighted
7118 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
7119 burden of this shift.
7120 </para>
7121 <para>
7122 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7123 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7124 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7125 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7126 nothing
7127 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7129 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
7130 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7131 produced
7132 a copy.
7133 </para>
7134 <para>
7135 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7136 different
7137 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7138 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7139 copyright
7140 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7141 accidental
7142 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7143 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7144 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7145 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7146 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7147 </para>
7148 <para>
7149 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7150 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7151 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7152 points also become clear:
7153 </para>
7154 <para>
7155 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7156 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7157 presumptively
7158 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7159 evidence
7160 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7161 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7162 free culture before the Internet.
7163 </para>
7164 <para>
7165 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7166 transformative
7167 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7168 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7169 transformation
7170 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7171 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7172 releasing
7173 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7174 justification.
7175 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7176 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7177 transformative
7178 uses of creative work.
7179 </para>
7180 <para>
7181 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7182
7183 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7184 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7185 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7186 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7187 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7188 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7189 Internet,
7190 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7191 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7192 protected
7193 before because reading was not regulated.
7194 </para>
7195 <para>
7196 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7197 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7198 depend
7199 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7200 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7201 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7202 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7203 protections
7204 of fair use are not enough.
7205 </para>
7206 <para>
7207 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7208 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7209 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7210 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7211 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7212 </para>
7213 <para>
7214 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7215 began
7216 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7217 previews.
7218 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7219 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7220 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7221 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7222 before
7223 you bought it.
7224 </para>
7225 <para>
7226 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7227 distributors
7228 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7229 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7230 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7232 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7233 business
7234 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7235 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7236 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7237 immediately.
7238 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7239 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7240 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7241 </para>
7242 <para>
7243 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7244 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7245 infringed"
7246 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7247 willful
7248 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7249 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7250 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7251 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7252 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7253 </para>
7254 <para>
7255 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7256 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7257 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7258 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7259 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7260 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7261 Disney's permission.
7262 </para>
7263 <para>
7264 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7265 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7266 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7267 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7268 marketplace,
7269 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7270 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7271 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7272 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7273 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7274 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7275 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7276 </para>
7277 <para>
7278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7279 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7280 control
7281 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7282 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7283 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7284 Noble
7285 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7286 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7287 argument
7288 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7289 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7290 exercising
7291 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7292 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7293 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7294 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7295 </para>
7296 <para>
7297 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7298 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7299 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7300 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7301 owners
7302 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7303 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7304 </para>
7305 </sect2>
7306 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7307 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7308 <para>
7309 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7310 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7311 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7312 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7313 </para>
7314 <para>
7315 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7316 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7317 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7318 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7319 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7320 your freedom.
7321 </para>
7322 <para>
7323 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7324 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7326 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7327 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7328 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7329 <!-- f19 -->
7330 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7331 Contemporary
7332 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7333 </para></footnote>
7334 </para>
7335 <para>
7336 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7337 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7338 you were."<footnote><para>
7339 <!-- f20 -->
7340 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7341 </para></footnote>
7342 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7343 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7344 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7345 </para>
7346 <para>
7347 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7348 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7349 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7350 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7351 </para>
7352 <para>
7353 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7354 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7355 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7356 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7357 copyrighted
7358 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7359 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7360 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7361 that is not at all funny.
7362 </para>
7363 <para>
7364 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7365 </para>
7366 <para>
7367 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7368 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7369 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7370 technology,
7371 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7372 </para>
7373 <para>
7374 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7375 Reader.
7376 </para>
7377 <para>
7378 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7379 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7380 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7381 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7382 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7383 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7385 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7386 called Permissions.
7387 </para>
7388 <figure id="fig-1611">
7389 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7390 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7391 </figure>
7392 <para>
7393 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7394 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7395 </para>
7396 <figure id="fig-1612">
7397 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7398 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7399 </figure>
7400 <para>
7401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7402 According to my eBook
7403 Reader, I have the permission
7404 to copy to the clipboard of the
7405 computer ten text selections
7406 every ten days. (So far, I've
7407 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7408 I also have the permission to
7409 print ten pages from the book
7410 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7411 the permission to use the Read
7412 Aloud button to hear
7413 Middlemarch
7414 read aloud through the
7415 computer.
7416 </para>
7417 <para>
7418 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7419 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7420 </para>
7421 <figure id="fig-1621">
7422 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7423 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7424 </figure>
7425 <para>
7426 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7427 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7428 the book.
7429 </para>
7430 <figure id="fig-1622">
7431 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7432 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7433 </figure>
7434 <para>
7435 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7436 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7437 </para>
7438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7439 <figure id="fig-1631">
7440 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7441 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7442 </figure>
7443 <para>
7444 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7445 </para>
7446 <para>
7447 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7448 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7449 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7450 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7451 under
7452 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7453 <!-- f21 -->
7454 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7455 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7456 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7457 obligation
7458 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7459 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7460 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7461 </para></footnote>
7462 When my e-book of
7463 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7464 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7465 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7466 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7467 </para>
7468 <para>
7469 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7470 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7471 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7472 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7473 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7474 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7475 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7476 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7477 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7478 restrictions:
7479 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7480 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7481 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7482 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7483 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7484 </para>
7485 <para>
7486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7487 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7488 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7489 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7490 </para>
7491 <para>
7492 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7493 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7494 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7495 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7496 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7497 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7498 </para>
7499 <para>
7500 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7501 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7502 technologies
7503 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7504 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7505 protections as well?
7506 </para>
7507 <para>
7508 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7509 eBook Reader.
7510 </para>
7511 <para>
7512 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7513 public
7514 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7515 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7516 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7517 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7518 </para>
7519 <figure id="fig-1641">
7520 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7521 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7522 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7523 </figure>
7524 <para>
7525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7526 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7527 allowed
7528 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7529 "permissions"
7530 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7531 </para>
7532 <para>
7533 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7534 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7535 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7536 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7537 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7538 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7539 </para>
7540 <para>
7541 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7542 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7543 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7544 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7545 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7546 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7547 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7548 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7549 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7550 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7551 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7552 </para>
7553 <para>
7554 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7555 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7556 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7557 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7558 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7559 often crazy.
7560 </para>
7561 <para>
7562 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7563 story of mine that makes the same point.
7564 </para>
7565 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7566 <para>
7567 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7568 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7569 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7570 </para>
7571 <para>
7572 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7573 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7574 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7576 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7577 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7578 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7579 </para>
7580 <para>
7581 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7582 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7583 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7584 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7585 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7586 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7587 </para>
7588 <para>
7589 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7590 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7591 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7592 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7593 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7594 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7595 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7596 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7597 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7598 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7599 </para>
7600 <para>
7601 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7602 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7603 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7604 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7605 ethically.
7606 </para>
7607 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7608 <para>
7609 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7610 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7611 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7612 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7613 than Sony had built.
7614 </para>
7615 <para>
7616 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7617 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7618 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7619 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7620 the
7621
7622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7623 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7624 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7625 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7626 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7627 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7628 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7629 dog to dance?
7630 </para>
7631 <para>
7632 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7633 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7634 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7635 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7636 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7637 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7638 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7639 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7640 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7641 </para>
7642 <para>
7643 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7644 <!-- f22 -->
7645 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7646 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7647 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7648 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7649 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7650 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7651 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7652 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7653 Questions
7654 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7655 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7656 </para></footnote>
7657 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7658 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7659 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7660 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7661 </para>
7662 <para>
7663 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7664 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7665 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7666 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7667 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7668 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7669 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7670 Internet much more.
7671 </para>
7672 <para>
7673 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7674 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7675 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7676 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7677 </para>
7678 <para>
7679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7680 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7681 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7682 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7683 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7684 </para>
7685 <para>
7686 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7687 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7688 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7689 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7690 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7691 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7692 </para>
7693 <para>
7694 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7695 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7696 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7697 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7698 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7699 constituted, succeed.
7700 </para>
7701 <para>
7702 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7703 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7704 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7705 wrote:
7706 </para>
7707 <blockquote>
7708 <para>
7709 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7710 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7711 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7712 </para>
7713 </blockquote>
7714 <para>
7715 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7716 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7717 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7718 </para>
7719 <blockquote>
7720 <para>
7721 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7723 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7724 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7725 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7726 </para>
7727 </blockquote>
7728 <para>
7729 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7730 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7731 spreading such information an offense.
7732 </para>
7733 <para>
7734 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7735 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7736 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7737 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7738 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7739 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7740 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7741 </para>
7742 <para>
7743 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7744 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7745 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7746 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7747 </para>
7748 <para>
7749 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7750 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7751 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7752 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7753 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7754 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7755 have been a copyright violation.
7756 </para>
7757 <para>
7758 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7759 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7760 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7761 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7762 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7763 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7764 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7766 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7767 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7768 </para>
7769 <para>
7770 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7771 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7772 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7773 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7774 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7775 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7776 </para>
7777 <para>
7778 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7779 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7780 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7781 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7782 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7783 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7784 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7785 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7786 </para>
7787 <blockquote>
7788 <para>
7789 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7790 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7791 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7792 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7793 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7794 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7795 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7796 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7797 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7798 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7799 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7800 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7801 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7802 important.<footnote><para>
7803 <!-- f23 -->
7804 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7805 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7806 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7807 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7808 </para></footnote>
7809 </para>
7810 </blockquote>
7811 <para>
7812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7813 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7814 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7815 the VCR responsible.
7816 </para>
7817 <para>
7818 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7819 the DMCA.
7820 </para>
7821 <para>
7822 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7823 </para>
7824 <para>
7825 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7826 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7827 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7828 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7829 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7830 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7831 </para>
7832 <para>
7833 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7835 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7836 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7837 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7838 and bad uses.
7839 </para>
7840 <figure id="fig-1711">
7841 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7842 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7843 </figure>
7844 <para>
7845 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7846 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7847 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7848 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7849 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7850 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7851 </para>
7852 <para>
7853 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7854 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7855 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7856 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7857 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7858 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7859 </para>
7860 <para>
7861 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7862 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7863 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7864 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7865 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7866 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7867 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7868 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7869 </para>
7870 <para>
7871 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7872 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7873 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7874 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7875 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7876 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7877 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7878 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7879 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7880 </para>
7881 <para>
7882
7883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7884 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7885 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7886 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7887 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7888 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7889 <!-- f24 -->
7890 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7891 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7892 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7893 </para></footnote>
7894 </para>
7895 <para>
7896 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7897 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7898 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7899 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7900 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7901 </para>
7902 <para>
7903 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7904 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7905 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7906 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7907 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7908 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7909 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7910 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7911 </para>
7912 <para>
7913 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7914 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7915 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7916 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7917 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7918 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7919 </para>
7920 </sect2>
7921 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7922 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7923 <para>
7924 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7925 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7926 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7927 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7928 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7929 find better ways
7930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7931 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7932 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7933 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7934 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7935 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7936 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7937 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7938 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7939 control.
7940 </para>
7941 <para>
7942 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7943 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7944 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7945 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7946 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7947 </para>
7948 <para>
7949 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7950 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7951 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7952 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7953 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7954 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7955 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7956 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7957 of the media.
7958 </para>
7959 <para>
7960 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7961 nature.
7962 </para>
7963 <para>
7964 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7965 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7966 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7967 <!-- f25 -->
7968 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7969 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7970 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote> The five
7971 recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7972 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7973 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7974 <!-- f26 -->
7975 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7976 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7977 </para></footnote>
7978 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7979 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7980 <!-- f27 -->
7981 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7982 31 May 2003.
7983 </para></footnote>
7984 </para>
7985 <para>
7986 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7987 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7989 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7990 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7991 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7992 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7993 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7994 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7995 </para>
7996 <para>
7997 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7998 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7999 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8000 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8001 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
8002 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
8003 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8004 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8005 protected&mdash; by the market.
8006 </para>
8007 <para>
8008 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8009 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8010 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8011 </para>
8012 <blockquote>
8013 <para>
8014 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8015 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
8016 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8017 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8018 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8019 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8020 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8021 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8022 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8023 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
8024 <!-- f28 -->
8025 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
8026 2003): 89.
8027 </para></footnote>
8028 </para>
8029 </blockquote>
8030 <para>
8031 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8032 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8033 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8034 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8035 </para>
8036 <figure id="fig-1761">
8037 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
8038 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
8039 </figure>
8040 <para>
8041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8042 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8043 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8044 distribute content?
8045 </para>
8046 <para>
8047 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8048 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8049 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8050 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8051 </para>
8052 <para>
8053 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8054 integration may matter.
8055 </para>
8056 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8057 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8058 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8059 <para>
8060 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
8061 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8062 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8063 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8064 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8065 </para>
8066 <para>
8067 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8068 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8069 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8070 control.<footnote><para>
8071 <!-- f29 -->
8072 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8073 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8074 Missouri,
8075 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8076 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8077 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8078 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8079 </para></footnote>
8080 </para>
8081 <para>
8082
8083 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8084 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
8085 forbade
8086 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
8087 law required a separation between the networks and the content
8088 producers;
8089 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
8090 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8091 television&mdash;75
8092 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
8093 </para>
8094 <para>
8095 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8096 independence.
8097 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8098 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8099 studios;
8100 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8101 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8102 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8103 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
8104 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8105 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
8106 <!-- f30 -->
8107 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8108 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
8109 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8110 Consumers
8111 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8112 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8113 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8114 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
8115 </para></footnote>
8116 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
8117 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8118 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8119 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
8120 number
8121 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8122 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
8123 <!-- f31 -->
8124 Ibid.
8125 </para></footnote>
8126 </para>
8127 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8128 <para>
8129 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8130 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8131 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8132 owned by the network.
8133 </para>
8134 <para>
8135 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8136 ownership
8137 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8138 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8139 </para>
8140 <blockquote>
8141 <para>
8142 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8143 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8144 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8145 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8147 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8148 production
8149 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8150 than a handful.<footnote><para>
8151 <!-- f32 -->
8152 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8153 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8154 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8155 </para></footnote>
8156 </para>
8157 </blockquote>
8158 <para>
8159 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8160 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8161 Increasingly
8162 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8163 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8164 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8165 inside,
8166 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8167 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8168 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8169 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8170 </para>
8171 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8172 <para>
8173 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8174 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8175 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8176 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8177 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8178 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8179 <!-- f33 -->
8180 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8181 National
8182 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8183 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8184 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8185 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8186 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8187 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8188 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
8189 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
8190 </para></footnote>
8191
8192 Lumbering
8193 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8194 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8195 </para>
8196 <para>
8197 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8198 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8199 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8200 measure.
