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18 <book id="index" lang="en">
19 <bookinfo>
20 <title>Free Culture</title>
21
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
23
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
26
27 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
28
29 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
30
31 <authorgroup>
32 <author>
33 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig</surname>
35 </author>
36 </authorgroup>
37
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41 <subjectset scheme="libraryofcongress">
42 <subject>
43 <subjectterm>Intellectual property&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
44 </subject>
45 <subject>
46 <subjectterm>Mass media&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
47 </subject>
48 <subject>
49 <subjectterm>Technological innovations&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
50 </subject>
51 <subject>
52 <subjectterm>Art&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
53 </subject>
54 </subjectset>
55
56
57 <publisher>
58 <publishername>The Penguin Press</publishername>
59 <address><city>New York</city></address>
60 </publisher>
61
62 <copyright>
63 <year>2004</year>
64 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
65 </copyright>
66 <legalnotice>
67 <para>
68 <inlinemediaobject>
69 <imageobject>
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71 </imageobject>
72 <imageobject>
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74 </imageobject>
75 <textobject>
76 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
77 </textobject>
78 </inlinemediaobject>
79 </para>
80
81 <para>
82 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
83 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
84 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
85 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
86 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
87 </para>
88 </legalnotice>
89
90 <abstract>
91 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
92 <para>
93 LAWRENCE LESSIG
94 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
95 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
96 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
97 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
98 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
99 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
100 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
101 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
102 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
103 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
104 twice listed in BusinessWeek's <quote>e.biz 25,</quote> and named one of Scientific
105 American's <quote>50 visionaries.</quote> A graduate of the University of
106 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
107 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
108 Appeals.
109 </para>
110 </abstract>
111
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129
130 <biblioid class="isbn">1-59420-006-8</biblioid>
131
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135 <biblioid class="libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
136
137 </bookinfo>
138 <!--PAGE BREAK 1-->
139 <dedication id="salespoints">
140 <title></title>
141 <para>
142 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
143 </para>
144 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
145 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
146 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
147 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
148 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
149 </itemizedlist>
150 </dedication>
151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
153 <dedication id="alsobylessig">
154 <title></title>
155 <para>
156 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
157 </para>
158 <para>
159 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
160 </para>
161 <para>
162 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
163 </para>
164 </dedication>
165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
166 <dedication id="frontpublisher">
167 <title></title>
168 <para>
169 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
170 </para>
171 </dedication>
172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
173 <dedication id="frontbookinfo">
174 <title></title>
175 <para>
176 FREE CULTURE
177 </para>
178
179 <para>
180 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
181 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
182 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
183 </para>
184
185 <para>
186 LAWRENCE LESSIG
187 </para>
188 </dedication>
189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
190 <colophon>
191 <para>
192 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
193 York, New York
194 </para>
195 <para>
196 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
197 </para>
198 <para>
199 Excerpt from an editorial titled <quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,</quote>
200 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
201 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
202 </para>
203 <para>
204 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
205 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
206 </para>
207 <para>
208 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
209 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
210 </para>
211 <para>
212 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
213 </para>
214 <para>
215 Lessig, Lawrence.
216 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
217 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
218 </para>
219 <para>
220 p. cm.
221 </para>
222 <para>
223 Includes index.
224 </para>
225 <para>
226 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
227 </para>
228
229 <para>
230 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
231 </para>
232 <para>
233 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
234 </para>
235 <para>
236 KF2979.L47
237 </para>
238 <para>
239 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
240 </para>
241 <para>
242 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
243 </para>
244 <para>
245 Printed in the United States of America
246 </para>
247 <para>
248 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
249 </para>
250 <para>
251 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
252 </para>
253
254 <para>
255 &translationblock;
256 </para>
257
258 <para>
259 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
260 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
261 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
262 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
263 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
264 the above publisher of this book.
265 </para>
266 <para>
267 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
268 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
269 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
270 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
271 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
272 author's rights is appreciated.
273 </para>
274 </colophon>
275
276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
277 <dedication><title></title>
278 <para>
279 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
280 it continues still.
281 </para>
282 </dedication>
283
284 <toc id="toc"></toc>
285
286 <lot>
287 <title>List of figures</title>
288 </lot>
289
290 <!--
291 c PREFACE xiii
292 c INTRODUCTION
293 c "PIRACY"
294 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
295 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
296 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
297 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
298 2 Film
299 2 Recorded Music
300 2 Radio
301 2 Cable TV
302 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
303 2 Piracy I
304 2 Piracy II
305 c "PROPERTY"
306 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
307 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
308 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
309 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
310 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
311 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
312 2 Beginnings
313 2 Law: Duration
314 2 Law: Scope
315 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
316 2 Architecture and Law: Force
317 2 Market: Concentration
318 2 Together
319 c PUZZLES
320 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
321 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
322 2 Constraining Creators
323 2 Constraining Innovators
324 2 Corrupting Citizens
325 c BALANCES
326 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
327 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
328 c CONCLUSION
329 c AFTERWORD
330 1 Us, Now
331 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
332 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
333 1 Them, Soon
334 2 1. More Formalities
335 3 Registration and Renewal
336 3 Marking
337 2 2. Shorter Terms
338 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
339 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
340 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
341 c NOTES
342 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
343 c INDEX
344 -->
345
346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
347
348 <preface id="preface">
349 <title>PREFACE</title>
350 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
351 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
352 </indexterm>
353 <para>
354 <emphasis role="bold">At the end</emphasis> of his review of my first
355 book, <citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David
356 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
357 computer-related texts, wrote this:
358 </para>
359 <blockquote>
360 <para>
361 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
362 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
363 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
364 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
365 David Pogue, <quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
366 </para></footnote>
367 </para>
368 </blockquote>
369 <para>
370 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
371 software, or <quote>code,</quote> functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
372 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
373 could always <quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome</quote>-like simply flip a
374 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
375 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
376 <quote>affect</quote> us anymore.
377 </para>
378 <para>
379 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
380 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
381 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
382 causes even after the modem is turned
383 <!--PAGE BREAK 12-->
384 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
385 on-line have fundamentally affected <quote>people who aren't online.</quote> There
386 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
387 </para>
388 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
389 <para>
390 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
391 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
392 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
393 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
394 important.
395 </para>
396 <para>
397 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
398 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of <quote>free culture</quote>&mdash;not
399 <quote>free</quote> as in <quote>free beer</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
400 free software movement<footnote>
401 <para>
402 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
403 </para></footnote>), but <quote>free</quote> as in <quote>free speech,</quote> <quote>free markets,</quote>
404 <quote>free trade,</quote> <quote>free enterprise,</quote> <quote>free will,</quote> and <quote>free elections.</quote> A
405 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
406 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
407 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
408 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
409 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
410 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
411 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
412 <quote>permission culture</quote>&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
413 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
414 past.
415 </para>
416 <para>
417 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not <quote>we</quote>
418 on the Left or <quote>you</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
419 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
420 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
421 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
422 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
423 culture deem fundamental.
424 </para>
425 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
426 <para>
427 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
428 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
429 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
430 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
431 As William Safire described marching <quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
432 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
433 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,</quote> he formulated perhaps
434 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
435 he asked,
436 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
437 </para>
438 <blockquote>
439 <para>
440 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
441 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
442 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
443 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
444 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
445 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
446 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
447 </para></footnote>
448 </para>
449 </blockquote>
450 <para>
451 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
452 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
453 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
454 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
455 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
456 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
457 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
458 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
459 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
460 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
461 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
462 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
463 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
464 that this work is <quote>merely</quote> derivative.
465 </para>
466 <para>
467 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
468 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
469 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
470 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
471 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
472 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
473 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
474 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
475
476 <!--PAGE BREAK 14-->
477 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
478 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
479 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
480 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
481 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
482 what I advance here.
483 </para>
484 <para>
485 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
486 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
487 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
488 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
489 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
490 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
491 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
492 book is written.
493 </para>
494
495 </preface>
496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
497
498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
499 <chapter label="0" id="c-introduction">
500 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
501 <para>
502 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
503 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
504 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
505 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
506 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
507 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
508 </para>
509 <para>
510 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
511 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
512 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
513 and all the space above, to <quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.</quote><footnote><para>
514 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
515 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
516 </para></footnote>
517 For many
518 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
519 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
520 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
521 </para>
522 <para>
523 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
524 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
525 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
526 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
527 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
528 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
529 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
530 </para>
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
532 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
533 <para>
534 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
535 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
536 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
537 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
538 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
539 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
540 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to <quote>an indefinite
541 extent, upwards,</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
542 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
543 </para>
544 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
545 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
546 <para>
547 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
548 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
549 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
550 <quote>taking</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
551 that <quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
552 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.</quote> But Justice Douglas
553 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
554 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
555 </para>
556 <blockquote>
557 <para>
558 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
559 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
560 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
561 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
562 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
563 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
564 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
565 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
566 <para>
567 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
568 that there could be a <quote>taking</quote> if the government's use of its land
569 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
570 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, <quote>(Intellectual)
571 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
572 Authorship,</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
573 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
574 1112&ndash;13.
575 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
576 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
577 </para></footnote>
578 </para>
579 </blockquote>
580 <para>
581 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.</quote>
582 </para>
583 <para>
584 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
585 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
586 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
587 <!--PAGE BREAK 18-->
588 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: <quote>Common sense revolts
589 at the idea.</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
590 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
591 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
592 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
593 </para>
594 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
595 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
596 <para>
597 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
598 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
599 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
600 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
601 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
602 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
603 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
604 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
605 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by <quote>what
606 seemed reasonable</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
607 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
608 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
609 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
610 end, the force of what seems <quote>obvious</quote> to everyone else&mdash;the power of
611 <quote>common sense</quote>&mdash;would prevail. Their <quote>private interest</quote> would not be
612 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
613 </para>
614 <para>
615 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
616 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
617 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
618 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
619 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
620 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
621 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
622 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
623 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
624 understanding of radio.
625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
626 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
627 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
628 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
629 </para>
630 <para>
631 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
632 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
633 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
634 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
635 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
636 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
637 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
638 much less transmitter power and static.
639 </para>
640 <para>
641 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
642 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
643 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
644 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
645 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
646 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
647 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
648 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
649 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.</quote>
650 </para>
651 <para>
652 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
653 </para>
654 <blockquote>
655 <para>
656 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
657 sounded like a glass of water being poured. &hellip; A paper was crumpled
658 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
659 fire. &hellip; Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
660 and guitar number were performed. &hellip; The music was projected with a
661 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio <quote>music
662 box.</quote><footnote><para>
663 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
664 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
665 </para></footnote>
666 </para>
667 </blockquote>
668 <para>
669 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
670 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
671 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
672 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
673 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
674 a handful of networks.
675 <!--PAGE BREAK 20-->
676 </para>
677 <para>
678 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
679 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
680 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
681 that removed static from <quote>radio.</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
682 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
683 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
684 </para>
685 <blockquote>
686 <para>
687 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
688 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
689 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
690 RCA.<footnote><para> See <quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
691 Electronic Era,</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
692 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
693
694 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
695 </para></footnote>
696 </para>
697 </blockquote>
698 <para>
699 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
700 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
701 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
702 described,
703 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
704 </para>
705 <blockquote>
706 <para>
707 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
708 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
709 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
710 unrestrained, posed &hellip; a complete reordering of radio power
711 &hellip; and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
712 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
713 </para></footnote>
714 </para>
715 </blockquote>
716 <para>
717 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
718 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
719 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
720 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
721 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
722 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
723 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
724 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
725 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
726 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
727 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
728 </para>
729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
730 <blockquote>
731 <para>
732 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
733 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
734 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
735 deviousness.<footnote><para>
736 Lessing, 256.
737 </para></footnote>
738 </para>
739 </blockquote>
740 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
741 <para>
742 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
743 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
744 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
745 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
746 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
747 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
748 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
749 least temporarily.
750 </para>
751 <para>
752 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
753 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
754 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
755 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
756 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
757 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
758 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
759 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
760 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
761 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
762 </para>
763 <para>
764 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
765 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
766 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
767 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
768 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
769 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
770 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
771 course always public spirited; the reality is something
772 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
773 to themselves, would crumble in
774 <!--PAGE BREAK 22-->
775 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
776 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
777 effect of technological change.
778 </para>
779 <para>
780 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
781 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
782 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
783 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
784 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
785 before.<footnote><para>
786 Amanda Lenhart, <quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
787 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,</quote> Pew Internet and American
788 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
789 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
790 </para></footnote>
791 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
792 of 2004.
793 </para>
794 <para>
795 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
796 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
797 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
798 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
799 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
800 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
801 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
802 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
803 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
804 </para>
805 <para>
806 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
807 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
808 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
809 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
810 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
811 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
812 has introduced.
813 </para>
814 <para>
815 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
816 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
817 regulation of each. By <quote>commercial culture</quote> I mean that part of our
818 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
819 <quote>noncommercial culture</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
820 parks or on
821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
822 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
823 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his <quote>Reader,</quote> or
824 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
825 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel</primary></indexterm>
826 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah</primary></indexterm>
827 </para>
828 <para>
829 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
830 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
831 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
832 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
833 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
834 left this culture <quote>free.</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
835 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
836 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
837 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
838 </para>
839 <para>
840 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
841 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
842 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
843 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
844 marketplace.<footnote>
845 <para>
846 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
847 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
848 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
849 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
850 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
851 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
852 D. Brandeis, <quote>The Right to Privacy,</quote> Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
853 198&ndash;200.
854 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
855 </para></footnote>
856 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
857 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
858 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
859 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
860 </para>
861 <para>
862 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
863 been erased.<footnote><para>
864 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
865 2001), ch. 13.
866 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
867 </para></footnote>
868 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
869 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
870 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
871 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
872 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
873 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
874 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
875 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
876 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
877 culture, more and more a permission culture.
878 </para>
879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
880 <para>
881 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
882 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
883 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
884 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
885 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
886 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
887 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
888 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
889 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
890 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
891 Causbys.
892 </para>
893 <para>
894 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
895 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
896 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
897 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
898 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
899 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
900 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
901 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
902 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
903 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
904 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
905 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
906 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
907 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
908 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
909 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
910 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
911 </para>
912 <para>
913 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
914 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
915 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
916 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
917 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
918 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
919 remakes them.
920 </para>
921 <para>
922 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
924 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
925 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether <quote>piracy</quote> will
926 be permitted, and whether <quote>property</quote> will be protected. The <quote>war</quote> that
927 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
928 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
929 calls his <quote>own terrorist war</quote><footnote><para>
930 Amy Harmon, <quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
931 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,</quote> <citetitle>New York
932 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
933 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
934 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
935 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
936 against it.
937 </para>
938 <para>
939 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
940 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
941 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
942 <quote>creative property.</quote> I believe that <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong, and that the
943 law, properly tuned, should punish <quote>piracy,</quote> whether on or off the
944 Internet.
945 </para>
946 <para>
947 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
948 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
949 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet <quote>pirates</quote> will also rid our
950 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
951 </para>
952 <para>
953 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
954 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
955 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
956 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
957 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
958 <para>
959 Neil W. Netanel, <quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
960 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
961 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
962 </para></footnote>
963 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
964 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
965 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
966 could cultivate and extend our culture.
967 </para>
968 <para>
969 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
970 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
971 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
972 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
973 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
974 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
975 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
976 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
977 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
978 </para>
979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
980 <para>
981 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
982 <quote>centrality of technology</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
983 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
984 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
985 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
986 against an industry.
987 </para>
988 <para>
989 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
990 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
991 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
992 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
993 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
994 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
995 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
996 </para>
997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
998 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
999 <para>
1000 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about <quote>property.</quote> The
1001 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1002 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1003 this <quote>property</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1004 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1005 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1006 of <quote>intellectual property</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1007 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1008 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1009 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1010 <quote>trespassing</quote> upon legitimate claims of <quote>property.</quote> It is as plain to
1011 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1012 trespass.
1013 </para>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1015 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1016 <para>
1017 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1018 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1019 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1020 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1021 war. Unlike
1022 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1023 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1024 on its side.
1025 </para>
1026 <para>
1027 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1028 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1029 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1030 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1031 our <quote>culture</quote> was as <quote>owned</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1032 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1033 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1034 accepted as it is now.
1035 </para>
1036 <para>
1037 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1038 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1039 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1040 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1041 </para>
1042 <para>
1043 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1044 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1045 </para>
1046 <para>
1047 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1048 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1049 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1050 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1051 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1052 </para>
1053 <para>
1054 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1055 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1056 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1057 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1058 view?
1059 </para>
1060 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1061 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1062 <para>
1063 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1064 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1065 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1066 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of <quote>intellectual
1067 property.</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1068 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1069 this silliness will be much more profound.
1070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1071 </para>
1072 <para>
1073 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: <quote>piracy</quote> and
1074 <quote>property.</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1075 ideas.
1076 </para>
1077 <para>
1078 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1079 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1080 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1081 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1082 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1083 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1084 </para>
1085 <para>
1086 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1087 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1088 government, pushed by big media to respond to this <quote>something new,</quote> is
1089 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1090 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let <quote>common
1091 sense</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1092 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1093 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1094 fundamental about who we have always been.
1095 </para>
1096 <para>
1097 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1098 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1099 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1100 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1101 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1102 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1103 </para>
1104 </chapter>
1105 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1106 <part id="c-piracy">
1107 <title><quote>PIRACY</quote></title>
1108 <partintro>
1109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1110 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1111 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1112 </indexterm>
1113 <para>
1114 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1115 been a war against <quote>piracy.</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1116 <quote>piracy,</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1117 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1118 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1119 </para>
1120 <blockquote>
1121 <para>
1122 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1123 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1124 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1125 <!-- f1 -->
1126 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1127 </para></footnote>
1128 </para>
1129 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1130 </blockquote>
1131 <para>
1132 Today we are in the middle of another <quote>war</quote> against <quote>piracy.</quote> The
1133 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1134 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1135 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1136 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1137 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1139 </para>
1140 <para>
1141 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1142 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1143 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1144 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1145 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will <quote>rob the author of the
1146 profit.</quote>
1147 </para>
1148 <para>
1149 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1150 increasingly to technology to defend their <quote>property</quote> against this
1151 <quote>piracy.</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1152 raised to believe that <quote>property</quote> should be <quote>free.</quote> Forget tattoos,
1153 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1154 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1155 </para>
1156 <para>
1157 There's no doubt that <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1158 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1159 notion of <quote>piracy</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1160 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1161 </para>
1162 <para>
1163 The idea goes something like this:
1164 </para>
1165 <blockquote>
1166 <para>
1167 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1168 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1169 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1170 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1171 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1172 piracy.
1173 </para>
1174 </blockquote>
1175 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1176 <para>
1177 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1178 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the <quote>if value, then right</quote>
1179 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1180 <!-- f2 -->
1181 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, <quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1182 in the Pepsi Generation,</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1183 </para></footnote>
1184 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1185 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1186 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1187 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1188 <!-- f3 -->
1189 Lisa Bannon, <quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1190 Up,</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1191 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1192 Zittrain, <quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1193 Speech, No One Wins,</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1194 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1195 </para></footnote>
1196 There was <quote>value</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1197 <quote>right</quote>&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1198 </para>
1199 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1200 <para>
1201 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1202 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1204 of law protecting creative property. But the <quote>if value, then right</quote>
1205 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1206 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1207 </para>
1208 <para>
1209 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1210 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1211 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1212 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1213 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1214 </para>
1215 <para>
1216 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1217 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1218 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1219 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1220 copyright law today regulates both.
1221 </para>
1222 <para>
1223 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1224 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1225 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1226 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1227 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1228 more expense of doing business.
1229 </para>
1230 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1231 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1232 <para>
1233 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1234 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1235 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1236 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1237 <quote>copying,</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1238 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1239 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1240 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1241 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1242 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1243 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1244 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1245 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1246 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1247 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1249 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the <quote>Rise of the Creative
1250 Class.</quote><footnote>
1251 <para>
1252 <!-- f4 -->
1253 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York:
1254 Basic Books, 2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1255 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1256 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1257 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1258 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1259 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1260
1261 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1262 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1263 </para></footnote>
1264 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1265 this creative class.
1266 </para>
1267 <para>
1268 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1269 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1270 context the current battles about behavior labeled <quote>piracy.</quote>
1271 </para>
1272 </partintro>
1273
1274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1275 <chapter label="1" id="creators">
1276 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1277 <indexterm id="idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'>
1278 <primary>animated cartoons</primary>
1279 </indexterm>
1280 <para>
1281 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1282 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1283 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1284 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1285 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1286 </para>
1287 <para>
1288 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1289 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1290 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1291 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1292 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1293 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1294 </para>
1295 <blockquote>
1296 <para>
1297 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1298 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1299 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1300 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1302 </para>
1303 <para>
1304 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1305 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1306 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1307 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1308 synchronization was pretty close.
1309 </para>
1310 <para>
1311 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1312 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1313 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1314 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1315 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1316 <!-- f1 -->
1317 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1318 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1319 </para></footnote>
1320 </para>
1321 </blockquote>
1322 <para>
1323 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1324 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: <quote>I have never been so thrilled
1325 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.</quote>
1326 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1327 </para>
1328 <para>
1329 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1330 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1331 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1332 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1333 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1334 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1335 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1336 </para>
1337 <para>
1338 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1339 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1340 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1341 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1342 </para>
1343 <para>
1344 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1345 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1346 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1347 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1348 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1349 and among the best of its genre.
1350 </para>
1351 <para>
1352 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1353 Willie.
1354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1355 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1356 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1357 <!-- f2 -->
1358 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1359 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1360 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1361 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: <quote>Steamboat Bill,</quote> <quote>The
1362 Simpleton</quote> (Delille), <quote>Mischief Makers</quote> (Carbonara), <quote>Joyful Hurry No. 1</quote>
1363 (Baron), and <quote>Gawky Rube</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song, <quote>The Turkey in the
1364 Straw,</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1365 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1366 </para></footnote>
1367 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1368 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1369 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1370 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song <quote>Steamboat Bill,</quote>
1371 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1372 Mouse.
1373 </para>
1374 <para>
1375 This <quote>borrowing</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1376 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1377 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1378 <!-- f3 -->
1379 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, <quote>The Mouse
1380 that Ate the Public Domain,</quote> Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1381 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1382 </para></footnote>
1383 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1384 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1385 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1386 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1387 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1388 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1389 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1390 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1391 old.
1392 </para>
1393 <para>
1394 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1395 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1396 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1397 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1398 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1399 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1400 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1401 </para>
1402 <para>
1403 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1404 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1405 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1406 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1407 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1408 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1409 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1410 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1411 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1412 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1413 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1415 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1416 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1417 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1418 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1419 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1420 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1421 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1422 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1423 </para>
1424 <indexterm startref="idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'/>
1425 <para>
1426 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1427 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1428 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1429 its importance. We could call this <quote>Disney creativity,</quote> though that
1430 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, <quote>Walt Disney
1431 creativity</quote>&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1432 culture around us and makes it something different.
1433 </para>
1434 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1435 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1436 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1437 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1438 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1439 <!-- f4 -->
1440 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1441 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the <quote>average</quote> term by
1442 determining
1443 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1444 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1445 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1446 average
1447 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1448 Web site associated with this book, available at
1449 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1450 </para></footnote>
1451 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1452 copyright holders of a creative work had an <quote>exclusive right</quote> to control
1453 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1454 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1455 </para>
1456 <para>
1457 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1458 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1459 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a <quote>lawyer-free
1460 zone.</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1461 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1462 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1463 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1464 </para>
1465 <para>
1466 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1467 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1468 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1469 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1470
1471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1472 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1473 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1474 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1475 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1476 content from before the Great Depression.
1477 </para>
1478 <para>
1479 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on <quote>Walt Disney creativity.</quote>
1480 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1481 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1482 universal.
1483 </para>
1484 <para>
1485 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1486 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1487 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1488 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1489 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1490 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1491 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1492 </para>
1493 <para>
1494 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1495 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1496 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1497 the stories that these <quote>graphic novels</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1498 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are <quote>men in tights.</quote>
1499 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1500 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1501 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1502 interestingly different way.
1503 </para>
1504 <para>
1505 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1506 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1507 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1508 </para>
1509 <para>
1510 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1511 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1512 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1513 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1514 transforming it either subtly or
1515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1516 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1517 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1518 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1519 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently <quote>different.</quote> But they
1520 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1521 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1522 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1523 </para>
1524 <para>
1525 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1526 huge. More than 33,000 <quote>circles</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1527 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1528 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1529 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1530 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1531 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1532 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1533 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1534 </para>
1535 <para>
1536 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1537 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1538 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1539 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1540 one. Doujinshi are plainly <quote>derivative works.</quote> There is no general
1541 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1542 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1543 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1544 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that <quote>taking</quote> without
1545 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1546 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1547 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1548 </para>
1549 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1550 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1551 </indexterm>
1552 <para>
1553 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1554 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1555 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, <quote>The
1556 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1557 in Japan now. &hellip; American comics were born out of copying each
1558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1559 other. &hellip; That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1560 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them</quote>
1561 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1562 <!-- f5 -->
1563 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1564 York: Perennial, 2000).
1565 </para></footnote>
1566 </para>
1567 <para>
1568 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1569 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1570 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, <quote>there are these rules
1571 and you have to stick to them.</quote> There are things Superman <quote>cannot</quote>
1572 do. <quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1573 which are fifty years old.</quote>
1574 </para>
1575 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1576 <para>
1577 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1578 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1579 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1580 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1581 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1582 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1583 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1584 <!-- f6 -->
1585 See Salil K. Mehra, <quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1586 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1587 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. <quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1588 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1589 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1590 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1591 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1592 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.</quote>
1593 </para></footnote>
1594 </para>
1595 <para>
1596 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1597 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1598 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1599 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1600 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1601 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1602 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1603 a more general pattern of blocking this <quote>free taking</quote> by the doujinshi
1604 culture?
1605 </para>
1606 <para>
1607 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1608 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1609 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. <quote>We don't have enough
1610 lawyers,</quote> he told me one afternoon. There <quote>just aren't enough resources
1611 to prosecute cases like this.</quote>
1612 </para>
1613 <para>
1614 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1615 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1616 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1617 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1619 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1620 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1621 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1622 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1623 their clients or hurt them?
1624 Let's pause for a moment.
1625 </para>
1626 <para>
1627 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1628 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1629 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1630 </para>
1631 <para>
1632 We live in a world that celebrates <quote>property.</quote> I am one of those
1633 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1634 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1635 <quote>intellectual property.</quote><footnote><para>
1636 <!-- f7 -->
1637 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1638 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1639 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1640 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1641 describes a set of <quote>property</quote> rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1642 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1643 very different.
1644 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1645 </para></footnote>
1646 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1647 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1648 property.
1649 </para>
1650 <para>
1651 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1652 plenty of value out there that <quote>property</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1653 mean <quote>money can't buy you love,</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1654 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1655 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1656 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1657 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1658 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1659 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1660 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1661 Disney's use would have been considered <quote>fair.</quote> There was nothing
1662 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1663 the public domain.
1664 </para>
1665 <para>
1666 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1667 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1668 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1669
1670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1671 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1672 freedom is good.
1673 </para>
1674 <para>
1675 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1676 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1677 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1678 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1679 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1680 form, whether large or small.
1681 </para>
1682 <para>
1683 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1684 say that the copycat comic artists are <quote>stealing.</quote> This form of Walt
1685 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1686 particular find it hard to say why.
1687 </para>
1688 <para>
1689 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1690 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1691 without asking or paying for the privilege. (<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1692 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1693 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?</quote>) Acting companies
1694 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1695 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1696 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1697 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1698 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1699 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1700 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1701 </para>
1702 <para>
1703 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1704 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1705 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1706 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1707 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1708 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1709 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1710 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1712 </para>
1713 <para>
1714 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1715 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1716 question instead is <quote><emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?</quote>
1717 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1718 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1719 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1720 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1721 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1722 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1723 a studio or not?
1724 </para>
1725 <para>
1726 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1727 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1728 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1729 </para>
1730
1731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1732 </chapter>
1733 <chapter label="2" id="mere-copyists">
1734 <title>CHAPTER TWO: <quote>Mere Copyists</quote></title>
1735 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1736 <primary>photography</primary>
1737 </indexterm>
1738 <para>
1739 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1740 producing what we would call <quote>photographs.</quote> Appropriately enough, they
1741 were called <quote>daguerreotypes.</quote> The process was complicated and
1742 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1743 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1744 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1745 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1746 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1747 </para>
1748 <para>
1749 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1750 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1751 <quote>automatic pictures.</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1752 making <quote>negatives.</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1753 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1754 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1755 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1756 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1757 amateurs.
1758 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1759 </para>
1760 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1761 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1762 </indexterm>
1763 <para>
1764 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1765 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1767 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1768 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1769 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1770 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1771 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1772 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1773 population of photographers.
