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20 <title>Free Culture
</title>
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
27 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
29 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
33 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
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41 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
43 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
52 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
58 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
59 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
64 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
70 <imagedata fileref=
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73 <imagedata fileref=
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"100%" align=
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76 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
82 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
83 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
84 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
85 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
86 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
91 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
94 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
95 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
96 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
97 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
98 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
99 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
100 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
101 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
102 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
103 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
104 twice listed in BusinessWeek's
<quote>e.biz
25,
</quote> and named one of Scientific
105 American's
<quote>50 visionaries.
</quote> A graduate of the University of
106 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
107 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
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130 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
133 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
135 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
139 <dedication id=
"salespoints">
142 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
144 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
145 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
146 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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&N
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147 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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148 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
153 <dedication id=
"alsobylessig">
156 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
159 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
162 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
166 <dedication id=
"frontpublisher">
169 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
173 <dedication id=
"frontbookinfo">
180 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
181 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
182 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
192 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
196 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
199 Excerpt from an editorial titled
<quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,
</quote>
200 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
201 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
204 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
205 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
208 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
209 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
212 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
216 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
217 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
226 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
230 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
233 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
239 343.7309'
9—dc22
242 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
245 Printed in the United States of America
251 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
259 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
260 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
261 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
262 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
263 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
264 the above publisher of this book.
267 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
268 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
269 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
270 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
271 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
272 author's rights is appreciated.
276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
277 <dedication><title></title>
279 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
287 <title>List of figures
</title>
294 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
295 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
296 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
297 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
302 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
306 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
307 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
308 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
309 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
310 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
311 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
315 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
316 2 Architecture and Law: Force
317 2 Market: Concentration
320 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
321 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
322 2 Constraining Creators
323 2 Constraining Innovators
324 2 Corrupting Citizens
326 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
327 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
331 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
332 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
334 2 1. More Formalities
335 3 Registration and Renewal
338 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
339 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
340 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
348 <preface id=
"preface">
349 <title>PREFACE
</title>
350 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
351 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
354 At the end of his review of my first book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other
355 Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
356 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
360 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
361 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
362 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
363 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
364 David Pogue,
<quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
369 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
370 software, or
<quote>code,
</quote> functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
371 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
372 could always
<quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome
</quote>-like simply flip a
373 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
374 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
375 <quote>affect
</quote> us anymore.
378 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
379 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
380 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
381 causes even after the modem is turned
383 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
384 on-line have fundamentally affected
<quote>people who aren't online.
</quote> There
385 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
387 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
389 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
390 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
391 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
392 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
396 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
397 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of
<quote>free culture
</quote>—not
398 <quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free beer
</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
399 free software movement
<footnote>
401 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
402 </para></footnote>), but
<quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free speech,
</quote> <quote>free markets,
</quote>
403 <quote>free trade,
</quote> <quote>free enterprise,
</quote> <quote>free will,
</quote> and
<quote>free elections.
</quote> A
404 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
405 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
406 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
407 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
408 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
409 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
410 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
411 <quote>permission culture
</quote>—a culture in which creators get to create
412 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
416 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not
<quote>we
</quote>
417 on the Left or
<quote>you
</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
418 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
419 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
420 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
421 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
422 culture deem fundamental.
424 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
426 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
427 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
428 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
429 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
430 As William Safire described marching
<quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
431 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
432 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,
</quote> he formulated perhaps
433 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
435 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
439 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
440 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
441 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
442 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
443 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
444 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
445 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
450 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
451 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
452 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
453 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
454 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
455 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
456 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
457 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
458 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
459 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
460 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
461 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
462 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
463 that this work is
<quote>merely
</quote> derivative.
466 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
467 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
468 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
469 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
470 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
471 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
472 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
473 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
476 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
477 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
478 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
479 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
480 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
484 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
485 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
486 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
487 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
488 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
489 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
490 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
498 <chapter label=
"0" id=
"c-introduction">
499 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
501 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
502 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
503 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
504 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
505 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
506 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
509 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
510 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
511 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
512 and all the space above, to
<quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.
</quote><footnote><para>
513 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
514 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
517 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
518 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
519 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
522 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
523 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
524 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
525 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
526 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
527 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
528 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
530 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
533 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
534 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
535 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
536 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
537 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
538 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
539 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to
<quote>an indefinite
540 extent, upwards,
</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
541 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
543 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
544 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
546 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
547 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
548 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
549 <quote>taking
</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
550 that
<quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
551 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.
</quote> But Justice Douglas
552 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
553 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
557 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
558 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
559 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
560 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
561 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
562 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
563 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
564 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
566 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
567 that there could be a
<quote>taking
</quote> if the government's use of its land
568 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
569 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece,
<quote>(Intellectual)
570 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
571 Authorship,
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
572 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
574 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
575 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
580 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.
</quote>
583 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
584 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
585 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
587 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line:
<quote>Common sense revolts
588 at the idea.
</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
589 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
590 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
591 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
593 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
594 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
596 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
597 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
598 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
599 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
600 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
601 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
602 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
603 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
604 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by
<quote>what
605 seemed reasonable
</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
606 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
607 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
608 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
609 end, the force of what seems
<quote>obvious
</quote> to everyone else
—the power of
610 <quote>common sense
</quote>—would prevail. Their
<quote>private interest
</quote> would not be
611 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
614 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
615 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
616 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
617 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
618 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
619 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
620 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
621 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
622 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
623 understanding of radio.
624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
625 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
626 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
627 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
630 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
631 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
632 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
633 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
634 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
635 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
636 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
637 much less transmitter power and static.
640 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
641 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
642 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
643 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
644 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
645 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
646 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
647 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
648 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.
</quote>
651 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
655 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
656 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
657 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
658 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
659 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
660 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
<quote>music
661 box.
</quote><footnote><para>
662 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
663 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
668 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
669 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
670 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
671 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
672 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
673 a handful of networks.
677 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
678 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
679 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
680 that removed static from
<quote>radio.
</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
681 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
682 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
686 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
687 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
688 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
689 RCA.
<footnote><para> See
<quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
690 Electronic Era,
</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
691 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
693 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
698 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
699 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
700 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
702 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
706 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
707 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
708 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
709 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
710 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
711 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
716 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
717 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
718 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
719 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
720 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
721 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
722 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
723 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
724 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
725 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
726 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
731 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
732 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
733 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
734 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
739 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
741 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
742 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
743 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
744 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
745 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
746 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
747 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
751 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
752 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
753 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
754 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
755 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
756 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
757 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
758 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
759 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
760 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
763 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
764 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
765 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
766 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
767 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
768 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
769 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
770 course always public spirited; the reality is something
771 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
772 to themselves, would crumble in
774 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
775 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
776 effect of technological change.
779 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
780 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
781 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
782 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
783 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
784 before.
<footnote><para>
785 Amanda Lenhart,
<quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
786 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,
</quote> Pew Internet and American
787 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
788 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
790 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
794 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
795 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
796 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
797 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
798 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
799 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
800 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
801 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
802 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
805 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
806 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
807 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
808 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
809 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
810 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
814 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
815 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
816 regulation of each. By
<quote>commercial culture
</quote> I mean that part of our
817 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
818 <quote>noncommercial culture
</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
821 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
822 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his
<quote>Reader,
</quote> or
823 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
824 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
825 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
828 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
829 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
830 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
831 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
832 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
833 left this culture
<quote>free.
</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
834 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
835 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
836 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
839 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
840 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
841 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
842 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
843 marketplace.
<footnote>
845 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
846 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
847 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
848 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
849 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
850 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
851 D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote> Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
853 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
855 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
856 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
857 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
858 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
861 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
862 been erased.
<footnote><para>
863 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
865 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
867 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
868 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
869 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
870 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
871 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
872 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
873 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
874 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
875 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
876 culture, more and more a permission culture.
878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
880 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
881 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
882 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
883 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
884 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
885 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
886 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
887 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
888 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
889 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
893 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
894 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
895 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
896 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
897 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
898 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
899 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
900 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
901 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
902 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
903 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
904 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
905 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
906 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
907 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
908 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
909 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
912 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
913 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
914 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
915 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
916 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
917 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
921 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
923 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
924 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether
<quote>piracy
</quote> will
925 be permitted, and whether
<quote>property
</quote> will be protected. The
<quote>war
</quote> that
926 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
927 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
928 calls his
<quote>own terrorist war
</quote><footnote><para>
929 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
930 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,
</quote> <citetitle>New York
931 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
932 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
933 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
934 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
938 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
939 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
940 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
941 <quote>creative property.
</quote> I believe that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that the
942 law, properly tuned, should punish
<quote>piracy,
</quote> whether on or off the
946 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
947 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
948 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet
<quote>pirates
</quote> will also rid our
949 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
952 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
953 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
954 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
955 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
956 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
958 Neil W. Netanel,
<quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
959 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
960 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
962 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
963 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
964 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
965 could cultivate and extend our culture.
968 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
969 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
970 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
971 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
972 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
973 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
974 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
975 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
976 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
980 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
981 <quote>centrality of technology
</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
982 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
983 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
984 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
988 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
989 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
990 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
991 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
992 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
993 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
994 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
996 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
999 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about
<quote>property.
</quote> The
1000 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1001 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1002 this
<quote>property
</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1003 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1004 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1005 of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1006 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1007 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1008 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1009 <quote>trespassing
</quote> upon legitimate claims of
<quote>property.
</quote> It is as plain to
1010 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1016 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1017 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1018 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1019 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1021 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1022 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1026 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1027 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1028 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1029 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1030 our
<quote>culture
</quote> was as
<quote>owned
</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1031 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1032 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1033 accepted as it is now.
1036 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1037 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1038 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1039 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1042 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1043 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1046 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1047 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1048 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1049 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1050 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1053 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1054 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1055 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1056 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1059 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1060 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1062 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1063 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1064 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1065 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of
<quote>intellectual
1066 property.
</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1067 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1068 this silliness will be much more profound.
1069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1072 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas:
<quote>piracy
</quote> and
1073 <quote>property.
</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1077 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1078 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1079 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1080 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1081 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1082 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1085 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1086 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1087 government, pushed by big media to respond to this
<quote>something new,
</quote> is
1088 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1089 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let
<quote>common
1090 sense
</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1091 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1092 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1093 fundamental about who we have always been.
1096 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1097 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1098 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1099 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1100 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1101 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1105 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1106 <title><quote>PIRACY
</quote></title>
1108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1109 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1110 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1113 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1114 been a war against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1115 <quote>piracy,
</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1116 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1117 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1121 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1122 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1123 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1125 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1128 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1131 Today we are in the middle of another
<quote>war
</quote> against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The
1132 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1133 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1134 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1135 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1136 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1140 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1141 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1142 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1143 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1144 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will
<quote>rob the author of the
1148 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1149 increasingly to technology to defend their
<quote>property
</quote> against this
1150 <quote>piracy.
</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1151 raised to believe that
<quote>property
</quote> should be
<quote>free.
</quote> Forget tattoos,
1152 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1153 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1156 There's no doubt that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1157 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1158 notion of
<quote>piracy
</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1159 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1162 The idea goes something like this:
1166 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1167 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1168 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1169 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1170 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1174 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1176 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1177 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1178 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1180 See Rochelle Dreyfuss,
<quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1181 in the Pepsi Generation,
</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1183 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1184 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1185 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1186 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1188 Lisa Bannon,
<quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1189 Up,
</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1190 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1191 Zittrain,
<quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1192 Speech, No One Wins,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1193 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1195 There was
<quote>value
</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1196 <quote>right
</quote>—even against the Girl Scouts.
1198 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1200 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1201 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1203 of law protecting creative property. But the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1204 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1205 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1208 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1209 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1210 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1211 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1212 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1215 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1216 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1217 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1218 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1219 copyright law today regulates both.
1222 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1223 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1224 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1225 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1226 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1227 more expense of doing business.
1229 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1230 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1232 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1233 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1234 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1235 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1236 <quote>copying,
</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1237 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1238 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1239 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1240 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1241 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1242 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1243 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1244 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1245 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1246 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1248 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the
<quote>Rise of the Creative
1249 Class.
</quote><footnote>
1252 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York:
1253 Basic Books,
2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1254 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1255 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1256 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1257 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1258 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1260 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1261 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1263 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1264 this creative class.
1267 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1268 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1269 context the current battles about behavior labeled
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
1273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1274 <chapter label=
"1" id=
"creators">
1275 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1276 <indexterm id=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'
>
1277 <primary>animated cartoons
</primary>
1280 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1281 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1282 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1283 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1284 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1287 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1288 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1289 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1290 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1291 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1292 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1296 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1297 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1298 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1299 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1303 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1304 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1305 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1306 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1307 synchronization was pretty close.
1310 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1311 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1312 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1313 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1314 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1316 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1317 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1322 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1323 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly:
<quote>I have never been so thrilled
1324 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.
</quote>
1325 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1328 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1329 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1330 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1331 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1332 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1333 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1334 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1337 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1338 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1339 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1340 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1343 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1344 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1345 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1346 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1347 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1348 and among the best of its genre.
1351 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1354 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1355 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1357 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1358 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1359 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1360 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>:
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote> <quote>The
1361 Simpleton
</quote> (Delille),
<quote>Mischief Makers
</quote> (Carbonara),
<quote>Joyful Hurry No.
1</quote>
1362 (Baron), and
<quote>Gawky Rube
</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song,
<quote>The Turkey in the
1363 Straw,
</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1364 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1366 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1367 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1368 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1369 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote>
1370 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1374 This
<quote>borrowing
</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1375 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1376 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1378 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman,
<quote>The Mouse
1379 that Ate the Public Domain,
</quote> Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1380 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1382 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1383 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1384 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1385 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1386 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1387 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1388 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1389 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1393 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1394 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1395 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1396 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1397 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1398 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1399 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1402 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1403 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1404 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1405 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1406 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1407 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1408 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1409 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1410 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1411 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1412 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1414 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1415 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1416 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1417 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1418 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1419 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1420 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1421 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1423 <indexterm startref=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'
/>
1425 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1426 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1427 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1428 its importance. We could call this
<quote>Disney creativity,
</quote> though that
1429 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely,
<quote>Walt Disney
1430 creativity
</quote>—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1431 culture around us and makes it something different.
1433 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1434 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1435 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1436 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1437 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1439 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1440 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the
<quote>average
</quote> term by
1442 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1443 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1444 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1446 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1447 Web site associated with this book, available at
1448 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1450 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1451 copyright holders of a creative work had an
<quote>exclusive right
</quote> to control
1452 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1453 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1456 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1457 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1458 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a
<quote>lawyer-free
1459 zone.
</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1460 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1461 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1462 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1465 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1466 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1467 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1468 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1471 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1472 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1473 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1474 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1475 content from before the Great Depression.
1478 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on
<quote>Walt Disney creativity.
</quote>
1479 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1480 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1484 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1485 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1486 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1487 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1488 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1489 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1490 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1493 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1494 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1495 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1496 the stories that these
<quote>graphic novels
</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1497 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are
<quote>men in tights.
</quote>
1498 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1499 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1500 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1501 interestingly different way.
1504 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1505 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1506 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1509 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1510 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1511 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1512 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1513 transforming it either subtly or
1514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1515 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1516 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1517 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1518 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently
<quote>different.
</quote> But they
1519 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1520 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1521 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1524 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1525 huge. More than
33,
000 <quote>circles
</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1526 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1527 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1528 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1529 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1530 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1531 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1532 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1535 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1536 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1537 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1538 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1539 one. Doujinshi are plainly
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> There is no general
1540 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1541 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1542 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1543 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that
<quote>taking
</quote> without
1544 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1545 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1546 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1548 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1549 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1552 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1553 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1554 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me,
<quote>The
1555 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1556 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1558 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1559 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them
</quote>
1560 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1562 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1563 York: Perennial,
2000).
1567 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1568 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1569 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me,
<quote>there are these rules
1570 and you have to stick to them.
</quote> There are things Superman
<quote>cannot
</quote>
1571 do.
<quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1572 which are fifty years old.
</quote>
1574 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1576 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1577 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1578 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1579 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1580 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1581 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1582 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1584 See Salil K. Mehra,
<quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1585 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?
</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1586 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
<quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1587 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1588 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1589 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1590 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1591 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.
</quote>
1595 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1596 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1597 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1598 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1599 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1600 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1601 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1602 a more general pattern of blocking this
<quote>free taking
</quote> by the doujinshi
1606 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1607 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1608 a friend from a major Japanese law firm.
<quote>We don't have enough
1609 lawyers,
</quote> he told me one afternoon. There
<quote>just aren't enough resources
1610 to prosecute cases like this.
</quote>
1613 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1614 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1615 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1616 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1618 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1619 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1620 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1621 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1622 their clients or hurt them?
1623 Let's pause for a moment.
1626 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1627 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1628 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1631 We live in a world that celebrates
<quote>property.
</quote> I am one of those
1632 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1633 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1634 <quote>intellectual property.
</quote><footnote><para>
1636 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1637 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1638 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1639 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1640 describes a set of
<quote>property
</quote> rights
—copyright, patents,
1641 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1643 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1645 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1646 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1650 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1651 plenty of value out there that
<quote>property
</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1652 mean
<quote>money can't buy you love,
</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1653 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1654 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1655 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1656 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1657 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1658 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1659 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1660 Disney's use would have been considered
<quote>fair.
</quote> There was nothing
1661 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1665 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1666 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1667 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1670 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1674 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1675 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1676 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1677 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1678 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1679 form, whether large or small.
1682 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1683 say that the copycat comic artists are
<quote>stealing.
</quote> This form of Walt
1684 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1685 particular find it hard to say why.
1688 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1689 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1690 without asking or paying for the privilege. (
<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1691 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1692 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?
</quote>) Acting companies
1693 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1694 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1695 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1696 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1697 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1698 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1699 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1702 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1703 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1704 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1705 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1706 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1707 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1708 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1709 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1713 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1714 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1715 question instead is
<quote><emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?
</quote>
1716 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1717 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1718 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1719 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1720 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1721 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1725 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1726 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1727 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1732 <chapter label=
"2" id=
"mere-copyists">
1733 <title>CHAPTER TWO:
<quote>Mere Copyists
</quote></title>
1734 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1735 <primary>photography
</primary>
1738 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1739 producing what we would call
<quote>photographs.
</quote> Appropriately enough, they
1740 were called
<quote>daguerreotypes.
</quote> The process was complicated and
1741 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1742 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1743 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1744 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1745 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1748 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1749 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1750 <quote>automatic pictures.
</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1751 making
<quote>negatives.
</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1752 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1753 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1754 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1755 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1757 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1759 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1760 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1763 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1764 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1766 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1767 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1768 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1769 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1770 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1771 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1772 population of photographers.
1775 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1776 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1777 marketed on the basis of its simplicity.
<quote>You press the button and we
1778 do the rest.
</quote><footnote><para>
1780 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1781 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1782 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1786 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1787 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1788 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1789 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1790 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1791 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1792 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1793 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1794 chemicals.
<footnote>
1797 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1799 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1804 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1805 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1806 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1807 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1808 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1809 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1810 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1811 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1812 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1813 percent.
<footnote><para>
1816 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1817 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1819 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1822 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1826 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1827 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1828 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1829 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1830 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes,
<quote>For the
1831 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1832 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1833 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1834 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1835 interpretation or bias.
</quote><footnote><para>
1841 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1842 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1843 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1844 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1845 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1846 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its
<quote>quality
</quote>;
1847 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1848 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1849 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1850 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1854 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1855 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1856 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1857 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1858 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1859 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1860 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1861 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1863 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1864 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1865 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1866 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1871 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1872 familiar. The photographer was
<quote>taking
</quote> something from the person or
1873 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1874 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1875 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1878 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1879 that they thought valuable.