8201 </para>
8202 <para>
8203 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8204 suggest the concern.
8205 </para>
8206 <para>
8207 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8208 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8209 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8210 </para>
8211 <para>
8212 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8213 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8214 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8215
8216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8217 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8218 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8219 collateral
8220 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8221 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8222 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8223 opportunities
8224 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8225 because
8226 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8227 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8228 nations
8229 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8230 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8231 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8232 </para>
8233 <para>
8234 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8235 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8236 depend
8237 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8238 these issues.
8239 </para>
8240 <para>
8241 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8242 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8243 campaign
8244 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8245 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8246 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8247 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8248 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8249 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8250 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8251 the pro-legalization campaign.
8252 </para>
8253 <para>
8254 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8255 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8256 </para>
8257 <para>
8258 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8259 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8260 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8261 drug war. Can you do it?
8262 </para>
8263 <para>
8264 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8266 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8267 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8268 message
8269 will be heard then?
8270 </para>
8271 <para>
8272 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8273 avoiding
8274 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8275 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8276 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8277 Amendment,
8278 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8279 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8280 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8281 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8282 <!-- f34 -->
8283 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
8284 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8285 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8286 policy."
8287 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8288 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8289 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8290 returned
8291 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.
8292 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8293 example,
8294 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8295 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4.
8296 Outside
8297 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8298 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8299 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8300 Advertising
8301 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988):
8302 449&ndash;79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8303 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d
8304 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8305 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8306 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8307 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8308 Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8309 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground was
8310 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8311 </para></footnote>
8312 </para>
8313 <para>
8314 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived in
8315 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8316 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8317 access
8318 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8319 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8320 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8321 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8322 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8323 get to know about.
8324
8325 </para>
8326 </sect2>
8327 <sect2 id="together">
8328 <title>Together</title>
8329 <para>
8330 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8331 copyright
8332 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8333 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8334 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8335 </para>
8336 <para>
8337 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8338 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8339 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8340 cultivate
8341 our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins to seem
8342
8343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8344 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8345 supplement
8346 the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets
8347 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8348 massively
8349 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8350 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8351 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8352 </para>
8353 <para>
8354 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8355 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8356 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8357 our culture today.
8358 </para>
8359 <para>
8360 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8361 notwithstanding.
8362 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8363 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8364 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8365 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8366 adjustment
8367 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8368 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8369 adjustment
8370 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8371 regulation&mdash;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8372 </para>
8373 <para>
8374 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8375 constant
8376 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8377 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8378 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8379 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8380 copyright
8381 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8382 technology
8383 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8384 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8385 response
8386 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8387 market enable.
8388 </para>
8389 <para>
8390 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8391 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8393 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8394 changing
8395 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8396 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8397 development
8398 of our culture than now.
8399 </para>
8400 <para>
8401 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8402 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8403 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8404 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8405 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8406 independent
8407 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8408 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8409 remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny
8410 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a
8411 massive
8412 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8413 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8414 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8415 known.<footnote><para>
8416 <!-- f35 -->
8417 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8418 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8419 </para></footnote>
8420 </para>
8421 <para>
8422 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8423 </para>
8424 <para>
8425 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8426 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8427 distinguished
8428 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8429 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8430 that copyright law has undergone.
8431 In 1790, the law looked like this:
8432 </para>
8433
8434 <table id="t2">
8435 <title></title>
8436 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8437 <thead>
8438 <row>
8439 <entry></entry>
8440 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8441 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8442 </row>
8443 </thead>
8444 <tbody>
8445 <row>
8446 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8447 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8448 <entry>Free</entry>
8449 </row>
8450 <row>
8451 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8452 <entry>Free</entry>
8453 <entry>Free</entry>
8454 </row>
8455 </tbody>
8456 </tgroup>
8457 </table>
8458
8459 <para>
8460 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8461 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8462 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8463
8464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8465 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8466 noncommercial work was also free.
8467 </para>
8468 <para>
8469 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8470 </para>
8471
8472 <table id="t3">
8473 <title></title>
8474 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8475 <thead>
8476 <row>
8477 <entry></entry>
8478 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8479 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8480 </row>
8481 </thead>
8482 <tbody>
8483 <row>
8484 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8485 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8486 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8487 </row>
8488 <row>
8489 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8490 <entry>Free</entry>
8491 <entry>Free</entry>
8492 </row>
8493 </tbody>
8494 </tgroup>
8495 </table>
8496
8497 <para>
8498 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8499 published,
8500 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8501 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8502 transformation were still essentially free.
8503 </para>
8504 <para>
8505 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8506 after
8507 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8508 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8509 expanded.
8510 Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more
8511 common,
8512 we could say the law began to look like this:
8513 </para>
8514
8515 <table id="t4">
8516 <title></title>
8517 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8518 <thead>
8519 <row>
8520 <entry></entry>
8521 <entry>COPY</entry>
8522 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8523 </row>
8524 </thead>
8525 <tbody>
8526 <row>
8527 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8528 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8529 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8530 </row>
8531 <row>
8532 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8533 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8534 <entry>Free</entry>
8535 </row>
8536 </tbody>
8537 </tgroup>
8538 </table>
8539
8540 <para>
8541 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8542 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8543 commercial
8544 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8545 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8546 means that the law now looks like this:
8547 </para>
8548
8549 <table id="t5">
8550 <title></title>
8551 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8552 <thead>
8553 <row>
8554 <entry></entry>
8555 <entry>COPY</entry>
8556 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8557 </row>
8558 </thead>
8559 <tbody>
8560 <row>
8561 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8562 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8563 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8564 </row>
8565 <row>
8566 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8567 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8568 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8569 </row>
8570 </tbody>
8571 </tgroup>
8572 </table>
8573
8574 <para>
8575 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8576 creativity
8577 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&mdash;
8578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8579 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules designed
8580 to regulate commercial publishers.
8581 </para>
8582 <para>
8583 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8584 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8585 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8586 these domains actually does any good.
8587 </para>
8588 <para>
8589 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8590 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8591 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8592 especially,
8593 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8594 reasons
8595 sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8596 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8597 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8598 rights were more sharply restricted.
8599 </para>
8600 <para>
8601 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8602 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8603 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8604 notwithstanding,
8605 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<footnote><para>
8606 <!-- f36 -->
8607 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8608 movement
8609 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8610 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8611 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8612 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
8613 </para></footnote>)
8614 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8615 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8616 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8617 technologies.
8618 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8619 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8620 work. American culture was born free, and for almost 180 years our
8621 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8622 </para>
8623 <para>
8624 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8625 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8626 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8627 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8628 of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8629 concern
8630 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8631 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding
8632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8633 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8634 familiar
8635 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And
8636 granting
8637 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8638 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8639 (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8640 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8641 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8642 </para>
8643 <para>
8644 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8645 response
8646 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8647 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8648 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8649 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8650 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8651 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8652 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8653 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8654 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8655 </para>
8656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8657 </sect2>
8658 </sect1>
8659 </chapter>
8660 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8661 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8662
8663 <para> </para>
8664
8665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8666 <sect1 id="chimera">
8667 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8668 <para>
8669
8670 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8671 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8672 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8673 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8674 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8675 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8676 </para></footnote>
8677 The valley is extraordinarily
8678 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8679 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8680 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8681 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8682 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8683 </para>
8684 <para>
8685 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8686 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8687 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8688 Indeed,
8689 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8690 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8691 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8692 understand,'
8693 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8694 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8695 </para>
8696 <para>
8697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8698 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8699 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8700 affection,
8701 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8702 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8703 description
8704 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8705 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8706 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8707 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8708 understand,
8709 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8710 </para>
8711 <para>
8712 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8713 delighted"
8714 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8715 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8716 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8717 </para>
8718 <para>
8719 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8720 is affected," he reports.
8721 </para>
8722 <para>
8723 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8724 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8725 such a way as to affect his brain."
8726 </para>
8727 <para>
8728 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8729 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8730 and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8731 [the eyes]."
8732 </para>
8733 <para>
8734 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8735 inform
8736 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8737 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8738 believe
8739 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8740 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8741 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8742 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8743 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8744
8745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8746 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8747 certainty
8748 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8749 </para>
8750 <para>
8751 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8752 impossible.
8753 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8754 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8755 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8756 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8757 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8758 </para>
8759 <para>
8760 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8761 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8762 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8763 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8764 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8765 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8766 records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8767 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8768 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8769 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8770 respects,
8771 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8772 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8773 </para>
8774 <para>
8775 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8776 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8777 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8778 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8779 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8780 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8781 allowed
8782 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8783 </para>
8784 <para>
8785 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8786 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8787 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
8788 releases
8789 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
8790 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
8791 </para>
8792 <para>
8793
8794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8795 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8796 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
8797 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8798 something
8799 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
8800 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
8801 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $1,000.
8802 According
8803 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
8804 liable
8805 for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8806 </para>
8807 <para>
8808 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
8809 it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
8810 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
8811 asserts,
8812 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
8813 chimera. What rules should govern it?
8814 </para>
8815 <para>
8816 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8817 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
8818 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
8819 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
8820 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
8821 computer
8822 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
8823 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.<footnote><para>
8824 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8825 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8826 "Copyright
8827 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8828 at
8829 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8830 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8831 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8832 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8833 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8834 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8835 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8836 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8837 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8838 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8839 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8840 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8841 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8842 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8843 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8844 billion
8845 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8846 Elizabeth
8847 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8848 August 2003, available at
8849 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8850 targeting
8851 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8852 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8853 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8854 D3, available at
8855 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8856 </para></footnote>
8857
8858 </para>
8859 <para>
8860 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
8861 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
8862 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8863 copyrighted
8864 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
8865 regulated,
8866 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8867 </para>
8868 <para>
8869 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8870 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8871 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8872 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8873 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8874 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8875 alternative.
8876 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8877 of the two extremes.
8878 </para>
8879 <para>
8880
8881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8882 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8883 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8884 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8885 content
8886 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8887 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8888 innovation
8889 and new creativity will be lost.
8890 </para>
8891 <para>
8892 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8893 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8894 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8895 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8896 innovation
8897 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8898 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8899 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8900 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8901 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8902 material,
8903 </para>
8904 <blockquote>
8905 <para>
8906 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8907 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8908 </para>
8909 <para>
8910 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8911 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8912 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8913 answer
8914 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8915 well produce a totally different industry model.
8916 </para>
8917 <para>
8918 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8919 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8920 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8921 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8922 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8923 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8924 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8925 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8926 interests.<footnote><para>
8927 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8928 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8929 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8930 Protection,
8931 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8932 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8933 EMusic.com),
8934 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8935 Congressional
8936 Testimony File.
8937 </para></footnote>
8938 </para>
8939 </blockquote>
8940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8941 <para>
8942 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8943 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8944 changed.
8945 </para>
8946 <para>
8947 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8948 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8949 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8950 </para>
8951
8952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8953 </sect1>
8954 <sect1 id="harms">
8955 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8956 <para>
8957
8958 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8959 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8960 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8961 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8962 prohibition,
8963 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8964 </para>
8965 <para>
8966 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8967 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8968 extend
8969 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8970 justified?
8971 </para>
8972 <para>
8973 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8974 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8975 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8976 our history.
8977 </para>
8978 <para>
8979 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
8980 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
8981 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8982 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8983 </para>
8984 <para>
8985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8986 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8987 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8988 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8989 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8990 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8991 </para>
8992 <sect2 id="constrain">
8993 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8994 <para>
8995 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8996 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8997 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8998 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8999 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9000 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9001 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9002 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9003 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9004 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9005 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9006 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
9007 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9008 </para>
9009 <para>
9010 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
9011 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9012 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9013 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9014 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
9015 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9016 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9017 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9018 the culture all around.
9019 </para>
9020 <para>
9021 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9022 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9023
9024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9025
9026 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9027 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9028 storytelling extended across the globe.
9029 </para>
9030 <para>
9031 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9032 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9033 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9034 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9035 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9036 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9037 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9038 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9039 work is presumptively illegal.
9040 </para>
9041 <para>
9042 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9043 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9044 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9045 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9046 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9047 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
9048 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9049 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
9050 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9051 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
9052 million.<footnote><para>
9053 <!-- f1. -->
9054 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
9055 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
9056 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9057 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
9058 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
9059 </para></footnote>
9060 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9061 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9062 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9063 suffering.<footnote><para>
9064 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9065 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9066 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9067 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9068 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9069 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9070 available at
9071 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9072 recent months.
9073 </para></footnote>
9074 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9075 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9076 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9077 </para>
9078 <para>
9079 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9080 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
9081 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
9082 creative
9083 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
9084 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
9085 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
9086
9087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9088 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
9089 create,
9090 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
9091 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
9092 begin
9093 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
9094 necessarily
9095 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
9096 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
9097 "illegal
9098 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
9099 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
9100 available
9101 at
9102 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9103 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9104 </para></footnote>
9105 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9106 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9107 critical or reflective.
9108 </para>
9109 <para>
9110 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9111 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
9112 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9113 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9114 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9115 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9116 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9117 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9118 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9119 </para>
9120 <para>
9121 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9122 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9123 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9124 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9125 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9126 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9127 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9128 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9129 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9130 </para>
9131 <para>
9132 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9133 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
9134 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9135 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9136 law regulates such a use.
9137 </para>
9138 <para>
9139
9140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9141 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9142 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9143 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9144 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9145 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9146 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9147 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9148 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9149 </para>
9150 <para>
9151 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9152 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9153 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9154 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9155 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9156 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9157 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9158 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9159 comfort themselves.
9160 </para>
9161 <para>
9162 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9163 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9164 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9165 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9166 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9167 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9168 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9169 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9170 culture that is free.