1774 </para>
1775 <para>
1776 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1777 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1778 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. <quote>You press the button and we
1779 do the rest.</quote><footnote><para>
1780 <!-- f1 -->
1781 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1782 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1783 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)</primary></indexterm>
1784 </para>
1785 <blockquote>
1786 <para>
1787 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1788 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1789 that only an expert can do. &hellip; We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1790 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1791 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1792 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1793 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1794 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1795 chemicals.<footnote>
1796 <para>
1797 <!-- f2 -->
1798 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1799 1977), 53.
1800 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1801 </para></footnote>
1802 </para>
1803 </blockquote>
1804 <para>
1805 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1806 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1807 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1808 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1809 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1810 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1811 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1812 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1813 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1814 percent.<footnote><para>
1815 <!-- f3 -->
1816 Jenkins, 177.
1817 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1818 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1819 <!-- f4 -->
1820 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1821 </para></footnote>
1822 </para>
1823 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1824 <para>
1825
1826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1827 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1828 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1829 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1830 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1831 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, <quote>For the
1832 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1833 permanent record of his family and its activities. &hellip; For the first
1834 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1835 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1836 interpretation or bias.</quote><footnote><para>
1837 <!-- f5 -->
1838 Coe, 58.
1839 </para></footnote>
1840 </para>
1841 <para>
1842 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1843 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1844 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1845 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1846 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1847 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its <quote>quality</quote>;
1848 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1849 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1850 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1851 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1852 have before.
1853 </para>
1854 <para>
1855 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1856 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1857 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1858 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1859 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1860 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1861 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1862 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1863 <!-- f6 -->
1864 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1865 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1866 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1867 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1868 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1869 </para></footnote>
1870 </para>
1871 <para>
1872 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1873 familiar. The photographer was <quote>taking</quote> something from the person or
1874 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1875 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1876 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1877 draw
1878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1879 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1880 that they thought valuable.
1881 </para>
1882 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1883 <para>
1884 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1885 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1886 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1887 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1888 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1889 <para>
1890 <!-- f7 -->
1891 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, <quote>The Right to Privacy,</quote>
1892 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1893 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1894 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1895 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1896 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1897 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1898 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1899 </para>
1900 <para>
1901 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1902 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1903 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1904 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1905 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1906 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1907 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1908 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1909 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1910 <!-- f8 -->
1911 See Melville B. Nimmer, <quote>The Right of Publicity,</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1912 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, <quote>Privacy,</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1913 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1914 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1915 (1993).
1916 </para></footnote>)
1917 </para>
1918 <para>
1919 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1920 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1921 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1922 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1923 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1924 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1925 Kodak would be benefiting from the <quote>theft</quote> committed by the
1926 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1927 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1928 from the <quote>image-right</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1929 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1930 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1931 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1932 </para>
1933 <para>
1934
1935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1936 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1937 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1938 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1939 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1940 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1941 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1942 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1943 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1944 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1945 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1946 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1947 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1948 striking images, and the logo <quote>Just Think!</quote> in place of the name of a
1949 school. But there's little that's <quote>just</quote> cerebral in the projects that
1950 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1951 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1952 film of your VCR. Rather the <quote>film</quote> of digital cameras. Just Think!
1953 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1954 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1955 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1956 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1957 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1958 learn.
1959 </para>
1960 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1961 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1962 <para>
1963 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1964 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1965 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, <quote>Five years ago, a good
1966 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1967 professional quality for $595.</quote><footnote><para>
1968 <!-- f9 -->
1969 H. Edward Goldberg, <quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1970 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,</quote>
1971 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1972 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1973 </para></footnote>
1974 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1975 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1976 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1977 learning more and more of something teachers call <quote>media literacy.</quote>
1978 </para>
1979 <para>
1980 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1981 <quote>Media literacy,</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1982 Think!, puts it, <quote>is the ability &hellip; to understand, analyze, and
1983 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1984 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1985 the way people access it.</quote>
1986 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1987 </para>
1988 <para>
1989 This may seem like an odd way to think about <quote>literacy.</quote> For most
1990 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1991 and noticing split infinitives are the things that <quote>literate</quote> people know
1992 about.
1993 </para>
1994 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
1995 <para>
1996 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1997 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1998 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1999 <!-- f10 -->
2000 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2001 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); <quote>Findings on Family and TV
2002 Study,</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
2003 </para></footnote>
2004 it is increasingly important to understand the <quote>grammar</quote> of media. For
2005 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2006 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2007 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2008 (at least at first) terrible media.
2009 </para>
2010 <para>
2011 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2012 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2013 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
2014 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2015 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
2016 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2017 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2018 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2019 </para>
2020 <para>
2021 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2022 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2023 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2024 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2025 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2026 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2027 </para>
2028 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
2029 <para>
2030 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2031 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2032 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2033
2034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2035 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2036 about <quote>the placement of objects, color, &hellip; rhythm, pacing, and
2037 texture.</quote><footnote>
2038 <para>
2039 <!-- f11 -->
2040 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
2041 2002.
2042 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2043 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
2044 </para></footnote>
2045 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2046 <quote>played</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2047 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2048 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2049 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2050 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2051 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2052 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
2053 <!-- f12 -->
2054 See Scott Steinberg, <quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,</quote> E!online, 4
2055 November 2000, available at
2056 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; <quote>Timeline,</quote> 22 November 2000,
2057 available at
2058 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
2059 </para></footnote>
2060 </para>
2061 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
2062 <para>
2063 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2064 describes, <quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2065 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2066 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2067 led.</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2068 </para>
2069 <para>
2070 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
2071 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2072 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2073 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2074 </para>
2075 <blockquote>
2076 <para>
2077 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2078 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2079 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2080 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2081 being read-only.
2082 </para>
2083 </blockquote>
2084 <para>
2085 <quote>Read-only.</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2086 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2087 twentieth century.
2088 </para>
2089 <para>
2090 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2091 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2092 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2093 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2094 literacy,
2095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2096 and this literacy in particular, is to <quote>empower people to choose the
2097 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2098 express.</quote><footnote>
2099 <para>
2100 <!-- f13 -->
2101 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2102 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2103 </para></footnote> It is to enable students <quote>to communicate in the
2104 language of the twenty-first century.</quote><footnote><para>
2105 <!-- f14 -->
2106 Ibid.
2107 </para></footnote>
2108 </para>
2109 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2110 <para>
2111 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2112 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2113 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2114 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2115 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2116 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2117 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2118 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2119 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2120 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2121 </para>
2122 <para>
2123 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2124 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2125 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2126 away. The <quote>kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,</quote>
2127 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2128 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2129 </para>
2130 <para>
2131 Using whatever <quote>free web stuff they could find,</quote> and relatively simple
2132 tools to enable the kids to mix <quote>image, sound, and text,</quote> Barish said
2133 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2134 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2135 close to the lives of these students. The project <quote>gave them a tool
2136 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2137 it,</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2138 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2139 been created using only text. <quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2140 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2141 gone and done something else,</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2142 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2143 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2144 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2145 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2146 </para>
2147 <para>
2148
2149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2150 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?</quote> I asked. In part,
2151 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2152 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of <quote>constructing
2153 meaning.</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2154 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2155 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2156 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2157 our interview,
2158 </para>
2159 <blockquote>
2160 <para>
2161 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2162 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2163 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2164 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2165 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2166 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2167 you say, <quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.</quote>
2168 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2169 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2170 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, <quote>Well, with all these things that you
2171 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2172 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2173 for me something that reflects that.</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2174 camera and &hellip; saying, <quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2175 make a little movie.</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2176 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2177 about the topic.&hellip;
2178 </para>
2179 <para>
2180 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2181 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2182 bump up against the fact, <quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2183 to write something.</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2184 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2185 </para>
2186 <para>
2187 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2188 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2189 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2191 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2192 had a lot of power with this language.
2193 </para>
2194 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2195 not match with any start quote. -->
2196 </blockquote>
2197 <para>
2198 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2199 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2200 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2201 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2202 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2203 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2204 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2205 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2206 world would be watching.
2207 </para>
2208 <para>
2209 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2210 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2211 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was <quote>balance,</quote>
2212 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2213 increasingly come to expect it, <quote>news as entertainment,</quote> even if the
2214 entertainment is tragedy.
2215 </para>
2216 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2217 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2218 <para>
2219 But in addition to this produced news about the <quote>tragedy of September
2220 11,</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2221 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2222 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2223 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2224 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2225 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2226 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2227 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2228 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2229 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2230 was also the Internet.
2231 </para>
2232 <para>
2233 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2234 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2235 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2236 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2237 movie
2238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2239 by a student on the <quote>Just Think!</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2240 with sound or text.
2241 </para>
2242 <para>
2243 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2244 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2245 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2246 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2247 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2248 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2249 spread practically instantaneously.
2250 </para>
2251 <para>
2252 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2253 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2254 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2255 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2256 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2257 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2258 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2259 </para>
2260 <para>
2261 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2262 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2263 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2264 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2265 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2266 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2267 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2268 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2269 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2270 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2271 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2272 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2273 </para>
2274 <para>
2275 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2276 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2277 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2278 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2279 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2280 people vote
2281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2282 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2283 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2284 </para>
2285 <para>
2286 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2287 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2288 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2289 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2290 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2291 most important account of early <quote>Democracy in America.</quote> It wasn't
2292 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2293 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2294 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2295 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2296 deliberated. Members argued about the <quote>right</quote> result; they tried to
2297 persuade each other of the <quote>right</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2298 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2299 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2300 <!-- f15 -->
2301 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2302 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2303 </para></footnote>
2304 </para>
2305 <para>
2306 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2307 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2308 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2309 <!-- f16 -->
2310 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, <quote>Deliberation Day,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2311 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2312 </para></footnote>
2313 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2314 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2315 place for <quote>democratic deliberation</quote> to occur.
2316 </para>
2317 <para>
2318 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2319 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2320 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2321 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2322 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2323 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2324 <!-- f17 -->
2325 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2326 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2327 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2328 little beyond what our friends say.
2329 </para>
2330 <para>
2331 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2332 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2333 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2334 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2335 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2336
2337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2338 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2339 place.
2340 </para>
2341 <para>
2342 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2343 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2344 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2345 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2346 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2347 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2348 </para>
2349 <para>
2350 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2351 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2352 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2353 is having an effect.
2354 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2355 </para>
2356 <para>
2357 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2358 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2359 <quote>misspoke</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2360 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2361 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2362 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2363 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2364 more instances of the same <quote>misspeaking</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2365 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2366 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2367 <!-- f18 -->
2368 Noah Shachtman, <quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,</quote> New
2369 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2370 </para></footnote>
2371 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2372 </para>
2373 <para>
2374 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2375 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2376 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2377 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2378 on.
2379 </para>
2380 <para>
2381 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2382 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2383 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2384 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2385 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2386 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2387 peer-generated rankings.
2388 </para>
2389 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2390 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2391 </indexterm>
2392 <para>
2393 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2395 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2396 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2397 difference is the absence of a financial <quote>conflict of interest.</quote> <quote>I think you
2398 have to take the conflict of interest</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2399 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2400 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2401 get it out of the way.</quote>
2402 </para>
2403 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2404 <para>
2405 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2406 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2407 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2408 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2409 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2410 <!-- f19 -->
2411 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2412 </para></footnote>
2413 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2414 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2415 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2416 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2417 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2418 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2419 told her that <emphasis>they</emphasis> were writing <quote>the story.</quote>)
2420 </para>
2421 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2422 debate&mdash;<quote>amateur</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2423 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2424 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2425 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2426 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2427 had seen.<footnote><para>
2428 <!-- f20 -->
2429 John Schwartz, <quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2430 Information Online,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2431 D. Kramer, <quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,</quote>
2432 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2433 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2434 </para></footnote>
2435 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2436 <quote>triangulate,</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2437 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2438 out of it</quote>&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2439 </para>
2440 <para>
2441 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2442 with blogs. <quote>It's going to become an essential skill,</quote> Winer predicts,
2443 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2444 not clear that <quote>journalism</quote> is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2445 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2446 <para>
2447 <!-- f21 -->
2448 See Michael Falcone, <quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?</quote> <citetitle>New
2449 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. (<quote>Not all news organizations have
2450 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2451 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2452 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2453 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2454 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2455 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.</quote>)
2456 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2457 </para></footnote>
2458 But it is clear that we are still in transition. <quote>A
2459
2460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2461 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,</quote> Winer told me.
2462 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2463 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2464 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, <quote>we will
2465 be the last thing that gets shut down.</quote>
2466 </para>
2467 <para>
2468 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because <quote>you
2469 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.</quote>
2470 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2471 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2472 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2473 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2474 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2475 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2476 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2477 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2478 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2479 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2480 extraordinary to report.
2481 </para>
2482 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2483 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2484 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2485 </indexterm>
2486 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'>
2487 <primary>advertising</primary>
2488 </indexterm>
2489 <para>
2490 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2491 His work, as his Web site describes it, is <quote>human learning and &hellip; the
2492 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating &hellip; innovation.</quote>
2493 </para>
2494 <para>
2495 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2496 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2497 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2498 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2499 affect learning.
2500 </para>
2501 <para>
2502 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When <quote>a lot of us grew up,</quote>
2503 he explains, that tinkering was done <quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2504 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.</quote> But digital technologies
2505 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2506 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2507 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2509 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2510 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2511 or <quote>free collage,</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2512 the tinkering of many others.
2513 </para>
2514 <para>
2515 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2516 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2517 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2518 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2519 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2520 </para>
2521 <para>
2522 This opportunity creates a <quote>completely new kind of learning platform,</quote>
2523 as Brown describes. <quote>As soon as you start doing that, you &hellip;
2524 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2525 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2526 if they can improve it.</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2527 apprenticeship. <quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.</quote>
2528 </para>
2529 <para>
2530 In this process, <quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2531 They are code.</quote> Kids are <quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2532 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2533 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2534 platform. &hellip; You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2535 you tinker the more you improve.</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2536 learn.
2537 </para>
2538 <para>
2539 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2540 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2541 it, <quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2542 intelligence.</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2543 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2544 text. <quote>The Web &hellip; says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2545 you are visual, if you are interested in film &hellip; [then] there is a
2546 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2547 these multiple forms of intelligence.</quote>
2548 </para>
2549 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'/>
2550 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2551 <para>
2552 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2553 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2554
2555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2556 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2557 kind of recognition.
2558 </para>
2559 <para>
2560 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2561 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2562 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2563 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2564 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2565 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2566 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2567 </para>
2568 <para>
2569 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2570 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2571 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2572 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the <quote>right to
2573 tinker</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2574 general.<footnote><para>
2575 <!-- f22 -->
2576 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, <quote>Technological Access
2577 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2578 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2579 </para></footnote>
2580 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2581 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2582 </para>
2583 <para>
2584 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,</quote> Brown
2585 explains. We need to <quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2586 and want to learn.</quote>
2587 </para>
2588 <para>
2589 <quote>Yet,</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2590 evince, <quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2591 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. &hellip; We're building an
2592 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2593 system that closes down that part of the brain.</quote>
2594 </para>
2595 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2596 <para>
2597 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2598 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2599 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2600 the law to close down that technology.
2601 </para>
2602 <para>
2603 <quote>No way to run a culture,</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2604 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2605 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2606 </para>
2607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2608 </chapter>
2609 <chapter label="3" id="catalogs">
2610 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2611 <indexterm><primary>RPI</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</see></indexterm>
2612 <indexterm id="idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'>
2613 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</primary>
2614 </indexterm>
2615 <para>
2616 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2617 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2618 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2619 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2620 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2621 </para>
2622 <para>
2623 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2624 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2625 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2626 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2627 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2628 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2629 </para>
2630 <para>
2631 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2632 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2633 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2634 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2635 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2636 </para>
2637 <para>
2638 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2640 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2641 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2642 engines can do this even better. The idea of <quote>intranet</quote> search
2643 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2644 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2645 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2646 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2647 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2648 </para>
2649 <para>
2650 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2651 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2652 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2653 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2654 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2655 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2656 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2657 </para>
2658 <para>
2659 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2660 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2661 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2662 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2663 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2664 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2665 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2666 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2667 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2668 on-line.
2669 </para>
2670 <para>
2671 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2672 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2673 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2674 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2675 be on users' computers.
2676 </para>
2677 <para>
2678 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2679 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2680 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2681 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2683 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2684 computer.
2685 </para>
2686 <para>
2687 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2688 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2689 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2690 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2691 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2692 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2693 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2694 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2695 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2696 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2697 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2698 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2699 supposed to do.
2700 </para>
2701 <para>
2702 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2703 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2704 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2705 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2706 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2707 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2708 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2709 </para>
2710 <para>
2711 <quote>It was absurd,</quote> he told me. <quote>I don't think I did anything
2712 wrong. &hellip; I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2713 engine that I ran or &hellip; what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2714 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2715 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2716 easier to use</quote>&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2717 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2718 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2719 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2720 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2721 with music.
2722 </para>
2723 <para>
2724 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2725 network and had therefore <quote>willfully</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2727 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2728 <quote>willful infringement,</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2729 call <quote>statutory damages.</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2730 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2731 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2732 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2733 </para>
2734 <para>
2735 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2736 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2737 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2738 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2739 huge demands for <quote>damages</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2740 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2741 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2742 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2743 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2744 2001.<footnote><para>
2745
2746 <!-- f1 -->
2747 Tim Goral, <quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2748 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages,</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2749 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2750 </para></footnote>
2751 </para>
2752 <indexterm startref="idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'/>
2753 <para>
2754 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2755 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2756 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2757 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2758 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2759 </para>
2760 <para>
2761 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2762 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2763 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2764 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2765 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2766 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2767 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, <quote>You don't want to pay another
2768 visit to a dentist like me.</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2769 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2770 </para>
2771 <para>
2772 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2773 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2774 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2775 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2776 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2778 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2779 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2780 </para>
2781 <para>
2782 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2783 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2784 </para>
2785 <para>
2786 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2787 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2788 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2789 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2790 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2791 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2792 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2793 <!-- f2 -->
2794 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2795 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2796 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2797 </para></footnote>
2798 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2799 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2800 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2801 <!-- f3 -->
2802 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in <quote>KaZaA and Punishment,</quote>
2803 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2804 </para></footnote>
2805 </para>
2806 <para>
2807 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2808 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2809 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2810 activist:
2811 </para>
2812 <blockquote>
2813 <para>
2814 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2815 an activist. &hellip; [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2816 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2817 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2818 </para>
2819 </blockquote>
2820 <para>
2821 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2822 his father told me, Jesse <quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2823 I. &hellip; He's not a tree hugger. &hellip; I think it's bizarre that they would
2824 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2825 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.</quote>
2826 </para>
2827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2828 </chapter>
2829 <chapter label="4" id="pirates">
2830 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: <quote>Pirates</quote></title>
2831 <para>
2832 If <quote>piracy</quote> means using the creative property of others without
2833 their permission&mdash;if <quote>if value, then right</quote> is true&mdash;then the history of
2834 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2835 <quote>big media</quote> today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2836 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2837 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2838 </para>
2839 <section id="film">
2840 <title>Film</title>
2841 <para>
2842 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2843 <!-- f1 -->
2844 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2845 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2846 which details Edison's <quote>adventures</quote> with copyright and patent.
2847 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2848 </para></footnote>
2849 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2850 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2851 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2852 exercised through a monopoly <quote>trust,</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2853 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2854 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2855 this creative property
2856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2857 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2858 </para>
2859 <para>
2860 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2861 </para>
2862 <blockquote>
2863 <para>
2864 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2865 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2866 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2867 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2868 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2869 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2870 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2871 </para>
2872 <para>
2873 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2874 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2875 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2876 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2877 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2878 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2879 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2880 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2881 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2882 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2883 <!-- f2 -->
2884 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2885 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2886 posted at <quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2887 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,</quote> available at
2888 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2889 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2890 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, <quote>From
2891 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2892 the Propertization of Copyright</quote> (September 2002), University of
2893 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2894 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2895 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William</primary></indexterm>
2896 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2897 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2898 </para>
2899 </blockquote>
2900 <para>
2901 The Napsters of those days, the <quote>independents,</quote> were companies like
2902 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2903 resisted. <quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2904 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2905 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.</quote><footnote><para>
2906 <!-- f3 -->
2907 Marc Wanamaker, <quote>The First Studios,</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2908 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2909 </para></footnote>
2910 That led the independents to flee the East
2911 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2912 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2913 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2914 did just that.
2915 </para>
2916 <para>
2917 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2918 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2919 patent holder a truly <quote>limited</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2920
2921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2922 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2923 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2924 Edison's creative property.
2925 </para>
2926 </section>
2927 <section id="recordedmusic">
2928 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2929 <para>
2930 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2931 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2932 </para>
2933 <indexterm id="idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'>
2934 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri</primary>
2935 </indexterm>
2936 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil</primary></indexterm>
2937 <para>
2938 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2939 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2940 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2941 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2942 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2943 1899 hit <quote>Happy Mose,</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2944 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2945 right to perform it publicly.
2946 </para>
2947 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2948 <para>
2949 But what if I wanted to record <quote>Happy Mose,</quote> using Edison's phonograph
2950 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2951 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2952 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2953 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2954 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2955 <quote>public performance</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2956 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2957 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2958 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2959 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2960 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2961 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2962 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2963 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2964 its composer anything.
2965 </para>
2966 <indexterm startref="idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'/>
2967 <para>
2968 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2970 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2971 put it,
2972 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
2973 </para>
2974 <blockquote>
2975 <para>
2976 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2977 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2978 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2979 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2980 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2981 rights.<footnote><para>
2982 <!-- f4 -->
2983 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2984 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2985 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2986 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
2987 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2988 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2989 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
2990 </para></footnote>
2991 </para>
2992 </blockquote>
2993 <para>
2994 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2995 people's works were <quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2996 genius of American composers,</quote><footnote><para>
2997 <!-- f5 -->
2998 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2999 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3000 </para></footnote>
3001 and the <quote>music publishing industry</quote>
3002 was thereby <quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.</quote><footnote><para>
3003 <!-- f6 -->
3004 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
3005 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3006 </para></footnote>
3007 As John Philip
3008 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, <quote>When they make money
3009 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.</quote><footnote><para>
3010 <!-- f7 -->
3011 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
3012 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3013 </para></footnote>
3014 </para>
3015 <para>
3016 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3017 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3018 player piano argued that <quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3019 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3020 of anything he had before their introduction.</quote> Rather, the machines
3021 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
3022 <!-- f8 -->
3023
3024 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
3025 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3026 Perforating Company of New York).
3027 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3028 Congress was <quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3029 they represent, and whose servants they are.</quote> <quote>All talk about
3030 `theft,'</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3031 wrote, <quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3032 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3033 statute.</quote><footnote><para>
3034 <!-- f9 -->
3035 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
3036 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3037 Graphophone Company Association).
3038 </para></footnote>
3039 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company</primary></indexterm>
3040 </para>
3041 <para>
3042 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3043 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3044 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the <quote>mechanical
3045 reproductions</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3046 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3047 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3048 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3049 recorded once. This is the part of
3050
3051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3052 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3053 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3054 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3055 </para>
3056 <para>
3057 American law ordinarily calls this a <quote>compulsory license,</quote> but I will
3058 refer to it as a <quote>statutory license.</quote> A statutory license is a license
3059 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3060 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3061 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3062 the fee set by the statute.
3063 </para>
3064 <para>
3065 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3066 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3067 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3068 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3069 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3070 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3071 Grisham.
3072 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
3073 </para>
3074 <para>
3075 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3076 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
3077 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
3078 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3079 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3080 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3081 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3082 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3083 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3084 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3085 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3086 creativity.<footnote><para>
3087
3088 <!-- f10 -->
3089 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3090 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3091 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3092 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3093 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3094 </para></footnote>
3095 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3096 </para>
3097 <para>
3098 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3099 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3100 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3101 relates,
3102 </para>
3103 <blockquote>
3104 <para>
3105 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3107 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3108 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3109 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3110 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3111 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3112 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3113 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3114 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3115 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3116 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3117 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3118 choice.<footnote><para>
3119 <!-- f11 -->
3120 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3121 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3122 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3123 this report.</para></footnote>
3124 </para>
3125 </blockquote>
3126 <para>
3127 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3128 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3129 </para>
3130 </section>
3131 <section id="radio">
3132 <title>Radio</title>
3133 <para>
3134 Radio was also born of piracy.
3135 </para>
3136 <para>
3137 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3138 <quote>public performance</quote> of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3139 <!-- f12 -->
3140 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3141 record companies printed <quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast</quote> and other
3142 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3143 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3144 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3145 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3146 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, <quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3147 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3148 Copyright,</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3149 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3150 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3151 </para></footnote>
3152 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3153 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3154 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3155 </para>
3156 <para>
3157 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3158 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3159 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3160 work. It's one thing to have <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> sung on the radio by the
3161 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3162 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3163 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3164 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3165 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3166 music for his work.
3167 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3168
3169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3170 </para>
3171 <para>
3172 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3173 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3174 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3175 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3176 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3177 of playing the song.
3178 </para>
3179 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3180 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3181 </indexterm>
3182 <para>
3183 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3184 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3185 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3186 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3187 </para>
3188 <para>
3189 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3190 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3191 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3192 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3193 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3194 <quote>protected</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3195 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3196 her anything.
3197 </para>
3198 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3199 <para>
3200 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3201 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3202 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3203 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3204 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3205 to take something for nothing.
3206 </para>
3207 </section>
3208 <section id="cabletv">
3209 <title>Cable TV</title>
3210 <para>
3211
3212 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3213 </para>
3214 <para>
3215 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3216 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3217 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3218 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3220 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3221 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3222 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3223 give away.
3224 </para>
3225 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3226 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3227 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3228 <para>
3229 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3230 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3231 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.</quote><footnote><para>
3232 <!-- f13 -->
3233 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3234 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3235 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3236 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3237 Commission).
3238 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3239 </para></footnote>
3240 There may have been a <quote>public interest</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3241 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3242 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, <quote>Does public
3243 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?</quote><footnote><para>
3244 <!-- f14 -->
3245 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3246 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3247 </para></footnote>
3248 As another broadcaster put it,
3249 </para>
3250 <blockquote>
3251 <para>
3252 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3253 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3254 paid for.<footnote><para>
3255 <!-- f15 -->
3256 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3257 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3258 </para></footnote>
3259 </para>
3260 </blockquote>
3261 <para>
3262 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3263 </para>
3264 <blockquote>
3265 <para>
3266 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3267 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3268 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3269 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3270 <!-- f16 -->
3271 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3272 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3273 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3274 </para></footnote>
3275 </para>
3276 </blockquote>
3277 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3278 <para>
3279 These were <quote>free-ride[rs],</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3280 Heston said, who were <quote>depriving actors of
3281 compensation.</quote><footnote><para>
3282 <!-- f17 -->
3283 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3284 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3285 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3286 </para>
3287 </footnote>
3288 </para>
3289 <para>
3290 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3291 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3292 </para>
3293 <blockquote>
3294 <para>
3295 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3296 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3297 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3298 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. &hellip; The
3299
3300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3301 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3302 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3303 <!-- f18 -->
3304 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3305 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3306 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3307 </para></footnote>
3308 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3309 </para>
3310 </blockquote>
3311 <para>
3312 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3313 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3314 </para>
3315 <para>
3316 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3317 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they <quote>pirated.</quote>
3318 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3319 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3320 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3321 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3322 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3323 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3324 companies thus built their empire in part upon a <quote>piracy</quote> of the value
3325 created by broadcasters' content.
3326 </para>
3327 <para>
3328 These separate stories sing a common theme. If <quote>piracy</quote> means
3329 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3330 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3331 today<footnote><para>
3332 <!-- f19 -->
3333 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3334 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3335 Information</citetitle>, available at
3336 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. <quote>The
3337 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3338 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet.</quote>
3339 </para></footnote>
3340 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3341 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3342 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. &hellip; The list is long and
3343 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3344 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3345 </para>
3346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3347 </section>
3348 </chapter>
3349 <chapter label="5" id="piracy">
3350 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: <quote>Piracy</quote></title>
3351 <para>
3352 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3353 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3354 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3355 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3356 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3357 should stop it.
3358 </para>
3359 <para>
3360 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of <quote>taking</quote>
3361 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3362 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3363 taking <quote>piracy,</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3364 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3365 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3366 has so often done in the past.
3367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3368 </para>
3369 <section id="piracy-i">
3370 <title>Piracy I</title>
3371 <para>
3372 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3373 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3374 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3375 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3376 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3377 <!-- f1 -->
3378 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3379 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3380 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3381 also Ben Hunt, <quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3382 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3383 </para></footnote>
3384 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3385 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3386 </para>
3387 <para>
3388 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3389 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3390 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3391 This piracy is wrong.
3392 </para>
3393 <para>
3394 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3395 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3396 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3397 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3398 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3399 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3400 of our existence, treated as right.
3401 </para>
3402 <para>
3403 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3404 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3405 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3406 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3407 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3408 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3409 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3410 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3411 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3412 </para>
3413 <para>
3414 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3415 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3416 <beginpage pagenum="77"/>
3417 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3418 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3419 similar childhood.