1881 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1883 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1884 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1885 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1886 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1887 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1890 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote>
1891 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1892 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1893 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1894 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1895 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1896 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1897 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1900 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1901 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1902 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1903 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1904 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1905 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1906 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1907 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1908 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1910 See Melville B. Nimmer,
<quote>The Right of Publicity,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1911 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
<quote>Privacy,
</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1912 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1913 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1918 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1919 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1920 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1921 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1922 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1923 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1924 Kodak would be benefiting from the
<quote>theft
</quote> committed by the
1925 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1926 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1927 from the
<quote>image-right
</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1928 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1929 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1930 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1935 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1936 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1937 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1938 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1939 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1940 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1941 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1942 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1943 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1944 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1945 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1946 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1947 striking images, and the logo
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> in place of the name of a
1948 school. But there's little that's
<quote>just
</quote> cerebral in the projects that
1949 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1950 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1951 film of your VCR. Rather the
<quote>film
</quote> of digital cameras. Just Think!
1952 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1953 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1954 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1955 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1956 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1959 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1960 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1962 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1963 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1964 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it,
<quote>Five years ago, a good
1965 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1966 professional quality for $
595.
</quote><footnote><para>
1968 H. Edward Goldberg,
<quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1969 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,
</quote>
1970 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1971 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1973 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1974 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1975 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1976 learning more and more of something teachers call
<quote>media literacy.
</quote>
1979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1980 <quote>Media literacy,
</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1981 Think!, puts it,
<quote>is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
1982 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1983 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1984 the way people access it.
</quote>
1985 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1988 This may seem like an odd way to think about
<quote>literacy.
</quote> For most
1989 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1990 and noticing split infinitives are the things that
<quote>literate
</quote> people know
1994 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1995 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1996 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1998 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1999 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990);
<quote>Findings on Family and TV
2000 Study,
</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
2002 it is increasingly important to understand the
<quote>grammar
</quote> of media. For
2003 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2004 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2005 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2006 (at least at first) terrible media.
2009 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2010 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2011 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
2012 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2013 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2014 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2015 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2016 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2019 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2020 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2021 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2022 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2023 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2024 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2026 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2028 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2029 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2030 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2033 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2034 about
<quote>the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2035 texture.
</quote><footnote>
2038 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2040 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2041 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2043 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2044 <quote>played
</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2045 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2046 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2047 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2048 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2049 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2050 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2052 See Scott Steinberg,
<quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,
</quote> E!online,
4
2053 November
2000, available at
2054 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>;
<quote>Timeline,
</quote> 22 November
2000,
2056 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2059 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2061 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2062 describes,
<quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2063 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2064 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2065 led.
</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2068 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2069 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2070 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2071 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2075 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2076 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2077 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2078 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2083 <quote>Read-only.
</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2084 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2088 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2089 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2090 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2091 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2094 and this literacy in particular, is to
<quote>empower people to choose the
2095 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2096 express.
</quote><footnote>
2099 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2100 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2101 </para></footnote> It is to enable students
<quote>to communicate in the
2102 language of the twenty-first century.
</quote><footnote><para>
2107 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2109 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2110 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2111 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2112 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2113 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2114 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2115 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2116 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2117 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2118 students know something about
—gun violence.
2121 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2122 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2123 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2124 away. The
<quote>kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,
</quote>
2125 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2126 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2129 Using whatever
<quote>free web stuff they could find,
</quote> and relatively simple
2130 tools to enable the kids to mix
<quote>image, sound, and text,
</quote> Barish said
2131 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2132 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2133 close to the lives of these students. The project
<quote>gave them a tool
2134 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2135 it,
</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2136 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2137 been created using only text.
<quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2138 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2139 gone and done something else,
</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2140 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2141 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2142 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2143 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2148 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?
</quote> I asked. In part,
2149 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2150 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of
<quote>constructing
2151 meaning.
</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2152 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2153 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2154 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2159 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2160 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2161 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2162 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2163 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2164 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2165 you say,
<quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.
</quote>
2166 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2167 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2168 you. [But i]nstead, if you say,
<quote>Well, with all these things that you
2169 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2170 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2171 for me something that reflects that.
</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2172 camera and
… saying,
<quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2173 make a little movie.
</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2174 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2175 about the topic.
…
2178 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2179 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2180 bump up against the fact,
<quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2181 to write something.
</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2182 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2185 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2186 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2187 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2189 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2190 had a lot of power with this language.
2192 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2193 not match with any start quote. -->
2196 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2197 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2198 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2199 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2200 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2201 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2202 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2203 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2204 world would be watching.
2207 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2208 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2209 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was
<quote>balance,
</quote>
2210 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2211 increasingly come to expect it,
<quote>news as entertainment,
</quote> even if the
2212 entertainment is tragedy.
2214 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2215 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2217 But in addition to this produced news about the
<quote>tragedy of September
2218 11,
</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2219 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2220 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2221 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2222 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2223 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2224 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2225 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2226 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2227 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2228 was also the Internet.
2231 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2232 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2233 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2234 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2237 by a student on the
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2241 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2242 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2243 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2244 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2245 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2246 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2247 spread practically instantaneously.
2250 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2251 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2252 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2253 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2254 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2255 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2256 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2259 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2260 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2261 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2262 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2263 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2264 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2265 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2266 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2267 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2268 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2269 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2270 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2273 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2274 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2275 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2276 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2277 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2280 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2281 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2284 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2285 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2286 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2287 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2288 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2289 most important account of early
<quote>Democracy in America.
</quote> It wasn't
2290 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2291 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2292 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2293 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2294 deliberated. Members argued about the
<quote>right
</quote> result; they tried to
2295 persuade each other of the
<quote>right
</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2296 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2297 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2299 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2300 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2304 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2305 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2306 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2308 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin,
<quote>Deliberation Day,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2309 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2311 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2312 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2313 place for
<quote>democratic deliberation
</quote> to occur.
2316 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2317 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2318 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2319 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2320 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2321 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2323 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2324 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2325 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2326 little beyond what our friends say.
2329 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2330 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2331 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2332 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2333 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2336 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2340 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2341 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2342 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2343 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2344 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2345 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2348 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2349 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2350 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2351 is having an effect.
2352 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2355 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2356 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2357 <quote>misspoke
</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2358 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2359 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2360 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2361 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2362 more instances of the same
<quote>misspeaking
</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2363 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2364 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2366 Noah Shachtman,
<quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,
</quote> New
2367 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2369 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2372 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2373 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2374 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2375 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2379 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2380 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2381 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2382 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2383 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2384 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2385 peer-generated rankings.
2387 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2388 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2391 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2393 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2394 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2395 difference is the absence of a financial
<quote>conflict of interest.
</quote> <quote>I think you
2396 have to take the conflict of interest
</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2397 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2398 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2399 get it out of the way.
</quote>
2401 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2403 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2404 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2405 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2406 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2407 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2409 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2411 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2412 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2413 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2414 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2415 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2416 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2417 told her that
<emphasis>they
</emphasis> were writing
<quote>the story.
</quote>)
2419 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2420 debate
—<quote>amateur
</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2421 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2422 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2423 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2424 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2425 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2427 John Schwartz,
<quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2428 Information Online,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2429 D. Kramer,
<quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,
</quote>
2430 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2431 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2433 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2434 <quote>triangulate,
</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2435 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2436 out of it
</quote>—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2439 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2440 with blogs.
<quote>It's going to become an essential skill,
</quote> Winer predicts,
2441 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2442 not clear that
<quote>journalism
</quote> is happy about this
—some journalists
2443 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2446 See Michael Falcone,
<quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?
</quote> <citetitle>New
2447 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. (
<quote>Not all news organizations have
2448 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2449 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2450 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2451 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2452 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2453 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.
</quote>)
2454 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2456 But it is clear that we are still in transition.
<quote>A
2458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2459 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,
</quote> Winer told me.
2460 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2461 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2462 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said,
<quote>we will
2463 be the last thing that gets shut down.
</quote>
2466 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
<quote>you
2467 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.
</quote>
2468 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2469 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2470 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2471 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2472 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2473 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2474 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2475 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2476 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2477 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2478 extraordinary to report.
2480 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2481 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2482 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2485 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2486 His work, as his Web site describes it, is
<quote>human learning and
… the
2487 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation.
</quote>
2490 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2491 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2492 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2493 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2497 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When
<quote>a lot of us grew up,
</quote>
2498 he explains, that tinkering was done
<quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2499 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.
</quote> But digital technologies
2500 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2501 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2502 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2504 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2505 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2506 or
<quote>free collage,
</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2507 the tinkering of many others.
2510 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2511 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2512 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2513 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2514 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2517 This opportunity creates a
<quote>completely new kind of learning platform,
</quote>
2518 as Brown describes.
<quote>As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2519 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2520 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2521 if they can improve it.
</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2522 apprenticeship.
<quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.
</quote>
2525 In this process,
<quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2526 They are code.
</quote> Kids are
<quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2527 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2528 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2529 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2530 you tinker the more you improve.
</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2534 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2535 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2536 it,
<quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2537 intelligence.
</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2538 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2539 text.
<quote>The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2540 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2541 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2542 these multiple forms of intelligence.
</quote>
2544 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2546 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2547 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2550 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2551 kind of recognition.
2554 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2555 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2556 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2557 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2558 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2559 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2560 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2563 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2564 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2565 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2566 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the
<quote>right to
2567 tinker
</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2568 general.
<footnote><para>
2570 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel,
<quote>Technological Access
2571 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,
</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2572 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2574 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2575 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2578 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,
</quote> Brown
2579 explains. We need to
<quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2580 and want to learn.
</quote>
2583 <quote>Yet,
</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2584 evince,
<quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2585 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2586 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2587 system that closes down that part of the brain.
</quote>
2589 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2591 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2592 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2593 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2594 the law to close down that technology.
2597 <quote>No way to run a culture,
</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2598 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2599 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2603 <chapter label=
"3" id=
"catalogs">
2604 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2605 <indexterm><primary>RPI
</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</see></indexterm>
2606 <indexterm id=
"idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'
>
2607 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</primary>
2610 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2611 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2612 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2613 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2614 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2617 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2618 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2619 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2620 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2621 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2622 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2625 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2626 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2627 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2628 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2629 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2632 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2634 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2635 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2636 engines can do this even better. The idea of
<quote>intranet
</quote> search
2637 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2638 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2639 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2640 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2641 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2644 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2645 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2646 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2647 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2648 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2649 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2650 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2653 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2654 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2655 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2656 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2657 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2658 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2659 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2660 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2661 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2665 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2666 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2667 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2668 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2669 be on users' computers.
2672 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2673 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2674 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2675 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2677 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2681 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2682 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2683 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2684 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2685 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2686 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2687 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2688 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2689 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2690 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2691 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2692 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2696 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2697 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2698 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2699 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2700 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2701 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2702 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2705 <quote>It was absurd,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>I don't think I did anything
2706 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2707 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2708 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2709 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2710 easier to use
</quote>—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2711 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2712 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2713 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2714 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2718 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2719 network and had therefore
<quote>willfully
</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2721 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2722 <quote>willful infringement,
</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2723 call
<quote>statutory damages.
</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2724 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2725 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2726 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2729 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2730 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2731 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2732 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2733 huge demands for
<quote>damages
</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2734 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2735 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2736 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2737 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2738 2001.
<footnote><para>
2741 Tim Goral,
<quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2742 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,
</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2743 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2746 <indexterm startref=
"idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'
/>
2748 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2749 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2750 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2751 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2752 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2755 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2756 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2757 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2758 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2759 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2760 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2761 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse,
<quote>You don't want to pay another
2762 visit to a dentist like me.
</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2763 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2766 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2767 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2768 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2769 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2770 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2772 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2773 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2776 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2777 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2780 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2781 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2782 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2783 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2784 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2785 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2786 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2788 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2789 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2790 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2792 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2793 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2794 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2796 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in
<quote>KaZaA and Punishment,
</quote>
2797 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2801 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2802 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2803 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2808 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2809 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2810 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2811 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2815 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2816 his father told me, Jesse
<quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2817 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2818 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2819 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.
</quote>
2821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2823 <chapter label=
"4" id=
"pirates">
2824 <title>CHAPTER FOUR:
<quote>Pirates
</quote></title>
2826 If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means using the creative property of others without
2827 their permission
—if
<quote>if value, then right
</quote> is true
—then the history of
2828 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2829 <quote>big media
</quote> today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2830 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2831 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2836 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2838 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2839 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2840 which details Edison's
<quote>adventures
</quote> with copyright and patent.
2841 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2843 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2844 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2845 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2846 exercised through a monopoly
<quote>trust,
</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2847 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2848 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2849 this creative property
2850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2851 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2854 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2858 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2859 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2860 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2861 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2862 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2863 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2864 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2867 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2868 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2869 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2870 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2871 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2872 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2873 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2874 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2875 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2876 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2878 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2879 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2880 posted at
<quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2881 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,
</quote> available at
2882 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2883 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2884 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From
2885 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2886 the Propertization of Copyright
</quote> (September
2002), University of
2887 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2888 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2889 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2890 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2891 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2895 The Napsters of those days, the
<quote>independents,
</quote> were companies like
2896 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2897 resisted.
<quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2898 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2899 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.
</quote><footnote><para>
2901 Marc Wanamaker,
<quote>The First Studios,
</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2902 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2904 That led the independents to flee the East
2905 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2906 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2907 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2911 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2912 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2913 patent holder a truly
<quote>limited
</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2915 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2916 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2917 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2918 Edison's creative property.
2921 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2922 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2924 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2925 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2927 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2928 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2930 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil
</primary></indexterm>
2932 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2933 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2934 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2935 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2936 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2937 1899 hit
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2938 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2939 right to perform it publicly.
2941 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2943 But what if I wanted to record
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> using Edison's phonograph
2944 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2945 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2946 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2947 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2948 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2949 <quote>public performance
</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2950 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2951 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2952 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2953 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2954 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2955 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2956 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2957 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2958 its composer anything.
2960 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
2962 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2964 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2966 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2970 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2971 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2972 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2973 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2974 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2975 rights.
<footnote><para>
2977 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2978 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2979 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2980 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
2981 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2982 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2983 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2988 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2989 people's works were
<quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2990 genius of American composers,
</quote><footnote><para>
2992 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2993 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2995 and the
<quote>music publishing industry
</quote>
2996 was thereby
<quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.
</quote><footnote><para>
2998 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2999 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3002 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible,
<quote>When they make money
3003 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3005 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3006 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3010 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3011 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3012 player piano argued that
<quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3013 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3014 of anything he had before their introduction.
</quote> Rather, the machines
3015 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3018 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
3019 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3020 Perforating Company of New York).
3021 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3022 Congress was
<quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3023 they represent, and whose servants they are.
</quote> <quote>All talk about
3024 `theft,'
</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3025 wrote,
<quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3026 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3027 statute.
</quote><footnote><para>
3029 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3030 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3031 Graphophone Company Association).
3033 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3036 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3037 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3038 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the
<quote>mechanical
3039 reproductions
</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3040 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3041 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3042 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3043 recorded once. This is the part of
3045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3046 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3047 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3048 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3051 American law ordinarily calls this a
<quote>compulsory license,
</quote> but I will
3052 refer to it as a
<quote>statutory license.
</quote> A statutory license is a license
3053 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3054 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3055 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3056 the fee set by the statute.
3059 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3060 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3061 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3062 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3063 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3064 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3066 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3069 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3070 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3071 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3072 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3073 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3074 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3075 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3076 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3077 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3078 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3079 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3080 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3083 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3084 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3085 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3086 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3087 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3089 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3092 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3093 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3094 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3099 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3101 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3102 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3103 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3104 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3105 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3106 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3107 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3108 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3109 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3110 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3111 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3112 choice.
<footnote><para>
3114 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3115 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3116 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3117 this report.
</para></footnote>
3121 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3122 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3125 <section id=
"radio">
3126 <title>Radio
</title>
3128 Radio was also born of piracy.
3131 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3132 <quote>public performance
</quote> of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3134 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3135 record companies printed
<quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast
</quote> and other
3136 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3137 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3138 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3139 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3140 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3141 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3142 Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3143 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3144 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3146 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3147 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3148 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3151 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3152 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3153 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3154 work. It's one thing to have
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> sung on the radio by the
3155 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3156 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3157 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3158 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3159 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3161 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3166 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3167 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3168 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3169 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3170 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3171 of playing the song.
3173 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3174 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3177 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3178 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3179 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3180 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3183 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3184 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3185 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3186 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3187 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3188 <quote>protected
</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3189 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3192 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3194 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3195 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3196 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3197 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3198 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3199 to take something for nothing.
3202 <section id=
"cabletv">
3203 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3206 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3209 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3210 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3211 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3212 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3214 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3215 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3216 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3219 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3220 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3221 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3223 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3224 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3225 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.
</quote><footnote><para>
3227 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3228 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3229 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3230 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3232 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3234 There may have been a
<quote>public interest
</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3235 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3236 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony,
<quote>Does public
3237 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?
</quote><footnote><para>
3239 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3240 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3242 As another broadcaster put it,
3246 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3247 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3248 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3250 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3251 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3256 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3260 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3261 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3262 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3263 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3265 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3266 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3267 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3271 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3273 These were
<quote>free-ride[rs],
</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3274 Heston said, who were
<quote>depriving actors of
3275 compensation.
</quote><footnote><para>
3277 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3278 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3279 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3284 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3285 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3289 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3290 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3291 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3292 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3295 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3296 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3298 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3299 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3300 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3302 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3306 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3307 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3310 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3311 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they
<quote>pirated.
</quote>
3312 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3313 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3314 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3315 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3316 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3317 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3318 companies thus built their empire in part upon a
<quote>piracy
</quote> of the value
3319 created by broadcasters' content.
3322 These separate stories sing a common theme. If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
3323 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3324 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3325 today
<footnote><para>
3327 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3328 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3329 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3330 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>.
<quote>The
3331 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3332 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet.
</quote>
3334 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3335 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3336 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3337 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3338 last. Every generation
—until now.
3340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3343 <chapter label=
"5" id=
"piracy">
3344 <title>CHAPTER FIVE:
<quote>Piracy
</quote></title>
3346 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3347 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3348 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3349 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3350 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3354 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of
<quote>taking
</quote>
3355 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3356 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3357 taking
<quote>piracy,
</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3358 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3359 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3360 has so often done in the past.
3361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3363 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3364 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3366 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3367 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3368 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3369 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3370 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3372 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3373 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3374 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3375 also Ben Hunt,
<quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3376 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3378 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3379 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3382 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3383 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3384 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3385 This piracy is wrong.
3388 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3389 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3390 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3391 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3392 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3393 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3394 of our existence, treated as right.
3397 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3398 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3399 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3400 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3401 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3402 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3403 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3404 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3405 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3408 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3409 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3410 <beginpage pagenum=
"77"/>
3411 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3412 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3416 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3417 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3418 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3419 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3421 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3422 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The
3423 New Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3424 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3425 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3426 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3427 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3428 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3429 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3430 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3431 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3432 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3433 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3434 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3436 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents
</primary></indexterm>
3437 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3438 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3439 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3440 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3444 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3445 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3446 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3447 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3448 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3450 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3451 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3452 144–90.
<quote>In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3453 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3454 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3455 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3456 pirating were not an option.
</quote> Ibid.,
149.
3457 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3461 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3462 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3463 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3464 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3465 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3466 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?
</quote>
3467 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3468 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3469 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3470 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3471 piracy of the tangible.
3474 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3475 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3476 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3477 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3478 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3479 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3480 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3481 give people the right to
<quote>take
</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3482 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3485 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3486 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3487 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3488 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3489 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what
<quote>property
</quote> means.
3492 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3493 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
<quote>steal
</quote>
3494 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3495 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3496 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3497 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3498 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3499 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3500 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3501 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3502 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3503 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3504 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3506 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3507 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3509 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3512 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3513 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3514 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3515 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3516 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3517 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3520 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3521 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3522 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3523 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3524 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3525 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3526 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3527 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3528 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3529 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3530 violating the law is still wrong.
3531 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3532 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3533 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3534 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3538 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3539 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3540 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3541 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3542 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3543 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3544 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3548 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3549 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is. Or
3550 at least, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3551 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of
<quote>piracy
</quote> are useful
3552 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3553 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3554 <quote>piracy
</quote> in that sense of the term.
