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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>Version
2004-
02-
10</subtitle>
29 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
52 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 <itemizedlist mark=
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79 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
91 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
130 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig,
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
147 Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
164 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
167 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
170 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
176 343.7309'
9—dc22
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
182 Printed in the United States of America
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
211 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
215 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
216 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
217 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
223 <title>List of figures
</title>
230 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
231 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
232 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
233 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
238 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
242 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
243 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
244 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
245 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
246 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
247 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
251 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
252 2 Architecture and Law: Force
253 2 Market: Concentration
256 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
257 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
258 2 Constraining Creators
259 2 Constraining Innovators
260 2 Corrupting Citizens
262 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
263 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
267 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
268 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
270 2 1. More Formalities
271 3 Registration and Renewal
274 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
275 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
276 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
285 <chapter id=
"c-preface">
286 <title>PREFACE
</title>
288 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
289 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
290 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
294 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
295 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
296 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
297 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
298 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
303 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
304 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
305 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
306 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
307 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
308 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
311 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
312 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
313 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
315 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
316 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
317 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
320 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
321 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
322 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
323 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
326 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
327 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
328 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
329 free software movement
<footnote>
331 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
332 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
333 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
334 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
335 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
336 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
337 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
338 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
339 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
340 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"
—a culture in
341 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
342 or of creators from the past.
345 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
346 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
347 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
348 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
349 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
350 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
351 culture deem fundamental.
353 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
355 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
356 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
357 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
358 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
359 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
360 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
361 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
362 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
367 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
368 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
369 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
370 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
371 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
372 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
377 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
378 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
379 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
380 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
381 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
382 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
383 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
384 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
385 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
386 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
387 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
388 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
389 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
390 that this work is "merely" derivative.
393 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
394 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
395 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
396 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
397 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
398 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
399 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
400 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
403 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
404 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
405 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
406 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
407 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
411 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
412 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
413 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
414 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
415 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
416 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
417 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
425 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
426 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
428 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
429 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
430 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
431 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
432 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
433 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
436 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
437 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
438 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
439 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
440 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
441 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
444 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
445 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
446 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
449 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
450 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
451 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
452 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
453 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
454 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
455 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
457 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
458 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
460 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
461 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
462 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
463 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
464 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
465 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
466 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
467 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
468 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
470 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
471 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
473 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
474 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
475 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
476 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
477 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
478 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
479 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
480 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
484 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
485 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
486 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
487 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
488 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
489 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
490 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
491 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
493 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
494 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
495 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
496 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
497 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
498 Authorship," Stanford Law Review
48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
499 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
501 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
502 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
507 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
510 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
511 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
512 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
514 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
515 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
516 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
517 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
518 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
520 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
523 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
524 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
525 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
526 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
527 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
528 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
529 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
530 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
531 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
532 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
533 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
534 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
535 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
536 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
537 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
538 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
541 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
542 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
543 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
544 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
545 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
546 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
547 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
548 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
549 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
550 understanding of radio.
551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
552 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
555 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
556 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
557 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
558 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
559 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
560 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
561 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
562 much less transmitter power and static.
565 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
566 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
567 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
568 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
569 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
570 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
571 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
572 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
573 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
576 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
580 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
581 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
582 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
583 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
584 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
585 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
586 box."
<footnote><para>
587 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
588 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
593 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
594 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
595 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
596 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
597 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
598 a handful of networks.
599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
602 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
603 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
604 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
605 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
606 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
610 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
611 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
612 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
613 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
614 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
615 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
617 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
622 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
623 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
624 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
629 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
630 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
631 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
632 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
633 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
634 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
639 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
640 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
641 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
642 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
643 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
644 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
645 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
646 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
647 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
648 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
649 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
654 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
655 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
656 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
657 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
662 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
664 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
665 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
666 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
667 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
668 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
669 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
670 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
674 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
675 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
676 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
677 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
678 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
679 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
680 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
681 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
682 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
683 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
686 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
687 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
688 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
689 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
690 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
691 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
692 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
693 course always public spirited; the reality is something
694 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
695 to themselves, would crumble in
696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
697 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
698 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
699 effect of technological change.
702 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
703 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
704 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
705 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
706 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
707 before.
<footnote><para>
708 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
709 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
710 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
711 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
713 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
717 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
718 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
719 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
720 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
721 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
722 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
723 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
724 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
725 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
728 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
729 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
730 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
731 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
732 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
733 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
737 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
738 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
739 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
740 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
741 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
744 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
745 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
746 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
749 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
750 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
751 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
752 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
753 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
754 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
755 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
756 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
757 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
760 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
761 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
762 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
763 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
764 marketplace.
<footnote>
766 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
767 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
768 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
769 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
770 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
771 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
772 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
774 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
776 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
777 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
778 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
779 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
782 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
783 been erased.
<footnote><para>
784 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
787 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
788 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
789 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
790 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
791 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
792 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
793 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
794 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
795 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
796 culture, more and more a permission culture.
798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
800 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
801 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
802 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
803 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
804 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
805 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
806 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
807 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
808 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
809 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
813 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
814 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
815 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
816 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
817 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
818 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
819 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
820 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
821 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
822 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
823 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
824 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
825 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
826 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
827 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
828 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
829 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
832 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
833 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
834 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
835 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
836 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
837 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
841 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
843 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
844 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
845 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
846 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
847 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
848 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
849 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
850 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
851 Times,
17 January
2002.
852 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
853 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
854 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
858 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
859 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
860 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
861 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
862 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
866 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
867 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
868 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
869 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
872 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
873 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
874 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
875 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
876 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
878 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
879 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
880 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
882 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
883 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
884 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
885 could cultivate and extend our culture.
888 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
889 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
890 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
891 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
892 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
893 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
894 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
895 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
896 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
900 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
901 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
902 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
903 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
904 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
908 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
909 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
910 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
911 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
912 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
913 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
914 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
916 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
917 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
919 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
920 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
921 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
922 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
923 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
924 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
925 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
926 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
927 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
928 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
929 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
930 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
933 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
934 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
936 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
937 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
938 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
939 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
942 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
946 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
948 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
949 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
950 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
951 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
952 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
953 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
957 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
958 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
960 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
965 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
966 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
969 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
970 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
971 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
972 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
973 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
976 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
977 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
978 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
980 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
983 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
984 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
986 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
987 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
988 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
989 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
990 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
991 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
992 this silliness will be much more profound.
993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
996 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
997 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1001 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1002 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1004 French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird sort we
1005 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
1006 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
1007 can be more fully understood.
1010 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1011 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1013 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1014 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1015 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1016 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1018 by the changes to use their power to change the law
—and more
1019 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
1020 who we have always been.
1023 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1024 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1025 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1026 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1027 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1028 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1032 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1033 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1037 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1038 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1039 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1041 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1042 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1046 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1047 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1048 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1050 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1055 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1056 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1058 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1059 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1060 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1062 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1066 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1067 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1068 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1070 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1071 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1074 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1076 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1077 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1079 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1080 piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1083 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1084 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1085 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1086 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1089 The idea goes something like this:
1093 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1094 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1095 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1096 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1097 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1101 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1103 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1104 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1105 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1107 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1108 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1110 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1111 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1112 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1113 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1115 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1116 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1117 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1118 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1119 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1121 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1122 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1124 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1126 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1127 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1129 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1130 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1132 It has never taken hold within our law.
1135 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1136 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1137 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1138 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1139 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1142 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1143 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1144 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1145 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1146 copyright law today regulates both.
1149 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1150 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1151 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1152 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1153 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1154 more expense of doing business.
1156 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1158 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1159 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1160 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1161 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1162 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1163 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1164 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1165 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1166 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1167 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1168 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1169 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1170 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1171 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1172 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1174 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1177 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1178 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1179 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1180 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1181 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1182 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1183 enabled are much more tenuous.
1184 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1186 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1187 this creative class.
1190 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1191 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1192 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1196 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1197 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1199 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1200 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1201 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1202 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1203 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1206 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1207 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1208 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1209 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1210 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1211 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1215 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1216 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1217 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1218 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1222 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1223 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1224 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1225 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1226 synchronization was pretty close.
1229 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1231 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1232 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1233 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1234 wonderful! And it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1236 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1238 (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1243 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1244 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1245 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1246 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1249 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1250 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1251 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1252 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1253 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1254 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1255 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1258 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1259 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1260 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1261 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1264 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1265 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1266 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1267 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1268 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1272 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1274 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1275 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1277 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1278 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1279 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1280 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1281 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1282 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1283 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1284 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1286 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1287 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1288 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1289 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1290 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1294 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1295 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1296 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1298 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1299 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1300 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1302 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1303 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1304 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1305 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1306 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1307 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1308 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1309 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1313 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1314 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1315 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1316 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1317 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1318 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1319 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1322 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1323 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1324 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1325 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1326 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1327 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1328 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1329 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1330 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1331 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1333 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1334 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1335 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1336 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1337 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1338 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1339 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1342 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1343 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1344 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1345 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1346 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1347 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1348 culture around us and makes it something different.
1350 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1351 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1352 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1353 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1354 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1356 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1357 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1359 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1360 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1361 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1363 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1364 Web site associated with this book, available at
1365 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1367 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1368 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1369 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1370 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1373 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1374 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1375 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1376 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1377 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1378 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1379 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1382 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1383 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1384 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1385 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1388 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1389 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1390 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1391 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1392 content from before the Great Depression.
1395 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1396 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1397 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1401 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1402 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1403 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1404 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1405 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1406 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1407 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1410 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1411 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1412 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1413 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1414 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1415 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1416 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1417 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1418 interestingly different way.
1421 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1422 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1423 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1426 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1427 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1428 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1429 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1431 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1432 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1433 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1434 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1435 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1436 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1437 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1440 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1441 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1442 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1443 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1444 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1445 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1446 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1447 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1448 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1451 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1452 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1453 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1454 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1455 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1456 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1457 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1458 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1459 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1460 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1461 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1462 original copyright owner's permission.
1465 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1466 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1467 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1468 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1469 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1472 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1473 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1474 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1476 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1477 York: Perennial,
2000).
1481 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1482 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1483 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1484 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1485 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1486 which are fifty years old."
1489 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1490 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1491 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1492 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1493 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1494 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1495 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1497 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1498 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1499 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1500 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1501 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1502 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1503 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1504 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1508 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1509 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1510 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1511 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1512 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1513 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1514 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1515 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1519 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1520 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1521 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1522 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1523 to prosecute cases like this."
1526 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1527 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1528 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1529 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1531 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1532 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1533 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1534 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1535 their clients or hurt them?
1536 Let's pause for a moment.
1539 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1540 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1541 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1544 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1545 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1546 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1547 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1549 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1551 Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1553 Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1554 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately describes a set of
1555 "property" rights
—copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret
—but the
1556 nature of those rights is very different.
1558 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1560 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1561 intellectual property.
1564 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1565 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1566 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1567 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1568 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1569 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1570 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1571 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1572 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1573 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1574 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1575 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1579 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1580 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1581 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1584 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1588 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1589 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1590 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1591 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1592 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1593 form, whether large or small.
1596 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1597 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1598 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1599 particular find it hard to say why.
1602 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1603 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1604 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1605 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1606 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1607 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1608 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1609 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1610 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1611 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1612 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1616 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1617 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1618 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1619 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1620 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1621 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1622 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1623 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1627 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1628 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1629 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1630 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1631 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1632 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1633 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1634 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1635 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1638 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1639 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1640 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1645 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1646 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1647 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1649 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1650 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1651 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1652 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1653 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1654 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1655 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1658 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1659 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1660 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1661 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1662 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1663 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1664 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1665 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1669 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1670 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1672 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1673 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1674 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1675 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1676 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1677 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1678 population of photographers.
1681 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1682 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1683 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1684 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1686 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1687 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1691 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1692 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1693 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1694 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1695 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1696 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1697 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1698 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1699 chemicals.
<footnote>
1702 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1704 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1709 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1710 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1711 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1712 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1713 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1714 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1715 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1716 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1717 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1718 percent.
<footnote><para>
1721 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1722 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1724 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1727 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1731 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1732 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1733 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1734 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1735 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1736 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1737 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1738 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1739 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1740 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1746 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1747 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1748 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1749 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1750 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1751 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1752 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1753 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1754 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1755 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1759 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1760 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1761 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1762 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1763 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1764 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1765 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1766 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1768 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1772 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1773 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1774 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1775 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1776 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1779 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1780 that they thought valuable.
1782 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1784 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1785 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1786 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1787 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1788 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1791 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1792 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1793 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1794 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1795 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1796 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1797 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1798 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1801 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1802 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1803 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1804 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1805 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1806 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1807 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1808 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1809 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1811 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1812 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1813 Review
48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1814 Inc.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1819 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1820 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1821 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1822 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1823 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1824 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1825 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1826 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1827 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1828 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1829 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1830 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1831 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1836 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1837 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1838 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1839 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1840 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1841 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1842 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1843 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1844 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1845 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1846 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1847 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1848 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1849 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1850 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1851 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1852 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1853 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1854 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1855 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1856 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1857 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1861 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1862 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1863 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1864 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1865 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1867 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1869 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1870 February
2002, available at
1871 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1873 These buses are filled with technology that
1874 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1875 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1876 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1877 teachers call "media literacy."
1880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1881 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1882 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1883 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1884 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1885 the way people access it."
1888 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1889 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1890 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1894 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1895 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1896 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1898 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1899 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1900 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1902 it is increasingly important to understand the
1903 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1904 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1905 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1907 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1910 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1911 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1912 written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult it is to
1914 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1915 understandable
—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1916 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1917 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1918 emotion or builds suspense.