3420 </para>
3421 <para>
3422 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3423 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3424 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3425 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3426 <!-- f2 -->
3427 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3428 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The
3429 New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13, 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3430 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3431 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3432 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3433 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3434 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3435 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3436 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3437 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3438 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3439 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3440 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3441 TRIPS framework.
3442 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents</primary></indexterm>
3443 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3444 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3445 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3446 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3447 is wrong.
3448 </para>
3449 <para>
3450 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3451 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3452 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3453 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3454 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3455 <!-- f3 -->
3456 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3457 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3458 144&ndash;90. <quote>In some instances &hellip; the impact of piracy on the
3459 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3460 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3461 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3462 pirating were not an option.</quote> Ibid., 149.
3463 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3464 </para></footnote>
3465 </para>
3466 <para>
3467 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3468 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3469 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3470 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3471 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3472 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?</quote>
3473 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3474 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3475 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3476 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3477 piracy of the tangible.
3478 </para>
3479 <para>
3480 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3481 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3482 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3483 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3484 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3485 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3486 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3487 give people the right to <quote>take</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3488 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3489
3490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3491 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3492 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3493 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3494 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3495 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what <quote>property</quote> means.
3496 </para>
3497 <para>
3498 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3499 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese <quote>steal</quote>
3500 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3501 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3502 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3503 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3504 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3505 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3506 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3507 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3508 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3509 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3510 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3511 <indexterm>
3512 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3513 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3514 </indexterm>
3515 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3516 </para>
3517 <para>
3518 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3519 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3520 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3521 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3522 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3523 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3524 </para>
3525 <para>
3526 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3527 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3528 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3529 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3530 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3531 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3532 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3533 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3534 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3535 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3536 violating the law is still wrong.
3537 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3538 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer</primary></indexterm>
3539 <indexterm><primary>Netscape</primary></indexterm>
3540 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3541 </para>
3542 <para>
3543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3544 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3545 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3546 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3547 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3548 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3549 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3550 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3551 is flat out wrong.
3552 </para>
3553 <para>
3554 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3555 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all <quote>piracy</quote> is. Or
3556 at least, not all <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3557 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of <quote>piracy</quote> are useful
3558 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3559 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3560 <quote>piracy</quote> in that sense of the term.
3561 </para>
3562 <para>
3563 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3564 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3565 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3566 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3567 </para>
3568 <para>
3569 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3570 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3571 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3572 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3573 </para>
3574 <para>
3575 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3576 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3577 sharing to survive.
3578 </para>
3579 </section>
3580 <section id="piracy-ii">
3581 <title>Piracy II</title>
3582 <para>
3583 The key to the <quote>piracy</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that <quote>rob[s]
3584 the author of [his] profit.</quote><footnote><para>
3585 <!-- f4 -->
3586 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3587 </para></footnote>
3588 This means we must determine whether
3589 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3591 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3592 author of his profit.
3593 </para>
3594 <para>
3595 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3596 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3597 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3598 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3599 <!-- f5 -->
3600 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3601 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3602 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3603 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3604 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3605 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3606 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3607 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3608
3609 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3610 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3611 put together components that had been developed independently.
3612 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3613 </para>
3614 <para>
3615 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3616 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3617 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3618 system.<footnote><para>
3619 <!-- f6 -->
3620 See Carolyn Lochhead, <quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,</quote> <citetitle>San
3621 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; <quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,</quote>
3622 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, <quote>Napster Names CEO,
3623 Secures New Financing,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3624 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,</quote> <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3625 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet</quote> (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3626 </para></footnote>
3627 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3628 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3629 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3630 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3631 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3632 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3633 or your 20,000 best friends.
3634 </para>
3635 <para>
3636 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3637 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3638 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3639 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3640
3641 <!-- f7 -->
3642 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3643 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3644 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3645 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3646 </para></footnote>
3647 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3648 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3649 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3650 <!-- f8 -->
3651 Amy Harmon, <quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,</quote> <citetitle>New
3652 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3653 </para></footnote>
3654 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3655 massive quantity of content is being <quote>taken</quote> on these networks. The
3656 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3657 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3658 </para>
3659 <para>
3660 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3661 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3662 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3663 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3664 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3665 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3666 of harm it entails.
3667 </para>
3668 <para>
3669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3670 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3671 different kinds into four types.
3672 </para>
3673 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3674 <listitem><para>
3675 <!-- A. -->
3676 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3677 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3678 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3679 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3680 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3681 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3682 users who download instead of purchasing.
3683 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3684 </para></listitem>
3685 <listitem><para>
3686 <!-- B. -->
3687 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3688 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3689 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3690 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3691 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3692 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3693 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3694 music purchased.
3695 </para></listitem>
3696 <listitem><para>
3697 <!-- C. -->
3698 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3699 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3700 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3701 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3702 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3703 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3704 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend <quote>recalling</quote> old
3705 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3706 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3707 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3708 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3709 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3710 a local collector.
3711 </para></listitem>
3712 <listitem><para>
3713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3714 <!-- D. -->
3715 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3716 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3717 wants to give away.
3718 </para></listitem>
3719 </orderedlist>
3720 <para>
3721 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3722 </para>
3723 <para>
3724 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3725 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3726 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3727 harmful.<footnote><para>
3728 <!-- f9 -->
3729 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3730 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3731 </para></footnote>
3732 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3733 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3734 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3735 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3736 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3737 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3738 </para>
3739 <para>
3740 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3741 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3742 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3743 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3744 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of <quote>theft</quote> that is
3745 <quote>devastating</quote> the industry.
3746 </para>
3747 <para>
3748 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3749 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3750 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3751 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3752 &amp; Young put it, <quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3753 technology, the labels fought it.</quote><footnote><para>
3754 <!-- f10 -->
3755 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3756 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3757 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3758 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3759 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption <quote>Home taping
3760 is killing music.</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3761 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3762 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3763 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3764 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3765 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3766 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3767 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3768 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3769 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3770 regulating technology was the answer.
3771 </para>
3772 <para>
3773 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3774 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3775 turnaround. <quote>In the end,</quote> Cap Gemini concludes, <quote>the `crisis' &hellip; was
3776 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3778 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3779 innovation at the major labels.</quote><footnote><para>
3780 <!-- f11 -->
3781 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3782 </para></footnote>
3783 </para>
3784 <para>
3785 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3786 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3787 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3788 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3789 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3790 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3791 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3792 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3793 </para>
3794 <para>
3795 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3796 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3797 The <quote>net harm</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3798 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3799 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3800 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3801 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3802 them.
3803
3804 </para>
3805 <para>
3806 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3807 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3808 actually suggest it might be close.
3809 </para>
3810 <para>
3811 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3812 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3813 percent.<footnote><para>
3814 <!-- f12 -->
3815 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3816 available at
3817 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3818 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3819 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3820 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3821 #16</ulink>: <quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3822 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3823 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3824 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3825 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3826 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3827 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3828 shipments).</quote>
3829 </para></footnote>
3830 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3831 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3832 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3833 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3834 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3835 account for at least some of the loss. <quote>From 1999 to 2001, the average
3836 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19.</quote><footnote>
3837 <!-- f13 -->
3838 <para>
3839 Jane Black, <quote>Big Music's Broken Record,</quote> BusinessWeek online, 13
3840 February 2003, available at
3841 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3842 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3843 </para>
3844 </footnote>
3845 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3846 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, <quote>The
3847 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3848 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3849 $19.99.</quote><footnote><para>
3850 <!-- f14 -->
3851 Ibid.
3852 </para></footnote>
3853 </para>
3854 <para>
3855
3856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3857 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3858 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3859 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3860 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3861 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3862 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3863 </para>
3864 <para>
3865 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3866 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3867 The recording industry constantly asks, <quote>What's the difference between
3868 downloading a song and stealing a CD?</quote>&mdash;but their own numbers
3869 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3870 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3871 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3872 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3873 Kazaa <quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit</quote>&mdash;then the industry
3874 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3875 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3876 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3877 a huge difference between <quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.</quote>
3878 </para>
3879 <para>
3880 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3881 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3882 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3883 these costs?
3884 </para>
3885 <para>
3886 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3887 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3888 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3889 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3890 available.<footnote><para>
3891 <!-- f15 -->
3892 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3893 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3894 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3895 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3896 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3897 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3898 </para></footnote>
3899 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3900 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3901 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3902 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3903 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3904 </para>
3905 <para>
3906 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3908 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3909 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3910 today.<footnote><para>
3911 <!-- f16 -->
3912 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3913 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3914 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3915 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3916 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3917 National
3918 Association of Recording Merchandisers, <quote>2002 Annual Survey
3919 Results,</quote>
3920 available at
3921 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3922 </para></footnote>
3923 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3924 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3925 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3926 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3927 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3928 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3929 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3930 the content they sell.
3931 </para>
3932 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3933 <para>
3934 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3935 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3936 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3937 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3938 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3939 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's <quote>Two Love Songs,</quote>
3940 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3941 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3942 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3943 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3944 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3945 </para>
3946 <para>
3947 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3948 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3949 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3950 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3951 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3952 shut as well?
3953 </para>
3954 <para>
3955 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3956 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3957 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3958 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3959 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
3960 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3961
3962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3963 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3964 would be a great advertisement for the <quote>real</quote> book. People would read
3965 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3966 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3967 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3968 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3969 great book!)
3970 </para>
3971 <para>
3972 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3973 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3974 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3975 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3976 </para>
3977 <para>
3978 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3979 understandably says, <quote>This is how much we've lost,</quote> we must also ask,
3980 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3981 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3982 unavailable?</quote>
3983 </para>
3984 <para>
3985 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3986 chapter, much of the <quote>piracy</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
3987 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3988 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
3989 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3990 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3991 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3992 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3993 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3994 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3995 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3996 found only with time.
3997 </para>
3998 <para>
3999 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4000 just what you call type A sharing?</quote>
4001 </para>
4002 <para>
4003 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4004 effect
4005 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4006 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4007 Napster
4008 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4009 developed
4010 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
4011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4012 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
4013 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4014 <quote>down to zero.</quote><footnote><para>
4015 <!-- f17 -->
4016 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
4017 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
4018 MHP, available at
4019
4020 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
4021 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4022 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
4023 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
4024 </para></footnote>
4025 </para>
4026 <para>
4027 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4028 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4029 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
4030 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
4031 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
4032 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4033 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4034 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4035 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4036 </para>
4037 <para>
4038 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4039 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4040 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4041 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4042 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4043 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4044 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4045 </para>
4046 <para>
4047 So, as we've seen, when <quote>mechanical reproduction</quote> threatened the
4048 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4049 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4050 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4051 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4052 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4053 complained to Congress that their <quote>creative property</quote> was not being
4054 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4055 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4056 benefit was enough.
4057 </para>
4058 <para>
4059 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4060 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4061 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4062 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4063 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4064 price.
4065 </para>
4066 <para>
4067
4068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4069 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4070 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
4071 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4072 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4073 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4074 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4075 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4076 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4077 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4078 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4079 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4080 Congress chose a path that would assure
4081 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
4082 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4083 </para>
4084 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
4085 <para>
4086 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4087 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4088 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4089 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4090 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4091 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4092 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4093 <quote>record</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4094 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4095 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4096 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4097 </para>
4098 <para>
4099 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4100 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4101 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4102 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4103 machine to copy only if there were a special <quote>copy me</quote> signal on the
4104 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4105 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4106 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4108 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4109 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4110 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4111 for the architecture it chose.
4112 </para>
4113 <para>
4114 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4115 champion. Valenti called VCRs <quote>tapeworms.</quote> He warned, <quote>When there are
4116 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4117 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4118 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4119 copyright.</quote><footnote><para>
4120 <!-- f18 -->
4121 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4122 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4123 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4124 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4125 </para></footnote>
4126 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4127 creative judgment,</quote> he told Congress, <quote>to understand the devastation
4128 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4129 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4130 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4131 and plain common sense.</quote><footnote><para>
4132 <!-- f19 -->
4133 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4134 </para></footnote>
4135 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4136 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4137 <!-- f20 -->
4138 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4139 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4140 </para></footnote>
4141 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not <quote>fair.</quote> By
4142 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4143 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4144 copyrightowners,</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would <quote>take from the
4145 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4146 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4147 profit from its reproduction.</quote><footnote><para>
4148 <!-- f21 -->
4149 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4150 of Jack Valenti).
4151 </para></footnote>
4152 </para>
4153 <para>
4154 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4155 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4156 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4157 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the <quote>Hollywood
4158 Circuit</quote>&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4159 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4160 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4161 called <quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry</quote> (worse
4162 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4163 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4164 technology.<footnote><para>
4165 <!-- f22 -->
4166 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4167 1981).
4168 </para></footnote>
4169 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex</primary></indexterm>
4170 </para>
4171 <para>
4172 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4173
4174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4175 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4176 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4177 Court wrote,
4178 </para>
4179 <blockquote>
4180 <para>
4181 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4182 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4183 market
4184 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4185 authority
4186 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4187 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4188 implicated
4189 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4190 <!-- f23 -->
4191 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4192 </para></footnote>
4193 </para>
4194 </blockquote>
4195 <para>
4196 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4197 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4198 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4199 enough, this <quote>taking</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4200 together, a pattern is clear:
4201 </para>
4202
4203 <informaltable id="t1">
4204 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4205 <thead>
4206 <row>
4207 <entry>CASE</entry>
4208 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS <quote>PIRATED</quote></entry>
4209 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4210 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4211 </row>
4212 </thead>
4213 <tbody>
4214 <row>
4215 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4216 <entry>Composers</entry>
4217 <entry>No protection</entry>
4218 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4219 </row>
4220 <row>
4221 <entry>Radio</entry>
4222 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4223 <entry>N/A</entry>
4224 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4225 </row>
4226 <row>
4227 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4228 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4229 <entry>No protection</entry>
4230 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4231 </row>
4232 <row>
4233 <entry>VCR</entry>
4234 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4235 <entry>No protection</entry>
4236 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4237 </row>
4238 </tbody>
4239 </tgroup>
4240 </informaltable>
4241
4242 <para>
4243 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4244 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4245 <!-- f24 -->
4246 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4247 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4248 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4249 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4250 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4251 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4252 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4253 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4254 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, <quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,</quote>
4255 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4256 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4257 </para></footnote>
4258 In each case, throughout our history,
4259 that change meant that someone got a <quote>free ride</quote> on someone else's
4260 work.
4261 </para>
4262 <para>
4263 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4264 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4265 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4266 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4267 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of <quote>piracy.</quote>
4268 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4269 the behavior of the <quote>pirates.</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4270 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4271 interests at stake.
4272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4273 </para>
4274 <para>
4275 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4276 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4277 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4278 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4279 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4280 regulated?
4281 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4282 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4283 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4284 permission to record a song?
4285 </para>
4286 <para>
4287 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4288 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4289 copyright <quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4290 over all possible uses of his work.</quote><footnote><para>
4291 <!-- f25 -->
4292 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4293 (1984).
4294 </para></footnote>
4295 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4296 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4297 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4298 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4299 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4300 facilitate the distribution of content.
4301 </para>
4302 <para>
4303 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4304 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4305 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4306 should not become a tool for <quote>stealing</quote> from artists. But neither
4307 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4308 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4309 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4310 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4311 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4312 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4313 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4314 public interest that innovation continue.
4315 </para>
4316 <para>
4317
4318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4319 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4320 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4321 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4322 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4323 efficient. Yet these <quote>potential public benefits,</quote> as John Schwartz
4324 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, <quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4325 fight.</quote><footnote><para>
4326 <!-- f26 -->
4327 John Schwartz, <quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4328 Echoes Past Efforts,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4329 </para></footnote>
4330 Yet when anyone begins to talk about <quote>balance,</quote> the copyright warriors
4331 raise a different argument. <quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4332 incentives,</quote> they say, <quote>misses a fundamental point. Our content,</quote> the
4333 warriors insist, <quote>is our <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we
4334 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4335 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4336 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4337 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4338 arrest him?</quote>
4339 </para>
4340 <para>
4341 <quote>It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>,</quote> the warriors
4342 insist. <quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4343 is protected.</quote>
4344 </para>
4345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4346 </section>
4347 </chapter>
4348 </part>
4349 <part id="c-property">
4350 <title><quote>PROPERTY</quote></title>
4351 <partintro>
4352 <para>
4353
4354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4355 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4356 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4357 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4358 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4359 the price she can get.
4360 </para>
4361 <para>
4362 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a <quote>property</quote> right is a
4363 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4364 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4365 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4366 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4367 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4368 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4369 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4370 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4371 then?
4372 </para>
4373 <para>
4374 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4375 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4377 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4378 narrow
4379 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4380 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4381 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4382 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4383 when I copy the way someone else dresses), <quote>He who receives an idea
4384 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4385 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.</quote><footnote><para>
4386 <!-- f1 -->
4387 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4388 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4389 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4390 </para></footnote>
4391 </para>
4392 <para>
4393 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4394 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4395 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4396 expression
4397 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4398 property.
4399 </para>
4400 <para>
4401 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4402 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4403 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4404 <quote>property</quote> in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4405 <!-- f2 -->
4406 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4407 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4408 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4409 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4410 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4411 Adam Mossoff, <quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,</quote>
4412 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4413 </para></footnote>
4414 </para>
4415 <para>
4416 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4417 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4418 <quote>copyright material is property</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4419 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4420 these stories, the significance of this true
4421 statement&mdash;<quote>copyright material is property</quote>&mdash; will be a bit
4422 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4423 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4424 </para>
4425 </partintro>
4426
4427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4428 <chapter label="6" id="founders">
4429 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4430 <indexterm><primary>Henry V</primary></indexterm>
4431 <para>
4432 William Shakespeare wrote <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play
4433 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4434 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4435 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4436 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4437 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4438 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4439 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: <quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare
4440 is so full of clichés.</quote>
4441 </para>
4442 <para>
4443 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4444 <quote>copy-right</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4445 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4446 <!-- f1 -->
4447 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4448 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4449 handsome <quote>definitive editions</quote> of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4450 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4451 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4452 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, <quote>Jacob Tonson,
4453 Bookseller,</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4454 </para></footnote>
4455 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4456 the Conger<footnote><para>
4457 <!-- f2 -->
4458 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4459 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4460 </para></footnote>
4461 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4462 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the <quote>copy</quote> of
4463 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4464 that no
4465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4466 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4467 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4468 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4469 </para>
4470 <para>
4471 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4472 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4473 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4474 adopted the first <quote>copyright</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4475 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4476 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4477 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4478 additional years.<footnote><para>
4479 <!-- f3 -->
4480 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4481 <quote>copyright law.</quote> See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4482 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4483 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4484 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4485 Tonson's control in 1774?
4486 </para>
4487 <para>
4488 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a <quote>copyright</quote>
4489 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4490 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4491 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4492 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4493 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4494 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4495 that the publishers, or <quote>Stationers,</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4496 books.
4497 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4498 </para>
4499 <para>
4500 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4501 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4502 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4503 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4504 from legislatures <quote>positive law.</quote> We call the words from judges
4505 <quote>common law.</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4506 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4507 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4508 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4509 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4510 </para>
4511 <para>
4512 This question was important to the publishers, or <quote>booksellers,</quote> as
4513 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4514 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4515 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4516
4517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4518 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4519 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4520 ultimately
4521 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4522 </para>
4523 <para>
4524 The Statute of Anne granted the author or <quote>proprietor</quote> of a book an
4525 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4526 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4527 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4528 copyright <quote>expired,</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4529 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4530 believed.
4531 </para>
4532 <para>
4533 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4534 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4535 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4536 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4537 </para>
4538 <para>
4539 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4540 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4541 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4542 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4543 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4544 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4545 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4546 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4547 reason is there to allow someone else to <quote>steal</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4548 </para>
4549 <para>
4550 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4551 about the notion of <quote>copyright</quote> that existed at the time of the
4552 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4553 <quote>booksellers.</quote>
4554 </para>
4555 <para>
4556 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4557 to apply the concept of <quote>copyright</quote> ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4558 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4559 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4560 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the <quote>copy-right</quote> was a right
4561 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4562 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4563 generally how
4564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4565 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4566 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4567 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4568 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4569 </para>
4570 <para>
4571 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4572 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4573 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4574 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4575 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4576 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4577 allowed to make his films. The <quote>copy-right</quote> was only an exclusive
4578 right to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4579 </para>
4580 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England</primary></indexterm>
4581 <para>
4582 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4583 They had had a long and ugly experience with <quote>exclusive rights,</quote>
4584 especially <quote>exclusive rights</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4585 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4586 monopolies&mdash;especially monopolies for works that already
4587 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4588 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4589 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the
4590 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4591 inventions. And by 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4592 monopoly in publishing.
4593 </para>
4594 <para>
4595 Thus the <quote>copy-right,</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4596 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4597 claim that <quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,</quote> try
4598 sounding convincing when uttering, <quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4599 have it forever.</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4600 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4601 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4602 </para>
4603 <para>
4604 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4605 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4606 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4607 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4608 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4609
4610 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4611 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4612 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4613 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as <quote>old patentees
4614 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling</quote>; they were <quote>men who do
4615 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4616 indetted.</quote><footnote><para>
4617
4618 <!-- f4 -->
4619 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4620 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4621 </para></footnote>
4622 </para>
4623 <para>
4624 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4625 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4626 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4627 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4628 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4629 with that idea.
4630 </para>
4631 <para>
4632 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4633 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4634 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4635 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4636 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4637 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4638 compromise
4639 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4640 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4641 construction and spread of culture.
4642 </para>
4643 <para>
4644 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4645 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4646 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4647 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4648 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4649 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4650 they said; they needed more time.
4651 </para>
4652 <para>
4653 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4654 words that echo today,
4655 </para>
4656 <blockquote>
4657 <para>
4658 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4659 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4661 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4662 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4663 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4664 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4665 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4666 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4667 <!-- f5 -->
4668 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4669 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4670 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4671 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4672 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4673 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4674 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4675 </para></footnote>
4676 </para>
4677 </blockquote>
4678 <para>
4679 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4680 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4681 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4682 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4683 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4684 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4685 creative <quote>property</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4686 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4687 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4688 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4689 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4690 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4691 way to protect authors.
4692 </para>
4693 <para>
4694 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4695 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4696 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4697 <quote>The publishers &hellip; had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4698 rancher has for cattle.</quote><footnote><para>
4699 <!-- f6 -->
4700 Lyman Ray Patterson, <quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4701 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4702 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4703 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4704 </para></footnote>
4705 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4706 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4707 </para>
4708 <para>
4709 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4710 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4711 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4712 <!-- f7 -->
4713 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4714 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4715 </para></footnote>
4716 </para>
4717 <para>
4718 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4719 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4720 reprints <quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,</quote> at least
4721 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4722 <!-- f8 -->
4723 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4724 1993), 92.
4725 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
4726 </para></footnote>
4727 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4729 and became <quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4730 them,</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was <quote>the young James Boswell
4731 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4732 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.</quote><footnote><para>
4733 <!-- f9 -->
4734 Ibid., 93.
4735 </para></footnote>
4736 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James</primary></indexterm>
4737 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4738 </para>
4739 <para>
4740 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4741 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4742 inexpensive editions <quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4743 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4744 Property.</quote><footnote><para>
4745 <!-- f10 -->
4746 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4747 Borwell).
4748 </para></footnote>
4749 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4750 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4751 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4752 </para>
4753 <para>
4754 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block <quote>piracy</quote> like
4755 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the <quote>pirates,</quote>
4756 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4757 </para>
4758 <para>
4759 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4760 Thomson's poem <quote>The Seasons.</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4761 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4762 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4763 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4764 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4765 <!-- f11 -->
4766 Howard B. Abrams, <quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4767 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4768 (1983): 1152.
4769 </para></footnote>
4770 </para>
4771 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4772 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4773 </indexterm>
4774 <para>
4775 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4776 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4777 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4778 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4779 law would protect the author against subsequent <quote>pirates.</quote>
4780 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4781 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4782 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4783 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4784 </para>
4785 <para>
4786 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4787 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4788 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4789 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4790 with in 1710: How best to limit
4791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4792 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4793 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4794 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4795 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4796 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4797 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4798 </para>
4799 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4800 <para>
4801 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4802 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4803 </para>
4804 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4805 <para>
4806 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4807 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4808 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4809 <!-- f12 -->
4810 Ibid., 1156.
4811 </para></footnote>
4812 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4813 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4814 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4815 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4816 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4817 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4818 </para>
4819 <para>
4820 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4821 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4822 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4823 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4824 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4825 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4826 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4827 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4828 </para>
4829 <para>
4830 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4831 presented to the House and voted upon first by the <quote>law lords,</quote>
4832 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4833 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4834 House of Lords generally voted.
4835 </para>
4836 <para>
4837 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4838 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4840 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4841 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4842 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4843 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4844 passed into the public domain.
4845 </para>
4846 <para>
4847 <quote>The public domain.</quote> Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4848 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4849 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4850 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4851 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4852 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4853 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4854 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4855 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4856 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4857 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4858 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4859 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4860 </para>
4861 <para>
4862 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4863 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4864 where most of the <quote>pirate publishers</quote> did their work, people
4865 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4866 reported, <quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4867 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4868 decision of which so many individuals were interested.</quote> <quote>Great
4869 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4870 and illuminations.</quote><footnote><para>
4871 <!-- f13 -->
4872 Rose, 97.
4873 </para></footnote>
4874 </para>
4875 <para>
4876 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4877 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4878 reported:
4879 </para>
4880 <blockquote>
4881 <para>
4882 By the above decision &hellip; near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4883 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4884 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4885 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4886 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4887 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4888 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4889 successors.<footnote><para>
4890 <!-- f14 -->
4891 Ibid.
4892 </para></footnote>
4893 </para>
4894 </blockquote>
4895 <para>
4896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4897 <quote>Ruined</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4898 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4899 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4900 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4901 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4902 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4903 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4904 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4905 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4906 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4907 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4908 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4909 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4910 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4911 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4912 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4913 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4914 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4915 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4916 </para>
4917 <para>
4918 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4919 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4920 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4921 protected.
4922 </para>
4923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4924 </chapter>
4925 <chapter label="7" id="recorders">
4926 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4927 <para>
4928 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4929 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4930 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4931 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4932 He was their god.)
4933 </para>
4934 <para>
4935 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4936 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4937 today.
4938 </para>
4939 <para>
4940 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4941 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4942 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4943 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4944 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4945 stage.
4946 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4947 </para>
4948 <para>
4949 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4950 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4951 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4952 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
4953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4954 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4955 about the scene.
4956 </para>
4957 <para>
4958 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4959 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
4960 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4961 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4962 unless <quote>fair use</quote> or some other privilege applies.
4963 </para>
4964 <para>
4965 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4966 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4967 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4968 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4969 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4970 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4971 </para>
4972 <para>
4973 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4974 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4975 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4976 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4977 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4978 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4979 </para>
4980 <para>
4981 Then, as Else told me, <quote>two things happened. First we discovered
4982 &hellip; that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4983 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.</quote>
4984 And second, Fox <quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4985 to use this four-point-five seconds of &hellip; entirely unsolicited
4986 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.</quote>
4987 </para>
4988 <para>
4989 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4990 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4991 explained to her, <quote>There must be some mistake here. &hellip; We're
4992 asking for your educational rate on this.</quote> That was the educational
4993 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4994 confirm what he had been told.
4995 </para>
4996 <para>
4997 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,</quote> he told me. <quote>Yes, you
4998 have your facts straight,</quote> she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4999 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5000 about
5001
5002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5003 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, <quote>And
5004 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.</quote> As an assistant
5005 to Herrera told Else later on, <quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5006 the money.</quote>
5007 </para>
5008 <para>
5009 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5010 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5011 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5012 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5013 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5014 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5015 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
5016 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
5017 </para>
5018 <para>
5019 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5020 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5021 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5022 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5023 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5024 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5025 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5026 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5027 says the owner gets to control.
5028 </para>
5029 <para>
5030 For example, <quote>public performance</quote> is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
5031 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5032 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see <quote>My
5033 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>,</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5034 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5035 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
5036 by the law.
5037 </para>
5038 <para>
5039 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5040 thought is <quote>fair use.</quote><footnote><para>
5041 <!-- f1 -->
5042 For an excellent argument that such use is <quote>fair use,</quote> but that
5043 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is <quote>fair use,</quote> see Richard
5044 A. Posner with William F. Patry, <quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5045 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5046 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5047 </para></footnote>
5048 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5049 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
5050 not require the permission of anyone.
5051 </para>
5052 <para>
5053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5054 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon <quote>fair use.</quote> Here's his reply:
5055 </para>
5056 <blockquote>
5057 <para>
5058 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5059 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5060 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5061 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was <quote>clearly
5062 fair use</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5063 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5064 </para>
5065 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5066 <listitem><para>
5067 <!-- 1. -->
5068 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5069 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5070 <quote>visual cue sheet</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5071 shot in the film. They take a dim view of <quote>fair use,</quote> and a claim of
5072 <quote>fair use</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5073 </para></listitem>
5074 <listitem><para>
5075 <!-- 2. -->
5076 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5077 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5078 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
5079 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5080 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5081 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5082 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5083 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5084 principle.