3557 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3558 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3559 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3560 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3563 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3564 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3565 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3566 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3569 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3570 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3574 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3575 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3577 The key to the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that
<quote>rob[s]
3578 the author of [his] profit.
</quote><footnote><para>
3580 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3582 This means we must determine whether
3583 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3584 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3585 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3586 author of his profit.
3589 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3590 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3591 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3592 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3594 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3595 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3596 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3597 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3598 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3599 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3600 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3601 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3603 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3604 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3605 put together components that had been developed independently.
3606 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3609 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3610 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3611 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3612 system.
<footnote><para>
3614 See Carolyn Lochhead,
<quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,
</quote> <citetitle>San
3615 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1;
<quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,
</quote>
3616 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Napster Names CEO,
3617 Secures New Financing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3618 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3619 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet
</quote> (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3621 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3622 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3623 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3624 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3625 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3626 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3627 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3630 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3631 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3632 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3633 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3636 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3637 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3638 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3639 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3641 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3642 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3643 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3645 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,
</quote> <citetitle>New
3646 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3648 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3649 massive quantity of content is being
<quote>taken
</quote> on these networks. The
3650 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3651 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3654 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3655 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3656 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3657 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3658 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3659 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3664 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3665 different kinds into four types.
3667 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3670 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3671 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3672 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3673 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3674 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3675 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3676 users who download instead of purchasing.
3677 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3681 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3682 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3683 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3684 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3685 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3686 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3687 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3692 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3693 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3694 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3695 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3696 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3697 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3698 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend
<quote>recalling
</quote> old
3699 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3700 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3701 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3702 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3703 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3709 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3710 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3715 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3718 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3719 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3720 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3721 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3723 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3724 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3726 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3727 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3728 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3729 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3730 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3731 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3734 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3735 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3736 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3737 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3738 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of
<quote>theft
</quote> that is
3739 <quote>devastating
</quote> the industry.
3742 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3743 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3744 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3745 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3746 & Young put it,
<quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3747 technology, the labels fought it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3749 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3750 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3751 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3752 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3753 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption
<quote>Home taping
3754 is killing music.
</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3755 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3756 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3757 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3758 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3759 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3760 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3761 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3762 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3763 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3764 regulating technology was the answer.
3767 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3768 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3769 turnaround.
<quote>In the end,
</quote> Cap Gemini concludes,
<quote>the `crisis'
… was
3770 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3772 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3773 innovation at the major labels.
</quote><footnote><para>
3775 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3779 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3780 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3781 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3782 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3783 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3784 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3785 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3786 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3789 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3790 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3791 The
<quote>net harm
</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3792 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3793 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3794 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3795 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3800 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3801 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3802 actually suggest it might be close.
3805 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3806 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3807 percent.
<footnote><para>
3809 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3811 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3812 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3813 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3814 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3815 #
16</ulink>:
<quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3816 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3817 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3818 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3819 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3820 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3821 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3824 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3825 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3826 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3827 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3828 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3829 account for at least some of the loss.
<quote>From
1999 to
2001, the average
3830 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19.
</quote><footnote>
3833 Jane Black,
<quote>Big Music's Broken Record,
</quote> BusinessWeek online,
13
3834 February
2003, available at
3835 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3836 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3839 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3840 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes,
<quote>The
3841 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3842 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3843 $
19.99.
</quote><footnote><para>
3850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3851 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3852 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3853 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3854 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3855 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3856 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3859 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3860 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3861 The recording industry constantly asks,
<quote>What's the difference between
3862 downloading a song and stealing a CD?
</quote>—but their own numbers
3863 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3864 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3865 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3866 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3867 Kazaa
<quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit
</quote>—then the industry
3868 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3869 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3870 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3871 a huge difference between
<quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.
</quote>
3874 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3875 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3876 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3880 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3881 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3882 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3883 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3884 available.
<footnote><para>
3886 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3887 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3888 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3889 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3890 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3891 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3893 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3894 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3895 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3896 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3897 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3900 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3902 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3903 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3904 today.
<footnote><para>
3906 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3907 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3908 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3909 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3910 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3912 Association of Recording Merchandisers,
<quote>2002 Annual Survey
3915 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3917 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3918 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3919 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3920 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3921 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3922 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3923 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3924 the content they sell.
3926 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3928 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3929 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3930 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3931 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3932 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3933 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's
<quote>Two Love Songs,
</quote>
3934 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3935 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3936 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3937 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3938 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3941 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3942 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3943 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3944 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3945 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3949 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3950 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3951 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3952 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3953 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
3954 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3957 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3958 would be a great advertisement for the
<quote>real
</quote> book. People would read
3959 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3960 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3961 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3962 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3966 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3967 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3968 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3969 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3972 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3973 understandably says,
<quote>This is how much we've lost,
</quote> we must also ask,
3974 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3975 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3976 unavailable?
</quote>
3979 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3980 chapter, much of the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
3981 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3982 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
3983 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3984 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3985 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3986 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3987 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3988 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3989 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3990 found only with time.
3993 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3994 just what you call type A sharing?
</quote>
3997 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3999 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4000 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4002 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4004 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4006 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4007 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4008 <quote>down to zero.
</quote><footnote><para>
4010 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4011 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4014 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
4015 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4016 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
4017 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
4021 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4022 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4023 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4024 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4025 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4026 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4027 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4028 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4029 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4032 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4033 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4034 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4035 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4036 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4037 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4038 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4041 So, as we've seen, when
<quote>mechanical reproduction
</quote> threatened the
4042 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4043 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4044 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4045 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4046 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4047 complained to Congress that their
<quote>creative property
</quote> was not being
4048 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4049 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4053 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4054 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4055 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4056 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4057 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4063 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4064 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4065 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4066 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4067 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4068 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4069 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4070 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4071 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4072 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4073 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4074 Congress chose a path that would assure
4075 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4076 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4078 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4080 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4081 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4082 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4083 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4084 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4085 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4086 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4087 <quote>record
</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4088 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4089 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4090 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4093 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4094 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4095 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4096 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4097 machine to copy only if there were a special
<quote>copy me
</quote> signal on the
4098 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4099 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4100 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4102 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4103 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4104 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4105 for the architecture it chose.
4108 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4109 champion. Valenti called VCRs
<quote>tapeworms.
</quote> He warned,
<quote>When there are
4110 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4111 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4112 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4113 copyright.
</quote><footnote><para>
4115 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4116 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4117 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4118 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4120 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4121 creative judgment,
</quote> he told Congress,
<quote>to understand the devastation
4122 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4123 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4124 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4125 and plain common sense.
</quote><footnote><para>
4127 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4129 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4130 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4132 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4135 — a use the Court would later hold was not
<quote>fair.
</quote> By
4136 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4137 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4138 copyrightowners,
</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would
<quote>take from the
4139 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4140 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4141 profit from its reproduction.
</quote><footnote><para>
4143 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4148 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4149 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4150 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4151 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the
<quote>Hollywood
4152 Circuit
</quote>—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4153 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4154 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4155 called
<quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry
</quote> (worse
4156 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4157 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4158 technology.
<footnote><para>
4160 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4163 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4166 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4169 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4170 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4175 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4176 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4178 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4180 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4181 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4183 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4185 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4190 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4191 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4192 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4193 enough, this
<quote>taking
</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4194 together, a pattern is clear:
4197 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4198 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4202 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS
<quote>PIRATED
</quote></entry>
4203 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4204 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4209 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4210 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4211 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4212 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4215 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4216 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4218 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4221 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4222 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4223 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4224 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4228 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4229 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4230 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4237 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4238 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4240 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4241 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4242 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4243 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4244 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4245 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4246 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4247 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4248 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,
</quote>
4249 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4250 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4252 In each case, throughout our history,
4253 that change meant that someone got a
<quote>free ride
</quote> on someone else's
4257 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4258 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4259 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4260 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4261 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
4262 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4263 the behavior of the
<quote>pirates.
</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4264 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4269 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4270 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4271 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4272 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4273 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4275 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4276 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4277 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4278 permission to record a song?
4281 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4282 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4283 copyright
<quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4284 over all possible uses of his work.
</quote><footnote><para>
4286 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4289 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4290 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4291 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4292 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4293 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4294 facilitate the distribution of content.
4297 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4298 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4299 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4300 should not become a tool for
<quote>stealing
</quote> from artists. But neither
4301 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4302 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4303 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4304 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4305 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4306 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4307 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4308 public interest that innovation continue.
4312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4313 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4314 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4315 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4316 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4317 efficient. Yet these
<quote>potential public benefits,
</quote> as John Schwartz
4318 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
<quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4319 fight.
</quote><footnote><para>
4321 John Schwartz,
<quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4322 Echoes Past Efforts,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4324 Yet when anyone begins to talk about
<quote>balance,
</quote> the copyright warriors
4325 raise a different argument.
<quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4326 incentives,
</quote> they say,
<quote>misses a fundamental point. Our content,
</quote> the
4327 warriors insist,
<quote>is our
<emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we
4328 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4329 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4330 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4331 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4335 <quote>It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>,
</quote> the warriors
4336 insist.
<quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4337 is protected.
</quote>
4339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4343 <part id=
"c-property">
4344 <title><quote>PROPERTY
</quote></title>
4348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4349 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4350 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4351 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4352 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4353 the price she can get.
4356 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a
<quote>property
</quote> right is a
4357 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4358 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4359 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4360 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4361 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4362 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4363 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4364 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4368 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4369 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4371 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4373 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4374 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4375 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4376 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4377 when I copy the way someone else dresses),
<quote>He who receives an idea
4378 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4379 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
</quote><footnote><para>
4381 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4382 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4383 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4387 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4388 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4389 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4391 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4395 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4396 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4397 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4398 <quote>property
</quote> in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4400 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4401 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4402 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4403 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4404 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4405 Adam Mossoff,
<quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,
</quote>
4406 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4410 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4411 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4412 <quote>copyright material is property
</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4413 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4414 these stories, the significance of this true
4415 statement
—<quote>copyright material is property
</quote>— will be a bit
4416 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4417 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4422 <chapter label=
"6" id=
"founders">
4423 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4424 <indexterm><primary>Henry V
</primary></indexterm>
4426 William Shakespeare wrote
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play
4427 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4428 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4429 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4430 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4431 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4432 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4433 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V:
<quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare
4434 is so full of clichés.
</quote>
4437 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4438 <quote>copy-right
</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4439 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4441 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4442 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4443 handsome
<quote>definitive editions
</quote> of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4444 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4445 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4446 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker,
<quote>Jacob Tonson,
4447 Bookseller,
</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4449 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4450 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4452 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4453 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4455 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4456 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the
<quote>copy
</quote> of
4457 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4460 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4461 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4462 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4465 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4466 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4467 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4468 adopted the first
<quote>copyright
</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4469 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4470 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4471 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4472 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4474 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4475 <quote>copyright law.
</quote> See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4476 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4477 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4478 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4479 Tonson's control in
1774?
4482 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
<quote>copyright
</quote>
4483 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4484 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4485 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4486 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4487 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4488 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4489 that the publishers, or
<quote>Stationers,
</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4491 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4494 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4495 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4496 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4497 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4498 from legislatures
<quote>positive law.
</quote> We call the words from judges
4499 <quote>common law.
</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4500 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4501 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4502 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4503 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4506 This question was important to the publishers, or
<quote>booksellers,
</quote> as
4507 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4508 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4509 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4512 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4513 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4515 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4518 The Statute of Anne granted the author or
<quote>proprietor
</quote> of a book an
4519 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4520 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4521 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4522 copyright
<quote>expired,
</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4523 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4527 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4528 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4529 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4530 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4533 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4534 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4535 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4536 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4537 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4538 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4539 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4540 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4541 reason is there to allow someone else to
<quote>steal
</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4544 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4545 about the notion of
<quote>copyright
</quote> that existed at the time of the
4546 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4547 <quote>booksellers.
</quote>
4550 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4551 to apply the concept of
<quote>copyright
</quote> ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4552 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4553 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4554 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was a right
4555 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4556 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4559 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4560 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4561 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4562 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4565 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4566 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4567 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4568 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4569 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4570 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4571 allowed to make his films. The
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was only an exclusive
4572 right to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4574 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England
</primary></indexterm>
4576 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4577 They had had a long and ugly experience with
<quote>exclusive rights,
</quote>
4578 especially
<quote>exclusive rights
</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4579 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4580 monopolies
—especially monopolies for works that already
4581 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4582 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4583 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the
4584 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4585 inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4586 monopoly in publishing.
4589 Thus the
<quote>copy-right,
</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4590 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4591 claim that
<quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,
</quote> try
4592 sounding convincing when uttering,
<quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4593 have it forever.
</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4594 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4595 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4598 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4599 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4600 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4601 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4604 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4605 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4606 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4607 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as
<quote>old patentees
4608 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling
</quote>; they were
<quote>men who do
4609 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4610 indetted.
</quote><footnote><para>
4613 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4614 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4618 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4619 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4620 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4621 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4622 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4626 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4627 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4628 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4629 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4630 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4631 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4633 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4634 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4635 construction and spread of culture.
4638 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4639 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4640 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4641 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4642 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4643 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4644 they said; they needed more time.
4647 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4648 words that echo today,
4652 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4653 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4655 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4656 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4657 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4658 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4659 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4660 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4662 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4663 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4664 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4665 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4666 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4667 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4668 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4673 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4674 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4675 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4676 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4677 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4678 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4679 creative
<quote>property
</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4680 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4681 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4682 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4683 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4684 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4685 way to protect authors.
4688 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4689 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4690 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4691 <quote>The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4692 rancher has for cattle.
</quote><footnote><para>
4694 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4695 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4696 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4697 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4699 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4700 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4703 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4704 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4705 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4707 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4708 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4712 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4713 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4714 reprints
<quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,
</quote> at least
4715 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4717 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4719 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
4721 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4723 and became
<quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.
</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4724 them,
</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was
<quote>the young James Boswell
4725 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4726 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.
</quote><footnote><para>
4730 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4731 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4734 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4735 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4736 inexpensive editions
<quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4737 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4738 Property.
</quote><footnote><para>
4740 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4743 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4744 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4745 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4748 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block
<quote>piracy
</quote> like
4749 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the
<quote>pirates,
</quote>
4750 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4753 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4754 Thomson's poem
<quote>The Seasons.
</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4755 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4756 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4757 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4758 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4760 Howard B. Abrams,
<quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4761 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4765 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4766 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4769 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4770 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4771 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4772 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4773 law would protect the author against subsequent
<quote>pirates.
</quote>
4774 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4775 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4776 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4777 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4780 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4781 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4782 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4783 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4784 with in
1710: How best to limit
4785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4786 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4787 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4788 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4789 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4790 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4791 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4793 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4795 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4796 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4798 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4800 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4801 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4802 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4806 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4807 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4808 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4809 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4810 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4811 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4814 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4815 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4816 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4817 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4818 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4819 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4820 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4821 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4824 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4825 presented to the House and voted upon first by the
<quote>law lords,
</quote>
4826 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4827 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4828 House of Lords generally voted.
4831 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4832 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4834 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4835 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4836 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4837 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4838 passed into the public domain.
4841 <quote>The public domain.
</quote> Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4842 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4843 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4844 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4845 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4846 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4847 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4848 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4849 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4850 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4851 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4852 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4853 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4856 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4857 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4858 where most of the
<quote>pirate publishers
</quote> did their work, people
4859 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4860 reported,
<quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4861 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4862 decision of which so many individuals were interested.
</quote> <quote>Great
4863 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4864 and illuminations.
</quote><footnote><para>
4870 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4871 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4876 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4877 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4878 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4879 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4880 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4881 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4882 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4883 successors.
<footnote><para>
4890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4891 <quote>Ruined
</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4892 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4893 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4894 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4895 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4896 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4897 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4898 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4899 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4900 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4901 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4902 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4903 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4904 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4905 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4906 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4907 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4908 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4909 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4912 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4913 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4914 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4919 <chapter label=
"7" id=
"recorders">
4920 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4922 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4923 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4924 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4925 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4929 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4930 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4934 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4935 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4936 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4937 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4938 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4940 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4943 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4944 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4945 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4946 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
4947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4948 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4952 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4953 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
4954 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4955 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4956 unless
<quote>fair use
</quote> or some other privilege applies.
4959 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4960 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4961 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4962 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4963 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4964 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4967 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4968 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4969 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4970 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4971 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4972 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4975 Then, as Else told me,
<quote>two things happened. First we discovered
4976 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4977 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.
</quote>
4978 And second, Fox
<quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4979 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
4980 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.
</quote>
4983 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4984 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4985 explained to her,
<quote>There must be some mistake here.
… We're
4986 asking for your educational rate on this.
</quote> That was the educational
4987 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4988 confirm what he had been told.
4991 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>Yes, you
4992 have your facts straight,
</quote> she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4993 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4997 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
<quote>And
4998 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.
</quote> As an assistant
4999 to Herrera told Else later on,
<quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5003 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5004 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5005 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5006 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5007 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5008 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5009 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5010 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
5013 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5014 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5015 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5016 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5017 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5018 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5019 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5020 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5021 says the owner gets to control.
5024 For example,
<quote>public performance
</quote> is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
5025 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5026 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see
<quote>My
5027 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>,
</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5028 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5029 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5033 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5034 thought is
<quote>fair use.
</quote><footnote><para>
5036 For an excellent argument that such use is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> but that
5037 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> see Richard
5038 A. Posner with William F. Patry,
<quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5039 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5040 Law School,
5 August
2003.
5042 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>
5043 episode is clearly a fair use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>—and fair use does
5044 not require the permission of anyone.
5047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5048 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon
<quote>fair use.
</quote> Here's his reply:
5052 The
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5053 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5054 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5055 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was
<quote>clearly
5056 fair use
</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5057 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5059 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5062 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5063 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5064 <quote>visual cue sheet
</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5065 shot in the film. They take a dim view of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and a claim of
5066 <quote>fair use
</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5070 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5071 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5072 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5073 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5074 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5075 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5076 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5077 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5079 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5083 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5084 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5085 that Fox would
<quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5086 life,
</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5087 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5088 pockets, me or them.
5089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5093 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5094 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5100 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5101 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5102 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5103 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5104 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5105 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5108 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5109 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5110 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5111 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5116 <chapter label=
"8" id=
"transformers">
5117 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5118 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5119 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5121 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5122 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5123 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5124 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5125 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5127 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5129 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5130 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5131 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5132 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5133 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5134 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5135 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5136 important to his career.
5138 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5140 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5141 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5142 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5143 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5147 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5148 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5149 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5150 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5151 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5153 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5155 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips.
<quote>Our
5156 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5157 Eastwood's films,
</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5158 arose.
<quote>No one had ever really done this before,
</quote> Alben explained.
<quote>No
5159 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5160 actor's career.
</quote>
5162 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5164 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5165 Slade asked,
<quote>Well, what will it take?
</quote>
5167 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5169 Alben replied,
<quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5170 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5171 else that we want to use in these film clips.
</quote> Slade said,
<quote>Great! Go
5172 for it.
</quote><footnote>
5175 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5176 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5177 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden
<quote>Rip, Mix,
5178 Burn
</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5180 <primary>artists
</primary>
5181 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5186 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5187 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5188 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5189 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5190 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5193 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5194 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5195 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5199 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5200 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5201 course we were going to use the
<quote>Make my day
</quote> clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5202 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5203 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5204 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5208 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5209 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5210 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5211 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5212 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5213 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5214 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5215 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5216 started calling people.
5219 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5221 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5222 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5223 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5224 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5225 know, $
1,
200?
</quote> And they would say,
<quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5226 to get $
1,
200.
</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5227 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5228 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5232 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—<quote>and even then we
5233 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.
</quote>
5235 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5237 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5238 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5239 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5243 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5244 hands and said,
<quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5245 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5246 actors.
</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5247 constituent parts and said,
<quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5248 directors,
… this many musicians,
</quote> and we just went at it very
5249 systematically and cleared the rights.
5254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5255 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5256 loved it, and it sold very well.
