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18 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
20 <title>Free Culture
</title>
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
27 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
29 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
33 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
40 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
45 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
46 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
47 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
48 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
49 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
54 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
57 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
58 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
59 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
60 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
61 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
62 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
63 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
64 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
65 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
66 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
67 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
68 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
69 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
70 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
80 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
82 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
83 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
84 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
85 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
86 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
92 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
95 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
98 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
103 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
123 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
127 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
130 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
131 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
132 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
135 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
136 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
139 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
140 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
143 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
147 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
148 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
157 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
160 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
163 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
169 343.7309'
9—dc22
172 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
175 Printed in the United States of America
181 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
189 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
190 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
191 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
192 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
193 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
194 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
195 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
196 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
197 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
198 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
199 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
206 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
211 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
212 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
213 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
221 <title>List of figures
</title>
228 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
229 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
230 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
231 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
236 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
240 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
241 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
242 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
243 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
244 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
245 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
249 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
250 2 Architecture and Law: Force
251 2 Market: Concentration
254 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
255 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
256 2 Constraining Creators
257 2 Constraining Innovators
258 2 Corrupting Citizens
260 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
261 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
265 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
266 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
268 2 1. More Formalities
269 3 Registration and Renewal
272 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
273 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
274 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
282 <preface id=
"preface">
283 <title>PREFACE
</title>
284 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
285 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
288 At the end of his review of my first book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other
289 Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
290 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
294 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
295 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
296 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
297 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
298 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
303 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
304 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
305 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
306 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
307 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
308 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
312 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
313 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
314 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
315 causes even after the modem is turned
316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
317 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
318 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
319 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
321 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
323 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
324 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
325 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
326 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
330 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
331 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
332 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
333 free software movement
<footnote>
335 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
336 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
337 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
338 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
339 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
340 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
341 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
342 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
343 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
344 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
345 "permission culture"
—a culture in which creators get to create
346 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
350 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
351 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
352 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
353 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
354 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
355 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
356 culture deem fundamental.
358 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
360 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
361 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
362 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
363 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
364 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
365 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
366 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
367 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
369 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
373 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
374 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
375 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
376 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
377 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
378 "The Great Media Gulp,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
379 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
384 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
385 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
386 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
387 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
388 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
389 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
390 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
391 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
392 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
393 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
394 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
395 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
396 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
397 that this work is "merely" derivative.
400 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
401 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
402 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
403 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
404 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
405 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
406 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
407 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
410 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
411 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
412 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
413 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
414 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
418 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
419 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
420 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
421 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
422 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
423 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
424 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
432 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
433 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
435 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
436 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
437 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
438 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
439 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
440 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
443 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
444 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
445 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
446 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
447 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
448 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
451 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
452 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
453 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
456 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
457 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
458 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
459 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
460 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
461 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
462 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
464 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
465 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
467 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
468 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
469 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
470 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
471 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
472 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
473 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
474 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
475 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
477 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
478 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
480 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
481 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
482 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
483 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
484 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
485 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
486 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
487 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
491 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
492 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
493 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
494 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
495 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
496 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
497 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
498 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
500 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
501 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
502 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
503 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
504 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
505 Authorship,"
<citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
506 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
508 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
509 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
514 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
517 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
518 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
519 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
521 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
522 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
523 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
524 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
525 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
527 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
528 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
530 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
531 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
532 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
533 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
534 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
535 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
536 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
537 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
538 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
539 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
540 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
541 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
542 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
543 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
544 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
545 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
548 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
549 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
550 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
551 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
552 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
553 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
554 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
555 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
556 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
557 understanding of radio.
558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
559 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
560 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
561 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
564 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
565 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
566 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
567 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
568 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
569 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
570 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
571 much less transmitter power and static.
574 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
575 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
576 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
577 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
578 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
579 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
580 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
581 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
582 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
585 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
589 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
590 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
591 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
592 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
593 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
594 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
595 box."
<footnote><para>
596 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
597 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
602 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
603 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
604 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
605 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
606 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
607 a handful of networks.
608 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
611 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
612 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
613 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
614 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
615 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
616 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
620 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
621 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
622 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
623 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
624 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
625 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
627 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
632 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
633 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
634 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
636 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
640 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
641 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
642 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
643 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
644 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
645 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
650 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
651 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
652 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
653 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
654 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
655 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
656 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
657 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
658 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
659 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
660 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
665 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
666 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
667 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
668 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
673 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
675 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
676 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
677 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
678 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
679 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
680 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
681 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
685 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
686 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
687 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
688 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
689 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
690 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
691 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
692 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
693 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
694 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
697 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
698 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
699 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
700 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
701 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
702 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
703 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
704 course always public spirited; the reality is something
705 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
706 to themselves, would crumble in
707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
708 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
709 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
710 effect of technological change.
713 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
714 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
715 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
716 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
717 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
718 before.
<footnote><para>
719 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
720 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
721 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
722 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
724 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
728 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
729 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
730 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
731 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
732 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
733 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
734 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
735 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
736 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
739 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
740 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
741 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
742 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
743 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
744 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
748 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
749 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
750 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
751 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
752 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
755 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
756 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
757 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
760 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
761 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
762 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
763 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
764 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
765 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
766 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
767 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
768 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
771 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
772 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
773 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
774 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
775 marketplace.
<footnote>
777 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
778 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
779 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
780 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
781 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
782 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
783 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
785 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
787 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
788 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
789 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
790 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
793 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
794 been erased.
<footnote><para>
795 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
798 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
799 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
800 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
801 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
802 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
803 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
804 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
805 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
806 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
807 culture, more and more a permission culture.
809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
811 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
812 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
813 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
814 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
815 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
816 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
817 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
818 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
819 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
820 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
824 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
825 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
826 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
827 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
828 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
829 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
830 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
831 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
832 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
833 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
834 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
835 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
836 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
837 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
838 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
839 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
840 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
843 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
844 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
845 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
846 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
847 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
848 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
852 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
854 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
855 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
856 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
857 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
858 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
859 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
860 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
861 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,"
<citetitle>New York
862 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
863 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
864 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
865 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
869 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
870 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
871 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
872 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
873 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
877 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
878 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
879 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
880 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
883 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
884 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
885 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
886 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
887 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
889 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"
<citetitle>Yale Law
890 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
891 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
893 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
894 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
895 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
896 could cultivate and extend our culture.
899 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
900 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
901 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
902 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
903 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
904 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
905 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
906 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
907 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
911 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
912 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
913 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
914 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
915 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
919 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
920 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
921 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
922 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
923 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
924 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
925 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
927 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
928 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
930 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
931 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
932 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
933 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
934 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
935 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
936 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
937 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
938 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
939 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
940 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
941 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
944 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
945 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
947 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
948 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
949 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
950 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
953 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
957 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
958 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
959 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
960 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
961 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
962 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
963 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
964 accepted as it is now.
967 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
968 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
969 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
970 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
973 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
974 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
977 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
978 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
979 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
980 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
981 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
984 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
985 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
986 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
987 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
990 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
991 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
993 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
994 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
995 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
996 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
997 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
998 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
999 this silliness will be much more profound.
1000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1003 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1004 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1008 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1009 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1010 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1011 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1012 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1013 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1016 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1017 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1018 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1019 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1020 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1021 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1022 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1023 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1024 fundamental about who we have always been.
1027 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1028 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1029 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1030 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1031 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1032 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1036 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1037 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1040 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1041 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1044 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1045 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1046 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1047 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1048 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1052 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1053 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1054 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1056 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1059 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1062 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1063 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1064 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1065 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1066 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1067 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1071 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1072 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1073 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1074 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1075 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1079 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1080 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1081 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1082 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1083 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1084 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1087 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1088 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1089 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1090 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1093 The idea goes something like this:
1097 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1098 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1099 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1100 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1101 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1105 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1107 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1108 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1109 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1111 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1112 in the Pepsi Generation,"
<citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1114 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1115 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1116 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1117 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1119 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1120 Up,"
<citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1121 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1122 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1123 Speech, No One Wins,"
<citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1124 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1126 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1127 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1129 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1131 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1132 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1134 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1135 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1136 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1139 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1140 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1141 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1142 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1143 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1146 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1147 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1148 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1149 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1150 copyright law today regulates both.
1153 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1154 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1155 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1156 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1157 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1158 more expense of doing business.
1160 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1162 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1163 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1164 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1165 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1166 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1167 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1168 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1169 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1170 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1171 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1172 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1173 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1174 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1175 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1176 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1178 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1181 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1182 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1183 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1184 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1185 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1186 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1187 enabled are much more tenuous.
1188 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1190 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1191 this creative class.
1194 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1195 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1196 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1200 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1201 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1203 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1204 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1205 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1206 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1207 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1210 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1211 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1212 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1213 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1214 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1215 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1219 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1220 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1221 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1222 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1226 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1227 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1228 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1229 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1230 synchronization was pretty close.
1233 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1234 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1235 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1236 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1237 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1239 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1240 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1245 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1246 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1247 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1248 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1251 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1252 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1253 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1254 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1255 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1256 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1257 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1260 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1261 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1262 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1263 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1266 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1267 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1268 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1269 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1270 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1271 and among the best of its genre.
1274 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1277 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1278 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1280 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1281 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1282 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1283 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1284 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1285 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1286 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1287 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1289 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1290 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1291 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1292 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1293 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1297 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1298 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1299 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1301 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1302 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1303 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1305 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1306 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1307 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1308 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1309 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1310 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1311 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1312 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1316 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1317 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1318 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1319 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1320 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1321 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1322 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1325 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1326 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1327 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1328 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1329 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1330 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1331 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1332 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1333 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1334 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1335 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1337 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1338 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1339 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1340 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1341 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1342 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1343 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1344 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1347 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1348 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1349 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1350 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1351 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1352 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1353 culture around us and makes it something different.
1355 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1356 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1357 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1358 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1359 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1361 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1362 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1364 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1365 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1366 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1368 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1369 Web site associated with this book, available at
1370 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1372 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1373 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1374 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1375 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1378 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1379 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1380 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1381 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1382 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1383 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1384 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1387 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1388 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1389 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1390 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1393 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1394 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1395 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1396 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1397 content from before the Great Depression.
1400 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1401 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1402 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1406 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1407 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1408 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1409 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1410 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1411 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1412 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1415 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1416 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1417 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1418 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1419 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1420 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1421 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1422 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1423 interestingly different way.
1426 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1427 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1428 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1431 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1432 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1433 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1434 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1435 transforming it either subtly or
1436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1437 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1438 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1439 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1440 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1441 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1442 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1443 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1446 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1447 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1448 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1449 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1450 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1451 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1452 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1453 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1454 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1457 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1458 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1459 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1460 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1461 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1462 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1463 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1464 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1465 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1466 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1467 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1468 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1470 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1471 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1474 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1475 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1476 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1477 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1478 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1480 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1481 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1482 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1484 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1485 York: Perennial,
2000).
1489 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1490 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1491 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1492 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1493 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1494 which are fifty years old."
1496 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1498 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1499 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1500 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1501 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1502 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1503 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1504 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1506 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1507 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?"
<citetitle>Rutgers Law
1508 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
"[T]here might be a collective economic
1509 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1510 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1511 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1512 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1513 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1517 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1518 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1519 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1520 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1521 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1522 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1523 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1524 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1528 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1529 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1530 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1531 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1532 to prosecute cases like this."
1535 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1536 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1537 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1538 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1540 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1541 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1542 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1543 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1544 their clients or hurt them?
1545 Let's pause for a moment.
1548 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1549 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1550 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1553 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1554 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1555 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1556 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1558 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1559 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1560 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1561 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1562 describes a set of "property" rights
—copyright, patents,
1563 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1565 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1567 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1568 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1572 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1573 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1574 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1575 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1576 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1577 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1578 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1579 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1580 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1581 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1582 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1583 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1587 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1588 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1589 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1592 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1596 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1597 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1598 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1599 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1600 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1601 form, whether large or small.
1604 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1605 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1606 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1607 particular find it hard to say why.
1610 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1611 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1612 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1613 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1614 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1615 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1616 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1617 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1618 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1619 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1620 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1621 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1624 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1625 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1626 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1627 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1628 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1629 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1630 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1631 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1635 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1636 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1637 question instead is "
<emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1638 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1639 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1640 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1641 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1642 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1643 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1647 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1648 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1649 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1654 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1655 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1656 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1658 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1659 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1660 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1661 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1662 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1663 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1664 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1667 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1668 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1669 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1670 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1671 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1672 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1673 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1674 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1677 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1678 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1681 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1682 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1683 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1684 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1685 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1686 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1687 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1688 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1689 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1690 population of photographers.
1693 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1694 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1695 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1696 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1698 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1699 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1703 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1704 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1705 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1706 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1707 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1708 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1709 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1710 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1711 chemicals.
<footnote>
1714 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1716 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1721 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1722 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1723 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1724 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1725 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1726 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1727 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1728 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1729 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1730 percent.
<footnote><para>
1733 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1734 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1736 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1739 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1743 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1744 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1745 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1746 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1747 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1748 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1749 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1750 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1751 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1752 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1758 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1759 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1760 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1761 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1762 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1763 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1764 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1765 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1766 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1767 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1771 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1772 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1773 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1774 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1775 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1776 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1777 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1778 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1780 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1781 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1782 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1783 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1788 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1789 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1790 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1791 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1792 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1795 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1796 that they thought valuable.
1798 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1800 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1801 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1802 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1803 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1804 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1807 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1808 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1809 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1810 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1811 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1812 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1813 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1814 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1817 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1818 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1819 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1820 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1821 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1822 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1823 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1824 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1825 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1827 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity,"
<citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1828 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
"Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1829 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1830 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1835 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1836 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1837 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1838 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1839 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1840 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1841 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1842 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1843 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1844 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1845 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1846 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1847 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1852 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1853 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1854 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1855 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1856 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1857 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1858 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1859 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1860 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1861 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1862 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1863 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1864 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1865 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1866 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1867 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1868 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1869 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1870 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1871 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1872 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1873 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1876 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1878 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1879 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1880 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1881 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1882 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1884 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1885 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1886 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1887 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1889 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1890 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1891 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1892 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1896 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1897 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1898 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1899 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1900 the way people access it."