9171 </para>
9172 <para>
9173 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9174 </para>
9175 <blockquote>
9176 <para>
9177 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9178 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9179 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9180 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9181 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9183 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9184 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9185 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9186 </para>
9187 </blockquote>
9188 </sect2>
9189 <sect2 id="innovators">
9190 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9191 <para>
9192 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9193 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9194 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9195 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9196 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9197 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9198 </para>
9199 <para>
9200 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9201 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9202 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9203 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9204 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9205 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9206 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9207 </para>
9208 <para>
9209 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9210 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9211 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9212 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9213 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9214 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9215 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9216 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9217 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9218 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9219 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9220 </para>
9221 <para>
9222 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9224 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9225 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9226 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9227 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9228 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9229 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9230 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9231 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9232 </para>
9233 <para>
9234 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9235 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9236 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9237 </para>
9238 <para>
9239 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9240 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9241 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9242 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9243 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9244 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9245 </para>
9246 <para>
9247 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9248 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9249 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9250 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9251 Raitt. And so on.
9252 </para>
9253 <para>
9254 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9255 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9256 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9257 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9258 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9259 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9260 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9261 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9262 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9263 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9264 </para>
9265 <para>
9266 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9267 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9268
9269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9270 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9271 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9272 the kind of content the users liked.
9273 </para>
9274 <para>
9275 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9276 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9277 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9278 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9279 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9280 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9281 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9282 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9283 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9284 they had already bought.
9285 </para>
9286 <para>
9287 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9288 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9289 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9290 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9291 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9292 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9293 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9294 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9295 </para>
9296 <para>
9297 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9298 </para>
9299 <para>
9300 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9301 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9302 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9303 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9304 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9305 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9306 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9307 demanded.
9308 </para>
9309 <para>
9310 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9311 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9312 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9313 clients in this
9314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9315 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9316 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9317 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9318 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9319 </para>
9320 <para>
9321 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9322 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9323 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9324 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9325 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9326 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9327 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9328 innovation
9329 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9330 Revolution
9331 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9332 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9333 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9334 Times, 28 May 2001.
9335 </para></footnote>
9336 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9337 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9338 industry
9339 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9340 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9341 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9342 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9343 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9344 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9345 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9346 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9347 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9348 </para>
9349 <blockquote>
9350 <para>
9351 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9352 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9353 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9354 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9355 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9356 forward
9357 for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9358 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote><para>
9359 <!-- f5. --> Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9360 2003, available at
9361 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli
9362 for this example.
9363 </para></footnote>
9364 </para>
9365 </blockquote>
9366 <para>
9367 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9368 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the
9369 law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system that will
9370 obviously
9371 and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard enough to start
9372 a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is constantly
9373 threatened
9374 by litigation.
9375 </para>
9376 <para>
9377
9378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9379 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9380 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9381 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9382 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9383 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9384 imposes,
9385 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9386 conservative
9387 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9388 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9389 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9390 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9391 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9392 </para>
9393 <para>
9394 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9395 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9396 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9397 systematically
9398 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9399 industries
9400 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9401 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9402 competition.
9403 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9404 competition.
9405 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9406 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9407 overregulatedregulated
9408 market.
9409 </para>
9410 <para>
9411 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9412 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9413 burden
9414 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9415 culture
9416 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9417 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9418 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9419 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9420 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9421 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9422 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9423 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9425 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9426 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9427 creativity.
9428 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9429 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9430 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9431 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9432 technology
9433 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9434 </para>
9435 <para>
9436 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9437 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9438 Internet's
9439 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9440 feature
9441 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9442 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9443 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9444 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9445 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9446 </para>
9447 <para>
9448 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9449 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9450 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9451 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9452 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9453 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9454 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9455 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9456 </para></footnote>
9457
9458 Congress
9459 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9460 "broadcast
9461 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9462 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9463 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9464 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9465 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9466 violators
9467 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9468 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9469 </para></footnote>
9470
9471 </para>
9472 <para>
9473 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9474 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9475 regulation
9476 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9477 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9478
9479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9480 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9481 those requirements.
9482 </para>
9483 <para>
9484 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9485 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9486 impose.<footnote><para>
9487 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9488 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9489 </para></footnote>
9490 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9491 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9492 harm than good.
9493 </para>
9494 <para>
9495 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9496 innovation&mdash;again,
9497 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9498 crowd.
9499 </para>
9500 <para>
9501 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9502 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9503 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9504 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9505 </para>
9506 <para>
9507 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9508 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9509 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9510 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9511 2001).
9512 </para></footnote>
9513 overall this history of copyright
9514 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9515 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9516 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9517 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9518 </para>
9519 <para>
9520 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9521 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9522 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9523 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9524 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9525 </para>
9526 <para>
9527 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9528 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9529 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9530 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9531 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9532 copyright
9533 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9534 music
9535 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9536 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9537 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9538 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9539 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9540 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9541 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9542 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9543 </para></footnote>
9544 It has been
9545 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9546 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9547 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9548 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9549 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9550 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9551 August
9552 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9553 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9554 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9555 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9556 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9557 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9558 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9559 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9560 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9561 </para></footnote>
9562 But there is one
9563 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9564 demise
9565 of Internet radio.
9566 </para>
9567 <para>
9568
9569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9570 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9571 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9572 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9573 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9574 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9575 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9576 copyright
9577 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9578 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9579 </para>
9580 <para>
9581 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9582 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9583 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9584 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9585 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9586 Probably
9587 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9588 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9589 efforts
9590 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9591 </para>
9592 <para>
9593 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9594 technology
9595 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9596 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9597 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9598 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9599 regular
9600 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9601 </para>
9602 <para>
9603 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9604 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9605 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9606 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9607 broadcasters
9608 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9609 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9610 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9611 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9612 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9613 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9614 in to this new form of radio.
9615 </para>
9616 <para>
9617
9618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9619 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9620 improvement
9621 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9622 improvement
9623 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9624 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9625 establish
9626 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9627 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9628 </para>
9629 <blockquote>
9630 <para>
9631 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9632 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9633 radio
9634 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9635 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9636 competition
9637 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9638 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9639 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9640 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9641 communications
9642 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9643 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9644 acquire
9645 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9646 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9647 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9648 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9649 </para></footnote>
9650 </para>
9651 </blockquote>
9652 <para>
9653 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9654 Armstrong
9655 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9656 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9657 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9658 </para></footnote>
9659 to
9660 retard
9661 the growth of this competing technology.
9662 </para>
9663 <para>
9664 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9665 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9666 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9667 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9668 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9669 radio?
9670 </para>
9671 <para>
9672 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9673 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9674
9675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9676 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9677 phenomenon
9678 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9679 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9680 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9681 hypothetical
9682 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9683 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9684 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9685 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9686 </para>
9687 <para>
9688 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9689 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed
9690 adfree
9691 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9692 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9693 over $1 million a year.<footnote><para>
9694 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9695 Arbitration
9696 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9697 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9698 (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9699 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9700 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9701 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2,
9702 available at
9703 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9704 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9705 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9706 Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9707 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9708 digital
9709 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9710 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9711 powerful
9712 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9713 </para></footnote>
9714 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9715 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9716 </para>
9717 <para>
9718 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9719 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9720 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9721 </para>
9722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9723 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9724 <listitem><para>
9725 name of the service;
9726 </para></listitem>
9727 <listitem><para>
9728 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9729 </para></listitem>
9730 <listitem><para>
9731 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9732 </para></listitem>
9733 <listitem><para>
9734 date of transmission;
9735 </para></listitem>
9736 <listitem><para>
9737 time of transmission;
9738 </para></listitem>
9739 <listitem><para>
9740 time zone of origination of transmission;
9741 </para></listitem>
9742 <listitem><para>
9743 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9744 </para></listitem>
9745 <listitem><para>
9746 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9747 </para></listitem>
9748 <listitem><para>
9749 sound recording title;
9750 </para></listitem>
9751 <listitem><para>
9752 ISRC code of the recording;
9753 </para></listitem>
9754 <listitem><para>
9755 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9756 </para></listitem>
9757 <listitem><para>
9758 featured recording artist;
9759 </para></listitem>
9760 <listitem><para>
9761 retail album title;
9762 </para></listitem>
9763 <listitem><para>
9764 recording label;
9765 </para></listitem>
9766 <listitem><para>
9767 UPC code of the retail album;
9768 </para></listitem>
9769 <listitem><para>
9770 catalog number;
9771 </para></listitem>
9772 <listitem><para>
9773 copyright owner information;
9774 </para></listitem>
9775 <listitem><para>
9776 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9777 </para></listitem>
9778 <listitem><para>
9779 name of the service or entity;
9780 </para></listitem>
9781 <listitem><para>
9782 channel or program;
9783 </para></listitem>
9784 <listitem><para>
9785 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9786 </para></listitem>
9787 <listitem><para>
9788 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9789 </para></listitem>
9790 <listitem><para>
9791 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9792 </para></listitem>
9793 <listitem><para>
9794 Unique User identifier;
9795 </para></listitem>
9796 <listitem><para>
9797 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9798 </para></listitem>
9799 </orderedlist>
9800
9801 <para>
9802 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9803 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9804 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9805 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9806 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9807 does not.
9808 </para>
9809 <para>
9810 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9811 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9812 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9813 </para>
9814 <para>
9815 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed
9816 obvious
9817 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9818 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9819 </para>
9820 <blockquote>
9821 <para>
9822 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9823 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9824 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9825 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9826 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9827 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9828
9829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9830 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9831 Because
9832 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9833 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9834 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9835 of business. . . ."
9836 </para>
9837 <para>
9838 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9839 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9840 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9841 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9842 </para>
9843 </blockquote>
9844 <para>
9845 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9846 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9847 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9848 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9849 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9850 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9851 effective to prevent it.
9852 </para>
9853 </sect2>
9854 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9855 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9856 <para>
9857 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9858 dinosaurs
9859 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9860 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9861 </para>
9862 <para>
9863 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9864 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9865 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9866 </para>
9867 <para>
9868 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9869 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9870 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9871 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9872 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9873 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9874 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9875 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9876 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9877 </para></footnote>
9878 According to the RIAA,
9879 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9880 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9881
9882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9883 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9884 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9885 increasingly
9886 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9887 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9888 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9889 extreme
9890 response by the other.
9891 </para>
9892 <para>
9893 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9894 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9895 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9896 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9897 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9898 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9899 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9900 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9901 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9902 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9903 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9904 was.<footnote><para>
9905 <!-- f16. --> Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9906 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9907 </para></footnote>
9908 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to
9909 defend
9910 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9911 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9912 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9913 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9914 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9915 they oppose.
9916 </para>
9917 <para>
9918 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9919 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9920 experimented
9921 with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9922 consumption
9923 of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war against
9924 drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent of its
9925 preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition, consumption was
9926 up to 70 percent of the preprohibition level. Americans were drinking
9927 just about as much, but now, a vast number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9928 <!-- f17. --> Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9929 Prohibition,"
9930 American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9931 </para></footnote>
9932 We have
9933
9934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9935 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of
9936 regulated
9937 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9938 <!-- f18. --> National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9939 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9940 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9941 </para></footnote>
9942
9943 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of the
9944 population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9945 majority
9946 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9947 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.<footnote><para>
9948 <!-- f19. --> See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9949 Compliance,"
9950 Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of compliance
9951 literature).
9952 </para></footnote>
9953 We
9954 pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of ordinary
9955 behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a huge
9956 proportion
9957 of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9958 </para>
9959 <para>
9960 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9961 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
9962 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told
9963 a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students
9964 who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and
9965 sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven
9966 cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the
9967 norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to teach them how
9968 to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds
9969 separate,
9970 or honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that
9971 your case is over. Generations of Americans&mdash;more significantly in
9972 some parts of America than in others, but still, everywhere in America
9973 today&mdash;can't live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally"
9974 entails a certain degree of illegality.
9975 </para>
9976 <para>
9977 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9978 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how
9979 to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9980 depends,
9981 in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9982 intended
9983 and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and
9984 collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be changed.
9985 Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much greater than
9986 the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason to consider the
9987 alternative.
9988 </para>
9989 <para>
9990
9991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9992 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9993 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9994 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9995 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9996 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9997 </para>
9998 <para>
9999 My point is instead one that democracies understood for
10000 generations,
10001 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law
10002 depends upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more
10003 repeatedly,
10004 we as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect
10005 the law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10006 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law or
10007 not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether
10008 my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law sow
10009 increasing
10010 disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they impose.
10011 Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10012 introduced
10013 this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to call these
10014 twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
10015 </para>
10016 <para>
10017 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from
10018 the Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10019 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10020 asking
10021 is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be
10022 whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve
10023 the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to
10024 assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three million
10025 Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other ways to
10026 assure that artists get paid without transforming America into a nation
10027 of felons?
10028 </para>
10029 <para>
10030 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10031 </para>
10032 <para>
10033 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These
10034 pieces of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.
10035 The law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10036 copyright
10037 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used
10038
10039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10040 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
10041 recordings is free.
10042 </para>
10043 <para>
10044 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10045 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10046 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
10047 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10048 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
10049 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
10050 capacities of digital technologies.
10051 </para>
10052 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
10053 <para>
10054 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10055 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10056 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10057 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10058 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10059 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10060 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10061 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10062 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10063 </para>
10064 <para>
10065 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
10066 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10067 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10068 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10069 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10070 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10071 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10072 on people's machines.
10073 </para>
10074 <para>
10075 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10076 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10077 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10078 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10079 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10080 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10081
10082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10083 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10084 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10085 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
10086 management" system.
10087 </para>
10088 <para>
10089 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10090 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10091 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10092 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10093 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10094 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10095 freedom to move content easily?
10096 </para>
10097 <para>
10098 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10099 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10100 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10101 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10102 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10103 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10104 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10105 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10106 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10107 </para>
10108 <para>
10109 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10110 turning
10111 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature
10112 of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for
10113 producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today
10114 control the vast majority of the distribution of content in the world,
10115 would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go
10116 the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10117 </para>
10118 <para>
10119 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already
10120 saddled Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against
10121 this new form of competition. For them the choice is between
10122 fortythree
10123 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10124 </para>
10125 <para>
10126 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10127 understandable
10128 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10129
10130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10131 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10132 tradition
10133 as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10134 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10135 important
10136 to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10137 prohibition.
10138 As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann
10139 describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises whenever you turn
10140 a very large percentage of the population into criminals." This is the
10141 collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10142 </para>
10143 <para>
10144 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10145 explains,
10146 </para>
10147 <blockquote>
10148 <para>
10149 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10150 evaporate
10151 to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright infringer,
10152 how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright
10153 infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of your
10154 computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10155 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh,
10156 well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this
10157 campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
10158 percentage
10159 of the American Internet-using population into
10160 "lawbreakers."