5085 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
5086 </para></listitem>
5087 <listitem><para>
5088 <!-- 3. -->
5089 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5090 School &hellip; who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5091 that Fox would <quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5092 life,</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5093 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5094 pockets, me or them.
5095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5096 </para></listitem>
5097 <listitem><para>
5098 <!-- 4. -->
5099 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5100 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5101 money.
5102 </para></listitem>
5103 </orderedlist>
5104 </blockquote>
5105 <para>
5106 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5107 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5108 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5109 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5110 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5111 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5112 </para>
5113 <para>
5114 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5115 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5116 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5117 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5118 not.
5119 </para>
5120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5121 </chapter>
5122 <chapter label="8" id="transformers">
5123 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5124 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5125 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5126 <para>
5127 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5128 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5129 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5130 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5131 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5132 </para>
5133 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5134 <para>
5135 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5136 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5137 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5138 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5139 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5140 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5141 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5142 important to his career.
5143 </para>
5144 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5145 <para>
5146 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5147 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5148 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5149 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5150 </para>
5151 <para>
5152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5153 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5154 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5155 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5156 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5157 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5158 </para>
5159 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5160 <para>
5161 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. <quote>Our
5162 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5163 Eastwood's films,</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5164 arose. <quote>No one had ever really done this before,</quote> Alben explained. <quote>No
5165 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5166 actor's career.</quote>
5167 </para>
5168 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5169 <para>
5170 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5171 Slade asked, <quote>Well, what will it take?</quote>
5172 </para>
5173 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5174 <para>
5175 Alben replied, <quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5176 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5177 else that we want to use in these film clips.</quote> Slade said, <quote>Great! Go
5178 for it.</quote><footnote>
5179 <para>
5180 <!-- f1 -->
5181 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5182 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5183 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden <quote>Rip, Mix,
5184 Burn</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5185 <indexterm>
5186 <primary>artists</primary>
5187 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5188 </indexterm>
5189 </para></footnote>
5190 </para>
5191 <para>
5192 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5193 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5194 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5195 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5196 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5197 </para>
5198 <para>
5199 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5200 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5201 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5202 </para>
5203 <blockquote>
5204 <para>
5205 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5206 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5207 course we were going to use the <quote>Make my day</quote> clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5208 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5209 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5210 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5211 </para>
5212 <para>
5213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5214 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5215 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5216 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5217 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5218 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5219 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5220 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5221 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5222 started calling people.
5223 </para>
5224 </blockquote>
5225 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5226 <para>
5227 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5228 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5229 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5230 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5231 know, $1,200?</quote> And they would say, <quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5232 to get $1,200.</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5233 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5234 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5235 career.
5236 </para>
5237 <para>
5238 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;<quote>and even then we
5239 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.</quote>
5240 </para>
5241 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5242 <para>
5243 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5244 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5245 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5246 </para>
5247 <blockquote>
5248 <para>
5249 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5250 hands and said, <quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5251 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5252 actors.</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5253 constituent parts and said, <quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5254 directors, &hellip; this many musicians,</quote> and we just went at it very
5255 systematically and cleared the rights.
5256 </para>
5257 </blockquote>
5258 <para>
5259
5260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5261 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5262 loved it, and it sold very well.
5263 </para>
5264 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5265 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5266 <para>
5267 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5268 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5269 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, <quote>There is
5270 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5271 at all.</quote><footnote><para>
5272 <!-- f2 -->
5273 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5274 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5275 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5276 </para></footnote>
5277 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5278 has to be made?
5279 </para>
5280 <para>
5281 For, as he acknowledged, <quote>very few &hellip; have the time and resources,
5282 and the will to do this,</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5283 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5284 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5285 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5286 </para>
5287 <blockquote>
5288 <para>
5289 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5290 he or she gets paid very well. &hellip; And then when 30 seconds of
5291 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5292 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person &hellip; should be
5293 compensated for that.
5294 </para>
5295 </blockquote>
5296 <para>
5297 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5298 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5299 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5300 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5301 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5302 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5303 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5304 made to be more clean?
5305 </para>
5306 <blockquote>
5307 <para>
5308 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5309 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5310 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5311 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5313 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5314 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5315 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5316 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5317 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5318 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5319 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5320 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5321 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, <quote>Oh, I
5322 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5323 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5324 money,</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5325 </para>
5326 </blockquote>
5327 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5328 <para>
5329 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5330 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5331 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5332 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5333 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5334 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5335 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5336 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5337 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5338 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5339 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5340 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5341 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5342 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5343 <quote>Does this still make sense?</quote>
5344 </para>
5345 <para>
5346 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5347 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5348 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5349 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5350
5351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5352 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5353 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5354 </para>
5355 <para>
5356 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5357 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5358 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5359 judges loved every minute of it.
5360 </para>
5361 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5362 <para>
5363 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5364 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5365 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5366 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5367 began his talk with a question: <quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5368 were just violated in this room?</quote>
5369 </para>
5370 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5371 <para>
5372 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5373 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5374 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5375 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5376 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5377 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5378 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5379 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5380 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5381 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5382 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5383 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5384 couldn't easily do them legally.
5385 </para>
5386 <para>
5387 We live in a <quote>cut and paste</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5388 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5389 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5390 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5391 planted in your presentation.
5392 </para>
5393 <para>
5394 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5396 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5397 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5398 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5399 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5400 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5401 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5402 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5403 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5404 </para>
5405 <para>
5406 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5407 wanted to be <quote>legal,</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5408 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5409 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5410 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5411 </para>
5412 <para>
5413 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5414 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5415 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5416 necessarily requiring that the <quote>free</quote> use be free as in <quote>free beer.</quote>
5417 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5418 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5419 along: a rule, for example, that says <quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5420 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5421 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5422 copyright owner.</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5423 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5424 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5425 registers the work.
5426 </para>
5427 <para>
5428 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5429 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5430 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5431 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5432 </para>
5433 <para>
5434 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5435 Myers, the comic genius of <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5437 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5438 would work together to form a <quote>unique filmmaking pact.</quote> Under the
5439 agreement, DreamWorks <quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5440 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5441 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5442 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5443 entertainment.</quote>
5444 </para>
5445 <para>
5446 The announcement called this <quote>film sampling.</quote> As Myers explained,
5447 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5448 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5449 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5450 to take that same concept and apply it to film.</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5451 quoted as saying, <quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5452 new audiences, it is Mike.</quote>
5453 </para>
5454 <para>
5455 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5456 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5457 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5458 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5459 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5460 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5461 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5462 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5463 </para>
5464 <para>
5465 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5466 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of <quote>fair use.</quote>
5467 Much of <quote>sampling</quote> should be considered <quote>fair use.</quote> But few would
5468 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5469 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5470 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5471 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5472 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5473 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5474 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5475 curse, reserved for the few.
5476 </para>
5477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5478 </chapter>
5479 <chapter label="9" id="collectors">
5480 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5481 <para>
5482 In April 1996, millions of <quote>bots</quote>&mdash;computer codes designed to
5483 <quote>spider,</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5484 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5485 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5486 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5487 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5488 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5489 </para>
5490 <para>
5491 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5492 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5493 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5494 the world. Using a technology called <quote>the Way Back Machine,</quote> you could
5495 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5496 well as when those pages changed.
5497 </para>
5498 <para>
5499 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5500 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5501 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5502 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5503 reports.
5504 </para>
5505 <para>
5506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5507 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5508 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5509 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5510 </para>
5511 <para>
5512 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5513 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5514 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5515 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5516 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5517 </para>
5518 <para>
5519 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5520 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5521 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5522 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5523 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5524 <!-- f1 -->
5525 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5526 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5527 press release stated, <quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.</quote> That was
5528 later changed, without notice, to <quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5529 Have Ended.</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5530 </para></footnote>
5531 </para>
5532 <para>
5533 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5534 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5535 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5536 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5537 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5538 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5539 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5540 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5541 truth.
5542 </para>
5543 <para>
5544 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5545 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5546 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5547 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5548 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5549 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5550 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5551 </para>
5552 <para>
5553 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5554 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5555 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5556 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5558 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5559 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5560 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5561 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5562 </para>
5563 <para>
5564 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5565 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5566 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5567 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5568 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5569 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5570 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5571 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5572 </para>
5573 <para>
5574 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5575 human history. At the end of 2002, it held <quote>two hundred and thirty
5576 terabytes of material</quote>&mdash;and was <quote>ten times larger than the
5577 Library of Congress.</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5578 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5579 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5580 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5581 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5582 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5583 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5584 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5585 is available to scholars for a very low fee. <quote>But other than that,
5586 [television] is almost unavailable,</quote> Kahle told me. <quote>If you were
5587 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5588 just a graduate student?</quote> As Kahle put it,
5589 </para>
5590 <blockquote>
5591 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan</primary></indexterm>
5592 <para>
5593 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5594 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5595 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5596 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5597 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5598
5599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5600 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it &hellip; it would be almost
5601 impossible. &hellip; Those materials are almost unfindable. &hellip;
5602 </para>
5603 </blockquote>
5604 <para>
5605 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5606 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5607 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5608 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5609 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5610 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5611 </para>
5612 <para>
5613 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5614 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5615 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5616 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5617 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5618 work.
5619 </para>
5620 <para>
5621 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5622 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5623 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5624 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5625 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and <quote>borrowed
5626 back.</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5627 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5628 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5629 <!-- f2 -->
5630 Doug Herrick, <quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5631 the Library of Congress,</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5632 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5633 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5634 Co., 1992), 36.
5635 </para></footnote>
5636 </para>
5637 <para>
5638 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5639 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5640 broadcasts, so there was no fear of <quote>theft.</quote> But as technology enabled
5641 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5642 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5643 <quote>copyrighted.</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5644 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5645 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5646 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5647 </para>
5648 <para>
5649 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5651 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5652 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5653 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5654 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5655 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5656 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5657 events of that day.
5658 </para>
5659 <para>
5660 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5661 archive of film includes close to 45,000 <quote>ephemeral films</quote> (meaning
5662 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5663 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5664 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5665 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5666 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5667 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5668 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5669 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5670 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5671 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5672 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the <quote>Duck and Cover</quote> film
5673 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5674 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5675 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5676 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5677 </para>
5678 <para>
5679 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5680 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5681 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5682 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5683 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5684 to find them.
5685 </para>
5686 <para>
5687 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5688 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5689 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5690 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5691 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5692 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5693 </para>
5694 <para>
5695 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5696 of creative property goes through different <quote>lives.</quote> In its first
5697 life, if the
5698
5699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5700 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5701 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5702 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5703 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5704 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5705 </para>
5706 <para>
5707 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5708 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5709 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5710 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5711 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5712 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5713 longer sold.
5714 </para>
5715 <para>
5716 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5717 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5718 <!-- f3 -->
5719 Dave Barns, <quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5720 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5721 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5722 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5723 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5724 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5725 </para></footnote>). After
5726 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5727 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5728 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5729 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5730 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5731 </para>
5732 <para>
5733 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5734 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5735 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5736 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5737 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5738 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5739 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5740 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5741 disappears.
5742 </para>
5743 <para>
5744 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5745 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5746 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5747 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5748 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5749 generally, the
5750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5751 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5752 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5753 little practical effect.
5754 </para>
5755 <para>
5756 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5757 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5758 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5759 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5760 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5761 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5762 </para>
5763 <para>
5764 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5765 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5766 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5767 Kahle describes,
5768 </para>
5769 <blockquote>
5770 <para>
5771 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5772 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5773 movies, &hellip; and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5774 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5775 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5776 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5777 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5778 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5779 &hellip; thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5780 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5781 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5782 </para>
5783 </blockquote>
5784 <para>
5785 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5786 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5787 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5788 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5789 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5790 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5791 will draw upon it to understand it;
5792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5793 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5794 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5795 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5796 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5797 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5798 </para>
5799 <para>
5800 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5801 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5802 call these <quote>archives,</quote> as warm as the idea of a <quote>library</quote> might seem,
5803 the <quote>content</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5804 someone's <quote>property.</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5805 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5806 </para>
5807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5808 </chapter>
5809 <chapter label="10" id="property-i">
5810 <title>CHAPTER TEN: <quote>Property</quote></title>
5811 <para>
5812 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5813 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5814 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5815 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5816 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5817 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5818 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5819 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5820 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
5821 </para>
5822 <para>
5823 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5824 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5825 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5826 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5827 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5828 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5829 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5830 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5831 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5832 Warner Brothers.
5833 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5834 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5835 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5836 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5837 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5838 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5839 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5840 </para>
5841 <para>
5842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5843 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5844 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5845 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5846 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5847 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5848 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5849 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5850 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5851 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5852 Washingtonian way.
5853 </para>
5854 <para>
5855 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5856 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5857 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5858 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5859 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5860 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5861 redefine the meaning of <quote>creative property.</quote>
5862 </para>
5863 <para>
5864 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5865 perfectly:
5866 </para>
5867 <blockquote>
5868 <para>
5869 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5870 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5871 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5872 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5873 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5874 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5875 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5876 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5877 <!-- f1 -->
5878 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5879 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5880 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5881 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5882 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5883 Valenti).
5884 </para></footnote>
5885 </para>
5886 </blockquote>
5887 <para>
5888 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5889 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5890 <quote>central theme</quote> to which <quote>reasonable men and women</quote> will return is
5891 this:
5892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5893 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5894 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.</quote>
5895 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5896 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5897 </para>
5898 <para>
5899 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5900 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5901 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5902 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
5903 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5904 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5905 it comes to the nature and scope of <quote>creative property.</quote> His views
5906 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5907 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5908 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5909 </para>
5910 <para>
5911 While <quote>creative property</quote> is certainly <quote>property</quote> in a nerdy and
5912 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5913 <!-- f2 -->
5914 Lawyers speak of <quote>property</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5915 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5916 object. Thus, my <quote>property right</quote> to my car gives me the right to
5917 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5918 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of <quote>property</quote> to
5919 <quote>lawyer talk,</quote> see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
5920 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5921 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5922 <quote>creative property owners</quote> have been <quote>accorded the same rights and
5923 protection resident in all other property owners.</quote> Indeed, if creative
5924 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5925 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5926 in our tradition.
5927 </para>
5928 <para>
5929 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5930 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5931 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5932 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5933 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5934 culture would develop.
5935 </para>
5936 <para>
5937 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5938 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5939 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5940 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5941 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5942 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5943 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5944 the same would be to
5945
5946 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5947 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5948 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5949 perfect control.
5950 </para>
5951 <para>
5952 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5953 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5954 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5955 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5956 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5957 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5958 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5959 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5960 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5961 Constitution itself.
5962 </para>
5963 <para>
5964 The framers of our Constitution loved <quote>property.</quote> Indeed, so strongly
5965 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5966 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5967 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5968 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's <quote>Takings
5969 Clause,</quote> to pay you <quote>just compensation</quote> for that taking. The
5970 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5971 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
5972 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5973 </para>
5974 <para>
5975 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5976 Valenti calls <quote>creative property.</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
5977 power to create <quote>creative property,</quote> the Constitution
5978 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a <quote>limited time,</quote> Congress
5979 take back the rights that it has granted and set the <quote>creative
5980 property</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5981 the expiration of a copyright term <quote>takes</quote> your copyright and turns it
5982 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5983 pay <quote>just compensation</quote> for this <quote>taking.</quote> Instead, the same
5984 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5986 requires that you lose your <quote>creative property</quote> right without any
5987 compensation at all.
5988 </para>
5989 <para>
5990 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5991 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5992 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5993 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5994 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5995 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5996 itself.
5997 </para>
5998 <para>
5999 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6000 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6001 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6002 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6003 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6004 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
6005 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6006 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6007 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6008 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6009 </para>
6010 <para>
6011 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6012 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6013 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6014 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6015 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6016 domain?
6017 </para>
6018 <para>
6019 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6020 history of these <quote>creative property</quote> rights, and the control that they
6021 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6022 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6023 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
6024 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6025 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6026 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6027 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6028 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6029 also control how culture develops.
6030 </para>
6031 <para>
6032
6033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6034 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6035 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6036 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6037 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6038 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6039 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6040 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6041 </para>
6042 <figure id="fig-1331">
6043 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6044 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6045 </figure>
6046 <para>
6047 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6048 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6049 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6050 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6051 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6052 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6053 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6054 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6055 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6056 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6057 Web, you can be punished
6058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6059 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6060 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6061 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
6062 </para>
6063 <para>
6064 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6065 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6066 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6067 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6068 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6069 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6070 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6071 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6072 the source of the enforcement.
6073 </para>
6074 <para>
6075 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6076 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6077 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6078 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6079 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6080 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6081 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6082 individual or group might behave.
6083 </para>
6084 <para>
6085 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6086 <quote>architecture</quote>&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
6087 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6088 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6089 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6090 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6091 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6092 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6093 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6094 theft, but by nature, by <quote>architecture.</quote> If a 500-pound boulder
6095 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6096 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6097 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6098 </para>
6099 <para>
6100
6101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6102 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6103 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6104 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6105 undermined by another.
6106 </para>
6107 <para>
6108 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6109 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6110 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6111 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6112 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6113 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6114 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6115 </para>
6116 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6117 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6118 </indexterm>
6119 <para>
6120 So, for example, consider the <quote>freedom</quote> to drive a car at a high
6121 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6122 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6123 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6124 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6125 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6126 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6127 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6128 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6129 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6130 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6131 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6132 </para>
6133 <para>
6134 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6135 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6136 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6137 <!-- f3 -->
6138 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6139 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6140 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6141 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6142 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6143 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6144 Lawrence Lessig, <quote>The New Chicago School,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6145 June 1998.
6146 </para></footnote>
6147 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6148 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6149 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6150 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6151 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6152 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6153 used to require that other laws be more
6154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6155 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6156 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6157 driving.
6158 </para>
6159 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6160
6161 <figure id="fig-1361">
6162 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6163 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6164 </figure>
6165 <para>
6166 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6167 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6168 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6169 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6170 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6171 another.<footnote>
6172 <para>
6173 <!-- f4 -->
6174 Some people object to this way of talking about <quote>liberty.</quote> They object
6175 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6176 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6177 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6178 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6179 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6180 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6181 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6182 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6183 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6184 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6185 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a
6186 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6187 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6188 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6189 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6190 <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6191 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6192 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, <quote>The
6193 Right to Work,</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6194 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6195 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6196 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6197 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6198 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6199 12101 (2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6200 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6201 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6202 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6203 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)</primary></indexterm>
6204 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6205 </para></footnote>
6206 </para>
6207 <section id="hollywood">
6208 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6209 <para>
6210 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6211 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6212 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6213 rallying makes sense.
6214 </para>
6215 <para>
6216 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6217 Internet:
6218 </para>
6219 <figure id="fig-1371">
6220 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6221 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6222 </figure>
6223 <para>
6224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6225 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6226 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6227 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6228 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6229 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6230 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6231 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6232 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6233 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6234 this form of infringement.
6235 </para>
6236 <para>
6237 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6238 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6239 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6240 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6241 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6242 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6243 </para>
6244 <para>
6245 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6246 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6247 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6248 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6249 Iraq
6250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6251 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6252 looting that results.
6253 </para>
6254 <figure id="fig-1381">
6255 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6256 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6257 </figure>
6258 <para>
6259 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6260 warriors. Indeed, in a <quote>White Paper</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6261 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6262 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6263 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6264 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6265 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6266 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6267 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6268 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6269 </para>
6270 <para>
6271 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6272 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6273 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6274 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6275 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6276 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6277 life. Homeowners living in a
6278
6279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6280 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6281 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6282 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6283 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6284 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6285 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6286 </para>
6287 <para>
6288 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6289 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6290 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6291 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6292 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6293 Brown describes it, its <quote>architecture of revenue.</quote>
6294 </para>
6295 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry</primary></indexterm>
6296 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
6297 <para>
6298 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6299 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6300 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6301 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6302 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6303 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6304 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6305 <!-- f5 -->
6306 See Geoffrey Smith, <quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?</quote>
6307 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6308 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6309 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6310 R. Schoenberger, <quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?</quote> Forbes.com, 6
6311 October 2003, available at
6312 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6313 </para></footnote>
6314
6315 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6316 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6317 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6318 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6319 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6320 weakened the <quote>stickiness</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6321 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6322 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6323 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6324 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6325 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6326 </para>
6327 <para>
6328 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6329 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6330 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6332 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6333 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6334 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6335 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, <quote>established companies
6336 have an interest in excluding future competitors.</quote><footnote><para>
6337 <!-- f6 -->
6338 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6339 </para></footnote>
6340 And relative to a
6341 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6342 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6343 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6344 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6345 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6346 Brezhnev.
6347 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6348 </para>
6349 <para>
6350 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6351 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6352 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6353 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6354 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6355 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6356 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6357 opportunities for innovation and change.
6358 </para>
6359 <para>
6360 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6361 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6362 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6363 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6364 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6365 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6366 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6367 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: <quote>Congress
6368 shall make no law &hellip; abridging the freedom of speech.</quote> So when
6369 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would <quote>abridge</quote> the freedom
6370 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6371 regulation is justified.
6372 </para>
6373 <para>
6374 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6376 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6377 <quote>justified.</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6378 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6379 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6380 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6381 </para>
6382 <para>
6383 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6384 </para>
6385 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6386 <primary>DDT</primary>
6387 </indexterm>
6388 <para>
6389 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6390 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6391 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6392 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6393 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6394 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6395 </para>
6396 <para>
6397 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6398 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6399 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6400 </para>
6401 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6402 <para>
6403 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6404 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6405 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6406 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6407 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6408 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6409 </para>
6410 <para>
6411 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6412 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6413 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6414 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6415 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6416 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6417 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6418 </para>
6419 <para>
6420 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6421 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an <quote>environmentalism</quote> for
6422 culture.<footnote><para>
6423 <!-- f7 -->
6424 See, for example, James Boyle, <quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6425 Environmentalism for the Net?</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6426 </para></footnote>
6427 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6428 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6429 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6430 <quote>for free.</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6431 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6432 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6434 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6435 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6436 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6437 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6438 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6439 </para>
6440 <para>
6441 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6442 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6443 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6444 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6445 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6446 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6447 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6448 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6449 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6450 </para>
6451 <para>
6452 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6453 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6454 be lost.
6455 </para>
6456 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6457 </section>
6458 <section id="beginnings">
6459 <title>Beginnings</title>
6460 <para>
6461 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6462 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of <quote>creative
6463 property</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6464 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6465 </para>
6466 <para>
6467 The power to establish <quote>creative property</quote> rights is granted to
6468 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6469 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6470 </para>
6471 <para>
6472 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6473 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6474 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6475
6476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6477 We can call this the <quote>Progress Clause,</quote> for notice what this clause
6478 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6479 <quote>creative property rights.</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6480 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6481 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6482 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6483 </para>
6484 <para>
6485 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6486 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6487 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6488 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6489 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6490 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6491 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6492 copyrights extend <quote>to Authors</quote> only.
6493 </para>
6494 <para>
6495 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6496 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6497 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6498 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6499 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6500 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6501 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6502 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6503 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6504 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6505 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6506 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6507 concentrations of power.
6508 </para>
6509 <para>
6510 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call <quote>copyright</quote>
6511 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6512 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6513 <quote>copyright</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6514 years since they first struck its design.
6515 </para>
6516 <para>
6517 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6518 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6520 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6521 started here:
6522 </para>
6523 <figure id="fig-1441">
6524 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6525 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6526 </figure>
6527 <para>
6528 We will end here:
6529 </para>
6530 <figure id="fig-1442">
6531 <title><quote>Copyright</quote> today.</title>
6532 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6533 </figure>
6534 <para>
6535 Let me explain how.
6536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6537 </para>
6538 </section>
6539 <section id="lawduration">
6540 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6541 <para>
6542 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6543 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6544 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6545 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6546 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6547 authorship.<footnote>
6548 <para>
6549 <!-- f8 -->
6550 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6551 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6552 485&ndash;86: <quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6553 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6554 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis></quote>
6555 (emphasis added).
6556 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6557 </para></footnote>
6558 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6559 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6560 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6561 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6562 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6563 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6564 </para>
6565 <para>
6566 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6567 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6568 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6569 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6570 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6571 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6572 </para>
6573 <para>
6574 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6575 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6576 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6577 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6578 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6579 </para>
6580 <para>
6581 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6582 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6583 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6584 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6585 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6586 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6587 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6588 <!-- f9 -->
6589 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6590 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6591 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6592 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6593 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6594 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6595 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6596 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6597 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6598 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6599 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6600 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6601 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6602 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6603 </para>
6604 <para>
6605 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6606 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6608 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6609 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6610 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6611 copyright, either.
6612 </para>
6613 <para>
6614 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6615 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6616 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6617 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6618 domain.<footnote><para>
6619 <!-- f10 -->
6620 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6621 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6622 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6623 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, <quote>Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,</quote>
6624 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6625 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6626 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, <quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,</quote>
6627 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6628 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6629 </para>
6630 <para>
6631 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6632 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6633 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6634 <!-- f11 -->
6635 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6636 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6637 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6638 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6639 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6640 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6641 </para>
6642 <para>
6643 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6644 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6645 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6646 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6647 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6648 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6649 </para>
6650 <para>
6651 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6652 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6653 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6654 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6655 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6656 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6657 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6658 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6659 </para>
6660 <para>
6661 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6662 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6663 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6664 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6665
6666 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6667 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6668 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6669 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6670 </para>
6671 <para>
6672 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6673 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6674 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6675 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6676 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6677 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6678 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6679 value.
6680 </para>
6681 <para>
6682 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6683 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6684 maximum term. For <quote>natural</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6685 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6686 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6687 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6688 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6689 was ninety-five years.
6690 </para>
6691 <para>
6692 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6693 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6694 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6695 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6696 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6697 that terms be <quote>limited,</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6698 them.
6699 </para>
6700 <para>
6701 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6702 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6703 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6704 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6705 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6706 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6707 years.<footnote><para>
6708 <!-- f12 -->
6709 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6710 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6711 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6712 Posner, <quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,</quote> loc. cit.
6713 </para></footnote>
6714 </para>
6715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6716 </section>
6717 <section id="lawscope">
6718 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6719 <para>
6720 The <quote>scope</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6721 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6722 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6723 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6724 </para>
6725 <para>
6726 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only <quote>maps,
6727 charts, and books.</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6728 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6729 the author the exclusive right to <quote>publish</quote> copyrighted works. That
6730 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6731 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6732 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6733 did not extend to what lawyers call <quote>derivative works.</quote> It would not,
6734 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6735 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6736 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6737 </para>
6738 <para>
6739 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6740 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6741 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6742 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6743 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6744 work not only the exclusive right to <quote>publish</quote> the work, but also the
6745 exclusive right of control over any <quote>copies</quote> of that work. And most
6746 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6747 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6748 <quote>derivative work</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6749 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6750 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6751 on the initial creative work.
6752 </para>
6753 <para>
6754 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6755 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6756 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6758 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6759 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6760 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6761 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6762 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6763 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6764 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6765 secured.
6766 </para>
6767 <para>
6768 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6769 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6770 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6771 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6772 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6773 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6774 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6775 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6776 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6777 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6778 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6779 original author.
6780 </para>
6781 <para>
6782 All of these <quote>formalities</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6783 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6784 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6785 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6786 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6787 copy available for others to copy.
6788 </para>
6789 <para>
6790 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6791 differences.
6792 </para>
6793 <para>
6794 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6795 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6796 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6797 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6798 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6799 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6800 <!-- f13 -->
6801 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, <quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6802 Creation of American Literature,</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6803 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6804 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6805
6806 </para></footnote>
6807 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6808 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6809 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6810 </para>
6811 <para>
6812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6813 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6814 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6815 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6816 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6817 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6818 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6819 were restrained.
6820 </para>
6821 <para>
6822 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6823 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6824 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6825 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6826 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6827 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6828 protect it.
6829 </para>
6830 <para>
6831 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6832 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6833 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6834 </para>
6835 <para>
6836 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6837 control
6838 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6839 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of <quote>derivative
6840 rights.</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6841 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6842 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6843 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6844 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6845 exclusive
6846 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6847 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6848 </para>
6849 <para>
6850 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6851 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6852 expansion
6853 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6854 copyright.
6855 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6856 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6857 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6858 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6859 </para>
6860 <para>
6861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6862 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6863 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6864 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6865 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6866 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6867 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6868 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6869 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6870 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6871 <!-- f14 -->
6872 Jonathan Zittrain, <quote>The Copyright Cage,</quote> <citetitle>Legal
6873 Affairs</citetitle>, July/August 2003, available at
6874 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6875 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6876 </para></footnote>
6877 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6878 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6879 the wrong of direct piracy.
6880 </para>
6881 <para>
6882 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6883 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6884 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6885 of my book.<footnote><para>
6886 <!-- f15 -->
6887 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6888 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6889 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere <quote>copies</quote> and
6890 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, <quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
6891 Copyright's Constitutionality,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
6892 Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially
6893 pp. 53&ndash;59).
