]> pere.pagekite.me Git - text-free-culture-lessig.git/blob - freeculture.xml
Wrap lines.
[text-free-culture-lessig.git] / freeculture.xml
1 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' ?>
2 <?xml-stylesheet href="docbook-css-0.4/driver.css" type="text/css"?>
3 <!-- Converted to DocBook by Hans Schou 2004-03-29. Updated and improved
4 by Petter Reinholdtsen 2012 with input from Martin Borg. -->
5 <!--
6 TODO
7 * indexterm primary
8 -->
9 <!DOCTYPE book PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN"
10 "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd"
11 [
12 <!ENTITY copy "©">
13 <!ENTITY translationblock "">
14 ]>
15 <book id="index" lang="en">
16 <bookinfo>
17 <title>Free Culture</title>
18
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
20
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
23
24 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
25
26 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
27
28 <authorgroup>
29 <author>
30 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig</surname>
32 </author>
33 </authorgroup>
34
35 <!-- <subjectset> and cover <mediaobject> Based on example from
36 http://jfearn.fedorapeople.org/en-US/Publican/2.7/html/Users_Guide/chap-Users_Guide-Creating_a_document.html
37 -->
38 <subjectset scheme="libraryofcongress">
39 <subject>
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
41 </subject>
42 <subject>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
44 </subject>
45 <subject>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
47 </subject>
48 <subject>
49 <subjectterm>Art&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
50 </subject>
51 </subjectset>
52
53
54 <publisher>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York</city></address>
57 </publisher>
58
59 <copyright>
60 <year>2004</year>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
62 </copyright>
63 <legalnotice>
64 <para>
65 <inlinemediaobject>
66 <imageobject>
67 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.png" contentdepth="3em" width="100%" align="center"/>
68 </imageobject>
69 <imageobject>
70 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.svg" contentdepth="3em" width="100%" align="center"/>
71 </imageobject>
72 <textobject>
73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
74 </textobject>
75 </inlinemediaobject>
76 </para>
77
78 <para>
79 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
84 </para>
85 </legalnotice>
86
87 <abstract>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
89 <para>
90 LAWRENCE LESSIG
91 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's <quote>e.biz 25,</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's <quote>50 visionaries.</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
105 Appeals.
106 </para>
107 </abstract>
108
109 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
110 <mediaobject role="cover">
111 <imageobject remap="lrg" role="front-large">
112 <imagedata fileref="images/cover.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
113 </imageobject>
114 <!--
115 <imageobject remap="s" role="front">
116 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
117 </imageobject>
118 <imageobject remap="xs" role="front-small">
119 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
120 </imageobject>
121 <imageobject remap="cs" role="thumbnail">
122 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
123 </imageobject>
124 -->
125 </mediaobject>
126
127 <biblioid class="isbn">1-59420-006-8</biblioid>
128
129 <!-- LCCN from
130 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
131 -->
132 <biblioid class="libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
133
134 </bookinfo>
135 <!--PAGE BREAK 1-->
136 <dedication id="salespoints">
137 <title></title>
138 <para>
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
140 </para>
141 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
143 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
144 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
145 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
146 </itemizedlist>
147 </dedication>
148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id="alsobylessig">
151 <title></title>
152 <para>
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
154 </para>
155 <para>
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
157 </para>
158 <para>
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
160 </para>
161 </dedication>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
165 <colophon>
166 <para>
167 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
168 York, New York
169 </para>
170 <para>
171 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
172 </para>
173 <para>
174 Excerpt from an editorial titled <quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,</quote>
175 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
176 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
177 </para>
178 <para>
179 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
180 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
181 </para>
182 <para>
183 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
184 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
185 </para>
186 <para>
187 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
188 </para>
189 <para>
190 Lessig, Lawrence.
191 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
192 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
193 </para>
194 <para>
195 p. cm.
196 </para>
197 <para>
198 Includes index.
199 </para>
200 <para>
201 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
202 </para>
203
204 <para>
205 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
206 </para>
207 <para>
208 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
209 </para>
210 <para>
211 KF2979.L47
212 </para>
213 <para>
214 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
215 </para>
216 <para>
217 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
218 </para>
219 <para>
220 Printed in the United States of America
221 </para>
222 <para>
223 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
224 </para>
225 <para>
226 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
227 </para>
228
229 <para>
230 &translationblock;
231 </para>
232
233 <para>
234 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
235 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
236 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
237 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
238 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
239 the above publisher of this book.
240 </para>
241 <para>
242 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
243 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
244 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
245 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
246 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
247 author's rights is appreciated.
248 </para>
249 </colophon>
250
251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
252 <dedication><title></title>
253 <para>
254 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
255 it continues still.
256 </para>
257 </dedication>
258
259 <toc id="toc"></toc>
260
261 <lot>
262 <title>List of figures</title>
263 </lot>
264
265 <!--
266 c PREFACE xiii
267 c INTRODUCTION
268 c "PIRACY"
269 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
270 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
271 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
272 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
273 2 Film
274 2 Recorded Music
275 2 Radio
276 2 Cable TV
277 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
278 2 Piracy I
279 2 Piracy II
280 c "PROPERTY"
281 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
282 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
283 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
284 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
285 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
286 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
287 2 Beginnings
288 2 Law: Duration
289 2 Law: Scope
290 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
291 2 Architecture and Law: Force
292 2 Market: Concentration
293 2 Together
294 c PUZZLES
295 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
296 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
297 2 Constraining Creators
298 2 Constraining Innovators
299 2 Corrupting Citizens
300 c BALANCES
301 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
302 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
303 c CONCLUSION
304 c AFTERWORD
305 1 Us, Now
306 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
307 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
308 1 Them, Soon
309 2 1. More Formalities
310 3 Registration and Renewal
311 3 Marking
312 2 2. Shorter Terms
313 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
314 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
315 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
316 c NOTES
317 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
318 c INDEX
319 -->
320
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
322
323 <preface id="preface">
324 <title>PREFACE</title>
325 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
326 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
327 </indexterm>
328 <para>
329 <emphasis role="bold">At the end</emphasis> of his review of my first
330 book, <citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David
331 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
332 computer-related texts, wrote this:
333 </para>
334 <blockquote>
335 <para>
336 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
337 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
338 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
339 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
340 David Pogue, <quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
341 </para></footnote>
342 </para>
343 </blockquote>
344 <para>
345 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
346 software, or <quote>code,</quote> functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
347 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
348 could always <quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome</quote>-like simply flip a
349 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
350 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
351 <quote>affect</quote> us anymore.
352 </para>
353 <para>
354 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
355 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
356 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
357 causes even after the modem is turned
358 <!--PAGE BREAK 12-->
359 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
360 on-line have fundamentally affected <quote>people who aren't online.</quote> There
361 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
362 </para>
363 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
364 <para>
365 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
366 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
367 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
368 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
369 important.
370 </para>
371 <para>
372 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
373 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of <quote>free culture</quote>&mdash;not
374 <quote>free</quote> as in <quote>free beer</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
375 free software movement<footnote>
376 <para>
377 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
378 </para></footnote>), but <quote>free</quote> as in <quote>free speech,</quote> <quote>free markets,</quote>
379 <quote>free trade,</quote> <quote>free enterprise,</quote> <quote>free will,</quote> and <quote>free elections.</quote> A
380 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
381 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
382 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
383 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
384 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
385 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
386 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
387 <quote>permission culture</quote>&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
388 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
389 past.
390 </para>
391 <para>
392 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not <quote>we</quote>
393 on the Left or <quote>you</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
394 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
395 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
396 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
397 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
398 culture deem fundamental.
399 </para>
400 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
401 <indexterm><primary>Stevens, Ted</primary></indexterm>
402 <para>
403 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
404 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
405 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
406 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
407 As William Safire described marching <quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
408 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
409 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,</quote> he formulated perhaps
410 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
411 he asked,
412 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
413 </para>
414 <blockquote>
415 <para>
416 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
417 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
418 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
419 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
420 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
421 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
422 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
423 </para></footnote>
424 </para>
425 </blockquote>
426 <para>
427 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
428 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
429 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
430 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
431 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
432 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
433 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
434 Safire's left or on his right.
435 </para>
436 <para>
437 <emphasis role="strong">The inspiration</emphasis> for the title and for
438 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
439 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
440 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
441 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
442 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
443 that this work is <quote>merely</quote> derivative.
444 </para>
445 <para>
446 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
447 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
448 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
449 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
450 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
451 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
452 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
453 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
454
455 <!--PAGE BREAK 14-->
456 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
457 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
458 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
459 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
460 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
461 what I advance here.
462 </para>
463 <para>
464 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
465 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
466 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
467 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
468 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
469 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
470 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
471 book is written.
472 </para>
473
474 </preface>
475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
476
477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
478 <chapter label="0" id="c-introduction">
479 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
480 <indexterm id='idxairtraffic' class='startofrange'>
481 <primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.</primary>
482 </indexterm>
483 <indexterm id='idxlandownership' class='startofrange'>
484 <primary>land ownership, air traffic and</primary>
485 </indexterm>
486 <indexterm id='idxproprigtair' class='startofrange'>
487 <primary>property rights</primary>
488 <secondary>air traffic vs.</secondary>
489 </indexterm>
490 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
491 <para>
492 <emphasis role="strong">On December 17</emphasis>, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
493 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
494 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
495 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
496 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
497 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
498 </para>
499 <para>
500 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
501 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
502 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
503 and all the space above, to <quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.</quote><footnote><para>
504 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
505 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
506 </para></footnote>
507 For many
508 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
509 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
510 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
511 </para>
512 <para>
513 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
514 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
515 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
516 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
517 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
518 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
519 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
520 </para>
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
522 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
523 <para>
524 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
525 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
526 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
527 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
528 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
529 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
530 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to <quote>an indefinite
531 extent, upwards,</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
532 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
533 </para>
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
536 <para>
537 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
538 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
539 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
540 <quote>taking</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
541 that <quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
542 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.</quote> But Justice Douglas
543 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
544 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
545 </para>
546 <blockquote>
547 <para>
548 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
549 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
550 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
551 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
552 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
553 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
554 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
555 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
556 <para>
557 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
558 that there could be a <quote>taking</quote> if the government's use of its land
559 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
560 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, <quote>(Intellectual)
561 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
562 Authorship,</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
563 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
564 1112&ndash;13.
565 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
566 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
567 </para></footnote>
568 </para>
569 </blockquote>
570 <para>
571 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.</quote>
572 </para>
573 <para>
574 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
575 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
576 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
577 <!--PAGE BREAK 18-->
578 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: <quote>Common sense revolts
579 at the idea.</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
580 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
581 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
582 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
583 </para>
584 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
585 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
586 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
587 <para>
588 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
589 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
590 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
591 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
592 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
593 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
594 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
595 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
596 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by <quote>what
597 seemed reasonable</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
598 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
599 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
600 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
601 end, the force of what seems <quote>obvious</quote> to everyone else&mdash;the power of
602 <quote>common sense</quote>&mdash;would prevail. Their <quote>private interest</quote> would not be
603 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
604 </para>
605 <indexterm startref='idxproprigtair' class='endofrange'/>
606 <indexterm startref='idxlandownership' class='endofrange'/>
607 <indexterm startref='idxairtraffic' class='endofrange'/>
608 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwin' class='startofrange'>
609 <primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary>
610 </indexterm>
611 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
612 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
613 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
614 <para>
615 <emphasis role='strong'>Edwin Howard Armstrong</emphasis> is one of
616 America's forgotten inventor geniuses. He came to the great American
617 inventor scene just after the titans Thomas Edison and Alexander
618 Graham Bell. But his work in the area of radio technology was perhaps
619 the most important of any single inventor in the first fifty years of
620 radio. He was better educated than Michael Faraday, who as a
621 bookbinder's apprentice had discovered electric induction in 1831. But
622 he had the same intuition about how the world of radio worked, and on
623 at least three occasions, Armstrong invented profoundly important
624 technologies that advanced our understanding of radio.
625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
626 </para>
627 <para>
628 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
629 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
630 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
631 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
632 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
633 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
634 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
635 much less transmitter power and static.
636 </para>
637 <para>
638 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
639 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
640 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
641 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
642 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
643 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
644 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
645 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
646 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.</quote>
647 </para>
648 <para>
649 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
650 </para>
651 <blockquote>
652 <para>
653 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
654 sounded like a glass of water being poured. &hellip; A paper was crumpled
655 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
656 fire. &hellip; Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
657 and guitar number were performed. &hellip; The music was projected with a
658 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio <quote>music
659 box.</quote><footnote><para>
660 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
661 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
662 </para></footnote>
663 </para>
664 </blockquote>
665 <para>
666 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
667 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
668 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
669 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
670 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
671 a handful of networks.
672 <!--PAGE BREAK 20-->
673 </para>
674 <para>
675 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
676 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
677 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
678 that removed static from <quote>radio.</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
679 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
680 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
681 </para>
682 <blockquote>
683 <para>
684 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
685 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
686 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
687 RCA.<footnote><para> See <quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
688 Electronic Era,</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
689 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
690
691 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
692 </para></footnote>
693 </para>
694 </blockquote>
695 <indexterm id='idxlessing' class='startofrange'>
696 <primary>Lessing, Lawrence</primary>
697 </indexterm>
698 <para>
699 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
700 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
701 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
702 described,
703 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
704 </para>
705 <blockquote>
706 <para>
707 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
708 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
709 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
710 unrestrained, posed &hellip; a complete reordering of radio power
711 &hellip; and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
712 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
713 </para></footnote>
714 </para>
715 </blockquote>
716 <para>
717 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
718 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
719 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
720 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
721 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
722 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
723 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
724 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
725 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
726 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
727 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
728 </para>
729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
730 <blockquote>
731 <para>
732 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
733 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
734 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
735 deviousness.<footnote><para>
736 Lessing, 256.
737 </para></footnote>
738 </para>
739 </blockquote>
740 <indexterm startref='idxlessing' class='endofrange'/>
741 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
742 <para>
743 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
744 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
745 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
746 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
747 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
748 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
749 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
750 least temporarily.
751 </para>
752 <para>
753 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
754 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
755 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
756 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
757 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
758 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
759 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
760 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
761 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
762 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
763 </para>
764 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwin' class='endofrange'/>
765 <para>
766 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
767 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
768 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
769 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
770 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
771 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
772 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
773 course always public spirited; the reality is something
774 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
775 to themselves, would crumble in
776 <!--PAGE BREAK 22-->
777 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
778 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
779 effect of technological change.
780 </para>
781 <para>
782 <emphasis role="strong">There's no</emphasis> single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
783 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
784 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
785 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
786 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
787 before.<footnote><para>
788 Amanda Lenhart, <quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
789 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,</quote> Pew Internet and American
790 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
791 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
792 </para></footnote>
793 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
794 of 2004.
795 </para>
796 <para>
797 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
798 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
799 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
800 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
801 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
802 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
803 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
804 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
805 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
806 </para>
807 <para>
808 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
809 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
810 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
811 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
812 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
813 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
814 has introduced.
815 </para>
816 <para>
817 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
818 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
819 regulation of each. By <quote>commercial culture</quote> I mean that part of our
820 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
821 <quote>noncommercial culture</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
822 parks or on
823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
824 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
825 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his <quote>Reader,</quote> or
826 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
827 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel</primary></indexterm>
828 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah</primary></indexterm>
829 </para>
830 <para>
831 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
832 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
833 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
834 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
835 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
836 left this culture <quote>free.</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
837 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
838 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
839 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
840 </para>
841 <para>
842 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
843 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
844 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
845 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
846 marketplace.<footnote>
847 <para>
848 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
849 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
850 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
851 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
852 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
853 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
854 D. Brandeis, <quote>The Right to Privacy,</quote> Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
855 198&ndash;200.
856 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
857 </para></footnote>
858 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
859 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
860 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
861 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
862 </para>
863 <para>
864 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
865 been erased.<footnote><para>
866 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
867 2001), ch. 13.
868 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
869 </para></footnote>
870 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
871 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
872 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
873 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
874 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
875 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
876 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
877 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
878 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
879 culture, more and more a permission culture.
880 </para>
881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
882 <para>
883 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
884 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
885 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
886 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
887 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
888 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
889 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
890 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
891 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
892 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
893 Causbys.
894 </para>
895 <para>
896 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
897 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
898 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
899 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
900 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
901 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
902 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
903 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
904 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
905 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
906 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
907 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
908 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
909 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
910 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
911 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
912 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
913 </para>
914 <para>
915 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
916 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
917 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
918 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
919 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
920 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
921 remakes them.
922 </para>
923 <para>
924 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
926 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
927 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether <quote>piracy</quote> will
928 be permitted, and whether <quote>property</quote> will be protected. The <quote>war</quote> that
929 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
930 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
931 calls his <quote>own terrorist war</quote><footnote><para>
932 Amy Harmon, <quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
933 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,</quote> <citetitle>New York
934 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
935 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
936 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
937 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
938 against it.
939 </para>
940 <para>
941 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
942 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
943 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
944 <quote>creative property.</quote> I believe that <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong, and that the
945 law, properly tuned, should punish <quote>piracy,</quote> whether on or off the
946 Internet.
947 </para>
948 <para>
949 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
950 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
951 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet <quote>pirates</quote> will also rid our
952 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
953 </para>
954 <para>
955 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
956 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
957 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
958 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
959 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
960 <para>
961 Neil W. Netanel, <quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
962 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
963 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
964 </para></footnote>
965 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
966 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
967 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
968 could cultivate and extend our culture.
969 </para>
970 <para>
971 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
972 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
973 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
974 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
975 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
976 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
977 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
978 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
979 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
980 </para>
981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
982 <para>
983 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
984 <quote>centrality of technology</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
985 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
986 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
987 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
988 against an industry.
989 </para>
990 <para>
991 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
992 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
993 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
994 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
995 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
996 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
997 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
998 </para>
999 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1000 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1001 <para>
1002 <emphasis role="strong">Like the Causbys'</emphasis> battle, this war is, in part, about <quote>property.</quote> The
1003 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1004 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1005 this <quote>property</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1006 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1007 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1008 of <quote>intellectual property</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1009 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1010 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1011 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1012 <quote>trespassing</quote> upon legitimate claims of <quote>property.</quote> It is as plain to
1013 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1014 trespass.
1015 </para>
1016 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1017 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1018 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
1019 <para>
1020 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1021 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1022 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1023 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1024 war. Unlike
1025 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1026 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1027 on its side.
1028 </para>
1029 <para>
1030 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1031 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1032 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1033 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1034 our <quote>culture</quote> was as <quote>owned</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1035 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1036 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1037 accepted as it is now.
1038 </para>
1039 <para>
1040 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1041 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1042 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1043 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1044 </para>
1045 <para>
1046 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1047 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1048 </para>
1049 <para>
1050 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1051 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1052 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1053 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1054 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1055 </para>
1056 <para>
1057 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1058 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1059 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1060 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1061 view?
1062 </para>
1063 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1064 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1065 <para>
1066 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1067 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1068 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1069 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of <quote>intellectual
1070 property.</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1071 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1072 this silliness will be much more profound.
1073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1074 </para>
1075 <para>
1076 <emphasis role="strong">The struggle</emphasis> that rages just now centers on two ideas: <quote>piracy</quote> and
1077 <quote>property.</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1078 ideas.
1079 </para>
1080 <para>
1081 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1082 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1083 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1084 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1085 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1086 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1087 </para>
1088 <para>
1089 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1090 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1091 government, pushed by big media to respond to this <quote>something new,</quote> is
1092 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1093 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let <quote>common
1094 sense</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1095 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1096 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1097 fundamental about who we have always been.
1098 </para>
1099 <para>
1100 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1101 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1102 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1103 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1104 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1105 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1106 </para>
1107 </chapter>
1108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1109 <part id="c-piracy">
1110 <title><quote>PIRACY</quote></title>
1111 <partintro>
1112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1113 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1114 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1115 </indexterm>
1116 <para>
1117 <emphasis role="strong">Since the inception</emphasis> of the law regulating creative property, there has
1118 been a war against <quote>piracy.</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1119 <quote>piracy,</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1120 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1121 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1122 </para>
1123 <blockquote>
1124 <para>
1125 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1126 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1127 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1128 <!-- f1 -->
1129 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1130 </para></footnote>
1131 </para>
1132 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1133 </blockquote>
1134 <para>
1135 Today we are in the middle of another <quote>war</quote> against <quote>piracy.</quote> The
1136 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1137 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1138 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1139 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1140 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1142 </para>
1143 <para>
1144 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1145 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1146 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1147 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1148 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will <quote>rob the author of the
1149 profit.</quote>
1150 </para>
1151 <para>
1152 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1153 increasingly to technology to defend their <quote>property</quote> against this
1154 <quote>piracy.</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1155 raised to believe that <quote>property</quote> should be <quote>free.</quote> Forget tattoos,
1156 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1157 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1158 </para>
1159 <para>
1160 There's no doubt that <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1161 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1162 notion of <quote>piracy</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1163 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1164 </para>
1165 <para>
1166 The idea goes something like this:
1167 </para>
1168 <blockquote>
1169 <para>
1170 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1171 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1172 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1173 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1174 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1175 piracy.
1176 </para>
1177 </blockquote>
1178 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1179 <indexterm><primary>Girl Schouts</primary></indexterm>
1180 <indexterm id='idxifvalue' class='startofrange'>
1181 <primary><quote>if value, then right</quote> theory</primary>
1182 </indexterm>
1183 <para>
1184 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1185 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the <quote>if value, then right</quote>
1186 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1187 <!-- f2 -->
1188 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, <quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1189 in the Pepsi Generation,</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1190 </para></footnote>
1191 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1192 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1193 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1194 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1195 <!-- f3 -->
1196 Lisa Bannon, <quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1197 Up,</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1198 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1199 Zittrain, <quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1200 Speech, No One Wins,</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1201 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1202 </para></footnote>
1203 There was <quote>value</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1204 <quote>right</quote>&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1205 </para>
1206 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1207 <para>
1208 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1209 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1211 of law protecting creative property. But the <quote>if value, then right</quote>
1212 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1213 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1214 </para>
1215 <indexterm startref='idxifvalue' class='endofrange'/>
1216 <para>
1217 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1218 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1219 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1220 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1221 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1222 </para>
1223 <para>
1224 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1225 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1226 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1227 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1228 copyright law today regulates both.
1229 </para>
1230 <para>
1231 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1232 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1233 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1234 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1235 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1236 more expense of doing business.
1237 </para>
1238 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1239 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1240 <para>
1241 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1242 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1243 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1244 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1245 <quote>copying,</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1246 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1247 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1248 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1249 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1250 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1251 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1252 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1253 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1254 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1255 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1257 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the <quote>Rise of the Creative
1258 Class.</quote><footnote>
1259 <para>
1260 <!-- f4 -->
1261 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York:
1262 Basic Books, 2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1263 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1264 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1265 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1266 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1267 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1268
1269 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1270 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1271 </para></footnote>
1272 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1273 this creative class.
1274 </para>
1275 <para>
1276 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1277 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1278 context the current battles about behavior labeled <quote>piracy.</quote>
1279 </para>
1280 </partintro>
1281
1282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1283 <chapter label="1" id="creators">
1284 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1285 <indexterm id="idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'>
1286 <primary>animated cartoons</primary>
1287 </indexterm>
1288 <indexterm id='idxcartoonfilms' class='startofrange'>
1289 <primary>cartoon films</primary>
1290 </indexterm>
1291 <para>
1292 <emphasis role="strong">In 1928</emphasis>, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1293 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1294 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1295 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1296 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1297 </para>
1298 <para>
1299 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1300 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1301 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1302 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1303 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1304 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1305 </para>
1306 <blockquote>
1307 <para>
1308 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1309 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1310 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1311 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1313 </para>
1314 <para>
1315 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1316 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1317 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1318 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1319 synchronization was pretty close.
1320 </para>
1321 <para>
1322 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1323 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1324 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1325 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1326 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1327 <!-- f1 -->
1328 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1329 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1330 </para></footnote>
1331 </para>
1332 </blockquote>
1333 <para>
1334 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1335 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: <quote>I have never been so thrilled
1336 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.</quote>
1337 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1338 </para>
1339 <para>
1340 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1341 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1342 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1343 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1344 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1345 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1346 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1347 </para>
1348 <para>
1349 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1350 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1351 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1352 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1353 </para>
1354 <para>
1355 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1356 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1357 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1358 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1359 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1360 and among the best of its genre.
1361 </para>
1362 <para>
1363 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1364 Willie.
1365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1366 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1367 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1368 <!-- f2 -->
1369 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1370 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1371 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1372 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: <quote>Steamboat Bill,</quote> <quote>The
1373 Simpleton</quote> (Delille), <quote>Mischief Makers</quote> (Carbonara), <quote>Joyful Hurry No. 1</quote>
1374 (Baron), and <quote>Gawky Rube</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song, <quote>The Turkey in the
1375 Straw,</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1376 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1377 </para></footnote>
1378 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1379 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1380 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1381 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song <quote>Steamboat Bill,</quote>
1382 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1383 Mouse.
1384 </para>
1385 <para>
1386 This <quote>borrowing</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1387 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1388 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1389 <!-- f3 -->
1390 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, <quote>The Mouse
1391 that Ate the Public Domain,</quote> Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1392 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1393 </para></footnote>
1394 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1395 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1396 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1397 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1398 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1399 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1400 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1401 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1402 old.
1403 </para>
1404 <para>
1405 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1406 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1407 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1408 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1409 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1410 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1411 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1412 </para>
1413 <para>
1414 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1415 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1416 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1417 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1418 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1419 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1420 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1421 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1422 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1423 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1424 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1426 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1427 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1428 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1429 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1430 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1431 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1432 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1433 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1434 </para>
1435 <indexterm startref="idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'/>
1436 <para>
1437 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1438 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1439 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1440 its importance. We could call this <quote>Disney creativity,</quote> though that
1441 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, <quote>Walt Disney
1442 creativity</quote>&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1443 culture around us and makes it something different.
1444 </para>
1445 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1446 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1447 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1448 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1449 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1450 <!-- f4 -->
1451 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1452 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the <quote>average</quote> term by
1453 determining
1454 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1455 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1456 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1457 average
1458 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1459 Web site associated with this book, available at
1460 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1461 </para></footnote>
1462 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1463 copyright holders of a creative work had an <quote>exclusive right</quote> to control
1464 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1465 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1466 </para>
1467 <para>
1468 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1469 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1470 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a <quote>lawyer-free
1471 zone.</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1472 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1473 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1474 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1475 </para>
1476 <para>
1477 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1478 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1479 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1480 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1481
1482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1483 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1484 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1485 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1486 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1487 content from before the Great Depression.
1488 </para>
1489 <indexterm startref='idxcartoonfilms' class='endofrange'/>
1490 <para>
1491 <emphasis role="strong">Of course</emphasis>, Walt Disney had no monopoly on <quote>Walt Disney creativity.</quote>
1492 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1493 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1494 universal.
1495 </para>
1496 <para>
1497 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1498 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1499 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1500 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1501 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1502 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1503 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1504 </para>
1505 <para>
1506 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1507 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1508 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1509 the stories that these <quote>graphic novels</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1510 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are <quote>men in tights.</quote>
1511 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1512 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1513 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1514 interestingly different way.
1515 </para>
1516 <para>
1517 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1518 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1519 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1520 </para>
1521 <para>
1522 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1523 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1524 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1525 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1526 transforming it either subtly or
1527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1528 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1529 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1530 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1531 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently <quote>different.</quote> But they
1532 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1533 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1534 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1535 </para>
1536 <para>
1537 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1538 huge. More than 33,000 <quote>circles</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1539 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1540 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1541 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1542 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1543 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1544 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1545 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1546 </para>
1547 <para>
1548 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1549 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1550 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1551 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1552 one. Doujinshi are plainly <quote>derivative works.</quote> There is no general
1553 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1554 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1555 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1556 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that <quote>taking</quote> without
1557 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1558 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1559 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1560 </para>
1561 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1562 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1563 </indexterm>
1564 <para>
1565 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1566 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1567 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, <quote>The
1568 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1569 in Japan now. &hellip; American comics were born out of copying each
1570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1571 other. &hellip; That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1572 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them</quote>
1573 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1574 <!-- f5 -->
1575 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1576 York: Perennial, 2000).
1577 </para></footnote>
1578 </para>
1579 <indexterm><primary>Superman comics</primary></indexterm>
1580 <para>
1581 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1582 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1583 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, <quote>there are these rules
1584 and you have to stick to them.</quote> There are things Superman <quote>cannot</quote>
1585 do. <quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1586 which are fifty years old.</quote>
1587 </para>
1588 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1589 <para>
1590 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1591 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1592 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1593 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1594 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1595 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1596 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1597 <!-- f6 -->
1598 See Salil K. Mehra, <quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1599 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1600 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. <quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1601 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1602 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1603 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1604 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1605 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.</quote>
1606 </para></footnote>
1607 </para>
1608 <para>
1609 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1610 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1611 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1612 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1613 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1614 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1615 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1616 a more general pattern of blocking this <quote>free taking</quote> by the doujinshi
1617 culture?
1618 </para>
1619 <para>
1620 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1621 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1622 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. <quote>We don't have enough
1623 lawyers,</quote> he told me one afternoon. There <quote>just aren't enough resources
1624 to prosecute cases like this.</quote>
1625 </para>
1626 <para>
1627 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1628 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1629 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1630 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1632 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1633 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1634 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1635 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1636 their clients or hurt them?
1637 </para>
1638 <para>
1639 <emphasis role='strong'>Let's pause</emphasis> for a moment.
1640 </para>
1641 <para>
1642 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1643 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1644 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1645 </para>
1646 <para>
1647 We live in a world that celebrates <quote>property.</quote> I am one of those
1648 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1649 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1650 <quote>intellectual property.</quote><footnote><para>
1651 <!-- f7 -->
1652 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1653 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1654 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1655 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1656 describes a set of <quote>property</quote> rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1657 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1658 very different.
1659 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1660 </para></footnote>
1661 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1662 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1663 property.
1664 </para>
1665 <para>
1666 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1667 plenty of value out there that <quote>property</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1668 mean <quote>money can't buy you love,</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1669 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1670 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1671 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1672 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1673 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1674 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1675 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1676 Disney's use would have been considered <quote>fair.</quote> There was nothing
1677 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1678 the public domain.
1679 </para>
1680 <para>
1681 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1682 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1683 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1684
1685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1686 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1687 freedom is good.
1688 </para>
1689 <para>
1690 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1691 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1692 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1693 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1694 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1695 form, whether large or small.
1696 </para>
1697 <para>
1698 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1699 say that the copycat comic artists are <quote>stealing.</quote> This form of Walt
1700 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1701 particular find it hard to say why.
1702 </para>
1703 <para>
1704 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1705 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1706 without asking or paying for the privilege. (<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1707 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1708 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?</quote>) Acting companies
1709 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1710 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1711 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1712 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1713 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1714 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1715 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1716 </para>
1717 <para>
1718 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1719 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1720 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1721 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1722 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1723 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1724 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1725 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1727 </para>
1728 <para>
1729 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1730 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1731 question instead is <quote><emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?</quote>
1732 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1733 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1734 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1735 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1736 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1737 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1738 a studio or not?
1739 </para>
1740 <para>
1741 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1742 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1743 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1744 </para>
1745
1746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1747 </chapter>
1748 <chapter label="2" id="mere-copyists">
1749 <title>CHAPTER TWO: <quote>Mere Copyists</quote></title>
1750 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1751 <primary>photography</primary>
1752 </indexterm>
1753 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1754 <para>
1755 <emphasis role='strong'>In 1839</emphasis>, Louis Daguerre invented
1756 the first practical technology for producing what we would call
1757 <quote>photographs.</quote> Appropriately enough, they were called
1758 <quote>daguerreotypes.</quote> The process was complicated and
1759 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1760 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1761 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1762 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1763 </para>
1764 <para>
1765 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1766 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1767 <quote>automatic pictures.</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1768 making <quote>negatives.</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1769 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1770 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1771 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1772 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1773 amateurs.
1774 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1775 </para>
1776 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1777 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1778 </indexterm>
1779 <para>
1780 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1781 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1783 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1784 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1785 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1786 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1787 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1788 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1789 population of photographers.
1790 </para>
1791 <para>
1792 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1793 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1794 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. <quote>You press the button and we
1795 do the rest.</quote><footnote><para>
1796 <!-- f1 -->
1797 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1798 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1799 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)</primary></indexterm>
1800 </para>
1801 <blockquote>
1802 <para>
1803 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1804 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1805 that only an expert can do. &hellip; We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1806 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1807 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1808 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1809 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1810 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1811 chemicals.<footnote>
1812 <para>
1813 <!-- f2 -->
1814 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1815 1977), 53.