1921 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1922 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1923 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1924 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1925 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1926 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1928 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
1930 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1931 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1932 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1935 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1936 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1940 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1942 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1943 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
1945 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1946 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1947 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1948 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1949 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1950 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1951 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1952 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1954 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1955 November
2000, available at
1956 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1958 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1961 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1963 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1964 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1965 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1966 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1967 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1970 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1971 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1972 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1973 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1977 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1978 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1979 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1980 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1985 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1986 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1990 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1991 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1993 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1994 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1996 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1998 language for what they need to create or express."
<footnote>
2001 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2002 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2003 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2004 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2009 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2011 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2012 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2013 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2014 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2015 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2016 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2017 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2018 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2019 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2020 students know something about
—gun violence.
2023 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2024 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2025 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2026 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2027 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2028 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2031 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2032 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2033 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2034 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2035 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2036 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2037 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2038 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2039 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2040 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2041 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2042 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2043 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2044 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2045 to this form of expression.
2049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2050 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2051 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2053 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2055 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2056 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part
—and
2058 not the most powerful part
—of constructing meaning. As Daley
2059 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2063 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2064 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2065 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2066 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2067 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2068 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2069 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2070 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2071 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2072 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2073 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2074 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2075 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2076 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2077 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2078 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2079 about the topic. . . .
2082 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2083 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2084 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2085 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2086 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2089 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2090 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2091 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2093 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2094 had a lot of power with this language."
2098 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2099 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2100 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2101 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2102 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2103 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2104 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2105 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2106 world would be watching.
2109 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2110 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2111 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2112 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2113 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2114 entertainment is tragedy.
2116 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2117 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2119 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2120 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2121 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2122 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2123 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2124 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2125 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2126 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2127 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2128 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2129 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2130 was also the Internet.
2133 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2134 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2135 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2136 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2139 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2143 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2144 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2145 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2146 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2147 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2148 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2149 spread practically instantaneously.
2152 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2153 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2154 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2155 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2156 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2157 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2158 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2161 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2162 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2163 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2164 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2165 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2166 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2167 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2168 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2169 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2170 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2171 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2172 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2175 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2176 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2177 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2178 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2179 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2182 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2183 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2186 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2187 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2188 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2189 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2190 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2191 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2192 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2193 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2194 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2195 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2196 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2197 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2198 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2199 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2201 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2202 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2206 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2207 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2208 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2210 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2212 Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2214 And in some towns in
2215 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2216 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2221 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2223 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2224 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2226 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2227 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2228 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2230 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2231 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2232 </para></footnote> We say what our
2233 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2236 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2237 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2238 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2240 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2241 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2244 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2248 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2249 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2250 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2251 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2252 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2253 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2256 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2257 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential
2258 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2260 is having an effect.
2263 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2264 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2265 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2267 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2268 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2269 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2270 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2272 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2273 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2274 as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2276 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2277 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2281 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2282 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2283 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2284 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2288 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2289 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2290 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2291 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2292 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2293 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2294 peer-generated rankings.
2297 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2299 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2300 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2301 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2302 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2303 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2304 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2305 get it out of the way."
2307 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2309 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2310 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2311 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2312 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2313 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2315 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2317 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2318 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2319 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2320 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2321 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2322 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2323 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2325 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2326 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2327 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2328 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2329 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2330 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2331 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2333 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2334 Information Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2335 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2336 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2337 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2339 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2340 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2341 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2342 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2345 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2346 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2347 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2348 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2349 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2352 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2353 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2354 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2355 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2356 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2357 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2358 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2359 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2360 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2362 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2365 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2366 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2367 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2368 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2369 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2372 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2373 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2375 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2376 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2377 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2378 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2379 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2380 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2381 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2382 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2383 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2384 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2389 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2390 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2391 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2394 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2396 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2397 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2398 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2401 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2402 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2404 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2406 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2407 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2408 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2410 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2411 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2412 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2413 tinkering of many others.
2416 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2417 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2418 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2419 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2420 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2423 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2425 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2426 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2427 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2428 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2430 a major apprenticeship platform."
2433 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2434 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2436 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2438 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2439 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2440 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2443 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2444 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2445 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2447 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2448 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2449 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2451 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2452 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2453 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2455 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2457 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2458 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2461 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2465 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2466 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2467 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2468 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2469 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2470 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2471 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2474 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2475 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2476 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2477 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2478 general.
<footnote><para>
2480 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2481 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2482 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2484 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2485 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2488 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2489 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2493 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2494 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2495 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2496 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2497 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2500 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2501 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2502 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2503 the law to close down that technology.
2506 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2507 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2511 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2512 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2514 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2515 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2516 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2517 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2518 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2521 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2522 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2523 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2524 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2525 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2526 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2529 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2530 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2531 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2532 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2533 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2536 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2538 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2539 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2540 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2541 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2542 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2543 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2544 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2545 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2548 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2549 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2550 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2551 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2552 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2553 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2554 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2557 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2558 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2559 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2560 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2561 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2562 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2563 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2564 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2565 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2569 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2570 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2571 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2572 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2573 be on users' computers.
2576 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2577 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2578 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2580 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2582 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2586 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2587 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2588 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2589 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2590 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2591 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2592 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2593 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2594 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2595 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2596 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2597 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2601 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2602 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2603 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2604 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2605 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2606 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2607 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2610 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2611 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2612 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2613 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2614 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2615 easier to use"
—again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2616 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2617 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2618 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2619 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2622 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2623 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2626 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2627 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2628 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2629 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2630 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2631 that Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2634 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2635 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2636 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2637 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2638 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2639 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2640 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2641 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2643 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2644 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2645 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2649 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2650 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2651 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2652 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2653 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2656 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2657 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2658 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2659 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2660 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2661 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2662 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2663 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2664 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2667 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2668 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2669 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2670 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2671 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2673 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2674 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2677 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2678 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2681 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2682 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2683 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2684 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2685 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2686 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2687 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2689 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2690 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2691 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2693 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2694 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2695 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2697 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2698 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2702 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2703 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2704 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2709 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2710 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2711 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2712 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2716 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2717 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2718 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2719 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2720 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2724 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2725 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2727 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2728 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2729 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2730 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2731 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2732 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2737 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2739 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2740 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2741 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2743 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2744 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2745 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2746 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2747 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2748 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2749 this creative property
2750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2751 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2754 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2758 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2759 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2760 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2761 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2762 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2763 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2764 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2767 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2768 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2769 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2770 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2771 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2772 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2773 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2774 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2775 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2776 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2778 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2779 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2780 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2781 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2782 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2783 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2784 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2785 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2786 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2787 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2788 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2792 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2793 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2794 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2795 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2796 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2798 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2799 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2801 That led the independents to flee the East
2802 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2803 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2804 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2808 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2809 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2810 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2813 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2814 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2815 Edison's creative property.
2818 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2819 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2821 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2822 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2825 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2826 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2827 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2828 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2829 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2830 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2831 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2832 right to perform it publicly.
2834 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2836 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2837 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2838 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2839 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2840 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2841 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2842 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2843 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2844 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2845 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2846 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2847 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2848 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2849 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2850 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2851 its composer anything.
2854 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2856 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2861 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2862 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2863 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2864 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2865 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2866 rights.
<footnote><para>
2868 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2869 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2870 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2871 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2872 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2873 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2878 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2879 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2880 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2882 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2883 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2885 and the "music publishing industry"
2886 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2888 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2889 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2892 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2893 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2895 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2896 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2900 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2901 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2902 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2903 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2904 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2905 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2907 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2908 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2910 Company of New York).
2911 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2912 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2913 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2914 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2915 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2916 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<footnote><para>
2918 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376
2920 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2922 Graphophone Company Association).
2926 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2927 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2928 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2929 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2931 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2932 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2933 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2936 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2938 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2939 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2942 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2943 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2944 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2945 Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2947 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2951 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2952 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2953 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2955 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2956 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2957 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2959 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2961 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2962 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2963 of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2964 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2965 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2966 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2967 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2968 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2969 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2970 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2972 follow-on creativity.
<footnote><para>
2974 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2975 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2976 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2977 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2978 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2982 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2983 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2984 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2989 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2991 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2993 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2995 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2996 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2997 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2999 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3000 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3001 before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3002 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3003 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3004 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3006 quality, and a greater choice.
<footnote><para>
3008 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3009 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3010 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3011 this report.
</para></footnote>
3015 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3017 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3021 <title>Radio
</title>
3023 Radio was also born of piracy.
3026 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3027 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3029 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning, record
3030 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3032 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3033 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3034 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3036 Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd Cir.
1940). See also Randal C.
3037 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3038 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3039 Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3041 As I described above,
3042 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3043 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3045 money for that performance.
3048 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3049 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3050 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3052 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3053 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3054 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3056 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3057 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3059 of the music for his work.
3061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3064 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3066 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3067 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3069 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3070 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3074 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3076 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3077 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3078 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3081 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3082 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3083 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3084 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3085 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3086 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3087 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3090 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3091 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3092 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3094 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3095 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3096 something for nothing.
3099 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3100 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3103 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3106 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3107 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3108 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3109 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3111 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3112 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3113 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3116 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3117 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3119 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3120 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3121 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3123 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3124 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3125 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3126 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3129 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3130 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3131 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3132 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3134 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3135 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3137 As another broadcaster put it,
3141 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3142 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3143 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3145 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3146 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3151 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3155 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3156 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3157 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3158 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3160 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3161 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3162 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3167 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3168 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3169 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3171 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3172 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3176 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3177 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3181 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3182 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3183 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3184 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3187 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3188 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3190 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3191 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3196 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3197 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3200 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3201 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3202 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3203 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3204 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3205 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3206 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3207 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3208 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3209 created by broadcasters' content.
3212 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3213 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3214 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3215 today
<footnote><para>
3217 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3218 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3219 Information, available at
3220 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3221 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3222 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3224 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3225 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3226 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3227 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3228 generation
—until now.
3230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3234 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3236 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3237 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3238 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3239 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3240 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3244 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3245 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3246 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3247 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3248 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3249 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3250 has so often done in the past.
3251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3253 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3254 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3256 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3257 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3258 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3259 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3260 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3262 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3263 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available at
3265 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3266 Financial Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3268 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3269 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually
3270 worldwide to piracy.
3273 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3274 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3275 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3276 This piracy is wrong.
3279 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3280 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3281 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3283 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3284 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3286 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3287 existence, treated as right.
3290 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3291 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3292 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3293 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3294 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3295 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3297 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3298 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3299 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3302 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3303 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3305 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3307 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3311 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3312 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3313 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3314 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3316 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3317 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3318 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3319 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3320 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3321 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3322 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3323 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3324 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3325 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3326 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3327 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3328 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3329 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3330 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3331 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3332 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3333 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3337 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3338 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3339 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3340 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3341 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3343 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3344 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3345 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3346 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3348 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3349 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3353 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3354 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3355 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3356 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3357 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3358 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3359 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3360 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3361 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3362 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3363 piracy of the tangible.
3366 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3367 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3369 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3370 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3371 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3373 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3374 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3376 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3379 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3380 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3381 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3383 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3384 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3387 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3388 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3389 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3390 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3391 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3393 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3394 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3396 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3397 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3398 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3400 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3403 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3404 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3405 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3406 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3408 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3409 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3412 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3414 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3415 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3417 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3418 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3419 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3420 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3422 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what
—at
3423 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3425 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3430 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3431 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3432 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3433 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3434 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3435 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3436 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3440 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3441 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3442 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3443 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3444 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3445 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3446 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3449 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3450 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3451 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3452 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3455 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3456 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3457 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3458 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3461 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3462 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3467 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3468 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3470 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3471 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3473 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3475 This means we must determine whether
3476 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3478 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3479 author of his profit.
3482 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3483 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3484 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3485 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3487 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3488 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3489 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3490 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3491 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3492 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3493 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3494 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3495 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3496 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3497 put together components that had been developed independently.
3498 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3501 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3502 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3503 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3504 system.
<footnote><para>
3506 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3507 Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3508 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3509 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3510 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3511 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3513 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3514 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3515 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3516 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3517 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3518 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3519 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3522 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3524 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3525 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3526 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3528 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3529 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3530 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3531 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3534 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
43 million citizens
3535 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3537 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3538 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3541 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3542 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3543 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3545 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3548 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3549 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3551 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3552 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully
3553 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of
3554 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3558 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3559 different kinds into four types.
3561 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3564 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3566 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3567 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3568 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3569 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3570 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3571 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3577 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3578 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3579 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3580 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3582 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3583 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3585 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3586 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3590 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3592 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3593 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3594 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3596 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3597 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3598 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3599 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3600 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3602 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3603 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3604 content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same harm
3605 that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3611 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3612 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3617 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3620 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3622 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3623 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<footnote><para>
3625 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3627 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3629 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3630 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3631 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer
—and
3633 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3637 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3638 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3640 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3641 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3642 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3643 that is "devastating" the industry.