1901 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1904 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1905 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1906 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1910 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1911 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1912 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1914 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1915 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1916 Study,"
<citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
1918 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1919 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1920 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1921 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1922 (at least at first) terrible media.
1925 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1926 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1927 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
1928 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1929 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
1930 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1931 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1932 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1935 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1936 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1937 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1938 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1939 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1940 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1942 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
1944 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1945 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1946 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1949 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1950 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1954 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1956 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1957 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
1959 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1960 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1961 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1962 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1963 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1964 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1965 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1966 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1968 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1969 November
2000, available at
1970 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1972 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1975 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1977 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1978 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1979 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1980 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1981 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1984 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1985 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1986 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1987 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1991 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1992 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1993 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1994 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1999 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2000 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2004 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2005 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2006 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2007 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2010 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2011 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2015 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2016 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2017 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2018 language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2023 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2025 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2026 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2027 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2028 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2029 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2030 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2031 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2032 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2033 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2034 students know something about
—gun violence.
2037 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2038 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2039 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2040 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2041 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2042 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2045 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2046 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2047 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2048 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2049 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2050 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2051 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2052 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2053 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2054 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2055 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2056 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2057 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2058 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2059 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2064 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2065 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2066 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2067 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2068 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2069 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2070 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2075 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2076 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2077 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2078 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2079 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2080 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2081 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2082 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2083 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2084 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2085 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2086 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2087 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2088 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2089 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2090 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2091 about the topic. . . .
2094 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2095 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2096 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2097 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2098 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2101 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2102 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2103 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2105 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2106 had a lot of power with this language."
2110 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2111 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2112 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2113 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2114 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2115 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2116 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2117 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2118 world would be watching.
2121 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2122 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2123 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2124 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2125 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2126 entertainment is tragedy.
2128 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2129 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2131 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2132 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2133 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2134 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2135 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2136 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2137 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2138 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2139 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2140 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2141 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2142 was also the Internet.
2145 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2146 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2147 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2148 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2151 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2155 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2156 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2157 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2158 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2159 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2160 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2161 spread practically instantaneously.
2164 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2165 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2166 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2167 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2168 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2169 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2170 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2173 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2174 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2175 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2176 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2177 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2178 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2179 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2180 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2181 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2182 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2183 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2184 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2187 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2188 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2189 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2190 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2191 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2194 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2195 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2198 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2199 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2200 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2201 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2202 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2203 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2204 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2205 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2206 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2207 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2208 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2209 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2210 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2211 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2213 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2214 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2218 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2219 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2220 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2222 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day,"
<citetitle>Journal of
2223 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2225 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2226 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2227 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2230 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2231 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2232 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2233 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2234 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2235 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2237 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2238 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2239 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2240 little beyond what our friends say.
2243 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2244 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2245 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2246 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2247 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2250 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2254 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2255 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2256 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2257 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2258 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2259 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2262 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2263 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2264 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2265 is having an effect.
2266 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2269 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2270 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2271 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2272 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2273 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2274 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2275 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2276 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2277 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2278 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2280 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2281 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2283 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2286 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2287 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2288 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2289 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2293 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2294 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2295 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2296 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2297 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2298 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2299 peer-generated rankings.
2301 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2302 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2305 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2307 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2308 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2309 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2310 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2311 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2312 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2313 get it out of the way."
2315 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2317 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2318 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2319 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2320 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2321 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2323 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2325 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2326 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2327 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2328 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2329 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2330 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2331 told her
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> they were writing "the story.")
2333 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2334 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2335 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2336 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2337 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2338 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2339 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2341 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2342 Information Online,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2343 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2344 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2345 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2347 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2348 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2349 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2350 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2353 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2354 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2355 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2356 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2357 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2360 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
<citetitle>New
2361 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2362 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2363 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2364 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2365 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2366 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2367 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2368 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2370 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2373 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2374 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2375 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2376 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2377 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2380 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2381 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2382 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2383 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2384 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2385 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2386 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2387 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2388 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2389 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2390 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2391 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2392 extraordinary to report.
2394 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2395 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2396 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2399 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2400 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2401 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2404 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2405 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2406 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2407 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2411 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2412 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2413 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2414 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2415 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2416 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2418 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2419 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2420 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2421 the tinkering of many others.
2424 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2425 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2426 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2427 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2428 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2431 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2432 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2433 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2434 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2435 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2436 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2439 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2440 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2441 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2442 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2443 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2444 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2448 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2449 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2450 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2451 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2452 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2453 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2454 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2455 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2456 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2458 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2460 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2461 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2464 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2465 kind of recognition.
2468 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2469 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2470 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2471 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2472 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2473 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2474 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2477 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2478 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2479 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2480 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2481 general.
<footnote><para>
2483 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2484 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
<citetitle>Communications
2485 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2487 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2488 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2491 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2492 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2496 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2497 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2498 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2499 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2500 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2502 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2504 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2505 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2506 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2507 the law to close down that technology.
2510 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2511 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2515 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2516 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2518 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2519 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2520 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2521 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2522 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2525 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2526 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2527 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2528 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2529 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2530 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2533 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2534 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2535 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2536 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2537 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2540 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2542 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2543 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2544 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2545 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2546 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2547 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2548 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2549 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2552 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2553 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2554 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2555 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2556 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2557 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2558 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2561 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2562 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2563 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2564 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2565 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2566 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2567 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2568 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2569 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2573 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2574 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2575 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2576 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2577 be on users' computers.
2580 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2581 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2582 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2583 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2584 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2585 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2589 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2590 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2591 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2592 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2593 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2594 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2595 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2596 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2597 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2598 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2599 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2600 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2604 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2605 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2606 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2607 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2608 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2609 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2610 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2613 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2614 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2615 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2616 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2617 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2618 easier to use"
—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2619 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2620 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2621 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2622 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2626 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2627 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2629 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2630 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2631 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2632 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2633 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2634 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2637 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2638 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2639 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2640 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2641 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2642 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2643 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2644 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2645 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2646 2001.
<footnote><para>
2649 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2650 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,"
<citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2651 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2655 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2656 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2657 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2658 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2659 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2662 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2663 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2664 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2665 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2666 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2667 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2668 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2669 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2670 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2673 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2674 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2675 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2676 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2677 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2679 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2680 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2683 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2684 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2687 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2688 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2689 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2690 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2691 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2692 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2693 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2695 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2696 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2697 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2699 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2700 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2701 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2703 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2704 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2708 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2709 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2710 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2715 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2716 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2717 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2718 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2722 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2723 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2724 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2725 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2726 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2730 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2731 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2733 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2734 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2735 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2736 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2737 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2738 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2743 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2745 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2746 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2747 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2748 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2750 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2751 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2752 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2753 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2754 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2755 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2756 this creative property
2757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2758 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2761 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2765 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2766 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2767 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2768 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2769 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2770 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2771 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2774 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2775 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2776 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2777 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2778 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2779 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2780 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2781 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2782 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2783 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2785 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2786 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2787 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2788 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2789 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2790 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2791 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2792 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2793 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2794 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2795 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2796 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2797 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2801 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2802 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2803 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2804 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2805 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2807 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios,"
<citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2808 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2810 That led the independents to flee the East
2811 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2812 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2813 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2817 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2818 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2819 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2822 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2823 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2824 Edison's creative property.
2827 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2828 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2830 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2831 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2834 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2835 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2836 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2837 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2838 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2839 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2840 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2841 right to perform it publicly.
2843 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2845 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2846 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2847 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2848 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2849 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2850 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2851 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2852 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2853 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2854 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2855 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2856 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2857 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2858 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2859 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2860 its composer anything.
2863 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2865 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2870 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2871 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2872 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2873 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2874 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2875 rights.
<footnote><para>
2877 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2878 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2879 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2880 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
2881 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2882 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2887 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2888 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2889 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2891 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2892 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2894 and the "music publishing industry"
2895 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2897 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2898 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2901 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2902 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2904 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2905 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2909 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2910 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2911 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2912 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2913 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2914 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2917 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2918 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2919 Perforating Company of New York).
2920 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2921 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2922 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2923 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2924 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2925 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2926 statute."
<footnote><para>
2928 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
2929 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2930 Graphophone Company Association).
2934 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2935 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
2936 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
2937 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
2938 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
2939 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
2940 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
2941 recorded once. This is the part of
2943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2944 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2945 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2946 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2949 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2950 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2951 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2952 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2953 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2954 the fee set by the statute.
2957 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2958 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2959 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2960 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2961 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2962 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2964 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
2967 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2968 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
2969 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
2970 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
2971 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
2972 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
2973 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
2974 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
2975 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
2976 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
2977 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2978 creativity.
<footnote><para>
2981 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2982 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2983 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2984 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2985 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2987 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2990 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2991 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2992 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2997 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2999 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3000 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3001 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3002 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3003 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3004 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3005 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3006 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3007 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3008 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3009 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3010 choice.
<footnote><para>
3012 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3013 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3014 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3015 this report.
</para></footnote>
3019 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3020 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3024 <title>Radio
</title>
3026 Radio was also born of piracy.
3029 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3030 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3032 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3033 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3034 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3035 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3036 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3037 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3038 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3039 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3040 Copyright,"
<citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3041 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3042 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3044 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3045 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3046 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3049 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3050 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3051 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3052 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3053 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3054 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3055 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3056 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3057 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3059 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3064 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3065 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3066 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3067 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3068 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3069 of playing the song.
3071 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3072 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3075 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3076 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3077 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3078 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3081 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3082 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3083 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3084 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3085 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3086 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3087 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3090 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3092 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3093 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3094 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3095 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3096 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3097 to take something for nothing.
3100 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3101 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3104 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3107 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3108 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3109 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3110 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3111 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3112 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3113 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3114 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3117 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3118 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3120 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3121 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3122 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3124 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3125 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3126 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3127 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3130 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3131 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3132 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3133 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3135 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3136 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3138 As another broadcaster put it,
3142 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3143 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3144 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3146 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3147 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3152 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3156 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3157 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3158 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3159 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3161 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3162 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3163 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3168 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3169 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3170 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3172 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3173 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3177 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3178 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3182 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3183 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3184 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3185 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3187 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3188 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3189 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3191 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3192 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3193 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3195 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3199 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3200 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3203 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3204 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3205 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3206 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3207 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3208 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3209 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3210 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3211 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3212 created by broadcasters' content.
3215 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3216 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3217 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3218 today
<footnote><para>
3220 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3221 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3222 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3223 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3224 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3225 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3227 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3228 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3229 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. . . . The list is long and
3230 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3231 last. Every generation
—until now.
3233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3237 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3239 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3240 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3241 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3242 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3243 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3247 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3248 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3249 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3250 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3251 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3252 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3253 has so often done in the past.
3254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3256 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3257 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3259 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3260 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3261 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3262 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3263 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3265 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3266 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3267 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3268 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
<citetitle>Financial
3269 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3271 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3272 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3275 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3276 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3277 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3278 This piracy is wrong.
3281 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3282 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3283 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3284 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3285 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3286 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3287 of our existence, treated as right.
3290 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3291 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3292 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3293 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3294 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3295 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3296 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3297 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3298 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3301 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3302 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3304 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3305 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3309 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3310 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3311 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3312 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3314 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
<citetitle>Who
3315 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3316 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3317 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3318 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3319 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3320 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3321 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3322 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3323 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3324 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3325 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3326 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3327 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3328 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3329 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3330 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3331 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3335 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3336 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3337 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3338 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3339 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3341 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3342 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3343 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the
3344 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3345 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3346 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3347 pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3348 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3352 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3353 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3354 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3355 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3356 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3357 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3358 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3359 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3360 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3361 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3362 piracy of the tangible.
3365 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3366 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3367 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3368 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3369 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3370 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3371 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3372 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3373 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3376 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3377 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3378 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3379 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3380 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3383 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3384 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3385 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3386 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3387 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3388 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3389 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3390 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3391 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3392 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3393 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3394 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3397 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3398 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3399 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3400 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3401 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3402 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3405 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3406 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3407 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3408 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3409 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3410 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3411 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3412 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3413 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3414 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3415 violating the law is still wrong.
3418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3419 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3420 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3421 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3422 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3423 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3424 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3425 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3429 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3430 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3431 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3432 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3433 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3434 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3435 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3438 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3439 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3440 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3441 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3444 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3445 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3446 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3447 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3450 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3451 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3455 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3456 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3458 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3459 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3461 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3463 This means we must determine whether
3464 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3466 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3467 author of his profit.
3470 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3471 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3472 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3473 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3475 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3476 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3477 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3478 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3479 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3480 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3481 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3482 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3483 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3484 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3485 put together components that had been developed independently.
3486 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3489 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3490 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3491 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3492 system.
<footnote><para>
3494 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
<citetitle>San
3495 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3496 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3497 Secures New Financing,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3498 "Napster's Wake-Up Call,"
<citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3499 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3501 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3502 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3503 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3504 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3505 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3506 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3507 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3510 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3511 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3512 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3513 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3516 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3517 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3518 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3519 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3521 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3522 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3523 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3525 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,"
<citetitle>New
3526 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3528 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3529 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3530 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3531 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3534 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3535 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3536 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3537 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3538 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3539 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3544 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3545 different kinds into four types.
3547 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3550 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3551 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3552 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3553 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3554 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3555 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3556 users who download instead of purchasing.
3557 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3561 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3562 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3563 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3564 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3565 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3566 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3567 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3572 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3573 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3574 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3575 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3576 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3577 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3578 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3579 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3580 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3581 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3582 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3583 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3589 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3590 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3595 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3598 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3599 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3600 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3601 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3603 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3604 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3606 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3607 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3608 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3609 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3610 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3611 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3614 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3615 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3616 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3617 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3618 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3619 "devastating" the industry.
3622 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3623 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3624 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3625 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3626 & Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3627 technology, the labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3629 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3630 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3631 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3632 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3633 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3634 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3635 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3636 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3637 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3638 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3639 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3640 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3641 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3642 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3643 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3644 regulating technology was the answer.
3647 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3648 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3649 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3650 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3652 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3653 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3655 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3659 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3660 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3661 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3662 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3663 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3664 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3665 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3666 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3669 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3670 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3671 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3672 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3673 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3674 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3675 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3680 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3681 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3682 actually suggest it might be close.
3685 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3686 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3687 percent.