5258 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5259 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5261 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5262 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5263 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped,
<quote>There is
5264 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5265 at all.
</quote><footnote><para>
5267 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5268 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5269 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5271 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5275 For, as he acknowledged,
<quote>very few
… have the time and resources,
5276 and the will to do this,
</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5277 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5278 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5279 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5283 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5284 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5285 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5286 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5287 compensated for that.
5291 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5292 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5293 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5294 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5295 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5296 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5297 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5298 made to be more clean?
5302 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5303 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5304 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5305 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5307 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5308 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5309 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5310 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5311 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5312 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5313 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5314 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5315 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say,
<quote>Oh, I
5316 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5317 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5318 money,
</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5321 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5323 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5324 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5325 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5326 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5327 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5328 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5329 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5330 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5331 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5332 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5333 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5334 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5335 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5336 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5337 <quote>Does this still make sense?
</quote>
5340 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5341 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5342 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5343 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5346 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5347 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5350 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5351 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5352 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5353 judges loved every minute of it.
5355 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5357 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5358 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5359 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5360 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5361 began his talk with a question:
<quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5362 were just violated in this room?
</quote>
5364 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5366 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5367 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5368 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5369 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5370 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5371 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5372 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5373 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5374 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5375 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5376 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5377 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5378 couldn't easily do them legally.
5381 We live in a
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5382 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5383 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5384 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5385 planted in your presentation.
5388 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5390 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5391 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5392 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5393 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5394 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5395 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5396 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5397 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5400 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5401 wanted to be
<quote>legal,
</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5402 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5403 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5404 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5407 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5408 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5409 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5410 necessarily requiring that the
<quote>free
</quote> use be free as in
<quote>free beer.
</quote>
5411 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5412 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5413 along: a rule, for example, that says
<quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5414 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5415 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5416 copyright owner.
</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5417 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5418 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5422 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5423 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5424 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5425 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5428 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5429 Myers, the comic genius of
<citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5431 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5432 would work together to form a
<quote>unique filmmaking pact.
</quote> Under the
5433 agreement, DreamWorks
<quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5434 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5435 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5436 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5437 entertainment.
</quote>
5440 The announcement called this
<quote>film sampling.
</quote> As Myers explained,
5441 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5442 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5443 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5444 to take that same concept and apply it to film.
</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5445 quoted as saying,
<quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5446 new audiences, it is Mike.
</quote>
5449 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5450 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5451 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5452 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5453 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5454 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5455 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5456 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5459 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5460 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of
<quote>fair use.
</quote>
5461 Much of
<quote>sampling
</quote> should be considered
<quote>fair use.
</quote> But few would
5462 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5463 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5464 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5465 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5466 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5467 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5468 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5469 curse, reserved for the few.
5471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5473 <chapter label=
"9" id=
"collectors">
5474 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5476 In April
1996, millions of
<quote>bots
</quote>—computer codes designed to
5477 <quote>spider,
</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5478 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5479 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5480 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5481 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5482 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5485 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5486 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5487 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5488 the world. Using a technology called
<quote>the Way Back Machine,
</quote> you could
5489 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5490 well as when those pages changed.
5493 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5494 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5495 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5496 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5501 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5502 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5503 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5506 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5507 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5508 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5509 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5510 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5513 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5514 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5515 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5516 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5517 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5519 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5520 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5521 press release stated,
<quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.
</quote> That was
5522 later changed, without notice, to
<quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5523 Have Ended.
</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5527 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5528 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5529 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5530 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5531 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5532 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5533 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5534 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5538 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5539 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5540 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5541 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5542 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5543 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5544 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5547 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5548 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5549 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5550 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5552 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5553 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5554 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5555 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5558 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5559 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5560 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5561 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5562 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5563 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5564 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5565 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5568 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5569 human history. At the end of
2002, it held
<quote>two hundred and thirty
5570 terabytes of material
</quote>—and was
<quote>ten times larger than the
5571 Library of Congress.
</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5572 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5573 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5574 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5575 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5576 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5577 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5578 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5579 is available to scholars for a very low fee.
<quote>But other than that,
5580 [television] is almost unavailable,
</quote> Kahle told me.
<quote>If you were
5581 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5582 just a graduate student?
</quote> As Kahle put it,
5585 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
5587 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5588 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5589 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5590 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5591 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5594 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5595 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5599 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5600 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5601 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5602 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5603 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5604 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5607 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5608 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5609 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5610 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5611 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5615 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5616 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5617 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5618 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5619 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and
<quote>borrowed
5620 back.
</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5621 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5622 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5624 Doug Herrick,
<quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5625 the Library of Congress,
</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5626 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5627 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5632 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5633 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5634 broadcasts, so there was no fear of
<quote>theft.
</quote> But as technology enabled
5635 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5636 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5637 <quote>copyrighted.
</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5638 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5639 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5640 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5643 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5644 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5645 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5646 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5647 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5648 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5649 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5650 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5654 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5655 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 <quote>ephemeral films
</quote> (meaning
5656 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5657 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5658 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5659 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5660 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5661 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5662 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5663 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5664 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5665 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5666 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
<quote>Duck and Cover
</quote> film
5667 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5668 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5669 few minutes
—for free.
5670 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5673 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5674 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5675 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5676 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5677 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5681 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5682 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5683 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5684 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5685 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5686 has
—a noncommercial life.
5689 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5690 of creative property goes through different
<quote>lives.
</quote> In its first
5693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5694 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5695 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5696 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5697 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5698 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5701 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5702 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5703 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5704 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5705 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5706 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5710 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5711 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5713 Dave Barns,
<quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5714 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5715 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5716 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5717 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5718 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5719 </para></footnote>). After
5720 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5721 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5722 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5723 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5724 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5727 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5728 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5729 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5730 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5731 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5732 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5733 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5734 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5738 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5739 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5740 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5741 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5742 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5745 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5746 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5747 little practical effect.
5750 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5751 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5752 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5753 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5754 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5755 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5758 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5759 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5760 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5765 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5766 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5767 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5768 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5769 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5770 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5771 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5772 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5773 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5774 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5775 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5779 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5780 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5781 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5782 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5783 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5784 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5785 will draw upon it to understand it;
5786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5787 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5788 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5789 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5790 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5791 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5794 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5795 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5796 call these
<quote>archives,
</quote> as warm as the idea of a
<quote>library
</quote> might seem,
5797 the
<quote>content
</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5798 someone's
<quote>property.
</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5799 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5801 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5803 <chapter label=
"10" id=
"property-i">
5804 <title>CHAPTER TEN:
<quote>Property
</quote></title>
5806 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5807 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5808 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5809 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5810 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5811 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5812 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5813 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5814 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5817 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5818 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5819 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5820 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5821 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5822 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5823 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5824 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5825 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5827 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5828 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5829 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5830 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5831 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5832 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5833 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5837 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5838 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5839 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5840 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5841 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5842 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5843 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5844 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5845 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5849 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5850 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5851 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5852 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5853 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5854 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5855 redefine the meaning of
<quote>creative property.
</quote>
5858 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5863 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5864 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5865 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5866 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5867 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5868 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5869 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5870 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5872 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5873 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5874 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5875 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5876 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5882 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5883 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5884 <quote>central theme
</quote> to which
<quote>reasonable men and women
</quote> will return is
5886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5887 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5888 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.
</quote>
5889 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5890 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5893 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5894 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5895 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5896 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
5897 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5898 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5899 it comes to the nature and scope of
<quote>creative property.
</quote> His views
5900 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5901 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5902 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5905 While
<quote>creative property
</quote> is certainly
<quote>property
</quote> in a nerdy and
5906 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5908 Lawyers speak of
<quote>property
</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5909 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5910 object. Thus, my
<quote>property right
</quote> to my car gives me the right to
5911 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5912 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of
<quote>property
</quote> to
5913 <quote>lawyer talk,
</quote> see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
5914 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5915 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5916 <quote>creative property owners
</quote> have been
<quote>accorded the same rights and
5917 protection resident in all other property owners.
</quote> Indeed, if creative
5918 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5919 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5923 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5924 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5925 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5926 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5927 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5928 culture would develop.
5931 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5932 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5933 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5934 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5935 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5936 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5937 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5938 the same would be to
5940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5941 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5942 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5946 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5947 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5948 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5949 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5950 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5951 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5952 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5953 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5954 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5955 Constitution itself.
5958 The framers of our Constitution loved
<quote>property.
</quote> Indeed, so strongly
5959 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5960 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5961 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5962 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's
<quote>Takings
5963 Clause,
</quote> to pay you
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for that taking. The
5964 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5965 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
5966 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5969 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5970 Valenti calls
<quote>creative property.
</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
5971 power to create
<quote>creative property,
</quote> the Constitution
5972 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a
<quote>limited time,
</quote> Congress
5973 take back the rights that it has granted and set the
<quote>creative
5974 property
</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5975 the expiration of a copyright term
<quote>takes
</quote> your copyright and turns it
5976 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5977 pay
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for this
<quote>taking.
</quote> Instead, the same
5978 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5980 requires that you lose your
<quote>creative property
</quote> right without any
5981 compensation at all.
5984 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5985 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5986 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5987 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5988 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5989 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5993 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5994 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5995 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5996 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5997 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5998 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5999 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6000 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6001 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6002 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6005 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6006 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6007 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6008 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6009 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6013 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6014 history of these
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights, and the control that they
6015 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6016 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6017 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
6018 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6019 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6020 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6021 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6022 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6023 also control how culture develops.
6027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6028 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6029 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6030 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6031 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6032 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6033 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6034 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6036 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6037 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6038 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6041 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6042 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6043 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6044 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6045 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6046 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6047 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6048 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6049 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6050 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6051 Web, you can be punished
6052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6053 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6054 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6055 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6058 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6059 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6060 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6061 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6062 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6063 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6064 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6065 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6066 the source of the enforcement.
6069 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6070 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6071 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6072 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6073 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6074 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6075 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6076 individual or group might behave.
6079 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6080 <quote>architecture
</quote>—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6081 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6082 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6083 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6084 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6085 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6086 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6087 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6088 theft, but by nature, by
<quote>architecture.
</quote> If a
500-pound boulder
6089 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6090 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6091 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6096 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6097 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6098 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6099 undermined by another.
6102 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6103 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6104 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6105 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6106 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6107 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6108 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6110 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6111 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6114 So, for example, consider the
<quote>freedom
</quote> to drive a car at a high
6115 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6116 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6117 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6118 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6119 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6120 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6121 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6122 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6123 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6124 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6125 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6128 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6129 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6130 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6132 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6133 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6134 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6135 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6136 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6137 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6138 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>The New Chicago School,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6141 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6142 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6143 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6144 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6145 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6146 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6147 used to require that other laws be more
6148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6149 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6150 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6153 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6155 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6156 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6157 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6160 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6161 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6162 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6163 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6164 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6168 Some people object to this way of talking about
<quote>liberty.
</quote> They object
6169 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6170 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6171 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6172 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6173 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6174 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6175 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6176 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6177 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6178 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6179 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a
6180 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6181 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6182 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6183 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6184 <citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6185 1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6186 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons,
<quote>The
6187 Right to Work,
</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6188 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6189 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6190 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6191 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6192 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6193 12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6194 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6195 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6196 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6197 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990)
</primary></indexterm>
6198 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6201 <section id=
"hollywood">
6202 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6204 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6205 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6206 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6207 rallying makes sense.
6210 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6213 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6214 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6215 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6219 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6220 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6221 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6222 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6223 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6224 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6225 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6226 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6227 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6228 this form of infringement.
6231 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6232 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6233 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6234 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6235 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6236 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6239 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6240 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6241 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6242 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6245 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6246 looting that results.
6248 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6249 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6250 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6253 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6254 warriors. Indeed, in a
<quote>White Paper
</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6255 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6256 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6257 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6258 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6259 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6260 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6261 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6262 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6265 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6266 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6267 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6268 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6269 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6270 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6271 life. Homeowners living in a
6273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6274 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6275 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6276 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6277 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6278 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6279 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6282 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6283 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6284 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6285 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6286 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6287 Brown describes it, its
<quote>architecture of revenue.
</quote>
6289 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry
</primary></indexterm>
6291 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6292 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6293 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6294 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6295 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6296 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6297 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6299 See Geoffrey Smith,
<quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?
</quote>
6300 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6301 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6302 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6303 R. Schoenberger,
<quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?
</quote> Forbes.com,
6
6304 October
2003, available at
6305 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6308 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6309 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6310 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6311 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6312 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6313 weakened the
<quote>stickiness
</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6314 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6315 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6316 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6317 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6318 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6321 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6322 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6323 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6325 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6326 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6327 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6328 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents,
<quote>established companies
6329 have an interest in excluding future competitors.
</quote><footnote><para>
6331 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6334 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6335 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6336 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6337 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6338 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6340 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6343 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6344 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6345 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6346 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6347 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6348 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6349 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6350 opportunities for innovation and change.
6353 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6354 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6355 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6356 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6357 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6358 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6359 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6360 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution:
<quote>Congress
6361 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech.
</quote> So when
6362 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would
<quote>abridge
</quote> the freedom
6363 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6364 regulation is justified.
6367 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6369 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6370 <quote>justified.
</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6371 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6372 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6373 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6376 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6378 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6379 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6382 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6383 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6384 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6385 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6386 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6387 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6390 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6391 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6392 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6394 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6396 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6397 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6398 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6399 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6400 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6401 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6404 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6405 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6406 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6407 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6408 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6409 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6410 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6413 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6414 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an
<quote>environmentalism
</quote> for
6415 culture.
<footnote><para>
6417 See, for example, James Boyle,
<quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6418 Environmentalism for the Net?
</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6420 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6421 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6422 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6423 <quote>for free.
</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6424 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6425 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6427 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6428 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6429 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6430 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6431 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6434 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6435 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6436 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6437 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6438 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6439 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6440 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6441 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6442 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6445 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6446 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6449 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6451 <section id=
"beginnings">
6452 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6454 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6455 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
<quote>creative
6456 property
</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6457 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6460 The power to establish
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights is granted to
6461 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6462 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6465 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6466 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6467 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6470 We can call this the
<quote>Progress Clause,
</quote> for notice what this clause
6471 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6472 <quote>creative property rights.
</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6473 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6474 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6475 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6478 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6479 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6480 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6481 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6482 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6483 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6484 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6485 copyrights extend
<quote>to Authors
</quote> only.
6488 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6489 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6490 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6491 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6492 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6493 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6494 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6495 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6496 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6497 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6498 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6499 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6500 concentrations of power.
6503 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
<quote>copyright
</quote>
6504 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6505 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6506 <quote>copyright
</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6507 years since they first struck its design.
6510 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6511 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6513 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6516 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6517 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6518 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6523 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6524 <title><quote>Copyright
</quote> today.
</title>
6525 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6532 <section id=
"lawduration">
6533 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6535 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6536 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6537 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6538 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6539 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6540 authorship.
<footnote>
6543 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6544 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6545 485–86:
<quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6546 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6547 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis></quote>
6549 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6551 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6552 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6553 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6554 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6555 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6556 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6559 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6560 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6561 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6562 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6563 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6564 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6567 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6568 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6569 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6570 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6571 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6574 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6575 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6576 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6577 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6578 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6579 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6580 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6582 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6583 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel,
<citetitle>A
6584 History of Book Publishing in the United States
</citetitle>, vol.
1,
<citetitle>The Creation
6585 of an Industry,
1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6586 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6587 1790 act; William J. Maher,
<citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6588 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context
</citetitle>,
7–10 (
2002),
6589 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6590 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6591 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6592 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6593 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6594 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6595 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6598 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6599 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6601 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6602 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6603 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6607 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6608 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6609 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6610 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6611 domain.
<footnote><para>
6613 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6614 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6615 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6616 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
<quote>Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
</quote>
6617 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright
</citetitle>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6618 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6619 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote>
6620 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6621 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6624 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6625 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6626 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6628 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6629 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6630 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6631 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6632 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6633 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6636 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6637 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6638 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6639 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6640 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6641 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6644 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6645 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6646 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6647 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6648 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6649 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6650 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6651 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6654 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6655 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6656 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6657 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6659 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6660 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6661 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6662 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6665 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6666 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6667 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6668 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6669 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6670 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6671 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6675 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6676 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6677 maximum term. For
<quote>natural
</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6678 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6679 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6680 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6681 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6682 was ninety-five years.
6685 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6686 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6687 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6688 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6689 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6690 that terms be
<quote>limited,
</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6694 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6695 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6696 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6697 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6698 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6699 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6700 years.
<footnote><para>
6702 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6703 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6704 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6705 Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote> loc. cit.
6708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6710 <section id=
"lawscope">
6711 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6713 The
<quote>scope
</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6714 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6715 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6716 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6719 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only
<quote>maps,
6720 charts, and books.
</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6721 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6722 the author the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> copyrighted works. That
6723 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6724 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6725 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6726 did not extend to what lawyers call
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> It would not,
6727 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6728 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6729 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6732 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6733 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6734 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6735 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6736 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6737 work not only the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> the work, but also the
6738 exclusive right of control over any
<quote>copies
</quote> of that work. And most
6739 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6740 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6741 <quote>derivative work
</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6742 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6743 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6744 on the initial creative work.
6747 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6748 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6749 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6751 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6752 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6753 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6754 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6755 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6756 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6757 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6761 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6762 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6763 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6764 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6765 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6766 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6767 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6768 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6769 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6770 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6771 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6775 All of these
<quote>formalities
</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6776 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6777 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6778 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6779 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6780 copy available for others to copy.
6783 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6787 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6788 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6789 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6790 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6791 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6792 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6794 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner,
<quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6795 Creation of American Literature,
</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6796 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6797 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6800 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6801 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6802 the United States
—publishers.
6805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6806 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6807 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6808 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6809 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6810 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6811 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6815 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6816 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6817 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6818 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6819 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6820 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6824 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6825 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6826 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6829 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6831 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6832 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of
<quote>derivative
6833 rights.
</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6834 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6835 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6836 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6837 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6839 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6840 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6843 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6844 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6846 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6848 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6849 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6850 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6851 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6855 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6856 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6857 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6858 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6859 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6860 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6861 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6862 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6863 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6865 Jonathan Zittrain,
<quote>The Copyright Cage,
</quote> <citetitle>Legal
6866 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
6867 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6868 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6870 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6871 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6872 the wrong of direct piracy.
6875 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6876 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6877 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6878 of my book.
<footnote><para>
6880 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6881 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6882 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere
<quote>copies
</quote> and
6883 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld,
<quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
6884 Copyright's Constitutionality,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
6885 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
6887 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb
</primary></indexterm>
6889 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6892 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6893 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6894 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6895 called
<quote>Mickey Mouse,
</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6896 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6900 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6901 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6902 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6903 the rights originally granted.
6906 <section id=
"lawreach">
6907 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6909 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6910 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6911 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6912 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6914 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6915 certainly regulates more than
<quote>copies
</quote>—a public performance of a
6916 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6917 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6918 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a
<quote>copy
</quote>;
17
6919 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
6920 existing law (which regulates
<quote>copies;
</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6921 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6926 <quote>Copies.
</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6927 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6928 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that
<quote>creative
6929 property
</quote> deserves the
<quote>same rights
</quote> as all other property, it is the
6930 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6931 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6932 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6933 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6934 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6935 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
6936 the trigger for copyright law.
6939 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6940 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6941 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6942 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6944 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
6945 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
6946 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
6947 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
6950 because it is clear that the
6951 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6952 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6955 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6958 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6959 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6960 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6964 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6965 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6966 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6967 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6968 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6969 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6970 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6971 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6972 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6973 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6974 acts do not make a copy.
6976 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6977 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6978 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6981 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6982 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6983 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6984 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6985 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6986 diagram on next page).
6989 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6990 that remain unregulated because the law considers these
<quote>fair uses.
</quote>
6992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6993 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6994 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6995 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6998 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
6999 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7000 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7001 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7002 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7003 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7004 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such
<quote>fair uses
</quote>
7005 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7007 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7008 <title>Unregulated copying considered
<quote>fair uses.