3646 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3648 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3650 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3651 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
&
3652 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3653 labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3655 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3657 Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report describes the music
3659 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3660 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3661 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3662 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3663 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent
3664 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3665 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3666 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3667 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
3669 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3670 album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the
3671 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3673 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3676 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3677 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3678 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3679 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3681 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3682 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3684 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3688 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3689 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3690 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3691 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3692 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3693 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3694 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3695 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3698 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3699 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3700 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3701 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3702 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3703 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3704 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3707 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3709 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3710 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3713 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3715 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3717 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3719 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3720 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3721 25 June
2003, available at
3722 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3723 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3724 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3725 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3726 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3728 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3729 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3731 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3733 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3734 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3735 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3736 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3737 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3738 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3741 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3742 February
2003, available at
3743 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3744 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3747 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3748 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3749 High Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie
3750 [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3758 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3759 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3760 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3761 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3763 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3764 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3767 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3768 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3769 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3771 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3773 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3774 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3775 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3776 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3777 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3778 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3779 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3780 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3782 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3785 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3787 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3788 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3792 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3793 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3795 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3796 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3798 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3799 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3800 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3802 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3804 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3805 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3809 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3810 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3811 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3813 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3817 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3819 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3821 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3823 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3824 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3825 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3826 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3827 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3829 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3832 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3835 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3836 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3837 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3838 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3839 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3841 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3842 owner for the content they sell.
3844 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3846 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3847 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3848 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3849 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3850 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3851 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3852 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3853 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3854 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3855 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3856 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3859 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3860 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3861 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3862 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3863 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3867 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3868 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3869 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3870 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3871 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3872 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3875 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3876 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3877 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3878 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3879 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3880 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3884 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3885 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3886 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3887 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3890 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3891 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3892 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3893 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3897 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3898 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3899 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3900 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3901 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3902 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3903 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3904 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3905 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3906 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3907 found only with time.
3910 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3911 just what you call type A sharing?"
3914 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3916 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3917 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3919 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3921 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3923 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3924 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3925 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3927 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3928 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3930 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3931 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3933 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3937 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3938 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3939 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3940 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3941 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3942 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3943 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3944 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3945 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3948 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3949 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3950 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3952 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3954 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3955 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3956 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3959 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3960 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3961 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3963 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3964 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3965 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3966 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3967 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3969 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3972 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3973 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3974 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3975 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3977 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3982 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3983 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
3984 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3985 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3987 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3989 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3990 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3991 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3992 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3994 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3995 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3996 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3998 over the future (cable).
4000 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4002 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4003 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4004 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4005 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4006 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4007 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4008 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4009 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4010 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4011 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4012 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4015 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4016 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4017 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4018 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4019 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4020 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4021 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4022 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4024 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4025 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4026 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4027 for the architecture it chose.
4030 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4031 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4032 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4033 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4034 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4035 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4037 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4038 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4039 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4040 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4042 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4043 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4044 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4045 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4046 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4047 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4049 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4051 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4052 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4054 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4057 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4058 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4059 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4060 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4061 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4062 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4063 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4065 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4070 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4071 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4072 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4073 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4074 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4075 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4076 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4077 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4078 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4079 technology.
<footnote><para>
4081 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4086 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4089 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4090 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4095 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4096 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4098 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4100 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4101 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4103 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4105 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4110 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4111 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4113 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4114 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4115 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4119 <title>Table
</title>
4120 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4124 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4125 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4126 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4131 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4132 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4133 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4134 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4137 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4138 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4140 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4143 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4144 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4145 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4146 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4150 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4151 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4152 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4159 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4160 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4162 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4163 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4164 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4165 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4166 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4167 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4168 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4169 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4170 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4171 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4173 In each case, throughout our history,
4174 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4178 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4179 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4180 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4181 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4182 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4184 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4185 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4186 the interests at stake.
4187 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4190 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4191 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4192 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4193 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4194 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4196 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4197 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4198 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4199 permission to record a song?
4202 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4203 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4204 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4205 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4207 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4210 Instead, the particular uses that the
4211 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4212 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4213 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4215 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4216 the distribution of content.
4219 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4220 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4221 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4222 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4223 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4224 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4225 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4226 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4227 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4228 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4230 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4236 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4238 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4239 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4241 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4243 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4244 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4246 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4247 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4249 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4251 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4252 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4253 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4254 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4255 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4256 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4257 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4260 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4261 just as any other property is protected."
4263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4267 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4268 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4272 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4273 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4274 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4275 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4276 the price she can get.
4279 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4280 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4281 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4282 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4283 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4284 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4285 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4287 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4288 thing I am taking then?
4291 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4292 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4294 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4296 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4297 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4298 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4299 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4300 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4301 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4302 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4304 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4305 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4306 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4310 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4311 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4312 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4314 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4318 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4319 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4321 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4323 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4325 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4327 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4328 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4330 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4331 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4333 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4338 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4340 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4342 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4343 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4344 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4345 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4346 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4351 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4352 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4354 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4355 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4357 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4358 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4359 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4360 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4361 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4363 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4366 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4367 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4368 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4370 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4371 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4372 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4373 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4374 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4375 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4376 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4379 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4381 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4383 University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4386 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4387 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4388 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4390 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4392 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4394 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4397 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4398 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4399 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4400 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4401 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4403 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4405 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4407 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4409 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4411 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4412 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4415 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4417 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4418 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4419 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4421 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4422 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4423 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4425 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4428 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4429 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4430 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4432 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4434 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4435 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4437 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4438 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4440 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4442 of any positive law.
4445 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4446 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4447 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4448 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4451 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4452 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4454 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4457 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4458 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4460 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4461 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4463 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4464 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4467 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4468 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4469 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4472 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4473 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4474 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4475 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4476 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4477 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4478 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4479 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4481 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4484 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4486 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4487 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4491 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4492 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4493 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4494 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4496 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4497 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4499 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4501 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4503 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4504 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4508 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4509 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4510 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4512 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4514 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4515 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4516 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4517 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4520 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4521 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4523 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4524 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4525 monopolies
—especially
4526 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4527 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4528 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4529 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4531 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4532 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4536 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4538 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4539 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4540 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4541 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4542 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4544 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4547 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4548 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4549 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4550 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4552 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4553 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4555 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4556 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4557 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4558 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4560 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4561 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4565 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4566 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4568 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4569 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4570 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4574 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4575 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4576 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4577 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4578 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4579 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4581 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4582 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4583 construction and spread of culture.
4586 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4587 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4588 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4589 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4590 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4591 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4592 they said; they needed more time.
4595 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4596 words that echo today,
4600 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4601 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4603 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4604 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4605 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4606 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4607 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4608 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4610 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4611 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4612 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4613 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4614 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4615 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4616 al.,
8, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4621 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4622 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4623 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4624 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4625 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4626 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4627 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4628 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4629 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4630 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4631 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4632 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4633 way to protect authors.
4636 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4637 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4638 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4639 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4640 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4642 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4643 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4644 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4646 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4647 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4650 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4651 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4652 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4654 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4655 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4659 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4660 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4661 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4662 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4664 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4667 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4669 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4670 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4671 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4672 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4676 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4679 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4680 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4681 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4682 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4683 Property."
<footnote><para>
4685 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4688 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4689 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4690 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4693 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4694 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4695 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4698 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4699 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4700 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4701 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4702 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4703 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4705 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4706 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review
29
4711 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4712 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4713 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4714 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4715 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4716 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4717 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4718 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4719 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4722 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4723 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4724 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4725 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4726 with in
1710: How best to limit
4727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4728 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4729 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4730 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4731 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4732 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4733 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4736 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4737 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4739 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4741 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4742 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4743 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4747 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4748 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4749 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4750 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4751 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4752 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4755 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4756 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4757 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4758 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4759 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4760 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4761 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4762 statute were no longer protected.
4765 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4766 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4767 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4768 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4769 House of Lords generally voted.
4772 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4773 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4775 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4776 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4777 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4778 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4779 passed into the public domain.
4782 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4783 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4784 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4785 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4786 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4787 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4788 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4790 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4791 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4792 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4793 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4794 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4797 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4798 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4799 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4800 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4801 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4802 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4803 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4804 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4805 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4811 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4812 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4817 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4818 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4819 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4820 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4821 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4822 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4823 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4824 successors.
<footnote><para>
4831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4832 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4833 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4834 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4835 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4836 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4837 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4838 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4839 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4840 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4841 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4842 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4843 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4844 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4845 readers chose to let it develop
— chose in the books they bought
4846 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4847 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4848 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4849 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4852 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4853 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4854 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4859 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4860 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4862 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4863 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4864 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4865 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4869 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4870 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4874 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4875 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4876 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4877 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4878 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4882 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4883 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4884 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4885 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4887 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4891 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4892 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4893 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4894 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4895 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4898 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4899 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4900 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4901 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4902 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4905 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4906 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4907 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4908 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4909 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4912 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4913 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4914 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4915 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4916 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4917 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4920 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4921 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4922 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4923 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4924 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4925 confirm what he had been told.
4928 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4929 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4930 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4934 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4935 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4936 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4940 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4941 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4942 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4943 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4944 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4945 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4948 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4949 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4950 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4951 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4952 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4953 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4954 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4955 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4956 says the owner gets to control.
4959 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4960 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4961 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4962 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4963 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4964 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
4968 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4969 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4971 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4972 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4973 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4974 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4975 Law School,
5 August
2003.
4977 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4978 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use does
4979 not require the permission of anyone.
4982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4983 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4987 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4988 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4989 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4990 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4991 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4992 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4994 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
4997 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4998 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4999 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5000 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5001 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5005 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5006 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5007 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
5008 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
5009 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5010 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
5011 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5012 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5017 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5018 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5019 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5020 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5021 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5022 pockets, me or them.
5023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5027 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5028 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5034 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5035 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5036 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5037 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5038 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5039 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5042 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5043 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5044 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5045 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5050 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5051 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5052 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5053 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5055 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5056 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5057 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5058 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5059 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5061 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5063 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5064 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5065 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5066 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5067 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5068 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5069 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5070 important to his career.
5072 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5074 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5075 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5076 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5077 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5081 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5082 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5083 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5084 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5085 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5087 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5089 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5090 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5091 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5092 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5093 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5096 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5098 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5099 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5101 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5103 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5104 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5105 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5109 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5110 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5111 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5112 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5114 <primary>artists
</primary>
5115 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5120 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5121 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5122 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5123 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5124 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5127 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5128 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5129 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5133 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5134 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5135 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5136 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5137 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5138 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5142 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5143 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5144 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5145 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5146 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5147 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5148 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5149 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5150 started calling people.
5153 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5155 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5156 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5157 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5158 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5159 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5160 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5161 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5162 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5166 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5167 were totally in the clear."
5169 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5171 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5172 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5173 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5177 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5178 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5179 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5180 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5181 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5182 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5183 systematically and cleared the rights.
5188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5189 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5190 loved it, and it sold very well.
5192 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5193 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5195 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5196 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5197 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5198 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5199 at all."
<footnote><para>
5201 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5202 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5203 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5205 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5209 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5210 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5211 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5212 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5213 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5217 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5218 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5219 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5220 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5221 compensated for that.
5225 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5226 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5227 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5228 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5229 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5230 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5231 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5235 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5236 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5237 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5238 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5240 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5241 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5242 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5243 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5244 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5245 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5246 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5247 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5248 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5249 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5250 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5251 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5254 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5256 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5257 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5258 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5259 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5260 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5261 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5262 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5263 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5264 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5265 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5266 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5267 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5268 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5269 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5270 "Does this still make sense?"
5273 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5274 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5275 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5276 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5279 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5280 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5283 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5284 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5285 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5286 judges loved every minute of it.
5288 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5290 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5291 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5292 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5293 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5294 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5295 were just violated in this room?"
5297 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5299 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5300 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5301 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5302 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5303 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5304 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5305 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5306 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5307 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5308 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5309 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5310 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5311 couldn't easily do them legally.
5314 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5315 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5316 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5317 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5318 planted in your presentation.
5321 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5322 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5323 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5324 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5325 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5326 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5327 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5328 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5329 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5330 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5333 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5334 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5335 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5336 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5337 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5340 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5341 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5342 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5343 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5344 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5345 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5346 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5347 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5348 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5349 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5350 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5351 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5355 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5356 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5357 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5358 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5361 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5362 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5364 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5365 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5366 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5367 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5368 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5369 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5373 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5374 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5375 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5376 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5377 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5378 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5379 new audiences, it is Mike."
5382 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5383 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5384 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5385 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5386 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5387 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5388 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5389 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5392 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5393 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5394 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5395 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5396 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5397 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5398 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5399 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5400 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5401 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5402 curse, reserved for the few.
5404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5406 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5407 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5409 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5410 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5411 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5412 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5413 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5414 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5415 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5418 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5419 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5420 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5421 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5422 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5423 well as when those pages changed.
5426 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5427 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5428 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5429 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5434 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5435 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5436 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5439 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5440 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5441 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5442 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5443 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5446 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5447 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5448 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5449 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5450 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5452 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5453 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5454 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5455 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5456 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5460 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5461 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5462 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5463 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5464 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5465 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5466 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5467 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5471 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5472 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5473 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5474 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5475 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5476 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5477 presumes this knowedge.
5480 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5481 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5482 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5483 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5485 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5486 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5487 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5488 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5491 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5492 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5493 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5494 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5495 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5496 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5497 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5498 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5501 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5502 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5503 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5504 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5505 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5506 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5507 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5508 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5509 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5510 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5511 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5512 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5513 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5514 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5515 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5519 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5520 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5521 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5522 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5523 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5526 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5527 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5531 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5532 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5533 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5534 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5535 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5536 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5539 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5540 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5541 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5542 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5543 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5547 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5548 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5549 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5550 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5551 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5552 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5553 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5554 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5556 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5557 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3
5558 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5559 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5564 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5565 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5566 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5567 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5568 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5569 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5570 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5571 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5572 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5575 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5577 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5578 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5579 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5580 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5581 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5582 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5586 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5587 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5588 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5589 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5590 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5591 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5592 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5593 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5594 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5595 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5596 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5597 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5598 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5599 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5600 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5601 few minutes
—for free.