6894 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb</primary></indexterm>
6895 </para></footnote>
6896 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6897 </para>
6898 <para>
6899 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6900 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6901 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6902 called <quote>Mickey Mouse,</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6903 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6904 created?
6905 </para>
6906 <para>
6907 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6908 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6909 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6910 the rights originally granted.
6911 </para>
6912 </section>
6913 <section id="lawreach">
6914 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6915 <para>
6916 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6917 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6918 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6919 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6920 <!-- f16 -->
6921 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6922 certainly regulates more than <quote>copies</quote>&mdash;a public performance of a
6923 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6924 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6925 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a <quote>copy</quote>; 17
6926 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
6927 existing law (which regulates <quote>copies;</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6928 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6929 </para></footnote>
6930 </para>
6931 <para>
6932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6933 <quote>Copies.</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6934 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6935 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that <quote>creative
6936 property</quote> deserves the <quote>same rights</quote> as all other property, it is the
6937 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6938 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6939 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6940 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6941 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6942 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
6943 the trigger for copyright law.
6944 </para>
6945 <para>
6946 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6947 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6948 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6949 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6950 <!-- f17 -->
6951 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
6952 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
6953 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
6954 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
6955 technology.
6956 </para></footnote>
6957 because it is clear that the
6958 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6959 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6960 </para>
6961 <para>
6962 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6963 empty circle.
6964 </para>
6965 <figure id="fig-1521">
6966 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6967 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6968 </figure>
6969 <para>
6970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6971 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6972 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6973 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6974 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6975 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6976 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6977 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6978 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6979 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6980 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6981 acts do not make a copy.
6982 </para>
6983 <figure id="fig-1531">
6984 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6985 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6986 </figure>
6987 <para>
6988 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6989 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6990 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6991 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6992 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6993 diagram on next page).
6994 </para>
6995 <para>
6996 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6997 that remain unregulated because the law considers these <quote>fair uses.</quote>
6998 </para>
6999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7000 <figure id="fig-1541">
7001 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7002 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7003 </figure>
7004 <para>
7005 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7006 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7007 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7008 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7009 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7010 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7011 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such <quote>fair uses</quote>
7012 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7013 </para>
7014 <figure id="fig-1542">
7015 <title>Unregulated copying considered <quote>fair uses.</quote></title>
7016 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7017 </figure>
7018 <para> </para>
7019 <figure id="fig-1551">
7020 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7021 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7022 </figure>
7023 <para>
7024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7025 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7026 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7027 are nonetheless deemed <quote>fair</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7028 </para>
7029 <para>
7030 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7031 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7032 <!-- f18 -->
7033 I don't mean <quote>nature</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7034 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7035 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7036 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7037 of copies remain.
7038 </para></footnote>
7039 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7040 digital network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses
7041 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7042 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7043 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7044 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7045 a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into category 2. And those who
7046 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7047 exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7048 shift.
7049 </para>
7050 <para>
7051 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7052 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7053 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
7054 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7055 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7056 the book once, ten times, or every
7057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7058 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7059 use&mdash;reading&mdash; could be regulated by copyright law because
7060 none of those uses produced a copy.
7061 </para>
7062 <para>
7063 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7064 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7065 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
7066 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7067 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7068 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7069 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7070 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7071 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7072 copyright owner's wish.
7073 </para>
7074 <para>
7075 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7076 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7077 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7078 points also become clear:
7079 </para>
7080 <para>
7081 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7082 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7083 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7084 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7085 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7086 part of free culture before the Internet.
7087 </para>
7088 <para>
7089 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7090 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7091 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7092 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7093 using a machine. <quote>Copy and paste</quote> and <quote>cut and paste</quote> become
7094 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7095 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7096 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7097 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7098 creative work.
7099 </para>
7100 <para>
7101 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7102
7103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7104 burden on category 3 (<quote>fair use</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7105 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7106 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7107 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7108 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7109 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7110 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7111 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7112 regulated.
7113 </para>
7114 <para>
7115 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7116 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7117 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7118 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7119 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7120 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7121 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7122 enough.
7123 </para>
7124 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'>
7125 <primary>advertising</primary>
7126 </indexterm>
7127 <para>
7128 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7129 in the business of making <quote>trailer</quote> advertisements for movies available
7130 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7131 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7132 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7133 </para>
7134 <para>
7135 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began
7136 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7137 previews. The idea was to expand their <quote>selling by sampling</quote>
7138 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7139 <quote>browsing.</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7140 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7141 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7142 </para>
7143 <para>
7144 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7145 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7146 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7147 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7149 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7150 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7151 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7152 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7153 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7154 <quote>fair use</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7155 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7156 their rights.
7157 </para>
7158 <para>
7159 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7160 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had <quote>willfully
7161 infringed</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7162 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7163 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7164 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7165 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7166 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7167 </para>
7168 <para>
7169 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7170 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7171 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7172 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7173 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7174 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7175 Disney's permission.
7176 </para>
7177 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'/>
7178 <para>
7179 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7180 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7181 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7182 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7183 was in the marketplace, the <quote>first-sale doctrine</quote> would free the
7184 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7185 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7186 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7187 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7188 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7189 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7190 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7191 </para>
7192 <para>
7193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7194 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7195 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7196 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7197 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7198 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7199 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7200 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7201 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7202 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7203 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7204 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7205 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7206 happening are quite slight.
7207 </para>
7208 <para>
7209 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7210 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7211 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7212 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7213 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7214 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7215 </para>
7216 </section>
7217 <section id="lawforce">
7218 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7219 <para>
7220 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7221 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7222 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7223 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7224 </para>
7225 <para>
7226 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7227 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7228 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7229 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7230 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7231 your freedom.
7232 </para>
7233 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7234 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7235 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7236 </indexterm>
7237 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7238 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7239 </indexterm>
7240 <para>
7241 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7242 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7244 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7245 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7246 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7247 plan.<footnote><para>
7248 <!-- f19 -->
7249 See David Lange, <quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7250 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7251 </para></footnote>
7252 </para>
7253 <para>
7254 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7255 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers <quote>were brothers long before
7256 you were.</quote><footnote><para>
7257 <!-- f20 -->
7258 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7259 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7260 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7261 </para></footnote>
7262 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7263 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7264 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7265 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7266 </para>
7267 <para>
7268 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7269 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7270 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7271 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7272 </para>
7273 <para>
7274 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7275 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7276 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7277 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7278 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7279 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7280 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7281 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7282 </para>
7283 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7284 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7285
7286 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7287 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7288 </indexterm>
7289 <para>
7290 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7291 </para>
7292 <para>
7293 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7294 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7295 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7296 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7297 technology.
7298 </para>
7299 <para>
7300 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7301 Reader.
7302 </para>
7303 <para>
7304 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7305 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7306 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7307 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7308 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7309 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7310 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7311 copy of
7312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7313 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7314 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7315 </para>
7316 <figure id="fig-1611">
7317 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7318 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7319 </figure>
7320 <para>
7321 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7322 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7323 </para>
7324 <figure id="fig-1612">
7325 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7326 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7327 </figure>
7328 <para>
7329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7330 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7331 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7332 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7333 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7334 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7335 read aloud through the computer.
7336 </para>
7337 <para>
7338 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7339 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7340 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7341 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7342 </para>
7343 <figure id="fig-1621">
7344 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s <quote>Politics</quote></title>
7345 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7346 </figure>
7347 <para>
7348 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7349 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7350 the book.
7351 </para>
7352 <figure id="fig-1622">
7353 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s <quote>Politics</quote>.</title>
7354 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7355 </figure>
7356 <para>
7357 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7358 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7359 Ideas</citetitle>:
7360 </para>
7361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7362 <figure id="fig-1631">
7363 <title>List of the permissions for <quote>The Future of Ideas</quote>.</title>
7364 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7365 </figure>
7366 <para>
7367 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7368 </para>
7369 <para>
7370 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7371 <quote>permissions</quote>&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7372 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7373 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7374 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7375 power.<footnote><para>
7376 <!-- f21 -->
7377 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7378 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7379 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7380 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7381 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7382 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7383 subsequently acquired the book.
7384 </para></footnote>
7385 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7386 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7387 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7388 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7389 control that the law would enable.
7390 </para>
7391 <para>
7392 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7393 within which the e-book <quote>lives.</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7394 permissions, they are not the sort of <quote>permissions</quote> that most of us
7395 deal with. When a teenager gets <quote>permission</quote> to stay out till
7396 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7397 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7398 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7399 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7400 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7401 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7402 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7403 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7404 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7405 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7406 won't read aloud.
7407 </para>
7408 <para>
7409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7410 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7411 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7412 you tried to type <quote>Warner Brothers,</quote> erased <quote>Brothers</quote> from the
7413 sentence.
7414 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7415 </para>
7416 <para>
7417 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7418 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7419 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7420 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7421 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7422 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7423 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7424 </para>
7425 <para>
7426 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7427 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7428 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7429 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7430 to defeat these protections as well?
7431 </para>
7432 <para>
7433 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7434 eBook Reader.
7435 </para>
7436 <para>
7437 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7438 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7439 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7440 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7441 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7442 following report:
7443 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7444 </para>
7445 <figure id="fig-1641">
7446 <title>List of the permissions for <quote>Alice's Adventures in
7447 Wonderland</quote>.</title>
7448 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7449 </figure>
7450 <beginpage pagenum="164"/>
7451 <para>
7452 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7453 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7454 <quote>permissions</quote> indicated, not allowed to <quote>read aloud</quote>!
7455 </para>
7456 <para>
7457 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7458 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7459 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7460 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7461 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7462 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7463 </para>
7464 <para>
7465 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7466 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7467 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7468 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7469 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7470 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7471 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7472 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7473 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7474 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7475 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7476 </para>
7477 <para>
7478 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7479 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7480 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7481 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7482 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7483 often crazy.
7484 </para>
7485 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7486 <para>
7487 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7488 story of mine that makes the same point.
7489 </para>
7490 <indexterm id="idxaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7491 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7492 </indexterm>
7493 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'>
7494 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7495 </indexterm>
7496 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7497 <primary>Sony</primary>
7498 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7499 </indexterm>
7500 <para>
7501 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named <quote>Aibo.</quote> The Aibo
7502 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7503 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7504 </para>
7505 <para>
7506 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7507 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7508 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7509 <beginpage pagenum="165"/>
7510 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7511 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7512 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7513 </para>
7514 <para>
7515 <quote>Teach</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7516 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7517 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7518 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7519 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7520 their computer <quote>dog</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7521 </para>
7522 <para>
7523 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7524 <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7525 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7526 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7527 them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much more positive
7528 term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7529 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7530 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7531 old computer doesn't run, or <quote>drive,</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7532 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7533 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7534 you just bought.
7535 </para>
7536 <para>
7537 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7538 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7539 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7540 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7541 ethically.
7542 </para>
7543 <para>
7544 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7545 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7546 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7547 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7548 than Sony had built.
7549 </para>
7550 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7551 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'/>
7552 <indexterm startref="idxaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7553 <para>
7554 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7555 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7556 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7557 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7558 the
7559
7560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7561 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7562 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7563 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7564 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7565 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7566 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7567 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7568 </para>
7569 <para>
7570 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7571 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7572 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7573 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7574 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7575 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7576 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7577 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7578 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7579 </para>
7580 <para>
7581 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7582 <!-- f22 -->
7583 See Pamela Samuelson, <quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,</quote>
7584 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, <quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7585 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7586 January 2002; <quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7587 DMCA,</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7588 Holland, <quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,</quote> <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7589 May 2001; Janelle Brown, <quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?</quote> Salon.com,
7590 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, <quote>Frequently Asked
7591 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case,</quote> available at
7592 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7593 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7594 </para></footnote>
7595 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7596 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7597 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7598 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7599 </para>
7600 <para>
7601 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7602 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7603 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7604 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7605 <quote>this music cannot be copied,</quote> and have a computer respect that
7606 command. The technology was to be part of a <quote>trusted system</quote> of
7607 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7608 Internet much more.
7609 </para>
7610 <para>
7611 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7612 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7613 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7614 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7615 </para>
7616 <para>
7617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7618 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7619 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7620 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7621 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7622 </para>
7623 <para>
7624 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7625 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7626 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7627 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7628 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7629 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7630 </para>
7631 <para>
7632 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7633 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7634 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7635 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7636 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7637 constituted, succeed.
7638 </para>
7639 <indexterm id="idxaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7640 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7641 </indexterm>
7642 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'>
7643 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7644 </indexterm>
7645 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7646 <primary>Sony</primary>
7647 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7648 </indexterm>
7649 <para>
7650 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7651 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7652 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7653 wrote:
7654 </para>
7655 <blockquote>
7656 <para>
7657 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7658 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7659 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7660 </para>
7661 </blockquote>
7662 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7663 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'/>
7664 <indexterm startref="idxaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7665 <para>
7666 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7667 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7668 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7669 </para>
7670 <blockquote>
7671 <para>
7672 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7674 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7675 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7676 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (<quote>DMCA</quote>).
7677 </para>
7678 </blockquote>
7679 <para>
7680 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7681 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7682 spreading such information an offense.
7683 </para>
7684 <para>
7685 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7686 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7687 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7688 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7689 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7690 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7691 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7692 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7693 protection for copyright owners.
7694 </para>
7695 <para>
7696 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7697 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7698 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7699 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7700 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7701 </para>
7702 <para>
7703 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7704 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7705 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7706 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7707 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7708 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7709 have been a copyright violation.
7710 </para>
7711 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7712 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7713 <indexterm>
7714 <primary>Sony</primary>
7715 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7716 </indexterm>
7717 <para>
7718 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7719 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7720 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7721 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7722 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7723 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7724 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7726 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7727 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7728 </para>
7729 <para>
7730 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7731 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7732 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7733 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7734 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7735 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7736 </para>
7737 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7738 <para>
7739 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7740 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7741 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7742 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7743 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7744 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka <quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>,</quote>
7745 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7746 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7747 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7748 </para>
7749 <blockquote>
7750 <para>
7751 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7752 <quote>Neighborhood</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7753 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7754 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7755 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7756 <quote>Neighborhood</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the <quote>Neighborhood</quote>
7757 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7758 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7759 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7760 broadcasting has always been <quote>You are an important person just the way
7761 you are. You can make healthy decisions.</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7762 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7763 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7764 important.<footnote><para>
7765 <!-- f23 -->
7766 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7767 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7768 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7769 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7770 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7771 </para></footnote>
7772 </para>
7773 </blockquote>
7774 <para>
7775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7776 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7777 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7778 the VCR responsible.
7779 </para>
7780 <para>
7781 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7782 the DMCA.
7783 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7784 </para>
7785 <para>
7786 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7787 </para>
7788 <para>
7789 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7790 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7791 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7792 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7793 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7794 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7795 </para>
7796 <para>
7797 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7799 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7800 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7801 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7802 and bad uses.
7803 </para>
7804 <figure id="fig-1711">
7805 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7806 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7807 </figure>
7808 <para>
7809 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7810 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7811 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7812 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7813 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7814 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7815 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7816 </para>
7817 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7818 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7819 <indexterm>
7820 <primary>Sony</primary>
7821 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7822 </indexterm>
7823 <para>
7824 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7825 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7826 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7827 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7828 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7829 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7830 </para>
7831 <para>
7832 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7833 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7834 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7835 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7836 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7837 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7838 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7839 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7840 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7841 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7842 </para>
7843 <para>
7844 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7845 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7846 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7847 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7848 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7849 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7850 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7851 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7852 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7853 </para>
7854 <para>
7855
7856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7857 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7858 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7859 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7860 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7861 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7862 <!-- f24 -->
7863 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, <quote>Legal Fictions,
7864 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7865 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7866 </para></footnote>
7867 </para>
7868 <para>
7869 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7870 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7871 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7872 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7873 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7874 </para>
7875 <para>
7876 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7877 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7878 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7879 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7880 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7881 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7882 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7883 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7884 </para>
7885 <para>
7886 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7887 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7888 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7889 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7890 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7891 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7892 </para>
7893 </section>
7894 <section id="marketconcentration">
7895 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7896 <para>
7897 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7898 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7899 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7900 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7901 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7902 find better ways
7903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7904 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7905 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7906 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7907 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7908 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7909 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7910 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7911 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7912 control.
7913 </para>
7914 <para>
7915 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7916 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7917 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7918 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7919 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7920 </para>
7921 <para>
7922 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7923 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7924 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7925 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7926 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7927 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7928 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7929 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7930 of the media.
7931 </para>
7932 <para>
7933 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7934 nature.
7935 </para>
7936 <para>
7937 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7938 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7939 ownership, <quote>five companies control 85 percent of our media sources.</quote><footnote><para>
7940 <!-- f25 -->
7941 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7942 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7943 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7944 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7945 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7946 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7947 <!-- f26 -->
7948 Lynette Holloway, <quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7949 Slide,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
7950 </para></footnote>
7951 The <quote>five largest cable companies pipe
7952 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.</quote><footnote><para>
7953 <!-- f27 -->
7954 Molly Ivins, <quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
7955 31 May 2003.
7956 </para></footnote>
7957 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7958 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
7959 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
7960 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
7961 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group</primary></indexterm>
7962 </para>
7963 <para>
7964 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7965 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7967 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
7968 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7969 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
7970 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
7971 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
7972 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7973 </para>
7974 <para>
7975 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7976 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7977 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7978 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7979 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7980 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7981 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7982 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7983 protected&mdash; by the market.
7984 </para>
7985 <para>
7986 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7987 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7988 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7989 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7990 </para>
7991 <blockquote>
7992 <para>
7993 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7994 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7995 &hellip; Fox TV shows &hellip; Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7996 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7997 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7998 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7999 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8000 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8001 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8002 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
8003 <!-- f28 -->
8004 James Fallows, <quote>The Age of Murdoch,</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
8005 2003): 89.
8006 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
8007 </para></footnote>
8008 </para>
8009 </blockquote>
8010 <para>
8011 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8012 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8013 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8014 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8015 </para>
8016 <figure id="fig-1761">
8017 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
8018 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
8019 </figure>
8020 <para>
8021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8022 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8023 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8024 distribute content?
8025 </para>
8026 <para>
8027 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8028 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8029 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8030 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8031 </para>
8032 <para>
8033 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8034 integration may matter.
8035 </para>
8036 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8037 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8038 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8039 <para>
8040 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
8041 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8042 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8043 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8044 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8045 </para>
8046 <para>
8047 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8048 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8049 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8050 control.<footnote><para>
8051 <!-- f29 -->
8052 Leonard Hill, <quote>The Axis of Access,</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8053 Forum, <quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,</quote> St. Louis,
8054 Missouri, 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8055 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8056 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8057 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8058 </para></footnote>
8059 </para>
8060 <para>
8061
8062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8063 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8064 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8065 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8066 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
8067 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8068 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was <quote>independent</quote> of the
8069 networks.
8070 </para>
8071 <para>
8072 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8073 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
8074 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8075 2002, only five independent television studios remained. <quote>In 1992,
8076 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8077 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8078 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent.</quote> <quote>In 1992, 16
8079 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8080 year there was one.</quote><footnote><para>
8081 <!-- f30 -->
8082 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8083 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
8084 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8085 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8086 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8087 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8088 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
8089 2003.
8090 </para></footnote>
8091 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8092 that ran it. <quote>In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
8093 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8094 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8095 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8096 63%.</quote><footnote><para>
8097 <!-- f31 -->
8098 Ibid.
8099 </para></footnote>
8100 </para>
8101 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8102 <para>
8103 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
8104 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8105 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8106 owned by the network.
8107 </para>
8108 <para>
8109 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8110 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8111 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8112 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
8113 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
8114 </para>
8115 <blockquote>
8116 <para>
8117 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8118 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8119 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8120 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8122 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8123 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8124 handful.<footnote><para>
8125 <!-- f32 -->
8126 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
8127 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8128 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8129 </para></footnote>
8130 </para>
8131 </blockquote>
8132 <para>
8133 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8134 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8135 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8136 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8137 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8138 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8139 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8140 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8141 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8142 democracy.
8143 </para>
8144 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8145 <para>
8146 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8147 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the <quote>Innovator's
8148 Dilemma</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8149 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8150 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8151 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8152 <!-- f33 -->
8153 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8154 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8155 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8156 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8157 Kim B. Clark, <quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8158 Concepts in Technological Evolution,</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8159 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8160 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8161 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8162 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8163
8164 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8165 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8166 sprinting.
8167 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8168 </para>
8169 <para>
8170 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8171 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8172 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8173 measure.
8174 </para>
8175 <para>
8176 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8177 suggest the concern.
8178 </para>
8179 <para>
8180 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8181 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8182 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8183 </para>
8184 <para>
8185 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8186 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8187 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8188
8189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8190 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8191 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8192 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8193 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8194 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8195 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8196 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8197 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8198 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8199 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8200 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8201 outweigh these costs.
8202 </para>
8203 <para>
8204 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8205 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8206 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8207 these issues.
8208 </para>
8209 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'>
8210 <primary>advertising</primary>
8211 </indexterm>
8212 <para>
8213 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8214 a media campaign as part of the <quote>war on drugs.</quote> The campaign produced
8215 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8216 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8217 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8218 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8219 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8220 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8221 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8222 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8223 </para>
8224 <para>
8225 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8226 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8227 </para>
8228 <para>
8229 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8230 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8231 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8232 war. Can you do it?
8233 </para>
8234 <para>
8235 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8237 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8238 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8239 message will be heard then?
8240 </para>
8241 <para>
8242 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8243 <quote>controversial</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8244 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8245 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8246 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8247 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8248 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8249 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8250 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8251 <!-- f34 -->
8252 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8253 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8254 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as <quote>against
8255 [their] policy.</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8256 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8257 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8258 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8259 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8260 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, <quote>On the Issue of
8261 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,</quote> <citetitle>New
8262 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8263 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8264 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, <quote>Ad
8265 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8266 Radio,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8267 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8268 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8269 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8270 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8271 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8272 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, <quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8273 After Muni Rejects Ad,</quote> SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8274 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8275 was that the criticism was <quote>too controversial.</quote>
8276 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8277 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8278 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8279 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8280 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8281 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8282 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
8283 </para></footnote>
8284 </para>
8285 <para>
8286 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8287 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8288 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8289 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8290 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8291 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8292 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8293 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8294 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8295 </para>
8296 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'/>
8297 </section>
8298 <section id="together">
8299 <title>Together</title>
8300 <para>
8301 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8302 copyright warriors that the government should <quote>protect my property.</quote>
8303 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8304 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8305 </para>
8306 <para>
8307 But when we see how dramatically this <quote>property</quote> has changed&mdash;
8308 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8309 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8310 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8311 to seem
8312
8313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8314 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8315 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8316 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8317 the massively expanded <quote>property</quote> rights granted by copyright
8318 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8319 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8320 be redefined.
8321 </para>
8322 <para>
8323 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8324 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8325 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8326 our culture today.
8327 </para>
8328 <para>
8329 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8330 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8331 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8332 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8333 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8334 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8335 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8336 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8337 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8338 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8339 </para>
8340 <para>
8341 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8342 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8343 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8344 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8345 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8346 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8347 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8348 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8349 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8350 in control that technology and the market enable.
8351 </para>
8352 <para>
8353 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8354 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8356 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8357 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8358 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8359 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8360 </para>
8361 <para>
8362 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8363 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8364 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8365 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8366 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8367 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8368 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8369 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8370 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8371 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8372 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8373 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8374 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8375 known.<footnote><para>
8376 <!-- f35 -->
8377 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his <quote>four surrenders</quote> of
8378 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8379 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8380 </para></footnote>
8381 </para>
8382 <para>
8383 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8384 </para>
8385 <para>
8386 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8387 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8388 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8389 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8390 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8391 </para>
8392
8393 <informaltable id="t2">
8394 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8395 <thead>
8396 <row>
8397 <entry></entry>
8398 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8399 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8400 </row>
8401 </thead>
8402 <tbody>
8403 <row>
8404 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8405 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8406 <entry>Free</entry>
8407 </row>
8408 <row>
8409 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8410 <entry>Free</entry>
8411 <entry>Free</entry>
8412 </row>
8413 </tbody>
8414 </tgroup>
8415 </informaltable>
8416
8417 <para>
8418 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8419 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8420 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8421
8422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8423 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8424 noncommercial work was also free.
8425 </para>
8426 <para>
8427 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8428 </para>
8429
8430 <informaltable id="t3">
8431 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8432 <thead>
8433 <row>
8434 <entry></entry>
8435 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8436 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8437 </row>
8438 </thead>
8439 <tbody>
8440 <row>
8441 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8442 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8443 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8444 </row>
8445 <row>
8446 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8447 <entry>Free</entry>
8448 <entry>Free</entry>
8449 </row>
8450 </tbody>
8451 </tgroup>
8452 </informaltable>
8453
8454 <para>
8455 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8456 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8457 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8458 transformation were still essentially free.
8459 </para>
8460 <para>
8461 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8462 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8463 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8464 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8465 we could say the law began to look like this:
8466 </para>
8467
8468 <informaltable id="t4">
8469 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8470 <thead>
8471 <row>
8472 <entry></entry>
8473 <entry>COPY</entry>
8474 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8475 </row>
8476 </thead>
8477 <tbody>
8478 <row>
8479 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8480 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8481 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8482 </row>
8483 <row>
8484 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8485 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8486 <entry>Free</entry>
8487 </row>
8488 </tbody>
8489 </tgroup>
8490 </informaltable>
8491
8492 <para>
8493 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8494 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8495 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8496 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8497 that the law now looks like this:
8498 </para>
8499
8500 <informaltable id="t5">
8501 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8502 <thead>
8503 <row>
8504 <entry></entry>
8505 <entry>COPY</entry>
8506 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8507 </row>
8508 </thead>
8509 <tbody>
8510 <row>
8511 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8512 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8513 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8514 </row>
8515 <row>
8516 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8517 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8518 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8519 </row>
8520 </tbody>
8521 </tgroup>
8522 </informaltable>
8523
8524 <para>
8525 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8526 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8527 creativity&mdash;
8528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8529 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8530 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8531 </para>
8532 <para>
8533 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8534 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8535 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8536 these domains actually does any good.
8537 </para>
8538 <para>
8539 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8540 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8541 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8542 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8543 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8544 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8545 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8546 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8547 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8548 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8549 </para>
8550 <para>
8551 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8552 course copyright is a kind of <quote>property,</quote> and of course, as with any
8553 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8554 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8555 property rights<footnote><para>
8556 <!-- f36 -->
8557 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8558 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8559 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, <quote>The
8560 Disintegration of Property,</quote> in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8561 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8562 Press, 1980).
8563 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement</primary></indexterm>
8564 </para></footnote>)
8565 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8566 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8567 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8568 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the <quote>copyright</quote>
8569 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8570 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8571 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8572 vibrant and rich free culture.
8573 </para>
8574 <para>
8575 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8576 limits on the scope of the interests protected by <quote>property.</quote> The very
8577 birth of <quote>copyright</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8578 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8579 story of chapter 6). The tradition of <quote>fair use</quote> is animated by a
8580 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8581 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8582 chapter 7). Adding
8583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8584 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8585 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8586 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8587 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8588 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8589 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8590 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8591 dominates the debate today.
8592 </para>
8593 <para>
8594 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8595 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8596 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8597 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8598 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8599 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8600 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8601 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8602 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8603 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8604 lawyer.
8605 </para>
8606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8607 </section>
8608 </chapter>
8609 </part>
8610 <part id="c-puzzles">
8611 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8612
8613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8614 <chapter label="11" id="chimera">
8615 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8616 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8617 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8618 </indexterm>
8619 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8620 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8621 </indexterm>
8622 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8623 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The</quote> (Wells)</primary>
8624 </indexterm>
8625
8626 <para>
8627 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8628 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8629 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8630 <!-- f1. -->
8631 H. G. Wells, <quote>The Country of the Blind</quote> (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8632 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8633 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8634 </para></footnote>
8635 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with <quote>sweet water, pasture,
8636 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8637 that bore an excellent fruit.</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8638 takes this as an opportunity. <quote>In the Country of the Blind,</quote> he tells
8639 himself, <quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8640 villagers to explore life as a king.
8641 </para>
8642 <para>
8643 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8644 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8645 <quote>blind.</quote> They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8646 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8647 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8648 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. <quote>`You
8649 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8650 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8651 alone!'</quote>
8652 </para>
8653 <para>
8654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8655 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8656 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8657 affection, a young woman who to him seems <quote>the most beautiful thing in
8658 the whole of creation,</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8659 description of what he sees <quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8660 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8661 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8662 indulgence.</quote> <quote>She did not believe,</quote> Wells tells us, and <quote>she could
8663 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.</quote>
8664 </para>
8665 <para>
8666 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his <quote>mysteriously delighted</quote>
8667 love, the father and the village object. <quote>You see, my dear,</quote> her
8668 father instructs, <quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8669 anything right.</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8670 </para>
8671 <para>
8672 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. <quote>His brain
8673 is affected,</quote> he reports.