<footnote><para>
3689 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3691 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3692 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3693 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3694 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3695 #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3696 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3697 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3698 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3699 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3700 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3701 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3704 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3705 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3706 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3707 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3708 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3709 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3710 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3713 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3714 February
2003, available at
3715 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3716 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3719 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3720 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes, "The
3721 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3722 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3723 $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3731 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3732 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3733 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3734 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3735 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3736 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3739 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3740 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3741 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3742 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own numbers
3743 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3744 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3745 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3746 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3747 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry
3748 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3749 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3750 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3751 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3754 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3755 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3756 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3760 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3761 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3762 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3763 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3764 available.
<footnote><para>
3766 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3767 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3768 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3769 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3770 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3771 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3773 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3774 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3775 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3776 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3777 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3780 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3782 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3783 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3784 today.
<footnote><para>
3786 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3787 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3788 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3789 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3790 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3792 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3795 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3797 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3798 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3799 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3800 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3801 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3802 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3803 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3804 the content they sell.
3806 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3808 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3809 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3810 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3811 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3812 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3813 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3814 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3815 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3816 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3817 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3818 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3821 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3822 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3823 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3824 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3825 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3829 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3830 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3831 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3832 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3833 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
3834 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3837 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3838 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3839 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3840 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3841 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3842 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3846 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3847 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3848 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3849 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3852 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3853 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3854 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3855 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3859 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3860 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3861 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3862 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3863 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3864 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3865 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3866 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3867 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3868 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3869 found only with time.
3872 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3873 just what you call type A sharing?"
3876 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3878 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3879 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3881 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3883 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3885 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3886 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3887 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3889 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3890 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3893 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
3894 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
3895 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
3896 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3900 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3901 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3902 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3903 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3904 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3905 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3906 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3907 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3908 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3911 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3912 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3913 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
3914 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3915 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
3916 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
3917 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3920 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3921 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3922 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3923 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
3924 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
3925 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
3926 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
3927 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
3928 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
3932 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3933 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3934 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3935 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3936 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
3941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3942 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3943 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
3944 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
3945 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
3946 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
3947 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
3948 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
3949 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
3950 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
3951 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
3952 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
3953 Congress chose a path that would assure
3954 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
3955 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
3957 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
3959 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3960 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3961 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3962 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3963 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3964 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3965 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3966 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3967 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3968 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3969 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3972 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3973 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3974 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3975 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3976 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3977 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3978 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3979 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3980 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3981 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3982 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3983 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3984 for the architecture it chose.
3987 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
3988 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
3989 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
3990 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
3991 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
3992 copyright."
<footnote><para>
3994 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
3995 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
3996 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
3997 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
3999 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4000 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4001 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4002 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4003 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4004 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4006 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4008 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4009 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4011 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4014 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4015 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4016 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4017 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4018 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4019 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4020 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4022 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4027 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4028 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4029 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4030 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4031 Circuit"
—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4032 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4033 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4034 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4035 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4036 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4037 technology.
<footnote><para>
4039 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4044 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4047 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4048 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4053 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4054 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4056 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4058 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4059 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4061 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4063 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4068 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4069 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4070 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4071 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4072 together, a pattern is clear:
4076 <title>Table
</title>
4077 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4081 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4082 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4083 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4088 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4089 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4090 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4091 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4094 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4095 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4097 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4100 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4101 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4102 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4103 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4107 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4108 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4109 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4116 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4117 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4119 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4120 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4121 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4122 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4123 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4124 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4125 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4126 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4127 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4128 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4129 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4131 In each case, throughout our history,
4132 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4136 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4137 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4138 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4139 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4140 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4141 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4142 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4143 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4148 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4149 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4150 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4151 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4152 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4154 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4155 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4156 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4157 permission to record a song?
4160 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4161 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4162 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4163 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4165 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4168 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4169 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4170 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4171 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4172 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4173 facilitate the distribution of content.
4176 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4177 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4178 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4179 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4180 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4181 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4182 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4183 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4184 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4185 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4186 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4187 public interest that innovation continue.
4191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4192 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4193 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4194 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4195 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4196 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4197 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4198 fight."
<footnote><para>
4200 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4201 Echoes Past Efforts,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4203 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4204 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4205 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4206 warriors insist, "is our
<emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we
4207 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4208 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4209 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4210 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4214 "It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4215 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4221 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4222 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4226 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4227 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4228 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4229 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4230 the price she can get.
4233 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4234 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4235 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4236 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4237 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4238 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4239 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4240 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4241 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4245 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4246 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4248 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4250 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4251 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4252 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4253 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4254 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4255 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4256 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4258 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4259 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4260 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4264 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4265 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4266 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4268 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4272 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4273 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4274 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4275 "property" in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4277 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4278 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4279 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4280 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4281 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4282 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4283 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4287 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4288 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4289 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4290 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4291 these stories, the significance of this true
4292 statement
—"copyright material is property"
— will be a bit
4293 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4294 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4298 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4299 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4301 William Shakespeare wrote
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play
4302 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4303 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4304 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4305 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4306 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4307 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4308 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4309 is so full of clichés."
4312 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4313 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4314 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4316 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4317 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4318 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4319 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4320 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4321 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4322 Bookseller,"
<citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4324 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4325 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4327 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4328 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4330 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4331 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4332 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4335 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4336 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4337 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4340 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4341 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4342 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4343 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4344 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4345 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4346 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4347 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4349 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4350 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4351 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4352 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4353 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4354 Tonson's control in
1774?
4357 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4358 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4359 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4360 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4361 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4362 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4363 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4364 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4368 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4369 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4370 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4371 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4372 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4373 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4374 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4375 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4376 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4377 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4380 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4381 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4382 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4383 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4386 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4387 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4389 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4392 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4393 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4394 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4395 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4396 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4397 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4401 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4402 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4403 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4404 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4407 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4408 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4409 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4410 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4411 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4412 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4413 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4414 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4415 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4418 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4419 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4420 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4424 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4425 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4426 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4427 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4428 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4429 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4430 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4433 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4434 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4435 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4436 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4439 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4440 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4441 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4443 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4445 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4446 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4447 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4448 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4451 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4452 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4454 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4455 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4456 monopolies
—especially
4457 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4458 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4459 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4460 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4462 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4463 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4467 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4469 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4470 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4471 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4472 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4473 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4475 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4478 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4479 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4480 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4481 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4484 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4485 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4486 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4487 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4488 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4489 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4490 indetted."
<footnote><para>
4493 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4494 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4498 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4499 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4500 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4501 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4502 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4506 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4507 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4508 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4509 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4510 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4511 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4513 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4514 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4515 construction and spread of culture.
4518 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4519 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4520 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4521 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4522 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4523 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4524 they said; they needed more time.
4527 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4528 words that echo today,
4532 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4533 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4535 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4536 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4537 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4538 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4539 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4540 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4542 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4543 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4544 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4545 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4546 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4547 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4548 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4553 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4554 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4555 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4556 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4557 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4558 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4559 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4560 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4561 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4562 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4563 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4564 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4565 way to protect authors.
4568 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4569 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4570 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4571 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4572 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4574 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
<citetitle>Vanderbilt
4575 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4576 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4577 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4579 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4580 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4583 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4584 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4585 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4587 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4588 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4592 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4593 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4594 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4595 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4597 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4600 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4602 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4603 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4604 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4605 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4609 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4612 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4613 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4614 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4615 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4616 Property."
<footnote><para>
4618 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4621 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4622 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4623 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4626 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4627 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4628 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4631 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4632 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4633 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4634 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4635 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4636 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4638 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4639 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,"
<citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4643 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4644 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4647 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4648 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4649 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4650 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4651 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4652 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4653 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4654 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4655 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4658 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4659 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4660 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4661 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4662 with in
1710: How best to limit
4663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4664 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4665 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4666 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4667 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4668 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4669 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4671 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4673 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4674 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4676 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4678 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4679 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4680 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4684 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4685 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4686 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4687 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4688 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4689 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4692 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4693 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4694 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4695 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4696 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4697 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4698 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4699 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4702 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4703 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4704 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4705 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4706 House of Lords generally voted.
4709 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4710 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4712 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4713 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4714 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4715 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4716 passed into the public domain.
4719 "The public domain." Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4720 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4721 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4722 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4723 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4724 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4725 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4726 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4727 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4728 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4729 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4730 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4731 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4734 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4735 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4736 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4737 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4738 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4739 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4740 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4741 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4742 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4748 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4749 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4754 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4755 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4756 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4757 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4758 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4759 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4760 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4761 successors.
<footnote><para>
4768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4769 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4770 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4771 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4772 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4773 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4774 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4775 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4776 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4777 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4778 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4779 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4780 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4781 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4782 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4783 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4784 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4785 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4786 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4787 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4790 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4791 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4792 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4795 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4797 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4798 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4800 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4801 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4802 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4803 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4807 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4808 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4812 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4813 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4814 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4815 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4816 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4818 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4821 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4822 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4823 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4824 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
4825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4826 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4830 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4831 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
4832 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4833 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4834 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4837 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4838 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4839 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4840 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4841 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4842 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4845 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4846 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4847 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4848 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4849 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4850 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4853 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4854 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4855 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4856 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4857 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4858 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4861 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4862 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4863 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4864 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4865 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4866 confirm what he had been told.
4869 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4870 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4871 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4875 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4876 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4877 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4881 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4882 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4883 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4884 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4885 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4886 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
4887 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4888 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
4891 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4892 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
4893 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4894 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4895 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4896 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4897 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4898 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4899 says the owner gets to control.
4902 For example, "public performance" is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
4903 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4904 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4905 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4906 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4907 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
4911 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4912 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4914 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4915 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4916 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4917 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4918 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4920 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
4921 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>—and fair use does
4922 not require the permission of anyone.
4925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4926 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use.
" Here's his reply:
4930 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4931 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4932 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4933 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4934 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4935 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4937 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
4940 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4941 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4942 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4943 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4944 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4948 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4949 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4950 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
4951 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
4952 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4953 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
4954 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4955 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4957 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
4961 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4962 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4963 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4964 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4965 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4966 pockets, me or them.
4967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4971 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
4972 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
4978 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
4979 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
4980 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
4981 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
4982 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
4983 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
4986 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
4987 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
4988 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
4989 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
4992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
4994 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
4995 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
4996 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
4997 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4999 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5000 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5001 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5002 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5003 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5005 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5007 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5008 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5009 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5010 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5011 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5012 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5013 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5014 important to his career.
5016 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5018 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5019 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5020 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5021 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5025 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5026 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5027 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5028 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5029 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5031 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5033 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5034 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5035 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5036 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5037 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5040 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5042 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5043 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5045 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5047 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5048 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5049 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5053 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5054 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5055 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5056 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5058 <primary>artists
</primary>
5059 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5064 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5065 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5066 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5067 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5068 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5071 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5072 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5073 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5077 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5078 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5079 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5080 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5081 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5082 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5086 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5087 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5088 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5089 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5090 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5091 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5092 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5093 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5094 started calling people.
5097 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5099 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5100 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5101 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5102 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5103 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5104 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5105 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5106 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5110 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—"and even then we
5111 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5113 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5115 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5116 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5117 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5121 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5122 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5123 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5124 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5125 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5126 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5127 systematically and cleared the rights.
5132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5133 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5134 loved it, and it sold very well.
5136 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5137 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5139 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5140 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5141 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5142 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5143 at all."
<footnote><para>
5145 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5146 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5147 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5149 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5153 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5154 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5155 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5156 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5157 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5161 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5162 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5163 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5164 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5165 compensated for that.
5169 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5170 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5171 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5172 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5173 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5174 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5175 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5176 made to be more clean?
5180 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5181 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5182 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5183 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5185 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5186 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5187 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5188 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5189 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5190 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5191 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5192 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5193 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5194 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5195 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5196 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5199 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5201 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5202 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5203 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5204 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5205 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5206 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5207 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5208 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5209 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5210 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5211 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5212 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5213 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5214 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5215 "Does this still make sense?"
5218 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5219 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5220 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5221 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5224 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5225 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5228 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5229 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5230 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5231 judges loved every minute of it.
5233 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5235 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5236 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5237 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5238 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5239 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5240 were just violated in this room?"
5242 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5244 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5245 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5246 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5247 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5248 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5249 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5250 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5251 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5252 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5253 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5254 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5255 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5256 couldn't easily do them legally.
5259 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5260 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5261 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5262 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5263 planted in your presentation.
5266 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5268 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5269 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5270 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5271 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5272 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5273 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5274 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5275 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5278 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5279 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5280 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5281 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5282 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5285 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5286 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5287 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5288 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5289 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5290 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5291 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5292 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5293 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5294 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5295 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5296 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5300 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5301 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5302 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5303 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5306 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5307 Myers, the comic genius of
<citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5309 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5310 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5311 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5312 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5313 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5314 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5318 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5319 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5320 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5321 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5322 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5323 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5324 new audiences, it is Mike."
5327 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5328 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5329 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5330 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5331 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5332 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5333 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5334 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5337 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5338 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5339 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5340 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5341 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5342 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5343 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5344 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5345 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5346 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5347 curse, reserved for the few.
5349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5351 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5352 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5354 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5355 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5356 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5357 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5358 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5359 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5360 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5363 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5364 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5365 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5366 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5367 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5368 well as when those pages changed.
5371 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5372 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5373 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5374 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5379 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5380 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5381 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5384 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5385 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5386 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5387 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5388 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5391 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5392 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5393 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5394 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5395 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5397 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5398 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5399 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5400 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5401 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5405 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5406 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5407 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5408 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5409 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5410 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5411 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5412 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5416 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5417 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5418 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5419 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5420 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5421 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5422 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5425 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5426 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5427 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5428 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5430 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5431 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5432 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5433 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5436 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5437 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5438 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5439 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5440 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5441 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5442 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5443 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5446 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5447 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5448 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5449 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5450 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5451 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5452 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5453 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5454 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5455 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5456 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5457 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5458 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5459 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5460 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5464 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5465 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5466 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5467 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5468 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5471 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5472 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5476 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5477 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5478 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5479 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5480 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5481 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5484 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5485 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5486 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5487 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5488 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5492 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5493 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5494 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5495 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5496 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5497 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5498 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5499 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5501 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5502 the Library of Congress,"
<citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5503 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5504 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5509 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5510 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5511 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5512 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5513 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5514 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5515 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5516 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5517 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5520 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5522 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5523 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5524 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5525 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5526 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5527 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5531 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5532 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5533 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5534 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5535 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5536 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5537 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5538 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5539 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5540 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5541 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5542 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5543 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5544 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5545 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5546 few minutes
—for free.