</quote></title>
7009 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7012 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7013 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7014 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7018 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7019 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7020 are nonetheless deemed
<quote>fair
</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7023 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7024 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7026 I don't mean
<quote>nature
</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7027 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7028 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7029 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7032 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7033 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7034 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7035 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7036 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7037 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7038 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7039 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7040 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7044 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7045 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7046 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7047 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7048 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7049 the book once, ten times, or every
7050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7051 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7052 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7053 none of those uses produced a copy.
7056 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7057 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7058 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7059 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7060 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7061 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7062 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7063 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7064 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7065 copyright owner's wish.
7068 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7069 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7070 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7071 points also become clear:
7074 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7075 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7076 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7077 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7078 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7079 part of free culture before the Internet.
7082 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7083 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7084 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7085 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7086 using a machine.
<quote>Copy and paste
</quote> and
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> become
7087 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7088 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7089 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7090 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7094 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7097 burden on category
3 (
<quote>fair use
</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7098 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7099 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7100 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7101 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7102 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7103 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7104 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7108 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7109 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7110 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7111 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7112 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7113 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7114 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7118 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7119 in the business of making
<quote>trailer
</quote> advertisements for movies available
7120 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7121 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7122 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7125 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7126 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7127 previews. The idea was to expand their
<quote>selling by sampling
</quote>
7128 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7129 <quote>browsing.
</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7130 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7131 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7134 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7135 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7136 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7137 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7139 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7140 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7141 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7142 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7143 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7144 <quote>fair use
</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7145 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7149 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7150 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had
<quote>willfully
7151 infringed
</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7152 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7153 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7154 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7155 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7156 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7159 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7160 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7161 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7162 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7163 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7164 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7165 Disney's permission.
7168 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7169 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7170 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7171 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7172 was in the marketplace, the
<quote>first-sale doctrine
</quote> would free the
7173 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7174 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7175 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7176 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7177 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7178 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7179 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7183 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7184 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7185 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7186 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7187 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7188 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7189 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7190 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7191 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7192 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7193 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7194 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7195 happening are quite slight.
7198 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7199 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7200 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7201 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7202 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7203 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7206 <section id=
"lawforce">
7207 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7209 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7210 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7211 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7212 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7215 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7216 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7217 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7218 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7219 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7222 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7223 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7224 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7226 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7227 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7230 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7231 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7233 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7234 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7235 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7236 plan.
<footnote><para>
7238 See David Lange,
<quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7239 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7243 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7244 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers
<quote>were brothers long before
7245 you were.
</quote><footnote><para>
7247 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7248 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7249 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7251 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7252 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7253 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7254 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7257 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7258 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7259 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7260 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7263 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7264 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7265 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7266 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7267 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7268 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7269 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7270 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7272 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7273 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7275 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7276 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7279 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7282 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7283 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7284 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7285 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7289 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7293 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7294 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7295 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7296 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7297 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7298 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7299 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7302 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7303 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7305 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7306 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7307 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7310 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7311 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7313 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7314 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7315 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7319 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7320 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7321 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7322 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7323 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7324 read aloud through the computer.
7327 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7328 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7329 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7330 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7332 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7333 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote></title>
7334 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7337 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7338 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7341 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7342 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote>.
</title>
7343 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7346 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7347 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7351 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7352 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>The Future of Ideas
</quote>.
</title>
7353 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7356 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7359 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7360 <quote>permissions
</quote>— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7361 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7362 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7363 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7364 power.
<footnote><para>
7366 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7367 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7368 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7369 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7370 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7371 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7372 subsequently acquired the book.
7374 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7375 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7376 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7377 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7378 control that the law would enable.
7381 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7382 within which the e-book
<quote>lives.
</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7383 permissions, they are not the sort of
<quote>permissions
</quote> that most of us
7384 deal with. When a teenager gets
<quote>permission
</quote> to stay out till
7385 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7386 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7387 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7388 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7389 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7390 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7391 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7392 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7393 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7394 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7399 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7400 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7401 you tried to type
<quote>Warner Brothers,
</quote> erased
<quote>Brothers
</quote> from the
7403 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7406 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7407 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7408 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7409 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7410 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7411 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7412 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7415 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7416 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7417 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7418 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7419 to defeat these protections as well?
7422 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7426 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7427 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7428 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7429 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7430 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7432 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7434 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7435 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>Alice's Adventures in
7436 Wonderland
</quote>.
</title>
7437 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7439 <beginpage pagenum=
"164"/>
7441 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7442 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7443 <quote>permissions
</quote> indicated, not allowed to
<quote>read aloud
</quote>!
7446 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7447 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7448 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7449 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7450 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7451 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7454 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7455 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7456 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7457 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7458 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7459 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7460 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7461 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7462 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7463 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7464 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7467 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7468 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7469 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7470 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7471 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7474 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7476 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7477 story of mine that makes the same point.
7479 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7480 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7482 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'
>
7483 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7485 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7486 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7487 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7490 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named
<quote>Aibo.
</quote> The Aibo
7491 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7492 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7495 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7496 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7497 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7498 <beginpage pagenum=
"165"/>
7499 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7500 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7501 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7504 <quote>Teach
</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7505 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7506 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7507 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7508 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7509 their computer
<quote>dog
</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7512 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7513 <citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7514 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7515 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7516 them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much more positive
7517 term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7518 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7519 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7520 old computer doesn't run, or
<quote>drive,
</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7521 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7522 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7526 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7527 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7528 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7529 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7533 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7534 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7535 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7536 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7537 than Sony had built.
7539 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7540 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'
/>
7541 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7543 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7544 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7545 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7546 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7550 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7551 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7552 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7553 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7554 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7555 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7556 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7559 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7560 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7561 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7562 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7563 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7564 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7565 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7566 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7567 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7570 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7572 See Pamela Samuelson,
<quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,
</quote>
7573 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
<quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7574 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,
</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7575 January
2002;
<quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7576 DMCA,
</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7577 Holland,
<quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,
</quote> <citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7578 May
2001; Janelle Brown,
<quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?
</quote> Salon.com,
7579 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<quote>Frequently Asked
7580 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case,
</quote> available at
7581 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7582 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7584 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7585 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7586 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7587 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7590 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7591 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7592 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7593 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7594 <quote>this music cannot be copied,
</quote> and have a computer respect that
7595 command. The technology was to be part of a
<quote>trusted system
</quote> of
7596 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7600 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7601 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7602 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7603 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7607 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7608 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7609 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7610 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7613 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7614 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7615 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7616 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7617 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7618 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7621 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7622 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7623 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7624 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7625 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7626 constituted, succeed.
7628 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7629 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7631 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'
>
7632 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7634 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7635 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7636 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7639 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7640 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7641 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7646 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7647 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7648 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7651 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7652 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'
/>
7653 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7655 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7656 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7657 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7661 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7663 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7664 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7665 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (
<quote>DMCA
</quote>).
7669 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7670 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7671 spreading such information an offense.
7674 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7675 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7676 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7677 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7678 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7679 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7680 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7681 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7682 protection for copyright owners.
7685 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7686 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7687 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7688 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7689 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7692 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7693 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7694 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7695 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7696 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7697 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7698 have been a copyright violation.
7700 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7701 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7703 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7704 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7707 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7708 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7709 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7710 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7711 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7712 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7713 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7715 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7716 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7719 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7720 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7721 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7722 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7723 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7724 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7726 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7728 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7729 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7730 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7731 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7732 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7733 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
<quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,
</quote>
7734 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7735 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7736 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7740 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7741 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7742 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7743 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7744 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7745 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the
<quote>Neighborhood
</quote>
7746 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7747 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7748 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7749 broadcasting has always been
<quote>You are an important person just the way
7750 you are. You can make healthy decisions.
</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7751 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7752 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7753 important.
<footnote><para>
7755 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7756 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7757 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7758 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7759 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7765 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7766 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7767 the VCR responsible.
7770 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7772 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7775 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7778 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7779 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7780 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7781 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7782 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7783 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7786 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7788 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7789 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7790 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7793 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7794 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7795 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7798 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7799 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7800 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7801 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7802 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7803 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7804 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7806 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7807 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7809 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7810 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7813 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7814 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7815 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7816 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7817 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7818 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7821 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7822 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7823 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7824 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7825 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7826 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7827 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7828 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7829 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7830 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7833 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7834 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7835 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7836 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7837 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7838 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7839 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7840 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7841 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7845 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7846 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7847 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7848 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7849 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7850 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7852 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet,
<quote>Legal Fictions,
7853 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7854 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7858 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7859 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7860 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7861 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7862 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7865 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7866 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7867 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7868 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7869 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7870 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7871 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7872 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7875 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7876 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7877 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7878 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7879 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7880 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7883 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
7884 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7886 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7887 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7888 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7889 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7890 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7893 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7894 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7895 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7896 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7897 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7898 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7899 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7900 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7904 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7905 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7906 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7907 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7908 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7911 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7912 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7913 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7914 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7915 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7916 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7917 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7918 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7922 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7926 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7927 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7928 ownership,
<quote>five companies control
85 percent of our media sources.
</quote><footnote><para>
7930 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7931 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7932 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7933 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7934 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7935 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7937 Lynette Holloway,
<quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7938 Slide,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
7940 The
<quote>five largest cable companies pipe
7941 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.
</quote><footnote><para>
7943 Molly Ivins,
<quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,
</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
7946 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7947 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
7948 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
7949 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
7950 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
7953 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7954 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7956 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
7957 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7958 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
7959 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
7960 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
7961 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7964 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7965 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7966 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7967 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7968 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7969 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7970 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7971 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7972 protected
— by the market.
7975 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7976 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7977 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7978 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7982 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7983 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7984 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7985 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7986 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7987 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7988 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7989 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7990 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7991 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7993 James Fallows,
<quote>The Age of Murdoch,
</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
7995 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8000 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8001 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8002 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8003 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8005 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8006 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8007 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8011 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8012 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8016 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8017 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8018 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8019 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8022 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8023 integration may matter.
8025 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8026 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8027 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8029 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
8030 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8031 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8032 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8033 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8036 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8037 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8038 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8039 control.
<footnote><para>
8041 Leonard Hill,
<quote>The Axis of Access,
</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8042 Forum,
<quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,
</quote> St. Louis,
8043 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8044 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8045 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8046 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8052 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8053 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8054 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8055 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
8056 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8057 television
—75 percent of it
—was
<quote>independent
</quote> of the
8061 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8062 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8063 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8064 2002, only five independent television studios remained.
<quote>In
1992,
8065 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8066 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8067 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent.
</quote> <quote>In
1992,
16
8068 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8069 year there was one.
</quote><footnote><para>
8071 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8072 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8073 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8074 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8075 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8076 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8077 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8080 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8081 that ran it.
<quote>In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8082 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8083 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8084 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8085 63%.
</quote><footnote><para>
8090 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8092 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8093 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8094 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8095 owned by the network.
8098 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8099 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8100 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8101 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8102 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8106 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8107 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8108 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8109 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8111 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8112 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8113 handful.
<footnote><para>
8115 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,
</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8116 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8117 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8122 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8123 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8124 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8125 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8126 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8127 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8128 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8129 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8130 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8133 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8135 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8136 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the
<quote>Innovator's
8137 Dilemma
</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8138 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8139 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8140 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8142 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8143 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8144 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8145 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8146 Kim B. Clark,
<quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8147 Concepts in Technological Evolution,
</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8148 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8149 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8150 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8151 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8153 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8154 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8156 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8159 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8160 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8161 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8165 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8166 suggest the concern.
8169 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8170 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8171 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8174 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8175 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8176 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8179 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8180 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8181 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8182 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8183 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8184 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8185 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8186 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8187 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8188 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8189 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8190 outweigh these costs.
8193 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8194 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8195 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8199 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8200 a media campaign as part of the
<quote>war on drugs.
</quote> The campaign produced
8201 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8202 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8203 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8204 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8205 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8206 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8207 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8208 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8211 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8212 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8215 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8216 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8217 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8221 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8223 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8224 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8225 message will be heard then?
8228 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8229 <quote>controversial
</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8230 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8231 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8232 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8233 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8234 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8235 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8236 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8238 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8239 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8240 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as
<quote>against
8241 [their] policy.
</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8242 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8243 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8244 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8245 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8246 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives,
<quote>On the Issue of
8247 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>New
8248 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8249 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8250 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown,
<quote>Ad
8251 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8252 Radio,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8253 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8254 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8255 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8256 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8257 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8258 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross,
<quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8259 After Muni Rejects Ad,
</quote> SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8260 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8261 was that the criticism was
<quote>too controversial.
</quote>
8262 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8263 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8264 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8265 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8266 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8267 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8271 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8272 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8273 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8274 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8275 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8276 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8277 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8278 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8279 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8282 <section id=
"together">
8283 <title>Together
</title>
8285 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8286 copyright warriors that the government should
<quote>protect my property.
</quote>
8287 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8288 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8291 But when we see how dramatically this
<quote>property
</quote> has changed
—
8292 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8293 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8294 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8298 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8299 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8300 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8301 the massively expanded
<quote>property
</quote> rights granted by copyright
8302 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8303 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8307 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8308 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8309 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8313 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8314 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8315 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8316 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8317 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8318 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8319 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8320 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8321 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8322 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8325 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8326 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8327 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8328 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8329 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8330 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8331 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8332 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8333 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8334 in control that technology and the market enable.
8337 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8338 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8340 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8341 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8342 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8343 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8346 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8347 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8348 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8349 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8350 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8351 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8352 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8353 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8354 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8355 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8356 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8357 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8358 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8359 known.
<footnote><para>
8361 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his
<quote>four surrenders
</quote> of
8362 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8363 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8367 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8370 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8371 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8372 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8373 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8374 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8377 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8378 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8382 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8383 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8388 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8389 <entry>©</entry>
8393 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8402 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8403 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8404 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8406 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8407 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8408 noncommercial work was also free.
8411 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8414 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8415 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8419 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8420 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8425 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8426 <entry>©</entry>
8427 <entry>©</entry>
8430 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8439 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8440 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8441 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8442 transformation were still essentially free.
8445 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8446 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8447 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8448 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8449 we could say the law began to look like this:
8452 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8453 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8458 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8463 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8464 <entry>©</entry>
8465 <entry>©</entry>
8468 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8469 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8477 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8478 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8479 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8480 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8481 that the law now looks like this:
8484 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8485 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8490 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8495 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8496 <entry>©</entry>
8497 <entry>©</entry>
8500 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8501 <entry>©</entry>
8502 <entry>©</entry>
8509 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8510 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8513 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8514 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8517 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8518 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8519 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8520 these domains actually does any good.
8523 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8524 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8525 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8526 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8527 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8528 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8529 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8530 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8531 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8532 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8535 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8536 course copyright is a kind of
<quote>property,
</quote> and of course, as with any
8537 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8538 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8539 property rights
<footnote><para>
8541 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8542 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8543 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey,
<quote>The
8544 Disintegration of Property,
</quote> in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8545 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8547 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8549 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8550 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8551 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8552 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the
<quote>copyright
</quote>
8553 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8554 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8555 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8556 vibrant and rich free culture.
8559 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8560 limits on the scope of the interests protected by
<quote>property.
</quote> The very
8561 birth of
<quote>copyright
</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8562 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8563 story of chapter
6). The tradition of
<quote>fair use
</quote> is animated by a
8564 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8565 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8568 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8569 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8570 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8571 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8572 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8573 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8574 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8575 dominates the debate today.
8578 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8579 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8580 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8581 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8582 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8583 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8584 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8585 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8586 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8587 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8594 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8595 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8598 <chapter label=
"11" id=
"chimera">
8599 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8600 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8601 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8603 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8604 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8606 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8607 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The
</quote> (Wells)
</primary>
8611 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8612 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8613 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8615 H. G. Wells,
<quote>The Country of the Blind
</quote> (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8616 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8617 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8619 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with
<quote>sweet water, pasture,
8620 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8621 that bore an excellent fruit.
</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8622 takes this as an opportunity.
<quote>In the Country of the Blind,
</quote> he tells
8623 himself,
<quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.
</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8624 villagers to explore life as a king.
8627 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8628 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8629 <quote>blind.
</quote> They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8630 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8631 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8632 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated.
<quote>`You
8633 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8634 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8639 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8640 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8641 affection, a young woman who to him seems
<quote>the most beautiful thing in
8642 the whole of creation,
</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8643 description of what he sees
<quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8644 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8645 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8646 indulgence.
</quote> <quote>She did not believe,
</quote> Wells tells us, and
<quote>she could
8647 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.
</quote>
8650 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his
<quote>mysteriously delighted
</quote>
8651 love, the father and the village object.
<quote>You see, my dear,
</quote> her
8652 father instructs,
<quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8653 anything right.
</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8656 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion.
<quote>His brain
8657 is affected,
</quote> he reports.
8660 <quote>What affects it?
</quote> the father asks.
<quote>Those queer things that are
8661 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8665 The doctor continues:
<quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8666 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8667 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8668 irritant bodies [the eyes].
</quote>
8671 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!
</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8672 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8673 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8674 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8675 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8676 womb. That fusion produces a
<quote>chimera.
</quote> A chimera is a single creature
8677 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8678 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8681 plot for murder mysteries.
<quote>But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8682 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8683 scene.
…</quote>
8685 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8686 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8688 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8689 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8690 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8691 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8692 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8693 understanding of a
<quote>person
</quote> should reflect this reality.
8696 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8697 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8698 unfairly enough,
<quote>the copyright wars,
</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8699 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question
<quote>What is
8700 p2p file sharing?
</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8701 wrong. One side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8702 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8703 thirty years without any question at all.
</quote> That's true, at least in
8704 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8705 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8706 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8707 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8710 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8711 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8712 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8713 <quote>friends
</quote> beyond recognition to say
<quote>my ten thousand best friends
</quote> can
8714 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8715 what
<quote>we have always been allowed to do,
</quote> we have not always been
8716 allowed to share music with
<quote>our ten thousand best friends.
</quote>
8719 Likewise, when the other side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like walking
8720 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8721 with it,
</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8722 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8723 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8725 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8730 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8731 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8732 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8733 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8734 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8735 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8736 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8737 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8740 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8741 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8742 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8743 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8744 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8747 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8748 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8749 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8750 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8751 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8752 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8753 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8754 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8756 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8757 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8758 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
8760 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8761 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8762 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8763 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8764 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
<quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8765 Stakes on Piracy,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8766 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8767 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8768 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8769 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8770 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8771 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8772 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8773 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8774 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8775 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8776 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8777 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8778 Elizabeth Young,
<quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,
</quote> redandblack.com,
8779 August
2003, available at
8780 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8781 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8782 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8783 identities, see James Collins,
<quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8784 Name Students,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8785 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8786 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
8787 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8791 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8793 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8794 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8795 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8796 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8797 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8800 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8801 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8802 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8803 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8804 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8805 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8806 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8807 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8812 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8813 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8814 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8815 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8816 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8817 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8820 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to
<quote>steal
</quote> music. My
8821 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8822 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8823 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8824 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8825 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8826 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8827 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8828 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8829 protection for copyrighted material,
8833 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8834 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8837 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8838 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8839 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8840 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8841 produce a totally different industry model.
8844 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8845 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8846 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8847 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8848 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8849 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8850 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8851 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8852 interests.
<footnote><para>
8854 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8855 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8856 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8857 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8858 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8859 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8860 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8865 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8866 one of
<quote>the major labels.
</quote> Its position on these matters has now
8868 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8871 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8872 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8873 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8878 <chapter label=
"12" id=
"harms">
8879 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8881 To fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> to protect
<quote>property,
</quote> the content industry has
8882 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8883 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8884 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8885 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8888 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8889 particular, the consequences for
<quote>free culture.
</quote> But my aim now is to
8890 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8894 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8895 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8896 power of the property called
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> is at its greatest in
8899 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8900 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8902 Yet
<quote>common sense
</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8903 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8904 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8905 rejection of
<quote>piracy
</quote> still has play.