10161 </para>
10162 </blockquote>
10163 <para>
10164 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10165 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10166 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10167 </para>
10168 <para>
10169 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the
10170 RIAA launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn
10171 over the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating
10172 copyright law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple
10173 request
10174 to a judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the
10175 identity of an Internet user is revealed.
10176 </para>
10177 <para>
10178
10179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10180 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general
10181 strategy to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10182 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10183 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10184 family's
10185 computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the
10186 family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop the
10187 RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10188 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10189 <!-- f20. --> See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10190 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10191 Washington
10192 Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
10193 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
10194 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being
10195 Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson Graham,
10196 "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September 2003, 4D;
10197 John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either,"
10198 New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a
10199 Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
10200 </para></footnote>
10201
10202 </para>
10203 <para>
10204 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10205 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10206 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10207 <!-- f21. --> See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry
10208 Discloses
10209 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10210 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10211 </para></footnote>
10212 Using a sophisticated
10213 hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a fingerprint of
10214 every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those MP3s will
10215 have the same "fingerprint."
10216 </para>
10217 <para>
10218 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10219 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just like the
10220 cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does
10221 your daughter, where these songs came from. But she copies these
10222 songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to college and
10223 connects it to a college network, and if the college network is
10224 "cooperating"
10225 with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't properly protected
10226 her content from the network (do you know how to do that yourself ?),
10227 then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as a "criminal."
10228 And under the rules that universities are beginning to deploy,<footnote><para>
10229 <!-- f22. --> See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent," Boston
10230 Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four Students Sued
10231 over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at Colleges,"
10232 Washington
10233 Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix,
10234 Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science Monitor, 2 September 2003,
10235 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to
10236 Loyola;
10237 Two Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible," Chicago
10238 Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy Guns on
10239 Universities," Internet News, 30 January 2003, available at
10240 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #48</ulink>; Benny
10241 Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman Orientation This Fall to
10242 Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing," San Francisco
10243 Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters Are Weapons at
10244 Universities,"
10245 USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10246 </para></footnote>
10247 your
10248 daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer network.
10249 She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10250 </para>
10251 <para>
10252 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10253 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead
10254 that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that
10255 they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes
10256 her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat this
10257 "contraband"
10258 as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students
10259
10260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10261 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10262 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10263 Says von Lohmann,
10264 </para>
10265 <blockquote>
10266 <para>
10267 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10268 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10269 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10270 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog
10271 where you could randomly choose any person off the street and be
10272 confident that they were committing an unlawful act that could
10273 put them on the hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of
10274 millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but
10275 speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit
10276 civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
10277 closest
10278 analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has
10279 eroded all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many
10280 Americans
10281 as criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing
10282 is an order of magnitude larger number of Americans than drug
10283 use. . . . If forty to sixty million Americans have become
10284 lawbreakers,
10285 then we're really on a slippery slope to lose a lot of civil
10286 liberties for all forty to sixty million of them.
10287 </para>
10288 </blockquote>
10289 <para>
10290 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals"
10291 under the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10292 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being considered
10293 "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is
10294 American,
10295 a constant war on our own people or a concerted effort through
10296 our democracy to change our law?
10297 </para>
10298
10299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10300 </sect2>
10301 </sect1>
10302 </chapter>
10303 <chapter id="c-balances">
10304 <title>BALANCES</title>
10305
10306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10307 <para>
10308 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10309 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10310 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10311 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10312 </para>
10313 <para>
10314 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10315 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to stop&mdash;or
10316 before
10317 she understands just why she should stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air.
10318 The gasoline is about to hit the blazing car. And the fire that gasoline
10319 will ignite is about to ignite everything around.
10320 </para>
10321 <para>
10322 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on the
10323 wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10324 businesses.
10325 No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies change.
10326 The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use technology
10327 to protect themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This
10328 is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10329 </para>
10330 <para>
10331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10332 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10333 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to eliminate
10334 the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is not the real
10335 threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small fire in the
10336 corner,
10337 there is a massive change in the way culture is made that is
10338 happening
10339 all around.
10340 </para>
10341 <para>
10342 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more
10343 important
10344 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to
10345 avoid pouring gasoline onto this fire.
10346 </para>
10347 <para>
10348 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a
10349 simpler,
10350 binary view. However much many people push to frame this
10351 debate
10352 more broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We
10353 rubberneck to look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on
10354 the road.
10355 </para>
10356 <para>
10357 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10358 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small brace
10359 of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this debate. We must
10360 understand these failures if we're to understand what success will
10361 require.
10362 </para>
10363
10364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10365 <sect1 id="eldred">
10366 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10367 <para>
10368
10369 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
10370 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least
10371 one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10372 programmer
10373 living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10374 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10375 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10376 come alive.
10377 </para>
10378 <para>
10379 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10380 Hawthorne
10381 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave
10382 birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a
10383 library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10384 them available for free.
10385 </para>
10386 <para>
10387 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10388 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10389 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10390 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10391 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10393 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne,
10394 and many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10395 accessible&mdash;today.
10396 </para>
10397 <para>
10398 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the
10399 same source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10400 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10401 permission
10402 of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10403 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10404 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10405 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10406 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10407 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10408 commercial
10409 publications of public domain works.
10410 </para>
10411 <para>
10412 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications
10413 of public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are
10414 literally
10415 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world
10416 have discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share
10417 works that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we
10418 might call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10419 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10420 social
10421 causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10422 individuals
10423 and groups dedicated to spreading culture generally.<footnote><para>
10424 <!-- f1. --> There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
10425 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world
10426 of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who were distributing porn
10427 but were not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.
10428 Such a class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the
10429 costs of distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors
10430 got special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down
10431 the Communications Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the
10432 burden on noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed
10433 Congress's power. The same point could have been made about
10434 noncommercial
10435 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10436 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at
10437 least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect
10438 noncommercial
10439 pornographers.
10440 </para></footnote>
10441
10442 </para>
10443 <para>
10444 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10445 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10446 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10447 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10448 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10449 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10450 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10451 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10452 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10453 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10454 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10455 </para>
10456 <para>
10457
10458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10459 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10460 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10461 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10462 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10463 <!-- f2. -->
10464 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10465 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10466 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10467 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10468 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10469 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10470 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10471 </para></footnote>
10472
10473 </para>
10474 <para>
10475 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10476 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10477 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10478 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10479 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10480 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10481 to undertake.
10482 </para>
10483 <para>
10484 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10485 constitutional
10486 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10487 interpretation.
10488 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10489 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10490 importantly
10491 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10492 </para>
10493 <blockquote>
10494 <para>
10495 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10496 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10497 their . . . Writings. . . .
10498 </para>
10499 </blockquote>
10500 <para>
10501 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10502 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10503 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10504 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10505 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10506 specific&mdash;to
10507 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10508 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10509 </para>
10510 <para>
10511 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10512 extending
10513 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10514 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10515 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10516 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10517 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10518 Congress
10519 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10520 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10521 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10522 </para>
10523 <para>
10524 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10525 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10526 consideration
10527 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10528 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10529 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10530 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10531 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10532 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10533 keep this gravy train going.
10534 </para>
10535 <para>
10536 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10537 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10538 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10539 beneficiaries
10540 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10541 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10542 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10543 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10544 </para>
10545 <para>
10546 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10547 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10548 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10549 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10550 continues
10551 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10552 benefits
10553 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10554 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10555 by anyone for free.
10556 </para>
10557 <para>
10558 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10559 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10560 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10561 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10562 report:
10563 </para>
10564 <para>
10565 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10566
10567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10568 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10569 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10570 those works.
10571 </para>
10572 <para>
10573 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10574 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10575 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10576 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10577 </para>
10578 <para>
10579 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10580 about it?"
10581 </para>
10582 <para>
10583 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10584 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10585 they support the bill."
10586 </para>
10587 <para>
10588 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10589 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10590 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10591 much is it worth?"
10592 </para>
10593 <para>
10594 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10595 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10596 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10597 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10598 </para>
10599 <para>
10600 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10601 correct conclusion:
10602 </para>
10603 <para>
10604 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10605 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10606 contributions
10607 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10608 </para>
10609 <para>
10610 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10611 contribute
10612 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10613 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10614 </para>
10615 <para>
10616 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10617 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10618 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10619 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10621 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10622 copyrights
10623 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10624 the copyright term extended.
10625 </para>
10626 <para>
10627 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10628 legislation
10629 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10630 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10631 </para>
10632 <para>
10633 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10634 Copyright
10635 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10636 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10637 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10638 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10639 contributions.<footnote><para>
10640 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10641 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10642 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10643 </para></footnote>
10644 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10645 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10646 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10647 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10648 Age," available at
10649 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10650 </para></footnote>
10651 Disney is estimated to have
10652 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10653 cycle.<footnote><para>
10654 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10655 Congressional
10656 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10657 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10658 </para></footnote>
10659
10660 </para>
10661 <para>
10662 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10663 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10664 reality
10665 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10666 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10667 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10668 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10669 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10670 "limited."
10671 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10672 and again.
10673 </para>
10674 <para>
10675 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10676 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10677 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10678 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10679 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10680 scholars,
10681 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10682
10683 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10684 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10685 guns near schools.
10686 </para>
10687 <para>
10688 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10689 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10690 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10691 "interstate
10692 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10693 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10694 interstate
10695 commerce.
10696 </para>
10697 <para>
10698 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10699 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10700 activity,
10701 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10702 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10703 interpreted
10704 to impose no limit.
10705 </para>
10706 <para>
10707 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10708 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10709 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10710 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10711 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10712 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10713 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10714 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10715 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10716 government
10717 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10718 </para>
10719 <para>
10720 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10721 arguments,"
10722 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10723 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10724 </para></footnote>
10725 If anything Congress says is interstate
10726 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10727 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10728 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10729 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10730 </para></footnote>
10731
10732 </para>
10733 <para>
10734 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10735 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10736 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10737 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10738 context
10739 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10740 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10741 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10742 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10743 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10744 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10745 </para></footnote>
10746 And if it is applied to the
10747 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10748 Congress
10749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10750 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10751 existing
10752 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10753 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10754 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10755 copyrights
10756 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10757 existing copyrights.
10758 </para>
10759 <para>
10760 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10761 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10762 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10763 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10764 rejected
10765 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10766 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10767 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10768 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10769 boring.
10770 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10771 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10772 </para>
10773 <para>
10774 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10775 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10776 Constitution's
10777 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10778 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10779 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10780 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10781 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10782 already
10783 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10784 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10785 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10786 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10787 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10788 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10789 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10790 </para>
10791 <para>
10792 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10793
10794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10795 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10796 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10797 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10798 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10799 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10800 </para></footnote>
10801 But
10802 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10803 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10804 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10805 </para>
10806 <para>
10807 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10808 copyright
10809 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10810 influence
10811 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10812 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10813 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10814 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10815 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10816 bought to extend them again.
10817 </para>
10818 <para>
10819 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10820 extended.
10821 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10822 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10823 society
10824 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10825 Disney's.
10826 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10827 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10828 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10829 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10830 exploited,
10831 and no longer available as a result.
10832 </para>
10833 <para>
10834 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10835 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10836 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10837 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10838 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10839 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10840 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10841 Congressional
10842 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10843 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10844 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10845 </para></footnote>
10846
10847 </para>
10848 <para>
10849 Think practically about the consequence of this
10850 extension&mdash;practically,
10851 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10852
10853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10854 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10855 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10856 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10857 remaining
10858 9,873. What would you have to do?
10859 </para>
10860 <para>
10861 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10862 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10863 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10864 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10865 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10866 list of books still under copyright.
10867 </para>
10868 <para>
10869 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10870 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10871 </para>
10872 <para>
10873 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10874 owners
10875 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10876 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10877 being at least a list?
10878 </para>
10879 <para>
10880 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10881 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10882 practically
10883 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10884 thousands
10885 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10886 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10887 </para>
10888 <para>
10889 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10890 apologists
10891 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10892 owners?"
10893 </para>
10894 <para>
10895 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10896 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10897 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10898 suggesting
10899 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10900 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10901 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10902 </para>
10903 <para>
10904 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10905 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10906 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10907
10908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10909 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10910 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10911 happen
10912 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10913 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10914 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10915 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10916 know quite well who owns what property.
10917 </para>
10918 <para>
10919 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10920 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10921 already
10922 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10923 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10924 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10925 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10926 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10927 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10928 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10929 </para>
10930 <para>
10931 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10932 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10933 consequence
10934 for other creative works is much more dire.
10935 </para>
10936 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10937 <para>
10938 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10939 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10940 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10941 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10942 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10943 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10944 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10945 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10946 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10947 films."<footnote><para>
10948 <!-- f11. -->
10949 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10950 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10951 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10952 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10953 </para></footnote>
10954
10955 </para>
10956 <para>
10957 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10958 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10959 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10960 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10961 </para>
10962 <para>
10963 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10964
10965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10966 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10967 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10968 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10969 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10970 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10971 work available for distribution.
10972 </para>
10973 <para>
10974 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10975 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10976 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10977 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10978 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10979 mm film.<footnote><para>
10980 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10981 Supporting
10982 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10983 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10984 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10985 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10986 </para></footnote>
10987
10988 </para>
10989 <para>
10990 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10991 important.
10992 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10993 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10994 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10995 locate the copyright owner.
10996 </para>
10997 <para>
10998 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10999 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
11000 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
11001 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
11002 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
11003 exceptionally
11004 high.
11005 </para>
11006 <para>
11007 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11008 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
11009 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11010 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11011 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11012 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11013 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11014 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11015 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11016 </para>
11017 <para>
11018 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11019
11020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11021 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11022 benefit
11023 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11024 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11025 the copyright expires.
11026 </para>
11027 <para>
11028 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11029 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11030 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11031 canisters
11032 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11033 than dust.
11034 </para>
11035 <para>
11036 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
11037 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
11038 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
11039 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
11040 creative
11041 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
11042 free expression."
11043 </para>
11044 <para>
11045 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11046 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11047 indicated,
11048 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11049 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11050 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11051 distributors,
11052 the commercial life ends.
11053 </para>
11054 <para>
11055 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11056 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
11057 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11058 between
11059 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11060 Friday
11061 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11062 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
11063 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11064 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11065 have, we need to have access to this history.
11066 </para>
11067 <para>
11068 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11069
11070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11071 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11072 this context do no good.