8674 </para>
8675 <para>
8676 <quote>What affects it?</quote> the father asks. <quote>Those queer things that are
8677 called the eyes &hellip; are diseased &hellip; in such a way as to affect
8678 his brain.</quote>
8679 </para>
8680 <para>
8681 The doctor continues: <quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8682 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8683 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8684 irritant bodies [the eyes].</quote>
8685 </para>
8686 <para>
8687 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8688 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8689 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8690 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8691 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8692 womb. That fusion produces a <quote>chimera.</quote> A chimera is a single creature
8693 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8694 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8695
8696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8697 plot for murder mysteries. <quote>But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8698 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8699 scene. &hellip;</quote>
8700 </para>
8701 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8702 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8703 <para>
8704 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8705 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8706 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8707 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8708 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8709 understanding of a <quote>person</quote> should reflect this reality.
8710 </para>
8711 <para>
8712 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8713 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8714 unfairly enough, <quote>the copyright wars,</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8715 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question <quote>What is
8716 p2p file sharing?</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8717 wrong. One side says, <quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8718 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8719 thirty years without any question at all.</quote> That's true, at least in
8720 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8721 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8722 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8723 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8724 </para>
8725 <para>
8726 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8727 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8728 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8729 <quote>friends</quote> beyond recognition to say <quote>my ten thousand best friends</quote> can
8730 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8731 what <quote>we have always been allowed to do,</quote> we have not always been
8732 allowed to share music with <quote>our ten thousand best friends.</quote>
8733 </para>
8734 <para>
8735 Likewise, when the other side says, <quote>File sharing is just like walking
8736 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8737 with it,</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8738 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8739 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8740 from Tower.
8741 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8742 </para>
8743 <para>
8744
8745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8746 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8747 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8748 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8749 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8750 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8751 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8752 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8753 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8754 </para>
8755 <para>
8756 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8757 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8758 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8759 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8760 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8761 </para>
8762 <para>
8763 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8764 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8765 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8766 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8767 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8768 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8769 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8770 implemented.<footnote><para>
8771 <!-- f2. -->
8772 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8773 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8774 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> 27 June 2003,
8775 available at
8776 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8777 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8778 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8779 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8780 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, <quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8781 Stakes on Piracy,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8782 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8783 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8784 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8785 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8786 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8787 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8788 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8789 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8790 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8791 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8792 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8793 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8794 Elizabeth Young, <quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,</quote> redandblack.com,
8795 August 2003, available at
8796 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8797 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8798 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8799 identities, see James Collins, <quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8800 Name Students,</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8801 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8802 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.</primary></indexterm>
8803 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8804 </para></footnote>
8805
8806 </para>
8807 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8808 <para>
8809 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8810 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8811 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8812 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8813 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8814 </para>
8815 <para>
8816 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8817 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8818 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8819 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8820 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8821 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8822 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8823 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8824 </para>
8825 <para>
8826
8827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8828 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8829 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8830 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8831 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8832 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8833 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8834 </para>
8835 <para>
8836 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to <quote>steal</quote> music. My
8837 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8838 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8839 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8840 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8841 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8842 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8843 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8844 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8845 protection for copyrighted material,
8846 </para>
8847 <blockquote>
8848 <para>
8849 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8850 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8851 </para>
8852 <para>
8853 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8854 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8855 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8856 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8857 produce a totally different industry model.
8858 </para>
8859 <para>
8860 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8861 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8862 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8863 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8864 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8865 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8866 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8867 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8868 interests.<footnote><para>
8869 <!-- f3. -->
8870 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8871 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8872 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8873 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
8874 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8875 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8876 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
8877 </para>
8878 </blockquote>
8879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8880 <para>
8881 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8882 one of <quote>the major labels.</quote> Its position on these matters has now
8883 changed.
8884 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
8885 </para>
8886 <para>
8887 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8888 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8889 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8890 </para>
8891
8892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8893 </chapter>
8894 <chapter label="12" id="harms">
8895 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8896 <para>
8897 To fight <quote>piracy,</quote> to protect <quote>property,</quote> the content industry has
8898 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8899 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8900 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8901 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8902 </para>
8903 <para>
8904 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8905 particular, the consequences for <quote>free culture.</quote> But my aim now is to
8906 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8907 justified?
8908 </para>
8909 <para>
8910 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8911 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8912 power of the property called <quote>intellectual property</quote> is at its greatest in
8913 our history.
8914 </para>
8915 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8916 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8917 <para>
8918 Yet <quote>common sense</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8919 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8920 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8921 rejection of <quote>piracy</quote> still has play.
8922 </para>
8923 <para>
8924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8925 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8926 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8927 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8928 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8929 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8930 </para>
8931 <section id="constrain">
8932 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8933 <para>
8934 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8935 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8936 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8937 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8938 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8939 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8940 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8941 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8942 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8943 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8944 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8945 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8946 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8947 </para>
8948 <para>
8949 This digital <quote>capturing and sharing</quote> is in part an extension of the
8950 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8951 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8952 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8953 of digital <quote>capturing and sharing</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
8954 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8955 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8956 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8957 the culture all around.
8958 </para>
8959 <para>
8960 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8961 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8962
8963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8964
8965 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8966 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8967 storytelling extended across the globe.
8968 </para>
8969 <para>
8970 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8971 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8972 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8973 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8974 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8975 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8976 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8977 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8978 work is presumptively illegal.
8979 </para>
8980 <para>
8981 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8982 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8983 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8984 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8985 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8986 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8987 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8988 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8989 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8990 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8991 million.<footnote><para>
8992 <!-- f1. -->
8993 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
8994 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8995 the settlement, see MCI press release, <quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8996 Approval for SEC Settlement</quote> (7 July 2003), available at
8997 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8998 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8999 </para></footnote>
9000 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9001 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9002 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9003 suffering.<footnote>
9004 <para>
9005 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9006 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9007 an overview, see Tanya Albert, <quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9008 Say Tort Reformers,</quote> amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9009 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9010 and <quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,</quote> CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9011 available at
9012 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9013 recent months.
9014 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
9015 </para></footnote>
9016 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9017 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9018 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9019 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
9020 </para>
9021 <para>
9022 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9023 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9024 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9025 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9026 Disneys <quote>pirates.</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9027 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9028 designed to
9029
9030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9031 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9032 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9033 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9034 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
9035 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9036 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9037 fraught. Already, exhibits of <quote>illegal art</quote> tour the United
9038 States.<footnote><para>
9039 <!-- f3. -->
9040
9041 See Danit Lidor, <quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,</quote> <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
9042 2003, available at
9043 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9044 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9045 </para></footnote>
9046 In what does their <quote>illegality</quote> consist?
9047 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9048 critical or reflective.
9049 </para>
9050 <para>
9051 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9052 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9053 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
9054 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9055 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9056 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9057 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9058 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9059 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9060 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9061 </para>
9062 <para>
9063 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9064 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9065 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9066 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9067 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9068 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9069 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9070 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9071 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9072 </para>
9073 <para>
9074 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9075 described in chapter
9076 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
9077 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9078 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9079 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9080 use.
9081 </para>
9082 <para>
9083
9084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9085 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9086 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9087 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9088 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9089 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9090 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9091 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9092 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9093 </para>
9094 <para>
9095 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9096 <quote>breathing room</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9097 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9098 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9099 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9100 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9101 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9102 these rules have little relationship to the <quote>law</quote> with which judges
9103 comfort themselves.
9104 </para>
9105 <para>
9106 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9107 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9108 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9109 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9110 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9111 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9112 <quote>copyright</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9113 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9114 culture that is free.
9115 </para>
9116 <para>
9117 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9118 </para>
9119 <blockquote>
9120 <para>
9121 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9122 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9123 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9124 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made &hellip; you're not
9125 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9126 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9127 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, <quote>This has been
9128 cleared.</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9129 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9130 </para>
9131 </blockquote>
9132 </section>
9133 <section id="innovators">
9134 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9135 <para>
9136 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9137 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9138 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9139 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9140 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9141 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9142 </para>
9143 <para>
9144 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9145 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9146 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9147 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9148 other aspect by substituting <quote>free market</quote> every place I've spoken of
9149 <quote>free culture.</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9150 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9151 </para>
9152 <para>
9153 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9154 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9155 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9156 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9157 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9158 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9159 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9160 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9161 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9162 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9163 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9164 </para>
9165 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9166 <para>
9167 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9169 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9170 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9171 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9172 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9173 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9174 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9175 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9176 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9177 <quote>nuclear pall</quote> that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9178 </para>
9179 <para>
9180 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9181 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9182 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9183 </para>
9184 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael</primary></indexterm>
9185 <para>
9186 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9187 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9188 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9189 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9190 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9191 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9192 </para>
9193 <para>
9194 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9195 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9196 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9197 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9198 Raitt. And so on.
9199 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9200 </para>
9201 <para>
9202 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9203 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9204 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9205 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9206 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9207 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9208 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9209 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9210 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9211 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9212 </para>
9213 <para>
9214 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9215 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9216
9217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9218 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9219 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9220 the kind of content the users liked.
9221 </para>
9222 <para>
9223 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9224 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9225 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9226 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9227 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9228 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9229 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9230 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9231 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9232 they had already bought.
9233 </para>
9234 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9235 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9236 </indexterm>
9237 <para>
9238 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9239 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9240 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9241 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9242 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9243 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9244 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9245 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9246 </para>
9247 <para>
9248 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9249 </para>
9250 <para>
9251 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9252 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9253 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9254 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9255 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9256 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9257 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9258 demanded.
9259 </para>
9260 <para>
9261 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9262 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9263 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9264 clients in this
9265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9266 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9267 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9268 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9269 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9270 </para>
9271 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9272 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9273 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9274 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad</primary></indexterm>
9275 <para>
9276 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9277 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9278 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9279 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9280 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9281 <!-- f4. -->
9282 See Joseph Menn, <quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9283 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9284 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, <quote>The Music
9285 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,</quote> Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9286 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9287 See also Jon Healey, <quote>Online Music Services Besieged,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9288 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9289 </para></footnote>
9290 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9291 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9292 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9293 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9294 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9295 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9296 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9297 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9298 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9299 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9300 <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9301 discussion with BMW:
9302 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
9303 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
9304 </para>
9305 <blockquote>
9306 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9307 <para>
9308 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9309 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9310 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9311 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9312 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9313 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9314 United States with bona fide MP3 players. &hellip; <footnote>
9315 <para>
9316 <!-- f5. -->
9317 Rafe Needleman, <quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,</quote> <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9318 2003, available at
9319 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9320 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9321 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9322 </para></footnote>
9323 </para>
9324 </blockquote>
9325 <para>
9326 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with <quote>your money or your
9327 life</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9328 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9329 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9330 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9331 constantly threatened by litigation.
9332 </para>
9333 <para>
9334
9335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9336 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9337 enterprises. The point is the definition of <quote>illegal.</quote> The law is a
9338 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9339 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9340 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9341 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9342 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9343 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9344 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9345 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9346 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9347 much less creativity.
9348 </para>
9349 <para>
9350 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9351 use. Whatever the <quote>real</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9352 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9353 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9354 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9355 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9356 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9357 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9358 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9359 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9360 </para>
9361 <para>
9362 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9363 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9364 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9365 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9366 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9367 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9368 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9369 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9370 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9371 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9372 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9373 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9375 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9376 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9377 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9378 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9379 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9380 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9381 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9382 </para>
9383 <para>
9384 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9385 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9386 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9387 this feature is a <quote>bug.</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9388 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9389 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9390 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables <quote>piracy,</quote> then,
9391 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9392 </para>
9393 <para>
9394 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9395 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9396 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9397 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9398 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> GartnerG2 and
9399 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9400 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9401 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9402 </para></footnote>
9403 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9404 <quote>broadcast flag</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9405 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9406 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9407 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9408 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9409 copyright violators and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9410 <!-- f7. -->
9411 GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9412 </para></footnote>
9413 </para>
9414 <para>
9415 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9416 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9417 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9418 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9419 and costs on
9420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9421 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9422 those requirements.
9423 </para>
9424 <para>
9425 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9426 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9427 would impose.<footnote><para>
9428 <!-- f8. -->
9429 See David McGuire, <quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,</quote> Newsbytes,
9430 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9431 </para></footnote>
9432 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9433 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9434 harm than good.
9435 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
9436 </para>
9437 <para>
9438 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9439 innovation&mdash;again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9440 free market crowd.
9441 </para>
9442 <para>
9443 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9444 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9445 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9446 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9447 </para>
9448 <para>
9449 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9450 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9451 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9452 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9453 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9454 <!-- f9. -->
9455 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9456 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9457 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9458 </para></footnote>
9459 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10 details,
9460 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9461 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9462 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9463 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9464 </para>
9465 <para>
9466 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9467 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9468 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9469 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9470 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9471 </para>
9472 <para>
9473 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9474 <!-- f10. -->
9475 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9476 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9477 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9478 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9479 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9480 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9481 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9482 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9483 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9484 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9485 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9486 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9487 liability.
9488 </para></footnote>
9489 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9490 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9491 here.<footnote><para>
9492 <!-- f11. -->
9493 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9494 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9495 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9496 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9497 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9498 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9499 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a <quote>broadcast flag</quote> that
9500 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9501 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9502 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9503 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, <quote>Copyright and
9504 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9505 available at
9506 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9507 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9508 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz</primary></indexterm>
9509 </para></footnote>
9510 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9511 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9512 </para>
9513 <para>
9514
9515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9516 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9517 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9518 artist doesn't get paid for that <quote>radio performance</quote> unless he or she
9519 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9520 version of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote>&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9521 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9522 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9523 copyright owners of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> would get some money, whereas
9524 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9525 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
9526 </para>
9527 <para>
9528 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9529 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9530 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9531 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9532 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9533 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9534 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9535 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9536 recording artists.
9537 </para>
9538 <para>
9539 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9540 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9541 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9542 spectrum. Thus, I can <quote>tune in</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9543 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9544 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9545 metropolitan area.
9546 </para>
9547 <para>
9548 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9549 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9550 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9551 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9552 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9553 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9554 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9555 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9556 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9557 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9558 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9559 </para>
9560 <para>
9561
9562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9563 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9564 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9565 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9566 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9567 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9568 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9569 FM radio,
9570 </para>
9571 <blockquote>
9572 <para>
9573 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9574 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9575 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9576 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9577 than by technical restrictions. &hellip; Armstrong likened the situation
9578 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9579 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9580 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9581 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9582 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9583 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9584 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9585 shackles.<footnote><para>
9586 <!-- f12. -->
9587 Lessing, 239.
9588 </para></footnote>
9589 </para>
9590 </blockquote>
9591 <para>
9592 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9593 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9594 underestimated the power of <quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9595 legislation</quote><footnote><para>
9596 <!-- f13. -->
9597 Ibid., 229.
9598 </para></footnote>
9599 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9600 </para>
9601 <para>
9602 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9603 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9604 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9605 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9606 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9607 radio?
9608 </para>
9609 <para>
9610 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9611 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9612
9613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9614 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9615 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9616 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9617 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9618 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9619 of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9620 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9621 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9622 burdens terrestrial radio.
9623 </para>
9624 <para>
9625 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9626 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9627 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9628 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9629 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9630 <para>
9631 <!-- f14. -->
9632 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9633 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9634 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9635 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9636 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9637 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9638 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9639 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9640 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9641 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9642 C. Picker, <quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9643 Distribution,</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: <quote>This was
9644 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9645 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9646 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9647 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9648 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.</quote>
9649 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9650 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9651 </para></footnote>
9652 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9653 equivalent fee.
9654 </para>
9655 <para>
9656 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9657 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9658 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9659 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9660 </para>
9661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9662 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9663 <listitem><para>
9664 name of the service;
9665 </para></listitem>
9666 <listitem><para>
9667 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9668 </para></listitem>
9669 <listitem><para>
9670 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9671 </para></listitem>
9672 <listitem><para>
9673 date of transmission;
9674 </para></listitem>
9675 <listitem><para>
9676 time of transmission;
9677 </para></listitem>
9678 <listitem><para>
9679 time zone of origination of transmission;
9680 </para></listitem>
9681 <listitem><para>
9682 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9683 </para></listitem>
9684 <listitem><para>
9685 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9686 </para></listitem>
9687 <listitem><para>
9688 sound recording title;
9689 </para></listitem>
9690 <listitem><para>
9691 ISRC code of the recording;
9692 </para></listitem>
9693 <listitem><para>
9694 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9695 </para></listitem>
9696 <listitem><para>
9697 featured recording artist;
9698 </para></listitem>
9699 <listitem><para>
9700 retail album title;
9701 </para></listitem>
9702 <listitem><para>
9703 recording label;
9704 </para></listitem>
9705 <listitem><para>
9706 UPC code of the retail album;
9707 </para></listitem>
9708 <listitem><para>
9709 catalog number;
9710 </para></listitem>
9711 <listitem><para>
9712 copyright owner information;
9713 </para></listitem>
9714 <listitem><para>
9715 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9716 </para></listitem>
9717 <listitem><para>
9718 name of the service or entity;
9719 </para></listitem>
9720 <listitem><para>
9721 channel or program;
9722 </para></listitem>
9723 <listitem><para>
9724 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9725 </para></listitem>
9726 <listitem><para>
9727 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9728 </para></listitem>
9729 <listitem><para>
9730 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9731 </para></listitem>
9732 <listitem><para>
9733 unique user identifier;
9734 </para></listitem>
9735 <listitem><para>
9736 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9737 </para></listitem>
9738 </orderedlist>
9739
9740 <para>
9741 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9742 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9743 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9744 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9745 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9746 that terrestrial radio does not.
9747 </para>
9748 <para>
9749 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9750 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9751 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9752 </para>
9753 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9754 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
9755 <para>
9756 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9757 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9758 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9759 </para>
9760 <blockquote>
9761 <para>
9762 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9763 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9764 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9765 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9766 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9767 webcasters asked the RIAA, &hellip; <quote>How do you come up with a
9768
9769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9770 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9771 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9772 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9773 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9774 business. &hellip;</quote>
9775 </para>
9776 <para>
9777 And the RIAA experts said, <quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
9778 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9779 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9780 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>.</quote> (Emphasis
9781 added.)
9782 </para>
9783 </blockquote>
9784 <para>
9785 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9786 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9787 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9788 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9789 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9790 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9791 effective to prevent it.
9792 </para>
9793 </section>
9794 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9795 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9796 <para>
9797 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9798 dinosaurs
9799 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9800 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9801 </para>
9802 <para>
9803 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9804 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9805 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9806 </para>
9807 <para>
9808 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9809 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9810 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9811 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9812 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, <quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,</quote> Pew
9813 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9814 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9815 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9816 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9817 </para></footnote>
9818 According to the RIAA,
9819 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9820 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9821
9822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9823 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9824 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9825 increasingly
9826 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9827 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9828 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9829 extreme
9830 response by the other.
9831 </para>
9832 <para>
9833 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9834 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9835 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9836 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9837 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9838 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9839 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9840 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9841 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9842 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9843 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9844 was.<footnote><para>
9845 <!-- f16. -->
9846 Alex Pham, <quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,</quote> <citetitle>Los
9847 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
9848 </para></footnote>
9849 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9850 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9851 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9852 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9853 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9854 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9855 they oppose.
9856 </para>
9857 <para>
9858 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9859 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9860 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9861 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9862 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9863 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9864 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9865 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9866 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9867 <!-- f17. -->
9868 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, <quote>Alcohol Consumption During
9869 Prohibition,</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9870 </para></footnote>
9871 We have
9872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9873 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9874 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9875 <!-- f18. -->
9876 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9877 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9878 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9879 </para></footnote>
9880 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9881 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9882 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9883 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9884 cheat.<footnote><para>
9885 <!-- f19. -->
9886 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, <quote>Tax
9887 Compliance,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9888 compliance literature).
9889 </para></footnote>
9890 We pride ourselves on our <quote>free society,</quote> but an endless array of
9891 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9892 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9893 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
9894 </para>
9895 <para>
9896 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9897 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9898 students about the importance of <quote>ethics.</quote> As my colleague Charlie
9899 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9900 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9901 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9902 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9903 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9904 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9905 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9906 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9907 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9908 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9909 lives both normally and legally, since <quote>normally</quote> entails a certain
9910 degree of illegality.
9911 <indexterm><primary>law schools</primary></indexterm>
9912 </para>
9913 <para>
9914 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9915 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9916 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9917 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9918 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9919 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9920 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9921 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9922 to consider the alternative.
9923 </para>
9924 <para>
9925
9926 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9927 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9928 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9929 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9930 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9931 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9932 </para>
9933 <para>
9934 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9935 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9936 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9937 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9938 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9939 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9940 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9941 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9942 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9943 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9944 introduced this different idea of <quote>sharing.</quote> We need to be able to
9945 call these twenty million Americans <quote>citizens,</quote> not <quote>felons.</quote>
9946 </para>
9947 <para>
9948 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9949 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9950 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9951 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9952 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9953 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9954 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9955 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9956 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9957 a nation of felons?
9958 </para>
9959 <para>
9960 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9961 </para>
9962 <para>
9963 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9964 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9965 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9966 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9967 used
9968
9969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9970 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That <quote>use</quote> of the
9971 recordings is free.
9972 </para>
9973 <para>
9974 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9975 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9976 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am <quote>free</quote> to copy,
9977 or <quote>rip,</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9978 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that <quote>freedom</quote> was a
9979 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the <quote>Rip, Mix, Burn</quote>
9980 capacities of digital technologies.
9981 </para>
9982 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9983 <para>
9984 This <quote>use</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9985 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9986 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9987 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9988 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9989 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9990 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9991 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9992 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9993 </para>
9994 <para>
9995 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9996 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9997 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9998 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9999 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10000 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10001 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10002 on people's machines.
10003 </para>
10004 <para>
10005 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10006 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10007 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10008 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10009 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10010 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10011
10012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10013 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10014 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10015 plastic or were part of a massively complex <quote>digital rights
10016 management</quote> system.
10017 </para>
10018 <para>
10019 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10020 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10021 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10022 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10023 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10024 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10025 freedom to move content easily?
10026 </para>
10027 <para>
10028 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10029 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10030 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10031 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10032 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10033 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10034 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10035 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10036 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10037 </para>
10038 <para>
10039 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10040 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10041 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10042 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10043 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10044 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10045 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10046 </para>
10047 <para>
10048 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10049 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10050 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10051 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10052 </para>
10053 <para>
10054 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10055 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10056
10057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10058
10059 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10060 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10061 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10062 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10063 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10064 Lohmann describes, this is the <quote>collateral damage</quote> that <quote>arises
10065 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10066 criminals.</quote> This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10067 generally.
10068 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
10069 </para>
10070 <para>
10071 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,</quote> von Lohmann
10072 explains,
10073 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10074 </para>
10075 <blockquote>
10076 <para>
10077 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10078 evaporate to one degree or another. &hellip; If you're a copyright
10079 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10080 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10081 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10082 access? &hellip; Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, <quote>Oh, well,
10083 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.</quote> Well, what this campaign
10084 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10085 American Internet-using population into <quote>lawbreakers.</quote>
10086 </para>
10087 </blockquote>
10088 <para>
10089 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10090 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10091 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10092 </para>
10093 <para>
10094 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10095 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10096 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10097 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10098 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10099 an Internet user is revealed.
10100 </para>
10101 <para>
10102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10103 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10104 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10105 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10106 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10107 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10108 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10109 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10110 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10111 <!-- f20. -->
10112 See Frank Ahrens, <quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10113 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,</quote>
10114 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, <quote>Worried Parents
10115 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10116 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10117 Being Sued,</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10118 Graham, <quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
10119 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, <quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10120 Fan, Either,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, <quote>Is
10121 Brianna a Criminal?</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
10122 </para></footnote>
10123
10124 </para>
10125 <para>
10126 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10127 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10128 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10129 <!-- f21. -->
10130 See <quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10131 Some Methods Used,</quote> CNN.com, available at
10132 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10133 </para></footnote>
10134 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10135 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10136 one of those MP3s will have the same <quote>fingerprint.</quote>
10137 </para>
10138 <para>
10139 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10140 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10141 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10142 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10143 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10144 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10145 network is <quote>cooperating</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10146 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10147 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10148 as a <quote>criminal.</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10149 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10150 <!-- f22. -->
10151 See Jeff Adler, <quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,</quote>
10152 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, <quote>Four
10153 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10154 Colleges,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10155 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10156 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, <quote>Music
10157 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10158 Lawsuit Possible,</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, <quote>RIAA
10159 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,</quote> <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10160 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10161 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, <quote>Download Warning 101: Freshman
10162 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10163 Sharing,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; <quote>Raid, Letters
10164 Are Weapons at Universities,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10165 </para></footnote>
10166 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10167 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10168 </para>
10169 <para>
10170 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10171 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10172 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10173 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10174 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10175 this <quote>contraband</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10176 college students
10177
10178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10179 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10180 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10181 Says von Lohmann,
10182 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10183 </para>
10184 <blockquote>
10185 <para>
10186 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10187 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10188 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10189 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10190 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10191 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10192 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10193 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10194 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10195 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10196 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10197 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10198 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10199 larger number of Americans than drug use. &hellip; If forty to sixty
10200 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10201 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10202 million of them.
10203 </para>
10204 </blockquote>
10205 <para>
10206 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered <quote>criminals</quote> under
10207 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10208 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10209 considered <quote>criminals,</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10210 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10211 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10212 </para>
10213
10214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10215 </section>
10216 </chapter>
10217 </part>
10218 <part id="c-balances">
10219 <title>BALANCES</title>
10220 <partintro>
10221
10222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10223 <para>
10224 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10225 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10226 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10227 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10228 </para>
10229 <para>
10230 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10231 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10232 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10233 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10234 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10235 everything around.
10236 </para>
10237 <para>
10238 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10239 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10240 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10241 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10242 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10243 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10244 </para>
10245 <para>
10246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10247 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10248 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10249 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10250 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10251 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10252 made that is happening all around.
10253 </para>
10254 <para>
10255 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10256 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10257 gasoline onto this fire.
10258 </para>
10259 <para>
10260 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10261 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10262 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10263 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10264 </para>
10265 <para>
10266 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10267 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10268 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10269 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10270 success will require.
10271 </para>
10272 </partintro>
10273
10274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10275 <chapter label="13" id="eldred">
10276 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10277 <indexterm id="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'>
10278 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel</primary>
10279 </indexterm>
10280 <para>
10281 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10282 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10283 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10284 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10285 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10286 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10287 come alive.
10288 </para>
10289 <para>
10290 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10291 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10292 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10293 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10294 them available for free.
10295 </para>
10296 <para>
10297 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10298 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10299 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10300 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10301 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10303 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10304 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10305 accessible&mdash;today.
10306 </para>
10307 <para>
10308 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10309 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10310 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10311 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10312 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10313 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10314 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10315 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10316 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10317 commercial publications of public domain works.
10318 </para>
10319 <indexterm startref="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'/>
10320 <para>
10321 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10322 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10323 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10324 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10325 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10326 call the <quote>noncommercial publishing industry,</quote> which before the
10327 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10328 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10329 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10330 generally.<footnote><para>
10331 <!-- f1. -->
10332 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10333 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10334 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10335 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10336 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10337 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10338 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10339 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10340 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10341 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10342 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10343 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10344 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10345 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10346 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10347 </para>
10348 <para>
10349 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10350 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10351 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10352 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10353 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10354 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10355 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10356 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10357 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10358 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10359 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10360 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10361 </para>
10362 <para>
10363
10364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10365 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10366 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10367 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10368 <quote>copyrights should be forever.</quote><footnote><para>
10369 <!-- f2. -->
10370 The full text is: <quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10371 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10372 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10373 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10374 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10375 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10376 Congress,</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10377 </para></footnote>
10378
10379 </para>
10380 <para>
10381 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10382 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10383 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10384 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10385 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10386 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10387 to undertake.
10388 </para>
10389 <para>
10390 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10391 constitutional
10392 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10393 interpretation.
10394 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10395 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10396 importantly
10397 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10398 </para>
10399 <blockquote>
10400 <para>
10401 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science &hellip;
10402 by securing for limited Times to Authors &hellip; exclusive Right to
10403 their &hellip; Writings. &hellip;
10404 </para>
10405 </blockquote>
10406 <para>
10407 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10408 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10409 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10410 something&mdash;for example, to regulate <quote>commerce among the several
10411 states</quote> or <quote>declare War.</quote> But here, the <quote>something</quote> is something quite
10412 specific&mdash;to <quote>promote &hellip; Progress</quote>&mdash;through means that
10413 are also specific&mdash; by <quote>securing</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights</quote> (i.e.,
10414 copyrights) <quote>for limited Times.</quote>
10415 </para>
10416 <para>
10417 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10418 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10419 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10420 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be <quote>limited</quote> will have
10421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10422 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10423 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10424 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms <quote>on the
10425 installment plan,</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10426 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10427 </para>
10428 <para>
10429 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10430 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10431 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10432 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10433 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10434 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10435 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10436 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10437 this gravy train going.
10438 </para>
10439 <para>
10440 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10441 government. <quote>Corruption</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10442 bribed. Rather, <quote>corruption</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10443 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10444 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10445 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10446 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10447 </para>
10448 <para>
10449 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10450 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10451 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10452 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10453 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10454 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10455 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10456 published by anyone for free.