8908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8909 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8910 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8911 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8912 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8913 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8915 <section id=
"constrain">
8916 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8918 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8919 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8920 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8921 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8922 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8923 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8924 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8925 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8926 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8927 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8928 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8929 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8930 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8933 This digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> is in part an extension of the
8934 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8935 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8936 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8937 of digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
8938 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8939 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8940 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8941 the culture all around.
8944 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8945 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8949 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8950 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8951 storytelling extended across the globe.
8954 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8955 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8956 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8957 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8958 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8959 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8960 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8961 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8962 work is presumptively illegal.
8965 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8966 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8967 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8968 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8969 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8970 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8971 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8972 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8973 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8974 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8975 million.
<footnote><para>
8977 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
8978 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8979 the settlement, see MCI press release,
<quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8980 Approval for SEC Settlement
</quote> (
7 July
2003), available at
8981 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8982 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8984 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8985 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8986 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8987 suffering.
<footnote>
8989 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8990 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8991 an overview, see Tanya Albert,
<quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8992 Say Tort Reformers,
</quote> amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8993 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8994 and
<quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,
</quote> CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8996 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8998 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
9000 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9001 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9002 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9003 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9006 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9007 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9008 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9009 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9010 Disneys
<quote>pirates.
</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9011 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9015 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9016 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9017 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9018 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
9019 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9020 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9021 fraught. Already, exhibits of
<quote>illegal art
</quote> tour the United
9022 States.
<footnote><para>
9025 See Danit Lidor,
<quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
9027 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9028 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9030 In what does their
<quote>illegality
</quote> consist?
9031 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9032 critical or reflective.
9035 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9036 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9037 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
9038 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9039 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9040 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9041 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9042 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9043 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9044 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9047 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9048 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9049 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9050 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9051 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9052 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9053 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9054 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9055 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9058 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9059 described in chapter
9060 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9061 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9062 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9063 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9069 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9070 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9071 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9072 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9073 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9074 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9075 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9076 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9079 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9080 <quote>breathing room
</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9081 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9082 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9083 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9084 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9085 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9086 these rules have little relationship to the
<quote>law
</quote> with which judges
9090 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9091 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9092 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9093 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9094 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9095 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9096 <quote>copyright
</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9097 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9098 culture that is free.
9101 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9105 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9106 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9107 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9108 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9109 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9111 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying,
<quote>This has been
9112 cleared.
</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9113 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9117 <section id=
"innovators">
9118 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9120 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9121 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9122 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9123 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9124 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9125 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9128 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9129 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9130 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9131 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9132 other aspect by substituting
<quote>free market
</quote> every place I've spoken of
9133 <quote>free culture.
</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9134 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9137 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9138 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9139 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9140 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9141 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9142 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9143 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9144 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9145 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9146 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9147 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9149 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9151 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9153 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9154 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9155 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9156 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9157 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9158 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9159 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9160 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9161 <quote>nuclear pall
</quote> that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9164 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9165 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9166 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9168 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
9170 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9171 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9172 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9173 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9174 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9175 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9178 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9179 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9180 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9181 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9183 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9186 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9187 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9188 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9189 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9190 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9191 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9192 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9193 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9194 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9195 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9198 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9199 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9202 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9203 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9204 the kind of content the users liked.
9207 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9208 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9209 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9210 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9211 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9212 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9213 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9214 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9215 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9216 they had already bought.
9218 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9219 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9222 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9223 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9224 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9225 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9226 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9227 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9228 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9229 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9232 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9235 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9236 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9237 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9238 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9239 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9240 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9241 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9245 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9246 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9247 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9250 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9251 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9252 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9253 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9255 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9256 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9257 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9258 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad
</primary></indexterm>
9260 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9261 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9262 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9263 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9264 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9266 See Joseph Menn,
<quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9267 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9268 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown,
<quote>The Music
9269 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,
</quote> Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9270 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9271 See also Jon Healey,
<quote>Online Music Services Besieged,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9272 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9274 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9275 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9276 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9277 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9278 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9279 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9280 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9281 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9282 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9283 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9284 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9285 discussion with BMW:
9286 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9287 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9290 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9292 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9293 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9294 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9295 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9296 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9297 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9298 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9301 Rafe Needleman,
<quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,
</quote> <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9303 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9304 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9305 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9310 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with
<quote>your money or your
9311 life
</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9312 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9313 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9314 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9315 constantly threatened by litigation.
9319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9320 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9321 enterprises. The point is the definition of
<quote>illegal.
</quote> The law is a
9322 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9323 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9324 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9325 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9326 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9327 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9328 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9329 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9330 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9331 much less creativity.
9334 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9335 use. Whatever the
<quote>real
</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9336 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9337 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9338 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9339 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9340 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9341 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9342 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9343 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9346 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9347 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9348 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9349 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9350 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9351 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9352 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9353 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9354 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9355 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9356 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9357 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9359 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9360 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9361 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9362 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9363 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9364 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9365 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9368 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9369 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9370 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9371 this feature is a
<quote>bug.
</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9372 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9373 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9374 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables
<quote>piracy,
</quote> then,
9375 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9378 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9379 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9380 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9381 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9382 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> GartnerG2 and
9383 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9384 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9385 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9387 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9388 <quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9389 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9390 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9391 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9392 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9393 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9395 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9399 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9400 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9401 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9402 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9405 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9409 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9410 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9411 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9413 See David McGuire,
<quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,
</quote> Newsbytes,
9414 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9416 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9417 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9419 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9422 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9423 innovation
—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9427 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9428 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9429 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9430 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9433 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9434 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9435 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9436 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9437 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9439 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9440 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9441 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9443 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9444 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9445 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9446 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9447 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9450 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9451 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9452 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9453 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9454 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9457 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9459 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9460 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9461 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9462 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9463 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9464 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9465 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9466 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9467 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9468 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9469 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9470 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9473 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9474 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9475 here.
<footnote><para>
9477 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9478 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9479 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9480 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9481 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9482 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9483 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a
<quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that
9484 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9485 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9486 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9487 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2,
<quote>Copyright and
9488 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
33–34,
9490 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9491 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9492 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz
</primary></indexterm>
9494 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9495 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9499 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9500 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9501 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9502 artist doesn't get paid for that
<quote>radio performance
</quote> unless he or she
9503 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9504 version of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote>—to memorialize her famous
9505 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9506 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9507 copyright owners of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> would get some money, whereas
9508 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9509 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9512 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9513 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9514 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9515 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9516 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9517 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9518 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9519 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9523 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9524 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9525 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9526 spectrum. Thus, I can
<quote>tune in
</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9527 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9528 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9532 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9533 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9534 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9535 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9536 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9537 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9538 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9539 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9540 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9541 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9542 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9547 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9548 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9549 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9550 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9551 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9552 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9557 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9558 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9559 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9560 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9561 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9562 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9563 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9564 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9565 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9566 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9567 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9568 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9569 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9576 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9577 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9578 underestimated the power of
<quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9579 legislation
</quote><footnote><para>
9583 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9586 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9587 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9588 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9589 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9590 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9594 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9595 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9598 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9599 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9600 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9601 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9602 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9603 of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9604 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9605 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9606 burdens terrestrial radio.
9609 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9610 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9611 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9612 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9613 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9616 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9617 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9618 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9619 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9620 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9621 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9622 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9623 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9624 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9625 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9626 C. Picker,
<quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9627 Distribution,
</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461:
<quote>This was
9628 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9629 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9630 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9631 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9632 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.
</quote>
9633 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9634 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9636 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9640 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9641 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9642 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9643 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9646 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9648 name of the service;
9651 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9654 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9657 date of transmission;
9660 time of transmission;
9663 time zone of origination of transmission;
9666 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9669 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9672 sound recording title;
9675 ISRC code of the recording;
9678 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9681 featured recording artist;
9690 UPC code of the retail album;
9696 copyright owner information;
9699 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9702 name of the service or entity;
9708 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9711 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9714 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9717 unique user identifier;
9720 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9725 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9726 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9727 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9728 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9729 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9730 that terrestrial radio does not.
9733 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9734 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9735 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9737 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9738 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
9740 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9741 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9742 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9746 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9747 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9748 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9749 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9750 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9751 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… <quote>How do you come up with a
9753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9754 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9755 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9756 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9757 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9758 business.
…</quote>
9761 And the RIAA experts said,
<quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
9762 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9763 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9764 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>.
</quote> (Emphasis
9769 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9770 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9771 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9772 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9773 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9774 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9775 effective to prevent it.
9778 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9779 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9781 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9783 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9784 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9787 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9788 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9789 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9792 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9793 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9794 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9795 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9796 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie,
<quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,
</quote> Pew
9797 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9798 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9799 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9800 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9802 According to the RIAA,
9803 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9804 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9807 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9808 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9810 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9811 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9812 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9814 response by the other.
9817 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9818 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9819 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9820 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9821 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9822 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9823 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9824 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9825 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9826 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9827 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9828 was.
<footnote><para>
9830 Alex Pham,
<quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,
</quote> <citetitle>Los
9831 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
9833 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9834 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9835 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9836 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9837 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9838 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9842 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9843 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9844 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9845 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9846 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9847 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9848 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9849 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9850 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9852 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel,
<quote>Alcohol Consumption During
9853 Prohibition,
</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9857 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9858 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9860 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9861 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9862 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9864 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9865 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9866 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9867 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9868 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9870 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein,
<quote>Tax
9871 Compliance,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9872 compliance literature).
9874 We pride ourselves on our
<quote>free society,
</quote> but an endless array of
9875 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9876 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9877 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
9880 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9881 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9882 students about the importance of
<quote>ethics.
</quote> As my colleague Charlie
9883 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9884 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9885 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9886 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9887 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9888 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9889 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9890 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9891 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9892 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9893 lives both normally and legally, since
<quote>normally
</quote> entails a certain
9894 degree of illegality.
9895 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
9898 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9899 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9900 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9901 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9902 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9903 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9904 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9905 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9906 to consider the alternative.
9910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9911 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9912 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9913 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9914 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9915 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9918 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9919 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9920 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9921 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9922 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9923 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9924 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9925 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9926 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9927 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9928 introduced this different idea of
<quote>sharing.
</quote> We need to be able to
9929 call these twenty million Americans
<quote>citizens,
</quote> not
<quote>felons.
</quote>
9932 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9933 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9934 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9935 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9936 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9937 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9938 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9939 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9940 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9944 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9947 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9948 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9949 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9950 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9954 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That
<quote>use
</quote> of the
9958 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9959 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9960 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am
<quote>free
</quote> to copy,
9961 or
<quote>rip,
</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9962 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that
<quote>freedom
</quote> was a
9963 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the
<quote>Rip, Mix, Burn
</quote>
9964 capacities of digital technologies.
9966 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9968 This
<quote>use
</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9969 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9970 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9971 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9972 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9973 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9974 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9975 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9976 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9979 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9980 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9981 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9982 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9983 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9984 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9985 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9986 on people's machines.
9989 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9990 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9991 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9992 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9993 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9994 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9997 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9998 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9999 plastic or were part of a massively complex
<quote>digital rights
10000 management
</quote> system.
10003 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10004 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10005 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10006 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10007 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10008 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10009 freedom to move content easily?
10012 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10013 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10014 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10015 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10016 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10017 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10018 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10019 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10020 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10023 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10024 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10025 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10026 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10027 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10028 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10029 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10032 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10033 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10034 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10035 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10038 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10039 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10043 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10044 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10045 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10046 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10047 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10048 Lohmann describes, this is the
<quote>collateral damage
</quote> that
<quote>arises
10049 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10050 criminals.
</quote> This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10052 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
10055 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,
</quote> von Lohmann
10057 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10061 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10062 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10063 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10064 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10065 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10066 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think,
<quote>Oh, well,
10067 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.
</quote> Well, what this campaign
10068 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10069 American Internet-using population into
<quote>lawbreakers.
</quote>
10073 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10074 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10075 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10078 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10079 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10080 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10081 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10082 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10083 an Internet user is revealed.
10086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10087 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10088 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10089 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10090 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10091 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10092 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10093 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10094 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10096 See Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10097 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,
</quote>
10098 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs,
<quote>Worried Parents
10099 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10100 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10101 Being Sued,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10102 Graham,
<quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10103 2003,
4D; John Schwartz,
<quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10104 Fan, Either,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi,
<quote>Is
10105 Brianna a Criminal?
</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10110 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10111 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10112 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10114 See
<quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10115 Some Methods Used,
</quote> CNN.com, available at
10116 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10118 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10119 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10120 one of those MP3s will have the same
<quote>fingerprint.
</quote>
10123 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10124 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10125 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10126 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10127 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10128 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10129 network is
<quote>cooperating
</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10130 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10131 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10132 as a
<quote>criminal.
</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10133 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10135 See Jeff Adler,
<quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,
</quote>
10136 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>Four
10137 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10138 Colleges,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10139 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10140 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas,
<quote>Music
10141 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10142 Lawsuit Possible,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox,
<quote>RIAA
10143 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10144 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10145 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Download Warning
101: Freshman
10146 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10147 Sharing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11;
<quote>Raid, Letters
10148 Are Weapons at Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10150 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10151 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10154 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10155 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10156 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10157 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10158 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10159 this
<quote>contraband
</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10163 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10164 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10166 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10170 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10171 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10172 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10173 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10174 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10175 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10176 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10177 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10178 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10179 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10180 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10181 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10182 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10183 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10184 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10185 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10190 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered
<quote>criminals
</quote> under
10191 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10192 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10193 considered
<quote>criminals,
</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10194 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10195 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10202 <part id=
"c-balances">
10203 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10208 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10209 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10210 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10211 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10214 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10215 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10216 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10217 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10218 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10222 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10223 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10224 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10225 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10226 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10227 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10231 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10232 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10233 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10234 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10235 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10236 made that is happening all around.
10239 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10240 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10241 gasoline onto this fire.
10244 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10245 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10246 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10247 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10250 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10251 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10252 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10253 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10254 success will require.
10258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10259 <chapter label=
"13" id=
"eldred">
10260 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10261 <indexterm id=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'
>
10262 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel
</primary>
10265 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10266 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10267 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10268 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10269 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10270 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10274 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10275 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10276 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10277 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10278 them available for free.
10281 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10282 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10283 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10284 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10285 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10287 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10288 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10289 accessible
—today.
10292 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10293 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10294 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10295 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10296 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10297 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10298 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10299 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10300 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10301 commercial publications of public domain works.
10303 <indexterm startref=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'
/>
10305 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10306 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10307 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10308 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10309 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10310 call the
<quote>noncommercial publishing industry,
</quote> which before the
10311 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10312 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10313 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10314 generally.
<footnote><para>
10316 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10317 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10318 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10319 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10320 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10321 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10322 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10323 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10324 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10325 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10326 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10327 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10328 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10329 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10330 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10333 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10334 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10335 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10336 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10337 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10338 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10339 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10340 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10341 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10342 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10343 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10344 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10349 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10350 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10351 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10352 <quote>copyrights should be forever.
</quote><footnote><para>
10354 The full text is:
<quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10355 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10356 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10357 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10358 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10359 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10360 Congress,
</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10365 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10366 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10367 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10368 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10369 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10370 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10374 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10376 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10378 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10379 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10381 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10385 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10386 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10387 their
… Writings.
…
10391 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10392 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10393 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10394 something
—for example, to regulate
<quote>commerce among the several
10395 states
</quote> or
<quote>declare War.
</quote> But here, the
<quote>something
</quote> is something quite
10396 specific
—to
<quote>promote
… Progress
</quote>—through means that
10397 are also specific
— by
<quote>securing
</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights
</quote> (i.e.,
10398 copyrights)
<quote>for limited Times.
</quote>
10401 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10402 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10403 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10404 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be
<quote>limited
</quote> will have
10405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10406 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10407 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10408 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms
<quote>on the
10409 installment plan,
</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10410 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10413 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10414 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10415 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10416 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10417 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10418 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10419 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10420 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10421 this gravy train going.
10424 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10425 government.
<quote>Corruption
</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10426 bribed. Rather,
<quote>corruption
</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10427 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10428 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10429 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10430 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10433 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10434 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10435 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10436 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10437 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10438 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10439 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10440 published by anyone for free.
10443 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10444 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10445 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10446 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10450 <quote>Next year,
</quote> the adviser announces,
<quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10453 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10454 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10455 those works.
</quote>
10458 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,
</quote> she continues,
<quote>that
10459 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10460 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10461 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.
</quote>
10464 <quote>Hope?
</quote> a fellow board member says.
<quote>Can't we be doing something
10468 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>We could contribute
10469 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10470 they support the bill.
</quote>
10473 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10474 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it.
<quote>How much
10475 would we get if this extension were passed?
</quote> you ask the adviser.
<quote>How
10476 much is it worth?
</quote>
10479 <quote>Well,
</quote> the adviser says,
<quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10480 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10481 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10482 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate.
</quote>
10485 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10486 correct conclusion:
10489 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10490 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10492 would assure that the bill was passed?
</quote>
10495 <quote>Absolutely,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>It is worth it to you to
10497 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10498 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000.
</quote>
10501 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10502 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10503 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10504 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10506 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10508 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10509 the copyright term extended.
10512 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10513 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10514 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10517 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10519 Term Extension Act, this
<quote>theory
</quote> about incentives was proved
10520 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10521 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10522 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10523 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10524 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press,
<quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10525 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,
</quote>
10526 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10528 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10529 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10530 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10531 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown,
<quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10532 Age,
</quote> available at
10533 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10535 Disney is estimated to have
10536 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10537 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10539 Alan K. Ota,
<quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,
</quote>
10540 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10541 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10546 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10547 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10549 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10550 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10551 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10552 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10553 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10554 <quote>limited.
</quote>
10555 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10559 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10560 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10561 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10562 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10563 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10564 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10568 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10572 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10573 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10574 power to regulate only
<quote>commerce among the several states
</quote> (aka
10576 commerce
</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10577 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10582 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10583 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10584 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10585 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10586 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10588 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
10590 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10591 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10592 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10593 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10594 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10595 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10596 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10597 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10598 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10599 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10600 position to second-guess Congress.
10603 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,
</quote>
10604 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10605 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10607 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10608 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10609 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10610 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10612 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10616 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10617 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10619 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10620 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10621 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10622 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10623 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10624 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10625 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10626 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10627 limitation to
<quote>limited times
</quote> notwithstanding.
10629 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10630 yield the conclusion that Congress
10631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10632 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10633 term, then there would be no
<quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power over
10634 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10635 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10636 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10637 term of existing copyrights.
10640 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10641 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10642 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10643 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10644 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10645 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10646 demonstrating the
<quote>fidelity
</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10647 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10648 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10649 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10650 were going to be petty politicians.
10653 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10654 argument in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10655 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10656 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10657 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10658 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10659 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10660 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10661 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10662 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10663 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10664 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10665 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10666 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10667 piracy that affects us all.
10670 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10673 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10674 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than
<quote>legal piracy.
</quote><footnote><para>
10676 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10677 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10678 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10680 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10681 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10682 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10684 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10687 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10689 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10691 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10692 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10693 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10694 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10695 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10696 bought to extend them again.
10699 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10701 Mickey Mouse and
<quote>Rhapsody in Blue.
</quote> These works are too
10702 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10704 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10706 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10707 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10708 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10709 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10711 and no longer available as a result.
10714 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10715 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10716 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10717 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10718 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10719 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10720 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10722 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10723 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10724 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10729 Think practically about the consequence of this
10730 extension
—practically,
10731 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10734 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10735 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10736 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10738 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10741 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10742 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10743 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10744 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10745 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10746 list of books still under copyright.
10749 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10750 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10753 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10755 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10756 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10757 being at least a list?
10760 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10761 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10763 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10765 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10766 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10769 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,
</quote> the
10770 apologists for the system respond.
<quote>Why should there be a list of
10771 copyright owners?
</quote>
10774 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10775 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10776 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10777 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10778 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10779 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10780 what tangible property.
10783 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10784 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10785 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10788 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10789 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10791 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10792 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10793 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10794 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10795 know quite well who owns what property.