11073 </para>
11074 <para>
11075 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11076 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11077 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
11078 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
11079 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used book
11080 store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the copyright
11081 owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its commercial
11082 life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
11083 </para>
11084 <para>
11085 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11086 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were so high, it
11087 was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains of
11088 a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
11089 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the
11090 end of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
11091 </para>
11092 <para>
11093 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11094 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11095 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11096 would not have interfered with anything.
11097 </para>
11098 <para>
11099 But this situation has now changed.
11100 </para>
11101 <para>
11102 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11103 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11104 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11105 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11106 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once
11107 a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it and make it
11108 available
11109 to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give new life to
11110 copyrighted
11111 material after it passes out of its commercial life. It is now
11112 possible to preserve and assure universal access to this knowledge and
11113 culture, whereas before it was not.
11114 </para>
11115 <para>
11116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11117 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of
11118 producing
11119 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
11120 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11121 permission
11122 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other
11123 aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these
11124 things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want
11125 to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
11126 radically
11127 different context.
11128 </para>
11129 <para>
11130 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms:
11131 Now that technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria,
11132 the law gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11133 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
11134 commercial
11135 market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about culture
11136 after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright is
11137 serving
11138 no purpose at all related to the spread of knowledge. In this
11139 context,
11140 copyright is not an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11141 </para>
11142 <para>
11143 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11144 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11145 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11146 culture widely?"
11147 </para>
11148 <para>
11149 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest
11150 that publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11151 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11152 eliminate
11153 the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a
11154 library
11155 is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you think the
11156 role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its role is to archive
11157 culture, whether there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture
11158 or not&mdash;then we can't count on the commercial market to do our
11159 library
11160 work for us.
11161 </para>
11162 <para>
11163 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11164 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11165 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11166 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11167
11168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11169 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11170 culture,
11171 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11172 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11173 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure to
11174 provide that value.<footnote><para>
11175 <!-- f13. --> Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
11176 December
11177 2002, available at
11178 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11179 </para></footnote>
11180
11181 </para>
11182 <para>
11183 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in
11184 federal
11185 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11186 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11187 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11188 violated
11189 the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11190 extending
11191 terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11192 </para>
11193 <para>
11194 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11195 argument.
11196 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11197 dismissed
11198 our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11199 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11200 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11201 </para>
11202 <para>
11203 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11204 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11205 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11206 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11207 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11208 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to
11209 interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11210 interpretation,
11211 Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11212 power to extend existing terms.
11213 </para>
11214 <para>
11215 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11216 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11217 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11218 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11219 </para>
11220 <para>
11221 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11222 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11223
11224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11225 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11226 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11227 overstepped
11228 its bounds.
11229 </para>
11230 <para>
11231 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11232 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11233 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11234 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11235 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11236 </para>
11237 <para>
11238 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11239 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11240 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11241 briefs and preparing for argument.
11242 </para>
11243 <para>
11244 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
11245 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we
11246 lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just the
11247 minimum,
11248 you probably think there was no way this case could have been
11249 won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by
11250 well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11251 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11252 significant
11253 to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11254 </para>
11255 <para>
11256 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11257 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11258 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11259 mistake lost it.
11260 </para>
11261 <para>
11262 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the
11263 very end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11264 extraordinary
11265 lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had moved
11266 to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11268 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11269 ignored
11270 this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11271 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11272 </para>
11273 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11274 <para>
11275 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11276 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11277 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11278 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11279 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11280 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11281 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11282 most powerful media companies in the world."
11283 </para>
11284 <para>
11285 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11286 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11287 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11288 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11289 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11290 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11291 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11292 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11293 interpretation
11294 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11295 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11296 unconstitutional,
11297 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11298 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11299 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11300 Constitution,
11301 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11302 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11303 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11304 </para>
11305 <para>
11306 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11307 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11308 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11309 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11310 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11311 why it was unconstitutional.
11312 </para>
11313 <para>
11314 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11315
11316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11317 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11318 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11319 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11320 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11321 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11322 minority.
11323 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11324 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11325 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11326 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11327 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11328 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11329 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11330 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11331 </para>
11332 <para>
11333 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11334 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11335 beginning.
11336 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11337 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11338 Republican
11339 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11340 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11341 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11342 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11343 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11344 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11345 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11346 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11347 </para>
11348 <para>
11349 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11350 supporting
11351 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11352 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11353 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11354 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11355 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11356 </para>
11357 <para>
11358 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11359 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11360
11361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11362 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11363 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11364 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11365 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11366 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11367 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11368 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11369 </para>
11370 <para>
11371 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11372 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11373 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11374 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11375 </para>
11376 <para>
11377 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11378 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11379 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11380 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11381 clear.
11382 </para>
11383 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11384 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11385 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11386 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11387 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11388 <para>
11389 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11390 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11391 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11392 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11393 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11394 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11395 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11396 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11397 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11398 </para>
11399 <para>
11400 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11401 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11402 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11403 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11404 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11405 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11406 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11407 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11408
11409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11410 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11411 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11412 </para>
11413 <para>
11414 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11415 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11416 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11417 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11418 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11419 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11420 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11421 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11422 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11423 confidence in our argument.
11424 </para>
11425 <para>
11426 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11427 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11428 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11429 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11430 copyright holders.
11431 </para>
11432 <para>
11433 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11434 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11435 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11436 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11437 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11438 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11439 wanted to control.
11440 </para>
11441 <para>
11442 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11443 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11444 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11445 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11446 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11447 pornography."<footnote><para>
11448 <!-- f14. -->
11449 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11450 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11451 </para></footnote>
11452 That was also the motive of
11453 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11454 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11455 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11456 <!-- f15. -->
11457 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11458 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11459 </para></footnote>
11460 That's
11461
11462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11463 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11464 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11465 </para>
11466 <para>
11467 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11468 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11469 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11470 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11471 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11472 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11473 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11474 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11475 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11476 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11477 </para>
11478 <para>
11479 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11480 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11481 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11482 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11483 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11484 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11485 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11486 </para>
11487 <para>
11488 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11489 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11490 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11491 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11492 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11493 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11494 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11495 powers had limits.
11496 </para>
11497 <para>
11498 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11499 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
11500 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that the
11501 Constitution
11502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11503 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to
11504 implement
11505 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the
11506 Court's role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11507 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11508 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11509 </para>
11510 <para>
11511 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11512 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11513 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11514 context
11515 of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11516 excellent
11517 and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11518 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11519 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11520 context
11521 to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
11522 </para>
11523 <para>
11524 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also
11525 viewed as unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter
11526 strongly favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both
11527 were also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11528 believed,
11529 there was a very important free speech argument against these
11530 retrospective extensions.
11531 </para>
11532 <para>
11533 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11534 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11535 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11536 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11537 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11538 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11539 </para>
11540 <para>
11541 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11542 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11543 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11544 overriding
11545 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11546 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11547 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11548 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11549 </para>
11550 <para>
11551 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11552 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11553
11554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11555 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11556 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11557 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11558 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11559 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11560 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11561 copyright be limited.
11562 </para>
11563 <para>
11564 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11565 Congress
11566 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11567 government
11568 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11569 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11570 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11571 </para>
11572 <para>
11573 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11574 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11575 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11576 existing
11577 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11578 </para>
11579 <para>
11580 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11581 extended
11582 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11583 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11584 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11585 existing
11586 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11587 restraint
11588 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11589 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11590 hesitated
11591 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11592 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11593 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11594 arrived
11595 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11596 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11597
11598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11599 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11600 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11601 </para>
11602 <para>
11603 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11604 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11605 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11606 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11607 Congress
11608 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11609 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11610 this central idea.
11611 </para>
11612 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11613 <para>
11614 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11615 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11616 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11617 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11618 </para>
11619 <para>
11620 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11621 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11622 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11623 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11624 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11625 </para>
11626 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11627 <para>
11628 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11629 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11630 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11631 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11632 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11633 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11634 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11635 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11636 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11637 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11638 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11639
11640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11641 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11642 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11643 </para>
11644 <para>
11645 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11646 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11647 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11648 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11649 congressmen
11650 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11651 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11652 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11653 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11654 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11655 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11656 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11657 family of the Justices.
11658 </para>
11659 <para>
11660 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11661 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11662 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11663 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11664 </para>
11665 <para>
11666 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11667 The history was bothering her.
11668 </para>
11669 <blockquote>
11670 <para>
11671 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11672 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11673 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11674 practice that began with the very first act.
11675 </para>
11676 </blockquote>
11677 <para>
11678 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11679 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11680 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11681 </para>
11682 <blockquote>
11683 <para>
11684 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11685 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11686 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11687 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11688 is yes.
11689 </para>
11690 </blockquote>
11691 <para>
11692 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11693 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11694 Kennedy, who observed,
11695 </para>
11696 <blockquote>
11697 <para>
11698 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11699 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11700 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11701 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11702 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11703 </para>
11704 </blockquote>
11705 <para>
11706 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11707 student,
11708 I answered,
11709 </para>
11710 <blockquote>
11711 <para>
11712 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11713 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11714 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11715 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11716 effectively
11717 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11718 </para>
11719 </blockquote>
11720 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11721 <para>
11722 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11723 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11724 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11725 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11726 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11727 </para>
11728 <para>
11729 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11730 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11731 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11732 </para>
11733 <para>
11734 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11735 sympathetic.
11736 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11737
11738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11739 </para>
11740 <blockquote>
11741 <para>
11742 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11743 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11744 </para>
11745 <para>
11746 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11747 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11748 domain
11749 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11750 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11751 into the Copyright Clause.
11752 </para>
11753 </blockquote>
11754 <para>
11755 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11756 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11757 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11758 </para>
11759 <blockquote>
11760 <para>
11761 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11762 unlimited
11763 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11764 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11765 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11766 an unlimited time.
11767 </para>
11768 </blockquote>
11769 <para>
11770 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11771 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11772 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11773 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11774 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11775 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11776 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11777 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11778 specific
11779 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11780 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11781 </para>
11782 <para>
11783 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11784 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11785
11786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11787 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11788 optimistic.
11789 </para>
11790 <para>
11791 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11792 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11793 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11794 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11795 believed
11796 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11797 Copyright
11798 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11799 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11800 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11801 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11802 Copyright
11803 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11804 believe
11805 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11806 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11807 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11808 </para>
11809 <para>
11810 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11811 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11812 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11813 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11814 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11815 </para>
11816 <para>
11817 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11818 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11819 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11820 </para>
11821 <para>
11822 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11823 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11824 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11825 </para>
11826 <para>
11827 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11828 distinguish
11829 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11830 argument
11831 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11832 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11833 in the Court's opinion.
11834 </para>
11835 <para>
11836
11837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11838 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11839 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11840 generally,
11841 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11842 </para>
11843 <para>
11844 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11845 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11846 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11847 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11848 </para>
11849 <para>
11850 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11851 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11852 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11853 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11854 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11855 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11856 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11857 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11858 would not.
11859 </para>
11860 <para>
11861 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers'
11862 values
11863 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent five&mdash;get to
11864 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the
11865 values
11866 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that
11867 I said I hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue
11868 here was important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I
11869 might hate a system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional
11870 values that it will respect, that is the system we have.
11871 </para>
11872 <para>
11873 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11874 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
11875 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension
11876 of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had
11877 governed
11878 in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court
11879 discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the very same words
11880 in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally different things
11881 depending
11882 upon whether the words were about patents or copyrights.
11883 The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11884 </para>
11885 <para>
11886
11887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11888 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11889 written,
11890 was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11891 copyrights
11892 has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said
11893 that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8 percent of
11894 the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the
11895 actual
11896 number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the
11897 point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and
11898 the existing term was so long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was
11899 unconstitutional.
11900 </para>
11901 <para>
11902 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11903 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11904 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11905 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11906 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11907 </para>
11908 <para>
11909 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11910 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11911 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11912 </para>
11913 <para>
11914 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11915 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11916 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11917 argument,
11918 I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having tried
11919 to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of integrity.
11920 These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the proper mode
11921 of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to first understand
11922 the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light of the structure
11923 of the Constitution. That method had produced Lopez and many other
11924 "originalist" rulings. Where was their "originalism" now?
11925 </para>
11926 <para>
11927 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11928 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11929 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11930 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11931
11932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11933 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11934 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11935 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11936 apply
11937 to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11938 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that they
11939 liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their own
11940 principles.
11941 </para>
11942 <para>
11943 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11944 myself.
11945 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11946 the law as it is.
11947 </para>
11948 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11949 <para>
11950 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11951 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11952 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11953 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11954 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11955 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11956 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11957 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11958 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11959 </para>
11960 <para>
11961 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11962 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11963 conversation
11964 in different directions, where the truth about the harm that
11965 this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to this
11966 Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically,
11967 corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown
11968 the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the
11969 question
11970 to make the logical point. I had shown them how they could strike
11971 this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a hundred places
11972 where I could have helped them want to, yet my stubbornness, my
11973 refusal
11974 to give in, stopped me. I have stood before hundreds of audiences
11975 trying to persuade; I have used passion in that effort to persuade; but I
11976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11977 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11978 passion
11979 I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court should
11980 decide the issue.
11981 </para>
11982 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11983 <para>
11984 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11985 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11986 Kathleen Sullivan?
11987 </para>
11988 <para>
11989 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11990 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11991 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11992 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11993 </para>
11994 <para>
11995 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11996 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11997 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11998 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11999 have persuaded.
12000 </para>
12001 <para>
12002 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12003 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12004 intellectual
12005 property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case was
12006 a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
12007 not be raised until it is.
12008 </para>
12009 <para>
12010 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12011 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12012 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12013 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12014 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12015 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12016 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
12017 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
12018 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
12019 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
12020 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
12021
12022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12023 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12024 skeptical
12025 of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good thing,
12026 even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was attacked,
12027 it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful law. The New
12028 York Times wrote in its editorial,
12029 </para>
12030 <blockquote>
12031 <para>
12032 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12033 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12034 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand
12035 experiment,
12036 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw
12037 freely on the entire creative output of humanity is one of the
12038 reasons
12039 we live in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12040 </para>
12041 </blockquote>
12042 <para>
12043 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12044 hilarious
12045 images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view
12046 of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page. The
12047 "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch in the face felt
12048 exactly like that.