5604 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5605 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5606 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5607 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5608 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5612 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5613 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5614 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5615 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5616 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5617 has
—a noncommercial life.
5620 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5621 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5625 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5626 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5627 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5628 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5629 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5632 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5633 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5634 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5635 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5636 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5637 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5641 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5642 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5644 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5645 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5646 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5647 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5648 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5649 College Law Review
44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5650 </para></footnote>). After
5651 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5652 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5653 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5654 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5655 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5658 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5659 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5660 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5661 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5662 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5663 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5664 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5665 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5669 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5670 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5671 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5672 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5673 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5676 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5677 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5678 little practical effect.
5681 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5682 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5683 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5684 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5685 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5686 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5689 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5690 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5691 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5696 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5697 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5698 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5699 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5700 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5701 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5702 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5703 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5704 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5705 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5706 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5710 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5711 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5712 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5713 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5714 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5715 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5718 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5719 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5720 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5721 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5722 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5725 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5726 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5727 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5728 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5729 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5730 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5734 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5735 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5737 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5738 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5739 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5740 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5741 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5742 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5743 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5744 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5747 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5748 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5749 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5750 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5751 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5752 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5753 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5754 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5755 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5760 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5761 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5762 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5763 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5764 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5765 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5766 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5767 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5768 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5772 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5773 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5774 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5775 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5776 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5777 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5778 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5781 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5786 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5787 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5788 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5789 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5790 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5791 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5792 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5793 debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5795 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5796 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5797 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5798 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5799 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5805 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5806 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5807 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5810 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5811 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5812 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5813 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5816 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5817 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5818 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5819 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5820 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5821 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5822 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5823 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5824 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5828 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5829 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5831 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5832 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5833 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5834 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5835 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5836 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5837 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5838 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5839 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5840 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5841 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5842 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5846 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5847 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5848 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5849 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5850 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5851 culture would develop.
5854 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5855 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5856 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5857 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5858 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5859 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5860 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5861 the same would be to
5863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5864 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5865 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5869 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5870 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5871 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5872 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5873 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5874 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5875 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5876 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5877 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5878 Constitution itself.
5881 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5882 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5883 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5884 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5885 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5886 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5887 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5888 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5889 government pays for the privilege.
5892 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5893 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5894 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5895 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5896 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5897 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5898 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5899 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5900 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5901 compensation for your land
5902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5903 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5904 compensation at all.
5907 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5908 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5909 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5910 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5911 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5912 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5916 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5917 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5918 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5919 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5920 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5921 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5922 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5923 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5924 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5925 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5928 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5929 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5930 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5931 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5932 creative property there must be a public domain?
5935 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5936 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5937 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5938 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5939 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5940 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5941 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5942 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5943 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5944 control how culture develops.
5948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5949 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5950 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5951 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5952 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5953 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5954 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5955 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5957 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
5958 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
5959 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
5962 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5963 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5964 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5965 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5966 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5967 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5968 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5969 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5970 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5971 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5972 Web, you can be punished
5973 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5974 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5975 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5978 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5979 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5980 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5981 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5982 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5983 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5984 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5985 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5986 the source of the enforcement.
5989 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5990 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5991 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5992 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5993 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5994 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5995 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5996 individual or group might behave.
5999 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6000 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6001 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6002 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6003 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6004 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6005 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6006 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6007 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6008 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
6009 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6010 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6011 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6016 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6017 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6018 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6019 undermined by another.
6022 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6023 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6024 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6025 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6026 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6027 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6028 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6030 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6031 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6034 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6035 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6036 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6037 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6038 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6039 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6040 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6041 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6042 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6043 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6044 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6045 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6048 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6049 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6050 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6052 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6053 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6054 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6055 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6056 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6057 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6058 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6061 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6062 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6063 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6064 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6065 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6066 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6067 used to require that other laws be more
6068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6069 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6070 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6073 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6075 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6076 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6077 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6080 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6081 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6082 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6083 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6084 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6088 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6089 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6090 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6091 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6092 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6093 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6094 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6095 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6096 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6097 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6098 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6099 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6100 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6101 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6102 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6103 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6104 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6105 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6106 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6107 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6108 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6109 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6110 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6111 places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6112 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6113 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6114 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6115 of these groups might face.
6116 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6119 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6120 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6122 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6123 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6124 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6125 rallying makes sense.
6128 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6131 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6132 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6133 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6137 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6138 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6139 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6140 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6141 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6142 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6143 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6144 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6145 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6146 this form of infringement.
6149 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6150 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6151 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6152 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6153 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6154 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6157 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6158 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6159 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6160 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6163 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6164 looting that results.
6166 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6167 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6168 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6171 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6172 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6173 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6174 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6175 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6176 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6177 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6178 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6179 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6180 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6183 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6184 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6185 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6186 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6187 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6188 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6189 life. Homeowners living in a
6191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6192 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6193 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6194 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6195 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6196 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6197 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6200 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6201 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6202 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6203 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6204 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6205 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6208 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6209 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6210 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6211 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6212 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6213 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6214 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6216 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6217 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6218 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6219 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6220 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6221 October
2003, available at
6222 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6225 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6226 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6227 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6228 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6229 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6230 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6231 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6232 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6233 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6234 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6235 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6238 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6239 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6240 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6242 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6243 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6244 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6245 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6246 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6248 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6251 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6252 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6253 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6254 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6255 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6259 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6260 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6261 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6262 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6263 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6264 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6265 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6266 opportunities for innovation and change.
6269 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6270 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6271 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6272 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6273 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6274 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6275 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6276 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6277 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6278 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6279 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6280 regulation is justified.
6283 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6285 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6286 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6287 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6288 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6289 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6292 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6295 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6296 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6297 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6298 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6299 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6302 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6303 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6304 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6306 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6308 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6309 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6310 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6311 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6312 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6313 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6316 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6317 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6318 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6319 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6320 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6321 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6322 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6325 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6326 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6327 culture.
<footnote><para>
6329 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6330 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6332 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6333 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6334 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6335 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6336 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6337 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6339 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6340 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6341 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6342 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6343 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6346 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6347 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6348 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6349 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6350 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6351 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6352 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6353 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6354 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6357 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6358 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6362 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6363 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6365 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6366 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6367 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6368 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6371 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6372 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6373 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6376 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6377 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6378 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6381 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6382 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6383 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6384 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6385 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6386 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6389 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6390 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6391 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6392 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6393 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6394 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6395 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6398 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6399 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6400 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6401 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6402 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6403 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6404 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6405 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6406 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6407 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6408 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6409 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6413 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6414 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6415 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6416 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6417 years since they first struck its design.
6420 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6421 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6423 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6426 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6427 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6428 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6433 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6434 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6435 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6442 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6443 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6445 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6446 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6447 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6448 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6449 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6450 authorship.
<footnote>
6453 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6454 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6455 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6456 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6457 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6458 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6460 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6461 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6462 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6463 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6464 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6465 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6468 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6469 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6470 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6471 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6472 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6473 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6476 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6477 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6478 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6479 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6480 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6483 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6484 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6485 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6486 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6487 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6488 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6489 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6491 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6492 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6493 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6494 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6495 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6496 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6497 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6498 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6499 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6500 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6501 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6502 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6503 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6504 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6507 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6508 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6510 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6511 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6512 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6516 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6517 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6518 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6519 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6520 domain.
<footnote><para>
6522 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6523 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6524 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6525 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6526 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6527 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6528 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6529 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6530 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6533 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6534 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6535 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6537 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6538 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6539 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6540 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6541 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6545 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6546 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6547 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6548 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6549 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6550 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6553 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6554 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6555 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6556 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6557 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6558 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6559 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6560 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6563 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6564 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6565 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6566 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6569 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6570 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6571 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6574 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6575 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6576 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6577 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6578 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6579 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6580 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6584 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6585 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6586 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6587 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6588 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6589 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6590 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6591 was ninety-five years.
6594 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6595 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6596 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6597 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6598 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6599 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6603 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6604 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6605 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6606 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6607 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6608 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6609 years.
<footnote><para>
6611 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6612 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6613 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6614 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6619 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6620 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6622 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6623 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6624 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6625 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6628 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6629 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6630 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6631 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6632 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6633 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6634 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6635 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6636 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6637 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6638 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6641 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6642 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6643 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6644 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6645 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6646 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6647 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6648 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6649 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6650 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6651 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6652 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6653 on the initial creative work.
6656 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6657 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6658 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6659 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6660 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6661 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6662 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6663 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6664 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6665 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6666 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6669 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6670 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6671 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6672 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6673 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6674 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6675 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6676 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6677 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6678 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6679 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6683 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6684 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6685 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6686 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6687 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6688 copy available for others to copy.
6691 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6695 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6696 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6697 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6698 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6699 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6700 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6702 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6704 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6706 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6707 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6709 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6710 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6711 the United States
—publishers.
6714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6715 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6716 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6717 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6718 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6719 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6721 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6725 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6726 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6727 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6729 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6730 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6731 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6734 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6735 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6736 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6739 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6741 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6742 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6743 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6744 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6745 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6746 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6747 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6749 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6750 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6753 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6754 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6756 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6758 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6759 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6760 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6761 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6766 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6767 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6768 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6769 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6770 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6771 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6772 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6774 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6776 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6778 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6780 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6781 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6782 the wrong of direct piracy.
6785 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6786 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6787 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6789 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6791 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6792 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6793 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6794 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6796 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6798 These two different uses of my creative work are
6802 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6803 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6804 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6806 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6807 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6811 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6812 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6814 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6815 rights originally granted.
6818 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6819 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6821 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6822 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6823 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6824 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6826 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6827 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6828 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6829 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6831 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6832 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6833 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6838 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6839 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6840 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6841 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6842 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6843 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6844 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6845 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6846 trigger for copyright law.
6849 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6850 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6851 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6852 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6854 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6855 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6856 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6858 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6860 because it is clear that the
6861 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6862 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6865 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6868 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6869 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6870 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6874 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6875 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6876 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6877 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6878 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6879 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6880 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6881 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6882 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6883 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6886 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6887 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6888 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6891 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6892 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6893 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6894 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6895 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6896 diagram on next page).
6899 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6900 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6903 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6904 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6905 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6908 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6909 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6911 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6912 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6913 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6914 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6915 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6916 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6918 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6919 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6920 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6923 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6924 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6925 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6929 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6930 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6931 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6934 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6935 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6937 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6938 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6939 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6940 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6942 And because of this single,
6943 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6945 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6947 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6948 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6949 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6950 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
6952 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6954 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
6955 burden of this shift.
6958 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6959 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6960 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6961 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6963 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6965 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
6966 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6971 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6973 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6974 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6976 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6978 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6979 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6980 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6981 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6982 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6985 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6986 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6987 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6988 points also become clear:
6991 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6992 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6994 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6996 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6997 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6998 free culture before the Internet.
7001 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7003 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7004 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7006 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7007 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7009 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7011 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7012 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7014 uses of creative work.
7017 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7020 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7021 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7022 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7023 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7024 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7026 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7027 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7029 before because reading was not regulated.
7032 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7033 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7035 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7036 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7037 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7038 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7040 of fair use are not enough.
7043 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7044 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7045 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7046 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7047 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7050 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7052 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7054 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7055 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7056 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7057 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7062 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7064 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7065 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7066 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7068 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7070 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7071 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7072 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7074 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7075 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7076 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7079 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7080 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7082 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7084 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7085 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7086 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7087 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7088 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7091 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7092 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7093 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7094 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7095 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7096 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7097 Disney's permission.
7100 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7101 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7102 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7103 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7105 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7106 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7107 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7108 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7109 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7110 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7111 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7115 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7117 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say
7118 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7119 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
&
7121 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7122 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7124 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7125 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7127 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7128 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7129 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7130 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7133 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7134 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7135 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7136 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7138 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7139 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7142 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7143 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7145 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7146 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7147 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7148 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7151 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7152 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7153 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7154 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7155 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7158 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7160 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7161 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7163 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7164 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7165 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7167 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7169 Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7173 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7174 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7175 you were."
<footnote><para>
7177 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7179 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7180 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7181 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7184 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7185 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7186 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7187 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7190 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7191 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7192 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7193 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7195 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7196 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7197 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7198 that is not at all funny.
7201 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7204 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7205 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7206 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7208 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7211 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7215 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7216 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7217 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7218 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7219 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7220 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7222 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7225 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7226 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7227 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7230 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7231 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7233 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7234 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7235 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7239 According to my eBook
7240 Reader, I have the permission
7241 to copy to the clipboard of the
7242 computer ten text selections
7243 every ten days. (So far, I've
7244 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7245 I also have the permission to
7246 print ten pages from the book
7247 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7248 the permission to use the Read
7249 Aloud button to hear
7251 read aloud through the
7255 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7256 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7258 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7259 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7260 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7263 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7264 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7267 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7268 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7269 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7272 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7273 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7276 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7277 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7278 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7281 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7284 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7285 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7286 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7287 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7289 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7291 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7292 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7293 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7295 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7296 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7297 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7300 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7301 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7302 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7303 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7306 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7307 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7308 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7309 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7310 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7311 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7312 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7313 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7314 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7316 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7317 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7318 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7319 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7320 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7324 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7325 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7326 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7329 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7330 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7331 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7332 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7333 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7334 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7337 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7338 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7340 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7341 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7342 protections as well?