10798 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10799 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10801 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10802 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10803 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10804 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10805 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10806 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10807 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10810 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10811 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10813 for other creative works is much more dire.
10815 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10816 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
10817 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
10819 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10820 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10821 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10822 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
10823 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10824 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10825 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10826 money. According to one estimate,
<quote>Roach has sold about
60,
000
10827 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10828 films.
</quote><footnote><para>
10830 See David G. Savage,
<quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,
</quote>
10831 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
<quote>Classic Movies,
10832 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10833 Down Copyright Extension,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
10836 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10839 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10840 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10841 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10842 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10845 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10848 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10849 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10850 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10851 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10852 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10853 work available for distribution.
10856 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10857 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10858 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10859 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10860 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10861 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10863 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10864 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
10865 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10866 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10867 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
10868 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10873 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10875 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10876 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10877 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10878 locate the copyright owner.
10881 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10882 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10883 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10884 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10885 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10886 to these films is exceptionally high.
10889 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10890 copyright owner when she shows up?
</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
10891 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10892 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10893 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10894 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10895 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10896 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10897 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10900 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10903 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10905 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10906 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10907 the copyright expires.
10910 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10911 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10912 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10914 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10918 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10919 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10920 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10921 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10923 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an
<quote>engine of
10924 free expression.
</quote>
10927 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10928 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10930 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10931 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10932 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10934 the commercial life ends.
10937 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10938 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10939 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10941 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10943 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10944 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10945 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10946 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10947 have, we need to have access to this history.
10950 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10953 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10954 this context do no good.
10957 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10958 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10959 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10960 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10961 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10962 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10963 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10964 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10965 was independent of copyright law.
10968 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10969 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10970 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10971 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10972 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10973 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10974 market didn't have more to offer.
10977 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10978 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10979 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10980 would not have interfered with anything.
10983 But this situation has now changed.
10986 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10987 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10988 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10989 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10990 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10991 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10992 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10993 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10994 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10995 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10999 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11000 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11001 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11002 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11003 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11004 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11005 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11006 written for a radically different context.
11009 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11010 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11011 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11012 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11013 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11014 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11015 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
11016 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11017 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11020 You may well ask,
<quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11021 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11022 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11023 culture widely?
</quote>
11026 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11027 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11028 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11029 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11030 of a library is to serve what
<quote>the market
</quote> would demand. But if you
11031 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11032 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11033 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11034 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11037 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11038 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11039 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11040 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11043 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11044 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11045 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11046 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11047 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11049 Jason Schultz,
<quote>The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,
</quote> 20
11050 December
2002, available at
11051 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11056 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11057 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11058 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11059 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
11060 violated the Constitution's
<quote>limited Times
</quote> requirement, and (
2) that
11061 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11064 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11065 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11066 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11067 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11068 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11071 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11072 copyrights be for
<quote>limited Times
</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11073 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11074 <quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11075 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11076 terms that are
<quote>limited.
</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11077 to interpret the term
<quote>limited Times
</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11078 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11079 power to extend existing terms.
11082 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11083 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11084 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11085 whole, where the court will sit
<quote>en banc
</quote> to hear the case.
11088 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11089 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11092 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11093 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11094 overstepped its bounds.
11097 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11098 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11099 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11100 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11101 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11104 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11105 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11106 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11107 briefs and preparing for argument.
11110 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11111 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11112 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11113 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11114 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11115 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11116 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11117 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11120 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11121 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11122 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11125 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11127 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11128 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11129 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11130 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11133 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11134 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11135 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11137 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11138 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11139 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11141 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11142 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11143 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11144 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11145 told me, if we could make the issue seem
<quote>important
</quote> to the Supreme
11146 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11147 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against
<quote>the
11148 most powerful media companies in the world.
</quote>
11151 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11152 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11153 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11154 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11155 <quote>right
</quote> as in
<quote>true,
</quote> I thought, but it is
<quote>wrong
</quote> as in
<quote>it just shouldn't be
11156 that way.
</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11157 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11158 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11160 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11161 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11163 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11164 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11165 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11167 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11168 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11169 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11172 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11173 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11174 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11175 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11176 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11177 why it was unconstitutional.
11180 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11183 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11184 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11185 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11186 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11187 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11188 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11189 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11190 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11191 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11192 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11193 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11194 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11195 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11196 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11199 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11200 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11201 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11202 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11203 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11204 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11205 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11206 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11207 to get bogged down?
</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11208 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11209 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11210 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11211 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11212 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11215 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11216 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11217 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11218 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11219 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11220 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11223 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11224 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11227 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11228 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11229 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11230 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11231 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11232 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11233 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11234 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11235 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11236 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11237 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11240 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11241 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11242 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11243 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11244 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11245 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11247 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11249 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11250 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11251 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11252 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11255 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11256 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11257 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11258 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11259 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11261 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11262 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11263 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11264 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11265 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11266 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11267 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11268 nothing more than
<quote>rent-seeking
</quote>—the fancy term economists use
11269 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11272 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11273 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11274 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11275 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11276 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11277 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11278 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11279 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11282 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11283 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11284 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11285 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan
</primary></indexterm>
11286 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen
</primary></indexterm>
11287 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11290 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11291 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11292 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11293 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11294 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11295 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11296 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11297 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11298 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11299 confidence in our argument.
11300 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11303 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11304 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these
<quote>friends
</quote> included
11305 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11306 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11310 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11311 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11312 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11313 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11314 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11315 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11319 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11320 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11321 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11322 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11323 domain, then people could use it to
<quote>glorify drugs or to create
11324 pornography.
</quote><footnote><para>
11326 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11327 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11329 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11330 <quote>protection
</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11331 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11332 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11334 Dinitia Smith,
<quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11335 Mouse Joins the Fray,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11339 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11340 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11341 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11344 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11345 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11346 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11347 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11348 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say,
<quote>Give us twenty years
11349 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11350 better with them than anyone else.
</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11351 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11352 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11353 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11356 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11357 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11358 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11359 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11360 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11361 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11362 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11364 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
11366 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11367 called
<quote>the Conservatives.
</quote> The other we called
<quote>the Rest.
</quote> The
11368 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11369 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11370 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11371 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line
11372 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11373 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11375 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11377 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11378 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11379 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11382 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11383 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11384 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11385 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11386 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11389 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11390 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11391 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11392 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11393 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11394 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11395 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11396 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11399 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11401 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11402 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11403 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11404 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11405 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11406 these retrospective extensions.
11409 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11410 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11411 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11412 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11413 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11414 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11417 This analysis of
<quote>the Rest
</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11418 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11419 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11420 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11421 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation
—the
11422 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11423 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11424 powers have limits.
11427 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11428 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11429 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11431 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11432 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11433 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11434 supposed to be
<quote>limited.
</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11435 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
11436 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11437 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11441 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11442 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11443 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11444 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11445 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11448 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11449 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831
11450 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11452 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11455 But this
<quote>consistency
</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11457 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11458 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11459 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11461 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11463 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11464 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11466 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11467 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11468 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11470 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11471 weeks, I was repeatedly
<quote>mooted
</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11474 help in the case. Such
<quote>moots
</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11475 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11478 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11479 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11480 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11481 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11483 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11484 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11487 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11488 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11490 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11491 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11492 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11493 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11494 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11497 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11498 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11499 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11500 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11501 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.
</quote>
11503 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11505 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11506 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11507 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11508 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11509 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11510 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11511 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11512 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11513 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11514 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11515 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11518 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11519 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11522 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11523 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11524 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11525 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11527 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11528 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11529 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11530 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11531 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11532 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11533 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11534 family of the Justices.
11537 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11538 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11539 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11540 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11543 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11544 The history was bothering her.
11548 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11549 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11550 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11551 practice that began with the very first act.
11555 She was quite willing to concede
<quote>that this flies directly in the face
11556 of what the framers had in mind.
</quote> But my response again and again
11557 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11561 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11562 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11564 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11569 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11570 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11571 Kennedy, who observed,
11575 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11576 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11577 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11578 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11579 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11583 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11589 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11590 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11591 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11592 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11593 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11596 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11598 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11599 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11600 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11601 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11602 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11605 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11606 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11607 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11610 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11611 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11617 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11618 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11621 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11622 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11624 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11625 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11626 into the Copyright Clause.
11630 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11631 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11632 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11636 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11637 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11638 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11639 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11644 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11645 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11646 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11647 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11648 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11649 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11650 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11651 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11652 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11653 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11657 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11658 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11661 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11665 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11666 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11667 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11668 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11669 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11670 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11671 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11672 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11673 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11674 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11675 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11676 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11677 law that it had established elsewhere.
11680 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11681 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11682 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11683 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11684 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11687 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11688 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11689 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11692 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11693 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11694 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11698 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11699 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11700 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11701 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11702 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11707 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11708 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11709 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11712 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11713 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11714 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11715 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11718 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11719 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11720 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11721 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11722 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11723 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11724 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11725 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11726 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11729 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11730 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11731 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11732 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11733 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11734 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11735 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11736 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11737 the system we have.
11739 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11741 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11742 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11743 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11744 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11745 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11746 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11747 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11748 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11749 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11751 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11754 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11755 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11756 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11757 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11758 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11759 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11760 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11761 <quote>limited,
</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11762 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11765 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11766 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11767 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11768 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11769 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11772 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11773 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11774 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11777 It was first anger with the five
<quote>Conservatives.
</quote> It would have been
11778 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11779 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11780 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11781 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11782 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11783 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is
<quote>originalism
</quote>—to
11784 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11785 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11786 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other
<quote>originalist
</quote> rulings. Where was their
11787 <quote>originalism
</quote> now?
11790 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11791 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11792 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11793 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11795 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11796 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11797 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11798 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11799 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11800 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11801 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11805 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11807 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11810 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11812 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11813 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11814 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11815 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11816 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11817 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11818 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11819 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11820 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11823 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11824 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11825 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11826 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11827 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11828 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11829 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11830 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11831 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11832 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11833 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11834 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11835 effort to persuade; but I
11836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11837 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11838 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11839 should decide the issue.
11841 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11843 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11844 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11846 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11849 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11850 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11851 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11852 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11855 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11856 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11857 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11858 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11862 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11863 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11864 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11865 case was a mistake.
<quote>The Court is not ready,
</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
11866 issue should not be raised until it is.
11867 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11870 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11871 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11872 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11873 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11874 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11875 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11876 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11877 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11878 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11879 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11880 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11883 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11884 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11885 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11886 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11887 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11891 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11892 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11893 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11894 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11895 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11896 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11900 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11901 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11902 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
11903 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The
<quote>powerful and wealthy
</quote> line is a bit
11904 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
11905 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11907 <figure id=
"fig-18">
11908 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
11909 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
11910 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11913 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11914 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That
<quote>grand experiment
</quote> we call the
11915 <quote>public domain
</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think,
<quote>Honey,
11916 I shrunk the Constitution.
</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11917 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11918 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11919 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11923 <chapter label=
"14" id=
"eldred-ii">
11924 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11926 The day
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11927 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was
11928 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11929 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11930 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11931 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11932 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11934 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11936 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11937 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11938 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11939 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11940 Justice Kennedy:
<quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11941 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11942 that.
</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11943 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11946 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11947 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11949 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11950 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11951 the work passed into the public domain.
11954 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11955 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11956 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11959 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11960 is either the
<quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act
</quote> or the
<quote>Copyright
11961 Term Deregulation Act.
</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11962 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11963 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11964 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11965 everything else, let the content go.
11967 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11969 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11970 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11971 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11972 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11973 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11974 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11975 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11976 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11977 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11978 the stupid harm of the present system.
11981 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11982 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11983 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11984 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11985 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11986 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11987 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11988 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11989 where copyright owners could be identified.
11991 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11992 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11995 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
11996 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11997 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11998 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12000 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12001 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12002 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12003 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
12004 every text of the Convention has provided that
<quote>the enjoyment and the
12005 exercise
</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention
<quote>shall not be subject
12006 to any formality.
</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12007 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12008 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12009 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12010 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12011 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12012 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12013 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12014 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12015 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
12016 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12017 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
12018 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a
<quote>natural right.
</quote> Natural
12019 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12020 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12021 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12022 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12023 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12026 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12027 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12028 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12029 <quote>Walt Disney creativity
</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12030 know what's protected and what's not.
12032 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12034 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12035 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12036 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12037 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12038 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12039 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12040 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
12041 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12044 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12045 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12046 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12047 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12048 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12049 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12052 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12053 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12054 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12055 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12057 imposed upon creators.
12060 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12061 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12064 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12065 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12066 the government. He has a property right over the table
<quote>naturally,
</quote>
12067 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12068 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12072 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12073 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12074 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12075 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12076 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12077 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12081 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12082 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12083 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12084 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12085 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12086 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12087 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12088 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12089 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12090 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12091 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12092 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12093 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12094 system of protection for property generally.
12097 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12098 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12099 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12100 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12101 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12102 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12103 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12104 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12107 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12108 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12109 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12112 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12113 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12114 didn't
<quote>get.
</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12115 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12116 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be,
<quote>short,
</quote> then this
12117 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12118 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12119 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12122 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12123 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12124 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12125 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12126 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12127 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12128 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12131 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12132 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12133 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12134 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12135 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12138 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12139 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12140 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12141 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12142 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12145 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12146 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12147 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12151 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12152 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12153 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12156 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12157 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12158 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12159 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12160 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12161 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12162 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12163 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12164 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12165 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12167 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12169 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12170 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12171 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12172 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12175 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12176 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12177 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12178 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12179 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog,
<quote>we are
12180 close.
</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12181 something good might happen here.
12182 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12185 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12186 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12187 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12188 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12189 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12190 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12193 The MPAA argued first that Congress had
<quote>firmly rejected the central
12194 concept in the proposed bill
</quote>—that copyrights be renewed. That
12195 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's
<quote>firm rejection
</quote> had occurred
12196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12197 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12198 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12199 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12200 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12201 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12202 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12203 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12204 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12205 argued that the bill would impose
<quote>enormous
</quote> costs, since a
12206 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12207 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12208 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12209 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12210 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12211 film is a valid derivative use.
12214 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12215 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12216 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12217 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12218 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12219 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12222 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12223 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12224 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12225 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12226 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12227 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12228 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12232 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12233 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12234 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12235 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12241 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12242 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12243 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12244 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12245 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12246 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12247 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12248 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12249 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12252 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12253 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12254 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12255 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12256 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12257 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the
<quote>Dark
12258 Content
</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12259 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12260 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12263 What does this industry really want?
12266 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12267 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12268 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12269 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12270 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12271 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12272 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12273 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12277 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12278 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12279 its aim not the protection of
<quote>property
</quote> but the rejection of a
12280 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12281 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12285 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12286 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12289 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12290 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12291 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12292 and to share its own creation.
12294 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12295 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12297 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12298 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12299 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12300 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12301 block the progress of others.
12304 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12305 <quote>property
</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12306 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12307 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing
<quote>permission
12308 society.
</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12309 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12310 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12315 <chapter label=
"15" id=
"c-conclusion">
12316 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12318 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12319 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12320 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12321 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12322 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12325 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12326 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12327 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12328 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12329 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12330 the disease almost invisible.
12333 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12334 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12335 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12336 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12338 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12339 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12340 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
<quote>Final Report: Integrating
12341 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy
</quote> (London,
2002),
12343 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12345 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12346 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12351 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12352 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12353 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12354 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12355 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12356 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12359 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12360 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12361 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12362 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12363 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12364 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12365 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12366 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12370 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12371 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12372 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12373 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12374 costs significantly below the market price.
12377 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12378 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12379 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12380 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12381 Africa from India. This is called
<quote>parallel importation,
</quote> and it is
12382 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12383 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12386 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12387 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12388 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12389 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12393 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12394 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12395 characterized it,
<quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12396 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12397 imports.
</quote><footnote><para>
12399 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12400 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12401 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12402 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12403 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12404 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12405 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12406 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12407 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12410 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12411 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12412 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12413 possible trade sanctions.
12414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12415 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12416 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12417 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12418 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12419 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12420 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12421 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12422 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12423 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12424 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12426 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12427 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12428 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12429 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12432 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12433 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12434 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12435 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12436 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12437 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12438 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12439 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12442 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12443 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12444 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12445 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12446 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12447 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12450 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12451 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12452 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12453 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12454 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12455 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12459 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12460 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12463 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12465 See Sabin Russell,
<quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12466 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12467 May
1999, A1, available at
12468 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12469 (
<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12470 system of intellectual property protection
</quote>); Robert Weissman,
<quote>AIDS
12471 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12472 Medicines,
</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12473 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12474 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson,
<quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12475 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12476 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,
</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12477 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12480 It was because
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> would be violated that these
12481 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12482 importance of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> that led these government actors
12483 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12486 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12487 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12488 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12489 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12490 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the
<quote>sanctity
</quote> of an
12491 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12492 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12493 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12496 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12497 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12498 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12499 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12500 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12501 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12504 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12505 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12506 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12507 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12508 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12509 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12512 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12513 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12514 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask,
<quote>How
12515 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12516 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?
</quote> Because there is no
<quote>sound
12517 bite
</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12518 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12519 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12521 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12522 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12523 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12524 idea called
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote>
12527 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12528 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12529 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12530 What is the argument?
12533 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12534 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12535 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12536 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12537 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12538 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12539 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12540 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12541 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12542 were balanced in just this sense.
12545 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12546 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12547 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12548 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12549 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12550 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12551 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12552 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12553 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12554 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12555 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12556 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12559 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12560 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12561 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12562 this common sense open its eyes.
12565 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12566 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12567 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12568 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12569 to fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12570 the idea of
<quote>creative property,
</quote> while transforming real creators into
12571 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12572 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12573 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12574 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12575 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12576 produce the
<quote>perfect storm
</quote> for free culture.
12578 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
12580 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12581 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12582 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12583 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12584 August
2003, E1, available at
12585 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New,
<quote>Global Group's
12586 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12587 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12588 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New,
<quote>U.S. Official
12589 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12590 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12591 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12593 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12594 a meeting to discuss
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12595 goods.
</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12596 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12597 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12598 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12599 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12600 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12601 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12602 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12603 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12604 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12605 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12607 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12608 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12609 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12610 in the early
1980s. And it included
<quote>open source and free software.
</quote>
12611 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12612 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12613 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12616 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12617 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12618 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12619 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12620 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12623 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12624 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12627 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12628 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12629 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12630 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12634 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12635 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12636 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12637 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12638 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12639 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12640 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12641 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12642 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12643 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12644 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12645 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12646 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12647 talk about an
<quote>Information Society
</quote> unless one also talked about the
12648 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12649 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12650 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12653 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12654 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12655 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12658 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12659 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12660 thus the meeting about
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12661 public goods
</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12664 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12665 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is
<quote>open source
12666 and free software.
</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12667 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12668 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12669 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12670 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12671 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12672 rather than
<quote>proprietary software,
</quote> for their own internal uses.
12675 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12676 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12677 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12678 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12679 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12680 operating system, the most famous bit of
<quote>free software
</quote>—and IBM
12681 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support
<quote>open source and
12682 free software
</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12683 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12684 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12686 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12687 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12688 <quote>open source
</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12689 principal opposition is to
<quote>free software
</quote> licensed under a
<quote>copyleft
</quote>
12690 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12691 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith,
<quote>The Future
12692 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,
</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
12693 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12694 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12695 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12696 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12697 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12698 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12699 May
2001), available at
12700 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12702 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12703 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft
</quote> licenses
</primary></indexterm>
12704 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12705 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12708 More important for our purposes, to support
<quote>open source and free
12709 software
</quote> is not to oppose copyright.
<quote>Open source and free software
</quote>
12710 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12711 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12712 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12715 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12716 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12717 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12718 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12719 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12720 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12721 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12722 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12723 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12726 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12727 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12728 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12729 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12730 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12731 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12732 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12734 Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> available at
<ulink
12735 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12737 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12738 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
12741 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12742 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12743 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12744 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12745 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12746 its lobbying efforts.