1816 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1817 </para></footnote>
1818 </para>
1819 </blockquote>
1820 <para>
1821 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1822 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1823 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1824 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1825 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1826 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1827 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1828 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1829 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1830 percent.<footnote><para>
1831 <!-- f3 -->
1832 Jenkins, 177.
1833 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1834 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1835 <!-- f4 -->
1836 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1837 </para></footnote>
1838 </para>
1839 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1840 <para>
1841
1842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1843 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1844 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1845 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1846 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1847 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, <quote>For the
1848 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1849 permanent record of his family and its activities. &hellip; For the first
1850 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1851 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1852 interpretation or bias.</quote><footnote><para>
1853 <!-- f5 -->
1854 Coe, 58.
1855 </para></footnote>
1856 </para>
1857 <para>
1858 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1859 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1860 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1861 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1862 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1863 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its <quote>quality</quote>;
1864 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1865 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1866 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1867 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1868 have before.
1869 </para>
1870 <para>
1871 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1872 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1873 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1874 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1875 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1876 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1877 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1878 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1879 <!-- f6 -->
1880 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1881 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1882 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1883 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1884 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1885 </para></footnote>
1886 </para>
1887 <para>
1888 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1889 familiar. The photographer was <quote>taking</quote> something from the person or
1890 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1891 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1892 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1893 draw
1894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1895 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1896 that they thought valuable.
1897 </para>
1898 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1899 <para>
1900 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1901 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1902 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1903 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1904 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1905 <para>
1906 <!-- f7 -->
1907 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, <quote>The Right to Privacy,</quote>
1908 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1909 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1910 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1911 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1912 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1913 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1914 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1915 </para>
1916 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of</primary></indexterm>
1917 <para>
1918 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1919 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1920 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1921 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1922 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1923 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1924 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1925 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1926 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1927 <!-- f8 -->
1928 See Melville B. Nimmer, <quote>The Right of Publicity,</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1929 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, <quote>Privacy,</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1930 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1931 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1932 (1993).
1933 </para></footnote>)
1934 </para>
1935 <para>
1936 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1937 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1938 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1939 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1940 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1941 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1942 Kodak would be benefiting from the <quote>theft</quote> committed by the
1943 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1944 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1945 from the <quote>image-right</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1946 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1947 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1948 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1949 </para>
1950 <para>
1951
1952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1953 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1954 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1955 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1956 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1957 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1958 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1959 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1960 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1961 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1962 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1963 realized.
1964 </para>
1965 <para>
1966 <emphasis role='strong'>If you drive</emphasis> through San
1967 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses
1968 painted over with colorful and striking images, and the logo
1969 <quote>Just Think!</quote> in place of the name of a school. But
1970 there's little that's <quote>just</quote> cerebral in the projects
1971 that these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies
1972 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even
1973 the film of your VCR. Rather the <quote>film</quote> of digital
1974 cameras. Just Think! is a project that enables kids to make films, as
1975 a way to understand and critique the filmed culture that they find all
1976 around them. Each year, these busses travel to more than thirty
1977 schools and enable three hundred to five hundred children to learn
1978 something about media by doing something with media. By doing, they
1979 think. By tinkering, they learn.
1980 </para>
1981 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1982 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1983 <para>
1984 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1985 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1986 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, <quote>Five years ago, a good
1987 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1988 professional quality for $595.</quote><footnote><para>
1989 <!-- f9 -->
1990 H. Edward Goldberg, <quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1991 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,</quote>
1992 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1993 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1994 </para></footnote>
1995 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1996 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1997 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1998 learning more and more of something teachers call <quote>media literacy.</quote>
1999 </para>
2000 <para>
2001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
2002 <quote>Media literacy,</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
2003 Think!, puts it, <quote>is the ability &hellip; to understand, analyze, and
2004 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
2005 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
2006 the way people access it.</quote>
2007 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
2008 </para>
2009 <para>
2010 This may seem like an odd way to think about <quote>literacy.</quote> For most
2011 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
2012 and noticing split infinitives are the things that <quote>literate</quote> people know
2013 about.
2014 </para>
2015 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
2016 <para>
2017 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
2018 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
2019 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
2020 <!-- f10 -->
2021 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2022 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); <quote>Findings on Family and TV
2023 Study,</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
2024 </para></footnote>
2025 it is increasingly important to understand the <quote>grammar</quote> of media. For
2026 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2027 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2028 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2029 (at least at first) terrible media.
2030 </para>
2031 <para>
2032 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2033 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2034 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
2035 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2036 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
2037 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2038 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2039 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2040 </para>
2041 <para>
2042 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2043 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2044 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2045 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2046 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2047 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2048 </para>
2049 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
2050 <para>
2051 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2052 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2053 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2054
2055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2056 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2057 about <quote>the placement of objects, color, &hellip; rhythm, pacing, and
2058 texture.</quote><footnote>
2059 <para>
2060 <!-- f11 -->
2061 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
2062 2002.
2063 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2064 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
2065 </para></footnote>
2066 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2067 <quote>played</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2068 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2069 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2070 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2071 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2072 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2073 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
2074 <!-- f12 -->
2075 See Scott Steinberg, <quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,</quote> E!online, 4
2076 November 2000, available at
2077 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; <quote>Timeline,</quote> 22 November 2000,
2078 available at
2079 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
2080 </para></footnote>
2081 </para>
2082 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
2083 <para>
2084 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2085 describes, <quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2086 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2087 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2088 led.</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2089 </para>
2090 <para>
2091 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
2092 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2093 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2094 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2095 </para>
2096 <blockquote>
2097 <para>
2098 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2099 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2100 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2101 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2102 being read-only.
2103 </para>
2104 </blockquote>
2105 <para>
2106 <quote>Read-only.</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2107 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2108 twentieth century.
2109 </para>
2110 <para>
2111 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2112 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2113 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2114 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2115 literacy,
2116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2117 and this literacy in particular, is to <quote>empower people to choose the
2118 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2119 express.</quote><footnote>
2120 <para>
2121 <!-- f13 -->
2122 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2123 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2124 </para></footnote> It is to enable students <quote>to communicate in the
2125 language of the twenty-first century.</quote><footnote><para>
2126 <!-- f14 -->
2127 Ibid.
2128 </para></footnote>
2129 </para>
2130 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2131 <para>
2132 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2133 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2134 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2135 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2136 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2137 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2138 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2139 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2140 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2141 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2142 </para>
2143 <para>
2144 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2145 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2146 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2147 away. The <quote>kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,</quote>
2148 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2149 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2150 </para>
2151 <para>
2152 Using whatever <quote>free web stuff they could find,</quote> and relatively simple
2153 tools to enable the kids to mix <quote>image, sound, and text,</quote> Barish said
2154 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2155 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2156 close to the lives of these students. The project <quote>gave them a tool
2157 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2158 it,</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2159 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2160 been created using only text. <quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2161 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2162 gone and done something else,</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2163 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2164 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2165 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2166 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2167 </para>
2168 <para>
2169
2170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2171 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?</quote> I asked. In part,
2172 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2173 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of <quote>constructing
2174 meaning.</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2175 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2176 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2177 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2178 our interview,
2179 </para>
2180 <blockquote>
2181 <para>
2182 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2183 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2184 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2185 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2186 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2187 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2188 you say, <quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.</quote>
2189 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2190 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2191 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, <quote>Well, with all these things that you
2192 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2193 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2194 for me something that reflects that.</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2195 camera and &hellip; saying, <quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2196 make a little movie.</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2197 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2198 about the topic.&hellip;
2199 </para>
2200 <para>
2201 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2202 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2203 bump up against the fact, <quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2204 to write something.</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2205 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2206 </para>
2207 <para>
2208 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2209 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2210 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2212 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2213 had a lot of power with this language.
2214 </para>
2215 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2216 not match with any start quote. -->
2217 </blockquote>
2218 <indexterm><primary>World Trade Center</primary></indexterm>
2219 <para>
2220 <emphasis role='strong'>When two planes</emphasis> crashed into the
2221 World Trade Center, another into the Pentagon, and a fourth into a
2222 Pennsylvania field, all media around the world shifted to this
2223 news. Every moment of just about every day for that week, and for
2224 weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold the
2225 story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a
2226 retelling, because we had seen the events that were described. The
2227 genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the delayed second
2228 attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole world would be
2229 watching.
2230 </para>
2231 <para>
2232 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2233 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2234 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was <quote>balance,</quote>
2235 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2236 increasingly come to expect it, <quote>news as entertainment,</quote> even if the
2237 entertainment is tragedy.
2238 </para>
2239 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2240 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2241 <para>
2242 But in addition to this produced news about the <quote>tragedy of September
2243 11,</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2244 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2245 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2246 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2247 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2248 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2249 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2250 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2251 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2252 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2253 was also the Internet.
2254 </para>
2255 <para>
2256 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2257 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2258 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2259 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2260 movie
2261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2262 by a student on the <quote>Just Think!</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2263 with sound or text.
2264 </para>
2265 <para>
2266 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2267 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2268 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2269 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2270 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2271 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2272 spread practically instantaneously.
2273 </para>
2274 <para>
2275 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2276 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2277 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2278 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2279 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2280 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2281 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2282 </para>
2283 <indexterm><primary>blogs (Web-logs)</primary></indexterm>
2284 <para>
2285 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2286 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2287 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2288 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2289 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2290 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2291 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2292 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2293 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2294 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2295 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2296 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2297 </para>
2298 <para>
2299 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2300 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2301 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2302 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2303 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2304 people vote
2305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2306 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2307 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2308 </para>
2309 <indexterm><primary>Tocqueville, Alexis de</primary></indexterm>
2310 <para>
2311 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2312 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2313 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2314 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2315 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2316 most important account of early <quote>Democracy in America.</quote> It wasn't
2317 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2318 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2319 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2320 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2321 deliberated. Members argued about the <quote>right</quote> result; they tried to
2322 persuade each other of the <quote>right</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2323 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2324 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2325 <!-- f15 -->
2326 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2327 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2328 </para></footnote>
2329 </para>
2330 <para>
2331 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2332 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2333 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2334 <!-- f16 -->
2335 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, <quote>Deliberation Day,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2336 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2337 </para></footnote>
2338 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2339 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2340 place for <quote>democratic deliberation</quote> to occur.
2341 </para>
2342 <para>
2343 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2344 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2345 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2346 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2347 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2348 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2349 <!-- f17 -->
2350 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2351 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2352 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2353 little beyond what our friends say.
2354 </para>
2355 <indexterm id='idxblogs1' class='startofrange'>
2356 <primary>blogs (Web-logs)</primary>
2357 </indexterm>
2358 <para>
2359 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2360 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2361 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2362 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2363 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2364
2365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2366 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2367 place.
2368 </para>
2369 <para>
2370 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2371 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2372 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2373 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2374 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2375 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2376 </para>
2377 <para>
2378 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2379 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2380 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2381 is having an effect.
2382 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2383 </para>
2384 <indexterm><primary>Thurmond, Strom</primary></indexterm>
2385 <para>
2386 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2387 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2388 <quote>misspoke</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2389 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2390 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2391 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2392 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2393 more instances of the same <quote>misspeaking</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2394 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2395 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2396 <!-- f18 -->
2397 Noah Shachtman, <quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,</quote> New
2398 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2399 </para></footnote>
2400 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2401 </para>
2402 <para>
2403 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2404 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2405 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2406 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2407 on.
2408 </para>
2409 <para>
2410 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2411 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2412 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2413 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2414 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2415 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2416 peer-generated rankings.
2417 </para>
2418 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2419 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2420 </indexterm>
2421 <para>
2422 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2424 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2425 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2426 difference is the absence of a financial <quote>conflict of interest.</quote> <quote>I think you
2427 have to take the conflict of interest</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2428 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2429 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2430 get it out of the way.</quote>
2431 </para>
2432 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2433 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war</primary></indexterm>
2434 <para>
2435 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2436 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2437 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2438 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2439 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2440 <!-- f19 -->
2441 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2442 </para></footnote>
2443 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2444 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2445 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2446 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2447 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2448 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2449 told her that <emphasis>they</emphasis> were writing <quote>the story.</quote>)
2450 </para>
2451 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2452 debate&mdash;<quote>amateur</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2453 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2454 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2455 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2456 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2457 had seen.<footnote><para>
2458 <!-- f20 -->
2459 John Schwartz, <quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2460 Information Online,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2461 D. Kramer, <quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,</quote>
2462 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2463 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2464 </para></footnote>
2465 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2466 <quote>triangulate,</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2467 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2468 out of it</quote>&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2469 </para>
2470 <para>
2471 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2472 with blogs. <quote>It's going to become an essential skill,</quote> Winer predicts,
2473 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2474 not clear that <quote>journalism</quote> is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2475 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2476 <para>
2477 <!-- f21 -->
2478 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2479 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war</primary></indexterm>
2480 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve</primary></indexterm>
2481 <indexterm><primary>blogs (Web-logs)</primary></indexterm>
2482 See Michael Falcone, <quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?</quote> <citetitle>New
2483 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. (<quote>Not all news organizations have
2484 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2485 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2486 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2487 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2488 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2489 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.</quote>)
2490 </para></footnote>
2491 But it is clear that we are still in transition. <quote>A
2492
2493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2494 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,</quote> Winer told me.
2495 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2496 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2497 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, <quote>we will
2498 be the last thing that gets shut down.</quote>
2499 </para>
2500 <para>
2501 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because <quote>you
2502 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.</quote>
2503 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2504 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2505 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2506 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2507 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2508 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2509 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2510 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2511 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2512 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2513 extraordinary to report.
2514 </para>
2515 <indexterm startref='idxblogs1' class='endofrange'/>
2516 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2517 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2518 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2519 </indexterm>
2520 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'>
2521 <primary>advertising</primary>
2522 </indexterm>
2523 <para>
2524 <emphasis role='strong'>John Seely Brown</emphasis> is the chief
2525 scientist of the Xerox Corporation. His work, as his Web site
2526 describes it, is <quote>human learning and &hellip; the creation of
2527 knowledge ecologies for creating &hellip; innovation.</quote>
2528 </para>
2529 <para>
2530 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2531 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2532 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2533 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2534 affect learning.
2535 </para>
2536 <para>
2537 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When <quote>a lot of us grew up,</quote>
2538 he explains, that tinkering was done <quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2539 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.</quote> But digital technologies
2540 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2541 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2542 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2544 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2545 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2546 or <quote>free collage,</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2547 the tinkering of many others.
2548 </para>
2549 <para>
2550 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2551 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2552 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2553 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2554 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2555 </para>
2556 <para>
2557 This opportunity creates a <quote>completely new kind of learning platform,</quote>
2558 as Brown describes. <quote>As soon as you start doing that, you &hellip;
2559 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2560 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2561 if they can improve it.</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2562 apprenticeship. <quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.</quote>
2563 </para>
2564 <para>
2565 In this process, <quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2566 They are code.</quote> Kids are <quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2567 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2568 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2569 platform. &hellip; You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2570 you tinker the more you improve.</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2571 learn.
2572 </para>
2573 <para>
2574 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2575 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2576 it, <quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2577 intelligence.</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2578 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2579 text. <quote>The Web &hellip; says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2580 you are visual, if you are interested in film &hellip; [then] there is a
2581 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2582 these multiple forms of intelligence.</quote>
2583 </para>
2584 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'/>
2585 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2586 <para>
2587 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2588 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2589
2590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2591 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2592 kind of recognition.
2593 </para>
2594 <para>
2595 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2596 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2597 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2598 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2599 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2600 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2601 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2602 </para>
2603 <para>
2604 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2605 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2606 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2607 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the <quote>right to
2608 tinker</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2609 general.<footnote><para>
2610 <!-- f22 -->
2611 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, <quote>Technological Access
2612 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2613 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2614 </para></footnote>
2615 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2616 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2617 </para>
2618 <para>
2619 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,</quote> Brown
2620 explains. We need to <quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2621 and want to learn.</quote>
2622 </para>
2623 <para>
2624 <quote>Yet,</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2625 evince, <quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2626 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. &hellip; We're building an
2627 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2628 system that closes down that part of the brain.</quote>
2629 </para>
2630 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2631 <para>
2632 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2633 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2634 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2635 the law to close down that technology.
2636 </para>
2637 <para>
2638 <quote>No way to run a culture,</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2639 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2640 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2641 </para>
2642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2643 </chapter>
2644 <chapter label="3" id="catalogs">
2645 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2646 <indexterm><primary>RPI</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</see></indexterm>
2647 <indexterm id="idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'>
2648 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</primary>
2649 </indexterm>
2650 <para>
2651 <emphasis role='strong'>In the fall</emphasis> of 2002, Jesse Jordan
2652 of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as a freshman at Rensselaer
2653 Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York. His major at RPI was
2654 information technology. Though he is not a programmer, in October
2655 Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search engine technology that
2656 was available on the RPI network.
2657 </para>
2658 <para>
2659 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2660 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2661 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2662 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2663 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2664 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2665 </para>
2666 <para>
2667 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2668 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2669 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2670 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2671 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2672 </para>
2673 <para>
2674 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2676 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2677 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2678 engines can do this even better. The idea of <quote>intranet</quote> search
2679 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2680 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2681 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2682 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2683 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2684 </para>
2685 <para>
2686 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2687 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2688 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2689 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2690 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2691 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2692 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2693 </para>
2694 <para>
2695 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2696 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2697 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2698 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2699 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2700 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2701 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2702 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2703 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2704 on-line.
2705 </para>
2706 <para>
2707 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2708 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2709 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2710 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2711 be on users' computers.
2712 </para>
2713 <para>
2714 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2715 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2716 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2717 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2719 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2720 computer.
2721 </para>
2722 <para>
2723 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2724 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2725 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2726 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2727 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2728 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2729 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2730 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2731 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2732 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2733 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2734 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2735 supposed to do.
2736 </para>
2737 <para>
2738 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2739 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2740 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2741 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2742 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2743 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2744 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2745 </para>
2746 <para>
2747 <quote>It was absurd,</quote> he told me. <quote>I don't think I did anything
2748 wrong. &hellip; I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2749 engine that I ran or &hellip; what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2750 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2751 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2752 easier to use</quote>&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2753 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2754 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2755 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2756 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2757 with music.
2758 </para>
2759 <indexterm><primary>statutory damages</primary></indexterm>
2760 <para>
2761 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2762 network and had therefore <quote>willfully</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2764 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2765 <quote>willful infringement,</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2766 call <quote>statutory damages.</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2767 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2768 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2769 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2770 </para>
2771 <indexterm><primary>Princeton University</primary></indexterm>
2772 <indexterm><primary>Michigan Technical University</primary></indexterm>
2773 <para>
2774 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2775 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2776 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2777 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2778 huge demands for <quote>damages</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2779 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2780 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2781 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2782 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2783 2001.<footnote><para>
2784
2785 <!-- f1 -->
2786 Tim Goral, <quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2787 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages,</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2788 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2789 </para></footnote>
2790 </para>
2791 <indexterm startref="idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'/>
2792 <para>
2793 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2794 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2795 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2796 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2797 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2798 </para>
2799 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt</primary></indexterm>
2800 <para>
2801 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2802 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2803 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2804 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2805 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2806 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2807 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, <quote>You don't want to pay another
2808 visit to a dentist like me.</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2809 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2810 </para>
2811 <para>
2812 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2813 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2814 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2815 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2816 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2818 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2819 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2820 </para>
2821 <para>
2822 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2823 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2824 </para>
2825 <indexterm>
2826 <primary>artists</primary>
2827 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
2828 </indexterm>
2829 <para>
2830 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2831 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2832 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2833 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2834 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2835 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2836 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2837 <!-- f2 -->
2838 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2839 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2840 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2841 </para></footnote>
2842 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2843 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2844 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2845 <!-- f3 -->
2846 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in <quote>KaZaA and Punishment,</quote>
2847 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2848 </para></footnote>
2849 </para>
2850 <para>
2851 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2852 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2853 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2854 activist:
2855 </para>
2856 <blockquote>
2857 <para>
2858 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2859 an activist. &hellip; [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2860 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2861 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2862 </para>
2863 </blockquote>
2864 <para>
2865 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2866 his father told me, Jesse <quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2867 I. &hellip; He's not a tree hugger. &hellip; I think it's bizarre that they would
2868 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2869 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.</quote>
2870 </para>
2871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2872 </chapter>
2873 <chapter label="4" id="pirates">
2874 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: <quote>Pirates</quote></title>
2875 <indexterm><primary><quote>if value, then right</quote> theory</primary></indexterm>
2876 <para>
2877 <emphasis role='strong'>If <quote>piracy</quote> means</emphasis>
2878 using the creative property of others without their
2879 permission&mdash;if <quote>if value, then right</quote> is
2880 true&mdash;then the history of the content industry is a history of
2881 piracy. Every important sector of <quote>big media</quote>
2882 today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2883 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last
2884 generation's pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until
2885 now.
2886 </para>
2887 <section id="film">
2888 <title>Film</title>
2889 <para>
2890 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2891 <!-- f1 -->
2892 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2893 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2894 which details Edison's <quote>adventures</quote> with copyright and patent.
2895 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2896 </para></footnote>
2897 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2898 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2899 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2900 exercised through a monopoly <quote>trust,</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2901 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2902 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2903 this creative property
2904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2905 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2906 </para>
2907 <para>
2908 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2909 </para>
2910 <blockquote>
2911 <para>
2912 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2913 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2914 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2915 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2916 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2917 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2918 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2919 </para>
2920 <para>
2921 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2922 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2923 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2924 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2925 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2926 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2927 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2928 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2929 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2930 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2931 <!-- f2 -->
2932 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2933 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2934 posted at <quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2935 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,</quote> available at
2936 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2937 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2938 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, <quote>From
2939 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2940 the Propertization of Copyright</quote> (September 2002), University of
2941 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2942 Working Paper No. 159.
2943 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
2944 </para></footnote>
2945 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William</primary></indexterm>
2946 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2947 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2948 </para>
2949 </blockquote>
2950 <para>
2951 The Napsters of those days, the <quote>independents,</quote> were companies like
2952 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2953 resisted. <quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2954 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2955 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.</quote><footnote><para>
2956 <!-- f3 -->
2957 Marc Wanamaker, <quote>The First Studios,</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2958 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2959 </para></footnote>
2960 That led the independents to flee the East
2961 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2962 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2963 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2964 did just that.
2965 </para>
2966 <para>
2967 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2968 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2969 patent holder a truly <quote>limited</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2970
2971 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2972 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2973 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2974 Edison's creative property.
2975 </para>
2976 </section>
2977 <section id="recordedmusic">
2978 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2979 <para>
2980 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2981 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2982 </para>
2983 <indexterm id="idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'>
2984 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri</primary>
2985 </indexterm>
2986 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil</primary></indexterm>
2987 <para>
2988 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2989 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2990 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2991 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2992 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2993 1899 hit <quote>Happy Mose,</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2994 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2995 right to perform it publicly.
2996 </para>
2997 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2998 <para>
2999 But what if I wanted to record <quote>Happy Mose,</quote> using Edison's phonograph
3000 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
3001 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
3002 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
3003 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
3004 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
3005 <quote>public performance</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
3006 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
3007 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
3008 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
3009 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
3010 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
3011 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
3012 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
3013 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
3014 its composer anything.
3015 </para>
3016 <indexterm startref="idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'/>
3017 <para>
3018 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
3019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
3020 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
3021 put it,
3022 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
3023 </para>
3024 <blockquote>
3025 <para>
3026 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3027 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3028 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3029 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3030 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3031 rights.<footnote><para>
3032 <!-- f4 -->
3033 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3034 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
3035 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3036 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
3037 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3038 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3039 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
3040 </para></footnote>
3041 </para>
3042 </blockquote>
3043 <indexterm><primary>Sousa, John Philip</primary></indexterm>
3044 <para>
3045 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3046 people's works were <quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3047 genius of American composers,</quote><footnote><para>
3048 <!-- f5 -->
3049 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
3050 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3051 </para></footnote>
3052 and the <quote>music publishing industry</quote>
3053 was thereby <quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.</quote><footnote><para>
3054 <!-- f6 -->
3055 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
3056 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3057 </para></footnote>
3058 As John Philip
3059 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, <quote>When they make money
3060 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.</quote><footnote><para>
3061 <!-- f7 -->
3062 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
3063 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3064 </para></footnote>
3065 </para>
3066 <para>
3067 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3068 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3069 player piano argued that <quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3070 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3071 of anything he had before their introduction.</quote> Rather, the machines
3072 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
3073 <!-- f8 -->
3074
3075 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
3076 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3077 Perforating Company of New York).
3078 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3079 Congress was <quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3080 they represent, and whose servants they are.</quote> <quote>All talk about
3081 `theft,'</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3082 wrote, <quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3083 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3084 statute.</quote><footnote><para>
3085 <!-- f9 -->
3086 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
3087 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3088 Graphophone Company Association).
3089 </para></footnote>
3090 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company</primary></indexterm>
3091 </para>
3092 <para>
3093 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3094 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3095 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the <quote>mechanical
3096 reproductions</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3097 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3098 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3099 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3100 recorded once. This is the part of
3101
3102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3103 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3104 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3105 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3106 </para>
3107 <para>
3108 American law ordinarily calls this a <quote>compulsory license,</quote> but I will
3109 refer to it as a <quote>statutory license.</quote> A statutory license is a license
3110 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3111 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3112 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3113 the fee set by the statute.
3114 </para>
3115 <para>
3116 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3117 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3118 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3119 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3120 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3121 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3122 Grisham.
3123 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
3124 </para>
3125 <para>
3126 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3127 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
3128 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
3129 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3130 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3131 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3132 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3133 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3134 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3135 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3136 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3137 creativity.<footnote><para>
3138
3139 <!-- f10 -->
3140 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3141 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3142 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3143 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3144 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3145 </para></footnote>
3146 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3147 </para>
3148 <para>
3149 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3150 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3151 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3152 relates,
3153 </para>
3154 <blockquote>
3155 <para>
3156 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3158 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3159 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3160 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3161 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3162 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3163 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3164 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3165 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3166 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3167 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3168 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3169 choice.<footnote><para>
3170 <!-- f11 -->
3171 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3172 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3173 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3174 this report.</para></footnote>
3175 </para>
3176 </blockquote>
3177 <para>
3178 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3179 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3180 </para>
3181 </section>
3182 <section id="radio">
3183 <title>Radio</title>
3184 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'>
3185 <primary>artists</primary>
3186 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
3187 </indexterm>
3188 <para>
3189 Radio was also born of piracy.
3190 </para>
3191 <para>
3192 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3193 <quote>public performance</quote> of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3194 <!-- f12 -->
3195 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3196 record companies printed <quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast</quote> and other
3197 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3198 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3199 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3200 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3201 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, <quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3202 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3203 Copyright,</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3204 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3205 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3206 </para></footnote>
3207 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3208 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3209 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3210 </para>
3211 <para>
3212 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3213 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3214 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3215 work. It's one thing to have <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> sung on the radio by the
3216 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3217 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3218 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3219 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3220 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3221 music for his work.
3222 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3223
3224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3225 </para>
3226 <para>
3227 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3228 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3229 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3230 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3231 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3232 of playing the song.
3233 </para>
3234 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3235 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3236 </indexterm>
3237 <para>
3238 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3239 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3240 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3241 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3242 </para>
3243 <para>
3244 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3245 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3246 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3247 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3248 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3249 <quote>protected</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3250 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3251 her anything.
3252 </para>
3253 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3254 <para>
3255 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3256 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3257 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3258 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3259 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3260 to take something for nothing.
3261 </para>
3262 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'/>
3263 </section>
3264 <section id="cabletv">
3265 <title>Cable TV</title>
3266 <para>
3267
3268 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3269 </para>
3270 <para>
3271 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3272 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3273 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3274 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3276 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3277 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3278 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3279 give away.
3280 </para>
3281 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3282 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3283 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3284 <para>
3285 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3286 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3287 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.</quote><footnote><para>
3288 <!-- f13 -->
3289 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3290 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3291 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3292 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3293 Commission).
3294 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3295 </para></footnote>
3296 There may have been a <quote>public interest</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3297 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3298 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, <quote>Does public
3299 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?</quote><footnote><para>
3300 <!-- f14 -->
3301 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3302 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3303 </para></footnote>
3304 As another broadcaster put it,
3305 </para>
3306 <blockquote>
3307 <para>
3308 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3309 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3310 paid for.<footnote><para>
3311 <!-- f15 -->
3312 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3313 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3314 </para></footnote>
3315 </para>
3316 </blockquote>
3317 <para>
3318 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3319 </para>
3320 <blockquote>
3321 <para>
3322 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3323 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3324 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3325 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3326 <!-- f16 -->
3327 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3328 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3329 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3330 </para></footnote>
3331 </para>
3332 </blockquote>
3333 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3334 <para>
3335 These were <quote>free-ride[rs],</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3336 Heston said, who were <quote>depriving actors of
3337 compensation.</quote><footnote><para>
3338 <!-- f17 -->
3339 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3340 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3341 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3342 </para>
3343 </footnote>
3344 </para>
3345 <para>
3346 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3347 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3348 </para>
3349 <blockquote>
3350 <para>
3351 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3352 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3353 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3354 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. &hellip; The
3355
3356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3357 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3358 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3359 <!-- f18 -->
3360 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3361 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3362 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3363 </para></footnote>
3364 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3365 </para>
3366 </blockquote>
3367 <para>
3368 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3369 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3370 </para>
3371 <para>
3372 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3373 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they <quote>pirated.</quote>
3374 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3375 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3376 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3377 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3378 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3379 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3380 companies thus built their empire in part upon a <quote>piracy</quote> of the value
3381 created by broadcasters' content.
3382 </para>
3383 <para>
3384 <emphasis role='strong'>These separate stories</emphasis> sing a
3385 common theme. If <quote>piracy</quote> means using value from someone
3386 else's creative property without permission from that creator&mdash;as
3387 it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
3388 <!-- f19 -->
3389 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3390 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3391 Information</citetitle>, available at
3392 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. <quote>The
3393 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3394 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet.</quote>
3395 </para></footnote>
3396 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3397 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3398 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. &hellip; The list is long and
3399 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3400 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3401 </para>
3402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3403 </section>
3404 </chapter>
3405 <chapter label="5" id="piracy">
3406 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: <quote>Piracy</quote></title>
3407 <para>
3408 <emphasis role='strong'>There is piracy</emphasis> of copyrighted
3409 material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in many forms. The most
3410 significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized taking of other
3411 people's content within a commercial context. Despite the many
3412 justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
3413 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
3414 </para>
3415 <para>
3416 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of <quote>taking</quote>
3417 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3418 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3419 taking <quote>piracy,</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3420 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3421 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3422 has so often done in the past.
3423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3424 </para>
3425 <section id="piracy-i">
3426 <title>Piracy I</title>
3427 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3428 <para>
3429 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3430 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3431 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3432 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3433 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3434 <!-- f1 -->
3435 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3436 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3437 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3438 also Ben Hunt, <quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3439 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3440 </para></footnote>
3441 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3442 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3443 </para>
3444 <para>
3445 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3446 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3447 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3448 This piracy is wrong.
3449 </para>
3450 <para>
3451 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3452 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3453 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3454 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3455 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3456 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3457 of our existence, treated as right.
3458 </para>
3459 <para>
3460 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3461 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3462 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3463 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3464 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3465 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3466 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3467 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3468 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3469 </para>
3470 <para>
3471 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3472 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3473 <beginpage pagenum="77"/>
3474 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3475 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3476 similar childhood.
3477 </para>
3478 <para>
3479 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3480 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3481 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3482 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3483 <!-- f2 -->
3484 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3485 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The
3486 New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13, 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3487 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3488 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3489 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3490 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3491 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3492 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3493 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3494 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3495 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3496 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3497 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3498 TRIPS framework.
3499 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents</primary></indexterm>
3500 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3501 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3502 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3503 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3504 is wrong.
3505 </para>
3506 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3507 <para>
3508 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3509 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3510 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3511 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3512 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3513 <!-- f3 -->
3514 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3515 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3516 144&ndash;90. <quote>In some instances &hellip; the impact of piracy on the
3517 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3518 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3519 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3520 pirating were not an option.</quote> Ibid., 149.
3521 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3522 </para></footnote>
3523 </para>
3524 <para>
3525 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3526 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3527 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3528 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3529 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3530 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?</quote>
3531 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3532 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3533 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3534 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3535 piracy of the tangible.
3536 </para>
3537 <para>
3538 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3539 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3540 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3541 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3542 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3543 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3544 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3545 give people the right to <quote>take</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3546 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3547
3548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3549 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3550 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3551 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3552 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3553 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what <quote>property</quote> means.
3554 </para>
3555 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3556 <para>
3557 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3558 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese <quote>steal</quote>
3559 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3560 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3561 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3562 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3563 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3564 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3565 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3566 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3567 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3568 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3569 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3570 <indexterm>
3571 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3572 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3573 </indexterm>
3574 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3575 </para>
3576 <para>
3577 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3578 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3579 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3580 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3581 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3582 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3583 </para>
3584 <para>
3585 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3586 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3587 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3588 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3589 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3590 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3591 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3592 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3593 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3594 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3595 violating the law is still wrong.
3596 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3597 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer</primary></indexterm>
3598 <indexterm><primary>Netscape</primary></indexterm>
3599 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3600 </para>
3601 <para>
3602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3603 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3604 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3605 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3606 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3607 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3608 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3609 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3610 is flat out wrong.