7345 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7349 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7351 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7352 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7353 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7354 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7356 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7357 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7358 Wonderland
".
</title>
7359 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7363 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7365 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7367 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7370 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7371 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7372 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7373 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7374 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7375 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7378 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7379 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7380 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7381 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7382 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7383 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7384 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7385 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7386 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7387 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7388 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7391 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7392 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7393 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7394 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7395 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7399 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7400 story of mine that makes the same point.
7402 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7404 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7405 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7406 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7409 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7410 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7411 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7413 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7414 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7415 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7418 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7419 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7420 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7421 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7422 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7423 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7426 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7427 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7428 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7429 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7430 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7431 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7432 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7433 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7434 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7435 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7438 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7439 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7440 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7441 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7444 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7446 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7447 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7448 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7449 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7450 than Sony had built.
7453 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7454 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7455 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7456 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7460 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7461 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7462 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7463 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7464 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7465 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7469 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7470 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7471 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7472 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7473 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7474 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7475 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7476 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7477 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7480 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7482 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7483 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7484 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7485 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7486 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7487 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7488 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7489 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7490 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7491 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7492 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7494 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7495 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7496 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7497 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7500 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7501 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7502 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7503 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7504 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7505 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7506 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7510 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7511 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7512 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7513 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7516 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7517 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7518 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7519 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7520 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7523 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7524 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7525 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7526 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7527 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7528 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7531 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7532 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7533 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7534 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7535 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7536 constituted, succeed.
7539 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7540 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7541 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7546 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7547 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7548 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7552 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7553 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7554 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7558 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7560 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7561 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7562 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7566 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7567 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7568 spreading such information an offense.
7571 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7572 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7573 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7574 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7575 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7576 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7577 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7580 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7581 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7582 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7583 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7586 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7587 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7588 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7589 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7590 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7591 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7592 have been a copyright violation.
7595 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7596 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7597 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7598 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7599 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7600 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7601 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7603 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7604 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7607 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7608 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7609 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7610 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7611 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7612 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7615 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7616 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7617 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7618 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7619 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7620 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7621 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7622 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7626 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7627 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7628 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7629 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7630 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7631 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7632 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7633 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7634 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7635 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7636 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7637 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7638 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7639 important.
<footnote><para>
7641 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7642 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7643 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7644 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7649 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7650 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7651 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7652 the VCR responsible.
7655 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7659 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7662 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7663 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7664 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7665 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7666 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7667 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7670 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7672 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7673 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7674 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7677 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7678 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7679 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7682 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7683 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7684 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7685 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7686 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7687 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7690 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7691 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7692 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7693 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7694 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7695 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7698 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7699 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7700 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7701 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7702 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7703 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7704 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7705 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7708 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7709 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7710 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7711 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7712 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7713 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7714 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7715 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7716 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7721 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7722 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7723 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7724 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7725 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7727 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7728 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7729 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7733 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7734 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7735 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7736 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7737 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7740 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7741 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7742 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7743 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7744 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7745 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7746 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7747 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7750 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7751 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7752 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7753 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7754 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7755 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7758 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7759 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7761 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7762 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7763 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7764 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7765 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7768 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7769 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7770 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7771 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7772 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7773 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7774 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7775 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7779 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7780 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7781 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7782 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7783 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7786 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7787 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7788 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7789 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7790 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7791 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7792 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7793 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7797 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7800 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7802 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7803 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7804 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7806 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7807 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7808 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7809 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7810 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7811 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7813 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7814 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7816 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7817 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7819 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7824 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7825 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7827 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7828 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7829 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7830 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7831 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7832 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7835 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7836 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7837 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7838 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7839 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7840 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7841 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7842 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7843 protected
— by the market.
7846 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7847 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7848 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7849 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7853 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7854 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7855 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7856 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7857 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7858 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7859 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7860 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7861 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7862 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7864 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7866 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7871 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7872 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7873 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7874 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7876 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7877 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7878 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7882 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7883 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7887 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7888 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7889 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7890 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7893 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7894 integration may matter.
7896 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7897 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7898 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7900 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7901 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7902 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7903 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7904 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7907 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7908 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7909 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7910 control.
<footnote><para>
7912 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7913 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7915 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7916 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7917 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7918 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7924 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7925 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7926 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7927 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7928 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7929 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7933 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7934 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
7935 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7936 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
7937 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7938 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7939 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
7940 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7941 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
7943 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7944 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
7945 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7946 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7947 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7948 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7949 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
7952 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7953 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
7954 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7955 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7956 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7957 63%."
<footnote><para>
7962 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7964 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7965 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7966 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7967 owned by the network.
7970 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7971 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7972 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7976 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7977 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7978 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7979 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7980 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7981 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7982 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7983 handful.
<footnote><para>
7985 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7986 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
7987 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
7992 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7993 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7994 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7995 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7996 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7997 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7998 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
7999 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8000 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8003 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8005 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8006 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8007 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8008 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8009 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8010 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8012 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8013 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
8014 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8015 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8016 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8017 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy
14 (
1985):
8018 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8019 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8020 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
8021 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8023 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8024 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8026 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8029 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8030 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8031 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8035 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8036 suggest the concern.
8039 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8040 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8041 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8044 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8045 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8046 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8049 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8050 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8051 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8052 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8053 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8054 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8055 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8056 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8057 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8058 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8059 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8060 outweigh these costs.
8063 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8064 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8065 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8069 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8070 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8071 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8072 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8073 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8074 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8075 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8076 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8077 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8078 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8081 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8082 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8085 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8086 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8087 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8091 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8093 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8094 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8095 message will be heard then?
8098 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8099 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8100 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8101 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8102 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8103 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8104 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8105 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8106 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8108 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8109 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8110 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8111 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8112 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8113 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8114 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8115 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8116 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8117 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8118 York Times,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8119 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8120 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8121 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8122 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8123 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8124 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
872
8125 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8126 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8127 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8128 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8129 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8130 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8131 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8135 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8136 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8137 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8138 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8139 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8140 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8141 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8142 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8143 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8146 <sect2 id=
"together">
8147 <title>Together
</title>
8149 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8150 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8151 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8152 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8155 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8156 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8157 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8158 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8162 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8163 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8164 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8165 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8166 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8167 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8171 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8172 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8173 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8177 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8178 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8179 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8180 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8181 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8182 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8183 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8184 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8185 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8186 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8189 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8190 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8191 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8192 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8193 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8194 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8195 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8196 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8197 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8198 technology and the market enable.
8201 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8202 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8204 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8205 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8206 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8207 the development of our culture than now.
8209 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8210 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8211 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8212 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8213 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8214 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8215 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8216 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny
8217 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8218 founding
—is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8219 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8220 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8221 culture that our free society has known.
<footnote><para>
8223 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8224 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8228 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8231 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8232 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8233 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8234 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8235 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8240 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8244 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8245 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8250 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8251 <entry>©</entry>
8255 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8264 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8265 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8266 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8269 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8270 noncommercial work was also free.
8273 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8278 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8282 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8283 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8288 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8289 <entry>©</entry>
8290 <entry>©</entry>
8293 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8302 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8303 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8304 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8305 transformation were still essentially free.
8308 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8309 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8310 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8311 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8312 we could say the law began to look like this:
8317 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8322 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8327 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8328 <entry>©</entry>
8329 <entry>©</entry>
8332 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8333 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8341 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8342 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8343 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8344 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8345 that the law now looks like this:
8350 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8355 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8360 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8361 <entry>©</entry>
8362 <entry>©</entry>
8365 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8366 <entry>©</entry>
8367 <entry>©</entry>
8374 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8375 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8378 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8379 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8382 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8383 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8384 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8385 these domains actually does any good.
8388 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8389 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8390 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8391 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8392 reasons sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8393 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8394 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8395 rights were more sharply restricted.
8398 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8399 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8400 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8401 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8402 property rights
<footnote><para>
8404 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8405 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8406 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8407 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8408 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8411 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8412 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8413 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8414 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8415 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8416 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8417 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8421 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8422 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8423 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8424 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8425 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8426 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8427 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8430 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8431 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8432 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8433 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8434 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8435 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8436 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8437 dominates the debate today.
8440 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8441 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8442 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8443 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8444 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8445 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8446 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8447 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8448 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8449 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8456 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8457 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8460 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8461 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8462 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8463 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8465 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8466 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8468 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8469 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8473 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8474 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8475 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8477 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8478 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8479 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8481 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8482 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8483 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8484 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8485 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8486 villagers to explore life as a king.
8489 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8490 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8491 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8492 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8493 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8494 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8495 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8496 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8501 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8502 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8503 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8504 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8505 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8506 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8507 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8508 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8509 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8512 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8513 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8514 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8515 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8518 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8519 is affected," he reports.
8522 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8523 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8527 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8528 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8529 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8530 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8533 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8534 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8535 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8536 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8537 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8538 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8539 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8540 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8542 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8543 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8544 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8547 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8548 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8550 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8551 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8552 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8553 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8554 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8555 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8558 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8559 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8560 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8561 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8562 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8563 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8564 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8565 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8566 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8567 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8568 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8569 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8572 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8573 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8574 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8575 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8576 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8577 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8578 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8581 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8582 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8583 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8584 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8585 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8591 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8592 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8593 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8594 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8595 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8596 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8597 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8598 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8601 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8602 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8603 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8604 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8605 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8608 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8609 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8610 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8611 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8612 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8613 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8614 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8615 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8616 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8617 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8619 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available
8621 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8622 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8623 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8624 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8625 Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8626 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8627 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8628 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8629 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer,
8630 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F.
8631 Supp.
2d
24 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8632 high as $
90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8633 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8634 from $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8635 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8637 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8639 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8640 August
2003, available at
8641 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8643 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8644 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8645 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003,
8647 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8651 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8653 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8654 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8655 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8656 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8657 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8660 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8661 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8662 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8663 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8664 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8665 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8666 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8667 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8672 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8673 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8674 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8675 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8676 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8677 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8680 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8681 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8682 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8683 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8684 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8685 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8686 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8687 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8688 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8689 protection for copyrighted material,
8693 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8694 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8697 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8698 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8699 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8701 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8702 well produce a totally different industry model.
8705 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8706 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8707 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8708 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8709 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8710 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8711 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8712 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8713 interests.
<footnote><para>
8714 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8715 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8716 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8718 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
8719 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8721 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8729 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8730 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8734 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8735 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8736 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8742 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8745 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8746 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8747 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8748 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8750 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8753 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8754 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8756 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8760 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8761 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8762 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8765 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8766 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8768 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8769 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8770 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8771 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8775 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8776 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8777 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8778 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8779 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8781 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8782 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8784 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8785 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8786 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8787 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8788 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8789 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8790 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8791 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8792 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8793 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8794 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8795 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8796 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8799 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8800 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8801 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8802 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8803 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8804 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8805 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8806 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8807 the culture all around.
8810 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8811 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8813 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8815 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8816 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8817 storytelling extended across the globe.
8820 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8821 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8822 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8823 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8824 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8825 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8826 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8827 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8828 work is presumptively illegal.
8831 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8832 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8833 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8834 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8835 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8836 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8837 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8838 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8839 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8840 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8841 million.
<footnote><para>
8843 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8844 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8845 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8846 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8847 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8849 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8850 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8851 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8852 suffering.
<footnote>
8854 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8855 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8856 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8857 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8858 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8859 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8861 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8863 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8865 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8866 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8867 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8870 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8871 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8872 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8874 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8875 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8876 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8879 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8881 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8882 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8884 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
8886 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8887 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8889 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
8890 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
8893 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8894 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8896 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8897 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8898 critical or reflective.
8901 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8902 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
8903 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8904 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8905 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8906 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8907 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8908 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8909 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8912 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8913 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8914 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8915 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8916 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8917 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8918 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8919 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8920 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8923 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8924 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
8925 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8926 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8927 law regulates such a use.
8931 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8932 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8933 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8934 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
8935 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8936 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8937 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8938 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8939 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8942 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8943 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8944 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8945 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8946 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8947 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8948 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8949 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8953 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
8954 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8955 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8956 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8957 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
8958 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8959 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8960 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8961 culture that is free.
8964 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8968 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8969 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8970 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8971 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8972 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8973 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8974 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8975 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8976 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8980 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
8981 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
8983 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8984 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8985 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8986 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8987 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8988 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8991 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8992 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8993 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8994 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8995 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8996 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8997 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9000 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9001 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9002 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9003 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9004 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9005 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9006 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9007 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9008 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9009 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9010 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9012 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9014 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9016 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
9017 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9018 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9019 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9020 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9021 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9022 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9023 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9026 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9027 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9028 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9031 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9032 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9033 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9034 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9035 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9036 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9039 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9040 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9041 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9042 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9046 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9047 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9048 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9049 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9050 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9051 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9052 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9053 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9054 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9055 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9058 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9059 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9062 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9063 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9064 the kind of content the users liked.
9067 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9068 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9069 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9070 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9071 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9072 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9073 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9074 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9075 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9076 they had already bought.
9079 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9080 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9081 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9082 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9083 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9084 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9085 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9086 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9089 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9092 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9093 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9094 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9095 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9096 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9097 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9098 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9102 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9103 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9104 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9107 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9108 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9109 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9110 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9112 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9113 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9115 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9116 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9117 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9118 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9119 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9120 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9121 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9123 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9125 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9126 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9127 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9130 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9131 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9133 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9134 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9135 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9136 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9137 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9138 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9139 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9140 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9141 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9144 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9146 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9147 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9148 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9149 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9150 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9151 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9152 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9155 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9157 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9158 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9159 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9164 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9165 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9166 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9167 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9168 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9169 constantly threatened by litigation.