12749 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12750 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12751 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12752 Office, explained that
<quote>open-source software runs counter to the
12753 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.
</quote>
12754 She is quoted as saying,
<quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12755 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12756 goals of WIPO.
</quote>
12759 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12763 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12764 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12765 right called
<quote>copyright
</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12766 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it
<quote>runs counter
</quote> to the mission
12767 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12768 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12769 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12770 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12773 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to
<quote>promote
</quote>
12774 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12775 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12776 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12777 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12778 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12779 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12780 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12781 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12782 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12783 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12786 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12787 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12788 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12789 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12790 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to
<quote>waive
</quote> or
12791 <quote>disclaim
</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12792 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
12793 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12794 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12795 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12796 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
12797 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12800 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12801 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,
</quote> she's
12802 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12804 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12805 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from
<quote>waiving
</quote> or
12806 <quote>disclaiming
</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12807 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12808 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12812 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12813 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called
<quote>feudalism.
</quote> Under
12814 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12815 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12816 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12817 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12818 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12819 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12820 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12823 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12824 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12826 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12827 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12829 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
12830 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12832 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12833 choice now is whether that information society will be
12834 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
12838 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12839 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12840 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12841 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12845 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12846 it should be (
<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12847 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12848 not simply to promote intellectual property rights
</quote>), not as it is. If
12849 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12850 say anything wrong. But in the world
12851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12852 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12853 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12857 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12858 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12859 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12860 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12861 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12862 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12863 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12864 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12867 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12868 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12869 <quote>goal
</quote> of a government should be
<quote>to promote the right balance
</quote> of
12870 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12871 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism.
<quote>Typical for
12872 an academic,
</quote> the poster might well have continued.
12875 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12876 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12877 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12878 our own country's history).
12881 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12882 government should be to
<quote>seek balance,
</quote> then count me with the silly,
12883 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12884 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12885 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12886 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12887 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12888 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12889 democracy in the world, become?
12892 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12893 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12894 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12896 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12897 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12899 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12901 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12902 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12903 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12904 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12905 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12906 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12907 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12908 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12909 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12910 hearings and a different result.
12911 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
12912 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
12915 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12916 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12917 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12918 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12919 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12920 concentration in the media.
12923 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12924 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12925 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12926 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12927 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12930 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12931 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12932 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12933 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12934 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12935 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12936 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12940 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12941 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12942 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12943 Americans have a long history of fighting
<quote>big,
</quote> wisely or not. That
12944 we could be motivated to fight
<quote>big
</quote> again is not something new.
12947 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12948 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12949 the idea of
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote> Not because balance is alien to
12950 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12951 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12952 called
<quote>property
</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12955 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12958 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12960 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12961 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12963 John Borland,
<quote>RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers,
</quote> CNET News.com, September
12965 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12966 R. La Monica,
<quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,
</quote> CNN/Money,
8 September
12968 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12969 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty,
<quote>Sued for a Song,
12970 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
12971 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12972 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12973 Defendants,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12974 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
12976 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12978 Eminem has just been sued for
<quote>sampling
</quote> someone else's
12979 music.
<footnote><para>
12981 Jon Wiederhorn,
<quote>Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,
</quote>
12982 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12983 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12985 The story about Bob Dylan
<quote>stealing
</quote> from a Japanese author has just
12986 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12988 Kenji Hall, Associated Press,
<quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12989 Dylan Songs,
</quote> Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12990 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12993 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12994 anonymous
—reports
<quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
12995 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12996 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12997 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12998 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.
</quote> Congressmen are
12999 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13000 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13001 kids who use a computer to share content.
13003 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
13004 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
13005 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13006 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
13008 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13009 that it will build a
<quote>Creative Archive,
</quote> from which British citizens can
13010 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13011 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,
</quote> BBC press release,
13012 24 August
2003, available at
13013 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13015 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13016 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13017 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13018 country.
<footnote><para>
13020 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,
</quote> Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
13022 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13025 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13026 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13027 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13028 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13029 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13030 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13031 day into the Causbys.
13034 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13035 potential is ever to be realized.
13037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13041 <chapter label=
"16" id=
"c-afterword">
13042 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13046 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13047 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13048 maps what might be done.
13051 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13052 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13053 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13054 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13057 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13058 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13059 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13060 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13064 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13065 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13066 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13067 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13068 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13072 <section id=
"usnow">
13073 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13075 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13076 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
13077 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13078 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13081 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13082 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13083 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—<quote>All Rights
13084 Reserved
</quote>— and those who reject copyright
—<quote>No Rights
13085 Reserved.
</quote> The
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13086 permission before you
<quote>use
</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The
<quote>No
13087 Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13088 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13091 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13092 tilted in the
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13093 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13094 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13098 original design of the Internet was
<quote>no rights reserved.
</quote> Content was
13099 <quote>taken
</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13103 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13104 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13105 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13106 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13107 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13108 architecture made the effective default
<quote>no rights reserved,
</quote> the
13109 future architecture will make the effective default
<quote>all rights
13110 reserved.
</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13111 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13112 content requires permission. The
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> world that defines
13113 the Internet today will become a
<quote>get permission to cut and paste
</quote>
13114 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13117 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13118 <quote>all rights reserved
</quote> nor
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> but
<quote>some rights
13119 reserved
</quote>— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13120 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13121 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13125 <section id=
"examples">
13126 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13128 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13129 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13130 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13131 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13132 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13133 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13134 to your neighbors or boss. The
<quote>privacy
</quote> of your browsing habits was
13138 What made it assured?
13140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13142 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13143 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13144 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13145 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13146 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13147 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13148 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13149 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13150 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13151 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13152 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13153 (there is no law protecting
<quote>privacy
</quote> in public places), and in many
13154 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13155 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13157 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13159 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13160 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13161 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13162 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13163 <quote>recently viewed
</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13164 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13165 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13166 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13167 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13170 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13171 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13172 people should have the
<quote>right
</quote> to browse in a library without the
13173 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13174 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13175 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13176 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13180 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13181 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13182 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13183 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13186 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg,
<quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13187 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13188 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13190 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13191 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13192 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13193 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13194 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13195 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13196 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13199 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13200 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13201 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13204 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13205 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13206 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13207 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13208 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13209 care much about controlling their software.
13210 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13212 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13214 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13215 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13216 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13217 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13218 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13222 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13223 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13224 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13225 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13226 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13227 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13228 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13229 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13230 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13234 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13235 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13236 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13237 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13238 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13239 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13240 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13243 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13244 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13246 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13247 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13248 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13249 fundamentally weakened.
13252 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13253 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13254 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's
<quote>Linux
</quote>
13255 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13256 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13257 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13260 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13261 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13262 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13263 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13264 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13265 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13266 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13267 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13271 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13272 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13273 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13274 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13275 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13276 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13279 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13280 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13281 scientific journals are produced.
13283 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13284 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13287 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13288 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13289 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13290 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13291 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13292 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13293 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13294 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13295 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13296 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13297 and Westlaw are also free
13298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13299 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13300 Court opinion through their respective services.
13303 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13304 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13305 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13306 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13307 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13308 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13309 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13312 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13313 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13314 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13317 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13318 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13319 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13320 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13321 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13322 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13323 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13324 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13325 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13326 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13329 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13330 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13331 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13332 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13333 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13337 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13338 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13339 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13340 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13342 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13343 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13344 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13345 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13346 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13347 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13348 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13351 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13352 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13353 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13354 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13355 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13356 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13359 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13362 <section id=
"oneidea">
13363 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13364 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13365 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13368 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13369 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13372 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13373 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13374 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13375 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13376 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13377 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13378 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13379 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13380 make this possible.
13383 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13384 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13385 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13386 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13387 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13388 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13389 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13390 human-readable description, and
13391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13392 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13393 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13394 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13395 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13396 different than the
<quote>All
</quote> or
<quote>No
</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13397 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13398 certain freedoms are given.
13401 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13402 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13403 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13404 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13405 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13406 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (
<quote>share and share
13407 alike
</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13408 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13409 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13412 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13413 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13414 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13415 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13416 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13417 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13418 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13419 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13423 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13424 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13425 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13426 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13427 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13428 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13430 of content (
<quote>content conducers,
</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13431 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13432 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13433 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13436 The aim is not to fight the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13437 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13438 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13439 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13440 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13441 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13442 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13443 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13444 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13445 to begin to build those rules.
13448 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13449 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13450 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13451 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13452 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13455 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13456 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13457 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13458 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13459 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13460 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13461 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13462 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13463 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13464 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13467 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13468 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13469 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13470 was a total success.
13473 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13474 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13476 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13477 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13478 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13479 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13480 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13482 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13483 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13485 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy
</primary></indexterm>
13486 <indexterm><primary>rap music
</primary></indexterm>
13488 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13489 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13490 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13491 reasons. Many who use the
<quote>sampling license
</quote> do so because anything
13492 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13493 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13494 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13495 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13496 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13497 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13498 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13499 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not
<quote>allow
</quote>
13500 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13501 high
<footnote><para>
13503 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13504 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13505 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13506 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13507 </para></footnote>),
13508 these artists release into the creative environment content
13509 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13510 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13513 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13514 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13515 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13516 you are effectively saying you believe in the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote>
13517 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13518 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13519 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13520 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13521 this notion of
<quote>Some Rights Reserved,
</quote> and gives many the chance to
13525 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13526 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13527 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13528 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13531 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13532 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13535 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13536 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13537 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13538 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13539 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13540 steps are possible.
13543 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13544 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13545 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13546 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13547 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13548 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13549 creativity to spread more easily.
13551 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13556 <section id=
"themsoon">
13557 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13559 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13560 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13561 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13562 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13563 changes that we need.
13566 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13567 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13568 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13572 <section id=
"formalities">
13573 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13575 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13576 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13577 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13578 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13582 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13583 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13587 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13588 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13589 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13590 default is control, and
<quote>formalities
</quote> are banished.
13596 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13597 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13598 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13599 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13600 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13601 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13602 formalities were getting in the way.
13605 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13606 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13607 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13608 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13609 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13610 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13611 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13612 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13613 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13614 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13617 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13619 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13620 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13621 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13622 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13623 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13624 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13627 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13628 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13629 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13630 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13631 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13632 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13633 developed by others.
13636 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13638 <section id=
"registration">
13639 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13641 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13642 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13643 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13644 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13645 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13646 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13647 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13648 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13649 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13650 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13651 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13654 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13655 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13656 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13657 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13658 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13659 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13660 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13663 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13664 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13665 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13666 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13667 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13668 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13669 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13670 with which registration occurs up.
13673 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13674 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13675 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13676 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13677 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13678 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13679 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13680 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13681 formality
—while producing a database
13682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13683 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13687 <section id=
"marking">
13688 <title>MARKING
</title>
13690 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13691 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13692 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13693 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13694 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13695 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13696 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13697 uniformly across all media.
13700 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13701 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13702 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13706 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13707 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13708 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13709 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13710 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13711 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13712 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13713 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13716 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13717 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13718 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13719 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13720 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13721 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13723 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13724 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13725 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13727 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be
<quote>use unless someone
13728 complains.
</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13729 stop using the work in any new
13730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13731 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13732 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13736 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13737 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13738 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13739 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13740 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13743 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13744 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13745 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13746 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13747 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13748 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13749 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13750 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13751 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13752 other important functions.
13755 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13756 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13757 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13758 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13759 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13760 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13763 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13764 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13765 make things unclear.
13768 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13769 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13770 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13771 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13772 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13773 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13779 <section id=
"shortterms">
13780 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13782 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13783 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13787 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13788 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13789 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13790 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13791 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13792 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13795 <quote>A Radical Rethink,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13797 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13799 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13802 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13803 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13804 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13807 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13810 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13811 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13812 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13813 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13814 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13815 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13819 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
13820 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13821 fuzziness of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and the distinction between
<quote>ideas
</quote> and
13822 <quote>expression.
</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13823 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13824 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13825 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13826 <quote>lawyer-free zone
</quote> makes the complexities of
<quote>fair use
</quote> and
13827 <quote>idea/expression
</quote> less necessary to navigate.
13828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13832 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13833 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13834 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13835 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13836 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13837 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13838 pension.
<footnote><para>
13840 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13841 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13843 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13845 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13846 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13848 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
13852 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13853 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13854 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13855 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13856 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13857 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
13858 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13859 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13860 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
13861 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13862 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13863 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13864 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13865 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13868 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
13869 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
13870 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13874 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas
<quote>radical.
</quote> (After all, I
13875 call them
<quote>extremists.
</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
13876 than the term under Richard Nixon. How
<quote>radical
</quote> can it be to ask for
13877 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13883 <section id=
"freefairuse">
13884 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13886 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13887 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13888 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13889 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13890 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13891 the emergence of that new technology.
13894 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
<quote>exclusive
13895 right
</quote> to
<quote>their writings.
</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
13896 right to
<quote>their writings
</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
13897 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13898 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13899 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13900 though that movie is not
<quote>my writing.
</quote>
13903 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13904 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13905 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13907 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13908 University Press,
1967),
32.
13910 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13911 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13912 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13913 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
13917 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13918 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13919 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13920 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13921 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13926 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13927 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13928 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13929 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13930 Consider each limitation in turn.
13933 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13934 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13935 sense to protect John
13937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13938 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13939 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13940 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13941 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13942 after the creative work is done.
13943 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13946 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13947 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13948 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13949 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13950 material. When all
<quote>reuse
</quote> of creative material was within the control
13951 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13952 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13953 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13954 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13955 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13956 the creative process. Smothers it.
13959 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13960 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13961 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13962 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13963 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13967 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13968 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13969 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13970 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13973 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13974 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13975 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13977 His view is that the law should be written so that
13978 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13981 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13982 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13983 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13984 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13985 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13988 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13990 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13991 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13992 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13993 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13997 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
13998 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
14000 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14001 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14002 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
14003 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14004 battles around the sharing of music.
14007 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14008 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14009 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14010 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14011 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14012 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14013 innovation on the network.
14016 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14017 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14018 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14019 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14020 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14023 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14024 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14025 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14026 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
14027 four different kinds of sharing:
14029 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14032 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14033 for purchasing CDs.
14037 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14038 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14043 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14044 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14045 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14049 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14050 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14051 owner plainly endorses.
14055 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14056 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14057 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14058 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14059 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14060 significantly weakened.
14063 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14064 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14065 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14066 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14067 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14071 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14072 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14076 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14077 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14078 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14079 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14080 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14081 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14082 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14083 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14084 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14085 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14088 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14089 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14090 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14092 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14093 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14094 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14095 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14096 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14097 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14098 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14099 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14100 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14103 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14104 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14105 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14106 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14107 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14108 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14109 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14110 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14111 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14112 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14113 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14114 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14115 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14116 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14117 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14118 paying for this content even though
<quote>free
</quote> content is available in the
14119 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14121 See, for example,
<quote>Music Media Watch,
</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14122 April
2002, available at
14123 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14128 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14129 present: It is emphatically temporary. The
<quote>problem
</quote> with file
14130 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14131 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14132 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14133 makers today to be
<quote>solving
</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14134 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14135 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14136 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14137 artists get paid, during
14139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14140 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14141 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14144 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different
<quote>problems
</quote>
14145 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14146 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14147 <quote>problem
</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14148 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14149 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14150 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14151 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14152 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14155 Type C content raises a different
<quote>problem.
</quote> This is content that was,
14156 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14157 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14158 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14159 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14160 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14161 way that returns something to the artist.
14164 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14165 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14166 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14167 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14168 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14169 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14170 from the author's perspective, this
<quote>sharing
</quote> of his content without
14171 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14174 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14175 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14176 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14177 providers would be free, under this rule, to
<quote>share
</quote> that content,
14178 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14179 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14180 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14185 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14186 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14187 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14188 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14189 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14190 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14191 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14195 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14196 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14197 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14198 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14199 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14200 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14201 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14202 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14205 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14206 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14207 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14208 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14209 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14210 delivering and accessing content.
14213 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14214 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14217 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14218 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14219 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14220 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14221 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14222 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14223 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14224 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14228 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14229 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14230 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14231 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14232 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14233 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14236 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14237 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14240 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14241 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14242 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14243 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14244 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14245 2004), ch.
6, available at
14246 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14247 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14248 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14249 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
<quote>Impose a
14250 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,
</quote> available at
14251 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Who's Holding Back
14252 Broadband?
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14253 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14254 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14256 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14257 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14258 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14259 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14261 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry,
<quote>Getting Copyright Right,
</quote>
14262 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14263 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14264 McCullagh,
<quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,
</quote> CNET News.com,
27 August
14266 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14267 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14268 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14269 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14270 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14271 debate by about a decade. See
14272 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14273 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14274 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14275 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14277 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14278 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14279 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14280 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14281 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14282 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14283 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14284 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14288 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14289 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14290 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14291 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14292 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14293 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14294 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14295 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14296 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14297 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14298 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14299 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14300 controlling access.
14301 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14304 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14305 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14306 the system supports the widest range of
<quote>semiotic democracy
</quote>
14307 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14308 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14309 limits on derivative
14311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14312 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14313 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14314 allowed to do with the content itself.
14316 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
14318 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14319 <quote>harm
</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14320 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14321 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14322 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14323 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat
<quote>free
</quote> by being
14324 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14325 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14326 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14327 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14328 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14329 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14333 This competition has already occurred against the background of
<quote>free
</quote>
14334 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14335 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14336 that, there is nothing impossible at all about
<quote>competing with free.
</quote>
14337 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14338 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14339 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14340 theaters are often luxurious
—with
<quote>first class
</quote> seats, and meals
14341 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14342 finding ways to compete with
<quote>free.
</quote>
14345 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14346 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14347 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14348 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14349 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14350 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14354 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14359 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14360 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14361 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14362 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14366 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14369 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14372 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14376 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14377 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14382 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14383 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14387 But what if
<quote>piracy
</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14388 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14389 consumers continue to
<quote>take
</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14393 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14394 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14395 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14396 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14397 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14398 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14399 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14400 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14401 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14402 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14403 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14407 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14408 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14409 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14412 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14413 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14417 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14418 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14420 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14421 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14422 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14423 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14426 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14427 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14428 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14429 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14430 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14431 strong view queers the law.
14434 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14435 <quote>radical
</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14436 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14437 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14438 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14439 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14440 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14441 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14443 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Copyright's First Amendment
</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14444 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14449 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14450 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14451 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14454 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14455 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14456 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14457 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14459 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14460 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14461 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14462 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14463 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14464 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14465 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14466 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14467 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14468 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?
</quote> working paper, June
2003,
14470 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14471 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14472 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14473 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14474 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14475 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14477 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14478 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14483 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14484 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14485 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14486 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14487 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14488 practically never be done.
14491 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14492 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14493 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14494 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14495 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14496 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14497 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14498 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14501 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14502 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14503 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14504 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14505 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14506 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14509 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14510 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14511 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14515 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14516 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14517 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14518 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14519 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14520 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14521 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14524 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14525 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14528 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14529 simple pragmatic question:
<quote>Will it do good?
</quote> When challenged about
14530 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers,
<quote>Why not?
</quote>
14533 We should ask,
<quote>Why?
</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14534 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14535 keep your lawyers away.
14537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14541 <chapter label=
"17" id=
"c-notes">
14542 <title>NOTES
</title>
14544 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14545 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14546 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14547 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14548 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14549 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14550 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14551 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14552 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14555 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14558 <chapter label=
"18" id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14559 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14561 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14562 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14563 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14564 to him that this book is dedicated.
14566 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
14568 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14569 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14570 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14571 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14572 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14573 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14574 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14575 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14576 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14577 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14578 critical eye on much of this.
14581 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14582 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14583 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14584 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14585 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14586 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14587 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14588 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14589 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14592 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14593 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14594 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14595 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14596 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14597 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14598 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14599 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14600 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14601 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14602 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14603 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14604 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14605 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14606 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams,
<quote>Wink,
</quote> Roger Wood,
<quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,
</quote>
14607 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14608 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14609 a bunch of great replies.)
14612 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14613 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14614 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14615 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14616 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14617 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14618 throughout this book.
14621 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14622 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14623 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14624 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14626 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->