5547 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5550 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5551 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5552 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5553 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5554 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5558 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5559 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5560 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5561 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5562 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5563 has
—a noncommercial life.
5566 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5567 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5571 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5572 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5573 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5574 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5575 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5578 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5579 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5580 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5581 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5582 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5583 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5587 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5588 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5590 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5591 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,"
<citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5592 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5593 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5594 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
<citetitle>Boston
5595 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5596 </para></footnote>). After
5597 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5598 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5599 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5600 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5601 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5604 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5605 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5606 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5607 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5608 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5609 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5610 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5611 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5615 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5616 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5617 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5618 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5619 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5622 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5623 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5624 little practical effect.
5627 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5628 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5629 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5630 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5631 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5632 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5635 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5636 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5637 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5642 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5643 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5644 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5645 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5646 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5647 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5648 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5649 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5650 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5651 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5652 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5656 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5657 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5658 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5659 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5660 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5661 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5662 will draw upon it to understand it;
5663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5664 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5665 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5666 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5667 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5668 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5671 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5672 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5673 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5674 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5675 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5676 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5680 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5681 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5683 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5684 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5685 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5686 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5687 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5688 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5689 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5690 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5693 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5694 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5695 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5696 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5697 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5698 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5699 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5700 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5701 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5703 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5704 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5705 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5706 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5707 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5708 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5709 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5713 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5714 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5715 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5716 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5717 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5718 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5719 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5720 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5721 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5725 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5726 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5727 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5728 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5729 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5730 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5731 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5734 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5739 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5740 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5741 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5742 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5743 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5744 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5745 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5746 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5748 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5749 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5750 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5751 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5752 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5758 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5759 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5760 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5763 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5764 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5765 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5766 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5769 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5770 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5771 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5772 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
5773 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5774 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5775 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5776 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5777 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5778 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5781 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5782 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5784 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5785 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5786 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5787 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5788 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5789 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
5790 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5791 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5792 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5793 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5794 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5795 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5799 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5800 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5801 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5802 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5803 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5804 culture would develop.
5807 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5808 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5809 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5810 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5811 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5812 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5813 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5814 the same would be to
5816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5817 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5818 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5822 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5823 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5824 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5825 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5826 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5827 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5828 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5829 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5830 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5831 Constitution itself.
5834 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5835 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5836 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5837 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5838 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5839 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5840 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5841 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
5842 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5845 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5846 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5847 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5848 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5849 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5850 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5851 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5852 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5853 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5854 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5856 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5857 compensation at all.
5860 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5861 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5862 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5863 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5864 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5865 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5869 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5870 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5871 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5872 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5873 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5874 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5875 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5876 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5877 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5878 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5881 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5882 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
5883 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
5884 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
5885 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
5889 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5890 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5891 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5892 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5893 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
5894 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
5895 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
5896 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
5897 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
5898 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
5899 also control how culture develops.
5903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5904 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5905 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5906 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
5907 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5908 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5909 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5910 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5912 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
5913 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
5914 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
5917 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5918 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5919 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5920 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5921 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5922 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5923 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5924 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5925 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5926 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5927 Web, you can be punished
5928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5929 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5930 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5931 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
5934 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5935 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5936 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5937 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5938 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5939 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5940 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5941 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5942 the source of the enforcement.
5945 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5946 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5947 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5948 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5949 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5950 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5951 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5952 individual or group might behave.
5955 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5956 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
5957 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5958 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5959 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5960 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5961 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5962 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5963 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5964 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
5965 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5966 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5967 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5971 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5972 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5973 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5974 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5975 undermined by another.
5978 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
5979 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
5980 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
5981 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
5982 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
5983 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
5984 must consider how these four in particular interact.
5986 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
5987 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
5990 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
5991 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
5992 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
5993 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
5994 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
5995 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
5996 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
5997 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
5998 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
5999 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6000 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6001 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6004 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6005 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6006 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6008 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6009 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6010 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6011 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6012 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6013 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6014 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School,"
<citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6017 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6018 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6019 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6020 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6021 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6022 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6023 used to require that other laws be more
6024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6025 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6026 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6029 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6031 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6032 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6033 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6036 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6037 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6038 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6039 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6040 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6044 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6045 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6046 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6047 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6048 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6049 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6050 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6051 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6052 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6053 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6054 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6055 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a long tradition of
6056 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6057 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6058 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6059 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
<citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana:
6060 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6061 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6062 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6063 J. Samuels, eds.,
<citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6064 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6065 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6066 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6067 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6068 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6069 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6070 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6071 of these groups might face.
6072 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6075 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6076 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6078 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6079 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6080 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6081 rallying makes sense.
6084 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6087 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6088 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6089 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6093 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6094 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6095 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6096 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6097 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6098 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6099 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6100 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6101 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6102 this form of infringement.
6105 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6106 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6107 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6108 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6109 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6110 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6113 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6114 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6115 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6116 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6119 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6120 looting that results.
6122 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6123 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6124 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6127 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6128 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6129 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6130 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6131 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6132 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6133 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6134 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6135 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6136 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6139 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6140 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6141 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6142 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6143 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6144 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6145 life. Homeowners living in a
6147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6148 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6149 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6150 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6151 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6152 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6153 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6156 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6157 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6158 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6159 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6160 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6161 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6164 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6165 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6166 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6167 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6168 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6169 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6170 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6172 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6173 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6174 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6175 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6176 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6177 October
2003, available at
6178 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6181 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6182 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6183 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6184 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6185 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6186 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6187 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6188 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6189 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6190 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6191 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6194 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6195 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6196 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6198 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6199 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6200 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6201 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6202 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6204 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6207 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6208 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6209 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6210 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6211 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6213 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6216 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6217 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6218 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6219 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6220 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6221 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6222 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6223 opportunities for innovation and change.
6226 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6227 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6228 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6229 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6230 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6231 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6232 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6233 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6234 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6235 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6236 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6237 regulation is justified.
6240 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6242 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6243 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6244 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6245 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6246 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6249 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6251 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6252 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6255 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6256 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6257 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6258 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6259 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6260 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6263 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6264 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6265 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6267 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6269 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6270 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6271 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6272 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6273 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6274 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6277 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6278 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6279 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6280 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6281 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6282 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6283 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6286 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6287 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6288 culture.
<footnote><para>
6290 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6291 Environmentalism for the Net?"
<citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6293 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6294 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6295 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6296 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6297 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6298 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6300 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6301 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6302 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6303 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6304 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6307 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6308 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6309 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6310 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6311 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6312 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6313 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6314 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6315 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6318 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6319 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6322 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6324 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6325 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6327 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6328 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6329 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6330 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6333 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6334 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6335 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6338 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6339 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6340 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6343 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6344 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6345 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6346 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6347 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6348 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6351 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6352 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6353 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6354 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6355 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6356 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6357 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6360 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6361 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6362 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6363 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6364 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6365 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6366 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6367 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6368 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6369 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6370 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6371 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6372 concentrations of power.
6375 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6376 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6377 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6378 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6379 years since they first struck its design.
6382 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6383 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6385 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6388 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6389 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6390 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6395 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6396 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6397 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6404 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6405 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6407 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6408 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6409 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6410 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6411 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6412 authorship.
<footnote>
6415 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6416 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6417 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6418 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6419 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis>"
6421 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6423 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6424 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6425 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6426 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6427 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6428 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6431 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6432 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6433 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6434 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6435 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6436 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6439 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6440 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6441 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6442 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6443 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6446 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6447 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6448 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6449 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6450 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6451 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6452 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6454 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6455 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6456 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6457 of an Industry, 1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6458 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6459 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6460 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7–10 (2002),
6461 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/
">link
6462 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6463 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6464 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6465 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6466 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6467 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6470 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6471 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6473 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6474 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6475 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6479 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6480 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6481 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6482 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6483 domain.<footnote><para>
6485 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6486 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6487 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6488 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
"
6489 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6490 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6491 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6492 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6493 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6496 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6497 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6498 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6500 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6501 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6502 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6503 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6504 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6505 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6508 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6509 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6510 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6511 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6512 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6513 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6516 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6517 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6518 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6519 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6520 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6521 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6522 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6523 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6526 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6527 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6528 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6529 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6532 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6533 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6534 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6537 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6538 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6539 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6540 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6541 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6542 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6543 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6547 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6548 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6549 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6550 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6551 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6552 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6553 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6554 was ninety-five years.
6557 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6558 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6559 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6560 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6561 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6562 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6566 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6567 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6568 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6569 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6570 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6571 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6572 years.
<footnote><para>
6574 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6575 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6576 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6577 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6582 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6583 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6585 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6586 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6587 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6588 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6591 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6592 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6593 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6594 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6595 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6596 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6597 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6598 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6599 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6600 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6601 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6604 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6605 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6606 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6607 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6608 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6609 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6610 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6611 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6612 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6613 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6614 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6615 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6616 on the initial creative work.
6619 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6620 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6621 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6623 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6624 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6625 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6626 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6627 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6628 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6629 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6633 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6634 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6635 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6636 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6637 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6638 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6639 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6640 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6641 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6642 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6643 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6647 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6648 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6649 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6650 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6651 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6652 copy available for others to copy.
6655 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6659 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6660 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6661 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6662 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6663 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6664 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6666 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6667 Creation of American Literature,"
29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6668 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6669 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6672 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6673 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6674 the United States
—publishers.
6677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6678 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6679 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6680 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6681 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6682 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6683 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6687 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6688 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6689 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6690 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6691 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6692 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6696 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6697 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6698 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6701 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6703 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6704 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6705 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6706 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6707 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6708 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6709 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6711 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6712 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6715 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6716 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6718 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6720 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6721 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6722 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6723 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6727 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6728 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6729 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6730 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6731 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6732 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6733 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6734 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6735 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6737 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage,"
<citetitle>Legal Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
6739 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6740 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6742 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6743 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6744 the wrong of direct piracy.
6747 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6748 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6749 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6750 of my book.
<footnote><para>
6752 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6753 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6754 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6755 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6756 Copyright's Constitutionality,"
<citetitle>Yale Law Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
6757 1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6759 These two different uses of my creative work are
6763 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6764 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6765 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6767 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6768 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6772 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6773 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6775 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6776 rights originally granted.
6779 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6780 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6782 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6783 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6784 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6785 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6787 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6788 certainly regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a
6789 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6790 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6791 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy";
17
6792 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
6793 existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6794 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6799 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6800 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6801 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6802 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6803 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6804 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6805 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6806 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6807 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6808 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
6809 the trigger for copyright law.
6812 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6813 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6814 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6815 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6817 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6818 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6819 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6821 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6823 because it is clear that the
6824 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6825 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6828 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6831 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6832 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6833 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6837 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6838 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6839 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6840 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6841 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6842 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6843 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6844 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6845 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6846 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6847 acts do not make a copy.
6849 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6850 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6851 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6854 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6855 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6856 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6857 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6858 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6859 diagram on next page).
6862 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6863 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6866 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6867 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6868 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6871 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6872 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6874 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6875 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6876 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6877 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6878 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6879 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6881 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6882 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6883 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6886 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6887 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6888 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6892 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6893 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6894 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6897 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6898 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6900 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6901 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6902 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6903 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6905 And because of this single,
6906 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6908 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6910 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6911 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6912 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6913 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
6915 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6917 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
6918 burden of this shift.
6921 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6922 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
6923 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
6924 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
6925 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
6926 the book once, ten times, or every
6927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6928 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
6929 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6934 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
6935 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6936 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
6937 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
6938 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
6939 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
6940 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
6941 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
6942 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
6943 copyright owner's wish.
6946 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6947 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6948 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6949 points also become clear:
6952 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6953 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6954 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6955 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
6956 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
6957 part of free culture before the Internet.
6960 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6961 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
6962 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
6963 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
6964 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
6965 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
6966 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
6967 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
6968 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
6972 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
6974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
6975 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
6976 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
6977 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
6978 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
6979 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
6981 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
6982 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
6984 before because reading was not regulated.
6987 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
6988 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
6989 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
6990 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
6991 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
6992 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
6993 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
6997 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
6998 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
6999 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7000 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7001 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7004 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7006 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7008 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7009 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7010 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7011 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7016 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7018 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7019 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7020 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7022 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7024 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7025 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7026 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7028 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7029 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7030 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7033 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7034 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7036 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7038 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7039 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7040 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7041 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7042 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7045 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7046 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7047 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7048 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7049 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7050 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7051 Disney's permission.
7054 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7055 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7056 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7057 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7058 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7059 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7060 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7061 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7062 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7063 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7064 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7065 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7069 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7070 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7071 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7072 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7073 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7074 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7075 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7076 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7077 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7078 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7079 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7080 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7081 happening are quite slight.
7084 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7085 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7086 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7087 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7088 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7089 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7092 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7093 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7095 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7096 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7097 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7098 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7101 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7102 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7103 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7104 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7105 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7108 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7110 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7111 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7113 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7114 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7115 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7117 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain,"
<citetitle>Law and
7118 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7122 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7123 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7124 you were."
<footnote><para>
7126 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7127 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7129 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>,
7130 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then
7131 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7134 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7135 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7136 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7137 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7140 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7141 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7142 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7143 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7145 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7146 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7147 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7148 that is not at all funny.
7151 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7154 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7155 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7156 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7158 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7161 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7165 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7166 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7167 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in the public domain.
7168 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7169 own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> is not yet within the public domain.
7170 Consider
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7172 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7175 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7176 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7177 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7180 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7181 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7183 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7184 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7185 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7189 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7190 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7191 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7192 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7193 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7194 read aloud through the computer.
7197 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7198 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7200 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7201 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7202 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7205 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7206 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7209 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7210 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7211 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7214 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7215 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>:
7217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7218 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7219 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7220 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7223 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7226 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7227 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7228 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7229 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7231 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7233 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7234 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7235 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7237 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7238 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7239 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7241 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the permission to
7242 copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten days, what
7243 that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher
7244 to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the control
7245 that the law would enable.