3611 </para>
3612 <para>
3613 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3614 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all <quote>piracy</quote> is. Or
3615 at least, not all <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3616 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of <quote>piracy</quote> are useful
3617 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3618 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3619 <quote>piracy</quote> in that sense of the term.
3620 </para>
3621 <para>
3622 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3623 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3624 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3625 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3626 </para>
3627 <para>
3628 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3629 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3630 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3631 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3632 </para>
3633 <para>
3634 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3635 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3636 sharing to survive.
3637 </para>
3638 </section>
3639 <section id="piracy-ii">
3640 <title>Piracy II</title>
3641 <para>
3642 The key to the <quote>piracy</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that <quote>rob[s]
3643 the author of [his] profit.</quote><footnote><para>
3644 <!-- f4 -->
3645 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3646 </para></footnote>
3647 This means we must determine whether
3648 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3649 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3650 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3651 author of his profit.
3652 </para>
3653 <indexterm><primary>innovation</primary></indexterm>
3654 <para>
3655 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3656 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3657 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3658 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3659 <!-- f5 -->
3660 <indexterm><primary>innovation</primary></indexterm>
3661 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3662 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3663 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3664 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3665 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3666 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3667 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3668 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3669
3670 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3671 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3672 put together components that had been developed independently.
3673 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3674 </para>
3675 <para>
3676 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3677 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3678 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3679 system.<footnote><para>
3680 <!-- f6 -->
3681 See Carolyn Lochhead, <quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,</quote> <citetitle>San
3682 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; <quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,</quote>
3683 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, <quote>Napster Names CEO,
3684 Secures New Financing,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3685 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,</quote> <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3686 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet</quote> (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3687 </para></footnote>
3688 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3689 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3690 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3691 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3692 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3693 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3694 or your 20,000 best friends.
3695 </para>
3696 <para>
3697 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3698 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3699 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3700 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3701
3702 <!-- f7 -->
3703 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3704 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3705 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3706 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3707 </para></footnote>
3708 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3709 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3710 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3711 <!-- f8 -->
3712 Amy Harmon, <quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,</quote> <citetitle>New
3713 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3714 </para></footnote>
3715 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3716 massive quantity of content is being <quote>taken</quote> on these networks. The
3717 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3718 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3719 </para>
3720 <para>
3721 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3722 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3723 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3724 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3725 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3726 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3727 of harm it entails.
3728 </para>
3729 <para>
3730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3731 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3732 different kinds into four types.
3733 </para>
3734 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3735 <listitem><para>
3736 <!-- A. -->
3737 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3738 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3739 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3740 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3741 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3742 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3743 users who download instead of purchasing.
3744 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3745 </para></listitem>
3746 <listitem><para>
3747 <!-- B. -->
3748 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3749 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3750 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3751 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3752 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3753 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3754 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3755 music purchased.
3756 </para></listitem>
3757 <listitem><para>
3758 <!-- C. -->
3759 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3760 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3761 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3762 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3763 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3764 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3765 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend <quote>recalling</quote> old
3766 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3767 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3768 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3769 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3770 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3771 a local collector.
3772 </para></listitem>
3773 <listitem><para>
3774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3775 <!-- D. -->
3776 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3777 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3778 wants to give away.
3779 </para></listitem>
3780 </orderedlist>
3781 <para>
3782 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3783 </para>
3784 <para>
3785 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3786 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3787 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3788 harmful.<footnote><para>
3789 <!-- f9 -->
3790 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3791 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3792 </para></footnote>
3793 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3794 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3795 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3796 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3797 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3798 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3799 </para>
3800 <para>
3801 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3802 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3803 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3804 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3805 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of <quote>theft</quote> that is
3806 <quote>devastating</quote> the industry.
3807 </para>
3808 <para>
3809 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3810 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3811 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3812 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3813 &amp; Young put it, <quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3814 technology, the labels fought it.</quote><footnote><para>
3815 <!-- f10 -->
3816 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3817 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3818 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3819 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3820 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption <quote>Home taping
3821 is killing music.</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3822 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3823 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3824 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3825 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3826 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3827 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3828 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3829 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3830 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3831 regulating technology was the answer.
3832 </para>
3833 <para>
3834 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3835 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3836 turnaround. <quote>In the end,</quote> Cap Gemini concludes, <quote>the `crisis' &hellip; was
3837 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3839 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3840 innovation at the major labels.</quote><footnote><para>
3841 <!-- f11 -->
3842 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3843 </para></footnote>
3844 </para>
3845 <para>
3846 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3847 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3848 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3849 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3850 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3851 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3852 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3853 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3854 </para>
3855 <para>
3856 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3857 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3858 The <quote>net harm</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3859 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3860 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3861 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3862 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3863 them.
3864
3865 </para>
3866 <para>
3867 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3868 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3869 actually suggest it might be close.
3870 </para>
3871 <para>
3872 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3873 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3874 percent.<footnote><para>
3875 <!-- f12 -->
3876 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3877 available at
3878 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3879 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3880 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3881 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3882 #16</ulink>: <quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3883 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3884 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3885 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3886 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3887 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3888 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3889 shipments).</quote>
3890 </para></footnote>
3891 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3892 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3893 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3894 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3895 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3896 account for at least some of the loss. <quote>From 1999 to 2001, the average
3897 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19.</quote><footnote>
3898 <!-- f13 -->
3899 <para>
3900 Jane Black, <quote>Big Music's Broken Record,</quote> BusinessWeek online, 13
3901 February 2003, available at
3902 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3903 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3904 </para>
3905 </footnote>
3906 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3907 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, <quote>The
3908 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3909 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3910 $19.99.</quote><footnote><para>
3911 <!-- f14 -->
3912 Ibid.
3913 </para></footnote>
3914 </para>
3915 <para>
3916
3917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3918 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3919 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3920 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3921 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3922 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3923 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3924 </para>
3925 <para>
3926 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3927 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3928 The recording industry constantly asks, <quote>What's the difference between
3929 downloading a song and stealing a CD?</quote>&mdash;but their own numbers
3930 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3931 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3932 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3933 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3934 Kazaa <quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit</quote>&mdash;then the industry
3935 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3936 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3937 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3938 a huge difference between <quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.</quote>
3939 </para>
3940 <para>
3941 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3942 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3943 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3944 these costs?
3945 </para>
3946 <para>
3947 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3948 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3949 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3950 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3951 available.<footnote><para>
3952 <!-- f15 -->
3953 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3954 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3955 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3956 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3957 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3958 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3959 </para></footnote>
3960 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3961 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3962 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3963 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3964 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3965 </para>
3966 <indexterm>
3967 <primary>books</primary>
3968 <secondary>resales of</secondary>
3969 </indexterm>
3970 <para>
3971 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3973 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3974 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3975 today.<footnote><para>
3976 <!-- f16 -->
3977 <indexterm>
3978 <primary>books</primary>
3979 <secondary>resales of</secondary>
3980 </indexterm>
3981 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores
3982 in existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the
3983 United States, an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter
3984 Press, <citetitle>The Quiet Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book
3985 Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3986 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used
3987 records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See National
3988 Association of Recording Merchandisers, <quote>2002 Annual Survey
3989 Results,</quote> available at
3990 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3991 </para></footnote>
3992 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3993 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3994 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3995 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3996 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3997 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3998 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3999 the content they sell.
4000 </para>
4001 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
4002 <indexterm>
4003 <primary>books</primary>
4004 <secondary>out of print</secondary>
4005 </indexterm>
4006 <para>
4007 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
4008 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
4009 the content available isn't making money from making the content
4010 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
4011 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
4012 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's <quote>Two Love Songs,</quote>
4013 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
4014 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
4015 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
4016 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
4017 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
4018 </para>
4019 <para>
4020 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
4021 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
4022 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
4023 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
4024 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
4025 shut as well?
4026 </para>
4027 <indexterm id='idxbooksfreeonline1' class='startofrange'>
4028 <primary>books</primary>
4029 <secondary>free on-line releases of</secondary>
4030 </indexterm>
4031 <para>
4032 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
4033 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
4034 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
4035 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
4036 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
4037 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
4038
4039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
4040 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
4041 would be a great advertisement for the <quote>real</quote> book. People would read
4042 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
4043 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4044 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4045 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4046 great book!)
4047 </para>
4048 <indexterm startref='idxbooksfreeonline1' class='endofrange'/>
4049 <para>
4050 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4051 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4052 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4053 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4054 </para>
4055 <para>
4056 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4057 understandably says, <quote>This is how much we've lost,</quote> we must also ask,
4058 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4059 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4060 unavailable?</quote>
4061 </para>
4062 <para>
4063 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4064 chapter, much of the <quote>piracy</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4065 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4066 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
4067 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4068 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4069 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4070 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4071 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4072 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4073 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4074 found only with time.
4075 </para>
4076 <para>
4077 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4078 just what you call type A sharing?</quote>
4079 </para>
4080 <para>
4081 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4082 effect
4083 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4084 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4085 Napster
4086 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4087 developed
4088 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
4089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4090 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
4091 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4092 <quote>down to zero.</quote><footnote><para>
4093 <!-- f17 -->
4094 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
4095 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
4096 MHP, available at
4097
4098 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
4099 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4100 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
4101 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
4102 </para></footnote>
4103 </para>
4104 <para>
4105 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4106 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4107 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
4108 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
4109 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
4110 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4111 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4112 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4113 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4114 </para>
4115 <para>
4116 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4117 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4118 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4119 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4120 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4121 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4122 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4123 </para>
4124 <indexterm>
4125 <primary>artists</primary>
4126 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
4127 </indexterm>
4128 <para>
4129 So, as we've seen, when <quote>mechanical reproduction</quote> threatened the
4130 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4131 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4132 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4133 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4134 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4135 complained to Congress that their <quote>creative property</quote> was not being
4136 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4137 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4138 benefit was enough.
4139 </para>
4140 <para>
4141 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4142 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4143 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4144 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4145 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4146 price.
4147 </para>
4148 <para>
4149
4150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4151 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4152 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
4153 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4154 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4155 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4156 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4157 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4158 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4159 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4160 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4161 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4162 Congress chose a path that would assure
4163 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
4164 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4165 </para>
4166 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
4167 <para>
4168 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4169 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4170 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4171 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4172 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4173 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4174 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4175 <quote>record</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4176 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4177 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4178 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4179 </para>
4180 <para>
4181 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4182 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4183 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4184 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4185 machine to copy only if there were a special <quote>copy me</quote> signal on the
4186 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4187 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4188 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4190 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4191 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4192 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4193 for the architecture it chose.
4194 </para>
4195 <para>
4196 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4197 champion. Valenti called VCRs <quote>tapeworms.</quote> He warned, <quote>When there are
4198 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4199 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4200 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4201 copyright.</quote><footnote><para>
4202 <!-- f18 -->
4203 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4204 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4205 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4206 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4207 </para></footnote>
4208 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4209 creative judgment,</quote> he told Congress, <quote>to understand the devastation
4210 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4211 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4212 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4213 and plain common sense.</quote><footnote><para>
4214 <!-- f19 -->
4215 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4216 </para></footnote>
4217 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4218 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4219 <!-- f20 -->
4220 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4221 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4222 </para></footnote>
4223 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not <quote>fair.</quote> By
4224 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4225 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4226 copyrightowners,</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would <quote>take from the
4227 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4228 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4229 profit from its reproduction.</quote><footnote><para>
4230 <!-- f21 -->
4231 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4232 of Jack Valenti).
4233 </para></footnote>
4234 </para>
4235 <para>
4236 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4237 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4238 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4239 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the <quote>Hollywood
4240 Circuit</quote>&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4241 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4242 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4243 called <quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry</quote> (worse
4244 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4245 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4246 technology.<footnote><para>
4247 <!-- f22 -->
4248 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4249 1981).
4250 </para></footnote>
4251 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex</primary></indexterm>
4252 </para>
4253 <para>
4254 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4255
4256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4257 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4258 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4259 Court wrote,
4260 </para>
4261 <blockquote>
4262 <para>
4263 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4264 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4265 market
4266 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4267 authority
4268 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4269 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4270 implicated
4271 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4272 <!-- f23 -->
4273 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4274 </para></footnote>
4275 </para>
4276 </blockquote>
4277 <para>
4278 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4279 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4280 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4281 enough, this <quote>taking</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4282 together, a pattern is clear:
4283 </para>
4284
4285 <informaltable id="t1">
4286 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4287 <thead>
4288 <row>
4289 <entry>CASE</entry>
4290 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS <quote>PIRATED</quote></entry>
4291 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4292 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4293 </row>
4294 </thead>
4295 <tbody>
4296 <row>
4297 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4298 <entry>Composers</entry>
4299 <entry>No protection</entry>
4300 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4301 </row>
4302 <row>
4303 <entry>Radio</entry>
4304 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4305 <entry>N/A</entry>
4306 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4307 </row>
4308 <row>
4309 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4310 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4311 <entry>No protection</entry>
4312 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4313 </row>
4314 <row>
4315 <entry>VCR</entry>
4316 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4317 <entry>No protection</entry>
4318 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4319 </row>
4320 </tbody>
4321 </tgroup>
4322 </informaltable>
4323
4324 <para>
4325 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4326 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4327 <!-- f24 -->
4328 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4329 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4330 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4331 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4332 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4333 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4334 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4335 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4336 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, <quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,</quote>
4337 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4338 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
4339 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4340 </para></footnote>
4341 In each case, throughout our history,
4342 that change meant that someone got a <quote>free ride</quote> on someone else's
4343 work.
4344 </para>
4345 <para>
4346 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4347 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4348 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4349 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4350 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of <quote>piracy.</quote>
4351 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4352 the behavior of the <quote>pirates.</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4353 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4354 interests at stake.
4355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4356 </para>
4357 <para>
4358 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4359 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4360 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4361 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4362 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4363 regulated?
4364 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4365 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4366 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4367 permission to record a song?
4368 </para>
4369 <para>
4370 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4371 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4372 copyright <quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4373 over all possible uses of his work.</quote><footnote><para>
4374 <!-- f25 -->
4375 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4376 (1984).
4377 </para></footnote>
4378 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4379 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4380 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4381 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4382 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4383 facilitate the distribution of content.
4384 </para>
4385 <para>
4386 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4387 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4388 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4389 should not become a tool for <quote>stealing</quote> from artists. But neither
4390 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4391 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4392 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4393 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4394 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4395 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4396 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4397 public interest that innovation continue.
4398 </para>
4399 <para>
4400
4401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4402 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4403 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4404 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4405 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4406 efficient. Yet these <quote>potential public benefits,</quote> as John Schwartz
4407 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, <quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4408 fight.</quote><footnote><para>
4409 <!-- f26 -->
4410 John Schwartz, <quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4411 Echoes Past Efforts,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4412 </para></footnote>
4413 </para>
4414 <para>
4415 <emphasis role='strong'>Yet when anyone</emphasis> begins to talk
4416 about <quote>balance,</quote> the copyright warriors raise a different
4417 argument. <quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4418 incentives,</quote> they say, <quote>misses a fundamental point. Our
4419 content,</quote> the warriors insist, <quote>is our
4420 <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we wait for Congress to
4421 `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4422 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4423 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether
4424 the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?</quote>
4425 </para>
4426 <para>
4427 <quote>It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>,</quote> the warriors
4428 insist. <quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4429 is protected.</quote>
4430 </para>
4431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4432 </section>
4433 </chapter>
4434 </part>
4435 <part id="c-property">
4436 <title><quote>PROPERTY</quote></title>
4437 <partintro>
4438 <para>
4439
4440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4441 <emphasis role='strong'>The copyright warriors</emphasis> are right: A
4442 copyright is a kind of property. It can be owned and sold, and the law
4443 protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to
4444 hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand
4445 that partially determine the price she can get.
4446 </para>
4447 <para>
4448 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a <quote>property</quote> right is a
4449 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4450 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4451 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4452 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4453 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4454 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4455 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4456 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4457 then?
4458 </para>
4459 <para>
4460 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4461 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4463 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4464 narrow
4465 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4466 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4467 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4468 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4469 when I copy the way someone else dresses), <quote>He who receives an idea
4470 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4471 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.</quote><footnote><para>
4472 <!-- f1 -->
4473 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4474 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4475 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4476 </para></footnote>
4477 </para>
4478 <para>
4479 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4480 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4481 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4482 expression
4483 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4484 property.
4485 </para>
4486 <para>
4487 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4488 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4489 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4490 <quote>property</quote> in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4491 <!-- f2 -->
4492 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4493 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4494 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4495 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4496 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4497 Adam Mossoff, <quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,</quote>
4498 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4499 </para></footnote>
4500 </para>
4501 <para>
4502 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4503 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4504 <quote>copyright material is property</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4505 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4506 these stories, the significance of this true
4507 statement&mdash;<quote>copyright material is property</quote>&mdash; will be a bit
4508 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4509 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4510 </para>
4511 </partintro>
4512
4513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4514 <chapter label="6" id="founders">
4515 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4516 <indexterm><primary>Henry V</primary></indexterm>
4517 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
4518 <indexterm id='idxbooksenglishlaw' class='startofrange'>
4519 <primary>books</primary>
4520 <secondary>English copyright law developed for</secondary>
4521 </indexterm>
4522 <para>
4523 <emphasis role='strong'>William Shakespeare</emphasis> wrote
4524 <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play was first
4525 published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that Shakespeare had
4526 written. He would continue to write plays through 1613, and the plays
4527 that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American culture ever
4528 since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer seeped
4529 into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source. I
4530 once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of
4531 Henry V: <quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of
4532 clichés.</quote>
4533 </para>
4534 <para>
4535 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4536 <quote>copy-right</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4537 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4538 <!-- f1 -->
4539 <indexterm><primary>Jonson, Ben</primary></indexterm>
4540 <indexterm><primary>Dryden, John</primary></indexterm>
4541 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4542 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4543 handsome <quote>definitive editions</quote> of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4544 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4545 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4546 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, <quote>Jacob Tonson,
4547 Bookseller,</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4548 </para></footnote>
4549 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4550 the Conger<footnote><para>
4551 <!-- f2 -->
4552 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4553 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4554 </para></footnote>
4555 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4556 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the <quote>copy</quote> of
4557 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4558 that no
4559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4560 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4561 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4562 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4563 </para>
4564 <indexterm id='idxbritishparliament' class='startofrange'>
4565 <primary>British Parliament</primary>
4566 </indexterm>
4567 <para>
4568 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4569 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4570 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4571 adopted the first <quote>copyright</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4572 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4573 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4574 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4575 additional years.<footnote><para>
4576 <!-- f3 -->
4577 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4578 <quote>copyright law.</quote> See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4579 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4580 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4581 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4582 Tonson's control in 1774?
4583 </para>
4584 <para>
4585 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a <quote>copyright</quote>
4586 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4587 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4588 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4589 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4590 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4591 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4592 that the publishers, or <quote>Stationers,</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4593 books.
4594 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4595 </para>
4596 <para>
4597 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4598 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4599 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4600 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4601 from legislatures <quote>positive law.</quote> We call the words from judges
4602 <quote>common law.</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4603 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4604 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4605 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4606 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4607 </para>
4608 <para>
4609 This question was important to the publishers, or <quote>booksellers,</quote> as
4610 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4611 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4612 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4613
4614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4615 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4616 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4617 ultimately
4618 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4619 </para>
4620 <para>
4621 The Statute of Anne granted the author or <quote>proprietor</quote> of a book an
4622 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4623 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4624 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4625 copyright <quote>expired,</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4626 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4627 believed.
4628 </para>
4629 <para>
4630 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4631 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4632 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4633 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4634 </para>
4635 <para>
4636 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4637 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4638 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4639 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4640 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4641 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4642 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4643 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4644 reason is there to allow someone else to <quote>steal</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4645 </para>
4646 <para>
4647 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4648 about the notion of <quote>copyright</quote> that existed at the time of the
4649 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4650 <quote>booksellers.</quote>
4651 </para>
4652 <para>
4653 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4654 to apply the concept of <quote>copyright</quote> ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4655 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4656 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4657 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the <quote>copy-right</quote> was a right
4658 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4659 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4660 generally how
4661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4662 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4663 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4664 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4665 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4666 </para>
4667 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
4668 <para>
4669 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4670 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4671 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4672 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4673 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4674 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4675 allowed to make his films. The <quote>copy-right</quote> was only an exclusive
4676 right to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4677 </para>
4678 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England</primary></indexterm>
4679 <indexterm><primary>Statute of Monopolies (1656)</primary></indexterm>
4680 <para>
4681 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4682 They had had a long and ugly experience with <quote>exclusive rights,</quote>
4683 especially <quote>exclusive rights</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4684 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4685 monopolies&mdash;especially monopolies for works that already
4686 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4687 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4688 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the
4689 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4690 inventions. And by 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4691 monopoly in publishing.
4692 </para>
4693 <para>
4694 Thus the <quote>copy-right,</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4695 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4696 claim that <quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,</quote> try
4697 sounding convincing when uttering, <quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4698 have it forever.</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4699 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4700 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4701 </para>
4702 <indexterm id='idxbooksellers' class='startofrange'>
4703 <primary>booksellers, English</primary>
4704 </indexterm>
4705 <para>
4706 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4707 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4708 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4709 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4711
4712 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4713 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4714 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4715 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as <quote>old patentees
4716 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling</quote>; they were <quote>men who do
4717 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4718 indetted.</quote><footnote><para>
4719
4720 <!-- f4 -->
4721 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4722 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4723 </para></footnote>
4724 </para>
4725 <para>
4726 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4727 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4728 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4729 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4730 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4731 with that idea.
4732 </para>
4733 <para>
4734 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4735 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4736 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4737 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4738 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4739 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4740 compromise
4741 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4742 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4743 construction and spread of culture.
4744 </para>
4745 <para>
4746 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4747 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4748 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4749 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4750 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4751 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4752 they said; they needed more time.
4753 </para>
4754 <para>
4755 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4756 words that echo today,
4757 </para>
4758 <blockquote>
4759 <para>
4760 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4761 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4763 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4764 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4765 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4766 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4767 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4768 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4769 <!-- f5 -->
4770 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4771 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4772 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4773 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4774 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4775 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4776 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4777 </para></footnote>
4778 </para>
4779 </blockquote>
4780 <para>
4781 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4782 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4783 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4784 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4785 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4786 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4787 creative <quote>property</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4788 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4789 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4790 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4791 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4792 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4793 way to protect authors.
4794 </para>
4795 <para>
4796 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4797 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4798 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4799 <quote>The publishers &hellip; had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4800 rancher has for cattle.</quote><footnote><para>
4801 <!-- f6 -->
4802 Lyman Ray Patterson, <quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4803 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4804 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4805 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4806 </para></footnote>
4807 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4808 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4809 </para>
4810 <para>
4811 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4812 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4813 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4814 <!-- f7 -->
4815 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4816 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4817 </para></footnote>
4818 </para>
4819 <para>
4820 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4821 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4822 reprints <quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,</quote> at least
4823 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4824 <!-- f8 -->
4825 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4826 1993), 92.
4827 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
4828 </para></footnote>
4829 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4831 and became <quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4832 them,</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was <quote>the young James Boswell
4833 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4834 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.</quote><footnote><para>
4835 <!-- f9 -->
4836 Ibid., 93.
4837 </para></footnote>
4838 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James</primary></indexterm>
4839 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4840 </para>
4841 <para>
4842 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4843 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4844 inexpensive editions <quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4845 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4846 Property.</quote><footnote><para>
4847 <!-- f10 -->
4848 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4849 Borwell).
4850 </para></footnote>
4851 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4852 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4853 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4854 </para>
4855 <para>
4856 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block <quote>piracy</quote> like
4857 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the <quote>pirates,</quote>
4858 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4859 </para>
4860 <indexterm><primary>Taylor, Robert</primary></indexterm>
4861 <para>
4862 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4863 Thomson's poem <quote>The Seasons.</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4864 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4865 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4866 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4867 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4868 <!-- f11 -->
4869 Howard B. Abrams, <quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4870 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4871 (1983): 1152.
4872 </para></footnote>
4873 </para>
4874 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4875 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4876 </indexterm>
4877 <para>
4878 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4879 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4880 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4881 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4882 law would protect the author against subsequent <quote>pirates.</quote>
4883 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4884 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4885 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4886 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4887 </para>
4888 <para>
4889 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4890 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4891 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4892 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4893 with in 1710: How best to limit
4894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4895 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4896 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4897 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4898 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4899 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4900 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4901 </para>
4902 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4903 <para>
4904 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4905 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4906 </para>
4907 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4908 <para>
4909 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4910 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4911 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4912 <!-- f12 -->
4913 Ibid., 1156.
4914 </para></footnote>
4915 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4916 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4917 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4918 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4919 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4920 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4921 </para>
4922 <para>
4923 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4924 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4925 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4926 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4927 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4928 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4929 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4930 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4931 </para>
4932 <para>
4933 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4934 presented to the House and voted upon first by the <quote>law lords,</quote>
4935 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4936 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4937 House of Lords generally voted.
4938 </para>
4939 <para>
4940 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4941 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4943 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4944 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4945 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4946 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4947 passed into the public domain.
4948 </para>
4949 <para>
4950 <quote>The public domain.</quote> Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4951 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4952 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4953 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4954 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4955 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4956 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4957 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4958 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4959 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4960 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4961 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4962 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4963 </para>
4964 <para>
4965 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4966 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4967 where most of the <quote>pirate publishers</quote> did their work, people
4968 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4969 reported, <quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4970 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4971 decision of which so many individuals were interested.</quote> <quote>Great
4972 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4973 and illuminations.</quote><footnote><para>
4974 <!-- f13 -->
4975 Rose, 97.
4976 </para></footnote>
4977 </para>
4978 <para>
4979 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4980 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4981 reported:
4982 </para>
4983 <blockquote>
4984 <para>
4985 By the above decision &hellip; near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4986 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4987 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4988 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4989 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4990 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4991 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4992 successors.<footnote><para>
4993 <!-- f14 -->
4994 Ibid.
4995 </para></footnote>
4996 </para>
4997 </blockquote>
4998 <para>
4999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
5000 <quote>Ruined</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
5001 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
5002 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
5003 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
5004 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
5005 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
5006 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
5007 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
5008 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
5009 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
5010 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
5011 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
5012 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
5013 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
5014 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
5015 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
5016 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
5017 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
5018 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
5019 </para>
5020 <indexterm startref='idxbooksellers' class='endofrange'/>
5021 <para>
5022 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
5023 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
5024 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
5025 protected.
5026 </para>
5027 <indexterm startref='idxbritishparliament' class='endofrange'/>
5028 <indexterm startref='idxbooksenglishlaw' class='endofrange'/>
5029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
5030 </chapter>
5031 <chapter label="7" id="recorders">
5032 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
5033 <para>
5034 <emphasis role='strong'>Jon Else</emphasis> is a filmmaker. He is best
5035 known for his documentaries and has been very successful in spreading
5036 his art. He is also a teacher, and as a teacher myself, I envy the
5037 loyalty and admiration that his students feel for him. (I met, by
5038 accident, two of his students at a dinner party. He was their god.)
5039 </para>
5040 <para>
5041 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
5042 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
5043 today.
5044 </para>
5045 <para>
5046 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
5047 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
5048 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
5049 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
5050 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
5051 stage.
5052 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
5053 </para>
5054 <para>
5055 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
5056 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
5057 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
5058 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
5059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5060 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5061 about the scene.
5062 </para>
5063 <para>
5064 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5065 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
5066 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5067 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5068 unless <quote>fair use</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5069 </para>
5070 <para>
5071 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5072 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5073 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5074 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5075 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5076 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
5077 </para>
5078 <para>
5079 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5080 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5081 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5082 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5083 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5084 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
5085 </para>
5086 <para>
5087 Then, as Else told me, <quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5088 &hellip; that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
5089 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.</quote>
5090 And second, Fox <quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5091 to use this four-point-five seconds of &hellip; entirely unsolicited
5092 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.</quote>
5093 </para>
5094 <indexterm><primary>Herrera, Rebecca</primary></indexterm>
5095 <para>
5096 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5097 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5098 explained to her, <quote>There must be some mistake here. &hellip; We're
5099 asking for your educational rate on this.</quote> That was the educational
5100 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5101 confirm what he had been told.
5102 </para>
5103 <para>
5104 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,</quote> he told me. <quote>Yes, you
5105 have your facts straight,</quote> she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
5106 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5107 about
5108
5109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5110 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, <quote>And
5111 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.</quote> As an assistant
5112 to Herrera told Else later on, <quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5113 the money.</quote>
5114 </para>
5115 <para>
5116 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5117 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5118 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5119 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5120 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5121 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5122 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
5123 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
5124 </para>
5125 <para>
5126 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5127 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5128 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5129 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5130 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5131 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5132 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5133 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5134 says the owner gets to control.
5135 </para>
5136 <para>
5137 For example, <quote>public performance</quote> is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
5138 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5139 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see <quote>My
5140 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>,</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5141 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5142 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
5143 by the law.
5144 </para>
5145 <para>
5146 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5147 thought is <quote>fair use.</quote><footnote><para>
5148 <!-- f1 -->
5149 For an excellent argument that such use is <quote>fair use,</quote> but that
5150 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is <quote>fair use,</quote> see Richard
5151 A. Posner with William F. Patry, <quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5152 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5153 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5154 </para></footnote>
5155 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5156 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
5157 not require the permission of anyone.
5158 </para>
5159 <para>
5160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5161 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon <quote>fair use.</quote> Here's his reply:
5162 </para>
5163 <blockquote>
5164 <para>
5165 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5166 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5167 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5168 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was <quote>clearly
5169 fair use</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5170 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5171 </para>
5172 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5173 <listitem><para>
5174 <!-- 1. -->
5175 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5176 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5177 <quote>visual cue sheet</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5178 shot in the film. They take a dim view of <quote>fair use,</quote> and a claim of
5179 <quote>fair use</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5180 </para></listitem>
5181 <listitem>
5182 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle></primary></indexterm>
5183 <para>
5184 <!-- 2. -->
5185 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5186 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5187 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
5188 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5189 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5190 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5191 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5192 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5193 principle.
5194 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
5195 </para></listitem>
5196 <listitem><para>
5197 <!-- 3. -->
5198 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5199 School &hellip; who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5200 that Fox would <quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5201 life,</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5202 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5203 pockets, me or them.
5204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5205 </para></listitem>
5206 <listitem><para>
5207 <!-- 4. -->
5208 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5209 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5210 money.
5211 </para></listitem>
5212 </orderedlist>
5213 </blockquote>
5214 <para>
5215 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5216 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5217 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5218 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5219 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5220 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5221 </para>
5222 <para>
5223 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5224 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5225 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5226 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5227 not.
5228 </para>
5229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5230 </chapter>
5231 <chapter label="8" id="transformers">
5232 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5233 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5234 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'>
5235 <primary>Alben, Alex</primary>
5236 </indexterm>
5237 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft</primary></indexterm>
5238 <para>
5239 <emphasis role='strong'>In 1993</emphasis>, Alex Alben was a lawyer
5240 working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave was an innovative company founded
5241 by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop digital
5242 entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave began
5243 investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
5244 anticipation of the power of networks.
5245 </para>
5246 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'>
5247 <primary>artists</primary>
5248 <secondary>retrospective compilations on</secondary>
5249 </indexterm>
5250 <para>
5251 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5252 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5253 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5254 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5255 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5256 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5257 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5258 important to his career.
5259 </para>
5260 <para>
5261 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5262 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5263 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5264 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5265 </para>
5266 <para>
5267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5268 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5269 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5270 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5271 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5272 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5273 </para>
5274 <para>
5275 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. <quote>Our
5276 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5277 Eastwood's films,</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5278 arose. <quote>No one had ever really done this before,</quote> Alben explained. <quote>No
5279 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5280 actor's career.</quote>
5281 </para>
5282 <para>
5283 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5284 Slade asked, <quote>Well, what will it take?</quote>
5285 </para>
5286 <para>
5287 Alben replied, <quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5288 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5289 else that we want to use in these film clips.</quote> Slade said, <quote>Great! Go
5290 for it.</quote><footnote>
5291 <para>
5292 <!-- f1 -->
5293 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5294 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5295 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden <quote>Rip, Mix,
5296 Burn</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5297 <indexterm>
5298 <primary>artists</primary>
5299 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5300 </indexterm>
5301 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5302 </para></footnote>
5303 </para>
5304 <para>
5305 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5306 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5307 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5308 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5309 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5310 </para>
5311 <para>
5312 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5313 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5314 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5315 </para>
5316 <blockquote>
5317 <para>
5318 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5319 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5320 course we were going to use the <quote>Make my day</quote> clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5321 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5322 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5323 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5324 </para>
5325 <para>
5326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5327 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5328 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5329 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5330 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5331 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5332 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5333 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5334 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5335 started calling people.
5336 </para>
5337 </blockquote>
5338 <indexterm><primary>Sutherland, Donald</primary></indexterm>
5339 <para>
5340 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5341 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5342 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5343 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5344 know, $1,200?</quote> And they would say, <quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5345 to get $1,200.</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5346 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5347 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5348 career.