9173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9174 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9175 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9176 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9177 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9178 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9180 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9182 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9183 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9184 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9185 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9186 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9189 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9190 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9191 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9193 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9195 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9196 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9198 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9200 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9201 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9202 overregulatedregulated
9206 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9207 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9209 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture
—a
9211 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9212 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9213 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9214 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9215 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9216 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9217 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9218 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9220 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9221 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9223 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9224 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9225 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9226 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9228 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9231 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9232 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9234 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9236 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9237 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9238 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9239 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9240 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9243 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9244 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9245 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9246 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9247 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9248 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9249 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9250 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9254 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9256 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9257 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9258 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9259 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9260 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9262 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9263 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9268 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9269 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9271 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9272 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9275 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9279 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9280 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9281 impose.
<footnote><para>
9282 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9283 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9285 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9286 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9290 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9291 innovation
—again,
9292 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9296 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9297 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9298 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9299 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9302 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9303 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9304 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9305 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9308 overall this history of copyright
9309 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9310 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9311 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9312 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9315 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9316 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9317 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9318 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9319 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9322 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9323 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9324 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9325 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9326 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9328 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9330 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9331 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9332 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9334 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9335 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9336 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9337 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9340 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9341 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9342 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9343 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9344 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9345 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9347 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9348 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9349 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9350 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9351 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9352 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9353 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9354 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
9355 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9358 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9365 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9366 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9367 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9368 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9369 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9370 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9372 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9373 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9376 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9377 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9378 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9379 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9380 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9382 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9383 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9385 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9388 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9390 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9391 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9392 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9393 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9395 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9398 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9399 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9400 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9401 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9403 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9404 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9405 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9406 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9407 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9408 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9409 in to this new form of radio.
9413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9414 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9416 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9418 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9419 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9421 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9422 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9426 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9427 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9429 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9430 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9432 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9433 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9434 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9435 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9437 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9438 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9440 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9441 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9442 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
<footnote><para>
9443 <!-- f12. --> Lessing,
239.
9448 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because
9450 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9451 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<footnote><para>
9452 <!-- f13. --> Ibid.,
229.
9456 the growth of this competing technology.
9459 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9460 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9461 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9462 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9463 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9467 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9468 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9471 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9473 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9474 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9475 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9477 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9478 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9479 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9480 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9483 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9484 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9485 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9486 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9487 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9490 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9491 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9492 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9493 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9494 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9495 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9496 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9497 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9498 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9499 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9500 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9501 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9502 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9503 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9504 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9505 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9506 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9507 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9509 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9513 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9514 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9515 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9518 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9520 name of the service;
9523 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9526 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9529 date of transmission;
9532 time of transmission;
9535 time zone of origination of transmission;
9538 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9541 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9544 sound recording title;
9547 ISRC code of the recording;
9550 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9553 featured recording artist;
9562 UPC code of the retail album;
9568 copyright owner information;
9571 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9574 name of the service or entity;
9580 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9583 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9586 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9589 Unique User identifier;
9592 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9597 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9598 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9599 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9600 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9601 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9605 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9606 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9607 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9609 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9611 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9612 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9613 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9617 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9618 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9619 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9620 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9621 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9622 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9625 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9627 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9628 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9629 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9633 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9634 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9635 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9636 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9640 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9641 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9642 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9643 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9644 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9645 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9646 effective to prevent it.
9649 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9650 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9652 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9654 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9655 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9658 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9659 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9660 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9663 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9664 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9665 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9666 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9667 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9668 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9669 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9670 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9671 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9673 According to the RIAA,
9674 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9675 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9678 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9679 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9681 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9682 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9683 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9685 response by the other.
9688 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9689 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9690 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9691 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9692 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9693 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9694 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9695 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9696 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9697 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9698 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9699 was.
<footnote><para>
9701 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9702 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9704 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9705 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9706 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9707 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9708 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9709 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9713 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9714 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9715 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9716 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9717 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9718 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9719 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9720 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9721 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9723 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9724 Prohibition," American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9728 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9729 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9731 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9732 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9733 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9735 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9736 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9737 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9738 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9739 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9741 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9742 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9743 compliance literature).
9745 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9746 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9747 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9750 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9751 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9752 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9753 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9754 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9755 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9756 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9757 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9758 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9759 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9760 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9761 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9762 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9763 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9764 degree of illegality.
9767 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9768 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9769 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9770 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9771 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9772 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9773 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9774 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9775 to consider the alternative.
9779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9780 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9781 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9782 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9783 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9784 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9787 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9788 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9789 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9790 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9791 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9792 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9793 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9794 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9795 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9796 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9797 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9798 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9801 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9802 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9803 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9804 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9805 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9806 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9807 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9808 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9809 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9813 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9816 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9817 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9818 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9819 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9823 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9827 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9828 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9829 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9830 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9831 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9832 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9833 capacities of digital technologies.
9835 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9837 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9838 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9839 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9840 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9841 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9842 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9843 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9844 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9845 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9848 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9849 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9850 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9851 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9852 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9853 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9854 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9855 on people's machines.
9858 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9859 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9860 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9861 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9862 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9863 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9866 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9867 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9868 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9872 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9873 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9874 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9875 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9876 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9877 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9878 freedom to move content easily?
9881 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9882 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9883 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9884 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9885 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9886 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9887 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9888 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9889 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9892 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9893 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9894 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9895 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9896 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9897 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9898 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9901 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9902 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9903 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9904 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9907 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9908 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9912 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9913 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9914 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9915 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9916 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9917 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9918 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9919 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9921 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9924 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9929 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9930 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9931 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9932 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9933 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9934 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9935 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9936 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9937 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9941 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9942 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9943 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9946 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
9947 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9948 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9949 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9950 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9951 an Internet user is revealed.
9954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9955 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9956 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9957 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9958 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9959 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9960 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9961 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9962 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
9964 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9965 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9966 Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9967 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9968 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9969 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
9970 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
9971 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9972 Fan, Either," New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9973 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
9978 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9979 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9980 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
9982 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9983 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9984 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
9986 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9987 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9988 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9991 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9992 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
9993 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9994 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9995 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9996 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9997 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9998 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9999 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10000 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10001 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10003 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10004 Boston Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10005 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10006 Colleges," Washington Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10007 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10008 Monitor,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10009 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10010 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10011 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News,
30 January
10012 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10013 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10014 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10015 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10016 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10018 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10019 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10022 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10023 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10024 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10025 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10026 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10027 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10031 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10032 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10037 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10038 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10039 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10040 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10041 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10042 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10043 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10044 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10045 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10046 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10047 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10048 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10049 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10050 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10051 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10052 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10057 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10058 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10059 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10060 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10061 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10062 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10069 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10070 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10074 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10075 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10076 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10077 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10080 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10081 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10082 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10083 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10084 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10088 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10089 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10090 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10091 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10092 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10093 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10097 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10098 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10099 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10100 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10101 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10102 made that is happening all around.
10105 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10106 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10107 gasoline onto this fire.
10110 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10111 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10112 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10113 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10116 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10117 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10118 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10119 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10120 success will require.
10123 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10124 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10125 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10127 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10128 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10129 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10130 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10131 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10132 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10136 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10137 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10138 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10139 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10140 them available for free.
10143 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10144 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10145 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10146 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10147 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10149 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10150 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10151 accessible
—today.
10154 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10155 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10156 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10157 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10158 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10159 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10160 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10161 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10162 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10163 commercial publications of public domain works.
10166 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10167 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10168 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10169 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10170 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10171 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10172 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10173 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10174 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10175 generally.
<footnote><para>
10177 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10178 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10179 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10180 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10181 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10182 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10183 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10184 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10185 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10186 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10187 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10188 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10189 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10190 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10191 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10194 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10195 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10196 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10197 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10198 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10199 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10200 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10201 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10202 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10203 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10204 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10209 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10210 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10211 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10212 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10214 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10215 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10216 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10217 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10218 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10219 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10220 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10225 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10226 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10227 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10228 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10229 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10230 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10234 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10236 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10238 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10239 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10241 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10245 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10246 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10247 their . . . Writings. . . .
10251 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10252 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10253 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10254 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10255 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10256 specific
—to "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that
10257 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10258 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10261 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10262 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10263 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10264 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10266 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10267 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10268 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10269 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10270 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10273 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10274 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10275 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10276 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10277 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10278 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10279 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10280 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10281 this gravy train going.
10284 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10285 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10286 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10287 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10288 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10289 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10290 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10293 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10294 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10295 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10296 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10297 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10298 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10299 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10300 published by anyone for free.
10303 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10304 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10305 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10306 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10310 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10313 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10314 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10318 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10319 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10320 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10321 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10324 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10328 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10329 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10330 they support the bill."
10333 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10334 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10335 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10339 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10340 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10341 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10342 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10345 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10346 correct conclusion:
10349 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10350 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10352 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10355 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10357 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10358 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10361 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10362 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10363 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10364 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10366 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10368 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10369 the copyright term extended.
10372 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10374 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10375 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10378 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10380 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10381 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10382 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10383 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10384 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10385 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10386 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10387 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10389 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10390 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10391 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10392 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10394 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10396 Disney is estimated to have
10397 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10398 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10399 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10401 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10402 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10407 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10408 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10410 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10411 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10412 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10413 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10414 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10416 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10420 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10421 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10422 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10423 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10424 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10426 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10429 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10433 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10434 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10435 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10437 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10438 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10443 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10444 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10446 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10447 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10449 to impose no limit.
10452 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10453 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10454 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10455 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10456 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10457 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10458 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10459 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10460 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10462 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10465 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10467 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10468 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10470 If anything Congress says is interstate
10471 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10472 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10473 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10474 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10479 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10480 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10481 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10482 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10484 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10485 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10486 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10487 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10488 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10489 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10491 And if it is applied to the
10492 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10494 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10495 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10497 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10498 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10499 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10501 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10502 existing copyrights.
10505 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10506 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10507 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10508 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10510 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10511 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10512 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10513 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10515 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10516 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10519 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10520 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10522 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10523 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10524 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10525 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10526 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10528 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10529 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10530 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10531 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10532 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10533 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10534 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10537 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10540 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10541 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10542 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10543 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10544 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10547 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10548 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10549 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10552 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10554 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10556 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10557 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10558 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10559 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10560 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10561 bought to extend them again.
10564 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10566 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10567 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10569 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10571 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10572 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10573 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10574 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10576 and no longer available as a result.
10579 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10580 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10581 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10582 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10583 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10584 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10585 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10587 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10588 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10589 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10594 Think practically about the consequence of this
10595 extension
—practically,
10596 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10599 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10600 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10601 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10603 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10606 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10607 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10608 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10609 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10610 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10611 list of books still under copyright.
10614 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10615 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10618 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10620 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10621 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10622 being at least a list?
10625 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10626 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10628 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10630 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10631 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10634 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10636 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10640 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10641 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10642 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10644 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10645 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10646 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10649 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10650 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10651 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10654 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10655 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10657 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10658 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10659 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10660 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10661 know quite well who owns what property.
10664 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10665 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10667 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10668 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10669 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10670 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10671 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10672 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10673 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10676 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10677 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10679 for other creative works is much more dire.
10681 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10683 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10684 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10685 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10686 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10687 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10688 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10689 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10690 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10691 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10692 films."
<footnote><para>
10694 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10695 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10696 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10697 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10702 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10703 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10704 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10705 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10708 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10711 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10712 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10713 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10714 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10715 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10716 work available for distribution.
10719 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10720 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10721 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10722 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10723 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10724 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10725 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10727 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10728 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10729 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10730 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10735 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10737 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10738 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10739 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10740 locate the copyright owner.
10743 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10744 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10745 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10746 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10747 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10752 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10753 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10754 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10755 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10756 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10757 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10758 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10759 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10760 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10763 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10766 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10768 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10769 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10770 the copyright expires.
10773 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10774 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10775 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10777 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10781 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10782 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10783 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10784 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10786 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10790 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10791 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10793 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10794 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10795 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10797 the commercial life ends.
10800 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10801 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10802 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10804 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10806 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10807 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10808 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10809 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10810 have, we need to have access to this history.
10813 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10816 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10817 this context do no good.
10820 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10821 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10822 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10823 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10824 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10825 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10826 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10827 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10830 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10831 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10832 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10833 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10834 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10835 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10836 market didn't have more to offer.
10839 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10840 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10841 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10842 would not have interfered with anything.
10845 But this situation has now changed.
10848 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10849 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10850 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10851 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10852 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10853 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10854 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10855 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10856 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10857 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10861 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10862 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10863 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10864 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10865 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10866 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10867 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10868 written for a radically different context.
10871 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10872 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10873 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10874 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10875 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10876 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10877 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10878 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10879 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10882 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10883 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10884 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10888 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10889 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10890 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10891 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10892 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10893 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10894 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10895 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10896 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10899 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10900 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10901 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10902 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10905 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10906 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10907 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10908 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10909 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10911 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10912 December
2002, available at
10913 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10918 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10919 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10920 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10921 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10922 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10923 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10926 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10927 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10928 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10929 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10930 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10933 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10934 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10935 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10936 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10937 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10938 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10939 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10940 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10941 power to extend existing terms.
10944 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10945 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10946 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10947 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10950 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10951 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10954 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10955 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10956 overstepped its bounds.
10959 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10960 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10961 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10962 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10963 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10966 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10967 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10968 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
10969 briefs and preparing for argument.