7248 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7249 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7250 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7251 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7252 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7253 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7254 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7255 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7256 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7257 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7258 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7259 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7260 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7261 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7266 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7267 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7268 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7272 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7273 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7274 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7275 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7276 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7277 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7278 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7281 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7282 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7284 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7285 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7286 protections as well?
7289 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7293 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7295 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7296 free on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
</citetitle>.
7297 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7298 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7300 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7301 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7302 Wonderland
".
</title>
7303 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7307 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7309 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7311 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7314 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7315 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7316 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7317 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7318 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7319 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7322 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7323 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7324 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7325 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7326 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7327 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7328 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7329 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7330 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7331 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7332 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7335 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7336 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7337 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7338 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7339 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7343 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7344 story of mine that makes the same point.
7346 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo" class='startofrange'
>
7347 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7350 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7351 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7352 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7355 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7356 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7357 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7359 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7360 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7361 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7364 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7365 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7366 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7367 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7368 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7369 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7372 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7373 word
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7374 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7375 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much
7376 more positive term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the program to
7377 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7378 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7379 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7380 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7381 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7384 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7385 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7386 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7387 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7391 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7392 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7393 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7394 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7395 than Sony had built.
7397 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo" class='endofrange'
/>
7399 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7400 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7401 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7402 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7406 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7407 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7408 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7409 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7410 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7411 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7412 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7415 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7416 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7417 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7418 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7419 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7420 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7421 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7422 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7423 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7426 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7428 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7429 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
"Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7430 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7431 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7432 DMCA,"
<citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7433 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,"
<citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7434 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7435 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7436 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7437 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7438 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7440 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7441 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7442 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7443 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7446 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7447 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7448 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7449 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7450 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7451 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7452 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7456 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7457 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7458 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7459 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7463 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7464 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7465 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7466 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7469 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7470 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7471 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7472 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7473 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7474 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7477 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7478 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7479 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7480 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7481 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7482 constituted, succeed.
7485 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7486 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7487 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7492 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7493 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7494 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7498 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7499 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7500 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7504 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7506 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7507 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7508 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7512 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7513 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7514 spreading such information an offense.
7517 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7518 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7519 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7520 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7521 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7522 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7523 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7524 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7525 protection for copyright owners.
7528 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7529 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7530 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7531 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7532 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7535 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7536 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7537 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7538 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7539 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7540 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7541 have been a copyright violation.
7544 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7545 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7546 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7547 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7548 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7549 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7550 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7552 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7553 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7556 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7557 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7558 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7559 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7560 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7561 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7564 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7565 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7566 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7567 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7568 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7569 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "
<citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>," for example, had
7570 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7571 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7575 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7576 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7577 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7578 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7579 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7580 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7581 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7582 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7583 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7584 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7585 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7586 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7587 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7588 important.
<footnote><para>
7590 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7591 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7592 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7593 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7599 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7600 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7601 the VCR responsible.
7604 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7608 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7611 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7612 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7613 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7614 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7615 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7616 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7619 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7621 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7622 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7623 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7626 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7627 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7628 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7631 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7632 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7633 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7634 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7635 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7636 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7639 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7640 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7641 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7642 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7643 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7644 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7647 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7648 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7649 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7650 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7651 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7652 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7653 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7654 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7655 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7656 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7659 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7660 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7661 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7662 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7663 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7664 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7665 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7666 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7667 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7672 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7673 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7674 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7675 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7676 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7678 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7679 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,"
<citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7680 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7684 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7685 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7686 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7687 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7688 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7691 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7692 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7693 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7694 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7695 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7696 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7697 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7698 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7701 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7702 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7703 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7704 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7705 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7706 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7709 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7710 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7712 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7713 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7714 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7715 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7716 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7719 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7720 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7721 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7722 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7723 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7724 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7725 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7726 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7730 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7731 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7732 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7733 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7734 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7737 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7738 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7739 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7740 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7741 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7742 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7743 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7744 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7748 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7751 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7753 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7754 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7755 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7757 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7758 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7759 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7760 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7761 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7762 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7764 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7765 Slide,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
7767 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7768 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7770 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,"
<citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
7773 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
7776 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7777 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7779 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
7780 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7781 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
7782 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
7783 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
7784 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7787 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7788 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7789 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7790 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7791 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7792 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7793 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7794 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7795 protected
— by the market.
7798 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7799 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7800 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7801 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7805 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7806 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7807 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7808 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7809 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7810 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7811 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7812 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7813 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7814 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7816 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch,"
<citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
7818 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7823 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7824 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7825 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7826 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7828 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7829 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7830 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7834 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7835 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7839 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7840 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7841 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7842 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7845 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7846 integration may matter.
7848 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7849 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7850 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7852 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
7853 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7854 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7855 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7856 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7859 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7860 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7861 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7862 control.
<footnote><para>
7864 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7865 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7867 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7868 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7869 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7870 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7876 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7877 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7878 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7879 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7880 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7881 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7885 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7886 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
7887 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7888 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
7889 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7890 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7891 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
7892 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7893 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
7895 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7896 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
7897 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7898 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7899 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7900 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7901 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
7904 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7905 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
7906 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7907 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7908 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7909 63%."
<footnote><para>
7914 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7916 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
7917 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7918 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7919 owned by the network.
7922 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7923 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7924 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7925 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
7926 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
7930 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7931 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7932 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7933 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7935 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7936 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7937 handful.
<footnote><para>
7939 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,"
<citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
7940 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
7941 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
7946 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7947 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7948 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7949 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7950 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7951 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7952 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
7953 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
7954 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
7957 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
7959 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
7960 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
7961 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
7962 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
7963 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
7964 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
7966 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
7967 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
7968 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
7969 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
7970 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
7971 Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
<citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
7972 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
7973 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
7974 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
7975 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
7977 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
7978 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
7980 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
7983 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
7984 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
7985 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
7989 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
7990 suggest the concern.
7993 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
7994 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
7995 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
7998 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
7999 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8000 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8003 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8004 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8005 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8006 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8007 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8008 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8009 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8010 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8011 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8012 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8013 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8014 outweigh these costs.
8017 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8018 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8019 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8023 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8024 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8025 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8026 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8027 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8028 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8029 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8030 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8031 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8032 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8035 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8036 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8039 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8040 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8041 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8045 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8047 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8048 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8049 message will be heard then?
8052 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8053 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8054 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8055 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8056 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8057 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8058 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8059 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8060 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8062 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8063 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8064 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8065 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8066 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8067 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8068 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8069 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8070 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8071 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,"
<citetitle>New
8072 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8073 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8074 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8075 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8076 Radio,"
<citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8077 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8078 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8079 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8080 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8081 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8082 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8083 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8084 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8085 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8086 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8087 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8088 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8092 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8093 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8094 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8095 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8096 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8097 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8098 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8099 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8100 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8103 <sect2 id=
"together">
8104 <title>Together
</title>
8106 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8107 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8108 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8109 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8112 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8113 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8114 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8115 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8119 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8120 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8121 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8122 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8123 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8124 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8128 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8129 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8130 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8134 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8135 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8136 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8137 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8138 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8139 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8140 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8141 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8142 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8143 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8146 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8147 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8148 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8149 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8150 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8151 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8152 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8153 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8154 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8155 in control that technology and the market enable.
8158 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8159 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8161 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8162 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8163 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8164 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8167 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8168 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8169 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8170 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8171 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8172 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8173 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8174 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8175 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8176 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8177 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8178 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8179 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8180 known.
<footnote><para>
8182 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8183 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8184 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8188 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8191 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8192 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8193 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8194 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8195 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8200 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8204 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8205 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8210 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8211 <entry>©</entry>
8215 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8224 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8225 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8226 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8229 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8230 noncommercial work was also free.
8233 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8238 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8242 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8243 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8248 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8249 <entry>©</entry>
8250 <entry>©</entry>
8253 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8262 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8263 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8264 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8265 transformation were still essentially free.
8268 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8269 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8270 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8271 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8272 we could say the law began to look like this:
8277 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8282 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8287 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8288 <entry>©</entry>
8289 <entry>©</entry>
8292 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8293 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8301 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8302 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8303 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8304 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8305 that the law now looks like this:
8310 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8315 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8320 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8321 <entry>©</entry>
8322 <entry>©</entry>
8325 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8326 <entry>©</entry>
8327 <entry>©</entry>
8334 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8335 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8338 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8339 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8342 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8343 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8344 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8345 these domains actually does any good.
8348 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8349 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8350 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8351 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8352 reasons sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8353 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8354 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8355 rights were more sharply restricted.
8358 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8359 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8360 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8361 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8362 property rights
<footnote><para>
8364 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8365 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8366 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8367 Disintegration of Property," in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8368 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8371 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8372 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8373 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8374 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8375 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8376 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8377 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8378 vibrant and rich free culture.
8381 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8382 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8383 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8384 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8385 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8386 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8387 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8390 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8391 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8392 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8393 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8394 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8395 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8396 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8397 dominates the debate today.
8400 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8401 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8402 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8403 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8404 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8405 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8406 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8407 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8408 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8409 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8416 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8417 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8420 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8421 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8422 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8423 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8425 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8426 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8428 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8429 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8433 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8434 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8435 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8437 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8438 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8439 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8441 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8442 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8443 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8444 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8445 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8446 villagers to explore life as a king.
8449 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8450 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8451 "blind." They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8452 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8453 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8454 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8455 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8456 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8461 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8462 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8463 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8464 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8465 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8466 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8467 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8468 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8469 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8472 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8473 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8474 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8475 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8478 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8479 is affected," he reports.
8482 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8483 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8487 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8488 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8489 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8490 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8493 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8494 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8495 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8496 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8497 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8498 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8499 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8500 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8503 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8504 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8507 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8508 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8510 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8511 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8512 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8513 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8514 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8515 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8518 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8519 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8520 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8521 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8522 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8523 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8524 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8525 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8526 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8527 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8528 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8529 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8532 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8533 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8534 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8535 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8536 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8537 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8538 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8541 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8542 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8543 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8544 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8545 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8547 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8552 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8553 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8554 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8555 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8556 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8557 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8558 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8559 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8562 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8563 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8564 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8565 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8566 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8569 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8570 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8571 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8572 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8573 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8574 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8575 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8576 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8578 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8579 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8580 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
8582 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8583 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8584 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8585 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8586 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8587 Stakes on Piracy,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8588 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8589 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8590 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8591 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8592 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8593 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8594 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8595 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8596 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8597 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8598 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8599 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8600 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8601 August
2003, available at
8602 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8603 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8604 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8605 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8606 Name Students,"
<citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8607 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8608 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8612 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8614 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8615 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8616 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8617 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8618 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8621 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8622 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8623 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8624 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8625 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8626 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8627 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8628 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8633 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8634 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8635 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8636 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8637 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8638 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8641 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8642 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8643 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8644 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8645 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8646 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8647 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8648 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8649 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8650 protection for copyrighted material,
8654 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8655 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8658 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8659 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8660 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8662 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8663 well produce a totally different industry model.
8666 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8667 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8668 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8669 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8670 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8671 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8672 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8673 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8674 interests.
<footnote><para>
8676 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8677 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8678 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8679 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8680 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8681 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8682 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8687 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8688 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8690 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8693 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8694 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8695 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8701 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8704 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8705 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8706 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8707 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8709 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8712 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8713 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8715 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8719 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8720 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8721 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8724 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8725 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8727 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8728 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8729 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8730 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8734 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8735 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8736 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8737 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8738 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8740 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8741 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8743 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8744 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8745 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8746 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8747 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8748 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8749 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8750 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8751 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8752 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8753 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8754 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8755 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8758 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8759 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8760 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8761 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8762 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8763 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8764 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8765 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8766 the culture all around.
8769 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8770 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8774 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8775 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8776 storytelling extended across the globe.
8779 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8780 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8781 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8782 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8783 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8784 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8785 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8786 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8787 work is presumptively illegal.
8790 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8791 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8792 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8793 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8794 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8795 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8796 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8797 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8798 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8799 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8800 million.
<footnote><para>
8802 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
8803 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8804 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8805 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8806 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8807 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8809 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8810 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8811 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8812 suffering.
<footnote>
8814 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8815 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8816 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8817 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8818 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8819 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8821 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8823 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8825 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8826 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8827 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8828 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8831 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8832 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
8833 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
8834 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
8835 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
8836 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
8839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8840 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
8841 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
8842 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
8843 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
8844 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
8845 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
8846 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
8847 States.
<footnote><para>
8850 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free,"
<citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
8852 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8853 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8855 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8856 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8857 critical or reflective.
8860 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8861 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
8862 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8863 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8864 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8865 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8866 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8867 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8868 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8871 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8872 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8873 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8874 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8875 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8876 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8877 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8878 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8879 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8882 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8883 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
8884 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8885 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8886 law regulates such a use.
8890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8891 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8892 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8893 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
8894 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8895 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8896 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8897 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8898 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8901 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8902 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8903 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8904 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8905 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8906 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8907 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8908 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8912 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
8913 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8914 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8915 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8916 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
8917 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8918 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8919 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8920 culture that is free.
8923 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8927 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8928 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8929 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8930 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8931 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8933 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8934 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8935 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8939 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
8940 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
8942 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8943 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8944 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8945 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8946 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8947 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8950 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8951 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8952 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8953 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8954 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8955 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8956 affecting culture are more fundamental.
8959 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
8960 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
8961 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
8962 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
8963 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
8964 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
8965 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
8966 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
8967 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
8968 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
8969 against the competitors of tomorrow.
8971 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
8973 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
8974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
8975 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
8976 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
8977 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
8978 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
8979 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
8980 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
8981 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
8982 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
8985 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
8986 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
8987 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
8990 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
8991 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
8992 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
8993 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
8994 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
8995 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
8998 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
8999 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9000 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9001 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9003 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9006 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9007 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9008 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9009 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9010 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9011 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9012 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9013 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9014 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9015 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9018 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9019 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9022 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9023 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9024 the kind of content the users liked.
9027 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9028 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9029 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9030 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9031 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9032 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9033 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9034 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9035 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9036 they had already bought.