5349 </para>
5350 <para>
5351 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;<quote>and even then we
5352 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.</quote>
5353 </para>
5354 <para>
5355 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5356 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5357 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5358 </para>
5359 <blockquote>
5360 <para>
5361 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5362 hands and said, <quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5363 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5364 actors.</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5365 constituent parts and said, <quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5366 directors, &hellip; this many musicians,</quote> and we just went at it very
5367 systematically and cleared the rights.
5368 </para>
5369 </blockquote>
5370 <para>
5371
5372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5373 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5374 loved it, and it sold very well.
5375 </para>
5376 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5377 <para>
5378 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5379 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5380 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, <quote>There is
5381 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5382 at all.</quote><footnote><para>
5383 <!-- f2 -->
5384 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5385 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5386 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5387 </para></footnote>
5388 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5389 has to be made?
5390 </para>
5391 <para>
5392 For, as he acknowledged, <quote>very few &hellip; have the time and resources,
5393 and the will to do this,</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5394 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5395 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5396 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5397 </para>
5398 <blockquote>
5399 <para>
5400 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5401 he or she gets paid very well. &hellip; And then when 30 seconds of
5402 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5403 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person &hellip; should be
5404 compensated for that.
5405 </para>
5406 </blockquote>
5407 <para>
5408 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5409 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5410 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5411 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5412 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5413 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5414 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5415 made to be more clean?
5416 </para>
5417 <blockquote>
5418 <para>
5419 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5420 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5421 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5422 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5424 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5425 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5426 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5427 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5428 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5429 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5430 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5431 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5432 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, <quote>Oh, I
5433 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5434 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5435 money,</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5436 </para>
5437 </blockquote>
5438 <para>
5439 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5440 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5441 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5442 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5443 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5444 </para>
5445 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'/>
5446 <para>
5447 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5448 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5449 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5450 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5451 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5452 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5453 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5454 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5455 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5456 <quote>Does this still make sense?</quote>
5457 </para>
5458 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'/>
5459 <para>
5460 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5461 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5462 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5463 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5464
5465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5466 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5467 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5468 </para>
5469 <para>
5470 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5471 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5472 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5473 judges loved every minute of it.
5474 </para>
5475 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5476 <para>
5477 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5478 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5479 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5480 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5481 began his talk with a question: <quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5482 were just violated in this room?</quote>
5483 </para>
5484 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5485 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5486 <para>
5487 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5488 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5489 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5490 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5491 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5492 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5493 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5494 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5495 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5496 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5497 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5498 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5499 couldn't easily do them legally.
5500 </para>
5501 <para>
5502 We live in a <quote>cut and paste</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5503 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5504 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5505 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5506 planted in your presentation.
5507 </para>
5508 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5509 <para>
5510 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5512 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5513 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5514 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5515 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5516 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5517 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5518 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5519 </para>
5520 <para>
5521 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5522 wanted to be <quote>legal,</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5523 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5524 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5525 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5526 </para>
5527 <para>
5528 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5529 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5530 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5531 necessarily requiring that the <quote>free</quote> use be free as in <quote>free beer.</quote>
5532 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5533 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5534 along: a rule, for example, that says <quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5535 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5536 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5537 copyright owner.</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5538 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5539 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5540 registers the work.
5541 </para>
5542 <para>
5543 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5544 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5545 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5546 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5547 </para>
5548 <para>
5549 <emphasis role='strong'>In February 2003</emphasis>, DreamWorks
5550 studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers, the comic genius of
5551 <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5553 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5554 would work together to form a <quote>unique filmmaking pact.</quote> Under the
5555 agreement, DreamWorks <quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5556 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5557 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5558 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5559 entertainment.</quote>
5560 </para>
5561 <para>
5562 The announcement called this <quote>film sampling.</quote> As Myers explained,
5563 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5564 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5565 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5566 to take that same concept and apply it to film.</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5567 quoted as saying, <quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5568 new audiences, it is Mike.</quote>
5569 </para>
5570 <para>
5571 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5572 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5573 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5574 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5575 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5576 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5577 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5578 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5579 </para>
5580 <para>
5581 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5582 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of <quote>fair use.</quote>
5583 Much of <quote>sampling</quote> should be considered <quote>fair use.</quote> But few would
5584 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5585 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5586 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5587 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5588 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5589 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5590 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5591 curse, reserved for the few.
5592 </para>
5593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5594 </chapter>
5595 <chapter label="9" id="collectors">
5596 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5597 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'>
5598 <primary>archives, digital</primary>
5599 </indexterm>
5600 <indexterm><primary>bots</primary></indexterm>
5601 <para>
5602 <emphasis role='strong'>In April 1996</emphasis>, millions of
5603 <quote>bots</quote>&mdash;computer codes designed to
5604 <quote>spider,</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy
5605 content&mdash;began running across the Net. Page by page, these bots
5606 copied Internet-based information onto a small set of computers
5607 located in a basement in San Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots
5608 finished the whole of the Internet, they started again. Over and over
5609 again, once every two months, these bits of code took copies of the
5610 Internet and stored them.
5611 </para>
5612 <para>
5613 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5614 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5615 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5616 the world. Using a technology called <quote>the Way Back Machine,</quote> you could
5617 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5618 well as when those pages changed.
5619 </para>
5620 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'>
5621 <primary>Orwell, George</primary>
5622 </indexterm>
5623 <para>
5624 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5625 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5626 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5627 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5628 reports.
5629 </para>
5630 <para>
5631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5632 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5633 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5634 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5635 </para>
5636 <para>
5637 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5638 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5639 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5640 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5641 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5642 </para>
5643 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'/>
5644 <para>
5645 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5646 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5647 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5648 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5649 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5650 <!-- f1 -->
5651 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war</primary></indexterm>
5652 <indexterm><primary>White House press releases</primary></indexterm>
5653 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5654 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5655 press release stated, <quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.</quote> That was
5656 later changed, without notice, to <quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5657 Have Ended.</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5658 </para></footnote>
5659 </para>
5660 <indexterm><primary>history, records of</primary></indexterm>
5661 <para>
5662 <emphasis role='strong'>We take it</emphasis> for granted that we can
5663 go back to see what we remember reading. Think about newspapers. If
5664 you wanted to study the reaction of your hometown newspaper to the
5665 race riots in Watts in 1965, or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963,
5666 you could go to your public library and look at the newspapers. Those
5667 papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in
5668 paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back and
5669 remember&mdash;not just what it is convenient to remember, but
5670 remember something close to the truth.
5671 </para>
5672 <para>
5673 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5674 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5675 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5676 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5677 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5678 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5679 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5680 </para>
5681 <para>
5682 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5683 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5684 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5685 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5686 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5687 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5688 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5689 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5690 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5691 </para>
5692 <para>
5693 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5694 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5695 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5696 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5697 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5698 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5699 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5700 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5701 </para>
5702 <indexterm><primary>Vanderbilt University</primary></indexterm>
5703 <para>
5704 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5705 human history. At the end of 2002, it held <quote>two hundred and thirty
5706 terabytes of material</quote>&mdash;and was <quote>ten times larger than the
5707 Library of Congress.</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5708 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5709 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5710 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5711 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5712 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5713 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5714 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5715 is available to scholars for a very low fee. <quote>But other than that,
5716 [television] is almost unavailable,</quote> Kahle told me. <quote>If you were
5717 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5718 just a graduate student?</quote> As Kahle put it,
5719 </para>
5720 <blockquote>
5721 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan</primary></indexterm>
5722 <para>
5723 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5724 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5725 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5726 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5727 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5728
5729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5730 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it &hellip; it would be almost
5731 impossible. &hellip; Those materials are almost unfindable. &hellip;
5732 </para>
5733 </blockquote>
5734 <para>
5735 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5736 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5737 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5738 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5739 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5740 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5741 </para>
5742 <para>
5743 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5744 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5745 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5746 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5747 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5748 work.
5749 </para>
5750 <para>
5751 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5752 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5753 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5754 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5755 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and <quote>borrowed
5756 back.</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5757 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5758 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5759 <!-- f2 -->
5760 Doug Herrick, <quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5761 the Library of Congress,</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5762 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5763 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5764 Co., 1992), 36.
5765 </para></footnote>
5766 </para>
5767 <para>
5768 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5769 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5770 broadcasts, so there was no fear of <quote>theft.</quote> But as technology enabled
5771 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5772 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5773 <quote>copyrighted.</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5774 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5775 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5776 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5777 </para>
5778 <para>
5779 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5781 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5782 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5783 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5784 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5785 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5786 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5787 events of that day.
5788 </para>
5789 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5790 <indexterm>
5791 <primary>archive.org</primary>
5792 <seealso>Internet Archive</seealso>
5793 </indexterm>
5794 <para>
5795 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5796 archive of film includes close to 45,000 <quote>ephemeral films</quote> (meaning
5797 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5798 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5799 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5800 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5801 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5802 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5803 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5804 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5805 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5806 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5807 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the <quote>Duck and Cover</quote> film
5808 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5809 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5810 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5811 </para>
5812 <para>
5813 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5814 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5815 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5816 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5817 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5818 to find them.
5819 </para>
5820 <para>
5821 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5822 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5823 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5824 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5825 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5826 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5827 </para>
5828 <para>
5829 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5830 of creative property goes through different <quote>lives.</quote> In its first
5831 life, if the
5832
5833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5834 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5835 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5836 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5837 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5838 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5839 </para>
5840 <para>
5841 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5842 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5843 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5844 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5845 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5846 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5847 longer sold.
5848 </para>
5849 <indexterm>
5850 <primary>books</primary>
5851 <secondary>out of print</secondary>
5852 </indexterm>
5853 <para>
5854 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5855 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5856 <!-- f3 -->
5857 <indexterm>
5858 <primary>books</primary>
5859 <secondary>out of print</secondary>
5860 </indexterm>
5861 Dave Barns, <quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5862 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5863 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5864 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5865 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5866 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5867 </para></footnote>). After
5868 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5869 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5870 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5871 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5872 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5873 </para>
5874 <para>
5875 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5876 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5877 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5878 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5879 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5880 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5881 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5882 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5883 disappears.
5884 </para>
5885 <para>
5886 <emphasis role='strong'>For most of</emphasis> the twentieth century,
5887 it was economics that made this so. It would have been insanely
5888 expensive to collect and make accessible all television and film and
5889 music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily high. So even
5890 though the law in principle would have restricted the ability of a
5891 Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5893 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5894 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5895 little practical effect.
5896 </para>
5897 <para>
5898 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5899 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5900 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5901 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5902 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5903 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5904 </para>
5905 <para>
5906 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5907 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5908 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5909 Kahle describes,
5910 </para>
5911 <blockquote>
5912 <indexterm>
5913 <primary>books</primary>
5914 <secondary>total number of</secondary>
5915 </indexterm>
5916 <para>
5917 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5918 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5919 movies, &hellip; and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5920 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5921 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5922 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5923 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5924 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5925 &hellip; thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5926 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5927 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5928 </para>
5929 </blockquote>
5930 <para>
5931 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5932 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5933 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5934 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5935 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5936 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5937 will draw upon it to understand it;
5938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5939 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5940 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5941 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5942 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5943 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5944 </para>
5945 <para>
5946 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5947 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5948 call these <quote>archives,</quote> as warm as the idea of a <quote>library</quote> might seem,
5949 the <quote>content</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5950 someone's <quote>property.</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5951 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5952 </para>
5953 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'/>
5954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5955 </chapter>
5956 <chapter label="10" id="property-i">
5957 <title>CHAPTER TEN: <quote>Property</quote></title>
5958 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5959 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
5960 <para>
5961 <emphasis role='strong'>Jack Valenti</emphasis> has been the president
5962 of the Motion Picture Association of America since 1966. He first came
5963 to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
5964 administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of Johnson's
5965 swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of President
5966 Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty years of
5967 running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps the most
5968 prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5969 </para>
5970 <para>
5971 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5972 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5973 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5974 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5975 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5976 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5977 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5978 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5979 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5980 Warner Brothers.
5981 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5982 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5983 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5984 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5985 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5986 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5987 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5988 </para>
5989 <para>
5990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5991 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5992 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5993 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5994 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5995 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5996 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5997 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5998 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5999 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
6000 Washingtonian way.
6001 </para>
6002 <para>
6003 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
6004 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
6005 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
6006 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
6007 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
6008 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
6009 redefine the meaning of <quote>creative property.</quote>
6010 </para>
6011 <para>
6012 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
6013 perfectly:
6014 </para>
6015 <blockquote>
6016 <para>
6017 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
6018 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
6019 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
6020 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
6021 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
6022 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
6023 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
6024 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
6025 <!-- f1 -->
6026 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
6027 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
6028 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
6029 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
6030 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
6031 Valenti).
6032 </para></footnote>
6033 </para>
6034 </blockquote>
6035 <para>
6036 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
6037 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
6038 <quote>central theme</quote> to which <quote>reasonable men and women</quote> will return is
6039 this:
6040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
6041 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
6042 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.</quote>
6043 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
6044 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
6045 </para>
6046 <para>
6047 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
6048 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
6049 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
6050 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
6051 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
6052 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
6053 it comes to the nature and scope of <quote>creative property.</quote> His views
6054 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
6055 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
6056 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
6057 </para>
6058 <para>
6059 While <quote>creative property</quote> is certainly <quote>property</quote> in a nerdy and
6060 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
6061 <!-- f2 -->
6062 Lawyers speak of <quote>property</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
6063 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
6064 object. Thus, my <quote>property right</quote> to my car gives me the right to
6065 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
6066 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of <quote>property</quote> to
6067 <quote>lawyer talk,</quote> see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
6068 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
6069 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
6070 <quote>creative property owners</quote> have been <quote>accorded the same rights and
6071 protection resident in all other property owners.</quote> Indeed, if creative
6072 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
6073 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
6074 in our tradition.
6075 </para>
6076 <para>
6077 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
6078 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6079 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6080 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
6081 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6082 culture would develop.
6083 </para>
6084 <para>
6085 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6086 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
6087 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6088 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
6089 differently from the rights resident in all other property
6090 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
6091 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
6092 the same would be to
6093
6094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6095 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6096 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6097 perfect control.
6098 </para>
6099 <para>
6100 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6101 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6102 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6103 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6104 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6105 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6106 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old.
6107 </para>
6108 <para>
6109 <emphasis role='strong'>To get</emphasis> just a hint that there is
6110 something fundamentally wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no
6111 further than the United States Constitution itself.
6112 </para>
6113 <para>
6114 The framers of our Constitution loved <quote>property.</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6115 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6116 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
6117 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6118 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's <quote>Takings
6119 Clause,</quote> to pay you <quote>just compensation</quote> for that taking. The
6120 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6121 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
6122 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6123 </para>
6124 <para>
6125 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6126 Valenti calls <quote>creative property.</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6127 power to create <quote>creative property,</quote> the Constitution
6128 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a <quote>limited time,</quote> Congress
6129 take back the rights that it has granted and set the <quote>creative
6130 property</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6131 the expiration of a copyright term <quote>takes</quote> your copyright and turns it
6132 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6133 pay <quote>just compensation</quote> for this <quote>taking.</quote> Instead, the same
6134 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6136 requires that you lose your <quote>creative property</quote> right without any
6137 compensation at all.
6138 </para>
6139 <para>
6140 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6141 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6142 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6143 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6144 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6145 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6146 itself.
6147 </para>
6148 <para>
6149 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6150 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6151 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6152 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6153 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6154 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
6155 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6156 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6157 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6158 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6159 </para>
6160 <para>
6161 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6162 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6163 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6164 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6165 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6166 domain?
6167 </para>
6168 <para>
6169 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6170 history of these <quote>creative property</quote> rights, and the control that they
6171 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6172 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6173 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
6174 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6175 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6176 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6177 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6178 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6179 also control how culture develops.
6180 </para>
6181 <para>
6182
6183 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6184 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6185 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6186 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6187 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6188 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6189 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6190 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6191 </para>
6192 <figure id="fig-1331">
6193 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6194 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6195 </figure>
6196 <para>
6197 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6198 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6199 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6200 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6201 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6202 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6203 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6204 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6205 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6206 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6207 Web, you can be punished
6208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6209 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6210 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6211 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
6212 </para>
6213 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6214 <para>
6215 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6216 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6217 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6218 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6219 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6220 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6221 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6222 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6223 the source of the enforcement.
6224 </para>
6225 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6226 <para>
6227 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6228 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6229 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6230 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6231 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6232 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6233 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6234 individual or group might behave.
6235 </para>
6236 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6237 <para>
6238 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6239 <quote>architecture</quote>&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
6240 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6241 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6242 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6243 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6244 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6245 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6246 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6247 theft, but by nature, by <quote>architecture.</quote> If a 500-pound boulder
6248 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6249 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6250 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6251 </para>
6252 <para>
6253
6254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6255 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6256 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6257 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6258 undermined by another.
6259 </para>
6260 <para>
6261 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6262 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6263 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6264 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6265 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6266 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6267 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6268 </para>
6269 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6270 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6271 </indexterm>
6272 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6273 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6274 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6275 <para>
6276 So, for example, consider the <quote>freedom</quote> to drive a car at a high
6277 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6278 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6279 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6280 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6281 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6282 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6283 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6284 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6285 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6286 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6287 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6288 </para>
6289 <para>
6290 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6291 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6292 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6293 <!-- f3 -->
6294 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6295 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6296 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6297 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6298 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6299 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6300 Lawrence Lessig, <quote>The New Chicago School,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6301 June 1998.
6302 </para></footnote>
6303 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6304 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6305 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6306 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6307 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6308 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6309 used to require that other laws be more
6310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6311 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6312 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6313 driving.
6314 </para>
6315 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6316
6317 <figure id="fig-1361">
6318 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6319 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6320 </figure>
6321 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6322 <para>
6323 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6324 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6325 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6326 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6327 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6328 another.<footnote>
6329 <para>
6330 <!-- f4 -->
6331 Some people object to this way of talking about <quote>liberty.</quote> They object
6332 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6333 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6334 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6335 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6336 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6337 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6338 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6339 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6340 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6341 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6342 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a
6343 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6344 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6345 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6346 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6347 <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6348 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6349 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, <quote>The
6350 Right to Work,</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6351 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6352 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6353 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6354 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6355 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6356 12101 (2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6357 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6358 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6359 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6360 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)</primary></indexterm>
6361 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6362 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6363 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6364 </para></footnote>
6365 </para>
6366 <section id="hollywood">
6367 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6368 <para>
6369 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6370 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6371 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6372 rallying makes sense.
6373 </para>
6374 <para>
6375 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6376 Internet:
6377 </para>
6378 <figure id="fig-1371">
6379 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6380 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6381 </figure>
6382 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6383 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6384 <para>
6385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6386 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6387 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6388 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6389 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6390 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6391 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6392 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6393 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6394 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6395 this form of infringement.
6396 </para>
6397 <para>
6398 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6399 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6400 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6401 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6402 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6403 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6404 </para>
6405 <para>
6406 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6407 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6408 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6409 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6410 Iraq
6411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6412 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6413 looting that results.
6414 </para>
6415 <figure id="fig-1381">
6416 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6417 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6418 </figure>
6419 <para>
6420 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6421 warriors. Indeed, in a <quote>White Paper</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6422 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6423 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6424 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6425 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6426 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6427 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6428 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6429 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6430 </para>
6431 <indexterm><primary>steel industry</primary></indexterm>
6432 <para>
6433 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6434 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6435 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6436 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6437 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6438 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6439 life. Homeowners living in a
6440
6441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6442 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6443 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6444 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6445 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6446 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6447 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6448 </para>
6449 <para>
6450 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6451 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6452 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6453 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6454 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6455 Brown describes it, its <quote>architecture of revenue.</quote>
6456 </para>
6457 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry</primary></indexterm>
6458 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
6459 <para>
6460 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6461 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6462 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6463 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6464 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6465 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6466 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6467 <!-- f5 -->
6468 See Geoffrey Smith, <quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?</quote>
6469 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6470 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6471 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6472 R. Schoenberger, <quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?</quote> Forbes.com, 6
6473 October 2003, available at
6474 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6475 </para></footnote>
6476
6477 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6478 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6479 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6480 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6481 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6482 weakened the <quote>stickiness</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6483 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6484 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6485 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6486 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6487 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6488 </para>
6489 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid</primary></indexterm>
6490 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6491 <para>
6492 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6493 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6494 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6496 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6497 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6498 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6499 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, <quote>established companies
6500 have an interest in excluding future competitors.</quote><footnote><para>
6501 <!-- f6 -->
6502 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6503 </para></footnote>
6504 And relative to a
6505 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6506 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6507 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6508 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6509 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6510 Brezhnev.
6511 </para>
6512 <para>
6513 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6514 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6515 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6516 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6517 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6518 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6519 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6520 opportunities for innovation and change.
6521 </para>
6522 <para>
6523 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6524 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6525 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6526 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6527 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6528 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6529 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6530 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: <quote>Congress
6531 shall make no law &hellip; abridging the freedom of speech.</quote> So when
6532 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would <quote>abridge</quote> the freedom
6533 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6534 regulation is justified.
6535 </para>
6536 <para>
6537 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6538 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6539 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6540 <quote>justified.</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6541 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6542 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6543 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6544 </para>
6545 <para>
6546 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6547 </para>
6548 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6549 <primary>DDT</primary>
6550 </indexterm>
6551 <para>
6552 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6553 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6554 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6555 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6556 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6557 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6558 </para>
6559 <para>
6560 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6561 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6562 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6563 </para>
6564 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6565 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6566 <para>
6567 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6568 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6569 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6570 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6571 </para>
6572 <para>
6573 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6574 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6575 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6576 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6577 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6578 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6579 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6580 </para>
6581 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James</primary></indexterm>
6582 <para>
6583 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6584 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an <quote>environmentalism</quote> for
6585 culture.<footnote><para>
6586 <!-- f7 -->
6587 See, for example, James Boyle, <quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6588 Environmentalism for the Net?</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6589 </para></footnote>
6590 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6591 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6592 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6593 <quote>for free.</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6594 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6595 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6597 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6598 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6599 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6600 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6601 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6602 </para>
6603 <para>
6604 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6605 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6606 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6607 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6608 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6609 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6610 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6611 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6612 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6613 </para>
6614 <para>
6615 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6616 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6617 be lost.
6618 </para>
6619 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6620 </section>
6621 <section id="beginnings">
6622 <title>Beginnings</title>
6623 <para>
6624 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6625 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of <quote>creative
6626 property</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6627 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6628 </para>
6629 <para>
6630 The power to establish <quote>creative property</quote> rights is granted to
6631 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6632 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6633 </para>
6634 <para>
6635 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6636 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6637 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6638
6639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6640 We can call this the <quote>Progress Clause,</quote> for notice what this clause
6641 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6642 <quote>creative property rights.</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6643 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6644 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6645 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6646 </para>
6647 <para>
6648 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6649 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6650 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6651 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6652 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6653 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6654 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6655 copyrights extend <quote>to Authors</quote> only.
6656 </para>
6657 <para>
6658 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6659 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6660 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6661 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6662 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6663 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6664 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6665 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6666 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6667 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6668 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6669 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6670 concentrations of power.
6671 </para>
6672 <para>
6673 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call <quote>copyright</quote>
6674 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6675 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6676 <quote>copyright</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6677 years since they first struck its design.
6678 </para>
6679 <para>
6680 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6681 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6683 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6684 started here:
6685 </para>
6686 <figure id="fig-1441">
6687 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6688 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6689 </figure>
6690 <para>
6691 We will end here:
6692 </para>
6693 <figure id="fig-1442">
6694 <title><quote>Copyright</quote> today.</title>
6695 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6696 </figure>
6697 <para>
6698 Let me explain how.
6699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6700 </para>
6701 </section>
6702 <section id="lawduration">
6703 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6704 <para>
6705 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6706 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6707 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6708 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6709 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6710 authorship.<footnote>
6711 <para>
6712 <!-- f8 -->
6713 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6714 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6715 485&ndash;86: <quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6716 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6717 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis></quote>
6718 (emphasis added).
6719 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6720 </para></footnote>
6721 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6722 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6723 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6724 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6725 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6726 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6727 </para>
6728 <para>
6729 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6730 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6731 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6732 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6733 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6734 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6735 </para>
6736 <para>
6737 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6738 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6739 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6740 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6741 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6742 </para>
6743 <para>
6744 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6745 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6746 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6747 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6748 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6749 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6750 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6751 <!-- f9 -->
6752 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6753 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6754 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6755 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6756 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6757 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6758 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6759 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6760 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6761 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6762 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6763 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6764 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6765 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6766 </para>
6767 <para>
6768 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6769 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6771 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6772 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6773 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6774 copyright, either.
6775 </para>
6776 <para>
6777 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6778 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6779 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6780 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6781 domain.<footnote><para>
6782 <!-- f10 -->
6783 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6784 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6785 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6786 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, <quote>Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,</quote>
6787 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6788 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6789 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, <quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,</quote>
6790 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6791 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6792 </para>
6793 <indexterm>
6794 <primary>books</primary>
6795 <secondary>out of print</secondary>
6796 </indexterm>
6797 <indexterm>
6798 <primary>books</primary>
6799 <secondary>resales of</secondary>
6800 </indexterm>
6801 <para>
6802 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6803 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6804 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6805 <!-- f11 -->
6806 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6807 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6808 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6809 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6810 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6811 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6812 </para>
6813 <para>
6814 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6815 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6816 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6817 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6818 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6819 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6820 </para>
6821 <para>
6822 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6823 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6824 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6825 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6826 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6827 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6828 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6829 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6830 </para>
6831 <para>
6832 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6833 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6834 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6835 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6836
6837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6838 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6839 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6840 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6841 </para>
6842 <para>
6843 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6844 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6845 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6846 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6847 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6848 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6849 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6850 value.
6851 </para>
6852 <para>
6853 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6854 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6855 maximum term. For <quote>natural</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6856 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6857 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6858 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6859 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6860 was ninety-five years.
6861 </para>
6862 <para>
6863 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6864 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6865 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6866 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6867 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6868 that terms be <quote>limited,</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6869 them.
6870 </para>
6871 <para>
6872 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6873 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6874 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6875 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6876 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6877 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6878 years.<footnote><para>
6879 <!-- f12 -->
6880 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6881 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6882 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6883 Posner, <quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,</quote> loc. cit.
6884 </para></footnote>
6885 </para>
6886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6887 </section>
6888 <section id="lawscope">
6889 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6890 <para>
6891 The <quote>scope</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6892 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6893 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6894 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6895 </para>
6896 <para>
6897 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only <quote>maps,
6898 charts, and books.</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6899 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6900 the author the exclusive right to <quote>publish</quote> copyrighted works. That
6901 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6902 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6903 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6904 did not extend to what lawyers call <quote>derivative works.</quote> It would not,
6905 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6906 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6907 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6908 </para>
6909 <para>
6910 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6911 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6912 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6913 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6914 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6915 work not only the exclusive right to <quote>publish</quote> the work, but also the
6916 exclusive right of control over any <quote>copies</quote> of that work. And most
6917 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6918 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6919 <quote>derivative work</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6920 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6921 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6922 on the initial creative work.
6923 </para>
6924 <para>
6925 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6926 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6927 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6929 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6930 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6931 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6932 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6933 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6934 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6935 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6936 secured.
6937 </para>
6938 <para>
6939 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6940 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6941 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6942 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6943 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6944 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6945 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6946 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6947 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6948 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6949 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6950 original author.
6951 </para>
6952 <para>
6953 All of these <quote>formalities</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6954 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6955 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6956 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6957 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6958 copy available for others to copy.
6959 </para>
6960 <para>
6961 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6962 differences.
6963 </para>
6964 <para>
6965 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6966 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6967 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6968 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6969 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6970 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6971 <!-- f13 -->
6972 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, <quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6973 Creation of American Literature,</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6974 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6975 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6976
6977 </para></footnote>
6978 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6979 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6980 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6981 </para>
6982 <para>
6983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6984 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6985 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6986 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6987 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6988 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6989 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6990 were restrained.
6991 </para>
6992 <para>
6993 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6994 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6995 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6996 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6997 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6998 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6999 protect it.
7000 </para>
7001 <para>
7002 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
7003 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
7004 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
7005 </para>
7006 <para>
7007 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
7008 control
7009 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
7010 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of <quote>derivative
7011 rights.</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
7012 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
7013 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
7014 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
7015 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
7016 exclusive
7017 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
7018 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
7019 </para>
7020 <para>
7021 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
7022 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
7023 expansion
7024 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
7025 copyright.
7026 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
7027 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
7028 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
7029 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
7030 </para>
7031 <para>
7032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
7033 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
7034 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
7035 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
7036 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
7037 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
7038 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
7039 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
7040 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
7041 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
7042 <!-- f14 -->
7043 Jonathan Zittrain, <quote>The Copyright Cage,</quote> <citetitle>Legal
7044 Affairs</citetitle>, July/August 2003, available at
7045 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
7046 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
7047 </para></footnote>
7048 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
7049 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
7050 the wrong of direct piracy.
7051 </para>
7052 <para>
7053 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
7054 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
7055 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
7056 of my book.<footnote><para>
7057 <!-- f15 -->
7058 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
7059 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
7060 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere <quote>copies</quote> and
7061 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, <quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
7062 Copyright's Constitutionality,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
7063 Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially
7064 pp. 53&ndash;59).
7065 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb</primary></indexterm>
7066 </para></footnote>
7067 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
7068 </para>
7069 <para>
7070 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
7071 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
7072 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
7073 called <quote>Mickey Mouse,</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
7074 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
7075 created?
7076 </para>
7077 <para>
7078 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
7079 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
7080 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
7081 the rights originally granted.
7082 </para>
7083 </section>
7084 <section id="lawreach">
7085 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
7086 <para>
7087 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7088 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7089 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7090 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
7091 <!-- f16 -->
7092 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
7093 certainly regulates more than <quote>copies</quote>&mdash;a public performance of a
7094 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
7095 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
7096 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a <quote>copy</quote>; 17
7097 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
7098 existing law (which regulates <quote>copies;</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
7099 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7100 </para></footnote>
7101 </para>
7102 <para>
7103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7104 <quote>Copies.</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
7105 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
7106 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that <quote>creative
7107 property</quote> deserves the <quote>same rights</quote> as all other property, it is the
7108 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7109 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7110 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7111 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7112 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7113 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
7114 the trigger for copyright law.
7115 </para>
7116 <para>
7117 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7118 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7119 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7120 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
7121 <!-- f17 -->
7122 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7123 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7124 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7125 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7126 technology.
7127 </para></footnote>
7128 because it is clear that the
7129 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7130 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7131 </para>
7132 <para>
7133 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7134 empty circle.
7135 </para>
7136 <figure id="fig-1521">
7137 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
7138 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
7139 </figure>
7140 <indexterm id='idxbooksusetypes' class='startofrange'>
7141 <primary>books</primary>
7142 <secondary>three types of uses of</secondary>
7143 </indexterm>
7144 <para>
7145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7146 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7147 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7148 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7149 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7150 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7151 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7152 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7153 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7154 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7155 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7156 acts do not make a copy.
7157 </para>
7158 <figure id="fig-1531">
7159 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
7160 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
7161 </figure>
7162 <para>
7163 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7164 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7165 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7166 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7167 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7168 diagram on next page).
7169 </para>
7170 <para>
7171 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7172 that remain unregulated because the law considers these <quote>fair uses.</quote>
7173 </para>
7174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7175 <figure id="fig-1541">
7176 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7177 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7178 </figure>
7179 <para>
7180 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7181 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7182 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7183 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7184 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7185 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7186 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such <quote>fair uses</quote>
7187 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7188 </para>
7189 <figure id="fig-1542">
7190 <title>Unregulated copying considered <quote>fair uses.</quote></title>
7191 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7192 </figure>
7193 <para> </para>
7194 <figure id="fig-1551">
7195 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7196 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7197 </figure>
7198 <para>
7199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7200 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7201 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7202 are nonetheless deemed <quote>fair</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7203 </para>
7204 <indexterm startref='idxbooksusetypes' class='endofrange'/>
7205 <indexterm>
7206 <primary>books</primary>
7207 <secondary>on Internet</secondary>
7208 </indexterm>
7209 <para>
7210 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7211 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7212 <!-- f18 -->
7213 I don't mean <quote>nature</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7214 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7215 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7216 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7217 of copies remain.
7218 </para></footnote>
7219 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7220 digital network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses
7221 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7222 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7223 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7224 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7225 a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into category 2. And those who
7226 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7227 exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7228 shift.
7229 </para>
7230 <para>
7231 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7232 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7233 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
7234 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7235 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7236 the book once, ten times, or every
7237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7238 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7239 use&mdash;reading&mdash; could be regulated by copyright law because
7240 none of those uses produced a copy.
7241 </para>
7242 <indexterm>
7243 <primary>books</primary>
7244 <secondary>on Internet</secondary>
7245 </indexterm>
7246 <para>
7247 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7248 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7249 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
7250 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7251 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7252 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7253 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7254 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7255 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7256 copyright owner's wish.