12049 </para>
12050 <para>
12051 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12052 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
12053 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
12054 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in
12055 our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12056 fathered,
12057 the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12058 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12059 </para>
12060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12061 </sect1>
12062 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
12063 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
12064 <para>
12065 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
12066 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
12067 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
12068 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
12069 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
12070 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
12071 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
12072 </para>
12073 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
12074 <para>
12075 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12076 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12077 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12078 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12079 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12080 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12081 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12082 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12083 </para>
12084 <para>
12085 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12086 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12088 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12089 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12090 the work passed into the public domain.
12091 </para>
12092 <para>
12093 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12094 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12095 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12096 </para>
12097 <para>
12098 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12099 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
12100 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12101 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12102 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12103 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
12104 everything else, let the content go.
12105 </para>
12106 <para>
12107 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes
12108 endorsed
12109 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12110 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people
12111 can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican
12112 might say, here government regulation is simply getting in the way of
12113 innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the
12114 government is blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no
12115 good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference between Democrats
12116 and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm
12117 of the present system.
12118 </para>
12119 <para>
12120 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12121 requirement.
12122 For one of the hardest things about the current system for
12123 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to
12124 look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not
12125 required,
12126 since marking content is not required, since no formality at all
12127 is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask
12128 permission to use or license their work. This system would lower these
12129 costs, by establishing at least one registry where copyright owners
12130 could be identified.
12131 </para>
12132 <para>
12133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12134 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
12135 removed
12136 in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by
12137 abandoning
12138 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12139 <!-- f1. --> Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12140 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12141 formalities
12142 such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
12143 author's
12144 claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act, every text
12145 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
12146 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any
12147 formality."
12148 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article
12149 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue
12150 to impose some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as
12151 a condition of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of
12152 copies of works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12153 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12154 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12155 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12156 anonymous
12157 or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual
12158 Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation Press, 2001),
12159 153&ndash;54.
12160 </para></footnote>
12161 The
12162 Europeans
12163 are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
12164 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12165 tradition
12166 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were
12167 to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the
12168 dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not
12169 upon the special favor of the government.
12170 </para>
12171 <para>
12172 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12173 absurd
12174 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a
12175 world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12176 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12177 know what's protected and what's not.
12178 </para>
12179 <para>
12180 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin
12181 in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12182 Convention
12183 in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as
12184 the abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated
12185 because
12186 the stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was
12187 as if a Charles Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the
12188 failure
12189 to dot an i or cross a t resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12190 </para>
12191 <para>
12192 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12193 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
12194 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
12195 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities
12196 totally,
12197 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more
12198 equitable
12199 system of registration.
12200 </para>
12201 <para>
12202 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12203 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12204 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12205 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12206 burden
12207 imposed upon creators.
12208 </para>
12209 <para>
12210 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12211 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12212
12213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12214 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table,
12215 his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the
12216 government.
12217 He has a property right over the table "naturally," and he can
12218 assert that right against anyone who would steal the table, whether or
12219 not he has informed the government of his ownership of the table.
12220 </para>
12221 <para>
12222 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For
12223 the argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12224 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12225 formalities
12226 turns upon the special problems that creative property
12227 presents.
12228 The law of formalities responds to the special physics of creative
12229 property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
12230 </para>
12231 <para>
12232 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12233 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is
12234 to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just
12235 because you must register the car with the state and tag it with a
12236 license.
12237 In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important
12238 reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes the markets more
12239 efficient and because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without
12240 a registration system for land, landowners would perpetually have to
12241 guard their property. With registration, they can simply point the
12242 police
12243 to a deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would
12244 be much easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden
12245 to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but
12246 those burdens produce a much better system of protection for property
12247 generally.
12248 </para>
12249 <para>
12250 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12251 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12252 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12253 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12254 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12255 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12256 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12257 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12258
12259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12260 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12261 take their place.
12262 </para>
12263 <para>
12264 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12265 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12266 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12267 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12268 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12269 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12270 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12271 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12272 </para>
12273 <para>
12274 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12275 inability
12276 to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a
12277 huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12278 library
12279 can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12280 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the copyright
12281 system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been seen before
12282 because there are no formalities.
12283 </para>
12284 <para>
12285 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12286 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12287 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12288 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12289 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12290 </para>
12291 <para>
12292 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12293 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12294 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12295 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12296 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12297 </para>
12298 <para>
12299 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12300 registering
12301 the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the hassle
12302 worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with registration?
12303 </para>
12304 <para>
12305 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12306 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12307 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12308
12309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12310 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12311 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12312 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12313 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12314 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12315 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12316 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12317 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12318 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12319 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12320 </para>
12321 <para>
12322 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12323 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12324 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12325 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12326 </para>
12327 <para>
12328 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12329 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12330 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12331 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12332 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12333 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12334 something good might happen here.
12335 </para>
12336 <para>
12337 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12338 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12339 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12340 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12341 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12342 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12343 </para>
12344 <para>
12345 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12346 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12347 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12349 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12350 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12351 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12352 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12353 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12354 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12355 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12356 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12357 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12358 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12359 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12360 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12361 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12362 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12363 film is a valid derivative use.
12364 </para>
12365 <para>
12366 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12367 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12368 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12369 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12370 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12371 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12372 </para>
12373 <para>
12374 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12375 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12376 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12377 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12378 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12379 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12380 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12381 threat.
12382 </para>
12383 <para>
12384 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12385 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12386 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12387 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12388 sense?
12389 </para>
12390 <para>
12391
12392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12393 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12394 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12395 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12396 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12397 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12398 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12399 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12400 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12401 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12402 </para>
12403 <para>
12404 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12405 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12406 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12407 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12408 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12409 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12410 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12411 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12412 </para>
12413 <para>
12414 What does this industry really want?
12415 </para>
12416 <para>
12417 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12418 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12419 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12420 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12421 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12422 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12423 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12424 permission first.
12425 </para>
12426 <para>
12427 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12428 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12429 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12430 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12431 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12432 </para>
12433 <para>
12434 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12435 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12436
12437 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12438 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12439 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12440 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12441 and to share its own creation.
12442 </para>
12443 <para>
12444 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12445 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12446 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12447 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12448 block the progress of others.
12449 </para>
12450 <para>
12451 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12452 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12453 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12454 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12455 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12456 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12457 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12458 </para>
12459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12460 </sect1>
12461 </chapter>
12462 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12463 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12464 <para>
12465 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12466 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12467 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12468 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12469 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12470 </para>
12471 <para>
12472 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12473 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12474 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12475 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12476 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12477 the disease almost invisible.
12478 </para>
12479 <para>
12480 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12481 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12482 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12483 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12484 population:
12485 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12486 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12487 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12488 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12489 available at
12490 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12491 release
12492 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12493 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12494 </para></footnote>
12495 </para>
12496 <para>
12497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12498 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12499 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12500 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12501 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12502 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12503 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12504 </para>
12505 <para>
12506 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12507 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12508 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12509 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12510 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12511 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12512 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12513 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12514 changes.
12515 </para>
12516 <para>
12517 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12518 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12519 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12520 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12521 costs significantly below the market price.
12522 </para>
12523 <para>
12524 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12525 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12526 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12527 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12528 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12529 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12530 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12531 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12532 <para>
12533 <!-- f2. -->
12534 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12535 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12536 </para></footnote>
12537 </para>
12538 <para>
12539 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12540 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12541 Association
12542 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12543 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12544 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12545 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12546 Prepared
12547 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12548 2000), 14, available at
12549 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12550 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12551 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12552 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12553 (statement of James Love).
12554 </para></footnote>
12555 Through the
12556 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12557 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12558 request,
12559 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12561 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12562 began
12563 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12564 government's
12565 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12566 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12567 companies,
12568 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12569 international
12570 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12571 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12572 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12573 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12574 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12575 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12576 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12577 Prepared
12578 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12579 2000), 15.
12580 </para></footnote>
12581 </para>
12582 <para>
12583 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12584 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12585 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12586 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12587 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12588 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12589 marginal,
12590 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12591 the flow of medications into Africa.
12592 </para>
12593 <para>
12594 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12595 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12596 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12597 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12598 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12599 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12600 </para>
12601 <para>
12602 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12603 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12604 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12605 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12606 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12607 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12608 by U.S. companies.
12609 </para>
12610 <para>
12611 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12612 information,
12613 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12615 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12616 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12617 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12618 May 1999, A1, available at
12619 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12620 markets
12621 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12622 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12623 Access
12624 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12625 available at
12626 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12627 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12628 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12629 Synopsis,"
12630 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12632 </para></footnote>
12633 It was because "intellectual property"
12634 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12635 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12636 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12637 response
12638 to AIDS.
12639 </para>
12640 <para>
12641 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12642 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12643 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12644 direct
12645 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12646 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12647 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12648 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12649 many to die for such an abstraction?
12650 </para>
12651 <para>
12652 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12653 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12654 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12655 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12656 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12657 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12658 </para>
12659 <para>
12660 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12661 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12662 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12663 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12664 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12665 technology.
12666 They could be overcome.
12667 </para>
12668 <para>
12669 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12670 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12671 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12672 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12673 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12674 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12675 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12676 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12678 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12679 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12680 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12681 idea called "intellectual property."
12682 </para>
12683 <para>
12684 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12685 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12686 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12687 What is the argument?
12688 </para>
12689 <para>
12690 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12691 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12692 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12693 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12694 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12695 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12696 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12697 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12698 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12699 balanced in just this sense.
12700 </para>
12701 <para>
12702 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12703 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12704 extremism.
12705 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12706 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12707 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12708 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12709 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12710 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12711 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12712 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12713 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12714 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12716 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12717 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12718 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12719 this common sense open its eyes.
12720 </para>
12721 <para>
12722 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12723 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12724 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12725 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12726 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12727 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12728 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12729 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12730 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12731 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12732 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12733 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12734 </para>
12735 <para>
12736 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12737 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12738 meeting.<footnote><para>
12739 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12740 August 2003, E1, available at
12741 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12742 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12743 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12744 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12745 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12746 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12747 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12748 </para></footnote>
12749 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12750 decided
12751 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12752 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12753 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12754 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12755 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12756 protocols
12757 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12758 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12759 project
12760 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12761 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12762 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12763 comprised
12764 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12765 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12767 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12768 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12769 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12770 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12771 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12772 </para>
12773 <para>
12774 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12775 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12776 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12777 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12778 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12779 </para>
12780 <para>
12781 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12782 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12783 meeting.
12784 </para></footnote>
12785 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12786 noncommercial
12787 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12788 perspectives.
12789 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12790 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12791 property issues.
12792 </para>
12793 <para>
12794 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12795 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12796 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12797 Society
12798 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12799 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12800 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12801 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12802 interrupted
12803 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12804 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12805 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12806 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12807 relatively
12808 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12809 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12810 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12811 information
12812 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12813 immoderate
12814 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12815 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12817 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12818 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12819 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12820 </para>
12821 <para>
12822 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12823 property,
12824 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12825 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12826 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12827 agenda.
12828 </para>
12829 <para>
12830 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12831 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12832 software."
12833 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12834 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12835 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12836 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12837 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12838 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12839 software," for their own internal uses.
12840 </para>
12841 <para>
12842 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12843 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12844 noncommercial
12845 software. There are many important companies that depend
12846 fundamentally
12847 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12848 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12849 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12850 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12851 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12852 support a mode of software development that is different from
12853 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12854 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12855 sophisticated.
12856 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12857 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12858 opposition
12859 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12860 license
12861 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12862 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12863 Marketplace
12864 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12865 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12866 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12867 available at
12868 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12869 president,
12870 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12871 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12872 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12873 </para></footnote>
12874 </para>
12875 <para>
12876 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12877 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12878 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12879 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12880 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12881 by
12882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12883 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12884 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12885 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12886 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12887 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12888 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12889 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12890 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12891 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12892 </para>
12893 <para>
12894 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12895 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12896 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12897 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12898 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12899 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12900 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12901 <!-- f9. -->
12902 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12903 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12904 </para></footnote>
12905 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12906 </para>
12907 <para>
12908 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12909 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12910 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12911 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12912 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12913 its lobbying efforts.
12914 </para>
12915 <para>
12916 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12917 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12918 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12919 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12920 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12921 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12922 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12923 goals of WIPO."
12924 </para>
12925 <para>
12926 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12927 </para>
12928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12929 <para>
12930 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12931 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12932 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12933 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12934 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12935 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12936 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12937 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12938 </para>
12939 <para>
12940 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12941 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12942 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12943 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12944 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12945 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12946 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12947 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12948 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12949 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12950 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12951 </para>
12952 <para>
12953 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12954 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12955 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12956 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12957 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12958 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12959 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12960 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12961 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12962 right to decide what to do with their property.
12963 </para>
12964 <para>
12965 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12966 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12967 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12969 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12970 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12971 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12972 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12973 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12974 way possible.
12975 </para>
12976 <para>
12977 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12978 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12979 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12980 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12981 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12982 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12983 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12984 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12985 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12986 that control.
12987 </para>
12988 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12989 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12990 <para>
12991 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12992 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12993 <!-- f10. -->
12994 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12995 </para></footnote>
12996 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12997 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12998 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12999 </para>
13000 <para>
13001 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13002 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13003 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13004 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13005 </para>
13006 <blockquote>
13007 <para>
13008 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13009 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13010 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
13011 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
13012 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13013 say anything wrong. But in the world
13014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13015 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13016 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13017 </para>
13018 </blockquote>
13019 <para>
13020 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13021 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13022 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13023 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13024 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13025 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13026 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13027 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13028 </para>
13029 <para>
13030 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13031 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13032 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
13033 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13034 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
13035 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
13036 </para>
13037 <para>
13038 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13039 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13040 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13041 our own country's history).
13042 </para>
13043 <para>
13044 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13045 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
13046 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13047 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13048 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13049 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13050 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13051 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
13052 democracy in the world, become?
13053 </para>
13054 <para>
13055 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13056 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13057 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13059 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13060 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
13061 </para>
13062 <para>
13063 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13064 There are moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that
13065 surprise. When the FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules,
13066 which would thereby further increase the concentration in media
13067 ownership,
13068 an extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this
13069 change. For perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the
13070 NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and
13071 CodePink Women for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC
13072 policy. An astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC,
13073 demanding
13074 more hearings and a different result.