9038 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9039 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9042 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9043 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9044 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9045 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9046 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9047 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9048 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9049 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9052 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9055 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9056 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9057 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9058 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9059 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9060 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9061 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9065 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9066 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9067 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9070 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9071 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9072 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9073 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9075 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9076 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9077 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9079 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9080 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9081 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9082 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9083 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9085 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles
9086 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9087 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9088 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9089 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9090 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles
9091 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9093 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9094 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9095 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9096 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9097 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9098 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9099 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9100 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9101 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9102 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
<citetitle>Business
9103 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9106 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9108 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9109 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9110 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9111 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9112 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9113 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9114 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9117 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s,"
<citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9119 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9120 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9121 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9126 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9127 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9128 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9129 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9130 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9131 constantly threatened by litigation.
9135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9136 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9137 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9138 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9139 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9140 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9142 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9144 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9145 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9146 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9147 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9148 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9151 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9152 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9153 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9154 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9155 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9156 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9157 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9158 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9159 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9160 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9163 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9164 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9165 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9166 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9167 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9168 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9169 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9170 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9171 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9172 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9173 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9174 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9176 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9177 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9178 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9179 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9180 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9181 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9182 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9185 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9186 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9187 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9188 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9189 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9190 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9191 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9192 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9195 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9196 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9197 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9198 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9199 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9200 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9201 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9202 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9206 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9208 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9209 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9210 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9211 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9212 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9214 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9215 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9220 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9221 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9223 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9224 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9227 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9231 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9232 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9233 impose.
<footnote><para>
9234 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9235 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9237 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9238 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9242 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9243 innovation
—again,
9244 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9248 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9249 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9250 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9251 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9254 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9255 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9256 Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9257 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9260 overall this history of copyright
9261 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9262 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9263 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9264 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9267 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9268 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9269 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9270 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9271 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9274 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9276 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9277 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9278 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9279 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9280 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9281 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9282 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9283 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9284 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9285 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9286 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9287 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9290 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9291 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9292 here.
<footnote><para>
9294 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9295 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9296 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9297 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9298 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9299 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9300 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9301 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9302 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9303 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9304 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9305 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34,
9307 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9308 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9310 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9311 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9316 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9317 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless
9318 he or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9319 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9320 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9321 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9322 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9323 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9326 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9327 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9328 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9329 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9330 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9331 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9332 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9333 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9337 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9338 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9339 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9340 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9341 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9342 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9346 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9347 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9348 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9349 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9350 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9351 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9352 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9353 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9354 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9355 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9356 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9361 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9362 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9363 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9364 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9365 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9366 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9371 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9372 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9373 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9374 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9375 than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation
9376 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9377 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9378 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9379 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9380 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9381 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9382 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9383 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9390 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9391 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9392 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9393 legislation"
<footnote><para>
9397 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9400 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9401 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9402 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9403 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9404 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9408 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9409 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9412 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9413 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9414 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9415 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9416 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9417 of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9418 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9419 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9420 burdens terrestrial radio.
9423 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9424 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9425 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9426 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9427 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9430 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9431 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9432 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9433 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9434 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9435 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9436 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9437 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9438 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9439 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9440 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9441 Distribution,"
<citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9442 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9443 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9444 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9445 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9446 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9447 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9448 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9450 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9454 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9455 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9456 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9457 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9460 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9462 name of the service;
9465 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9468 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9471 date of transmission;
9474 time of transmission;
9477 time zone of origination of transmission;
9480 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9483 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9486 sound recording title;
9489 ISRC code of the recording;
9492 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9495 featured recording artist;
9504 UPC code of the retail album;
9510 copyright owner information;
9513 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9516 name of the service or entity;
9522 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9525 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9528 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9531 Unique User identifier;
9534 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9539 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9540 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9541 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9542 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9543 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9544 that terrestrial radio does not.
9547 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9548 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9549 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9551 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9553 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9554 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9555 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9559 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9560 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9561 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9562 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9563 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9564 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9567 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9569 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9570 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9571 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9575 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9576 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9577 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9578 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9583 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9584 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9585 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9586 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9587 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9588 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9589 effective to prevent it.
9592 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9593 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9595 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9597 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9598 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9601 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9602 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9603 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9606 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9607 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9608 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9609 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9610 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9611 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9612 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9613 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9614 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9616 According to the RIAA,
9617 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9618 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9621 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9622 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9624 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9625 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9626 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9628 response by the other.
9631 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9632 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9633 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9634 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9635 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9636 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9637 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9638 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9639 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9640 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9641 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9642 was.
<footnote><para>
9644 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
<citetitle>Los
9645 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
9647 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9648 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9649 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9650 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9651 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9652 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9656 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9657 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9658 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9659 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9660 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9661 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9662 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9663 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9664 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9666 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9667 Prohibition,"
<citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9671 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9672 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9674 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9675 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9676 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9678 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9679 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9680 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9681 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9682 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9684 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9685 Compliance,"
<citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9686 compliance literature).
9688 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9689 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9690 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9693 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9694 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9695 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9696 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9697 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9698 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9699 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9700 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9701 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9702 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9703 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9704 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9705 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9706 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9707 degree of illegality.
9710 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9711 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9712 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9713 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9714 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9715 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9716 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9717 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9718 to consider the alternative.
9722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9723 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9724 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9725 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9726 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9727 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9730 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9731 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9732 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9733 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9734 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9735 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9736 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9737 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9738 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9739 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9740 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9741 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9744 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9745 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9746 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9747 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9748 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9749 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9750 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9751 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9752 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9756 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9759 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9760 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9761 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9762 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9766 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9770 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9771 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9772 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9773 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9774 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9775 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9776 capacities of digital technologies.
9778 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9780 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9781 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9782 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9783 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9784 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9785 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9786 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9787 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9788 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9791 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9792 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9793 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9794 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9795 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9796 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9797 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9798 on people's machines.
9801 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9802 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9803 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9804 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9805 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9806 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9809 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9810 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9811 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9815 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9816 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9817 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9818 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9819 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9820 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9821 freedom to move content easily?
9824 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9825 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9826 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9827 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9828 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9829 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9830 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9831 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9832 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9835 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9836 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9837 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9838 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9839 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9840 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9841 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9844 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9845 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9846 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9847 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9850 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9851 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9855 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9856 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9857 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9858 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9859 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9860 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9861 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9862 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9864 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9867 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9869 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
9873 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9874 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9875 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9876 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9877 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9878 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9879 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9880 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9881 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9885 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9886 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9887 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9890 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
9891 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9892 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9893 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9894 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9895 an Internet user is revealed.
9898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9899 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9900 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9901 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9902 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9903 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9904 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9905 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9906 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
9908 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9909 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9910 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9911 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9912 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9913 Being Sued,"
<citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
9914 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
9915 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9916 Fan, Either,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9917 Brianna a Criminal?"
<citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
9922 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9923 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9924 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
9926 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9927 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9928 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
9930 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9931 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9932 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9935 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9936 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
9937 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9938 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9939 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9940 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9941 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9942 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9943 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9944 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
9945 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
9947 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
9948 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
9949 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
9950 Colleges,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
9951 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
<citetitle>Christian Science
9952 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
9953 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
9954 Lawsuit Possible,"
<citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
9955 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,"
<citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
9956 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9957 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
9958 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
9959 Sharing,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
9960 Are Weapons at Universities,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
9962 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
9963 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
9966 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
9967 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
9968 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
9969 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
9970 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
9971 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
9974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
9975 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
9976 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
9978 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
9982 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
9983 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
9984 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
9985 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
9986 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
9987 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
9988 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
9989 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
9990 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
9991 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
9992 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
9993 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
9994 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
9995 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
9996 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
9997 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10002 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10003 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10004 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10005 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10006 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10007 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10014 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10015 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10019 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10020 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10021 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10022 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10025 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10026 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10027 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10028 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10029 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10033 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10034 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10035 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10036 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10037 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10038 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10042 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10043 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10044 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10045 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10046 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10047 made that is happening all around.
10050 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10051 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10052 gasoline onto this fire.
10055 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10056 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10057 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10058 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10061 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10062 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10063 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10064 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10065 success will require.
10068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10069 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10070 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10072 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10073 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10074 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10075 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10076 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10077 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10081 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10082 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10083 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10084 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10085 them available for free.
10088 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10089 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10090 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10091 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10092 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10094 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10095 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10096 accessible
—today.
10099 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10100 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10101 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10102 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10103 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10104 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10105 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10106 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10107 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10108 commercial publications of public domain works.
10111 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10112 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10113 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10114 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10115 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10116 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10117 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10118 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10119 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10120 generally.
<footnote><para>
10122 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10123 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10124 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10125 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10126 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10127 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10128 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10129 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10130 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10131 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10132 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10133 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10134 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10135 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10136 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10139 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10140 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to pass into the public
10141 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10142 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10143 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10144 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10145 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10146 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10147 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10148 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10149 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10154 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10155 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10156 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10157 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10159 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10160 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10161 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10162 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10163 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10164 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10165 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10170 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10171 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10172 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10173 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10174 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10175 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10179 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10181 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10183 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10184 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10186 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10190 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10191 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10192 their . . . Writings. . . .
10196 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10197 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10198 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10199 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10200 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10201 specific
—to "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that
10202 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10203 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10206 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10207 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10208 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10209 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10211 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10212 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10213 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10214 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10215 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10218 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10219 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10220 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10221 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10222 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10223 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10224 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10225 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10226 this gravy train going.
10229 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10230 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10231 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10232 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10233 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10234 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10235 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10238 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10239 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10240 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10241 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10242 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10243 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10244 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10245 published by anyone for free.
10248 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10249 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10250 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10251 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10255 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10258 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10259 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10263 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10264 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10265 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10266 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10269 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10273 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10274 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10275 they support the bill."
10278 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10279 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10280 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10284 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10285 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10286 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10287 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10290 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10291 correct conclusion:
10294 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10295 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10297 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10300 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10302 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10303 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10306 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10307 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10308 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10309 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10311 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10313 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10314 the copyright term extended.
10317 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10318 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10319 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10322 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10324 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10325 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10326 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10327 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10328 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10329 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10330 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10331 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10333 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10334 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10335 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10336 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10338 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10340 Disney is estimated to have
10341 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10342 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10344 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10345 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10346 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10351 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10352 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10354 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10355 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10356 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10357 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10358 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10360 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10364 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10365 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10366 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10367 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10368 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10369 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10373 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10377 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10378 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10379 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10381 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10382 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10387 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10388 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10389 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10390 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10391 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10394 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10395 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10396 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10397 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10398 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10399 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10400 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10401 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10402 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10403 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10404 position to second-guess Congress.
10407 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10408 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10409 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10411 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10412 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10413 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10414 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10416 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10420 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10421 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10423 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10424 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10425 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10426 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10427 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10428 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10429 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10430 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10431 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10433 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10434 yield the conclusion that Congress
10435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10436 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10437 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10438 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10439 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10440 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10441 term of existing copyrights.
10444 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10445 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10446 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10447 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10448 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10449 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10450 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10451 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10452 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10453 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10454 were going to be petty politicians.
10457 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10458 argument in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10459 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10460 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10461 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10462 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10463 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10464 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10465 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10466 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10467 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10468 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10469 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10470 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10471 piracy that affects us all.
10474 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10477 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10478 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10480 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10481 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10482 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10484 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10485 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10486 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10490 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10492 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10494 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10495 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10496 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10497 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10498 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10499 bought to extend them again.
10502 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10504 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10505 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10507 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10509 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10510 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10511 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10512 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10514 and no longer available as a result.
10517 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10518 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10519 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10520 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10521 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10522 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10523 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10525 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10526 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10527 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10532 Think practically about the consequence of this
10533 extension
—practically,
10534 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10537 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10538 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10539 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10541 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10544 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10545 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10546 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10547 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10548 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10549 list of books still under copyright.
10552 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10553 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10556 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10558 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10559 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10560 being at least a list?
10563 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10564 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10566 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10568 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10569 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10572 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10573 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10577 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10578 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10579 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10580 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10581 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10582 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10583 what tangible property.
10586 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10587 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10588 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10591 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10592 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10594 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10595 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10596 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10597 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10598 know quite well who owns what property.
10601 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10602 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10604 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10605 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10606 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10607 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10608 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10609 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10610 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10613 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10614 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10616 for other creative works is much more dire.
10618 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10620 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10621 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10622 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10623 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
10624 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10625 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10626 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10627 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10628 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10629 films."
<footnote><para>
10631 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10632 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10633 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10634 Down Copyright Extension,"
<citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
10637 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10640 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10641 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10642 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10643 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10646 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10648 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10649 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10650 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10651 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10652 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10653 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10654 work available for distribution.
10657 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10658 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10659 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10660 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10661 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10662 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10664 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10665 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
10666 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10667 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10668 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
10669 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10674 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10676 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10677 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10678 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10679 locate the copyright owner.
10682 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10683 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10684 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10685 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10686 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10687 to these films is exceptionally high.
10690 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10691 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10692 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10693 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10694 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10695 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10696 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10697 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10698 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10701 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10704 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10706 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10707 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10708 the copyright expires.
10711 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10712 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10713 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10715 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10719 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10720 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10721 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10722 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10724 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10728 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10729 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10731 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10732 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10733 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10735 the commercial life ends.
10738 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10739 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10740 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10742 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10744 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10745 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10746 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10747 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10748 have, we need to have access to this history.
10751 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10754 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10755 this context do no good.
10758 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10759 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10760 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10761 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10762 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10763 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10764 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10765 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10766 was independent of copyright law.
10769 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10770 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10771 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10772 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10773 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10774 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10775 market didn't have more to offer.
10778 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10779 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10780 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10781 would not have interfered with anything.
10784 But this situation has now changed.
10787 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10788 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10789 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10790 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10791 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10792 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10793 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10794 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10795 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10796 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10800 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10801 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10802 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10803 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10804 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10805 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10806 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10807 written for a radically different context.
10810 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10811 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10812 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10813 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
10814 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
10815 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
10816 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
10817 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
10818 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
10821 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10822 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10823 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10827 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10828 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10829 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10830 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10831 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10832 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10833 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10834 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10835 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10838 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10839 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10840 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10841 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10844 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10845 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10846 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10847 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10848 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10850 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10851 December
2002, available at
10852 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10857 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10858 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10859 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10860 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10861 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10862 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10865 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10866 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10867 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10868 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10869 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10872 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10873 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10874 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10875 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10876 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10877 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10878 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10879 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10880 power to extend existing terms.