7257 </para>
7258 <para>
7259 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7260 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7261 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7262 points also become clear:
7263 </para>
7264 <para>
7265 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7266 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7267 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7268 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7269 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7270 part of free culture before the Internet.
7271 </para>
7272 <para>
7273 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7274 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7275 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7276 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7277 using a machine. <quote>Copy and paste</quote> and <quote>cut and paste</quote> become
7278 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7279 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7280 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7281 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7282 creative work.
7283 </para>
7284 <para>
7285 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7286
7287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7288 burden on category 3 (<quote>fair use</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7289 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7290 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7291 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7292 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7293 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7294 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7295 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7296 regulated.
7297 </para>
7298 <para>
7299 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7300 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7301 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7302 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7303 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7304 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7305 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7306 enough.
7307 </para>
7308 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'>
7309 <primary>advertising</primary>
7310 </indexterm>
7311 <para>
7312 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7313 in the business of making <quote>trailer</quote> advertisements for movies available
7314 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7315 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7316 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7317 </para>
7318 <indexterm><primary>browsing</primary></indexterm>
7319 <para>
7320 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began
7321 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7322 previews. The idea was to expand their <quote>selling by sampling</quote>
7323 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7324 <quote>browsing.</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7325 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7326 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7327 </para>
7328 <para>
7329 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7330 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7331 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7332 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7334 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7335 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7336 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7337 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7338 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7339 <quote>fair use</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7340 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7341 their rights.
7342 </para>
7343 <para>
7344 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7345 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had <quote>willfully
7346 infringed</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7347 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7348 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7349 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7350 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7351 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7352 </para>
7353 <para>
7354 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7355 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7356 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7357 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7358 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7359 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7360 Disney's permission.
7361 </para>
7362 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'/>
7363 <para>
7364 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7365 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7366 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7367 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7368 was in the marketplace, the <quote>first-sale doctrine</quote> would free the
7369 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7370 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7371 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7372 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7373 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7374 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7375 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7376 </para>
7377 <indexterm><primary>Barnes &amp; Noble</primary></indexterm>
7378 <indexterm><primary>browsing</primary></indexterm>
7379 <para>
7380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7381 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7382 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7383 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7384 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7385 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7386 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7387 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7388 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7389 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7390 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7391 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7392 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7393 happening are quite slight.
7394 </para>
7395 <para>
7396 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7397 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7398 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7399 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7400 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7401 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7402 </para>
7403 </section>
7404 <section id="lawforce">
7405 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7406 <para>
7407 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7408 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7409 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7410 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7411 </para>
7412 <para>
7413 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7414 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7415 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7416 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7417 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7418 your freedom.
7419 </para>
7420 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7421 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7422 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7423 </indexterm>
7424 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7425 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7426 </indexterm>
7427 <para>
7428 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7429 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7431 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7432 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7433 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7434 plan.<footnote><para>
7435 <!-- f19 -->
7436 See David Lange, <quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7437 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7438 </para></footnote>
7439 </para>
7440 <para>
7441 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7442 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers <quote>were brothers long before
7443 you were.</quote><footnote><para>
7444 <!-- f20 -->
7445 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7446 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7447 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7448 </para></footnote>
7449 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7450 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7451 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7452 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7453 </para>
7454 <para>
7455 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7456 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7457 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7458 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7459 </para>
7460 <indexterm id='idxbooksoninternet' class='startofrange'>
7461 <primary>books</primary>
7462 <secondary>on Internet</secondary>
7463 </indexterm>
7464 <para>
7465 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7466 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7467 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7468 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7469 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7470 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7471 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7472 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7473 </para>
7474 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7475 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7476
7477 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7478 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7479 </indexterm>
7480 <para>
7481 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7482 </para>
7483 <para>
7484 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7485 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7486 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7487 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7488 technology.
7489 </para>
7490 <para>
7491 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7492 Reader.
7493 </para>
7494 <para>
7495 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7496 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7497 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7498 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7499 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7500 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7501 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7502 copy of
7503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7504 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7505 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7506 </para>
7507 <figure id="fig-1611">
7508 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7509 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7510 </figure>
7511 <para>
7512 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7513 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7514 </para>
7515 <figure id="fig-1612">
7516 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7517 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7518 </figure>
7519 <para>
7520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7521 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7522 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7523 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7524 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7525 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7526 read aloud through the computer.
7527 </para>
7528 <para>
7529 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7530 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7531 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7532 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7533 </para>
7534 <figure id="fig-1621">
7535 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s <quote>Politics</quote></title>
7536 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7537 </figure>
7538 <para>
7539 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7540 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7541 the book.
7542 </para>
7543 <figure id="fig-1622">
7544 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s <quote>Politics</quote>.</title>
7545 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7546 </figure>
7547 <para>
7548 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7549 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7550 Ideas</citetitle>:
7551 </para>
7552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7553 <figure id="fig-1631">
7554 <title>List of the permissions for <quote>The Future of Ideas</quote>.</title>
7555 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7556 </figure>
7557 <para>
7558 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7559 </para>
7560 <para>
7561 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7562 <quote>permissions</quote>&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7563 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7564 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7565 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7566 power.<footnote><para>
7567 <!-- f21 -->
7568 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7569 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7570 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7571 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7572 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7573 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7574 subsequently acquired the book.
7575 </para></footnote>
7576 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7577 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7578 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7579 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7580 control that the law would enable.
7581 </para>
7582 <para>
7583 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7584 within which the e-book <quote>lives.</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7585 permissions, they are not the sort of <quote>permissions</quote> that most of us
7586 deal with. When a teenager gets <quote>permission</quote> to stay out till
7587 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7588 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7589 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7590 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7591 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7592 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7593 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7594 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7595 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7596 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7597 won't read aloud.
7598 </para>
7599 <para>
7600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7601 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7602 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7603 you tried to type <quote>Warner Brothers,</quote> erased <quote>Brothers</quote> from the
7604 sentence.
7605 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7606 </para>
7607 <para>
7608 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7609 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7610 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7611 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7612 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7613 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7614 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7615 </para>
7616 <para>
7617 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7618 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7619 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7620 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7621 to defeat these protections as well?
7622 </para>
7623 <para>
7624 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7625 eBook Reader.
7626 </para>
7627 <para>
7628 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7629 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7630 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7631 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7632 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7633 following report:
7634 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7635 </para>
7636 <figure id="fig-1641">
7637 <title>List of the permissions for <quote>Alice's Adventures in
7638 Wonderland</quote>.</title>
7639 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7640 </figure>
7641 <beginpage pagenum="164"/>
7642 <para>
7643 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7644 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7645 <quote>permissions</quote> indicated, not allowed to <quote>read aloud</quote>!
7646 </para>
7647 <para>
7648 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7649 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7650 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7651 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7652 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7653 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7654 </para>
7655 <para>
7656 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7657 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7658 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7659 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7660 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7661 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7662 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7663 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7664 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7665 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7666 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7667 </para>
7668 <para>
7669 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7670 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7671 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7672 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7673 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7674 often crazy.
7675 </para>
7676 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7677 <indexterm startref='idxbooksoninternet' class='endofrange'/>
7678 <para>
7679 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7680 story of mine that makes the same point.
7681 </para>
7682 <indexterm id="idxaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7683 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7684 </indexterm>
7685 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'>
7686 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7687 </indexterm>
7688 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7689 <primary>Sony</primary>
7690 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7691 </indexterm>
7692 <para>
7693 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named <quote>Aibo.</quote> The Aibo
7694 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7695 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7696 </para>
7697 <para>
7698 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7699 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7700 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7701 <beginpage pagenum="165"/>
7702 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7703 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7704 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7705 </para>
7706 <para>
7707 <quote>Teach</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7708 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7709 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7710 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7711 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7712 their computer <quote>dog</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7713 </para>
7714 <indexterm><primary>hacks</primary></indexterm>
7715 <para>
7716 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7717 <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7718 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7719 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7720 them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much more positive
7721 term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7722 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7723 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7724 old computer doesn't run, or <quote>drive,</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7725 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7726 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7727 you just bought.
7728 </para>
7729 <para>
7730 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7731 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7732 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7733 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7734 ethically.
7735 </para>
7736 <para>
7737 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7738 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7739 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7740 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7741 than Sony had built.
7742 </para>
7743 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7744 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'/>
7745 <indexterm startref="idxaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7746 <para>
7747 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7748 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7749 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7750 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7751 the
7752
7753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7754 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7755 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7756 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7757 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7758 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7759 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7760 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7761 </para>
7762 <para>
7763 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7764 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7765 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7766 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7767 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7768 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7769 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7770 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7771 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7772 </para>
7773 <para>
7774 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7775 <!-- f22 -->
7776 See Pamela Samuelson, <quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,</quote>
7777 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, <quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7778 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7779 January 2002; <quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7780 DMCA,</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7781 Holland, <quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,</quote> <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7782 May 2001; Janelle Brown, <quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?</quote> Salon.com,
7783 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, <quote>Frequently Asked
7784 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case,</quote> available at
7785 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7786 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7787 </para></footnote>
7788 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7789 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7790 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7791 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7792 </para>
7793 <para>
7794 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7795 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7796 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7797 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7798 <quote>this music cannot be copied,</quote> and have a computer respect that
7799 command. The technology was to be part of a <quote>trusted system</quote> of
7800 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7801 Internet much more.
7802 </para>
7803 <para>
7804 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7805 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7806 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7807 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7808 </para>
7809 <para>
7810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7811 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7812 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7813 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7814 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7815 </para>
7816 <para>
7817 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7818 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7819 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7820 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7821 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7822 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7823 </para>
7824 <para>
7825 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7826 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7827 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7828 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7829 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7830 constituted, succeed.
7831 </para>
7832 <indexterm id="idxaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7833 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7834 </indexterm>
7835 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'>
7836 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7837 </indexterm>
7838 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7839 <primary>Sony</primary>
7840 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7841 </indexterm>
7842 <para>
7843 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7844 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7845 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7846 wrote:
7847 </para>
7848 <blockquote>
7849 <para>
7850 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7851 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7852 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7853 </para>
7854 </blockquote>
7855 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7856 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'/>
7857 <indexterm startref="idxaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7858 <para>
7859 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7860 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7861 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7862 </para>
7863 <blockquote>
7864 <para>
7865 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7867 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7868 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7869 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (<quote>DMCA</quote>).
7870 </para>
7871 </blockquote>
7872 <para>
7873 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7874 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7875 spreading such information an offense.
7876 </para>
7877 <para>
7878 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7879 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7880 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7881 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7882 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7883 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7884 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7885 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7886 protection for copyright owners.
7887 </para>
7888 <para>
7889 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7890 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7891 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7892 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7893 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7894 </para>
7895 <para>
7896 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7897 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7898 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7899 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7900 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7901 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7902 have been a copyright violation.
7903 </para>
7904 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7905 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7906 <indexterm>
7907 <primary>Sony</primary>
7908 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7909 </indexterm>
7910 <para>
7911 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7912 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7913 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7914 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7915 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7916 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7917 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7919 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7920 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7921 </para>
7922 <para>
7923 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7924 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7925 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7926 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7927 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7928 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7929 </para>
7930 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7931 <para>
7932 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7933 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7934 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7935 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7936 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7937 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka <quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>,</quote>
7938 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7939 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7940 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7941 </para>
7942 <blockquote>
7943 <para>
7944 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7945 <quote>Neighborhood</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7946 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7947 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7948 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7949 <quote>Neighborhood</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the <quote>Neighborhood</quote>
7950 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7951 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7952 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7953 broadcasting has always been <quote>You are an important person just the way
7954 you are. You can make healthy decisions.</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7955 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7956 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7957 important.<footnote><para>
7958 <!-- f23 -->
7959 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7960 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7961 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7962 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7963 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7964 </para></footnote>
7965 </para>
7966 </blockquote>
7967 <para>
7968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7969 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7970 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7971 the VCR responsible.
7972 </para>
7973 <para>
7974 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7975 the DMCA.
7976 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7977 </para>
7978 <para>
7979 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7980 </para>
7981 <para>
7982 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7983 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7984 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7985 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7986 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7987 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7988 </para>
7989 <indexterm id='idxhandguns' class='startofrange'>
7990 <primary>handguns</primary>
7991 </indexterm>
7992 <para>
7993 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7995 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7996 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7997 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7998 and bad uses.
7999 </para>
8000 <figure id="fig-1711">
8001 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
8002 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
8003 </figure>
8004 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
8005 <para>
8006 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
8007 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
8008 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
8009 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
8010 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
8011 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
8012 </para>
8013 <indexterm startref='idxhandguns' class='endofrange'/>
8014 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
8015 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
8016 <indexterm>
8017 <primary>Sony</primary>
8018 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
8019 </indexterm>
8020 <para>
8021 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
8022 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
8023 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
8024 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
8025 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
8026 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
8027 </para>
8028 <para>
8029 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
8030 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
8031 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
8032 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
8033 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
8034 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
8035 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
8036 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
8037 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
8038 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
8039 </para>
8040 <para>
8041 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
8042 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
8043 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
8044 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
8045 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
8046 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
8047 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
8048 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
8049 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
8050 </para>
8051 <para>
8052
8053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
8054 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
8055 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
8056 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
8057 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
8058 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
8059 <!-- f24 -->
8060 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, <quote>Legal Fictions,
8061 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
8062 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
8063 </para></footnote>
8064 </para>
8065 <para>
8066 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
8067 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
8068 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
8069 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
8070 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
8071 </para>
8072 <indexterm><primary>bots</primary></indexterm>
8073 <para>
8074 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
8075 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
8076 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
8077 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
8078 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
8079 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
8080 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
8081 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
8082 </para>
8083 <para>
8084 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
8085 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
8086 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
8087 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
8088 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
8089 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
8090 </para>
8091 </section>
8092 <section id="marketconcentration">
8093 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
8094 <para>
8095 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
8096 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
8097 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
8098 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
8099 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
8100 find better ways
8101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
8102 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
8103 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
8104 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
8105 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
8106 market for creative work, has become the single most important
8107 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
8108 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
8109 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
8110 control.
8111 </para>
8112 <para>
8113 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8114 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8115 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8116 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8117 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8118 </para>
8119 <para>
8120 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8121 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8122 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8123 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8124 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8125 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8126 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8127 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8128 of the media.
8129 </para>
8130 <para>
8131 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8132 nature.
8133 </para>
8134 <para>
8135 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8136 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8137 ownership, <quote>five companies control 85 percent of our media sources.</quote><footnote><para>
8138 <!-- f25 -->
8139 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8140 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
8141 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
8142 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8143 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
8144 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
8145 <!-- f26 -->
8146 Lynette Holloway, <quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8147 Slide,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
8148 </para></footnote>
8149 The <quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8150 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.</quote><footnote><para>
8151 <!-- f27 -->
8152 Molly Ivins, <quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
8153 31 May 2003.
8154 </para></footnote>
8155 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
8156 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
8157 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
8158 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
8159 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group</primary></indexterm>
8160 </para>
8161 <para>
8162 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8163 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8165 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
8166 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8167 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
8168 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
8169 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
8170 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8171 </para>
8172 <para>
8173 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8174 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8175 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8176 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8177 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
8178 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
8179 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8180 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8181 protected&mdash; by the market.
8182 </para>
8183 <para>
8184 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8185 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8186 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8187 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
8188 </para>
8189 <blockquote>
8190 <para>
8191 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8192 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
8193 &hellip; Fox TV shows &hellip; Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8194 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8195 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8196 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8197 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8198 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8199 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8200 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
8201 <!-- f28 -->
8202 James Fallows, <quote>The Age of Murdoch,</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
8203 2003): 89.
8204 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
8205 </para></footnote>
8206 </para>
8207 </blockquote>
8208 <para>
8209 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8210 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8211 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8212 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8213 </para>
8214 <figure id="fig-1761">
8215 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
8216 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
8217 </figure>
8218 <para>
8219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8220 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8221 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8222 distribute content?
8223 </para>
8224 <para>
8225 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8226 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8227 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8228 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8229 </para>
8230 <para>
8231 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8232 integration may matter.
8233 </para>
8234 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8235 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8236 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8237 <para>
8238 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
8239 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8240 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8241 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8242 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8243 </para>
8244 <para>
8245 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8246 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8247 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8248 control.<footnote><para>
8249 <!-- f29 -->
8250 Leonard Hill, <quote>The Axis of Access,</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8251 Forum, <quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,</quote> St. Louis,
8252 Missouri, 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8253 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8254 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8255 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8256 </para></footnote>
8257 </para>
8258 <para>
8259
8260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8261 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8262 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8263 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8264 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
8265 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8266 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was <quote>independent</quote> of the
8267 networks.
8268 </para>
8269 <para>
8270 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8271 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
8272 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8273 2002, only five independent television studios remained. <quote>In 1992,
8274 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8275 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8276 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent.</quote> <quote>In 1992, 16
8277 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8278 year there was one.</quote><footnote><para>
8279 <!-- f30 -->
8280 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8281 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
8282 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8283 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8284 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8285 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8286 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
8287 2003.
8288 </para></footnote>
8289 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8290 that ran it. <quote>In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
8291 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8292 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8293 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8294 63%.</quote><footnote><para>
8295 <!-- f31 -->
8296 Ibid.
8297 </para></footnote>
8298 </para>
8299 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8300 <para>
8301 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
8302 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8303 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8304 owned by the network.
8305 </para>
8306 <para>
8307 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8308 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8309 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8310 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
8311 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
8312 </para>
8313 <blockquote>
8314 <para>
8315 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8316 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8317 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8318 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8320 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8321 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8322 handful.<footnote><para>
8323 <!-- f32 -->
8324 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
8325 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8326 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8327 </para></footnote>
8328 </para>
8329 </blockquote>
8330 <para>
8331 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8332 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8333 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8334 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8335 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8336 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8337 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8338 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8339 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8340 democracy.
8341 </para>
8342 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8343 <para>
8344 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8345 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the <quote>Innovator's
8346 Dilemma</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8347 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8348 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8349 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8350 <!-- f33 -->
8351 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8352 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8353 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8354 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8355 Kim B. Clark, <quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8356 Concepts in Technological Evolution,</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8357 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8358 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8359 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8360 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8361
8362 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8363 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8364 sprinting.
8365 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8366 </para>
8367 <para>
8368 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8369 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8370 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8371 measure.
8372 </para>
8373 <para>
8374 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8375 suggest the concern.
8376 </para>
8377 <para>
8378 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8379 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8380 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8381 </para>
8382 <para>
8383 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8384 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8385 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8386
8387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8388 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8389 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8390 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8391 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8392 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8393 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8394 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8395 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8396 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8397 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8398 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8399 outweigh these costs.
8400 </para>
8401 <para>
8402 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8403 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8404 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8405 these issues.
8406 </para>
8407 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'>
8408 <primary>advertising</primary>
8409 </indexterm>
8410 <para>
8411 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8412 a media campaign as part of the <quote>war on drugs.</quote> The campaign produced
8413 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8414 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8415 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8416 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8417 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8418 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8419 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8420 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8421 </para>
8422 <para>
8423 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8424 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8425 </para>
8426 <para>
8427 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8428 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8429 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8430 war. Can you do it?
8431 </para>
8432 <para>
8433 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8435 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8436 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8437 message will be heard then?
8438 </para>
8439 <para>
8440 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8441 <quote>controversial</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8442 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8443 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8444 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8445 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8446 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8447 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8448 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8449 <!-- f34 -->
8450 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8451 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8452 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as <quote>against
8453 [their] policy.</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8454 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8455 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8456 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8457 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8458 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, <quote>On the Issue of
8459 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,</quote> <citetitle>New
8460 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8461 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8462 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, <quote>Ad
8463 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8464 Radio,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8465 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8466 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8467 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8468 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8469 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8470 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, <quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8471 After Muni Rejects Ad,</quote> SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8472 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8473 was that the criticism was <quote>too controversial.</quote>
8474 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8475 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8476 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8477 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8478 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8479 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8480 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
8481 </para></footnote>
8482 </para>
8483 <para>
8484 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8485 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8486 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8487 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8488 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8489 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8490 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8491 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8492 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8493 </para>
8494 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'/>
8495 </section>
8496 <section id="together">
8497 <title>Together</title>
8498 <para>
8499 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8500 copyright warriors that the government should <quote>protect my property.</quote>
8501 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8502 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8503 </para>
8504 <para>
8505 But when we see how dramatically this <quote>property</quote> has changed&mdash;
8506 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8507 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8508 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8509 to seem
8510
8511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8512 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8513 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8514 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8515 the massively expanded <quote>property</quote> rights granted by copyright
8516 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8517 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8518 be redefined.
8519 </para>
8520 <para>
8521 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8522 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8523 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8524 our culture today.
8525 </para>
8526 <para>
8527 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8528 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8529 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8530 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8531 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8532 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8533 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8534 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8535 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8536 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8537 </para>
8538 <para>
8539 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8540 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8541 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8542 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8543 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8544 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8545 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8546 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8547 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8548 in control that technology and the market enable.
8549 </para>
8550 <para>
8551 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8552 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8554 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8555 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8556 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8557 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8558 </para>
8559 <para>
8560 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8561 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8562 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8563 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8564 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8565 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8566 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8567 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8568 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8569 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8570 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8571 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8572 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8573 known.<footnote><para>
8574 <!-- f35 -->
8575 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his <quote>four surrenders</quote> of
8576 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8577 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8578 </para></footnote>
8579 </para>
8580 <para>
8581 <emphasis role='strong'>This has been</emphasis> a long chapter. Its
8582 point can now be briefly stated.
8583 </para>
8584 <para>
8585 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8586 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8587 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8588 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8589 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8590 </para>
8591
8592 <informaltable id="t2">
8593 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8594 <thead>
8595 <row>
8596 <entry></entry>
8597 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8598 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8599 </row>
8600 </thead>
8601 <tbody>
8602 <row>
8603 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8604 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8605 <entry>Free</entry>
8606 </row>
8607 <row>
8608 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8609 <entry>Free</entry>
8610 <entry>Free</entry>
8611 </row>
8612 </tbody>
8613 </tgroup>
8614 </informaltable>
8615
8616 <para>
8617 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8618 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8619 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8620
8621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8622 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8623 noncommercial work was also free.
8624 </para>
8625 <para>
8626 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8627 </para>
8628
8629 <informaltable id="t3">
8630 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8631 <thead>
8632 <row>
8633 <entry></entry>
8634 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8635 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8636 </row>
8637 </thead>
8638 <tbody>
8639 <row>
8640 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8641 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8642 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8643 </row>
8644 <row>
8645 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8646 <entry>Free</entry>
8647 <entry>Free</entry>
8648 </row>
8649 </tbody>
8650 </tgroup>
8651 </informaltable>
8652
8653 <para>
8654 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8655 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8656 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8657 transformation were still essentially free.
8658 </para>
8659 <para>
8660 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8661 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8662 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8663 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8664 we could say the law began to look like this:
8665 </para>
8666
8667 <informaltable id="t4">
8668 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8669 <thead>
8670 <row>
8671 <entry></entry>
8672 <entry>COPY</entry>
8673 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8674 </row>
8675 </thead>
8676 <tbody>
8677 <row>
8678 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8679 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8680 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8681 </row>
8682 <row>
8683 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8684 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8685 <entry>Free</entry>
8686 </row>
8687 </tbody>
8688 </tgroup>
8689 </informaltable>
8690
8691 <para>
8692 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8693 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8694 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8695 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8696 that the law now looks like this:
8697 </para>
8698
8699 <informaltable id="t5">
8700 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8701 <thead>
8702 <row>
8703 <entry></entry>
8704 <entry>COPY</entry>
8705 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8706 </row>
8707 </thead>
8708 <tbody>
8709 <row>
8710 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8711 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8712 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8713 </row>
8714 <row>
8715 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8716 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8717 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8718 </row>
8719 </tbody>
8720 </tgroup>
8721 </informaltable>
8722
8723 <para>
8724 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8725 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8726 creativity&mdash;
8727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8728 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8729 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8730 </para>
8731 <para>
8732 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8733 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8734 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8735 these domains actually does any good.
8736 </para>
8737 <para>
8738 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8739 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8740 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8741 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8742 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8743 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8744 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8745 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8746 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8747 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8748 </para>
8749 <para>
8750 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8751 course copyright is a kind of <quote>property,</quote> and of course, as with any
8752 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8753 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8754 property rights<footnote><para>
8755 <!-- f36 -->
8756 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8757 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8758 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, <quote>The
8759 Disintegration of Property,</quote> in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8760 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8761 Press, 1980).
8762 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement</primary></indexterm>
8763 </para></footnote>)
8764 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8765 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8766 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8767 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the <quote>copyright</quote>
8768 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8769 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8770 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8771 vibrant and rich free culture.
8772 </para>
8773 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital</primary></indexterm>
8774 <para>
8775 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8776 limits on the scope of the interests protected by <quote>property.</quote> The very
8777 birth of <quote>copyright</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8778 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8779 story of chapter 6). The tradition of <quote>fair use</quote> is animated by a
8780 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8781 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8782 chapter 7). Adding
8783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8784 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8785 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8786 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8787 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8788 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8789 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8790 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8791 dominates the debate today.
8792 </para>
8793 <para>
8794 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8795 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8796 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8797 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8798 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8799 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8800 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8801 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8802 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8803 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8804 lawyer.
8805 </para>
8806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8807 </section>
8808 </chapter>
8809 </part>
8810 <part id="c-puzzles">
8811 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8812
8813 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8814 <chapter label="11" id="chimera">
8815 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8816 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8817 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8818 </indexterm>
8819 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8820 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8821 </indexterm>
8822 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8823 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The</quote> (Wells)</primary>
8824 </indexterm>
8825
8826 <para>
8827 <emphasis role='strong'>In a well-known</emphasis> short story by
8828 H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez trips (literally, down an
8829 ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in the Peruvian
8830 Andes.<footnote><para>
8831 <!-- f1. -->
8832 H. G. Wells, <quote>The Country of the Blind</quote> (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8833 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8834 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8835 </para></footnote>
8836 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with <quote>sweet water, pasture,
8837 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8838 that bore an excellent fruit.</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8839 takes this as an opportunity. <quote>In the Country of the Blind,</quote> he tells
8840 himself, <quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8841 villagers to explore life as a king.
8842 </para>
8843 <para>
8844 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8845 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8846 <quote>blind.</quote> They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8847 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8848 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8849 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. <quote>`You
8850 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8851 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8852 alone!'</quote>
8853 </para>
8854 <para>
8855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8856 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8857 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8858 affection, a young woman who to him seems <quote>the most beautiful thing in
8859 the whole of creation,</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8860 description of what he sees <quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8861 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8862 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8863 indulgence.</quote> <quote>She did not believe,</quote> Wells tells us, and <quote>she could
8864 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.</quote>
8865 </para>
8866 <para>
8867 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his <quote>mysteriously delighted</quote>
8868 love, the father and the village object. <quote>You see, my dear,</quote> her
8869 father instructs, <quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8870 anything right.</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8871 </para>
8872 <para>
8873 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. <quote>His brain
8874 is affected,</quote> he reports.
8875 </para>
8876 <para>
8877 <quote>What affects it?</quote> the father asks. <quote>Those queer things that are
8878 called the eyes &hellip; are diseased &hellip; in such a way as to affect
8879 his brain.</quote>
8880 </para>
8881 <para>
8882 The doctor continues: <quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8883 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8884 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8885 irritant bodies [the eyes].</quote>
8886 </para>
8887 <para>
8888 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8889 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8890 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8891 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8892 </para>
8893 <para>
8894 <emphasis role='strong'>It sometimes</emphasis> happens that the eggs
8895 of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
8896 <quote>chimera.</quote> A chimera is a single creature with two sets
8897 of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be different from the
8898 DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8899
8900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8901 plot for murder mysteries. <quote>But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8902 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8903 scene. &hellip;</quote>
8904 </para>
8905 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8906 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8907 <para>
8908 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8909 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8910 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8911 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8912 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8913 understanding of a <quote>person</quote> should reflect this reality.
8914 </para>
8915 <para>
8916 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8917 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8918 unfairly enough, <quote>the copyright wars,</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8919 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question <quote>What is
8920 p2p file sharing?</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8921 wrong. One side says, <quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8922 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8923 thirty years without any question at all.</quote> That's true, at least in
8924 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8925 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8926 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8927 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8928 </para>
8929 <para>
8930 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8931 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8932 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8933 <quote>friends</quote> beyond recognition to say <quote>my ten thousand best friends</quote> can
8934 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8935 what <quote>we have always been allowed to do,</quote> we have not always been
8936 allowed to share music with <quote>our ten thousand best friends.</quote>
8937 </para>
8938 <para>
8939 Likewise, when the other side says, <quote>File sharing is just like walking
8940 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8941 with it,</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8942 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8943 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8944 from Tower.
8945 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8946 </para>
8947 <para>
8948
8949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8950 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8951 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8952 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8953 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8954 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8955 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8956 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8957 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8958 </para>
8959 <para>
8960 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8961 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8962 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8963 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8964 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8965 </para>
8966 <para>
8967 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8968 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8969 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8970 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8971 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8972 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8973 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8974 implemented.<footnote><para>
8975 <!-- f2. -->
8976 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by</primary></indexterm>
8977 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8978 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8979 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> 27 June 2003,
8980 available at
8981 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8982 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8983 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8984 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8985 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, <quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8986 Stakes on Piracy,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8987 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8988 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8989 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8990 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8991 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8992 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8993 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8994 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8995 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8996 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8997 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8998 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8999 Elizabeth Young, <quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,</quote> redandblack.com,
9000 August 2003, available at
9001 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
9002 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
9003 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
9004 identities, see James Collins, <quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
9005 Name Students,</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
9006 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
9007 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.</primary></indexterm>
9008 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9009 </para></footnote>
9010
9011 </para>
9012 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
9013 <para>
9014 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
9015 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
9016 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
9017 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
9018 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
9019 </para>
9020 <para>
9021 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
9022 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
9023 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
9024 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
9025 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
9026 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
9027 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
9028 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
9029 </para>
9030 <para>
9031
9032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
9033 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
9034 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
9035 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
9036 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
9037 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
9038 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
9039 </para>
9040 <para>
9041 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to <quote>steal</quote> music. My
9042 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
9043 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
9044 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
9045 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
9046 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
9047 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
9048 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
9049 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
9050 protection for copyrighted material,
9051 </para>
9052 <blockquote>
9053 <para>
9054 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
9055 material, and we want to protect those rights.
9056 </para>
9057 <para>
9058 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
9059 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
9060 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
9061 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
9062 produce a totally different industry model.
9063 </para>
9064 <para>
9065 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
9066 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
9067 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
9068 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
9069 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
9070 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
9071 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
9072 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
9073 interests.<footnote><para>
9074 <!-- f3. -->
9075 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
9076 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
9077 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
9078 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
9079 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
9080 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
9081 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
9082 </para>
9083 </blockquote>
9084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
9085 <para>
9086 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
9087 one of <quote>the major labels.</quote> Its position on these matters has now
9088 changed.
9089 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
9090 </para>
9091 <para>
9092 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
9093 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
9094 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
9095 </para>
9096
9097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
9098 </chapter>
9099 <chapter label="12" id="harms">
9100 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
9101 <para>
9102 <emphasis role='strong'>To fight</emphasis> <quote>piracy,</quote> to
9103 protect <quote>property,</quote> the content industry has launched a
9104 war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
9105 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both
9106 direct and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these
9107 damages will be suffered most by our own people.
9108 </para>
9109 <para>
9110 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
9111 particular, the consequences for <quote>free culture.</quote> But my aim now is to
9112 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9113 justified?
9114 </para>
9115 <para>
9116 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9117 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9118 power of the property called <quote>intellectual property</quote> is at its greatest in
9119 our history.
9120 </para>
9121 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
9122 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
9123 <para>
9124 Yet <quote>common sense</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
9125 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
9126 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9127 rejection of <quote>piracy</quote> still has play.
9128 </para>
9129 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary></indexterm>
9130 <para>
9131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9132 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9133 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9134 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9135 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9136 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9137 </para>
9138 <section id="constrain">
9139 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
9140 <para>
9141 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9142 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9143 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9144 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9145 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9146 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9147 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9148 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9149 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9150 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9151 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9152 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
9153 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9154 </para>
9155 <para>
9156 This digital <quote>capturing and sharing</quote> is in part an extension of the
9157 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9158 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9159 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9160 of digital <quote>capturing and sharing</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9161 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9162 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9163 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9164 the culture all around.
9165 </para>
9166 <para>
9167 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9168 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9169
9170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9171
9172 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9173 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9174 storytelling extended across the globe.
9175 </para>
9176 <para>
9177 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9178 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9179 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9180 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9181 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9182 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9183 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9184 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9185 work is presumptively illegal.
9186 </para>
9187 <para>
9188 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9189 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9190 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9191 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9192 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9193 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
9194 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9195 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
9196 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9197 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
9198 million.<footnote><para>
9199 <!-- f1. -->
9200 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
9201 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
9202 the settlement, see MCI press release, <quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9203 Approval for SEC Settlement</quote> (7 July 2003), available at
9204 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
9205 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
9206 </para></footnote>
9207 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9208 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9209 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9210 suffering.<footnote>
9211 <para>
9212 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9213 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9214 an overview, see Tanya Albert, <quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9215 Say Tort Reformers,</quote> amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9216 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9217 and <quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,</quote> CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9218 available at
9219 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9220 recent months.