10972 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10973 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10974 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10975 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10976 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10977 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10978 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10979 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10982 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10983 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10984 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10987 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10989 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10990 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10991 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10992 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10995 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10996 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10997 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10999 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11000 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11001 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11003 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11004 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11005 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11006 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11007 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11008 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11009 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11010 most powerful media companies in the world."
11013 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11014 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11015 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11016 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11017 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11018 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11019 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11020 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11022 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11023 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11025 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11026 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11027 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11029 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11030 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11031 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11034 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11035 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11036 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11037 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11038 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11039 why it was unconstitutional.
11042 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11045 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11046 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11047 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11048 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11049 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11051 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11052 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11053 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11054 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11055 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11056 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11057 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11058 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11061 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11062 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11064 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11065 November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11067 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11068 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11069 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11070 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11071 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11072 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11073 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11074 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11077 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11079 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11080 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11081 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11082 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11083 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11086 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11087 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11090 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11091 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11092 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11093 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11094 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11095 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11096 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11099 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11100 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11101 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11102 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11105 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11106 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11107 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11108 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11111 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11112 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11113 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11114 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11115 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11117 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11118 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11119 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11120 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11121 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11122 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11123 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11124 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11125 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11128 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11129 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11130 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11131 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11132 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11133 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11134 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11135 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11138 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11139 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11142 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11143 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11144 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11145 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11146 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11147 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11148 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11149 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11150 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11151 confidence in our argument.
11154 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11155 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11156 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11157 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11161 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11162 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11163 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11164 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11165 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11166 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11170 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11171 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11172 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11173 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11174 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11175 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11177 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11178 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11180 That was also the motive of
11181 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11182 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11183 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11185 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11186 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11191 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11192 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11195 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11196 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11197 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11198 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11199 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11200 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11201 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11202 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11203 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11204 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11207 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11208 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11209 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11210 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11211 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11212 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11213 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11216 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11217 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11218 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11219 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11220 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11221 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11222 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11225 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11227 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11228 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11229 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11232 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11233 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11234 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11235 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11236 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11239 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11240 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11241 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11242 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11243 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11244 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11245 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11246 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11249 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11251 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11252 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11253 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11254 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11255 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11256 these retrospective extensions.
11259 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11260 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11261 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11262 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11263 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11264 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11267 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11268 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11269 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11271 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11272 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11273 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11274 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11277 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11278 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11281 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11282 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11283 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11284 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11285 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11286 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11287 copyright be limited.
11290 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11292 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11294 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11295 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11296 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11299 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11300 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11301 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11303 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11306 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11308 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11309 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11310 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11312 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11314 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11315 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11317 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11318 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11319 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11321 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11322 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11325 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11326 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11329 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11330 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11331 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11332 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11334 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11335 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11338 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11340 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11341 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11342 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11343 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11346 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11347 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11348 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11349 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11350 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11352 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11354 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11355 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11356 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11357 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11358 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11359 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11360 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11361 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11362 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11363 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11364 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11367 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11368 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11371 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11372 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11373 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11374 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11376 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11377 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11378 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11379 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11380 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11381 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11382 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11383 family of the Justices.
11386 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11387 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11388 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11389 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11392 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11393 The history was bothering her.
11397 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11398 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11399 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11400 practice that began with the very first act.
11404 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11405 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11406 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11410 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11411 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11413 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11418 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11419 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11420 Kennedy, who observed,
11424 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11425 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11426 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11427 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11428 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11432 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11438 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11439 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11440 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11441 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11443 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11446 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11448 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11449 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11450 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11451 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11452 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11455 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11456 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11457 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11460 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11462 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11468 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11469 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11472 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11473 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11475 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11476 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11477 into the Copyright Clause.
11481 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11482 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11483 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11487 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11489 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11490 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11491 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11496 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11497 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11498 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11499 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11500 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11501 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11502 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause
—
11503 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11505 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11506 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11509 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11510 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11513 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11517 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11518 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11519 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11520 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11522 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11524 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11525 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11526 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11527 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11529 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11531 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
11532 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule
11533 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11536 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11537 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11538 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11539 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11540 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11543 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11544 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11545 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11548 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11549 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11550 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11553 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11555 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11557 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11558 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11559 in the Court's opinion.
11563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11564 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11565 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11567 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11570 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11571 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11572 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11573 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11576 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11577 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11578 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11579 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11580 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11581 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11582 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11583 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11587 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11588 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11589 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11590 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11591 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11592 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11593 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11594 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11595 the system we have.
11597 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11599 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11600 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11601 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11602 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11603 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11604 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11605 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11606 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11607 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11609 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11612 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11613 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11614 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11615 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11616 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11617 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11618 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11619 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11620 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11623 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11624 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11625 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11626 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11627 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11630 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11631 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11632 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11635 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11636 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11637 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11638 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11639 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11640 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11641 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11642 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11643 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11644 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11648 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11649 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11650 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11651 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11654 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11655 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11656 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11657 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11658 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11659 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11663 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11665 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11668 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11670 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11671 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11672 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11673 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11674 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11675 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11676 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11677 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11678 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11681 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11682 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11683 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11684 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11685 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11686 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11687 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11688 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11689 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11690 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11691 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11692 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11693 effort to persuade; but I
11694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11695 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11696 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11697 should decide the issue.
11699 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11701 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11702 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11706 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11707 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11708 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11709 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11712 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11713 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11714 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11715 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11719 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11720 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11721 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11722 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11723 issue should not be raised until it is.
11724 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11727 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11728 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11729 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11730 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11731 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11732 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11733 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11734 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11735 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11736 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11737 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11740 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11741 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11742 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11743 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11744 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11748 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11749 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11750 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11751 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11752 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11753 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11757 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11758 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11759 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11760 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11761 in the face felt exactly like that.
11764 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11765 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11766 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11767 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11768 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11769 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11770 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11774 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11775 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11777 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11778 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11779 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11780 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11781 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11782 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11783 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11785 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11787 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11788 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11789 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11790 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11791 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11792 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11793 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11794 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11797 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11798 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11800 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11801 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11802 the work passed into the public domain.
11805 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11806 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11807 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11810 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11811 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11812 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11813 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11814 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11815 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11816 everything else, let the content go.
11818 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11820 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11821 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11822 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11823 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11824 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11825 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11826 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11827 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11828 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11829 the stupid harm of the present system.
11832 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11833 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11834 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11835 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11836 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11837 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11838 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11839 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11840 where copyright owners could be identified.
11842 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11843 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11845 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11846 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11847 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11848 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11850 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11851 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11852 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11853 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11854 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11855 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11856 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11857 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11858 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11859 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11860 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11861 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11862 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11863 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11864 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11865 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11866 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11867 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11868 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11869 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11870 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11871 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11872 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11873 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11876 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11877 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11878 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11879 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11880 know what's protected and what's not.
11882 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11884 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11885 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11886 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11887 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11888 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11889 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11890 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11891 in the loss of widows' only income.
11894 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11895 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11896 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11897 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11898 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11899 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11902 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11903 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11904 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11905 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11907 imposed upon creators.
11910 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11911 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11914 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11915 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11916 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11917 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11918 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11922 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11923 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11924 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11925 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11926 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11927 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11931 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11932 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11933 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11934 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11935 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11936 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
11937 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11938 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11939 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11940 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11941 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11942 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11943 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11944 system of protection for property generally.
11947 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11948 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11949 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11950 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11951 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11952 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11953 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11954 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11957 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11961 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11962 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11963 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11964 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11965 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11966 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11967 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11968 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11971 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11972 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11973 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11974 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11975 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11976 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11977 seen before because there are no formalities.
11980 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11981 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11982 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11983 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11984 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11987 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11988 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11989 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11990 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11991 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
11994 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11995 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11996 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12000 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12001 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12002 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12005 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12006 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12007 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12008 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12009 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12010 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12011 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12012 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
12013 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12014 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12016 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12018 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12019 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12020 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12021 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12024 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12025 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12026 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12027 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12028 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12029 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12030 something good might happen here.
12033 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12034 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12035 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12036 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12037 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12038 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12041 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12042 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12043 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12045 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12046 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12047 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12048 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12049 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12050 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12051 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12052 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12053 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12054 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12055 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12056 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12057 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12058 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12059 film is a valid derivative use.
12062 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12063 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12064 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12065 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12066 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12067 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12070 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12071 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12072 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12073 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12074 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12075 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12076 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12080 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12081 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12082 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12083 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12089 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12090 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12091 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12092 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12093 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12094 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12095 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12096 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12097 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12100 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12101 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12102 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12103 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12104 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12105 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12106 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12107 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12110 What does this industry really want?
12113 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12114 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12115 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12116 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12117 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12118 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12119 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12123 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12124 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12125 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12126 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12127 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12130 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12131 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12134 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12135 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12136 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12137 and to share its own creation.
12139 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12140 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12142 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12143 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12144 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12145 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12146 block the progress of others.
12149 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12150 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12151 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12152 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12153 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12154 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12155 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12160 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12161 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12163 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12164 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12165 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12166 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12167 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12170 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12171 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12172 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12173 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12174 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12175 the disease almost invisible.
12178 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12179 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12180 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12181 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12183 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12184 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12185 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12186 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12188 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12190 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12191 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12196 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12197 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12198 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12199 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12200 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12201 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12204 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12205 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12206 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12207 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12208 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12209 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12210 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12211 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12215 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12216 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12217 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12218 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12219 costs significantly below the market price.
12222 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12223 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12224 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12225 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12226 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12227 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12228 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12231 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12232 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12233 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12234 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12238 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12239 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12241 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12242 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12243 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12244 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12246 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12247 2000),
14, available at
12248 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12249 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12250 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12251 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12252 (statement of James Love).
12255 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12256 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12258 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12260 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12262 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12264 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12265 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12267 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12269 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12270 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12271 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12272 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12273 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12275 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12276 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12277 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12278 Organization (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12281 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12282 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12283 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12284 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12285 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12286 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12287 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12288 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12291 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12292 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12293 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12294 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12295 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12296 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12299 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12300 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12301 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12302 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12303 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12304 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12308 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12309 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12312 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12314 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12315 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12316 May
1999, A1, available at
12317 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12318 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12319 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12320 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12321 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12322 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12323 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12324 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12325 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12326 Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12329 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12330 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12331 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12332 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12335 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12336 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12337 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12338 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12339 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12340 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12341 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12342 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12345 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12346 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12347 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12348 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12349 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12350 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12353 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12354 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12355 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12356 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12357 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12358 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12361 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12362 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12363 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12364 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12365 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12366 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12367 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12368 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12370 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12371 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12372 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12373 idea called "intellectual property."
12376 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12377 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12378 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12379 What is the argument?
12382 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12383 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12384 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12385 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12386 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12387 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12388 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12389 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12390 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12391 were balanced in just this sense.
12394 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12395 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12396 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12397 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12398 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12399 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12400 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12401 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12402 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12403 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12404 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12405 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12408 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12409 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12410 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12411 this common sense open its eyes.
12414 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12415 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12416 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12417 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12418 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12419 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12420 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12421 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12422 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12423 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12424 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12425 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12428 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12429 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12430 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12431 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12432 August
2003, E1, available at
12433 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12434 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12435 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12436 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12437 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12438 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12439 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12441 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12442 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12443 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12444 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12445 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12446 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12447 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12448 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12449 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12450 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12451 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12452 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12453 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12455 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12456 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12457 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12458 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12461 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12462 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12463 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12464 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12465 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12468 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12469 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12472 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12473 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12474 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12475 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12479 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12480 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12481 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12482 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12483 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12484 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12485 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12486 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12487 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12488 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12489 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12490 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12491 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12492 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12493 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12494 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12495 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12498 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12499 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12500 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12503 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12504 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12505 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12506 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12509 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12510 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12511 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12512 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12513 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12514 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12515 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12516 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12517 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12520 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12521 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12523 software. There are many important companies that depend
12525 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12526 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12527 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM is
12528 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12529 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12530 support a mode of software development that is different from
12531 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12532 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12534 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12535 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12537 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12539 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12540 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12542 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12543 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12544 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
12546 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12548 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12549 Stern School of Business (
3 May
2001), available at
12550 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12554 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12555 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12556 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12557 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12558 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12561 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12562 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12563 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12564 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12565 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12566 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12567 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12568 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12569 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12572 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12573 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12574 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12575 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12576 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12577 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12578 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12580 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12581 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12583 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12586 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12587 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12588 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12589 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12590 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12591 its lobbying efforts.
12594 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12595 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12596 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12597 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12598 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12599 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12600 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12604 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12608 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12609 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12610 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12611 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12612 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12613 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12614 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12615 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12618 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12619 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12620 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12621 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12622 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12623 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12624 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12625 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12626 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12627 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12628 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12631 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12632 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12633 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12634 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12635 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12636 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12637 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12638 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12639 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12640 right to decide what to do with their property.
12643 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12644 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12645 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12647 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12648 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12649 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12650 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12651 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12655 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12656 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12657 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12658 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12659 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12660 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12661 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12662 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12663 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12666 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12667 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12669 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12670 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12672 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
12673 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12675 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12676 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12677 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12680 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12681 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12682 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12683 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12687 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12688 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12689 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12690 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12691 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12692 say anything wrong. But in the world
12693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12694 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12695 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12699 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12700 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12701 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12702 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12703 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12704 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12705 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12706 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12709 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12710 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12711 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12712 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12713 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12714 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12717 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12718 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12719 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12720 our own country's history).