10883 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10884 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10885 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10886 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10889 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10890 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10893 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10894 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10895 overstepped its bounds.
10898 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10899 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10900 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10901 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10902 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10905 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10906 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10907 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
10908 briefs and preparing for argument.
10911 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10912 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10913 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10914 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10915 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10916 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10917 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10918 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10921 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10922 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10923 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10926 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10928 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10929 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10930 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10931 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10934 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10935 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10936 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10938 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
10939 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
10940 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10942 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
10943 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
10944 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
10945 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
10946 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
10947 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
10948 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
10949 most powerful media companies in the world."
10952 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
10953 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
10954 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
10955 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
10956 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
10957 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
10958 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
10959 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
10961 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
10962 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
10964 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
10965 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
10966 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
10968 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
10969 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
10970 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
10973 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
10974 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
10975 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
10976 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
10977 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
10978 why it was unconstitutional.
10981 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
10983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
10984 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
10985 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
10986 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
10987 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
10988 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
10989 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
10990 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
10991 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
10992 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
10993 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
10994 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
10995 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
10996 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
10997 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11000 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11001 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11002 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11003 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11004 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11005 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11006 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11007 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11008 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11009 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11010 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11011 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11012 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11013 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11016 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11017 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11018 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11019 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11020 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11021 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11024 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11025 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11028 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11029 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11030 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11031 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11032 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11033 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11034 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11035 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11038 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11039 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11040 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11041 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11044 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11045 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11046 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11047 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11050 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11051 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11052 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11053 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11054 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11056 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11057 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11058 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11059 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11060 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11061 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11062 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11063 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11064 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11067 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11068 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11069 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11070 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11071 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11072 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11073 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11074 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11077 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11078 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11079 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11082 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11083 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11084 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11085 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11086 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11087 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11088 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11089 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11090 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11091 confidence in our argument.
11092 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11095 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11096 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11097 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11098 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11102 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11103 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11104 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11105 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11106 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11107 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11111 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11112 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11113 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11114 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11115 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11116 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11118 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11119 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11121 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11122 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11123 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11124 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11126 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11127 Mouse Joins the Fray,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11131 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11132 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11133 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11136 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11137 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11138 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11139 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11140 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11141 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11142 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11143 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11144 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11145 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11148 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11149 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11150 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11151 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11152 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11153 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11154 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11157 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11158 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11159 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11160 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11161 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11162 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line of cases that said that
11163 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11166 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11168 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11169 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11170 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11173 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11174 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11175 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11176 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11177 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11180 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11181 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11182 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11183 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11184 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11185 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11186 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11187 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11190 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11192 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11193 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11194 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11195 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11196 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11197 these retrospective extensions.
11200 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11201 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11202 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11203 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11204 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11205 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11208 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11209 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11210 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11212 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11213 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11214 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11215 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11218 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11219 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11220 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11223 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11224 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11225 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11226 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11227 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to
11228 regulate commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to
11229 regulate copyright be limited.
11232 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11233 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11234 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11235 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11236 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11239 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11240 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11241 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11243 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11246 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11248 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11249 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11250 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11252 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11254 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11255 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11257 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11258 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11259 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11261 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11262 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11265 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11266 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11269 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11270 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11271 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11272 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11274 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11275 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11278 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11280 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11281 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11282 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11283 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11284 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11287 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11288 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11289 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11290 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11291 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11293 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11295 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11296 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11297 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11298 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11299 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11300 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11301 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11302 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11303 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11304 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11305 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11307 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11308 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11309 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11312 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11313 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11314 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11315 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11317 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11318 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11319 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11320 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11321 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11322 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11323 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11324 family of the Justices.
11327 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11328 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11329 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11330 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11333 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11334 The history was bothering her.
11338 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11339 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11340 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11341 practice that began with the very first act.
11345 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11346 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11347 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11351 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11352 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11354 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11359 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11360 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11361 Kennedy, who observed,
11365 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11366 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11367 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11368 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11369 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11373 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11379 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11380 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11381 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11382 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11383 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11386 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11388 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11389 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11390 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11391 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11392 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11395 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11396 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11397 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11400 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11401 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11407 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11408 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11411 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11412 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11414 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11415 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11416 into the Copyright Clause.
11420 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11421 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11422 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11426 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11427 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11428 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11429 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11434 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11435 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11436 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11437 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11438 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11439 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11440 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11441 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11442 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11443 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11447 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11448 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11451 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11455 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11456 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11457 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11458 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11459 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11460 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11461 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11462 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11463 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11464 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11465 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11466 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11467 law that it had established elsewhere.
11470 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11471 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11472 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11473 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11474 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11477 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11478 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11479 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11482 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11483 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11484 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11488 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11489 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11490 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11491 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11492 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11497 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11498 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11499 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11502 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11503 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11504 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11505 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11508 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11509 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11510 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11511 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11512 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11513 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11514 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11515 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11516 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11519 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11520 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11521 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11522 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11523 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11524 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11525 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11526 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11527 the system we have.
11529 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11531 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11532 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11533 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11534 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11535 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11536 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11537 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11538 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11539 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11541 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11544 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11545 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11546 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11547 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11548 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11549 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11550 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11551 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11552 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11555 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11556 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11557 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11558 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11559 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11562 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11563 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11564 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11567 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11568 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11569 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11570 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11571 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11572 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11573 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11574 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11575 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11576 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11580 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11581 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11582 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11583 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11586 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11587 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11588 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11589 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11590 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11591 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11595 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11597 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11600 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11602 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11603 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11604 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11605 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11606 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11607 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11608 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11609 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11610 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11613 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11614 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11615 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11616 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11617 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11618 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11619 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11620 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11621 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11622 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11623 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11624 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11625 effort to persuade; but I
11626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11627 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11628 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11629 should decide the issue.
11631 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11633 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11634 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11636 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11639 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11640 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11641 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11642 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11645 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11646 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11647 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11648 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11652 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11653 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11654 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11655 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11656 issue should not be raised until it is.
11657 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11660 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11661 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11662 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11663 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11664 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11665 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11666 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11667 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11668 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11669 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11670 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11673 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11674 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11675 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11676 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11677 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11681 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11682 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11683 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11684 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11685 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11686 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11690 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11691 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11692 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11693 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11694 in the face felt exactly like that.
11695 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11698 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11699 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11700 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11701 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11702 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11703 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11704 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11708 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11709 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11711 The day
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11712 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was
11713 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11714 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11715 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11716 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11717 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11719 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11721 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11722 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11723 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11724 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11725 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11726 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11727 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11728 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11731 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11732 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11734 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11735 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11736 the work passed into the public domain.
11739 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11740 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11741 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11744 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11745 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11746 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11747 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11748 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11749 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11750 everything else, let the content go.
11752 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11754 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11755 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11756 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11757 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11758 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11759 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11760 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11761 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11762 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11763 the stupid harm of the present system.
11766 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11767 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11768 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11769 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11770 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11771 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11772 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11773 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11774 where copyright owners could be identified.
11776 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11777 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11780 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11781 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11782 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11784 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11785 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11786 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11787 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11788 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11789 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11790 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11791 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11792 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11793 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11794 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11795 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11796 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11797 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11798 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11799 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
11800 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
11801 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11802 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11803 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11804 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11805 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11806 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11807 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11810 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11811 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11812 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11813 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11814 know what's protected and what's not.
11816 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11818 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11819 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11820 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11821 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11822 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11823 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11824 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
11825 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
11828 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11829 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11830 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11831 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11832 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11833 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11836 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11837 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11838 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11839 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11841 imposed upon creators.
11844 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11845 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11848 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11849 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11850 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11851 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11852 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11856 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11857 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11858 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11859 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11860 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11861 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11865 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11866 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11867 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11868 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11869 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11870 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
11871 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11872 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11873 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11874 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11875 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11876 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11877 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11878 system of protection for property generally.
11881 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11882 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11883 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11884 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11885 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11886 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11887 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11888 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11891 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
11892 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
11893 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
11896 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11897 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11898 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11899 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11900 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11901 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11902 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11903 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11906 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11907 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11908 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11909 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11910 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11911 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11912 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
11915 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11916 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11917 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11918 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11919 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11922 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11923 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11924 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11925 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11926 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
11929 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11930 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11931 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
11935 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11936 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11937 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
11940 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
11941 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
11942 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
11943 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
11944 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
11945 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
11946 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
11947 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
11948 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
11949 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
11951 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11953 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
11954 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
11955 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
11956 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
11959 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
11960 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
11961 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
11962 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
11963 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
11964 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
11965 something good might happen here.
11966 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
11969 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
11970 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
11971 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
11972 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
11973 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
11974 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
11977 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
11978 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
11979 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
11980 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
11981 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
11982 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
11983 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
11984 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
11985 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
11986 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
11987 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
11988 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
11989 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
11990 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
11991 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
11992 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
11993 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
11994 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
11995 film is a valid derivative use.
11998 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
11999 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12000 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12001 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12002 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12003 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12006 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12007 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12008 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12009 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12010 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12011 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12012 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12016 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12017 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12018 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12019 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12025 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12026 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12027 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12028 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12029 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12030 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12031 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12032 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12033 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12036 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12037 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12038 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12039 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12040 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12041 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12042 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12043 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12046 What does this industry really want?
12049 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12050 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12051 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12052 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12053 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12054 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12055 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12056 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12060 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12061 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12062 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12063 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12064 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12068 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12069 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12072 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12073 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12074 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12075 and to share its own creation.
12077 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12078 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12080 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12081 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12082 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12083 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12084 block the progress of others.
12087 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12088 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12089 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12090 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12091 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12092 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12093 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12098 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12099 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12101 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12102 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12103 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12104 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12105 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12108 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12109 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12110 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12111 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12112 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12113 the disease almost invisible.
12116 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12117 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12118 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12119 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12121 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12122 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12123 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12124 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12126 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12128 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12129 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12134 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12135 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12136 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12137 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12138 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12139 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12142 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12143 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12144 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12145 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12146 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12147 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12148 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12149 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12153 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12154 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12155 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12156 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12157 costs significantly below the market price.
12160 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12161 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12162 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12163 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12164 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12165 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12166 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12169 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
<citetitle>Who
12170 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12171 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12172 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12176 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12177 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12178 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12179 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12180 imports."
<footnote><para>
12182 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12183 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12184 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12185 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12186 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12187 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12188 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12189 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12190 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12193 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12194 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12195 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12196 possible trade sanctions.
12197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12198 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12199 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12200 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12201 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12202 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12203 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12204 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12205 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12206 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12207 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12209 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12210 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12211 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12212 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12215 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12216 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12217 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12218 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12219 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12220 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12221 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12222 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12225 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12226 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12227 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12228 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12229 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12230 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12233 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12234 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12235 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12236 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12237 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12238 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12242 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12243 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12246 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12248 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12249 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12250 May
1999, A1, available at
12251 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12252 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12253 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12254 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12255 Medicines,"
<citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12256 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12257 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12258 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12259 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,"
<citetitle>Widener Law
12260 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12263 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12264 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12265 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12266 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12269 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12270 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12271 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12272 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12273 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12274 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12275 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12276 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12279 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12280 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12281 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12282 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12283 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12284 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12287 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12288 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12289 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12290 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12291 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12292 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12295 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12296 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12297 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12298 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12299 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12300 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12301 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12302 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12304 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12305 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12306 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12307 idea called "intellectual property."
12310 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12311 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12312 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12313 What is the argument?
12316 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12317 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12318 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12319 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12320 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12321 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12322 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12323 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12324 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12325 were balanced in just this sense.
12328 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12329 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12330 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12331 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12332 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12333 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12334 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12335 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12336 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12337 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12338 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12339 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12342 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12343 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12344 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12345 this common sense open its eyes.
12348 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12349 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12350 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12351 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12352 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12353 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12354 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12355 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12356 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12357 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12358 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12359 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12362 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12363 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12364 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12365 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12366 August
2003, E1, available at
12367 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12368 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,"
<citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12369 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12370 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12371 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,"
<citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12372 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12373 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12375 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12376 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12377 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12378 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12379 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12380 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12381 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12382 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12383 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12384 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12385 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12386 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12387 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12389 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12390 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12391 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12392 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12393 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12396 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12397 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12398 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12399 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12400 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12403 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12404 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12407 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12408 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12409 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12410 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12414 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12415 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12416 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12417 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12418 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12419 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12420 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12421 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12422 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12423 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12424 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12425 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12426 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12427 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12428 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12429 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12430 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12433 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12434 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12435 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12438 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12439 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12440 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12441 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12444 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12445 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12446 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12447 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12448 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12449 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12450 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12451 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12452 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12455 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12456 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12457 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12458 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12459 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12460 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM
12461 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12462 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12463 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12464 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12466 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12467 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12468 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12469 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12470 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12471 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12472 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,"
<citetitle>Government Policy
12473 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12474 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12475 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12476 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12477 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12478 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12479 May
2001), available at
12480 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12484 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12485 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12486 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12487 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12488 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12491 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12492 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12493 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12494 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12495 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12496 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12497 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12498 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12499 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12502 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12503 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12504 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12505 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12506 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12507 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12508 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12510 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12511 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12513 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12516 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12517 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12518 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12519 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12520 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12521 its lobbying efforts.
12524 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12525 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12526 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12527 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12528 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12529 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12530 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12534 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12538 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12539 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12540 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12541 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12542 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12543 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12544 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12545 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12548 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12549 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12550 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12551 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12552 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12553 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12554 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12555 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12556 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12557 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12558 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12561 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12562 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12563 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12564 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12565 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12566 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12567 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
12568 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12569 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12570 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12571 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
12572 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12575 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12576 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12577 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12579 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12580 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12581 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12582 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12583 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12587 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12588 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12589 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12590 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12591 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12592 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12593 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12594 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12595 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12598 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12599 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12601 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12602 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12604 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
12605 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12607 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12608 choice now is whether that information society will be
12609 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
12613 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12614 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12615 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12616 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12620 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12621 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12622 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12623 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12624 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12625 say anything wrong. But in the world
12626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12627 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12628 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12632 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12633 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12634 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12635 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12636 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12637 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12638 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12639 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12642 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12643 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12644 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12645 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12646 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12647 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12650 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12651 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12652 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12653 our own country's history).