9221 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
9222 </para></footnote>
9223 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9224 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9225 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9226 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
9227 </para>
9228 <indexterm><primary>art, underground</primary></indexterm>
9229 <para>
9230 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9231 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9232 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9233 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9234 Disneys <quote>pirates.</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9235 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9236 designed to
9237
9238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9239 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9240 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9241 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9242 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
9243 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9244 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9245 fraught. Already, exhibits of <quote>illegal art</quote> tour the United
9246 States.<footnote><para>
9247 <!-- f3. -->
9248
9249 See Danit Lidor, <quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,</quote> <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
9250 2003, available at
9251 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9252 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9253 </para></footnote>
9254 In what does their <quote>illegality</quote> consist?
9255 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9256 critical or reflective.
9257 </para>
9258 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by</primary></indexterm>
9259 <para>
9260 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9261 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9262 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
9263 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9264 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9265 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9266 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9267 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9268 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9269 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9270 </para>
9271 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of</primary></indexterm>
9272 <para>
9273 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9274 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9275 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9276 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9277 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9278 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9279 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9280 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9281 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9282 </para>
9283 <para>
9284 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9285 described in chapter
9286 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
9287 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9288 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9289 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9290 use.
9291 </para>
9292 <para>
9293
9294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9295 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9296 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9297 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9298 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9299 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9300 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9301 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9302 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9303 </para>
9304 <para>
9305 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9306 <quote>breathing room</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9307 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9308 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9309 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9310 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9311 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9312 these rules have little relationship to the <quote>law</quote> with which judges
9313 comfort themselves.
9314 </para>
9315 <para>
9316 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9317 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9318 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9319 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9320 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9321 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9322 <quote>copyright</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9323 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9324 culture that is free.
9325 </para>
9326 <para>
9327 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9328 </para>
9329 <blockquote>
9330 <para>
9331 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9332 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9333 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9334 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made &hellip; you're not
9335 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9337 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, <quote>This has been
9338 cleared.</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9339 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9340 </para>
9341 </blockquote>
9342 </section>
9343 <section id="innovators">
9344 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9345 <para>
9346 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9347 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9348 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9349 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9350 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9351 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9352 </para>
9353 <para>
9354 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9355 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9356 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9357 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9358 other aspect by substituting <quote>free market</quote> every place I've spoken of
9359 <quote>free culture.</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9360 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9361 </para>
9362 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
9363 <para>
9364 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9365 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9366 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9367 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9368 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9369 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9370 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9371 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9372 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9373 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9374 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9375 </para>
9376 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9377 <para>
9378 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9380 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9381 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9382 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9383 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9384 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9385 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9386 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9387 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9388 <quote>nuclear pall</quote> that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9389 </para>
9390 <para>
9391 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9392 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9393 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9394 </para>
9395 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael</primary></indexterm>
9396 <para>
9397 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9398 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9399 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9400 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9401 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9402 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9403 </para>
9404 <para>
9405 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9406 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9407 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9408 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9409 Raitt. And so on.
9410 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9411 </para>
9412 <para>
9413 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9414 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9415 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9416 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9417 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9418 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9419 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9420 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9421 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9422 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9423 </para>
9424 <para>
9425 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9426 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9427
9428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9429 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9430 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9431 the kind of content the users liked.
9432 </para>
9433 <para>
9434 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9435 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9436 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9437 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9438 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9439 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9440 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9441 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9442 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9443 they had already bought.
9444 </para>
9445 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9446 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9447 </indexterm>
9448 <para>
9449 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9450 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9451 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9452 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9453 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9454 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9455 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9456 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9457 </para>
9458 <para>
9459 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9460 </para>
9461 <para>
9462 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9463 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9464 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9465 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9466 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9467 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9468 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9469 demanded.
9470 </para>
9471 <para>
9472 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9473 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9474 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9475 clients in this
9476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9477 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9478 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9479 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9480 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9481 </para>
9482 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9483 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9484 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9485 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad</primary></indexterm>
9486 <para>
9487 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9488 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9489 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9490 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9491 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9492 <!-- f4. -->
9493 See Joseph Menn, <quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9494 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9495 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, <quote>The Music
9496 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,</quote> Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9497 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9498 See also Jon Healey, <quote>Online Music Services Besieged,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9499 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9500 </para></footnote>
9501 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9502 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9503 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9504 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9505 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9506 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9507 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9508 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9509 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9510 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9511 <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9512 discussion with BMW:
9513 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
9514 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
9515 </para>
9516 <blockquote>
9517 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9518 <para>
9519 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9520 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9521 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9522 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9523 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9524 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9525 United States with bona fide MP3 players. &hellip; <footnote>
9526 <para>
9527 <!-- f5. -->
9528 Rafe Needleman, <quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,</quote> <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9529 2003, available at
9530 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9531 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9532 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9533 </para></footnote>
9534 </para>
9535 </blockquote>
9536 <para>
9537 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with <quote>your money or your
9538 life</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9539 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9540 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9541 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9542 constantly threatened by litigation.
9543 </para>
9544 <para>
9545
9546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9547 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9548 enterprises. The point is the definition of <quote>illegal.</quote> The law is a
9549 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9550 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9551 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9552 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9553 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9554 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9555 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9556 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9557 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9558 much less creativity.
9559 </para>
9560 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
9561 <para>
9562 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9563 use. Whatever the <quote>real</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9564 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9565 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9566 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9567 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9568 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9569 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9570 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9571 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9572 </para>
9573 <para>
9574 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9575 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9576 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9577 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9578 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9579 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9580 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9581 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9582 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9583 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9584 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9585 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9587 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9588 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9589 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9590 result.
9591 </para>
9592 <para>
9593 <emphasis role='strong'>The uncertainty</emphasis> of the law is one
9594 burden on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more
9595 directly. This is the effort by many in the content industry to use
9596 the law to directly regulate the technology of the Internet so that it
9597 better protects their content.
9598 </para>
9599 <para>
9600 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9601 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9602 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9603 this feature is a <quote>bug.</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9604 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9605 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9606 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables <quote>piracy,</quote> then,
9607 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9608 </para>
9609 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
9610 <para>
9611 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9612 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9613 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9614 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9615 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> GartnerG2 and
9616 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9617 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9618 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9619 </para></footnote>
9620 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9621 <quote>broadcast flag</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9622 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9623 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9624 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9625 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9626 copyright violators and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9627 <!-- f7. -->
9628 GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9629 </para></footnote>
9630 </para>
9631 <para>
9632 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9633 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9634 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9635 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9636 and costs on
9637 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9638 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9639 those requirements.
9640 </para>
9641 <para>
9642 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9643 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9644 would impose.<footnote><para>
9645 <!-- f8. -->
9646 See David McGuire, <quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,</quote> Newsbytes,
9647 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9648 </para></footnote>
9649 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9650 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9651 harm than good.
9652 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
9653 </para>
9654 <para>
9655 <emphasis role='strong'>There is one</emphasis> more obvious way in
9656 which this war has harmed innovation&mdash;again, a story that will be
9657 quite familiar to the free market crowd.
9658 </para>
9659 <para>
9660 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9661 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9662 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9663 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9664 </para>
9665 <para>
9666 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9667 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9668 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9669 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9670 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9671 <!-- f9. -->
9672 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9673 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9674 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9675 </para></footnote>
9676 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10 details,
9677 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9678 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9679 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9680 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9681 </para>
9682 <para>
9683 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9684 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9685 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9686 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9687 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9688 </para>
9689 <para>
9690 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9691 <!-- f10. -->
9692 <indexterm><primary>Grokster, Ltd.</primary></indexterm>
9693 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9694 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9695 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9696 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9697 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9698 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9699 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9700 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9701 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9702 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9703 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9704 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9705 liability.
9706 </para></footnote>
9707 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9708 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9709 here.<footnote><para>
9710 <!-- f11. -->
9711 <indexterm><primary>Tauzin, Billy</primary></indexterm>
9712 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9713 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9714 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9715 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9716 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9717 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9718 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a <quote>broadcast flag</quote> that
9719 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9720 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9721 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9722 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, <quote>Copyright and
9723 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9724 available at
9725 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9726 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9727 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz</primary></indexterm>
9728 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
9729 </para></footnote>
9730 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9731 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9732 </para>
9733 <indexterm>
9734 <primary>artists</primary>
9735 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
9736 </indexterm>
9737 <para>
9738
9739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9740 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9741 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9742 artist doesn't get paid for that <quote>radio performance</quote> unless he or she
9743 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9744 version of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote>&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9745 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9746 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9747 copyright owners of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> would get some money, whereas
9748 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9749 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
9750 </para>
9751 <para>
9752 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9753 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9754 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9755 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9756 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9757 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9758 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9759 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9760 recording artists.
9761 </para>
9762 <para>
9763 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9764 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9765 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9766 spectrum. Thus, I can <quote>tune in</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9767 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9768 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9769 metropolitan area.
9770 </para>
9771 <para>
9772 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9773 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9774 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9775 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9776 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9777 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9778 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9779 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9780 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9781 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9782 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9783 </para>
9784 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary></indexterm>
9785 <para>
9786
9787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9788 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9789 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9790 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9791 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9792 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9793 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9794 FM radio,
9795 </para>
9796 <blockquote>
9797 <para>
9798 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9799 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9800 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9801 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9802 than by technical restrictions. &hellip; Armstrong likened the situation
9803 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9804 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9805 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9806 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9807 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9808 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9809 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9810 shackles.<footnote><para>
9811 <!-- f12. -->
9812 Lessing, 239.
9813 </para></footnote>
9814 </para>
9815 </blockquote>
9816 <para>
9817 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9818 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9819 underestimated the power of <quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9820 legislation</quote><footnote><para>
9821 <!-- f13. -->
9822 Ibid., 229.
9823 </para></footnote>
9824 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9825 </para>
9826 <para>
9827 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9828 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9829 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9830 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9831 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9832 radio?
9833 </para>
9834 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'>
9835 <primary>artists</primary>
9836 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
9837 </indexterm>
9838 <para>
9839 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9840 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9841
9842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9843 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9844 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9845 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9846 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9847 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9848 of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9849 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9850 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9851 burdens terrestrial radio.
9852 </para>
9853 <para>
9854 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9855 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9856 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9857 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9858 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9859 <para>
9860 <!-- f14. -->
9861 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9862 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9863 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9864 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9865 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9866 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9867 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9868 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9869 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9870 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9871 C. Picker, <quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9872 Distribution,</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: <quote>This was
9873 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9874 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9875 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9876 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9877 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.</quote>
9878 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9879 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9880 </para></footnote>
9881 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9882 equivalent fee.
9883 </para>
9884 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'/>
9885 <para>
9886 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9887 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9888 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9889 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9890 </para>
9891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9892 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9893 <listitem><para>
9894 name of the service;
9895 </para></listitem>
9896 <listitem><para>
9897 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9898 </para></listitem>
9899 <listitem><para>
9900 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9901 </para></listitem>
9902 <listitem><para>
9903 date of transmission;
9904 </para></listitem>
9905 <listitem><para>
9906 time of transmission;
9907 </para></listitem>
9908 <listitem><para>
9909 time zone of origination of transmission;
9910 </para></listitem>
9911 <listitem><para>
9912 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9913 </para></listitem>
9914 <listitem><para>
9915 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9916 </para></listitem>
9917 <listitem><para>
9918 sound recording title;
9919 </para></listitem>
9920 <listitem><para>
9921 ISRC code of the recording;
9922 </para></listitem>
9923 <listitem><para>
9924 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9925 </para></listitem>
9926 <listitem><para>
9927 featured recording artist;
9928 </para></listitem>
9929 <listitem><para>
9930 retail album title;
9931 </para></listitem>
9932 <listitem><para>
9933 recording label;
9934 </para></listitem>
9935 <listitem><para>
9936 UPC code of the retail album;
9937 </para></listitem>
9938 <listitem><para>
9939 catalog number;
9940 </para></listitem>
9941 <listitem><para>
9942 copyright owner information;
9943 </para></listitem>
9944 <listitem><para>
9945 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9946 </para></listitem>
9947 <listitem><para>
9948 name of the service or entity;
9949 </para></listitem>
9950 <listitem><para>
9951 channel or program;
9952 </para></listitem>
9953 <listitem><para>
9954 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9955 </para></listitem>
9956 <listitem><para>
9957 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9958 </para></listitem>
9959 <listitem><para>
9960 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9961 </para></listitem>
9962 <listitem><para>
9963 unique user identifier;
9964 </para></listitem>
9965 <listitem><para>
9966 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9967 </para></listitem>
9968 </orderedlist>
9969
9970 <para>
9971 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9972 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9973 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9974 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9975 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9976 that terrestrial radio does not.
9977 </para>
9978 <para>
9979 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9980 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9981 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9982 </para>
9983 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
9984 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'>
9985 <primary>Alben, Alex</primary>
9986 </indexterm>
9987 <para>
9988 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9989 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9990 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9991 </para>
9992 <blockquote>
9993 <para>
9994 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9995 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9996 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9997 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9998 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9999 webcasters asked the RIAA, &hellip; <quote>How do you come up with a
10000
10001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
10002 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
10003 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
10004 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
10005 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
10006 business. &hellip;</quote>
10007 </para>
10008 <indexterm>
10009 <primary>artists</primary>
10010 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
10011 </indexterm>
10012 <para>
10013 And the RIAA experts said, <quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
10014 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
10015 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
10016 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>.</quote> (Emphasis
10017 added.)
10018 </para>
10019 </blockquote>
10020 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'/>
10021 <para>
10022 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
10023 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
10024 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
10025 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
10026 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
10027 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
10028 effective to prevent it.
10029 </para>
10030 </section>
10031 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
10032 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
10033 <para>
10034 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
10035 dinosaurs
10036 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
10037 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
10038 </para>
10039 <para>
10040 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
10041 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
10042 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
10043 </para>
10044 <para>
10045 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
10046 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
10047 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
10048 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
10049 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, <quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,</quote> Pew
10050 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
10051 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
10052 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
10053 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
10054 </para></footnote>
10055 According to the RIAA,
10056 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
10057 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
10058
10059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
10060 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
10061 the world, but against students building search engines, and
10062 increasingly
10063 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
10064 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
10065 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
10066 extreme
10067 response by the other.
10068 </para>
10069 <para>
10070 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
10071 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
10072 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
10073 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
10074 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
10075 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
10076 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
10077 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
10078 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
10079 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
10080 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
10081 was.<footnote><para>
10082 <!-- f16. -->
10083 Alex Pham, <quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,</quote> <citetitle>Los
10084 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
10085 </para></footnote>
10086 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
10087 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
10088 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
10089 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
10090 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
10091 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
10092 they oppose.
10093 </para>
10094 <para>
10095 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
10096 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
10097 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
10098 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
10099 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
10100 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
10101 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
10102 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
10103 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
10104 <!-- f17. -->
10105 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, <quote>Alcohol Consumption During
10106 Prohibition,</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
10107 </para></footnote>
10108 We have
10109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
10110 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
10111 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
10112 <!-- f18. -->
10113 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
10114 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
10115 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
10116 </para></footnote>
10117 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
10118 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
10119 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
10120 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
10121 cheat.<footnote><para>
10122 <!-- f19. -->
10123 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, <quote>Tax
10124 Compliance,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
10125 compliance literature).
10126 </para></footnote>
10127 We pride ourselves on our <quote>free society,</quote> but an endless array of
10128 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
10129 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10130 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
10131 </para>
10132 <para>
10133 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10134 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
10135 students about the importance of <quote>ethics.</quote> As my colleague Charlie
10136 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
10137 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
10138 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
10139 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
10140 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
10141 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
10142 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
10143 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
10144 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
10145 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
10146 lives both normally and legally, since <quote>normally</quote> entails a certain
10147 degree of illegality.
10148 <indexterm><primary>law schools</primary></indexterm>
10149 </para>
10150 <para>
10151 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10152 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10153 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10154 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10155 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10156 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10157 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10158 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10159 to consider the alternative.
10160 </para>
10161 <para>
10162
10163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10164 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10165 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10166 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10167 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10168 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10169 </para>
10170 <para>
10171 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10172 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10173 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10174 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10175 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10176 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10177 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10178 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10179 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10180 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10181 introduced this different idea of <quote>sharing.</quote> We need to be able to
10182 call these twenty million Americans <quote>citizens,</quote> not <quote>felons.</quote>
10183 </para>
10184 <para>
10185 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10186 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10187 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10188 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10189 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10190 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10191 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10192 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10193 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10194 a nation of felons?
10195 </para>
10196 <para>
10197 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10198 </para>
10199 <para>
10200 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10201 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10202 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10203 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10204 used
10205
10206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10207 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That <quote>use</quote> of the
10208 recordings is free.
10209 </para>
10210 <para>
10211 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10212 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10213 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am <quote>free</quote> to copy,
10214 or <quote>rip,</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10215 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that <quote>freedom</quote> was a
10216 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the <quote>Rip, Mix, Burn</quote>
10217 capacities of digital technologies.
10218 </para>
10219 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
10220 <para>
10221 This <quote>use</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10222 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10223 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10224 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10225 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10226 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10227 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10228 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10229 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10230 </para>
10231 <para>
10232 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
10233 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10234 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10235 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10236 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10237 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10238 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10239 on people's machines.
10240 </para>
10241 <para>
10242 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10243 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10244 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10245 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10246 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10247 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10248
10249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10250 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10251 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10252 plastic or were part of a massively complex <quote>digital rights
10253 management</quote> system.
10254 </para>
10255 <para>
10256 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10257 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10258 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10259 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10260 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10261 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10262 freedom to move content easily?
10263 </para>
10264 <para>
10265 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10266 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10267 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10268 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10269 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10270 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10271 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10272 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10273 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10274 </para>
10275 <para>
10276 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10277 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10278 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10279 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10280 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10281 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10282 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10283 </para>
10284 <para>
10285 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10286 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10287 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10288 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10289 </para>
10290 <para>
10291 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10292 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10293
10294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10295
10296 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10297 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10298 </para>
10299 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
10300 <indexterm id='idxisps' class='startofrange'>
10301 <primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by</primary>
10302 </indexterm>
10303 <para>
10304 <emphasis role='strong'>There's one more</emphasis> aspect to this
10305 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and
10306 follows directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier
10307 Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the
10308 <quote>collateral damage</quote> that <quote>arises whenever you turn
10309 a very large percentage of the population into criminals.</quote> This
10310 is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10311 </para>
10312 <para>
10313 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,</quote> von Lohmann
10314 explains,
10315 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10316 </para>
10317 <blockquote>
10318 <para>
10319 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10320 evaporate to one degree or another. &hellip; If you're a copyright
10321 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10322 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10323 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10324 access? &hellip; Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, <quote>Oh, well,
10325 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.</quote> Well, what this campaign
10326 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10327 American Internet-using population into <quote>lawbreakers.</quote>
10328 </para>
10329 </blockquote>
10330 <para>
10331 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10332 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10333 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10334 </para>
10335 <para>
10336 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10337 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10338 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10339 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10340 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10341 an Internet user is revealed.
10342 </para>
10343 <para>
10344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10345 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10346 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10347 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10348 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10349 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10350 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10351 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10352 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10353 <!-- f20. -->
10354 See Frank Ahrens, <quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10355 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,</quote>
10356 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, <quote>Worried Parents
10357 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10358 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10359 Being Sued,</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10360 Graham, <quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
10361 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, <quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10362 Fan, Either,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, <quote>Is
10363 Brianna a Criminal?</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
10364 </para></footnote>
10365
10366 </para>
10367 <para>
10368 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10369 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10370 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10371 <!-- f21. -->
10372 See <quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10373 Some Methods Used,</quote> CNN.com, available at
10374 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10375 </para></footnote>
10376 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10377 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10378 one of those MP3s will have the same <quote>fingerprint.</quote>
10379 </para>
10380 <para>
10381 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10382 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10383 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10384 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10385 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10386 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10387 network is <quote>cooperating</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10388 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10389 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10390 as a <quote>criminal.</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10391 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10392 <!-- f22. -->
10393 See Jeff Adler, <quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,</quote>
10394 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, <quote>Four
10395 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10396 Colleges,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10397 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10398 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, <quote>Music
10399 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10400 Lawsuit Possible,</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, <quote>RIAA
10401 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,</quote> <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10402 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10403 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, <quote>Download Warning 101: Freshman
10404 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10405 Sharing,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; <quote>Raid, Letters
10406 Are Weapons at Universities,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10407 </para></footnote>
10408 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10409 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10410 </para>
10411 <indexterm startref='idxisps' class='endofrange'/>
10412 <para>
10413 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10414 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10415 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10416 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10417 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10418 this <quote>contraband</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10419 college students
10420
10421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10422 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10423 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10424 Says von Lohmann,
10425 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10426 </para>
10427 <blockquote>
10428 <para>
10429 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10430 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10431 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10432 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10433 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10434 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10435 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10436 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10437 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10438 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10439 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10440 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10441 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10442 larger number of Americans than drug use. &hellip; If forty to sixty
10443 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10444 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10445 million of them.
10446 </para>
10447 </blockquote>
10448 <para>
10449 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered <quote>criminals</quote> under
10450 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10451 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10452 considered <quote>criminals,</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10453 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10454 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10455 </para>
10456
10457 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10458 </section>
10459 </chapter>
10460 </part>
10461 <part id="c-balances">
10462 <title>BALANCES</title>
10463 <partintro>
10464
10465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10466 <para>
10467 <emphasis role='strong'>So here's</emphasis> the picture: You're
10468 standing at the side of the road. Your car is on fire. You are angry
10469 and upset because in part you helped start the fire. Now you don't
10470 know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket, filled with
10471 gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10472 </para>
10473 <para>
10474 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10475 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10476 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10477 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10478 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10479 everything around.
10480 </para>
10481 <para>
10482 <emphasis role='strong'>A war</emphasis> about copyright rages all
10483 around&mdash;and we're all focusing on the wrong thing. No doubt,
10484 current technologies threaten existing businesses. No doubt they may
10485 threaten artists. But technologies change. The industry and
10486 technologists have plenty of ways to use technology to protect
10487 themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This is a fire
10488 that if let alone would burn itself out.
10489 </para>
10490 <para>
10491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10492 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10493 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10494 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10495 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10496 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10497 made that is happening all around.
10498 </para>
10499 <para>
10500 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10501 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10502 gasoline onto this fire.
10503 </para>
10504 <para>
10505 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10506 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10507 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10508 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10509 </para>
10510 <para>
10511 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10512 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10513 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10514 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10515 success will require.
10516 </para>
10517 </partintro>
10518
10519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10520 <chapter label="13" id="eldred">
10521 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10522 <indexterm id="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'>
10523 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel</primary>
10524 </indexterm>
10525 <para>
10526 <emphasis role='strong'>In 1995</emphasis>, a father was frustrated
10527 that his daughters didn't seem to like Hawthorne. No doubt there was
10528 more than one such father, but at least one did something about
10529 it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in New
10530 Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
10531 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would
10532 make this nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
10533 </para>
10534 <para>
10535 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10536 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10537 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10538 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10539 them available for free.
10540 </para>
10541 <para>
10542 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10543 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10544 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10545 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10546 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10548 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10549 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10550 accessible&mdash;today.
10551 </para>
10552 <para>
10553 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10554 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10555 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10556 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10557 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10558 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10559 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10560 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10561 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10562 commercial publications of public domain works.
10563 </para>
10564 <indexterm startref="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'/>
10565 <para>
10566 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10567 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10568 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10569 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10570 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10571 call the <quote>noncommercial publishing industry,</quote> which before the
10572 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10573 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10574 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10575 generally.<footnote><para>
10576 <!-- f1. -->
10577 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10578 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10579 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10580 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10581 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10582 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10583 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10584 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10585 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10586 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10587 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10588 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10589 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10590 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10591 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10592 </para>
10593 <para>
10594 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10595 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10596 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10597 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10598 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10599 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10600 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10601 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10602 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10603 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10604 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10605 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10606 </para>
10607 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary</primary></indexterm>
10608 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny</primary></indexterm>
10609 <para>
10610
10611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10612 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10613 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10614 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10615 <quote>copyrights should be forever.</quote><footnote><para>
10616 <!-- f2. -->
10617 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary</primary></indexterm>
10618 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny</primary></indexterm>
10619 The full text is: <quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10620 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10621 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10622 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10623 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10624 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10625 Congress,</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10626 </para></footnote>
10627
10628 </para>
10629 <para>
10630 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10631 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10632 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10633 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10634 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10635 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10636 to undertake.
10637 </para>
10638 <para>
10639 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10640 constitutional
10641 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10642 interpretation.
10643 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10644 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10645 importantly
10646 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10647 </para>
10648 <blockquote>
10649 <para>
10650 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science &hellip;
10651 by securing for limited Times to Authors &hellip; exclusive Right to
10652 their &hellip; Writings. &hellip;
10653 </para>
10654 </blockquote>
10655 <para>
10656 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10657 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10658 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10659 something&mdash;for example, to regulate <quote>commerce among the several
10660 states</quote> or <quote>declare War.</quote> But here, the <quote>something</quote> is something quite
10661 specific&mdash;to <quote>promote &hellip; Progress</quote>&mdash;through means that
10662 are also specific&mdash; by <quote>securing</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights</quote> (i.e.,
10663 copyrights) <quote>for limited Times.</quote>
10664 </para>
10665 <para>
10666 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10667 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10668 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10669 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be <quote>limited</quote> will have
10670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10671 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10672 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10673 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms <quote>on the
10674 installment plan,</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10675 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10676 </para>
10677 <para>
10678 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10679 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10680 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10681 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10682 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10683 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10684 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10685 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10686 this gravy train going.
10687 </para>
10688 <para>
10689 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10690 government. <quote>Corruption</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10691 bribed. Rather, <quote>corruption</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10692 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10693 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10694 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10695 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10696 </para>
10697 <para>
10698 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10699 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10700 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10701 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10702 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10703 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10704 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10705 published by anyone for free.
10706 </para>
10707 <para>
10708 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10709 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10710 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10711 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10712 report:
10713 </para>
10714 <para>
10715 <quote>Next year,</quote> the adviser announces, <quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10716
10717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10718 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10719 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10720 those works.</quote>
10721 </para>
10722 <para>
10723 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,</quote> she continues, <quote>that
10724 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10725 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10726 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.</quote>
10727 </para>
10728 <para>
10729 <quote>Hope?</quote> a fellow board member says. <quote>Can't we be doing something
10730 about it?</quote>
10731 </para>
10732 <para>
10733 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,</quote> the adviser responds. <quote>We could contribute
10734 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10735 they support the bill.</quote>
10736 </para>
10737 <para>
10738 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10739 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. <quote>How much
10740 would we get if this extension were passed?</quote> you ask the adviser. <quote>How
10741 much is it worth?</quote>
10742 </para>
10743 <para>
10744 <quote>Well,</quote> the adviser says, <quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10745 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10746 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10747 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate.</quote>
10748 </para>
10749 <para>
10750 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10751 correct conclusion:
10752 </para>
10753 <para>
10754 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10755 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10756 contributions
10757 would assure that the bill was passed?</quote>
10758 </para>
10759 <para>
10760 <quote>Absolutely,</quote> the adviser responds. <quote>It is worth it to you to
10761 contribute
10762 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10763 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000.</quote>
10764 </para>
10765 <para>
10766 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10767 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10768 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10769 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10771 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10772 copyrights
10773 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10774 the copyright term extended.
10775 </para>
10776 <para>
10777 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10778 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10779 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10780 </para>
10781 <para>
10782 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10783 Copyright
10784 Term Extension Act, this <quote>theory</quote> about incentives was proved
10785 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10786 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10787 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10788 contributions.<footnote><para>
10789 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, <quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10790 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,</quote>
10791 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10792 </para></footnote>
10793 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10794 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10795 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10796 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, <quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10797 Age,</quote> available at
10798 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10799 </para></footnote>
10800 Disney is estimated to have
10801 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10802 cycle.<footnote><para>
10803 <!-- f5. -->
10804 Alan K. Ota, <quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,</quote>
10805 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10806 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10807 </para></footnote>
10808
10809 </para>
10810 <para>
10811 <emphasis role='strong'>Constitutional law</emphasis> is not oblivious
10812 to the obvious. Or at least, it need not be. So when I was considering
10813 Eldred's complaint, this reality about the never-ending incentives to
10814 increase the copyright term was central to my thinking. In my view, a
10815 pragmatic court committed to interpreting and applying the
10816 Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the power
10817 to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
10818 constitutional requirement that terms be <quote>limited.</quote> If
10819 they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again and
10820 again.
10821 </para>
10822 <para>
10823 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10824 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10825 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10826 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10827 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10828 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10829 Supreme Court's
10830
10831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10832 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10833 guns near schools.
10834 </para>
10835 <para>
10836 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10837 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10838 power to regulate only <quote>commerce among the several states</quote> (aka
10839 <quote>interstate
10840 commerce</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10841 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10842 interstate
10843 commerce.
10844 </para>
10845 <para>
10846 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10847 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10848 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10849 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10850 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10851 </para>
10852 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
10853 <para>
10854 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10855 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10856 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10857 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10858 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10859 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10860 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10861 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10862 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10863 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10864 position to second-guess Congress.
10865 </para>
10866 <para>
10867 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,</quote>
10868 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10869 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10870 </para></footnote>
10871 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10872 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10873 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10874 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10875 <!-- f7. -->
10876 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10877 </para></footnote>
10878 </para>
10879 <para>
10880 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10881 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10882 <!-- f8. -->
10883 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10884 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10885 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10886 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10887 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10888 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10889 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10890 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10891 limitation to <quote>limited times</quote> notwithstanding.
10892 </para></footnote>
10893 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10894 yield the conclusion that Congress
10895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10896 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10897 term, then there would be no <quote>stopping point</quote> to Congress's power over
10898 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10899 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10900 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10901 term of existing copyrights.
10902 </para>
10903 <para>
10904 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10905 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10906 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10907 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10908 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10909 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10910 demonstrating the <quote>fidelity</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10911 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10912 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10913 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10914 were going to be petty politicians.
10915 </para>
10916 <para>
10917 <emphasis role='strong'>Now let's pause</emphasis> for a moment to
10918 make sure we understand what the argument in
10919 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10920 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10921 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10922 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10923 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10924 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10925 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10926 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10927 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10928 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10929 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10930 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10931 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10932 piracy that affects us all.
10933 </para>
10934 <para>
10935 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10936
10937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10938 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10939 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than <quote>legal piracy.</quote><footnote><para>
10940 <!-- f9. -->
10941 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10942 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10943 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10944 </para></footnote>
10945 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10946 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10947 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10948 charter.
10949 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10950 </para>
10951 <para>
10952 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10953 copyright
10954 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10955 influence
10956 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10957 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10958 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10959 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10960 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10961 bought to extend them again.
10962 </para>
10963 <para>
10964 <emphasis role='strong'>It is valuable</emphasis> copyrights that are
10965 responsible for terms being extended. Mickey Mouse and
10966 <quote>Rhapsody in Blue.</quote> These works are too valuable for
10967 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from
10968 copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.
10969 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from
10970 the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The real
10971 harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The real
10972 harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially exploited,
10973 and no longer available as a result.
10974 </para>
10975 <para>
10976 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10977 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10978 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10979 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10980 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10981 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10982 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10983 Congressional
10984 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10985 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10986 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10987 </para></footnote>
10988
10989 </para>
10990 <para>
10991 Think practically about the consequence of this
10992 extension&mdash;practically,
10993 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10994
10995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10996 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10997 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10998 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10999 remaining
11000 9,873. What would you have to do?
11001 </para>
11002 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital</primary></indexterm>
11003 <para>
11004 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
11005 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
11006 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
11007 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
11008 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
11009 list of books still under copyright.
11010 </para>
11011 <para>
11012 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
11013 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
11014 </para>
11015 <para>
11016 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
11017 owners
11018 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
11019 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
11020 being at least a list?
11021 </para>
11022 <para>
11023 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
11024 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
11025 practically
11026 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
11027 thousands
11028 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
11029 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
11030 </para>
11031 <para>
11032 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,</quote> the
11033 apologists for the system respond. <quote>Why should there be a list of
11034 copyright owners?</quote>
11035 </para>
11036 <para>
11037 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
11038 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
11039 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
11040 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
11041 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
11042 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
11043 what tangible property.
11044 </para>
11045 <para>
11046 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
11047 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
11048 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
11049
11050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
11051 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
11052 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
11053 happen
11054 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
11055 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
11056 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
11057 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
11058 know quite well who owns what property.
11059 </para>
11060 <para>
11061 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
11062 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
11063 already
11064 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
11065 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
11066 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
11067 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
11068 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
11069 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
11070 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
11071 </para>
11072 <para>
11073 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
11074 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
11075 consequence
11076 for other creative works is much more dire.