13075 </para>
13076 <para>
13077 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad
13078 coalition
13079 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile
13080 hearings
13081 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement
13082 had become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision,
13083 and there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13084 concentration
13085 in the media.
13086 </para>
13087 <para>
13088 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13089 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13090 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13091 players.
13092 The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not mean
13093 that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13094 </para>
13095 <para>
13096 The danger in media concentration comes not from the
13097 concentration,
13098 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13099 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13100 powerful
13101 companies that control an ever expanding slice of the media. It
13102 is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated range of
13103 rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme form&mdash;that makes
13104 their bigness bad.
13105 </para>
13106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13107 <para>
13108 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13109 competition
13110 and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood as being
13111 about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We Americans have a
13112 long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That we could be
13113 motivated
13114 to fight "big" again is not something new.
13115 </para>
13116 <para>
13117 It would be something new, and something very important, if an
13118 equal number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built
13119 within the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien
13120 to our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13121 because
13122 the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything called
13123 "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13124 </para>
13125 <para>
13126 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13127 of our tragedy.
13128 </para>
13129 <para>
13130 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13131 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
13132 <!-- f11. --> John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com,
13133 September 2003, available at
13134 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music
13135 Industry
13136 Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September 2003, available at
13137 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a
13138 Song, N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily
13139 News, 9 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet
13140 Surprised
13141 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13142 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13143 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
13144 available
13145 at
13146 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
13147 </para></footnote>
13148
13149 Eminem
13150 has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's music.<footnote><para>
13151 <!-- f12. --> Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
13152 17 September 2003, available at
13153 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
13154 </para></footnote>
13155 The
13156 story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
13157 finished
13158 making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13159 <!-- f13. --> Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13160 Dylan
13161 Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13162 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13164 </para></footnote>
13165 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists
13166 he must remain anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with
13167 these studio guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd
13168 love to use but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've
13169 got scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but
13170 it would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
13171 talking
13172 about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers thought
13173 to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for kids who
13174 use a computer to share content.
13175 </para>
13176 <para>
13177 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13178 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13179 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13180 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13181 24 August 2003, available at
13182 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13183 </para></footnote>
13184 And in Brazil, the
13185 culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero of Brazilian music,
13186 has joined with Creative Commons to release content and free licenses
13187 in that Latin American country.<footnote><para>
13188 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August
13189 2003, available at
13190 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13191 </para></footnote>
13192 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13193 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13194 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13195 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13196 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13197 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13198 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13199 day into the Causbys.
13200 </para>
13201 <para>
13202 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13203 potential is ever to be realized.
13204
13205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13206
13207 </para>
13208 </chapter>
13209 <chapter id="c-afterword">
13210 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13211 <para>
13212
13213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13214 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that
13215 something
13216 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of
13217 this book maps what might be done.
13218 </para>
13219 <para>
13220 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13221 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13222 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13223 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13224 </para>
13225 <para>
13226 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must
13227 recruit
13228 a significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13229 authors,
13230 musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this story in their
13231 own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
13232 </para>
13233 <para>
13234 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13235 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13236 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13237 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13238 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13239 </para>
13240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13241
13242 <sect1 id="usnow">
13243 <title>US, NOW</title>
13244 <para>
13245 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so
13246 far has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13247 property
13248 or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that
13249 really
13250 is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13251 </para>
13252 <para>
13253 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13254 extremes
13255 in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There
13256 are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights Reserved"&mdash;
13257 and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights Reserved." The "All
13258 Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask permission before
13259 you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved"
13260 sorts believe you should be able to do with content as you wish,
13261 regardless
13262 of whether you have permission or not.
13263 </para>
13264 <para>
13265 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13266 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13267 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13268 regardless
13269 of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
13270
13271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13272 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13273 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13274 unprotected.
13275 </para>
13276 <para>
13277 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13278 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13279 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13280 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13281 character
13282 of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13283 architecture
13284 made the effective default "no rights reserved," the future
13285 architecture will make the effective default "all rights reserved." The
13286 architecture
13287 and law that surround the Internet's design will increasingly
13288 produce an environment where all use of content requires permission.
13289 The "cut and paste" world that defines the Internet today will become
13290 a "get permission to cut and paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
13291 </para>
13292 <para>
13293 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
13294 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
13295 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13296 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13297 freedoms
13298 that we could just take for granted before.
13299 </para>
13300
13301 <sect2 id="examples">
13302 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13303 <para>
13304 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13305 recognize
13306 this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before
13307 the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about
13308 our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore
13309 and browsed through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need
13310 to worry about explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or
13311 boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was assured.
13312 </para>
13313 <para>
13314 What made it assured?
13315 </para>
13316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13317 <para>
13318 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13319 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13320 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13321 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13322 Korea,
13323 working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be assured.
13324 But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable enough to
13325 spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of us (again,
13326 we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient architecture of
13327 real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount of privacy. That
13328 privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law (there is no law
13329 protecting
13330 "privacy" in public places), and in many places, not by norms
13331 (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs that
13332 friction
13333 imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13334 </para>
13335 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13336 <para>
13337 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13338 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13339 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13340 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13341 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13342 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13343 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13344 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13345 </para>
13346 <para>
13347 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13348 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13349 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13350 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13351 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13352 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13353 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13354 disappears.
13355 </para>
13356 <para>
13357 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13358 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13359 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13360 friction
13361 did.<footnote><para>
13362 <!-- f1. --> See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13363 Architecture
13364 of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology Law
13365 Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13366 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink> (describing examples in
13367 which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked
13368 Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (New York:
13369 Random
13370 House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs between technology and privacy).
13371 </para></footnote>
13372 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the
13373 pattern
13374 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13375
13376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13377 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13378 technology
13379 now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively act
13380 where, before, privacy was given by default.
13381 </para>
13382 <para>
13383 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13384 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13385 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the binaries&mdash;
13386 was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data General
13387 machine
13388 on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
13389 about controlling their software.
13390 </para>
13391 <para>
13392 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he
13393 was a researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that
13394 developed
13395 when one was free to explore and tinker with the software that
13396 ran on machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented
13397 programmer,
13398 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify
13399 other people's work.
13400 </para>
13401 <para>
13402 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In
13403 a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that
13404 someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a
13405 theorem,
13406 you could take what someone else did and change it. In a classics
13407 department, if you believed a colleague's translation of a recently
13408 discovered
13409 text was flawed, you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman,
13410 it seemed obvious that you should be free to tinker with and improve
13411 the code that ran a machine. This, too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't
13412 it be open for criticism like anything else?
13413 </para>
13414 <para>
13415 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13416 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs
13417 from one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least
13418 in the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13419 companies
13420 started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just
13421 take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make it easier for
13422 me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13423 </para>
13424 <para>
13425 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13426 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13428 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13429 economics
13430 of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about it,
13431 then the freedom to change and share software would be
13432 fundamentally
13433 weakened.
13434 </para>
13435 <para>
13436 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free
13437 operating
13438 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13439 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13440 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13441 </para>
13442 <para>
13443 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13444 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13445 Software
13446 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the
13447 source code for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone
13448 building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free
13449 as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code
13450 would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13451 fundamental
13452 goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a byproduct.
13453 </para>
13454 <para>
13455 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13456 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13457 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13458 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13459 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13460 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13461 </para>
13462 <para>
13463 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13464 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13465 scientific journals are produced.
13466 </para>
13467 <para>
13468 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13469 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13470 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13471 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13472 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13473 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13474 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13475 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13476 service.
13477 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13478 anyone
13479 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13481 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13482 Court opinion through their respective services.
13483 </para>
13484 <para>
13485 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13486 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13487 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13488 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13489 allowed
13490 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13491 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13492 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13493 </para>
13494 <para>
13495 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13496 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13497 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13498 </para>
13499 <para>
13500 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13501 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13502 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13503 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13504 because
13505 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13506 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13507 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13508 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13509 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13510 access to a paper journal.
13511 </para>
13512 <para>
13513 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13514 demanding
13515 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13516 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13517 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13518 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13519 </para>
13520 <para>
13521 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13522 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13523 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13524 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13526 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13527 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13528 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13529 available
13530 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13531 copyright
13532 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13533 redistribute the work for free.
13534 </para>
13535 <para>
13536 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13537 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13538 markets.
13539 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13540 traditional
13541 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13542 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13543 presumptively
13544 a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13545 </para>
13546
13547 </sect2>
13548 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13549 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13550 <para>
13551 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13552 increasing
13553 control effected through law and technology.
13554 </para>
13555 <para>
13556 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a
13557 nonprofit
13558 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13559 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright
13560 on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for
13561 people to build upon other people's work, by making it simple for
13562 creators
13563 to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their
13564 work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to
13565 bulletproof
13566 licenses, make this possible.
13567 </para>
13568 <para>
13569 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.
13570 By developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13571 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that
13572 can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13573 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13574 automatically
13575 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three
13576 expressions
13577 together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable description, and
13578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13579 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13580 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone
13581 who accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the
13582 ideal that the person associated with the license believes in something
13583 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13584 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13585 certain
13586 freedoms are given.
13587 </para>
13588 <para>
13589 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13590 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13591 creator
13592 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13593 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13594 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13595 freedoms
13596 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13597 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13598 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13599 lastly, any educational use.
13600 </para>
13601 <para>
13602 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13603 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13604 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13605 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13606 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13607 governed
13608 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13609 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13610 content
13611 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13612 public
13613 domain.
13614 </para>
13615 <para>
13616 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13617 Commons.
13618 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13619 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13620 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13621 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13622 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13624 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13625 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13626 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13627 </para>
13628 <para>
13629 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13630 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13631 culture
13632 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13633 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13634 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13635 background
13636 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13637 against the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with
13638 different
13639 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13640 use them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13641 effectively
13642 to begin to build those rules.
13643 </para>
13644 <para>
13645 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13646 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13647 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13648 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13649 Commons
13650 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13651 </para>
13652 <para>
13653 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13654 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1) those
13655 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2)
13656 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13657 free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book
13658 instead
13659 of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2) will download
13660 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.
13661 If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing
13662 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13663 </para>
13664 <para>
13665 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13666 conclusion.
13667 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13668 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13669 a total success.
13670 </para>
13671 <para>
13672 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
13673 content
13674 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13676 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13677 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13678 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13679 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13680 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13681 well.
13682 </para>
13683 <para>
13684 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13685 proprietary
13686 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13687 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13688 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13689 anything
13690 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
13691 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
13692 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13693 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13694 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
13695 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
13696 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
13697 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
13698 are so high<footnote><para>
13699 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
13700 (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
13701 Lucre
13702 production, available at
13703 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13704 </para></footnote>),
13705 these artists release into the creative environment content
13706 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13707 </para>
13708 <para>
13709 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
13710 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
13711 importance
13712 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
13713 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13714 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13715 appropriate
13716 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
13717 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
13718 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
13719 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
13720 </para>
13721 <para>
13722 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13723 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13724 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13725 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13726
13727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13728 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13729 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13730 </para>
13731 <para>
13732 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13733 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13734 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13735 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13736 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13737 steps are possible.
13738 </para>
13739 <para>
13740 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13741 individuals
13742 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
13743 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13744 complements
13745 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13746 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
13747 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
13748 more easily.
13749 </para>
13750
13751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13752 </sect2>
13753 </sect1>
13754 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13755 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13756 <para>
13757 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13758 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13759 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13760 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13761 changes that we need.
13762 </para>
13763 <para>
13764 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13765 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13766 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13767 to our end.
13768 </para>
13769
13770 <sect2 id="formalities">
13771 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13772 <para>
13773 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13774 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13775 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13776 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13777 </para>
13778 <para>
13779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13780 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13781 requirements
13782 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13783 </para>
13784 <para>
13785 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13786 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13787 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13788 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13789 </para>
13790 <para>
13791 Why?
13792 </para>
13793 <para>
13794 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13795 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13796 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13797 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13798 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13799 formalities
13800 were getting in the way.
13801 </para>
13802 <para>
13803 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13804 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13805 burdens
13806 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13807 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13808 creative
13809 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13810 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13811 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13812 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13813 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13814 speak.
13815 </para>
13816 <para>
13817 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13818 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13819 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13820 by other countries as well.
13821 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13822 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13823 require
13824 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13825 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13826 </para>
13827 <para>
13828 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13829 registering
13830 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13831 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13832 second
13833 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13834 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13835 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13836 </para>
13837
13838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13839
13840 <sect3 id="registration">
13841 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13842 <para>
13843 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13844 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13845 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13846 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13847 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13848 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13849 policymaking,
13850 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13851 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13852 about formalities, their first reaction is panic&mdash;nothing could be worse
13853 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13854 </para>
13855 <para>
13856 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13857 tradition
13858 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13859 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13860 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13861 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13862 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13863 subject to standards that the government sets.
13864 </para>
13865 <para>
13866 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13867 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13868 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13869 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13870 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13871 performed
13872 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13873 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13874 registration occurs up.
13875 </para>
13876 <para>
13877 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13878 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13879 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13880 establish
13881 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13882 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13883 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13884 registering
13885 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13886 substantially
13887 lower the burden of this formality&mdash;while producing a database
13888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13889 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13890 </para>
13891
13892 </sect3>
13893 <sect3 id="marking">
13894 <title>MARKING</title>
13895 <para>
13896 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13897 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13898 punishment
13899 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to imposing
13900 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
13901 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
13902 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
13903 marking
13904 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13905 </para>
13906 <para>
13907 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13908 copyrighted
13909 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
13910 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
13911 the work.
13912 </para>
13913 <para>
13914 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13915 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13916 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13917 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13918 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13919 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13920 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13921 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13922 </para>
13923 <para>
13924 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13925 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13926 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13927 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13928 copyright
13929 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13930 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13931 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13932 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13933 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13934 </para></footnote>
13935 The meaning of an unmarked work would
13936 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
13937 complain,
13938 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
13939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13940 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13941 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13942 their work.
13943 </para>
13944 <para>
13945 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13946 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13947 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13948 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13949 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13950 </para>
13951 <para>
13952 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method
13953 for marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13954 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13955 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13956 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13957 consideration
13958 of which method could best be integrated into the registration
13959 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to
13960 innovate;
13961 but we would count on the government to keep the product of
13962 innovation
13963 in line with its other important functions.
13964 </para>
13965 <para>
13966 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13967 requirements.