12656 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12657 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12658 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12659 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12660 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12661 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12662 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12663 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12664 democracy in the world, become?
12667 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12668 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12669 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12671 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12672 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12674 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12676 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12677 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12678 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12679 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12680 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12681 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12682 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12683 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12684 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12685 hearings and a different result.
12686 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
12687 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
12690 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12691 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12692 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12693 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12694 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12695 concentration in the media.
12698 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12699 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12700 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12701 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12702 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12705 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12706 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12707 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12708 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12709 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12710 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12711 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12715 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12716 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12717 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12718 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12719 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12722 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12723 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12724 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12725 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12726 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12727 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12730 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12733 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12735 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12736 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12738 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12740 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12741 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12743 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12744 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12745 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,"
<citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
12746 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12747 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12748 Defendants,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12749 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,"
<citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
12751 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12753 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12754 music.
<footnote><para>
12756 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12757 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12758 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12760 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12761 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12763 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12764 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12765 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12768 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12769 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12770 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12771 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12772 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12773 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12774 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12775 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12776 kids who use a computer to share content.
12778 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12779 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12780 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12781 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12783 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12784 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12785 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12786 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12787 24 August
2003, available at
12788 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12790 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12791 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12792 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12793 country.
<footnote><para>
12795 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12797 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12800 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12801 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12802 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12803 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12804 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12805 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12806 day into the Causbys.
12809 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12810 potential is ever to be realized.
12812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12816 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12817 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12821 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12822 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12823 maps what might be done.
12826 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12827 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12828 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12829 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12832 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12833 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12834 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12835 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12839 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12840 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12841 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12842 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12843 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12845 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12848 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12850 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12851 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12852 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12853 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12856 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12857 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12858 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12859 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
12860 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12861 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12862 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12863 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12866 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12867 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12868 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12869 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12873 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12874 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12878 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12879 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12880 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12881 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12882 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12883 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12884 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12885 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12886 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12887 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12888 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12889 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12892 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
12893 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12894 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12895 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12896 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12900 <sect2 id=
"examples">
12901 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
12903 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12904 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12905 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12906 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12907 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12908 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12909 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12913 What made it assured?
12915 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12917 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12918 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12919 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12920 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12921 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12922 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12923 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12924 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12925 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12926 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12927 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12928 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12929 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12931 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
12933 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12934 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12935 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12936 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
12937 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
12938 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
12939 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
12940 protected by the friction disappears, too.
12943 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
12944 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
12945 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
12946 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
12947 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
12948 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
12949 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
12953 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
12954 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
12955 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
12956 friction did.
<footnote><para>
12959 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
12960 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),"
<citetitle>Stanford Technology
12961 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
12963 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
12964 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
12965 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
12966 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
12967 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
12968 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
12969 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
12971 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
12972 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
12973 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
12974 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
12977 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
12978 movement. When computers with software were first made available
12979 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
12980 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
12981 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
12982 care much about controlling their software.
12984 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
12986 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
12987 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
12988 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
12989 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
12990 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
12994 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
12995 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
12996 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
12997 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
12998 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
12999 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13000 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13001 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13002 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13006 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13007 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13008 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13009 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13010 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13011 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13012 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13015 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13016 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13018 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13019 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13020 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13021 fundamentally weakened.
13024 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13025 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13026 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13027 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13030 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13031 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13032 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13033 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13034 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13035 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13036 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13037 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13041 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13042 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13043 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13044 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13045 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13046 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13049 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13050 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13051 scientific journals are produced.
13054 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13055 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13056 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13057 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13058 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13059 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13060 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13061 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13062 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13063 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13064 and Westlaw are also free
13065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13066 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13067 Court opinion through their respective services.
13070 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13071 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13072 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13073 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13074 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13075 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13076 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13079 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13080 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13081 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13084 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13085 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13086 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13087 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13088 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13089 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13090 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13091 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13092 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13093 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13096 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13097 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13098 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13099 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13100 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13104 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13105 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13106 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13107 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13109 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13110 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13111 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13112 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13113 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13114 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13115 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13118 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13119 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13120 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13121 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13122 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13123 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13128 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13129 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13130 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13131 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13134 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13135 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13138 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13139 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13140 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13141 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13142 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13143 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13144 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13145 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13146 make this possible.
13149 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13150 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13151 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13152 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13153 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13154 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13155 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13156 human-readable description, and
13157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13158 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13159 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13160 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13161 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13162 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13163 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13164 certain freedoms are given.
13167 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13168 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13169 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13170 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13171 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13172 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13173 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13174 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13175 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13178 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13179 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13180 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13181 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13182 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13183 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13184 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13185 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13189 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13190 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13191 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13192 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13193 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13194 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13196 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13197 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13198 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13199 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13202 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13203 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13204 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13205 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13206 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13207 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13208 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13209 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13210 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13211 to begin to build those rules.
13214 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13215 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13216 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13217 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13218 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13221 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13222 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13223 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13224 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13225 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13226 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13227 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13228 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13229 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13230 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13233 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13234 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13235 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13236 was a total success.
13239 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13240 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13242 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13243 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13244 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13245 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13246 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13250 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13251 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13252 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13253 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13254 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13255 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13256 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13257 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13258 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13259 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13260 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13261 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13262 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13263 high
<footnote><para>
13266 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13267 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13268 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13269 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13270 </para></footnote>),
13271 these artists release into the creative environment content
13272 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13275 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13276 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13277 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13278 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13279 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13280 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13281 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13282 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13283 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13287 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13288 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13289 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13290 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13293 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13294 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13297 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13298 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13299 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13300 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13301 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13302 steps are possible.
13305 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13306 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13307 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13308 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13309 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13310 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13311 creativity to spread more easily.
13313 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13318 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13319 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13321 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13322 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13323 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13324 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13325 changes that we need.
13328 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13329 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13330 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13334 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13335 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13337 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13338 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13339 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13340 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13344 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13345 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13349 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13350 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13351 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13352 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13358 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13359 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13360 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13361 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13362 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13363 formalities were getting in the way.
13366 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13367 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13368 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13369 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13370 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13371 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13372 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13373 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13374 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13375 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13378 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13380 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13381 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13382 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13383 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13384 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13385 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13388 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13389 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13390 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13391 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13392 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13393 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13394 developed by others.
13397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13399 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13400 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13402 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13403 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13404 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13405 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13406 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13407 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13408 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13409 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13410 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13411 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13412 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13415 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13416 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13417 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13418 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13419 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13420 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13421 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13424 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13425 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13426 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13427 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13428 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13429 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13430 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13431 with which registration occurs up.
13434 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13435 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13436 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13437 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13438 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13439 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13440 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13441 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13442 formality
—while producing a database
13443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13444 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13448 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13449 <title>MARKING
</title>
13451 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13452 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13453 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13454 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13455 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13456 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13457 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13458 uniformly across all media.
13461 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13462 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13463 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13467 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13468 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13469 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13470 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13471 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13472 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13473 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13474 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13477 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13478 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13479 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13480 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13481 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13482 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13484 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13485 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13486 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13488 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13489 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13490 stop using the work in any new
13491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13492 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13493 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13497 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13498 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13499 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13500 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13501 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13504 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13505 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13506 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13507 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13508 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13509 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13510 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13511 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13512 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13513 other important functions.
13516 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13517 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13518 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13519 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13520 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13521 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13524 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13525 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13526 make things unclear.
13529 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13530 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13531 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13532 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13533 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13534 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13540 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13541 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13543 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13544 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13548 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13549 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13550 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13551 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13552 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13553 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13556 "A Radical Rethink,"
<citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13558 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13560 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13563 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13564 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13565 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13568 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13571 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13572 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13573 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13574 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13575 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13576 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13580 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
13581 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13582 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13583 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13584 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13585 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13586 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13587 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13588 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13593 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13594 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13595 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13596 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13597 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13598 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13599 pension.
<footnote><para>
13601 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13602 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13604 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13606 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13607 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13609 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
13613 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13614 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13615 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13616 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13617 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13618 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
13619 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13620 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13621 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
13622 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13623 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13624 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13625 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13626 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13629 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
13630 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
13631 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13635 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13636 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13637 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13638 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13644 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13645 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13647 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13648 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13649 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13650 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13651 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13652 the emergence of that new technology.
13655 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13656 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13657 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13658 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13659 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13660 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13661 though that movie is not "my writing."
13664 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13665 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13666 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13668 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13669 University Press,
1967),
32.
13671 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13672 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13673 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13677 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13678 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13679 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13680 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13681 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13686 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13687 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13688 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13689 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13690 Consider each limitation in turn.
13693 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13694 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13695 sense to protect John
13697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13698 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13699 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13700 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13701 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13702 after the creative work is done.
13703 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13706 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13707 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13708 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13709 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13710 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13711 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13712 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13713 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13714 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13715 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13716 the creative process. Smothers it.
13719 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13720 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13721 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13722 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13723 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13727 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13728 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13729 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13730 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13733 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13734 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13735 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13737 His view is that the law should be written so that
13738 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13741 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13742 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13743 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13744 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13745 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13748 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13750 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13751 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13752 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13753 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13757 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13758 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13760 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13761 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13762 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13763 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13764 battles around the sharing of music.
13767 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13768 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13769 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13770 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13771 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13772 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13773 innovation on the network.
13776 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13777 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13778 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13779 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13780 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13783 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13784 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13785 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13786 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13788 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13791 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13792 for purchasing CDs.
13796 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13797 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13802 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13803 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13804 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13808 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13809 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13810 owner plainly endorses.
13814 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13815 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13816 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13817 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13818 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13819 significantly weakened.
13822 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13823 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13824 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13825 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13829 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13830 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13834 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13835 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13836 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13837 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13838 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13839 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13840 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13841 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13842 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13843 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13846 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13847 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13848 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13850 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13851 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13852 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13853 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13854 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13855 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
13856 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
13857 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13858 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13861 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
13862 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
13863 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
13864 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
13865 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
13866 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
13867 access to content than it will be to download and store content
13868 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
13869 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
13870 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13871 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13872 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13873 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13874 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13875 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13876 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13877 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
13879 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
13880 April
2002, available at
13881 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
13886 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13887 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13888 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
13889 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13890 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13891 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13892 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13893 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13894 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13895 artists get paid, during
13897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13898 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13899 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13902 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13903 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
13904 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13905 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13906 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13907 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13908 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13909 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13910 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13913 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13914 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13915 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13916 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13917 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13918 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13919 way that returns something to the artist.
13922 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13923 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13924 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13925 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13926 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13927 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13928 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13929 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13932 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13933 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13934 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13935 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13936 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13937 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13938 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13943 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13944 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13945 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
13946 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
13947 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
13948 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
13949 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
13953 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
13954 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
13955 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
13956 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
13957 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
13958 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
13959 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
13960 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
13963 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
13964 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
13965 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
13966 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
13967 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
13968 delivering and accessing content.
13971 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
13972 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
13975 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
13976 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
13977 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
13978 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
13979 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
13980 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
13981 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
13982 harmed the interests of the content industry.
13985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
13986 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
13987 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
13988 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
13989 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
13990 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
13991 way to compensate those who are harmed.
13994 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
13995 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
13998 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
13999 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14000 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14001 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14002 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14003 2004), ch.
6, available at
14004 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14005 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14006 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14007 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14008 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14009 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14010 Broadband?"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14011 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14012 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14014 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14015 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14016 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14017 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14019 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14020 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14021 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14022 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14024 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14025 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14026 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14027 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14028 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14029 debate by about a decade. See
14030 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14031 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14032 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14034 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14035 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14036 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14037 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14038 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14039 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14040 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14041 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14045 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14046 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14047 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14048 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14049 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14050 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14051 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14052 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14053 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14054 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14055 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14056 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14057 controlling access.
14060 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14061 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14062 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14063 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14064 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14065 limits on derivative
14067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14068 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14069 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14070 allowed to do with the content itself.
14073 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14074 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14075 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14076 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14077 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14078 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14079 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14080 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14081 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14082 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14083 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14084 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14088 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14089 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14090 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14091 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14092 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14093 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14094 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14095 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14096 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14097 finding ways to compete with "free."
14100 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14101 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14102 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14103 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14104 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14105 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14109 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14114 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14115 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14116 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14117 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14121 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14124 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14127 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14131 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14132 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14137 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14138 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14142 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14143 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14144 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14148 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14149 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14150 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14151 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14152 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14153 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14154 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14155 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14156 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14157 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14158 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14162 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14163 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14164 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14167 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14168 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14172 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14173 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14175 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14176 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14177 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14178 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14181 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14182 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14183 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14184 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14185 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14186 strong view queers the law.
14189 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14190 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14191 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14192 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14193 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14194 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14195 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14196 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14198 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14199 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14204 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14205 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14206 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14209 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14210 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14211 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14212 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14214 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14215 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14216 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14217 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14218 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14219 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14220 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14221 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14222 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14223 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14225 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14226 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14227 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14228 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14229 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14230 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14232 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14233 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14238 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14239 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14240 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14241 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14242 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14243 practically never be done.
14246 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14247 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14248 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14249 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14250 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14251 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14252 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14253 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14256 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14257 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14258 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14259 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14260 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14261 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14264 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14265 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14266 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14270 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14271 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14272 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14273 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14274 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14275 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14276 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14279 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14280 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14283 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14284 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14285 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14288 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14289 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14290 keep your lawyers away.
14292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14296 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14297 <title>NOTES
</title>
14299 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14300 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14301 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14302 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14303 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14304 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14305 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14306 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14307 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14313 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14314 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14316 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14317 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14318 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14319 to him that this book is dedicated.
14322 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14323 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14324 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14325 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14326 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14327 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14328 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14329 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14330 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14331 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14332 critical eye on much of this.
14335 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14336 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14337 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14338 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14340 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14341 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14342 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14343 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14346 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14347 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14348 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14349 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14350 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14351 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14352 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14353 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14354 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14355 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14356 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14357 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14358 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14359 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14360 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14361 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14362 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14363 a bunch of great replies.)
14366 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14367 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14368 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14369 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14370 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14371 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14372 throughout this book.
14375 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14376 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14377 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14378 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->