10457 </para>
10458 <para>
10459 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10460 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10461 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10462 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10463 report:
10464 </para>
10465 <para>
10466 <quote>Next year,</quote> the adviser announces, <quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10467
10468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10469 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10470 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10471 those works.</quote>
10472 </para>
10473 <para>
10474 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,</quote> she continues, <quote>that
10475 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10476 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10477 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.</quote>
10478 </para>
10479 <para>
10480 <quote>Hope?</quote> a fellow board member says. <quote>Can't we be doing something
10481 about it?</quote>
10482 </para>
10483 <para>
10484 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,</quote> the adviser responds. <quote>We could contribute
10485 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10486 they support the bill.</quote>
10487 </para>
10488 <para>
10489 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10490 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. <quote>How much
10491 would we get if this extension were passed?</quote> you ask the adviser. <quote>How
10492 much is it worth?</quote>
10493 </para>
10494 <para>
10495 <quote>Well,</quote> the adviser says, <quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10496 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10497 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10498 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate.</quote>
10499 </para>
10500 <para>
10501 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10502 correct conclusion:
10503 </para>
10504 <para>
10505 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10506 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10507 contributions
10508 would assure that the bill was passed?</quote>
10509 </para>
10510 <para>
10511 <quote>Absolutely,</quote> the adviser responds. <quote>It is worth it to you to
10512 contribute
10513 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10514 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000.</quote>
10515 </para>
10516 <para>
10517 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10518 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10519 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10520 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10522 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10523 copyrights
10524 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10525 the copyright term extended.
10526 </para>
10527 <para>
10528 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10529 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10530 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10531 </para>
10532 <para>
10533 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10534 Copyright
10535 Term Extension Act, this <quote>theory</quote> about incentives was proved
10536 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10537 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10538 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10539 contributions.<footnote><para>
10540 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, <quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10541 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,</quote>
10542 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10543 </para></footnote>
10544 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10545 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10546 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10547 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, <quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10548 Age,</quote> available at
10549 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10550 </para></footnote>
10551 Disney is estimated to have
10552 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10553 cycle.<footnote><para>
10554 <!-- f5. -->
10555 Alan K. Ota, <quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,</quote>
10556 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10557 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10558 </para></footnote>
10559
10560 </para>
10561 <para>
10562 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10563 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10564 reality
10565 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10566 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10567 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10568 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10569 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10570 <quote>limited.</quote>
10571 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10572 and again.
10573 </para>
10574 <para>
10575 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10576 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10577 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10578 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10579 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10580 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10581 Supreme Court's
10582
10583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10584 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10585 guns near schools.
10586 </para>
10587 <para>
10588 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10589 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10590 power to regulate only <quote>commerce among the several states</quote> (aka
10591 <quote>interstate
10592 commerce</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10593 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10594 interstate
10595 commerce.
10596 </para>
10597 <para>
10598 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10599 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10600 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10601 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10602 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10603 </para>
10604 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
10605 <para>
10606 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10607 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10608 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10609 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10610 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10611 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10612 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10613 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10614 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10615 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10616 position to second-guess Congress.
10617 </para>
10618 <para>
10619 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,</quote>
10620 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10621 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10622 </para></footnote>
10623 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10624 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10625 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10626 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10627 <!-- f7. -->
10628 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10629 </para></footnote>
10630 </para>
10631 <para>
10632 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10633 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10634 <!-- f8. -->
10635 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10636 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10637 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10638 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10639 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10640 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10641 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10642 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10643 limitation to <quote>limited times</quote> notwithstanding.
10644 </para></footnote>
10645 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10646 yield the conclusion that Congress
10647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10648 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10649 term, then there would be no <quote>stopping point</quote> to Congress's power over
10650 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10651 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10652 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10653 term of existing copyrights.
10654 </para>
10655 <para>
10656 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10657 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10658 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10659 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10660 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10661 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10662 demonstrating the <quote>fidelity</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10663 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10664 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10665 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10666 were going to be petty politicians.
10667 </para>
10668 <para>
10669 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10670 argument in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10671 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10672 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10673 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10674 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10675 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10676 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10677 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10678 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10679 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10680 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10681 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10682 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10683 piracy that affects us all.
10684 </para>
10685 <para>
10686 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10687
10688 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10689 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10690 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than <quote>legal piracy.</quote><footnote><para>
10691 <!-- f9. -->
10692 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10693 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10694 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10695 </para></footnote>
10696 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10697 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10698 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10699 charter.
10700 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10701 </para>
10702 <para>
10703 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10704 copyright
10705 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10706 influence
10707 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10708 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10709 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10710 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10711 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10712 bought to extend them again.
10713 </para>
10714 <para>
10715 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10716 extended.
10717 Mickey Mouse and <quote>Rhapsody in Blue.</quote> These works are too
10718 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10719 society
10720 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10721 Disney's.
10722 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10723 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10724 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10725 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10726 exploited,
10727 and no longer available as a result.
10728 </para>
10729 <para>
10730 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10731 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10732 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10733 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10734 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10735 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10736 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10737 Congressional
10738 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10739 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10740 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10741 </para></footnote>
10742
10743 </para>
10744 <para>
10745 Think practically about the consequence of this
10746 extension&mdash;practically,
10747 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10748
10749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10750 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10751 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10752 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10753 remaining
10754 9,873. What would you have to do?
10755 </para>
10756 <para>
10757 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10758 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10759 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10760 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10761 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10762 list of books still under copyright.
10763 </para>
10764 <para>
10765 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10766 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10767 </para>
10768 <para>
10769 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10770 owners
10771 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10772 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10773 being at least a list?
10774 </para>
10775 <para>
10776 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10777 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10778 practically
10779 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10780 thousands
10781 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10782 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10783 </para>
10784 <para>
10785 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,</quote> the
10786 apologists for the system respond. <quote>Why should there be a list of
10787 copyright owners?</quote>
10788 </para>
10789 <para>
10790 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10791 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10792 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10793 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10794 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10795 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10796 what tangible property.
10797 </para>
10798 <para>
10799 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10800 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10801 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10802
10803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10804 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10805 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10806 happen
10807 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10808 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10809 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10810 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10811 know quite well who owns what property.
10812 </para>
10813 <para>
10814 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10815 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10816 already
10817 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10818 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10819 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10820 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10821 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10822 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10823 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10824 </para>
10825 <para>
10826 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10827 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10828 consequence
10829 for other creative works is much more dire.
10830 </para>
10831 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'>
10832 <primary>Agee, Michael</primary>
10833 </indexterm>
10834 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
10835 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films</primary></indexterm>
10836 <para>
10837 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10838 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10839 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10840 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
10841 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10842 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10843 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10844 money. According to one estimate, <quote>Roach has sold about 60,000
10845 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10846 films.</quote><footnote><para>
10847 <!-- f11. -->
10848 See David G. Savage, <quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,</quote>
10849 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, <quote>Classic Movies,
10850 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10851 Down Copyright Extension,</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
10852 </para></footnote>
10853
10854 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
10855 </para>
10856 <para>
10857 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10858 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10859 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10860 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10861 </para>
10862 <para>
10863 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10864
10865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10866 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10867 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10868 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10869 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10870 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10871 work available for distribution.
10872 </para>
10873 <para>
10874 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10875 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10876 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10877 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10878 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10879 mm film.<footnote><para>
10880 <!-- f12. -->
10881 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10882 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
10883 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10884 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10885 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
10886 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10887 </para></footnote>
10888
10889 </para>
10890 <para>
10891 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10892 important.
10893 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10894 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10895 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10896 locate the copyright owner.
10897 </para>
10898 <para>
10899 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10900 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10901 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10902 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10903 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10904 to these films is exceptionally high.
10905 </para>
10906 <para>
10907 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10908 copyright owner when she shows up?</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
10909 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10910 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10911 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10912 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10913 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10914 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10915 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10916 </para>
10917 <para>
10918 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10919
10920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10921 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10922 benefit
10923 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10924 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10925 the copyright expires.
10926 </para>
10927 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'/>
10928 <para>
10929 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10930 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10931 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10932 canisters
10933 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10934 than dust.
10935 </para>
10936 <para>
10937 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10938 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10939 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10940 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10941 creative
10942 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an <quote>engine of
10943 free expression.</quote>
10944 </para>
10945 <para>
10946 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10947 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10948 indicated,
10949 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10950 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10951 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10952 distributors,
10953 the commercial life ends.
10954 </para>
10955 <para>
10956 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10957 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10958 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10959 between
10960 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10961 Friday
10962 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10963 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10964 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10965 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10966 have, we need to have access to this history.
10967 </para>
10968 <para>
10969 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10970
10971 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10972 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10973 this context do no good.
10974 </para>
10975 <para>
10976 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10977 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10978 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10979 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10980 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10981 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10982 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10983 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10984 was independent of copyright law.
10985 </para>
10986 <para>
10987 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10988 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10989 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10990 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10991 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10992 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10993 market didn't have more to offer.
10994 </para>
10995 <para>
10996 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10997 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10998 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10999 would not have interfered with anything.
11000 </para>
11001 <para>
11002 But this situation has now changed.
11003 </para>
11004 <para>
11005 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11006 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11007 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11008 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11009 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11010 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11011 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11012 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11013 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11014 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11015 </para>
11016 <para>
11017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11018 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11019 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11020 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11021 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11022 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11023 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11024 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11025 written for a radically different context.
11026 </para>
11027 <para>
11028 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11029 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11030 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11031 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11032 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11033 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11034 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
11035 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11036 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11037 </para>
11038 <para>
11039 You may well ask, <quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11040 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11041 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11042 culture widely?</quote>
11043 </para>
11044 <para>
11045 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11046 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11047 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11048 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11049 of a library is to serve what <quote>the market</quote> would demand. But if you
11050 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11051 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11052 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11053 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11054 </para>
11055 <para>
11056 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11057 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11058 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11059 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11060
11061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11062 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11063 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11064 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11065 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11066 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11067 <!-- f13. -->
11068 Jason Schultz, <quote>The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,</quote> 20
11069 December 2002, available at
11070 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11071 </para></footnote>
11072
11073 </para>
11074 <para>
11075 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11076 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11077 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11078 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11079 violated the Constitution's <quote>limited Times</quote> requirement, and (2) that
11080 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11081 </para>
11082 <para>
11083 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11084 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11085 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11086 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11087 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11088 </para>
11089 <para>
11090 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11091 copyrights be for <quote>limited Times</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11092 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11093 <quote>stopping point</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11094 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11095 terms that are <quote>limited.</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11096 to interpret the term <quote>limited Times</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11097 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11098 power to extend existing terms.
11099 </para>
11100 <para>
11101 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11102 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11103 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11104 whole, where the court will sit <quote>en banc</quote> to hear the case.
11105 </para>
11106 <para>
11107 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11108 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11109
11110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11111 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11112 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11113 overstepped its bounds.
11114 </para>
11115 <para>
11116 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11117 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11118 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11119 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11120 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11121 </para>
11122 <para>
11123 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11124 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11125 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11126 briefs and preparing for argument.
11127 </para>
11128 <para>
11129 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11130 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11131 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11132 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11133 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11134 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11135 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11136 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11137 </para>
11138 <para>
11139 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11140 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11141 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11142 mistake lost it.
11143 </para>
11144 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11145 <para>
11146 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11147 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11148 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11149 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11150 heat
11151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11152 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11153 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11154 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11155 </para>
11156 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11157 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11158 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11159 <para>
11160 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11161 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11162 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11163 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11164 told me, if we could make the issue seem <quote>important</quote> to the Supreme
11165 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11166 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against <quote>the
11167 most powerful media companies in the world.</quote>
11168 </para>
11169 <para>
11170 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11171 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11172 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11173 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11174 <quote>right</quote> as in <quote>true,</quote> I thought, but it is <quote>wrong</quote> as in <quote>it just shouldn't be
11175 that way.</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11176 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11177 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11178 interpretation
11179 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11180 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11181 unconstitutional,
11182 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11183 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11184 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11185 Constitution,
11186 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11187 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11188 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11189 </para>
11190 <para>
11191 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11192 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11193 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11194 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11195 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11196 why it was unconstitutional.
11197 </para>
11198 <para>
11199 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11200
11201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11202 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11203 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11204 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11205 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11206 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11207 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11208 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11209 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11210 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11211 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11212 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11213 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11214 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11215 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11216 </para>
11217 <para>
11218 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11219 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11220 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11221 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11222 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11223 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11224 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11225 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11226 to get bogged down?</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11227 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11228 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11229 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11230 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11231 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11232 </para>
11233 <para>
11234 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11235 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11236 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11237 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11238 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11239 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11240 </para>
11241 <para>
11242 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11243 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11244
11245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11246 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11247 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11248 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11249 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11250 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11251 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11252 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11253 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11254 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
11255 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11256 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11257 </para>
11258 <para>
11259 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11260 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11261 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11262 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11263 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11264 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11265 </para>
11266 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
11267 <para>
11268 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11269 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11270 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11271 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11272 clear.
11273 </para>
11274 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11275 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11276 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11277 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11278 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11279 <para>
11280 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11281 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11282 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11283 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11284 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11285 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11286 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11287 nothing more than <quote>rent-seeking</quote>&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11288 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11289 </para>
11290 <para>
11291 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11292 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11293 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11294 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11295 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11296 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11297 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11298 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11299
11300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11301 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11302 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11303 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11304 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan</primary></indexterm>
11305 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen</primary></indexterm>
11306 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11307 </para>
11308 <para>
11309 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11310 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11311 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11312 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11313 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11314 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11315 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11316 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11317 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11318 confidence in our argument.
11319 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11320 </para>
11321 <para>
11322 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11323 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these <quote>friends</quote> included
11324 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11325 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11326 copyright holders.
11327 </para>
11328 <para>
11329 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11330 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11331 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11332 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11333 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11334 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11335 wanted to control.
11336 </para>
11337 <para>
11338 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11339 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11340 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11341 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11342 domain, then people could use it to <quote>glorify drugs or to create
11343 pornography.</quote><footnote><para>
11344 <!-- f14. -->
11345 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11346 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11347 </para></footnote>
11348 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11349 <quote>protection</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11350 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11351 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11352 <!-- f15. -->
11353 Dinitia Smith, <quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11354 Mouse Joins the Fray,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11355 </para></footnote>
11356 That's
11357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11358 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11359 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11360 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11361 </para>
11362 <para>
11363 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11364 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11365 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11366 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11367 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, <quote>Give us twenty years
11368 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11369 better with them than anyone else.</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11370 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11371 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11372 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11373 </para>
11374 <para>
11375 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11376 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11377 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11378 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11379 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11380 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11381 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11382 </para>
11383 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
11384 <para>
11385 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11386 called <quote>the Conservatives.</quote> The other we called <quote>the Rest.</quote> The
11387 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11388 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11389 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11390 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line
11391 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11392 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11393 </para>
11394 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11395 <para>
11396 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11397 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11398 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11399 the Constitution
11400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11401 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11402 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11403 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11404 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11405 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11406 </para>
11407 <para>
11408 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11409 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11410 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11411 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11412 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11413 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11414 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11415 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11416 sense.
11417 </para>
11418 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11419 <para>
11420 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11421 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11422 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11423 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11424 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11425 these retrospective extensions.
11426 </para>
11427 <para>
11428 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11429 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11430 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11431 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11432 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11433 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11434 </para>
11435 <para>
11436 This analysis of <quote>the Rest</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11437 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11438 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11439 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11440 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the
11441 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11442 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11443 powers have limits.
11444 </para>
11445 <para>
11446 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11447 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11448 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11450 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11451 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11452 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11453 supposed to be <quote>limited.</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11454 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with
11455 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11456 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11457 be limited.
11458 </para>
11459 <para>
11460 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11461 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11462 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11463 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11464 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11465 </para>
11466 <para>
11467 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11468 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in 1831
11469 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11470 existing
11471 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11472 </para>
11473 <para>
11474 But this <quote>consistency</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11475 extended
11476 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11477 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11478 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11479 existing
11480 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11481 restraint
11482 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11483 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11484 hesitated
11485 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11486 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11487 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11488 arrived
11489 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11490 weeks, I was repeatedly <quote>mooted</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11491
11492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11493 help in the case. Such <quote>moots</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11494 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11495 </para>
11496 <para>
11497 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11498 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11499 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11500 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11501 Congress
11502 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11503 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11504 this central idea.
11505 </para>
11506 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11507 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11508 <para>
11509 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11510 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11511 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11512 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11513 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11514 </para>
11515 <para>
11516 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11517 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11518 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11519 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11520 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.</quote>
11521 </para>
11522 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11523 <para>
11524 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11525 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11526 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11527 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11528 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11529 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11530 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11531 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11532 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11533 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11534 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11535
11536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11537 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11538 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11539 </para>
11540 <para>
11541 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11542 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11543 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11544 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11545 congressmen
11546 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11547 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11548 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11549 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11550 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11551 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11552 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11553 family of the Justices.
11554 </para>
11555 <para>
11556 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11557 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11558 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11559 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11560 </para>
11561 <para>
11562 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11563 The history was bothering her.
11564 </para>
11565 <blockquote>
11566 <para>
11567 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11568 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11569 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11570 practice that began with the very first act.
11571 </para>
11572 </blockquote>
11573 <para>
11574 She was quite willing to concede <quote>that this flies directly in the face
11575 of what the framers had in mind.</quote> But my response again and again
11576 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11577 </para>
11578 <blockquote>
11579 <para>
11580 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11581 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11583 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11584 is yes.
11585 </para>
11586 </blockquote>
11587 <para>
11588 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11589 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11590 Kennedy, who observed,
11591 </para>
11592 <blockquote>
11593 <para>
11594 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11595 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11596 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11597 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11598 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11599 </para>
11600 </blockquote>
11601 <para>
11602 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11603 student,
11604 I answered,
11605 </para>
11606 <blockquote>
11607 <para>
11608 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11609 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11610 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11611 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11612 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11613 </para>
11614 </blockquote>
11615 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11616 <para>
11617 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11618 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11619 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11620 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11621 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11622 </para>
11623 <para>
11624 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11625 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11626 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11627 </para>
11628 <para>
11629 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11630 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11631
11632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11633 </para>
11634 <blockquote>
11635 <para>
11636 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11637 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11638 </para>
11639 <para>
11640 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11641 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11642 domain
11643 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11644 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11645 into the Copyright Clause.
11646 </para>
11647 </blockquote>
11648 <para>
11649 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11650 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11651 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11652 </para>
11653 <blockquote>
11654 <para>
11655 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11656 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11657 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11658 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11659 time.
11660 </para>
11661 </blockquote>
11662 <para>
11663 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11664 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11665 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11666 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11667 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11668 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11669 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11670 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11671 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11672 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11673 Court to my side.
11674 </para>
11675 <para>
11676 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11677 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11678
11679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11680 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11681 optimistic.
11682 </para>
11683 <para>
11684 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11685 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11686 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11687 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11688 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11689 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11690 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11691 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11692 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11693 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11694 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11695 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11696 law that it had established elsewhere.
11697 </para>
11698 <para>
11699 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11700 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11701 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11702 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11703 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11704 </para>
11705 <para>
11706 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11707 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11708 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11709 </para>
11710 <para>
11711 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11712 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11713 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11714 reasoning.
11715 </para>
11716 <para>
11717 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11718 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11719 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11720 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11721 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11722 </para>
11723 <para>
11724
11725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11726 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11727 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11728 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11729 </para>
11730 <para>
11731 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11732 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11733 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11734 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11735 </para>
11736 <para>
11737 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11738 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11739 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11740 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11741 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11742 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11743 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11744 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11745 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11746 </para>
11747 <para>
11748 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11749 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11750 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11751 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11752 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11753 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11754 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11755 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11756 the system we have.
11757 </para>
11758 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11759 <para>
11760 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11761 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11762 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11763 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11764 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11765 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11766 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11767 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11768 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11769 </para>
11770 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11771 <para>
11772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11773 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11774 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11775 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11776 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11777 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11778 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11779 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11780 <quote>limited,</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11781 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11782 </para>
11783 <para>
11784 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11785 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11786 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11787 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11788 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11789 </para>
11790 <para>
11791 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11792 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11793 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11794 </para>
11795 <para>
11796 It was first anger with the five <quote>Conservatives.</quote> It would have been
11797 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
11798 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11799 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11800 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11801 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11802 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is <quote>originalism</quote>&mdash;to
11803 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11804 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11805 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other <quote>originalist</quote> rulings. Where was their
11806 <quote>originalism</quote> now?
11807 </para>
11808 <para>
11809 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11810 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11811 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11812 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11813
11814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11815 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11816 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11817 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11818 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11819 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11820 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11821 own principles.
11822 </para>
11823 <para>
11824 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11825 myself.
11826 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11827 the law as it is.
11828 </para>
11829 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11830 <para>
11831 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11832 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11833 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11834 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11835 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11836 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11837 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11838 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11839 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11840 </para>
11841 <para>
11842 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11843 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11844 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11845 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11846 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11847 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11848 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11849 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11850 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11851 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11852 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11853 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11854 effort to persuade; but I
11855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11856 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11857 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11858 should decide the issue.
11859 </para>
11860 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11861 <para>
11862 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11863 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11864 Kathleen Sullivan?
11865 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11866 </para>
11867 <para>
11868 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11869 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11870 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11871 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11872 </para>
11873 <para>
11874 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11875 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11876 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11877 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11878 have persuaded.
11879 </para>
11880 <para>
11881 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11882 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11883 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11884 case was a mistake. <quote>The Court is not ready,</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
11885 issue should not be raised until it is.
11886 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11887 </para>
11888 <para>
11889 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11890 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11891 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11892 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11893 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11894 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11895 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11896 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11897 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11898 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11899 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11900
11901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11902 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11903 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11904 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11905 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11906 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11907 </para>
11908 <blockquote>
11909 <para>
11910 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11911 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11912 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11913 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11914 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11915 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11916 </para>
11917 </blockquote>
11918 <para>
11919 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11920 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11921 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
11922 (<xref linkend="fig-18"/>). The <quote>powerful and wealthy</quote> line is a bit
11923 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
11924 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11925 </para>
11926 <figure id="fig-18">
11927 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</title>
11928 <graphic fileref="images/18.png"></graphic>
11929 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11930 </figure>
11931 <para>
11932 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11933 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That <quote>grand experiment</quote> we call the
11934 <quote>public domain</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think, <quote>Honey,
11935 I shrunk the Constitution.</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11936 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11937 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11938 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11939 </para>
11940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11941 </chapter>
11942 <chapter label="14" id="eldred-ii">
11943 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11944 <para>
11945 The day <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11946 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was
11947 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11948 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11949 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11950 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11951 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11952 </para>
11953 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11954 <para>
11955 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11956 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11957 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11958 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11959 Justice Kennedy: <quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11960 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11961 that.</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11962 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11963 </para>
11964 <para>
11965 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11966 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11968 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11969 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11970 the work passed into the public domain.
11971 </para>
11972 <para>
11973 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11974 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11975 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11976 </para>
11977 <para>
11978 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11979 is either the <quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act</quote> or the <quote>Copyright
11980 Term Deregulation Act.</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11981 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11982 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11983 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11984 everything else, let the content go.
11985 </para>
11986 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11987 <para>
11988 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11989 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11990 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11991 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11992 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11993 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11994 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11995 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11996 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11997 the stupid harm of the present system.
11998 </para>
11999 <para>
12000 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12001 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12002 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12003 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12004 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12005 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12006 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12007 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12008 where copyright owners could be identified.
12009 </para>
12010 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12011 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12012 <para>
12013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12014 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
12015 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12016 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12017 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12018 <!-- f1. -->
12019 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12020 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12021 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12022 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
12023 every text of the Convention has provided that <quote>the enjoyment and the
12024 exercise</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention <quote>shall not be subject
12025 to any formality.</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12026 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12027 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12028 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12029 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12030 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12031 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12032 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12033 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12034 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
12035 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12036 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
12037 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a <quote>natural right.</quote> Natural
12038 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12039 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12040 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12041 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12042 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12043 </para>
12044 <para>
12045 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12046 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12047 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12048 <quote>Walt Disney creativity</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12049 know what's protected and what's not.
12050 </para>
12051 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12052 <para>
12053 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12054 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12055 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12056 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12057 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12058 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12059 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
12060 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12061 </para>
12062 <para>
12063 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12064 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12065 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12066 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12067 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12068 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12069 </para>
12070 <para>
12071 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12072 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12073 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12074 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12075 burden
12076 imposed upon creators.
12077 </para>
12078 <para>
12079 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12080 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12081
12082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12083 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12084 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12085 the government. He has a property right over the table <quote>naturally,</quote>
12086 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12087 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12088 table.
12089 </para>
12090 <para>
12091 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12092 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12093 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12094 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12095 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12096 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12097 spread.
12098 </para>
12099 <para>
12100 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12101 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12102 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12103 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12104 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12105 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12106 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12107 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12108 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12109 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12110 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12111 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12112 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12113 system of protection for property generally.
12114 </para>
12115 <para>
12116 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12117 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12118 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12119 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12120 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12121 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12122 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12123 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12124
12125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12126 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12127 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12128 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
12129 </para>
12130 <para>
12131 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12132 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12133 didn't <quote>get.</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12134 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12135 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, <quote>short,</quote> then this
12136 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12137 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12138 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12139 </para>
12140 <para>
12141 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12142 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12143 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12144 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12145 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12146 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12147 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
12148 </para>
12149 <para>
12150 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12151 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12152 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12153 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12154 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12155 </para>
12156 <para>
12157 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12158 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12159 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12160 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12161 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12162 </para>
12163 <para>
12164 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12165 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12166 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12167 registration?
12168 </para>
12169 <para>
12170 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12171 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12172 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12173
12174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12175 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12176 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12177 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12178 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12179 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12180 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12181 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12182 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12183 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12184 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12185 </para>
12186 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12187 <para>
12188 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12189 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12190 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12191 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12192 </para>
12193 <para>
12194 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12195 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12196 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12197 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12198 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, <quote>we are
12199 close.</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12200 something good might happen here.
12201 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12202 </para>
12203 <para>
12204 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12205 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12206 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12207 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12208 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12209 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12210 </para>
12211 <para>
12212 The MPAA argued first that Congress had <quote>firmly rejected the central
12213 concept in the proposed bill</quote>&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12214 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's <quote>firm rejection</quote> had occurred
12215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12216 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12217 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12218 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12219 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12220 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12221 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12222 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12223 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12224 argued that the bill would impose <quote>enormous</quote> costs, since a
12225 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12226 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12227 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12228 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12229 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12230 film is a valid derivative use.
12231 </para>
12232 <para>
12233 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12234 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12235 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12236 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12237 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12238 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12239 </para>
12240 <para>
12241 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12242 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12243 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12244 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12245 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12246 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12247 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12248 threat.
12249 </para>
12250 <para>
12251 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12252 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12253 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12254 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12255 sense?
12256 </para>
12257 <para>
12258
12259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12260 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12261 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12262 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12263 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12264 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12265 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12266 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12267 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12268 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12269 </para>
12270 <para>
12271 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12272 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12273 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12274 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12275 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12276 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the <quote>Dark
12277 Content</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12278 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12279 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin</primary></indexterm>
12280 </para>
12281 <para>
12282 What does this industry really want?
12283 </para>
12284 <para>
12285 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12286 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12287 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12288 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12289 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12290 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12291 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12292 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12293 first.
12294 </para>
12295 <para>
12296 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12297 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12298 its aim not the protection of <quote>property</quote> but the rejection of a
12299 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12300 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12301 theirs</emphasis>.
12302 </para>
12303 <para>
12304 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12305 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12306
12307 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12308 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12309 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12310 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12311 and to share its own creation.
12312 </para>
12313 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12314 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12315 <para>
12316 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12317 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12318 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12319 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12320 block the progress of others.
12321 </para>
12322 <para>
12323 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12324 <quote>property</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12325 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12326 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing <quote>permission
12327 society.</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12328 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12329 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12330 </para>
12331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12332 </chapter>
12333 </part>
12334 <chapter label="15" id="c-conclusion">
12335 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12336 <indexterm id="idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'>
12337 <primary>antiretroviral drugs</primary>
12338 </indexterm>
12339 <indexterm id="idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'>
12340 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies</primary>
12341 </indexterm>
12342 <indexterm id="idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'>
12343 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in</primary>
12344 </indexterm>
12345 <para>
12346 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12347 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12348 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12349 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12350 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12351 </para>
12352 <para>
12353 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12354 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12355 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12356 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12357 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12358 the disease almost invisible.
12359 </para>
12360 <para>
12361 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12362 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12363 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12364 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12365 population:
12366 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12367 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12368 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, <quote>Final Report: Integrating
12369 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy</quote> (London, 2002),
12370 available at
12371 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12372 release
12373 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12374 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12375 </para></footnote>
12376 </para>
12377 <para>
12378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12379 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12380 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12381 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12382 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12383 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12384 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12385 </para>
12386 <para>
12387 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12388 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12389 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12390 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12391 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12392 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12393 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12394 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12395 changes.