13968 If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13969 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13970 example,
13971 all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick step. The
13972 aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the system itself
13973 should be kept as simple as possible.
13974 </para>
13975 <para>
13976 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13977 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13978 make things unclear.
13979 </para>
13980 <para>
13981 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13982 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13983 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13984 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13985 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13986 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13987 </para>
13988
13989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13990 </sect3>
13991 </sect2>
13992 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13993 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13994 <para>
13995 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13996 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13997 natural authors.
13998 </para>
13999 <para>
14000 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
14001 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
14002 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
14003 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
14004 endorsed
14005 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.<footnote><para>
14006 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
14007 at
14008 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
14009 </para></footnote>
14010 Others have
14011 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14012 </para>
14013 <para>
14014 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14015 copyright's
14016 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
14017 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
14018 </para>
14019 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14020 <listitem><para>
14021 <!-- (1) -->
14022 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
14023 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
14024 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
14025 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14026 derivative
14027 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14028 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
14029 author.
14030 </para></listitem>
14031 <listitem><para>
14032 <!-- (2) -->
14033 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
14034 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14035 fuzziness
14036 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
14037 "expression."
14038 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14039 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
14040 unprotected.
14041 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
14042 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
14043 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
14044 complexities
14045 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
14046 navigate.
14047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14048 </para></listitem>
14049 <listitem><para>
14050 <!-- (3) -->
14051 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
14052 Especially
14053 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14054 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
14055 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
14056 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
14057 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
14058 veteran
14059 to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
14060 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14061 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
14062 available at
14063 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
14064 </para></footnote>
14065 If we make veterans suffer that
14066 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
14067 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
14068 </para></listitem>
14069 <listitem><para>
14070 <!-- (4) -->
14071 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
14072 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
14073 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
14074 mistake
14075 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
14076 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
14077 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
14078 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
14079 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
14080 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
14081 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
14082 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
14083 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
14084 increasing
14085 their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.
14086 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
14087 about that now.
14088 </para></listitem>
14089 </orderedlist>
14090 <para>
14091 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
14092 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
14093 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
14094 </para>
14095 <para>
14096 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
14097 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
14098 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
14099 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14100 </para>
14101
14102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14103
14104 </sect2>
14105 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
14106 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
14107 <para>
14108 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14109 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14110 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14111 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14112 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14113 the emergence of that new technology.
14114 </para>
14115 <para>
14116 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
14117 "exclusive
14118 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
14119 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
14120 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
14121 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
14122 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
14123 </para>
14124 <para>
14125 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
14126 expanded
14127 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
14128 translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
14129 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
14130 University Press, 1967), 32.
14131 </para></footnote>
14132 The courts have expanded
14133 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
14134 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
14135 Benjamin
14136 Kaplan.
14137 </para>
14138 <blockquote>
14139 <para>
14140 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14141 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14142 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14143 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
14144 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
14145 </para></footnote>
14146 </para>
14147 </blockquote>
14148 <para>
14149 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14150 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14151 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14152 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14153 Consider each limitation in turn.
14154 </para>
14155 <para>
14156 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
14157 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
14158
14159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14160 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14161 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14162 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14163 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14164 after the creative work is done.
14165 </para>
14166 <para>
14167 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
14168 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
14169 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
14170 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
14171 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
14172 perhaps
14173 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
14174 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
14175 creative
14176 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
14177 pouring
14178 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
14179 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
14180 </para>
14181 <para>
14182 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of
14183 the Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation
14184 for foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
14185 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
14186 negotiation
14187 for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much
14188 more sense.
14189 </para>
14190 <para>
14191 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14192 protected,
14193 and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14194 protected.
14195 This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul
14196 Goldstein.<footnote><para>
14197 <!-- f7. --> Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14198 Jukebox
14199 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14200 </para></footnote>
14201 His view is that the law should be written so that expanded
14202 protections follow expanded uses.
14203 </para>
14204 <para>
14205 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the
14206 legal
14207 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14208 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14209 incentives
14210 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a
14211 strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14212 </para>
14213 <para>
14214 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14216 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14217 certain
14218 statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great
14219 deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights
14220 regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14221 </para>
14222 </sect2>
14223
14224 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
14225 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14226 <para>
14227 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't
14228 be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most
14229 people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other policy issue that
14230 better
14231 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing
14232 of music.
14233 </para>
14234 <para>
14235 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14236 Internet's
14237 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14238 powerfully
14239 than any other single application. It was the Internet's killer
14240 app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was the
14241 application
14242 that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the application
14243 that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill innovation on
14244 the network.
14245 </para>
14246 <para>
14247 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music
14248 in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14249 performed,
14250 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14251 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14252 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14253 </para>
14254 <para>
14255 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14256 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14257 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14258 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14259 </para>
14260 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14261 <listitem><para>
14262 <!-- A. -->
14263 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14264 for purchasing CDs.
14265 </para></listitem>
14266 <listitem><para>
14267 <!-- B. -->
14268 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14269 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14270 </para></listitem>
14271 <listitem><para>
14272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14273 <!-- C. -->
14274 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14275 access
14276 to content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright
14277 or that would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14278 </para></listitem>
14279 <listitem><para>
14280 <!-- D. -->
14281 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14282 access
14283 to content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the
14284 copyright owner plainly endorses.
14285 </para></listitem>
14286 </orderedlist>
14287 <para>
14288 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14289 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14290 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14291 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14292 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14293 significantly weakened.
14294 </para>
14295 <para>
14296 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14297 controversial.
14298 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is
14299 real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly
14300 greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
14301 </para>
14302 <para>
14303 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14304 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14305 should respond.
14306 </para>
14307 <para>
14308 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
14309 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
14310 content.
14311 It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of content
14312 in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we
14313 in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and
14314 very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and down. Although
14315 wireless access is growing, most of us still get access across wires. Most
14316 only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The idea of the
14317 always
14318 on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
14319 </para>
14320 <para>
14321 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14322 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14323 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14325 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14326 question
14327 should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this world?
14328 The question should be, what law will we require when the network
14329 becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is one in
14330 which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net; where
14331 everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the Rockies&mdash;you can
14332 instantaneously be connected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as
14333 ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service, where with the flip of a
14334 device,
14335 you are connected.
14336 </para>
14337 <para>
14338 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14339 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio, content
14340 that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the
14341 critical point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give
14342 access to content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you
14343 access to content than it will be to download and store content on the
14344 many devices you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other
14345 words, to subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as
14346 everyone
14347 in the download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies
14348 essentially
14349 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if
14350 the services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14351 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell
14352 phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14353 paying
14354 for this content even though "free" content is available in the form
14355 of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14356 <!-- f8. --> See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
14357 3 April 2002, available at
14358 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14359 </para></footnote>
14360
14361 </para>
14362 <para>
14363 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14364 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14365 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14366 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14367 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14368 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14369 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14370 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14371 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14372 artists get paid, during
14373
14374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14375 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14376 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14377 </para>
14378 <para>
14379 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14380 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14381 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14382 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14383 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14384 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14385 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14386 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14387 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14388 </para>
14389 <para>
14390 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14391 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14392 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14393 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14394 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14395 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14396 way that returns something to the artist.
14397 </para>
14398 <para>
14399 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14400 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14401 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14402 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14403 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14404 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14405 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14406 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14407 </para>
14408 <para>
14409 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply
14410 deem out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make
14411 copies of the music available for sale, then commercial and
14412 noncommercial
14413 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14414 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would
14415 be incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing
14416 has ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14417 </para>
14418 <para>
14419
14420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14421 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14422 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14423 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14424 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14425 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14426 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14427 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14428 trade.
14429 </para>
14430 <para>
14431 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14432 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14433 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14434 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14435 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14436 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14437 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14438 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14439 </para>
14440 <para>
14441 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14442 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14443 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14444 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14445 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14446 delivering and accessing content.
14447 </para>
14448 <para>
14449 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14450 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14451 </para>
14452 <para>
14453 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14454 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14455 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14456 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14457 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14458 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14459 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14460 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14461 </para>
14462 <para>
14463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14464 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14465 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14466 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14467 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14468 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14469 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14470 </para>
14471 <para>
14472 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14473 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote><para>
14474 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14475 10 October 2000), available at
14476 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14477 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14478 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14479 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14480 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14481 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14482 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14483 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14484 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14485 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14486 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14487 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14488 available at
14489 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14490 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14491 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14492 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14493 2002, available at
14494 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14495 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14496 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14497 McCullagh,
14498 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14499 2002, available at
14500 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14501 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14502 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14503 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14504 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14505 debate
14506 by about a decade. See
14507 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14508 </para></footnote>
14509 Fisher suggests a
14510 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14511 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14512 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14513 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14514 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14515 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14516 basis
14517 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14518 compensation
14519 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14520 </para>
14521 <para>
14522 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14523 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14524 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14525 simple:
14526 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14527 system.
14528 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14529 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14530 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14531 facilitating
14532 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14533 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14534 exchange
14535 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14536 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14537 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14538 </para>
14539 <para>
14540 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14541 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14542 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14543 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14544 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14545
14546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14547 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14548 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14549 allowed
14550 to do with the content itself.
14551 </para>
14552 <para>
14553 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14554 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14555 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14556 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14557 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14558 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14559 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14560 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14561 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14562 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14563 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14564 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14565 on-line.
14566 </para>
14567 <para>
14568 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14569 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14570 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14571 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14572 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14573 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14574 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14575 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14576 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14577 finding ways to compete with "free."
14578 </para>
14579 <para>
14580 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14581 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14582 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14583 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14584 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14585 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14586 the law.
14587 </para>
14588 <para>
14589 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14590 </para>
14591 <para>
14592
14593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14594 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14595 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14596 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14597 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14598 create.
14599 </para>
14600 <para>
14601 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14602 by
14603 </para>
14604 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14605 <listitem><para>
14606 <!-- 1. -->
14607 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14608 </para></listitem>
14609 <listitem><para>
14610 <!-- 2. -->
14611 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14612 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14613 statute;
14614 </para></listitem>
14615 <listitem><para>
14616 <!-- 3. -->
14617 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14618 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14619 </para></listitem>
14620 </orderedlist>
14621 <para>
14622 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14623 competitive
14624 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14625 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14626 something then?
14627 </para>
14628 <para>
14629 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14630 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14631 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14632 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14633 technology
14634 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14635 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14636 market
14637 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14638 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14639 authorized
14640 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14641 compensation
14642 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14643 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14644 </para>
14645 <para>
14646 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14647 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14648 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14649
14650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14651 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14652 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14653 </para>
14654 </sect2>
14655
14656 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14657 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14658 <para>
14659 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14660 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14661 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14662 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14663 </para>
14664 <para>
14665 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14666 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14667 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14668 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14669 unwillingness
14670 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14671 the law.
14672 </para>
14673 <para>
14674 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14675 "radical"
14676 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14677 advocating
14678 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14679 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14680 example,
14681 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14682 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14683 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14684 obvious.<footnote><para>
14685 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14686 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14687 </para></footnote>
14688
14689 </para>
14690 <para>
14691 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14692 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14693 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14694 </para>
14695 <para>
14696 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14697 benefits.
14698 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14699 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14700 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14701 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14702 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14703 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14704 predicted
14705 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14706 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14707 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14708 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14709 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14710 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14711 June 2003, available at
14712 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14713 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14714 effect
14715 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14716 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14717 </para></footnote>
14718 They see a system that has been
14719 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14720 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14721 </para>
14722 <para>
14723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14724 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14725 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14726 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14727 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14728 system
14729 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14730 </para>
14731 <para>
14732 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14733 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14734 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14735 obscure
14736 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14737 little.
14738 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14739 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14740 doctrine
14741 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14742 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14743 </para>
14744 <para>
14745 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14746 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14747 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14748 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14749 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14750 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14751 </para>
14752 <para>
14753 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14754 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14755 precisely
14756 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14757 to its review.
14758 </para>
14759 <para>
14760 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14761 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14762 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14763 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14764 something.
14765 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14766 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14767 requires
14768 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14769 Russia.
14770 </para>
14771 <para>
14772 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14773 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14774
14775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14776 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14777 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14778 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14779 </para>
14780 <para>
14781 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14782 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14783 keep your lawyers away.
14784 </para>
14785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14786 </sect2>
14787 </sect1>
14788 </chapter>
14789 <chapter id="c-notes">
14790 <title>NOTES</title>
14791 <para>
14792 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide Web. As
14793 anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be highly unstable. I
14794 have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting readers to the original source
14795 through the Web site associated with this book. For each link below, you can go to
14796 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by clicking on the
14797 number after the # sign. If the original link remains alive, you will be redirected to
14798 that link. If the original link has disappeared, you will be redirected to an
14799 appropriate
14800 reference for the material.
14801 </para>
14802 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14803
14804 </chapter>
14805 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14806 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14807 <para>
14808 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14809 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14810 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14811 to him that this book is dedicated.
14812 </para>
14813 <para>
14814 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14815 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard
14816 Posner, Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction
14817 and guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School
14818 and Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden,
14819 James P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert
14820 Hallman,
14821 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum,
14822 Alina Ng, and Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine
14823 Crump and Harry Surden, who helped direct their research, and to
14824 Laura Lynch, who brilliantly managed the army that they assembled,
14825 and provided her own critical eye on much of this.
14826 </para>
14827 <para>
14828 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14829 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14830 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14831 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14833 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14834 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14835 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14836 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14837 </para>
14838 <para>
14839 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly
14840 draw upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible
14841 to receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14842 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice
14843 to requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli,
14844 David Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who
14845 had specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14846 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
14847 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy
14848 Hunsinger, Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James
14849 Lindenschmidt,
14850 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey
14851 McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.
14852 Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack,
14853 Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina,
14854 Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger
14855 Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have
14856 missed anyone; with computers come glitches, and a crash of my
14857 e-mail system meant I lost a bunch of great replies.)
14858 </para>
14859 <para>
14860 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book
14861 in draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14862 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14863 regulation
14864 of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an embarrassingly large
14865 number of errors. While my work is in part inspired by Stallman's, he
14866 does not agree with me in important places throughout this book.
14867 </para>
14868 <para>
14869 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14870 insisted
14871 that there would be unending happiness away from these battles,
14872 and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever, grateful for
14873 her perpetual patience and love.
14874 </para>
14875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14876
14877 </chapter>
14878 </book>