11077 </para>
11078 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'>
11079 <primary>Agee, Michael</primary>
11080 </indexterm>
11081 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
11082 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films</primary></indexterm>
11083 <para>
11084 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
11085 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
11086 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
11087 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
11088 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
11089 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
11090 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
11091 money. According to one estimate, <quote>Roach has sold about 60,000
11092 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
11093 films.</quote><footnote><para>
11094 <!-- f11. -->
11095 See David G. Savage, <quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,</quote>
11096 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, <quote>Classic Movies,
11097 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
11098 Down Copyright Extension,</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
11099 </para></footnote>
11100
11101 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
11102 </para>
11103 <para>
11104 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
11105 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
11106 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
11107 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
11108 </para>
11109 <para>
11110 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
11111
11112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
11113 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
11114 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
11115 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
11116 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
11117 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
11118 work available for distribution.
11119 </para>
11120 <para>
11121 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11122 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11123 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11124 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11125 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
11126 mm film.<footnote><para>
11127 <!-- f12. -->
11128 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11129 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11130 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
11131 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
11132 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
11133 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
11134 </para></footnote>
11135
11136 </para>
11137 <para>
11138 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11139 important.
11140 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11141 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11142 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11143 locate the copyright owner.
11144 </para>
11145 <para>
11146 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
11147 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
11148 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
11149 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
11150 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
11151 to these films is exceptionally high.
11152 </para>
11153 <para>
11154 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11155 copyright owner when she shows up?</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11156 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11157 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11158 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11159 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11160 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11161 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11162 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11163 </para>
11164 <para>
11165 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11166
11167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11168 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11169 benefit
11170 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11171 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11172 the copyright expires.
11173 </para>
11174 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'/>
11175 <para>
11176 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11177 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11178 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11179 canisters
11180 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11181 than dust.
11182 </para>
11183 <para>
11184 <emphasis role='strong'>Of all the</emphasis> creative work produced
11185 by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has continuing commercial
11186 value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a crucially important
11187 legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright creates incentives
11188 to produce and distribute the creative work. For that tiny fraction,
11189 the copyright acts as an <quote>engine of free expression.</quote>
11190 </para>
11191 <para>
11192 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11193 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11194 indicated,
11195 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11196 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11197 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11198 distributors,
11199 the commercial life ends.
11200 </para>
11201 <para>
11202 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11203 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
11204 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11205 between
11206 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11207 Friday
11208 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11209 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
11210 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11211 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11212 have, we need to have access to this history.
11213 </para>
11214 <para>
11215 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11216
11217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11218 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11219 this context do no good.
11220 </para>
11221 <para>
11222 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11223 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11224 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11225 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11226 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11227 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11228 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11229 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11230 was independent of copyright law.
11231 </para>
11232 <para>
11233 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11234 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
11235 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11236 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11237 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11238 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11239 market didn't have more to offer.
11240 </para>
11241 <para>
11242 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11243 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11244 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11245 would not have interfered with anything.
11246 </para>
11247 <para>
11248 But this situation has now changed.
11249 </para>
11250 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'>
11251 <primary>archives, digital</primary>
11252 </indexterm>
11253 <para>
11254 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11255 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11256 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11257 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11258 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11259 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11260 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11261 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11262 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11263 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11264 </para>
11265 <para>
11266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11267 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11268 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11269 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11270 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11271 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11272 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11273 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11274 written for a radically different context.
11275 </para>
11276 <para>
11277 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11278 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11279 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11280 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11281 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11282 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11283 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
11284 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11285 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11286 </para>
11287 <para>
11288 You may well ask, <quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11289 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11290 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11291 culture widely?</quote>
11292 </para>
11293 <para>
11294 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11295 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11296 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11297 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11298 of a library is to serve what <quote>the market</quote> would demand. But if you
11299 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11300 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11301 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11302 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11303 </para>
11304 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'/>
11305 <para>
11306 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11307 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11308 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11309 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11310
11311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11312 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11313 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11314 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11315 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11316 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11317 <!-- f13. -->
11318 Jason Schultz, <quote>The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,</quote> 20
11319 December 2002, available at
11320 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11321 </para></footnote>
11322
11323 </para>
11324 <para>
11325 <emphasis role='strong'>In January 1999</emphasis>, we filed a lawsuit
11326 on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
11327 asking the court to declare the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
11328 Act unconstitutional. The two central claims that we made were (1)
11329 that extending existing terms violated the Constitution's
11330 <quote>limited Times</quote> requirement, and (2) that extending terms
11331 by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11332 </para>
11333 <para>
11334 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11335 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11336 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11337 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11338 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11339 </para>
11340 <para>
11341 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11342 copyrights be for <quote>limited Times</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11343 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11344 <quote>stopping point</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11345 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11346 terms that are <quote>limited.</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11347 to interpret the term <quote>limited Times</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11348 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11349 power to extend existing terms.
11350 </para>
11351 <para>
11352 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11353 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11354 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11355 whole, where the court will sit <quote>en banc</quote> to hear the case.
11356 </para>
11357 <indexterm><primary>Tatel, David</primary></indexterm>
11358 <para>
11359 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11360 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11361
11362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11363 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11364 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11365 overstepped its bounds.
11366 </para>
11367 <para>
11368 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11369 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11370 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11371 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11372 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11373 </para>
11374 <para>
11375 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11376 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11377 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11378 briefs and preparing for argument.
11379 </para>
11380 <para>
11381 <emphasis role='strong'>It is over</emphasis> a year later as I write
11382 these words. It is still astonishingly hard. If you know anything at
11383 all about this story, you know that we lost the appeal. And if you
11384 know something more than just the minimum, you probably think there
11385 was no way this case could have been won. After our defeat, I received
11386 literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and supporters,
11387 thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed cause. And
11388 none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail from my
11389 client, Eric Eldred.
11390 </para>
11391 <para>
11392 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11393 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11394 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11395 mistake lost it.
11396 </para>
11397 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11398 <para>
11399 <emphasis role='strong'>The mistake</emphasis> was made early, though
11400 it became obvious only at the very end. Our case had been supported
11401 from the very beginning by an extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart,
11402 and by the law firm he had moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and
11403 Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11405 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11406 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11407 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11408 </para>
11409 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11410 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11411 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11412 <para>
11413 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11414 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11415 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11416 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11417 told me, if we could make the issue seem <quote>important</quote> to the Supreme
11418 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11419 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against <quote>the
11420 most powerful media companies in the world.</quote>
11421 </para>
11422 <para>
11423 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11424 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11425 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11426 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11427 <quote>right</quote> as in <quote>true,</quote> I thought, but it is <quote>wrong</quote> as in <quote>it just shouldn't be
11428 that way.</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11429 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11430 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11431 interpretation
11432 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11433 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11434 unconstitutional,
11435 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11436 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11437 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11438 Constitution,
11439 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11440 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11441 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11442 </para>
11443 <para>
11444 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11445 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11446 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11447 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11448 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11449 why it was unconstitutional.
11450 </para>
11451 <para>
11452 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11453
11454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11455 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11456 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11457 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11458 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11459 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11460 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11461 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11462 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11463 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11464 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11465 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11466 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11467 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11468 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11469 </para>
11470 <para>
11471 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11472 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11473 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11474 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11475 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11476 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11477 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11478 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11479 to get bogged down?</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11480 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11481 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11482 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11483 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11484 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11485 </para>
11486 <para>
11487 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11488 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11489 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11490 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11491 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11492 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11493 </para>
11494 <para>
11495 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11496 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11497
11498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11499 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11500 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11501 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11502 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11503 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11504 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11505 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11506 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11507 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
11508 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11509 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11510 </para>
11511 <para>
11512 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11513 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11514 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11515 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11516 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11517 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11518 </para>
11519 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
11520 <para>
11521 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11522 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11523 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11524 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11525 clear.
11526 </para>
11527 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11528 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11529 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11530 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11531 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11532 <para>
11533 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11534 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11535 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11536 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11537 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11538 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11539 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11540 nothing more than <quote>rent-seeking</quote>&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11541 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11542 </para>
11543 <para>
11544 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11545 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11546 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11547 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11548 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11549 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11550 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11551 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11552
11553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11554 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11555 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11556 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11557 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan</primary></indexterm>
11558 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen</primary></indexterm>
11559 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11560 </para>
11561 <para>
11562 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11563 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11564 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11565 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11566 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11567 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11568 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11569 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11570 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11571 confidence in our argument.
11572 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11573 </para>
11574 <para>
11575 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11576 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these <quote>friends</quote> included
11577 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11578 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11579 copyright holders.
11580 </para>
11581 <para>
11582 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11583 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11584 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11585 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11586 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11587 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11588 wanted to control.
11589 </para>
11590 <para>
11591 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11592 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11593 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11594 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11595 domain, then people could use it to <quote>glorify drugs or to create
11596 pornography.</quote><footnote><para>
11597 <!-- f14. -->
11598 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11599 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11600 </para></footnote>
11601 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11602 <quote>protection</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11603 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11604 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11605 <!-- f15. -->
11606 Dinitia Smith, <quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11607 Mouse Joins the Fray,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11608 </para></footnote>
11609 That's
11610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11611 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11612 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11613 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11614 </para>
11615 <para>
11616 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11617 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11618 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11619 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11620 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, <quote>Give us twenty years
11621 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11622 better with them than anyone else.</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11623 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11624 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11625 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11626 </para>
11627 <para>
11628 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11629 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11630 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11631 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11632 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11633 </para>
11634 <para>
11635 <emphasis role='strong'>Between February</emphasis> and October, there
11636 was little I did beyond preparing for this case. Early on, as I said,
11637 I set the strategy.
11638 </para>
11639 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
11640 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day</primary></indexterm>
11641 <para>
11642 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11643 called <quote>the Conservatives.</quote> The other we called <quote>the Rest.</quote> The
11644 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11645 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11646 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11647 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line
11648 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11649 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11650 </para>
11651 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11652 <indexterm id='idxginsburg' class='startofrange'>
11653 <primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader</primary>
11654 </indexterm>
11655 <para>
11656 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11657 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11658 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11659 the Constitution
11660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11661 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11662 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11663 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11664 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11665 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11666 </para>
11667 <para>
11668 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11669 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11670 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11671 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11672 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11673 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11674 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11675 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11676 sense.
11677 </para>
11678 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11679 <para>
11680 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11681 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11682 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11683 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11684 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11685 these retrospective extensions.
11686 </para>
11687 <indexterm startref='idxginsburg' class='endofrange'/>
11688 <para>
11689 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11690 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11691 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11692 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11693 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11694 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11695 </para>
11696 <para>
11697 This analysis of <quote>the Rest</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11698 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11699 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11700 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11701 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the
11702 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11703 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11704 powers have limits.
11705 </para>
11706 <para>
11707 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11708 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11709 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11711 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11712 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11713 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11714 supposed to be <quote>limited.</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11715 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with
11716 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11717 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11718 be limited.
11719 </para>
11720 <para>
11721 <emphasis role='strong'>The argument</emphasis> on the government's
11722 side came down to this: Congress has done it before. It should be
11723 allowed to do it again. The government claimed that from the very
11724 beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
11725 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say
11726 that practice is unconstitutional.
11727 </para>
11728 <para>
11729 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11730 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in 1831
11731 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11732 existing
11733 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11734 </para>
11735 <para>
11736 But this <quote>consistency</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11737 extended
11738 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11739 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11740 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11741 existing
11742 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11743 restraint
11744 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11745 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11746 hesitated
11747 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11748 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11749 </para>
11750 <para>
11751 <emphasis role='strong'>Oral argument</emphasis> was scheduled for the
11752 first week in October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the
11753 argument. During those two weeks, I was repeatedly
11754 <quote>mooted</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11755
11756 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11757 help in the case. Such <quote>moots</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11758 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11759 </para>
11760 <para>
11761 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11762 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11763 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11764 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11765 Congress
11766 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11767 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11768 this central idea.
11769 </para>
11770 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11771 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11772 <para>
11773 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11774 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11775 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11776 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11777 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11778 </para>
11779 <para>
11780 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11781 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11782 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11783 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11784 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.</quote>
11785 </para>
11786 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11787 <para>
11788 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11789 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11790 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11791 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11792 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11793 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11794 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11795 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11796 </para>
11797 <para>
11798 <emphasis role='strong'>The night before</emphasis> the argument, a
11799 line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The case
11800 had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
11801 culture. Hundreds stood in line
11802
11803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11804 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11805 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11806 </para>
11807 <para>
11808 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11809 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11810 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11811 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11812 congressmen
11813 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11814 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11815 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11816 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11817 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11818 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11819 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11820 family of the Justices.
11821 </para>
11822 <para>
11823 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11824 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11825 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11826 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11827 </para>
11828 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day</primary></indexterm>
11829 <para>
11830 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11831 The history was bothering her.
11832 </para>
11833 <blockquote>
11834 <para>
11835 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11836 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11837 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11838 practice that began with the very first act.
11839 </para>
11840 </blockquote>
11841 <para>
11842 She was quite willing to concede <quote>that this flies directly in the face
11843 of what the framers had in mind.</quote> But my response again and again
11844 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11845 </para>
11846 <blockquote>
11847 <para>
11848 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11849 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11851 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11852 is yes.
11853 </para>
11854 </blockquote>
11855 <para>
11856 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11857 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11858 Kennedy, who observed,
11859 </para>
11860 <blockquote>
11861 <para>
11862 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11863 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11864 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11865 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11866 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11867 </para>
11868 </blockquote>
11869 <para>
11870 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11871 student,
11872 I answered,
11873 </para>
11874 <blockquote>
11875 <para>
11876 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11877 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11878 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11879 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11880 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11881 </para>
11882 </blockquote>
11883 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11884 <para>
11885 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11886 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11887 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11888 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11889 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11890 </para>
11891 <para>
11892 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11893 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11894 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11895 </para>
11896 <para>
11897 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11898 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11899
11900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11901 </para>
11902 <blockquote>
11903 <para>
11904 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11905 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11906 </para>
11907 <para>
11908 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11909 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11910 domain
11911 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11912 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11913 into the Copyright Clause.
11914 </para>
11915 </blockquote>
11916 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.</primary></indexterm>
11917 <para>
11918 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11919 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11920 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11921 </para>
11922 <blockquote>
11923 <para>
11924 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11925 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11926 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11927 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11928 time.
11929 </para>
11930 </blockquote>
11931 <para>
11932 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11933 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11934 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11935 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11936 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11937 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11938 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11939 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11940 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11941 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11942 Court to my side.
11943 </para>
11944 <para>
11945 <emphasis role='strong'>As I left</emphasis> the court that day, I
11946 knew there were a hundred points I wished I could remake. There were a
11947 hundred questions I wished I had
11948
11949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11950 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11951 optimistic.
11952 </para>
11953 <para>
11954 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11955 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11956 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11957 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11958 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11959 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11960 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11961 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11962 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11963 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11964 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11965 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11966 law that it had established elsewhere.
11967 </para>
11968 <para>
11969 <emphasis role='strong'>The morning</emphasis> of January 15, 2003, I
11970 was five minutes late to the office and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from
11971 the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the message, I could tell in an
11972 instant that she had bad news to report.The Supreme Court had affirmed
11973 the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven justices had voted in the
11974 majority. There were two dissents.
11975 </para>
11976 <para>
11977 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11978 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11979 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11980 </para>
11981 <para>
11982 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11983 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11984 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11985 reasoning.
11986 </para>
11987 <para>
11988 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11989 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11990 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11991 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11992 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11993 </para>
11994 <indexterm><primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader</primary></indexterm>
11995 <para>
11996
11997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11998 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11999 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
12000 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
12001 </para>
12002 <para>
12003 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
12004 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
12005 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
12006 they had worked so hard to defeat.
12007 </para>
12008 <para>
12009 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
12010 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
12011 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
12012 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
12013 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
12014 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
12015 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
12016 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
12017 be limited, but in this context it would not.
12018 </para>
12019 <para>
12020 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
12021 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
12022 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
12023 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
12024 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
12025 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
12026 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
12027 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
12028 the system we have.
12029 </para>
12030 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
12031 <para>
12032 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
12033 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
12034 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
12035 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
12036 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
12037 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
12038 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
12039 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
12040 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
12041 </para>
12042 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
12043 <para>
12044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
12045 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
12046 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
12047 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
12048 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
12049 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
12050 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
12051 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
12052 <quote>limited,</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
12053 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
12054 </para>
12055 <para>
12056 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
12057 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
12058 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
12059 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
12060 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
12061 </para>
12062 <para>
12063 <emphasis role='strong'>Defeat brings depression</emphasis>. They say
12064 it is a sign of health when depression gives way to anger. My anger
12065 came quickly, but it didn't cure the depression. This anger was of two
12066 sorts.
12067 </para>
12068 <indexterm><primary>originalism</primary></indexterm>
12069 <para>
12070 It was first anger with the five <quote>Conservatives.</quote> It would have been
12071 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
12072 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
12073 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
12074 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
12075 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
12076 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is <quote>originalism</quote>&mdash;to
12077 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
12078 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
12079 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other <quote>originalist</quote> rulings. Where was their
12080 <quote>originalism</quote> now?
12081 </para>
12082 <para>
12083 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
12084 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
12085 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
12086 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
12087
12088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
12089 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
12090 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
12091 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
12092 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
12093 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
12094 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
12095 own principles.
12096 </para>
12097 <para>
12098 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
12099 myself.
12100 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
12101 the law as it is.
12102 </para>
12103 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
12104 <para>
12105 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
12106 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
12107 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
12108 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
12109 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
12110 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
12111 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
12112 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
12113 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
12114 </para>
12115 <para>
12116 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
12117 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
12118 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
12119 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
12120 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
12121 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
12122 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
12123 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
12124 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
12125 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
12126 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
12127 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
12128 effort to persuade; but I
12129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
12130 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
12131 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
12132 should decide the issue.
12133 </para>
12134 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
12135 <para>
12136 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
12137 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12138 Kathleen Sullivan?
12139 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
12140 </para>
12141 <para>
12142 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12143 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12144 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12145 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12146 </para>
12147 <para>
12148 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12149 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12150 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12151 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12152 have persuaded.
12153 </para>
12154 <para>
12155 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12156 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12157 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
12158 case was a mistake. <quote>The Court is not ready,</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
12159 issue should not be raised until it is.
12160 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12161 </para>
12162 <para>
12163 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12164 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12165 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12166 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12167 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12168 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12169 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
12170 </para>
12171 <para>
12172 <emphasis role='strong'>While the reaction</emphasis> to the Sonny
12173 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the
12174 Court's decision was mixed. No one, at least in the press, tried to
12175 say that extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won
12176 that battle over ideas. Where
12177
12178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12179 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12180 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12181 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12182 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12183 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12184 </para>
12185 <blockquote>
12186 <para>
12187 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12188 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12189 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12190 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12191 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12192 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12193 </para>
12194 </blockquote>
12195 <para>
12196 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12197 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12198 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12199 (<xref linkend="fig-18"/>). The <quote>powerful and wealthy</quote> line is a bit
12200 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12201 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
12202 </para>
12203 <figure id="fig-18">
12204 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</title>
12205 <graphic fileref="images/18.png"></graphic>
12206 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
12207 </figure>
12208 <para>
12209 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12210 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That <quote>grand experiment</quote> we call the
12211 <quote>public domain</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think, <quote>Honey,
12212 I shrunk the Constitution.</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12213 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12214 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12215 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12216 </para>
12217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12218 </chapter>
12219 <chapter label="14" id="eldred-ii">
12220 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
12221 <para>
12222 <emphasis role='strong'>The day</emphasis>
12223 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I
12224 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
12225 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was denied&mdash;meaning the case was
12226 really finally over&mdash;fate would have it that I was giving a
12227 speech to technologists at Disney World.) This was a particularly
12228 long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city from
12229 Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my computer and
12230 wrote an op-ed piece.
12231 </para>
12232 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
12233 <para>
12234 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12235 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12236 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12237 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12238 Justice Kennedy: <quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12239 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12240 that.</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12241 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12242 </para>
12243 <para>
12244 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12245 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12247 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12248 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12249 the work passed into the public domain.
12250 </para>
12251 <para>
12252 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12253 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12254 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12255 </para>
12256 <para>
12257 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12258 is either the <quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act</quote> or the <quote>Copyright
12259 Term Deregulation Act.</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12260 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12261 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12262 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
12263 everything else, let the content go.
12264 </para>
12265 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12266 <para>
12267 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12268 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12269 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12270 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12271 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12272 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12273 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12274 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12275 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12276 the stupid harm of the present system.
12277 </para>
12278 <para>
12279 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12280 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12281 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12282 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12283 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12284 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12285 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12286 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12287 where copyright owners could be identified.
12288 </para>
12289 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12290 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12291 <para>
12292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12293 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
12294 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12295 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12296 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12297 <!-- f1. -->
12298 <indexterm><primary>German copyright law</primary></indexterm>
12299 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12300 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12301 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12302 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
12303 every text of the Convention has provided that <quote>the enjoyment and the
12304 exercise</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention <quote>shall not be subject
12305 to any formality.</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12306 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12307 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12308 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12309 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12310 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12311 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12312 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12313 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12314 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
12315 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12316 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
12317 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a <quote>natural right.</quote> Natural
12318 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12319 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12320 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12321 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12322 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12323 </para>
12324 <para>
12325 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12326 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12327 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12328 <quote>Walt Disney creativity</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12329 know what's protected and what's not.
12330 </para>
12331 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12332 <para>
12333 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12334 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12335 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12336 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12337 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12338 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12339 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
12340 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12341 </para>
12342 <para>
12343 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12344 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12345 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12346 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12347 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12348 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12349 </para>
12350 <para>
12351 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12352 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12353 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12354 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12355 burden
12356 imposed upon creators.
12357 </para>
12358 <para>
12359 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12360 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12361
12362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12363 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12364 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12365 the government. He has a property right over the table <quote>naturally,</quote>
12366 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12367 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12368 table.
12369 </para>
12370 <para>
12371 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12372 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12373 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12374 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12375 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12376 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12377 spread.
12378 </para>
12379 <para>
12380 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12381 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12382 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12383 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12384 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12385 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12386 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12387 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12388 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12389 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12390 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12391 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12392 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12393 system of protection for property generally.
12394 </para>
12395 <para>
12396 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12397 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12398 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12399 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12400 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12401 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12402 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12403 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12404
12405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12406 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12407 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12408 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
12409 </para>
12410 <para>
12411 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12412 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12413 didn't <quote>get.</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12414 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12415 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, <quote>short,</quote> then this
12416 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12417 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12418 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12419 </para>
12420 <para>
12421 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12422 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12423 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12424 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12425 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12426 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12427 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
12428 </para>
12429 <para>
12430 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12431 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12432 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12433 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12434 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12435 </para>
12436 <para>
12437 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12438 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12439 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12440 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12441 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12442 </para>
12443 <para>
12444 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12445 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12446 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12447 registration?
12448 </para>
12449 <para>
12450 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12451 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12452 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12453
12454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12455 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12456 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12457 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12458 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12459 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12460 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12461 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12462 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12463 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12464 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12465 </para>
12466 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12467 <para>
12468 <emphasis role='strong'>When Steve Forbes</emphasis> endorsed the
12469 idea, some in Washington began to pay attention. Many people contacted
12470 me pointing to representatives who might be willing to introduce the
12471 Eldred Act. And I had a few who directly suggested that they might be
12472 willing to take the first step.
12473 </para>
12474 <para>
12475 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12476 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12477 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12478 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12479 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, <quote>we are
12480 close.</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12481 something good might happen here.
12482 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12483 </para>
12484 <para>
12485 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12486 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12487 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12488 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12489 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12490 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12491 </para>
12492 <para>
12493 The MPAA argued first that Congress had <quote>firmly rejected the central
12494 concept in the proposed bill</quote>&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12495 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's <quote>firm rejection</quote> had occurred
12496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12497 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12498 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12499 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12500 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12501 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12502 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12503 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12504 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12505 argued that the bill would impose <quote>enormous</quote> costs, since a
12506 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12507 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12508 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12509 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12510 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12511 film is a valid derivative use.
12512 </para>
12513 <para>
12514 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12515 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12516 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12517 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12518 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12519 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12520 </para>
12521 <para>
12522 <emphasis role='strong'>At the beginning</emphasis> of this book, I
12523 told two stories about the law reacting to changes in technology. In
12524 the one, common sense prevailed. In the other, common sense was
12525 delayed. The difference between the two stories was the power of the
12526 opposition&mdash;the power of the side that fought to defend the
12527 status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
12528 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
12529 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
12530 </para>
12531 <para>
12532 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12533 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12534 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12535 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12536 sense?
12537 </para>
12538 <para>
12539
12540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12541 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12542 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12543 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12544 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12545 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12546 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12547 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12548 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12549 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12550 </para>
12551 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin</primary></indexterm>
12552 <para>
12553 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12554 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12555 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12556 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12557 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12558 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the <quote>Dark
12559 Content</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12560 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12561 </para>
12562 <para>
12563 What does this industry really want?
12564 </para>
12565 <para>
12566 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12567 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12568 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12569 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12570 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12571 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12572 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12573 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12574 first.
12575 </para>
12576 <para>
12577 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12578 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12579 its aim not the protection of <quote>property</quote> but the rejection of a
12580 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12581 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12582 theirs</emphasis>.
12583 </para>
12584 <para>
12585 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12586 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12587
12588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12589 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12590 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12591 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12592 and to share its own creation.
12593 </para>
12594 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12595 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12596 <para>
12597 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12598 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12599 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12600 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12601 block the progress of others.
12602 </para>
12603 <para>
12604 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12605 <quote>property</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12606 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12607 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing <quote>permission
12608 society.</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12609 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12610 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12611 </para>
12612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12613 </chapter>
12614 </part>
12615 <chapter label="15" id="c-conclusion">
12616 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12617 <indexterm id="idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'>
12618 <primary>antiretroviral drugs</primary>
12619 </indexterm>
12620 <indexterm id="idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'>
12621 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies</primary>
12622 </indexterm>
12623 <indexterm id="idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'>
12624 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in</primary>
12625 </indexterm>
12626 <para>
12627 <emphasis role='strong'>There are more</emphasis> than 35 million
12628 people with the AIDS virus worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live
12629 in sub-Saharan Africa. Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen
12630 million Africans is proportional percentage-wise to seven million
12631 Americans. More importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12632 </para>
12633 <para>
12634 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12635 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12636 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12637 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12638 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12639 the disease almost invisible.
12640 </para>
12641 <para>
12642 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12643 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12644 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12645 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12646 population:
12647 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12648 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12649 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, <quote>Final Report: Integrating
12650 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy</quote> (London, 2002),
12651 available at
12652 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12653 release
12654 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12655 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12656 </para></footnote>
12657 </para>
12658 <para>
12659 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12660 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12661 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12662 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12663 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12664 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12665 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12666 </para>
12667 <para>
12668 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12669 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12670 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12671 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12672 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12673 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12674 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12675 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12676 changes.
12677 </para>
12678 <para>
12679 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12680 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12681 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12682 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12683 costs significantly below the market price.
12684 </para>
12685 <para>
12686 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12687 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12688 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12689 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12690 Africa from India. This is called <quote>parallel importation,</quote> and it is
12691 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12692 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12693 <para>
12694 <!-- f2. -->
12695 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12696 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12697 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12698 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12699 </para></footnote>
12700 </para>
12701 <para>
12702 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12703 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12704 characterized it, <quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa &hellip;
12705 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12706 imports.</quote><footnote><para>
12707 <!-- f3. -->
12708 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12709 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12710 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12711 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12712 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12713 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12714 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12715 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12716 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12717 Love).
12718 </para></footnote>
12719 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12720 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12721 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12722 possible trade sanctions.
12723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12724 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12725 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12726 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12727 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12728 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12729 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12730 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12731 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12732 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12733 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12734 <!-- f4. -->
12735 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12736 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12737 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12738 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12739 </para>
12740 <para>
12741 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12742 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12743 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12744 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12745 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12746 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12747 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12748 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12749 </para>
12750 <para>
12751 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12752 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12753 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12754 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12755 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12756 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12757 </para>
12758 <para>
12759 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12760 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12761 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12762 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12763 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12764 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12765 by U.S. companies.
12766 </para>
12767 <para>
12768 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12769 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12770 argument
12771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12772 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12773 <!-- f5. -->
12774 See Sabin Russell, <quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12775 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12776 May 1999, A1, available at
12777 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12778 (<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12779 system of intellectual property protection</quote>); Robert Weissman, <quote>AIDS
12780 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12781 Medicines,</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12782 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12783 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, <quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12784 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12785 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12786 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12788 </para></footnote>
12789 It was because <quote>intellectual property</quote> would be violated that these
12790 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12791 importance of <quote>intellectual property</quote> that led these government actors
12792 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12793 </para>
12794 <para>
12795 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12796 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12797 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12798 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12799 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the <quote>sanctity</quote> of an
12800 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12801 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12802 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12803 </para>
12804 <para>
12805 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12806 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12807 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12808 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12809 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12810 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12811 </para>
12812 <para>
12813 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12814 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12815 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12816 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12817 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12818 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12819 </para>
12820 <para>
12821 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12822 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12823 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, <quote>How
12824 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12825 drug would cost an American $1,500?</quote> Because there is no <quote>sound
12826 bite</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12827 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12828 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12830 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12831 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12832 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12833 idea called <quote>intellectual property.</quote>
12834 </para>
12835 <para>
12836 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12837 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12838 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12839 What is the argument?
12840 </para>
12841 <para>
12842 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12843 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12844 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12845 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12846 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12847 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12848 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12849 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12850 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12851 were balanced in just this sense.
12852 </para>
12853 <para>
12854 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12855 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12856 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12857 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12858 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12859 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12860 </para>
12861 <indexterm startref="idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'/>
12862 <indexterm startref="idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'/>
12863 <indexterm startref="idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'/>
12864 <para>
12865 <emphasis role='strong'>A simple idea</emphasis> blinds us, and under
12866 the cover of darkness, much happens that most of us would reject if
12867 any of us looked. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in
12868 ideas that we don't even notice how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a
12869 people who are dying without them. So uncritically do we accept the
12870 idea of property in culture that we don't even question when the
12871 control of that property removes our
12872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12873 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12874 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12875 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12876 this common sense open its eyes.
12877 </para>
12878 <para>
12879 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12880 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12881 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12882 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12883 to fight <quote>piracy,</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12884 the idea of <quote>creative property,</quote> while transforming real creators into
12885 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12886 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12887 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12888 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12889 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12890 produce the <quote>perfect storm</quote> for free culture.
12891 </para>
12892 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
12893 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'>
12894 <primary>biomedical research</primary>
12895 </indexterm>
12896 <indexterm><primary>Wellcome Trust</primary></indexterm>
12897 <para>
12898 <emphasis role='strong'>In August 2003</emphasis>, a fight broke out
12899 in the United States about a decision by the World Intellectual
12900 Property Organization to cancel a meeting.<footnote><para>
12901 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, <quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12902 August 2003, E1, available at
12903 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, <quote>Global Group's
12904 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12905 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12906 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, <quote>U.S. Official
12907 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12908 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12909 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12910 </para></footnote>
12911 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12912 a meeting to discuss <quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12913 goods.</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12914 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12915 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12916 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12917 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12918 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12919 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12920 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12921 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12922 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12923 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12925 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12926 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12927 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12928 in the early 1980s. And it included <quote>open source and free software.</quote>
12929 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12930 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12931 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12932 </para>
12933 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'/>
12934 <para>
12935 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12936 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12937 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12938 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12939 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12940 </para>
12941 <para>
12942 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12943 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12944 meeting.
12945 </para></footnote>
12946 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12947 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12948 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12949 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12950 property issues.
12951 </para>
12952 <para>
12953 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12954 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12955 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12956 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12957 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12958 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12959 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12960 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12961 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12962 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12963 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12964 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12965 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12966 talk about an <quote>Information Society</quote> unless one also talked about the
12967 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12968 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12969 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12970 stuff of
12971 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12972 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12973 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12974 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12975 </para>
12976 <para>
12977 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12978 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12979 thus the meeting about <quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12980 public goods</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12981 </para>
12982 <para>
12983 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12984 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is <quote>open source
12985 and free software.</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12986 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12987 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12988 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12989 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12990 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12991 rather than <quote>proprietary software,</quote> for their own internal uses.
12992 </para>
12993 <para>
12994 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12995 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12996 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12997 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12998 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12999 operating system, the most famous bit of <quote>free software</quote>&mdash;and IBM
13000 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support <quote>open source and
13001 free software</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
13002 to support a mode of software development that is different from
13003 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
13004 <!-- f8. -->
13005 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
13006 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
13007 <quote>open source</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
13008 principal opposition is to <quote>free software</quote> licensed under a <quote>copyleft</quote>
13009 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
13010 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, <quote>The Future
13011 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
13012 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
13013 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
13014 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
13015 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
13016 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
13017 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
13018 May 2001), available at
13019 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
13020 </para></footnote>
13021 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
13022 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft</quote> licenses</primary></indexterm>
13023 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13024 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13025 </para>
13026 <para>
13027 More important for our purposes, to support <quote>open source and free
13028 software</quote> is not to oppose copyright. <quote>Open source and free software</quote>
13029 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
13030 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
13031 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
13032 by
13033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
13034 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
13035 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
13036 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
13037 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
13038 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
13039 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
13040 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
13041 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
13042 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
13043 </para>
13044 <para>
13045 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
13046 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
13047 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
13048 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
13049 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
13050 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
13051 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
13052 <!-- f9. -->
13053 Krim, <quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,</quote> available at <ulink
13054 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
13055 </para></footnote>
13056 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
13057 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
13058 </para>
13059 <para>
13060 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
13061 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
13062 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
13063 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
13064 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
13065 its lobbying efforts.