12723 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12724 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12725 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12726 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12727 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12728 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12729 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12730 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12731 democracy in the world, become?
12734 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12735 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12736 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12738 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12739 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12741 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12743 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12744 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12745 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12746 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12747 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12748 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12749 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12750 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12751 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12752 hearings and a different result.
12755 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12756 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12757 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12758 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12759 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12760 concentration in the media.
12763 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12764 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12765 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12766 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12767 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12770 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12771 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12772 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12773 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12774 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12775 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12776 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12780 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12781 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12782 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12783 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12784 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12787 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12788 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12789 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12790 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12791 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12792 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12795 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12798 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12800 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12801 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12803 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12805 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12806 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12808 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12809 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12810 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News,
9
12811 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12812 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12813 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12814 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
12816 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12818 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12819 music.
<footnote><para>
12821 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12822 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12823 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12825 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12826 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12828 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12829 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12830 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12833 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12834 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12835 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12836 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12837 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12838 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12839 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12840 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12841 kids who use a computer to share content.
12843 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12844 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12845 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12846 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12848 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12849 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12850 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12851 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12852 24 August
2003, available at
12853 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12855 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12856 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12857 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12858 country.
<footnote><para>
12860 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12862 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12865 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12866 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12867 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12868 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12869 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12870 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12871 day into the Causbys.
12874 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12875 potential is ever to be realized.
12877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12881 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12882 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12886 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12887 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12888 maps what might be done.
12891 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12892 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12893 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12894 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12897 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12898 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12899 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12900 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12904 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12905 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12906 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12907 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12908 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12913 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12915 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12916 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12917 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12918 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12921 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12922 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12923 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12924 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
12925 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12926 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12927 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12928 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12931 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12932 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12933 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12934 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12938 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12939 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12943 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12944 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12945 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12946 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12947 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12948 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12949 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12950 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12951 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12952 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12953 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12954 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12957 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
12958 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12959 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12960 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12961 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12965 <sect2 id=
"examples">
12966 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
12968 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12969 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12970 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12971 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12972 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12973 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12974 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12978 What made it assured?
12980 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12982 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12983 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12984 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12985 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12986 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12987 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12988 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12989 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12990 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12991 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12992 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12993 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12994 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12996 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
12998 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12999 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13000 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13001 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13002 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13003 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13004 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13005 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13008 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13009 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13010 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13011 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13012 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13013 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13014 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13018 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13019 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13020 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13021 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13024 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13025 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13026 Law Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13028 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13029 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13030 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13031 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13032 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13033 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13034 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13037 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13038 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13039 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13042 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13043 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13044 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13045 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13046 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13047 care much about controlling their software.
13049 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13051 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13052 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13053 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13054 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13055 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13059 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13060 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13061 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13062 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13063 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13064 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13065 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13066 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13067 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13071 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13072 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13073 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13074 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13075 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13076 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13077 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13080 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13081 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13083 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13084 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13085 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13086 fundamentally weakened.
13089 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13090 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13091 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13092 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13095 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13096 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13097 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13098 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13099 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13100 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13101 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13102 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13106 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13107 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13108 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13109 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13110 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13111 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13114 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13115 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13116 scientific journals are produced.
13119 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13120 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13121 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13122 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13123 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13124 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13125 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13126 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13127 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13128 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13129 and Westlaw are also free
13130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13131 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13132 Court opinion through their respective services.
13135 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13136 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13137 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13138 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13139 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13140 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13141 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13144 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13145 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13146 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13149 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13150 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13151 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13152 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13153 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13154 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13155 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13156 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13157 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13158 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13161 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13162 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13163 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13164 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13165 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13169 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13170 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13171 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13172 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13174 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13175 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13176 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13177 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13178 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13179 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13182 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13183 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13184 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13185 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13186 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13187 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13192 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13193 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13194 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13195 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13198 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13199 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13202 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13203 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13204 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13205 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13206 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13207 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13208 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13209 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13212 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13213 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13214 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13215 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13216 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13217 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13218 three expressions together
—a legal license, a human-readable
13220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13221 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13222 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13223 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13224 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13225 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13226 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13227 certain freedoms are given.
13230 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13231 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13232 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13233 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13234 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13235 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13236 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13237 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13238 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13241 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13242 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13243 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13244 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13245 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13246 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13247 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13248 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13252 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13253 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13254 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13255 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13256 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13257 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13259 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13260 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13261 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13264 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13265 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13266 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13267 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13268 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13269 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13270 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13271 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13272 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13273 to begin to build those rules.
13276 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13277 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13278 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13279 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13280 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13283 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13284 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13285 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13286 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13287 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13288 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13289 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13290 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13291 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13292 sales of Cory's book.
13295 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13296 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13297 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13298 was a total success.
13301 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13302 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13304 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13305 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13306 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13307 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13308 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13312 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13313 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13314 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13315 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13316 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13317 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13318 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13319 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13320 with their own art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13321 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13322 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13323 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13324 because the legal costs are so high
<footnote><para>
13327 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13328 Culture Wars (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13329 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13330 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13331 </para></footnote>),
13332 these artists release into the creative environment content
13333 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13336 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13337 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13338 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13339 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13340 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13341 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13342 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13343 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13344 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13348 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13349 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13350 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13351 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13354 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13355 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13358 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13359 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13360 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13361 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13362 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13363 steps are possible.
13366 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13367 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13368 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13369 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13370 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13371 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13372 creativity to spread more easily.
13374 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13379 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13380 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13382 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13383 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13384 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13385 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13386 changes that we need.
13389 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13390 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13391 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13395 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13396 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13398 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13399 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13400 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13401 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13405 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13406 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13410 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13411 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13412 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13413 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13419 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13420 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13421 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13422 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13423 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13424 formalities were getting in the way.
13427 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13428 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13429 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13430 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13431 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13432 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13433 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13434 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13435 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13436 they otherwise could speak.
13439 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13441 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13442 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13443 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13444 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13445 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13446 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13449 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13450 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13451 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13452 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13453 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13454 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13455 developed by others.
13458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13460 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13461 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13463 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13464 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13465 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13466 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13467 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13468 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13469 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13470 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13471 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13472 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13473 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13476 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13477 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13478 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13479 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13480 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13481 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13482 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13485 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13486 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13487 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13488 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13489 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13490 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13491 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13492 with which registration occurs up.
13495 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13496 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13497 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13498 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13499 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13500 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13501 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13502 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13503 formality
—while producing a database
13504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13505 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13509 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13510 <title>MARKING
</title>
13512 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13513 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13514 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13515 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13516 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13517 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13518 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13519 uniformly across all media.
13522 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13523 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13524 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13528 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13529 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13530 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13531 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13532 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13533 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13534 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13535 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13538 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13539 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13540 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13541 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13542 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13543 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13545 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13546 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13547 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13549 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13550 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13551 stop using the work in any new
13552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13553 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13554 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13558 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13559 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13560 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13561 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13562 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13565 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13566 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13567 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13568 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13569 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13570 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13571 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13572 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13573 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13576 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13577 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13578 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13579 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13580 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13581 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13584 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13585 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13586 make things unclear.
13589 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13590 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13591 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13592 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13593 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13594 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13600 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13601 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13603 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13604 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13608 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13609 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13610 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13611 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13612 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13613 term.
<footnote><para>
13615 "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13617 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13619 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13622 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13623 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13624 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13627 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13630 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13631 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13632 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13633 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13634 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13635 regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
</para></listitem>
13638 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13639 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13640 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13641 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13642 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13643 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13644 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13645 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13651 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13652 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13653 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13654 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13655 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13656 veteran to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
13658 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13659 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13661 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13663 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13664 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13669 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13670 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13671 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the law to
13672 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13673 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13674 fewer authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13675 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13676 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13677 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13678 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13679 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13680 not increase their creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done,
13681 and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13684 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13685 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
13686 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13689 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13690 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13691 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13692 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13698 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13699 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13701 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13702 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13703 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13704 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13705 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13706 the emergence of that new technology.
13709 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13710 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13711 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13712 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13713 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13714 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13715 though that movie is not "my writing."
13718 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13719 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13720 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13722 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13723 University Press,
1967),
32.
13725 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13726 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13727 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13731 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13732 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13733 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13734 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13735 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13740 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13741 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13742 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13743 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13744 Consider each limitation in turn.
13747 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13748 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13751 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13752 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13753 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13754 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13755 after the creative work is done.
13758 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13759 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13760 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13761 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13762 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13763 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13764 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13765 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13766 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13767 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13770 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13771 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13772 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13773 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13774 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13778 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13779 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13780 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13781 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13784 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13785 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13786 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13788 His view is that the law should be written so that
13789 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13792 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13793 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13794 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13795 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13796 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13799 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13801 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13802 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13803 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13804 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13808 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13809 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13811 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13812 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13813 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13814 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13815 battles around the sharing of music.
13818 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13819 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13820 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13821 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13822 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13823 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13824 innovation on the network.
13827 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13828 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13829 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13830 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13831 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13834 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13835 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13836 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13837 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13839 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13842 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13843 for purchasing CDs.
13847 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13848 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13853 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13854 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13855 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13859 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13860 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13861 owner plainly endorses.
13865 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13866 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13867 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13868 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13869 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13870 significantly weakened.
13873 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13874 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13875 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13876 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13880 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13881 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13885 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13886 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13887 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13888 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13889 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13890 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13891 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13892 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13893 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13894 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13897 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13898 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13899 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13901 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13902 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13903 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13904 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13905 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13906 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
13907 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
13908 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13909 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13912 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13913 that give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet
13914 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13915 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13916 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13917 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13918 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13919 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13920 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13921 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13922 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13923 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13924 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13925 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13926 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13927 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
13929 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
13930 April
2002, available at
13931 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
13936 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13937 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13938 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
13939 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13940 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13941 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13942 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13943 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13944 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13945 artists get paid, during
13947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13948 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13949 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13952 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13953 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
13954 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13955 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13956 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13957 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13958 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13959 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13960 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13963 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13964 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13965 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13966 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13967 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13968 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13969 way that returns something to the artist.
13972 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13973 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13974 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13975 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13976 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13977 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13978 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13979 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13982 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13983 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13984 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13985 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13986 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13987 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13988 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13993 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13994 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13995 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
13996 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
13997 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
13998 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
13999 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14003 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14004 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14005 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14006 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14007 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14008 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14009 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14010 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14013 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14014 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14015 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14016 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14017 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14018 delivering and accessing content.
14021 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14022 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14025 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14026 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14027 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14028 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14029 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14030 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14031 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14032 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14036 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14037 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14038 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14039 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14040 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14041 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14044 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14045 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14047 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14048 10 October
2000), available at
14049 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14050 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14051 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14052 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14053 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14054 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14055 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14056 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14057 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14058 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14059 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14060 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14062 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14063 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14064 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14065 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14067 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14068 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14069 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14070 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14072 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14073 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14074 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14075 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14076 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14077 debate by about a decade. See
14078 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14079 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14080 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14082 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14083 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14084 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14085 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14086 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14087 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14088 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14089 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14093 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14094 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14095 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14096 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14097 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14098 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14099 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14100 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14101 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14102 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14103 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14104 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14105 controlling access.
14108 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14109 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14110 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14111 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14112 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14113 limits on derivative
14115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14116 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14117 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14118 allowed to do with the content itself.
14121 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14122 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14123 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14124 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14125 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14126 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14127 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14128 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14129 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14130 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14131 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14132 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14136 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14137 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14138 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14139 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14140 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14141 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14142 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14143 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14144 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14145 finding ways to compete with "free."
14148 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14149 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14150 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14151 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14152 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14153 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14157 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14162 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14163 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14164 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14165 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14169 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14172 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14175 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14179 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14180 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14185 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14186 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14190 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14191 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14192 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14196 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14197 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14198 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14199 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14200 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14201 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14202 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14203 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14204 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14205 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14206 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14210 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14211 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14212 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14215 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14216 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14220 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14221 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14223 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14224 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14225 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14226 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14229 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14230 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14231 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14232 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14233 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14234 strong view queers the law.
14237 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14238 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14239 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14240 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14241 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14242 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14243 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14244 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14246 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14247 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14252 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14253 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14254 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14257 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14258 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14259 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14260 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14262 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14263 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14264 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14265 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14266 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14267 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14268 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14269 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14270 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14271 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14273 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14274 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14275 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14276 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14277 Rethinking,
174–76.
14279 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14280 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14285 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14286 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14287 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14288 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14289 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14290 practically never be done.
14293 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14294 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14295 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14296 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14297 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14298 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14299 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14300 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14303 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14304 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14305 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14306 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14307 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14308 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14311 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14312 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14313 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14317 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14318 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14319 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14320 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14321 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14322 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14323 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14326 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14327 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14330 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14331 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14332 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14335 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14336 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14337 keep your lawyers away.
14339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14343 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14344 <title>NOTES
</title>
14346 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14347 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14348 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14349 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14350 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14351 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14352 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14353 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14354 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14360 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14361 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14363 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14364 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14365 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14366 to him that this book is dedicated.
14369 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14370 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14371 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14372 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14373 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14374 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14375 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14376 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14377 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14378 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14379 critical eye on much of this.
14382 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14383 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14384 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14385 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14387 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14388 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14389 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14390 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14393 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14394 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14395 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14396 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14397 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14398 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14399 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14400 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14401 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14402 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14403 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14404 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14405 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14406 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14407 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14408 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14409 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14410 a bunch of great replies.)
14413 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14414 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14415 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14416 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14417 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14418 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14419 throughout this book.
14422 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14423 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14424 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14425 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->