13066 </para>
13067 <indexterm><primary>Boland, Lois</primary></indexterm>
13068 <para>
13069 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
13070 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
13071 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
13072 Office, explained that <quote>open-source software runs counter to the
13073 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.</quote>
13074 She is quoted as saying, <quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
13075 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
13076 goals of WIPO.</quote>
13077 </para>
13078 <para>
13079 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
13080 </para>
13081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
13082 <para>
13083 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
13084 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
13085 right called <quote>copyright</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
13086 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it <quote>runs counter</quote> to the mission
13087 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
13088 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
13089 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
13090 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
13091 </para>
13092 <indexterm><primary>generic drugs</primary></indexterm>
13093 <para>
13094 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to <quote>promote</quote>
13095 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
13096 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
13097 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
13098 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
13099 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
13100 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
13101 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
13102 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
13103 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
13104 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
13105 </para>
13106 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
13107 <para>
13108 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
13109 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
13110 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
13111 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
13112 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to <quote>waive</quote> or
13113 <quote>disclaim</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
13114 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
13115 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
13116 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
13117 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
13118 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
13119 </para>
13120 <indexterm id='idxboland' class='startofrange'>
13121 <primary>Boland, Lois</primary>
13122 </indexterm>
13123 <para>
13124 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
13125 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,</quote> she's
13126 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
13127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
13128 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
13129 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from <quote>waiving</quote> or
13130 <quote>disclaiming</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
13131 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
13132 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
13133 way possible.
13134 </para>
13135 <para>
13136 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
13137 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called <quote>feudalism.</quote> Under
13138 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
13139 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
13140 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
13141 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
13142 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
13143 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
13144 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
13145 that control.
13146 </para>
13147 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13148 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
13149 <para>
13150 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13151 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
13152 <!-- f10. -->
13153 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
13154 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13155 </para></footnote>
13156 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13157 choice now is whether that information society will be
13158 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
13159 toward the feudal.
13160 </para>
13161 <para>
13162 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13163 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13164 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13165 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13166 </para>
13167 <blockquote>
13168 <para>
13169 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13170 it should be (<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13171 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
13172 not simply to promote intellectual property rights</quote>), not as it is. If
13173 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13174 say anything wrong. But in the world
13175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13176 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13177 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13178 </para>
13179 </blockquote>
13180 <para>
13181 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13182 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13183 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13184 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13185 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13186 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13187 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13188 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13189 </para>
13190 <indexterm startref='idxboland' class='endofrange'/>
13191 <para>
13192 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13193 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13194 <quote>goal</quote> of a government should be <quote>to promote the right balance</quote> of
13195 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13196 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. <quote>Typical for
13197 an academic,</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13198 </para>
13199 <para>
13200 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13201 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13202 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13203 our own country's history).
13204 </para>
13205 <para>
13206 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13207 government should be to <quote>seek balance,</quote> then count me with the silly,
13208 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13209 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13210 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13211 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13212 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13213 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
13214 democracy in the world, become?
13215 </para>
13216 <para>
13217 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13218 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13219 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13221 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13222 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
13223 </para>
13224 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
13225 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
13226 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
13227 <para>
13228 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13229 </para>
13230 <para>
13231 <emphasis role='strong'>There are moments</emphasis> of hope in this
13232 struggle. And moments that surprise. When the FCC was considering
13233 relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby further increase the
13234 concentration in media ownership, an extraordinary bipartisan
13235 coalition formed to fight this change. For perhaps the first time in
13236 history, interests as diverse as the NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org,
13237 William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women for Peace organized to
13238 oppose this change in FCC policy. An astonishing 700,000 letters were
13239 sent to the FCC, demanding more hearings and a different result.
13240 </para>
13241 <para>
13242 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13243 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13244 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13245 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13246 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13247 concentration in the media.
13248 </para>
13249 <para>
13250 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13251 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13252 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13253 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13254 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13255 </para>
13256 <para>
13257 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13258 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13259 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13260 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13261 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13262 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
13263 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
13264 </para>
13265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13266 <para>
13267 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13268 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13269 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13270 Americans have a long history of fighting <quote>big,</quote> wisely or not. That
13271 we could be motivated to fight <quote>big</quote> again is not something new.
13272 </para>
13273 <para>
13274 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13275 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13276 the idea of <quote>intellectual property.</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13277 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13278 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13279 called <quote>property</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13280 </para>
13281 <para>
13282 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13283 of our tragedy.
13284 </para>
13285 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
13286 <para>
13287 <emphasis role='strong'>As I write</emphasis> these final words, the
13288 news is filled with stories about the RIAA lawsuits against almost
13289 three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
13290 <!-- f11. -->
13291 John Borland, <quote>RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers,</quote> CNET News.com, September
13292 2003, available at
13293 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
13294 R. La Monica, <quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,</quote> CNN/Money, 8 September
13295 2003, available at
13296 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
13297 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, <quote>Sued for a Song,
13298 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers,</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
13299 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, <quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13300 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13301 Defendants,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13302 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,</quote> <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
13303 available at
13304 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
13305 </para></footnote>
13306 Eminem has just been sued for <quote>sampling</quote> someone else's
13307 music.<footnote><para>
13308 <!-- f12. -->
13309 Jon Wiederhorn, <quote>Eminem Gets Sued &hellip; by a Little Old Lady,</quote>
13310 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
13311 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
13312 </para></footnote>
13313 The story about Bob Dylan <quote>stealing</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13314 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13315 <!-- f13. -->
13316 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, <quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13317 Dylan Songs,</quote> Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13318 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13320 </para></footnote>
13321 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
13322 anonymous&mdash;reports <quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13323 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13324 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13325 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13326 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.</quote> Congressmen are
13327 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13328 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13329 kids who use a computer to share content.
13330 </para>
13331 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
13332 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
13333 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
13334 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
13335 <indexterm><primary>BBC</primary></indexterm>
13336 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in</primary></indexterm>
13337 <para>
13338 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13339 that it will build a <quote>Creative Archive,</quote> from which British citizens can
13340 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13341 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,</quote> BBC press release,
13342 24 August 2003, available at
13343 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13344 </para></footnote>
13345 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13346 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13347 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13348 country.<footnote><para>
13349 <!-- f15. -->
13350 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,</quote> Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
13351 available at
13352 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13353 </para></footnote>
13354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13355 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13356 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13357 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13358 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13359 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13360 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13361 day into the Causbys.
13362 </para>
13363 <para>
13364 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13365 potential is ever to be realized.
13366
13367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13368
13369 </para>
13370 </chapter>
13371 <chapter label="16" id="c-afterword">
13372 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13373 <para>
13374
13375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13376 <emphasis role='strong'>At least some</emphasis> who have read this
13377 far will agree with me that something must be done to change where we
13378 are heading. The balance of this book maps what might be done.
13379 </para>
13380 <para>
13381 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13382 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13383 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13384 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13385 </para>
13386 <para>
13387 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13388 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13389 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13390 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13391 is so important.
13392 </para>
13393 <para>
13394 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13395 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13396 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13397 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13398 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13399 </para>
13400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13401
13402 <section id="usnow">
13403 <title>US, NOW</title>
13404 <para>
13405 <emphasis role='strong'>Common sense</emphasis> is with the copyright
13406 warriors because the debate so far has been framed at the
13407 extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either property or anarchy,
13408 either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is the
13409 choice, then the warriors should win.
13410 </para>
13411 <para>
13412 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13413 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13414 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;<quote>All Rights
13415 Reserved</quote>&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;<quote>No Rights
13416 Reserved.</quote> The <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13417 permission before you <quote>use</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The <quote>No
13418 Rights Reserved</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13419 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13420 </para>
13421 <para>
13422 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13423 tilted in the <quote>no rights reserved</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13424 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13425 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13426 the
13427
13428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13429 original design of the Internet was <quote>no rights reserved.</quote> Content was
13430 <quote>taken</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13431 unprotected.
13432 </para>
13433 <para>
13434 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13435 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13436 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13437 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13438 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13439 architecture made the effective default <quote>no rights reserved,</quote> the
13440 future architecture will make the effective default <quote>all rights
13441 reserved.</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13442 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13443 content requires permission. The <quote>cut and paste</quote> world that defines
13444 the Internet today will become a <quote>get permission to cut and paste</quote>
13445 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13446 </para>
13447 <para>
13448 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
13449 <quote>all rights reserved</quote> nor <quote>no rights reserved</quote> but <quote>some rights
13450 reserved</quote>&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13451 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13452 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13453 before.
13454 </para>
13455
13456 <section id="examples">
13457 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13458 <indexterm id='browsing' class='startofrange'>
13459 <primary>browsing</primary>
13460 </indexterm>
13461 <para>
13462 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13463 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13464 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13465 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13466 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13467 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13468 to your neighbors or boss. The <quote>privacy</quote> of your browsing habits was
13469 assured.
13470 </para>
13471 <para>
13472 What made it assured?
13473 </para>
13474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13475 <para>
13476 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13477 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
13478 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13479 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13480 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13481 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13482 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13483 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13484 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13485 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13486 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13487 (there is no law protecting <quote>privacy</quote> in public places), and in many
13488 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13489 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13490 </para>
13491 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13492 <para>
13493 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13494 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13495 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13496 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13497 <quote>recently viewed</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13498 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13499 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any <quote>privacy</quote>
13500 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13501 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet</primary></indexterm>
13502 </para>
13503 <para>
13504 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13505 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13506 people should have the <quote>right</quote> to browse in a library without the
13507 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13508 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13509 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13510 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13511 disappears.
13512 </para>
13513 <indexterm startref='browsing' class='endofrange'/>
13514 <para>
13515 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define <quote>privacy</quote>
13516 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13517 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13518 friction did.<footnote><para>
13519 <!-- f1. -->
13520
13521 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, <quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13522 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13523 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13524
13525 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13526 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13527 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13528 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13529 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13530 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13531 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13532
13533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13534 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13535 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13536 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13537 </para>
13538 <para>
13539 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13540 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13541 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13542 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13543 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13544 care much about controlling their software.
13545 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
13546 </para>
13547 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13548 <para>
13549 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13550 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13551 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13552 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13553 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13554 people's work.
13555 </para>
13556 <para>
13557 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13558 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13559 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13560 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13561 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13562 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13563 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13564 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13565 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13566 anything else?
13567 </para>
13568 <para>
13569 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13570 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13571 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13572 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13573 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13574 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13575 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13576 </para>
13577 <para>
13578 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13579 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13581 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13582 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13583 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13584 fundamentally weakened.
13585 </para>
13586 <indexterm><primary>Torvalds, Linus</primary></indexterm>
13587 <para>
13588 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13589 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13590 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's <quote>Linux</quote>
13591 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13592 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13593 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13594 </para>
13595 <para>
13596 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13597 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13598 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13599 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13600 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13601 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13602 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13603 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13604 byproduct.
13605 </para>
13606 <para>
13607 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13608 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13609 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13610 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13611 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13612 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13613 </para>
13614 <para>
13615 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13616 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13617 scientific journals are produced.
13618 </para>
13619 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13620 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13621 </indexterm>
13622 <para>
13623 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13624 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13625 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13626 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13627 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13628 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13629 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13630 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13631 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13632 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13633 and Westlaw are also free
13634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13635 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13636 Court opinion through their respective services.
13637 </para>
13638 <para>
13639 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13640 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13641 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13642 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13643 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13644 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13645 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13646 </para>
13647 <para>
13648 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13649 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13650 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13651 </para>
13652 <para>
13653 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13654 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13655 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13656 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13657 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13658 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13659 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13660 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13661 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13662 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13663 </para>
13664 <para>
13665 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13666 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13667 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13668 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13669 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13670 granted before.
13671 </para>
13672 <para>
13673 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13674 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13675 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13676 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13678 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13679 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13680 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13681 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13682 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13683 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13684 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13685 </para>
13686 <para>
13687 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13688 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13689 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13690 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13691 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13692 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13693 and science.
13694 </para>
13695 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13696
13697 </section>
13698 <section id="oneidea">
13699 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13700 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13701 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13702 </indexterm>
13703 <para>
13704 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13705 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13706 </para>
13707 <indexterm><primary>Stanford University</primary></indexterm>
13708 <para>
13709 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13710 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13711 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13712 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13713 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13714 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13715 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13716 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13717 make this possible.
13718 </para>
13719 <para>
13720 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13721 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13722 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13723 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13724 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13725 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13726 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13727 human-readable description, and
13728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13729 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13730 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13731 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13732 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13733 different than the <quote>All</quote> or <quote>No</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13734 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13735 certain freedoms are given.
13736 </para>
13737 <para>
13738 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13739 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13740 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13741 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13742 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13743 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (<quote>share and share
13744 alike</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13745 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13746 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13747 </para>
13748 <para>
13749 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13750 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13751 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13752 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13753 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13754 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13755 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13756 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13757 a public domain.
13758 </para>
13759 <para>
13760 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13761 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13762 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13763 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13764 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13765 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13767 of content (<quote>content conducers,</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13768 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13769 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13770 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13771 </para>
13772 <para>
13773 The aim is not to fight the <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13774 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13775 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13776 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13777 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13778 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13779 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13780 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13781 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13782 to begin to build those rules.
13783 </para>
13784 <indexterm id='idxbooksfreeonline2' class='startofrange'>
13785 <primary>books</primary>
13786 <secondary>free on-line releases of</secondary>
13787 </indexterm>
13788 <para>
13789 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13790 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13791 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13792 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13793 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13794 </para>
13795 <para>
13796 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13797 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13798 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13799 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13800 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13801 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13802 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13803 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13804 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13805 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13806 </para>
13807 <para>
13808 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13809 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13810 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13811 was a total success.
13812 </para>
13813 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)</primary></indexterm>
13814 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13815 <para>
13816 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13817 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13819 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13820 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13821 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13822 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13823 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13824 well.
13825 </para>
13826 <indexterm startref='idxbooksfreeonline2' class='endofrange'/>
13827 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy</primary></indexterm>
13828 <indexterm><primary>rap music</primary></indexterm>
13829 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter</primary></indexterm>
13830 <para>
13831 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13832 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13833 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13834 reasons. Many who use the <quote>sampling license</quote> do so because anything
13835 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13836 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13837 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13838 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13839 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13840 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13841 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13842 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not <quote>allow</quote>
13843 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13844 high<footnote><para>
13845 <!-- f2. -->
13846 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13847 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13848 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13849 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13850 </para></footnote>),
13851 these artists release into the creative environment content
13852 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13853 </para>
13854 <para>
13855 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13856 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13857 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13858 you are effectively saying you believe in the <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote>
13859 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13860 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13861 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13862 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13863 this notion of <quote>Some Rights Reserved,</quote> and gives many the chance to
13864 say it to others.
13865 </para>
13866 <para>
13867 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13868 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13869 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13870 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13871
13872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13873 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13874 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13875 </para>
13876 <para>
13877 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13878 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13879 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13880 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13881 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13882 steps are possible.
13883 </para>
13884 <para>
13885 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13886 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13887 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13888 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13889 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13890 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13891 creativity to spread more easily.
13892 </para>
13893 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13894
13895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13896 </section>
13897 </section>
13898 <section id="themsoon">
13899 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13900 <para>
13901 <emphasis role='strong'>We will</emphasis> not reclaim a free culture
13902 by individual action alone. It will also take important reforms of
13903 laws. We have a long way to go before the politicians will listen to
13904 these ideas and implement these reforms. But that also means that we
13905 have time to build awareness around the changes that we need.
13906 </para>
13907 <para>
13908 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13909 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13910 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13911 to our end.
13912 </para>
13913
13914 <section id="formalities">
13915 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13916 <para>
13917 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13918 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13919 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13920 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13921 </para>
13922 <para>
13923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13924 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13925 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13926 protected.
13927 </para>
13928 <para>
13929 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13930 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13931 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13932 default is control, and <quote>formalities</quote> are banished.
13933 </para>
13934 <para>
13935 Why?
13936 </para>
13937 <para>
13938 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13939 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13940 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13941 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13942 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13943 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13944 formalities were getting in the way.
13945 </para>
13946 <para>
13947 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13948 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13949 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13950 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13951 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13952 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13953 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13954 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13955 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13956 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13957 </para>
13958 <para>
13959 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13960 <!-- f1. -->
13961 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13962 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13963 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13964 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13965 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13966 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13967 </para>
13968 <para>
13969 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13970 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13971 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13972 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13973 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13974 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13975 developed by others.
13976 </para>
13977
13978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13979
13980 <section id="registration">
13981 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13982 <para>
13983 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13984 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13985 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13986 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13987 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13988 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13989 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13990 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13991 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13992 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13993 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13994 </para>
13995 <para>
13996 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13997 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13998 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13999 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
14000 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
14001 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
14002 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
14003 </para>
14004 <para>
14005 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
14006 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
14007 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
14008 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
14009 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
14010 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
14011 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
14012 with which registration occurs up.
14013 </para>
14014 <para>
14015 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
14016 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
14017 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
14018 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
14019 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
14020 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
14021 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
14022 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
14023 formality&mdash;while producing a database
14024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
14025 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
14026 </para>
14027
14028 </section>
14029 <section id="marking">
14030 <title>MARKING</title>
14031 <para>
14032 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
14033 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
14034 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
14035 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
14036 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
14037 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
14038 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
14039 uniformly across all media.
14040 </para>
14041 <para>
14042 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
14043 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
14044 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
14045 use the work.
14046 </para>
14047 <para>
14048 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
14049 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
14050 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
14051 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
14052 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
14053 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
14054 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
14055 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
14056 </para>
14057 <para>
14058 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
14059 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
14060 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
14061 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
14062 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
14063 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
14064 <!-- f2. -->
14065 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
14066 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
14067 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
14068 </para></footnote>
14069 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be <quote>use unless someone
14070 complains.</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
14071 stop using the work in any new
14072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
14073 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
14074 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
14075 their work.
14076 </para>
14077 <para>
14078 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
14079 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
14080 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
14081 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
14082 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
14083 </para>
14084 <para>
14085 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
14086 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
14087 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
14088 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
14089 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
14090 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
14091 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
14092 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
14093 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
14094 other important functions.
14095 </para>
14096 <para>
14097 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
14098 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
14099 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
14100 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
14101 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
14102 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
14103 </para>
14104 <para>
14105 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
14106 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
14107 make things unclear.
14108 </para>
14109 <para>
14110 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
14111 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
14112 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
14113 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
14114 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
14115 that assertion at the appropriate time.
14116 </para>
14117
14118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
14119 </section>
14120 </section>
14121 <section id="shortterms">
14122 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
14123 <para>
14124 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
14125 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
14126 natural authors.
14127 </para>
14128 <para>
14129 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
14130 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
14131 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
14132 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
14133 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
14134 copyright term.<footnote><para>
14135
14136 <!-- f3. -->
14137 <quote>A Radical Rethink,</quote> <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
14138 available at
14139 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
14140 </para></footnote>
14141 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14142 </para>
14143 <para>
14144 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14145 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
14146 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
14147 terms.
14148 </para>
14149 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14150 <listitem><para>
14151 <!-- (1) -->
14152 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
14153 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
14154 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
14155 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14156 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14157 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
14158 </para></listitem>
14159 <listitem><para>
14160 <!-- (2) -->
14161 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
14162 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14163 fuzziness of <quote>fair use,</quote> and the distinction between <quote>ideas</quote> and
14164 <quote>expression.</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14165 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
14166 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
14167 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
14168 <quote>lawyer-free zone</quote> makes the complexities of <quote>fair use</quote> and
14169 <quote>idea/expression</quote> less necessary to navigate.
14170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14171 </para></listitem>
14172 <listitem><para>
14173 <!-- (3) -->
14174 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
14175 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14176 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
14177 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
14178 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
14179 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
14180 pension.<footnote><para>
14181 <!-- f4. -->
14182 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14183 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
14184 available at
14185 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
14186 </para></footnote>
14187 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
14188 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
14189 single form.
14190 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
14191 </para></listitem>
14192 <listitem><para>
14193 <!-- (4) -->
14194 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
14195 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
14196 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
14197 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
14198 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
14199 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
14200 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
14201 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
14202 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
14203 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14204 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14205 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14206 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14207 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
14208 </orderedlist>
14209 <para>
14210 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
14211 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
14212 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14213 same.
14214 </para>
14215 <para>
14216 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas <quote>radical.</quote> (After all, I
14217 call them <quote>extremists.</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14218 than the term under Richard Nixon. How <quote>radical</quote> can it be to ask for
14219 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14220 </para>
14221
14222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14223
14224 </section>
14225 <section id="freefairuse">
14226 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
14227 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and</primary></indexterm>
14228 <indexterm>
14229 <primary>property rights</primary>
14230 <secondary>air traffic vs.</secondary>
14231 </indexterm>
14232 <para>
14233 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14234 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14235 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14236 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14237 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14238 the emergence of that new technology.
14239 </para>
14240 <para>
14241 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors <quote>exclusive
14242 right</quote> to <quote>their writings.</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14243 right to <quote>their writings</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14244 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14245 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14246 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14247 though that movie is not <quote>my writing.</quote>
14248 </para>
14249 <para>
14250 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
14251 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14252 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
14253 <!-- f5. -->
14254 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14255 University Press, 1967), 32.
14256 </para></footnote>
14257 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14258 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14259 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14260 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin</primary></indexterm>
14261 </para>
14262 <blockquote>
14263 <para>
14264 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14265 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14266 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14267 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
14268 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
14269 </para></footnote>
14270 </para>
14271 </blockquote>
14272 <para>
14273 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14274 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14275 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14276 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14277 Consider each limitation in turn.
14278 </para>
14279 <para>
14280 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14281 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14282 sense to protect John
14283
14284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14285 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14286 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14287 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14288 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14289 after the creative work is done.
14290 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
14291 </para>
14292 <para>
14293 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14294 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14295 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14296 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14297 material. When all <quote>reuse</quote> of creative material was within the control
14298 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14299 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14300 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14301 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14302 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14303 the creative process. Smothers it.
14304 </para>
14305 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
14306 <para>
14307 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14308 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14309 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
14310 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
14311 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14312 much more sense.
14313 </para>
14314 <para>
14315 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14316 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14317 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14318 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
14319 <para>
14320 <!-- f7. -->
14321 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14322 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14323 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
14324 </para></footnote>
14325 His view is that the law should be written so that
14326 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14327 </para>
14328 <para>
14329 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14330 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14331 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14332 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14333 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14334 </para>
14335 <para>
14336 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14338 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14339 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14340 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14341 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14342 </para>
14343 </section>
14344
14345 <section id="liberatemusic">
14346 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14347 <para>
14348 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14349 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14350 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
14351 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14352 battles around the sharing of music.
14353 </para>
14354 <para>
14355 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14356 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14357 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14358 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14359 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14360 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14361 innovation on the network.
14362 </para>
14363 <para>
14364 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14365 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14366 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14367 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14368 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14369 </para>
14370 <para>
14371 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14372 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14373 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14374 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
14375 four different kinds of sharing:
14376 </para>
14377 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14378 <listitem><para>
14379 <!-- A. -->
14380 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14381 for purchasing CDs.
14382 </para></listitem>
14383 <listitem><para>
14384 <!-- B. -->
14385 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14386 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14387 </para></listitem>
14388 <listitem><para>
14389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14390 <!-- C. -->
14391 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14392 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14393 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14394 </para></listitem>
14395 <listitem><para>
14396 <!-- D. -->
14397 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14398 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14399 owner plainly endorses.
14400 </para></listitem>
14401 </orderedlist>
14402 <para>
14403 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14404 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14405 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14406 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14407 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14408 significantly weakened.
14409 </para>
14410 <para>
14411 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
14412 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14413 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14414 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14415 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14416 networks.
14417 </para>
14418 <para>
14419 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14420 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14421 should respond.
14422 </para>
14423 <para>
14424 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14425 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14426 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14427 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14428 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
14429 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14430 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14431 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14432 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14433 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14434 </para>
14435 <para>
14436 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14437 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14438 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14440 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14441 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14442 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14443 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14444 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14445 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
14446 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
14447 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14448 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14449 </para>
14450 <indexterm><primary>cell phones, music streamed over</primary></indexterm>
14451 <para>
14452 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14453 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
14454 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14455 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
14456 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14457 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14458 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14459 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14460 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14461 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14462 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14463 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14464 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14465 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14466 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14467 paying for this content even though <quote>free</quote> content is available in the
14468 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14469 <!-- f8. -->
14470 See, for example, <quote>Music Media Watch,</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14471 April 2002, available at
14472 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14473 </para></footnote>
14474
14475 </para>
14476 <para>
14477 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14478 present: It is emphatically temporary. The <quote>problem</quote> with file
14479 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14480 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14481 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14482 makers today to be <quote>solving</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14483 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14484 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14485 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14486 artists get paid, during
14487
14488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14489 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14490 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14491 </para>
14492 <para>
14493 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different <quote>problems</quote>
14494 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14495 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14496 <quote>problem</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14497 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14498 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14499 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14500 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14501 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14502 </para>
14503 <para>
14504 Type C content raises a different <quote>problem.</quote> This is content that was,
14505 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14506 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14507 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14508 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14509 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14510 way that returns something to the artist.
14511 </para>
14512 <indexterm>
14513 <primary>books</primary>
14514 <secondary>out of print</secondary>
14515 </indexterm>
14516 <indexterm>
14517 <primary>books</primary>
14518 <secondary>resales of</secondary>
14519 </indexterm>
14520 <para>
14521 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14522 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14523 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14524 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14525 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14526 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14527 from the author's perspective, this <quote>sharing</quote> of his content without
14528 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14529 </para>
14530 <para>
14531 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14532 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14533 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14534 providers would be free, under this rule, to <quote>share</quote> that content,
14535 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14536 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14537 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14538 </para>
14539 <para>
14540
14541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14542 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14543 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14544 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14545 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14546 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14547 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14548 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14549 trade.
14550 </para>
14551 <para>
14552 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14553 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14554 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14555 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14556 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14557 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14558 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14559 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14560 </para>
14561 <para>
14562 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14563 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14564 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14565 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14566 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14567 delivering and accessing content.
14568 </para>
14569 <para>
14570 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14571 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14572 </para>
14573 <para>
14574 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14575 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14576 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14577 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14578 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14579 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14580 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14581 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14582 </para>
14583 <para>
14584 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14585 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14586 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14587 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14588 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14589 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14590 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14591 </para>
14592 <para>
14593 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14594 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14595 <para>
14596 <!-- f9. -->
14597 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'>
14598 <primary>artists</primary>
14599 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
14600 </indexterm>
14601 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14602 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14603 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14604 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14605 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14606 2004), ch. 6, available at
14607 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14608 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14609 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14610 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, <quote>Impose a
14611 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,</quote> available at
14612 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, <quote>Who's Holding Back
14613 Broadband?</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14614 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14615 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14616 available at
14617 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14618 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14619 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14620 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14621 2002, available at
14622 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, <quote>Getting Copyright Right,</quote>
14623 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14624 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14625 McCullagh, <quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,</quote> CNET News.com, 27 August
14626 2002, available at
14627 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14628 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14629 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14630 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14631 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14632 debate by about a decade. See
14633 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14634 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14635 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14636 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14637 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'/>
14638 </para></footnote>
14639 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14640 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14641 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14642 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14643 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14644 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14645 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14646 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14647 tax.
14648 </para>
14649 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14650 <para>
14651 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14652 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14653 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14654 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14655 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14656 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14657 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14658 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14659 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14660 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14661 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14662 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14663 controlling access.
14664 </para>
14665 <indexterm>
14666 <primary>artists</primary>
14667 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
14668 </indexterm>
14669 <para>
14670 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14671 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14672 the system supports the widest range of <quote>semiotic democracy</quote>
14673 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14674 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14675 limits on derivative
14676
14677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14678 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14679 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14680 allowed to do with the content itself.
14681 </para>
14682 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
14683 <para>
14684 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14685 <quote>harm</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14686 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14687 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14688 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14689 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat <quote>free</quote> by being
14690 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14691 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14692 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14693 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14694 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14695 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14696 on-line.
14697 </para>
14698 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
14699 <para>
14700 This competition has already occurred against the background of <quote>free</quote>
14701 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14702 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14703 that, there is nothing impossible at all about <quote>competing with free.</quote>
14704 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14705 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14706 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14707 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with <quote>first class</quote> seats, and meals
14708 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14709 finding ways to compete with <quote>free.</quote>
14710 </para>
14711 <para>
14712 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14713 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14714 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14715 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14716 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14717 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14718 the law.
14719 </para>
14720 <para>
14721 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14722 </para>
14723 <para>
14724
14725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14726 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14727 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14728 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14729 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14730 create.
14731 </para>
14732 <para>
14733 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14734 by
14735 </para>
14736 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14737 <listitem><para>
14738 <!-- 1. -->
14739 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14740 </para></listitem>
14741 <listitem><para>
14742 <!-- 2. -->
14743 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14744 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14745 statute;
14746 </para></listitem>
14747 <listitem><para>
14748 <!-- 3. -->
14749 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14750 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14751 </para></listitem>
14752 </orderedlist>
14753 <para>
14754 But what if <quote>piracy</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14755 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14756 consumers continue to <quote>take</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14757 something then?
14758 </para>
14759 <para>
14760 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14761 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14762 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14763 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14764 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14765 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14766 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14767 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14768 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14769 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14770 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14771 pirates.
14772 </para>
14773 <para>
14774 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14775 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14776 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14777
14778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14779 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14780 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14781 </para>
14782 </section>
14783
14784 <section id="firelawyers">
14785 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14786 <para>
14787 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14788 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14789 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14790 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14791 </para>
14792 <para>
14793 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14794 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14795 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14796 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14797 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14798 strong view queers the law.
14799 </para>
14800 <para>
14801 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14802 <quote>radical</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14803 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14804 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14805 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14806 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14807 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14808 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14809 <!-- f10. -->
14810 Lawrence Lessig, <quote>Copyright's First Amendment</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14811 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14812 </para></footnote>
14813
14814 </para>
14815 <para>
14816 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14817 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14818 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14819 </para>
14820 <para>
14821 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14822 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14823 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14824 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14825 <!-- f11. -->
14826 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14827 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14828 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14829 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14830 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14831 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14832 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14833 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14834 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14835 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?</quote> working paper, June 2003,
14836 available at
14837 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14838 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14839 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14840 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14841 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14842 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14843 </para></footnote>
14844 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14845 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14846 them it works.
14847 </para>
14848 <para>
14849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14850 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14851 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14852 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14853 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14854 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14855 practically never be done.
14856 </para>
14857 <para>
14858 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14859 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14860 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14861 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14862 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14863 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14864 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14865 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14866 </para>
14867 <para>
14868 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14869 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14870 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14871 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14872 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14873 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14874 </para>
14875 <para>
14876 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14877 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14878 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14879 its review.
14880 </para>
14881 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid</primary></indexterm>
14882 <para>
14883 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14884 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14885 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14886 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14887 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14888 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14889 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14890 </para>
14891 <para>
14892 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14893 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14894
14895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14896 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14897 simple pragmatic question: <quote>Will it do good?</quote> When challenged about
14898 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, <quote>Why not?</quote>
14899 </para>
14900 <para>
14901 We should ask, <quote>Why?</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14902 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14903 keep your lawyers away.
14904 </para>
14905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14906 </section>
14907 </section>
14908 </chapter>
14909 <chapter label="17" id="c-notes">
14910 <title>NOTES</title>
14911 <para>
14912 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14913 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14914 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14915 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14916 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14917 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14918 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14919 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14920 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14921 the material.
14922 </para>
14923 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14924
14925 </chapter>
14926 <chapter label="18" id="c-acknowledgments">
14927 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14928 <para>
14929 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14930 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14931 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14932 to him that this book is dedicated.
14933 </para>
14934 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
14935 <para>
14936 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14937 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14938 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14939 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14940 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14941 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14942 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14943 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14944 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14945 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14946 critical eye on much of this.
14947 </para>
14948 <para>
14949 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14950 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14951 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14952 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14953 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14954 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14955 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14956 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14957 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14958 </para>
14959 <para>
14960 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14961 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14962 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14963 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14964 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14965 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14966 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14967 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14968 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14969 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14970 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14971 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14972 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14973 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14974 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, <quote>Wink,</quote> Roger Wood, <quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,</quote>
14975 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14976 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14977 a bunch of great replies.)
14978 </para>
14979 <para>
14980 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14981 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14982 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14983 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14984 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14985 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14986 throughout this book.
14987 </para>
14988 <para>
14989 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14990 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14991 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14992 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14993 </para>
14994 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->
14995
14996 </chapter>
14997 <index></index>
14998 </book>