12396 </para>
12397 <para>
12398 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12399 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12400 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12401 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12402 costs significantly below the market price.
12403 </para>
12404 <para>
12405 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12406 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12407 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12408 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12409 Africa from India. This is called <quote>parallel importation,</quote> and it is
12410 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12411 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12412 <para>
12413 <!-- f2. -->
12414 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12415 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12416 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12417 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12418 </para></footnote>
12419 </para>
12420 <para>
12421 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12422 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12423 characterized it, <quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa &hellip;
12424 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12425 imports.</quote><footnote><para>
12426 <!-- f3. -->
12427 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12428 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12429 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12430 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12431 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12432 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12433 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12434 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12435 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12436 Love).
12437 </para></footnote>
12438 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12439 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12440 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12441 possible trade sanctions.
12442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12443 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12444 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12445 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12446 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12447 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12448 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12449 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12450 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12451 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12452 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12453 <!-- f4. -->
12454 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12455 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12456 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12457 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12458 </para>
12459 <para>
12460 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12461 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12462 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12463 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12464 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12465 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12466 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12467 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12468 </para>
12469 <para>
12470 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12471 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12472 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12473 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12474 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12475 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12476 </para>
12477 <para>
12478 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12479 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12480 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12481 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12482 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12483 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12484 by U.S. companies.
12485 </para>
12486 <para>
12487 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12488 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12489 argument
12490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12491 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12492 <!-- f5. -->
12493 See Sabin Russell, <quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12494 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12495 May 1999, A1, available at
12496 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12497 (<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12498 system of intellectual property protection</quote>); Robert Weissman, <quote>AIDS
12499 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12500 Medicines,</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12501 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12502 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, <quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12503 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12504 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12505 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12507 </para></footnote>
12508 It was because <quote>intellectual property</quote> would be violated that these
12509 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12510 importance of <quote>intellectual property</quote> that led these government actors
12511 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12512 </para>
12513 <para>
12514 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12515 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12516 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12517 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12518 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the <quote>sanctity</quote> of an
12519 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12520 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12521 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12522 </para>
12523 <para>
12524 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12525 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12526 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12527 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12528 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12529 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12530 </para>
12531 <para>
12532 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12533 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12534 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12535 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12536 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12537 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12538 </para>
12539 <para>
12540 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12541 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12542 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, <quote>How
12543 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12544 drug would cost an American $1,500?</quote> Because there is no <quote>sound
12545 bite</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12546 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12547 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12549 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12550 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12551 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12552 idea called <quote>intellectual property.</quote>
12553 </para>
12554 <para>
12555 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12556 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12557 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12558 What is the argument?
12559 </para>
12560 <para>
12561 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12562 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12563 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12564 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12565 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12566 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12567 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12568 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12569 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12570 were balanced in just this sense.
12571 </para>
12572 <para>
12573 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12574 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12575 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12576 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12577 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12578 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12579 </para>
12580 <indexterm startref="idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'/>
12581 <indexterm startref="idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'/>
12582 <indexterm startref="idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'/>
12583 <para>
12584 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12585 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12586 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12587 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12588 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12589 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12590 our
12591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12592 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12593 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12594 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12595 this common sense open its eyes.
12596 </para>
12597 <para>
12598 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12599 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12600 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12601 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12602 to fight <quote>piracy,</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12603 the idea of <quote>creative property,</quote> while transforming real creators into
12604 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12605 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12606 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12607 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12608 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12609 produce the <quote>perfect storm</quote> for free culture.
12610 </para>
12611 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
12612 <para>
12613 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12614 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12615 meeting.<footnote><para>
12616 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, <quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12617 August 2003, E1, available at
12618 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, <quote>Global Group's
12619 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12620 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12621 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, <quote>U.S. Official
12622 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12623 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12624 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12625 </para></footnote>
12626 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12627 a meeting to discuss <quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12628 goods.</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12629 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12630 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12631 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12632 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12633 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12634 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12635 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12636 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12637 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12638 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12640 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12641 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12642 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12643 in the early 1980s. And it included <quote>open source and free software.</quote>
12644 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12645 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12646 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12647 </para>
12648 <para>
12649 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12650 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12651 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12652 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12653 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12654 </para>
12655 <para>
12656 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12657 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12658 meeting.
12659 </para></footnote>
12660 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12661 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12662 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12663 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12664 property issues.
12665 </para>
12666 <para>
12667 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12668 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12669 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12670 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12671 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12672 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12673 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12674 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12675 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12676 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12677 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12678 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12679 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12680 talk about an <quote>Information Society</quote> unless one also talked about the
12681 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12682 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12683 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12684 stuff of
12685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12686 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12687 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12688 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12689 </para>
12690 <para>
12691 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12692 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12693 thus the meeting about <quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12694 public goods</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12695 </para>
12696 <para>
12697 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12698 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is <quote>open source
12699 and free software.</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12700 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12701 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12702 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12703 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12704 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12705 rather than <quote>proprietary software,</quote> for their own internal uses.
12706 </para>
12707 <para>
12708 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12709 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12710 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12711 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12712 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12713 operating system, the most famous bit of <quote>free software</quote>&mdash;and IBM
12714 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support <quote>open source and
12715 free software</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12716 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12717 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12718 <!-- f8. -->
12719 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12720 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12721 <quote>open source</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12722 principal opposition is to <quote>free software</quote> licensed under a <quote>copyleft</quote>
12723 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12724 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, <quote>The Future
12725 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
12726 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12727 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12728 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12729 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12730 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12731 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12732 May 2001), available at
12733 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12734 </para></footnote>
12735 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12736 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft</quote> licenses</primary></indexterm>
12737 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12738 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12739 </para>
12740 <para>
12741 More important for our purposes, to support <quote>open source and free
12742 software</quote> is not to oppose copyright. <quote>Open source and free software</quote>
12743 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12744 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12745 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12746 by
12747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12748 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12749 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12750 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12751 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12752 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12753 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12754 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12755 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12756 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12757 </para>
12758 <para>
12759 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12760 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12761 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12762 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12763 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12764 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12765 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12766 <!-- f9. -->
12767 Krim, <quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,</quote> available at <ulink
12768 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12769 </para></footnote>
12770 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12771 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
12772 </para>
12773 <para>
12774 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12775 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12776 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12777 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12778 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12779 its lobbying efforts.
12780 </para>
12781 <para>
12782 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12783 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12784 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12785 Office, explained that <quote>open-source software runs counter to the
12786 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.</quote>
12787 She is quoted as saying, <quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12788 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12789 goals of WIPO.</quote>
12790 </para>
12791 <para>
12792 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12793 </para>
12794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12795 <para>
12796 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12797 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12798 right called <quote>copyright</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12799 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it <quote>runs counter</quote> to the mission
12800 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12801 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12802 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12803 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12804 </para>
12805 <para>
12806 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to <quote>promote</quote>
12807 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12808 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12809 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12810 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12811 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12812 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12813 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12814 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12815 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12816 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12817 </para>
12818 <para>
12819 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12820 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12821 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12822 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12823 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to <quote>waive</quote> or
12824 <quote>disclaim</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12825 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
12826 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12827 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12828 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12829 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
12830 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12831 </para>
12832 <para>
12833 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12834 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,</quote> she's
12835 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12837 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12838 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from <quote>waiving</quote> or
12839 <quote>disclaiming</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12840 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12841 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12842 way possible.
12843 </para>
12844 <para>
12845 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12846 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called <quote>feudalism.</quote> Under
12847 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12848 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12849 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12850 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12851 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12852 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12853 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12854 that control.
12855 </para>
12856 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12857 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12858 <para>
12859 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12860 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12861 <!-- f10. -->
12862 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
12863 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12864 </para></footnote>
12865 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12866 choice now is whether that information society will be
12867 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
12868 toward the feudal.
12869 </para>
12870 <para>
12871 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12872 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12873 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12874 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12875 </para>
12876 <blockquote>
12877 <para>
12878 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12879 it should be (<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12880 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12881 not simply to promote intellectual property rights</quote>), not as it is. If
12882 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12883 say anything wrong. But in the world
12884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12885 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12886 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12887 </para>
12888 </blockquote>
12889 <para>
12890 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12891 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12892 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12893 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12894 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12895 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12896 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12897 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12898 </para>
12899 <para>
12900 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12901 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12902 <quote>goal</quote> of a government should be <quote>to promote the right balance</quote> of
12903 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12904 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. <quote>Typical for
12905 an academic,</quote> the poster might well have continued.
12906 </para>
12907 <para>
12908 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12909 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12910 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12911 our own country's history).
12912 </para>
12913 <para>
12914 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12915 government should be to <quote>seek balance,</quote> then count me with the silly,
12916 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12917 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12918 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12919 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12920 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12921 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12922 democracy in the world, become?
12923 </para>
12924 <para>
12925 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12926 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12927 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12929 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12930 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12931 </para>
12932 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12933 <para>
12934 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12935 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12936 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12937 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12938 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12939 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12940 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12941 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12942 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12943 hearings and a different result.
12944 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12945 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12946 </para>
12947 <para>
12948 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12949 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12950 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12951 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12952 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12953 concentration in the media.
12954 </para>
12955 <para>
12956 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12957 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12958 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12959 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12960 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12961 </para>
12962 <para>
12963 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12964 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12965 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12966 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12967 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12968 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12969 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12970 </para>
12971 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12972 <para>
12973 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12974 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12975 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12976 Americans have a long history of fighting <quote>big,</quote> wisely or not. That
12977 we could be motivated to fight <quote>big</quote> again is not something new.
12978 </para>
12979 <para>
12980 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12981 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12982 the idea of <quote>intellectual property.</quote> Not because balance is alien to
12983 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12984 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12985 called <quote>property</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12986 </para>
12987 <para>
12988 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12989 of our tragedy.
12990 </para>
12991 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12992 <para>
12993 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12994 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12995 <!-- f11. -->
12996 John Borland, <quote>RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers,</quote> CNET News.com, September
12997 2003, available at
12998 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12999 R. La Monica, <quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,</quote> CNN/Money, 8 September
13000 2003, available at
13001 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
13002 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, <quote>Sued for a Song,
13003 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers,</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
13004 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, <quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13005 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13006 Defendants,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13007 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,</quote> <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
13008 available at
13009 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
13010 </para></footnote>
13011 Eminem has just been sued for <quote>sampling</quote> someone else's
13012 music.<footnote><para>
13013 <!-- f12. -->
13014 Jon Wiederhorn, <quote>Eminem Gets Sued &hellip; by a Little Old Lady,</quote>
13015 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
13016 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
13017 </para></footnote>
13018 The story about Bob Dylan <quote>stealing</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13019 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13020 <!-- f13. -->
13021 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, <quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13022 Dylan Songs,</quote> Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13023 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13025 </para></footnote>
13026 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
13027 anonymous&mdash;reports <quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13028 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13029 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13030 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13031 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.</quote> Congressmen are
13032 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13033 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13034 kids who use a computer to share content.
13035 </para>
13036 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
13037 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
13038 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
13039 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
13040 <para>
13041 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13042 that it will build a <quote>Creative Archive,</quote> from which British citizens can
13043 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13044 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,</quote> BBC press release,
13045 24 August 2003, available at
13046 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13047 </para></footnote>
13048 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13049 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13050 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13051 country.<footnote><para>
13052 <!-- f15. -->
13053 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,</quote> Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
13054 available at
13055 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13056 </para></footnote>
13057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13058 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13059 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13060 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13061 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13062 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13063 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13064 day into the Causbys.
13065 </para>
13066 <para>
13067 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13068 potential is ever to be realized.
13069
13070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13071
13072 </para>
13073 </chapter>
13074 <chapter label="16" id="c-afterword">
13075 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13076 <para>
13077
13078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13079 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13080 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13081 maps what might be done.
13082 </para>
13083 <para>
13084 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13085 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13086 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13087 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13088 </para>
13089 <para>
13090 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13091 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13092 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13093 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13094 is so important.
13095 </para>
13096 <para>
13097 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13098 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13099 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13100 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13101 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13102 </para>
13103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13104
13105 <section id="usnow">
13106 <title>US, NOW</title>
13107 <para>
13108 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13109 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13110 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13111 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13112 </para>
13113 <para>
13114 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13115 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13116 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;<quote>All Rights
13117 Reserved</quote>&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;<quote>No Rights
13118 Reserved.</quote> The <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13119 permission before you <quote>use</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The <quote>No
13120 Rights Reserved</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13121 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13122 </para>
13123 <para>
13124 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13125 tilted in the <quote>no rights reserved</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13126 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13127 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13128 the
13129
13130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13131 original design of the Internet was <quote>no rights reserved.</quote> Content was
13132 <quote>taken</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13133 unprotected.
13134 </para>
13135 <para>
13136 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13137 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13138 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13139 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13140 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13141 architecture made the effective default <quote>no rights reserved,</quote> the
13142 future architecture will make the effective default <quote>all rights
13143 reserved.</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13144 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13145 content requires permission. The <quote>cut and paste</quote> world that defines
13146 the Internet today will become a <quote>get permission to cut and paste</quote>
13147 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13148 </para>
13149 <para>
13150 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
13151 <quote>all rights reserved</quote> nor <quote>no rights reserved</quote> but <quote>some rights
13152 reserved</quote>&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13153 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13154 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13155 before.
13156 </para>
13157
13158 <section id="examples">
13159 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13160 <para>
13161 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13162 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13163 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13164 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13165 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13166 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13167 to your neighbors or boss. The <quote>privacy</quote> of your browsing habits was
13168 assured.
13169 </para>
13170 <para>
13171 What made it assured?
13172 </para>
13173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13174 <para>
13175 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13176 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
13177 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13178 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13179 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13180 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13181 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13182 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13183 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13184 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13185 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13186 (there is no law protecting <quote>privacy</quote> in public places), and in many
13187 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13188 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13189 </para>
13190 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13191 <para>
13192 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13193 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13194 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13195 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13196 <quote>recently viewed</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13197 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13198 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any <quote>privacy</quote>
13199 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13200 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet</primary></indexterm>
13201 </para>
13202 <para>
13203 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13204 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13205 people should have the <quote>right</quote> to browse in a library without the
13206 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13207 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13208 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13209 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13210 disappears.
13211 </para>
13212 <para>
13213 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define <quote>privacy</quote>
13214 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13215 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13216 friction did.<footnote><para>
13217 <!-- f1. -->
13218
13219 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, <quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13220 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13221 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13222
13223 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13224 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13225 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13226 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13227 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13228 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13229 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13230
13231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13232 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13233 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13234 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13235 </para>
13236 <para>
13237 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13238 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13239 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13240 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13241 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13242 care much about controlling their software.
13243 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
13244 </para>
13245 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13246 <para>
13247 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13248 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13249 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13250 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13251 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13252 people's work.
13253 </para>
13254 <para>
13255 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13256 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13257 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13258 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13259 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13260 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13261 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13262 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13263 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13264 anything else?
13265 </para>
13266 <para>
13267 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13268 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13269 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13270 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13271 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13272 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13273 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13274 </para>
13275 <para>
13276 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13277 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13279 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13280 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13281 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13282 fundamentally weakened.
13283 </para>
13284 <para>
13285 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13286 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13287 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's <quote>Linux</quote>
13288 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13289 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13290 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13291 </para>
13292 <para>
13293 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13294 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13295 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13296 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13297 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13298 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13299 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13300 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13301 byproduct.
13302 </para>
13303 <para>
13304 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13305 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13306 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13307 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13308 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13309 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13310 </para>
13311 <para>
13312 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13313 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13314 scientific journals are produced.
13315 </para>
13316 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13317 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13318 </indexterm>
13319 <para>
13320 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13321 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13322 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13323 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13324 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13325 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13326 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13327 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13328 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13329 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13330 and Westlaw are also free
13331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13332 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13333 Court opinion through their respective services.
13334 </para>
13335 <para>
13336 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13337 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13338 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13339 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13340 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13341 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13342 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13343 </para>
13344 <para>
13345 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13346 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13347 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13348 </para>
13349 <para>
13350 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13351 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13352 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13353 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13354 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13355 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13356 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13357 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13358 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13359 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13360 </para>
13361 <para>
13362 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13363 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13364 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13365 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13366 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13367 granted before.
13368 </para>
13369 <para>
13370 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13371 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13372 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13373 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13375 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13376 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13377 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13378 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13379 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13380 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13381 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13382 </para>
13383 <para>
13384 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13385 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13386 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13387 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13388 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13389 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13390 and science.
13391 </para>
13392 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13393
13394 </section>
13395 <section id="oneidea">
13396 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13397 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13398 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13399 </indexterm>
13400 <para>
13401 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13402 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13403 </para>
13404 <para>
13405 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13406 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13407 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13408 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13409 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13410 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13411 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13412 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13413 make this possible.
13414 </para>
13415 <para>
13416 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13417 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13418 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13419 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13420 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13421 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13422 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13423 human-readable description, and
13424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13425 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13426 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13427 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13428 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13429 different than the <quote>All</quote> or <quote>No</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13430 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13431 certain freedoms are given.
13432 </para>
13433 <para>
13434 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13435 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13436 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13437 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13438 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13439 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (<quote>share and share
13440 alike</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13441 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13442 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13443 </para>
13444 <para>
13445 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13446 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13447 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13448 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13449 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13450 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13451 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13452 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13453 a public domain.
13454 </para>
13455 <para>
13456 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13457 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13458 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13459 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13460 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13461 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13463 of content (<quote>content conducers,</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13464 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13465 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13466 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13467 </para>
13468 <para>
13469 The aim is not to fight the <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13470 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13471 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13472 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13473 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13474 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13475 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13476 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13477 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13478 to begin to build those rules.
13479 </para>
13480 <para>
13481 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13482 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13483 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13484 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13485 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13486 </para>
13487 <para>
13488 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13489 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13490 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13491 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13492 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13493 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13494 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13495 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13496 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13497 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13498 </para>
13499 <para>
13500 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13501 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13502 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13503 was a total success.
13504 </para>
13505 <para>
13506 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13507 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13509 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13510 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13511 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13512 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13513 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13514 well.
13515 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)</primary></indexterm>
13516 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13517 </para>
13518 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy</primary></indexterm>
13519 <indexterm><primary>rap music</primary></indexterm>
13520 <para>
13521 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13522 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13523 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13524 reasons. Many who use the <quote>sampling license</quote> do so because anything
13525 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13526 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13527 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13528 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13529 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13530 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13531 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13532 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not <quote>allow</quote>
13533 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13534 high<footnote><para>
13535 <!-- f2. -->
13536 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13537 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13538 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13539 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13540 </para></footnote>),
13541 these artists release into the creative environment content
13542 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13543 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter</primary></indexterm>
13544 </para>
13545 <para>
13546 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13547 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13548 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13549 you are effectively saying you believe in the <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote>
13550 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13551 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13552 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13553 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13554 this notion of <quote>Some Rights Reserved,</quote> and gives many the chance to
13555 say it to others.
13556 </para>
13557 <para>
13558 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13559 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13560 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13561 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13562
13563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13564 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13565 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13566 </para>
13567 <para>
13568 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13569 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13570 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13571 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13572 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13573 steps are possible.
13574 </para>
13575 <para>
13576 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13577 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13578 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13579 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13580 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13581 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13582 creativity to spread more easily.
13583 </para>
13584 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13585
13586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13587 </section>
13588 </section>
13589 <section id="themsoon">
13590 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13591 <para>
13592 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13593 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13594 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13595 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13596 changes that we need.
13597 </para>
13598 <para>
13599 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13600 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13601 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13602 to our end.
13603 </para>
13604
13605 <section id="formalities">
13606 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13607 <para>
13608 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13609 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13610 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13611 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13612 </para>
13613 <para>
13614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13615 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13616 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13617 protected.
13618 </para>
13619 <para>
13620 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13621 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13622 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13623 default is control, and <quote>formalities</quote> are banished.
13624 </para>
13625 <para>
13626 Why?
13627 </para>
13628 <para>
13629 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13630 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13631 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13632 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13633 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13634 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13635 formalities were getting in the way.
13636 </para>
13637 <para>
13638 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13639 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13640 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13641 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13642 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13643 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13644 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13645 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13646 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13647 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13648 </para>
13649 <para>
13650 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13651 <!-- f1. -->
13652 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13653 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13654 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13655 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13656 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13657 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13658 </para>
13659 <para>
13660 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13661 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13662 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13663 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13664 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13665 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13666 developed by others.
13667 </para>
13668
13669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13670
13671 <section id="registration">
13672 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13673 <para>
13674 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13675 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13676 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13677 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13678 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13679 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13680 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13681 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13682 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13683 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13684 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13685 </para>
13686 <para>
13687 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13688 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13689 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13690 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13691 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13692 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13693 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13694 </para>
13695 <para>
13696 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13697 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13698 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13699 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13700 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13701 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13702 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13703 with which registration occurs up.
13704 </para>
13705 <para>
13706 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13707 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13708 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13709 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13710 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13711 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13712 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13713 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13714 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13716 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13717 </para>
13718
13719 </section>
13720 <section id="marking">
13721 <title>MARKING</title>
13722 <para>
13723 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13724 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13725 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13726 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13727 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13728 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13729 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13730 uniformly across all media.
13731 </para>
13732 <para>
13733 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13734 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13735 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13736 use the work.
13737 </para>
13738 <para>
13739 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13740 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13741 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13742 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13743 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13744 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13745 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13746 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13747 </para>
13748 <para>
13749 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13750 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13751 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13752 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13753 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13754 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13755 <!-- f2. -->
13756 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13757 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13758 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13759 </para></footnote>
13760 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be <quote>use unless someone
13761 complains.</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13762 stop using the work in any new
13763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13764 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13765 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13766 their work.
13767 </para>
13768 <para>
13769 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13770 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13771 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13772 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13773 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13774 </para>
13775 <para>
13776 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13777 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13778 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13779 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13780 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13781 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13782 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13783 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13784 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13785 other important functions.
13786 </para>
13787 <para>
13788 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13789 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13790 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13791 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13792 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13793 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13794 </para>
13795 <para>
13796 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13797 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13798 make things unclear.
13799 </para>
13800 <para>
13801 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13802 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13803 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13804 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13805 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13806 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13807 </para>
13808
13809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13810 </section>
13811 </section>
13812 <section id="shortterms">
13813 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13814 <para>
13815 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13816 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13817 natural authors.
13818 </para>
13819 <para>
13820 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13821 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13822 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13823 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13824 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13825 copyright term.<footnote><para>
13826
13827 <!-- f3. -->
13828 <quote>A Radical Rethink,</quote> <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13829 available at
13830 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13831 </para></footnote>
13832 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13833 </para>
13834 <para>
13835 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13836 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13837 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13838 terms.
13839 </para>
13840 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13841 <listitem><para>
13842 <!-- (1) -->
13843 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13844 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13845 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13846 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13847 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13848 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13849 </para></listitem>
13850 <listitem><para>
13851 <!-- (2) -->
13852 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
13853 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13854 fuzziness of <quote>fair use,</quote> and the distinction between <quote>ideas</quote> and
13855 <quote>expression.</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13856 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13857 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13858 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13859 <quote>lawyer-free zone</quote> makes the complexities of <quote>fair use</quote> and
13860 <quote>idea/expression</quote> less necessary to navigate.
13861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13862 </para></listitem>
13863 <listitem><para>
13864 <!-- (3) -->
13865 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13866 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13867 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13868 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13869 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13870 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13871 pension.<footnote><para>
13872 <!-- f4. -->
13873 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13874 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13875 available at
13876 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13877 </para></footnote>
13878 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13879 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13880 single form.
13881 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
13882 </para></listitem>
13883 <listitem><para>
13884 <!-- (4) -->
13885 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13886 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13887 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13888 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13889 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13890 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
13891 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13892 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13893 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
13894 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13895 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13896 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13897 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13898 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13899 </orderedlist>
13900 <para>
13901 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
13902 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
13903 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13904 same.
13905 </para>
13906 <para>
13907 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas <quote>radical.</quote> (After all, I
13908 call them <quote>extremists.</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
13909 than the term under Richard Nixon. How <quote>radical</quote> can it be to ask for
13910 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13911 </para>
13912
13913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13914
13915 </section>
13916 <section id="freefairuse">
13917 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13918 <para>
13919 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13920 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13921 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13922 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13923 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13924 the emergence of that new technology.
13925 </para>
13926 <para>
13927 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors <quote>exclusive
13928 right</quote> to <quote>their writings.</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
13929 right to <quote>their writings</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
13930 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13931 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13932 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13933 though that movie is not <quote>my writing.</quote>
13934 </para>
13935 <para>
13936 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13937 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13938 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13939 <!-- f5. -->
13940 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13941 University Press, 1967), 32.
13942 </para></footnote>
13943 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13944 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13945 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13946 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin</primary></indexterm>
13947 </para>
13948 <blockquote>
13949 <para>
13950 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13951 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13952 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13953 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13954 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13955 </para></footnote>
13956 </para>
13957 </blockquote>
13958 <para>
13959 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13960 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13961 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13962 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13963 Consider each limitation in turn.
13964 </para>
13965 <para>
13966 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13967 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13968 sense to protect John
13969
13970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13971 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13972 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13973 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13974 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13975 after the creative work is done.
13976 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13977 </para>
13978 <para>
13979 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13980 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13981 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13982 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13983 material. When all <quote>reuse</quote> of creative material was within the control
13984 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13985 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13986 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13987 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13988 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13989 the creative process. Smothers it.
13990 </para>
13991 <para>
13992 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13993 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13994 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13995 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13996 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13997 much more sense.
13998 </para>
13999 <para>
14000 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14001 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14002 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14003 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
14004 <para>
14005 <!-- f7. -->
14006 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14007 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14008 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
14009 </para></footnote>
14010 His view is that the law should be written so that
14011 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14012 </para>
14013 <para>
14014 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14015 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14016 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14017 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14018 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14019 </para>
14020 <para>
14021 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14023 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14024 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14025 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14026 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14027 </para>
14028 </section>
14029
14030 <section id="liberatemusic">
14031 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14032 <para>
14033 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14034 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14035 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
14036 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14037 battles around the sharing of music.
14038 </para>
14039 <para>
14040 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14041 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14042 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14043 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14044 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14045 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14046 innovation on the network.
14047 </para>
14048 <para>
14049 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14050 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14051 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14052 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14053 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14057 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14058 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14059 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
14060 four different kinds of sharing:
14061 </para>
14062 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14063 <listitem><para>
14064 <!-- A. -->
14065 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14066 for purchasing CDs.
14067 </para></listitem>
14068 <listitem><para>
14069 <!-- B. -->
14070 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14071 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14072 </para></listitem>
14073 <listitem><para>
14074 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14075 <!-- C. -->
14076 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14077 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14078 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14079 </para></listitem>
14080 <listitem><para>
14081 <!-- D. -->
14082 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14083 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14084 owner plainly endorses.
14085 </para></listitem>
14086 </orderedlist>
14087 <para>
14088 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14089 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14090 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14091 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14092 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14093 significantly weakened.
14094 </para>
14095 <para>
14096 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
14097 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14098 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14099 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14100 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14101 networks.
14102 </para>
14103 <para>
14104 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14105 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14106 should respond.
14107 </para>
14108 <para>
14109 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14110 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14111 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14112 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14113 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
14114 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14115 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14116 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14117 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14118 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14119 </para>
14120 <para>
14121 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14122 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14123 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14125 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14126 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14127 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14128 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14129 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14130 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
14131 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
14132 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14133 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14134 </para>
14135 <para>
14136 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14137 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
14138 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14139 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
14140 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14141 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14142 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14143 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14144 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14145 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14146 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14147 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14148 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14149 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14150 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14151 paying for this content even though <quote>free</quote> content is available in the
14152 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14153 <!-- f8. -->
14154 See, for example, <quote>Music Media Watch,</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14155 April 2002, available at
14156 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14157 </para></footnote>
14158
14159 </para>
14160 <para>
14161 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14162 present: It is emphatically temporary. The <quote>problem</quote> with file
14163 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14164 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14165 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14166 makers today to be <quote>solving</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14167 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14168 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14169 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14170 artists get paid, during
14171
14172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14173 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14174 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14175 </para>
14176 <para>
14177 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different <quote>problems</quote>
14178 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14179 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14180 <quote>problem</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14181 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14182 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14183 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14184 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14185 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14186 </para>
14187 <para>
14188 Type C content raises a different <quote>problem.</quote> This is content that was,
14189 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14190 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14191 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14192 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14193 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14194 way that returns something to the artist.
14195 </para>
14196 <para>
14197 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14198 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14199 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14200 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14201 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14202 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14203 from the author's perspective, this <quote>sharing</quote> of his content without
14204 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14205 </para>
14206 <para>
14207 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14208 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14209 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14210 providers would be free, under this rule, to <quote>share</quote> that content,
14211 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14212 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14213 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14214 </para>
14215 <para>
14216
14217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14218 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14219 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14220 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14221 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14222 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14223 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14224 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14225 trade.
14226 </para>
14227 <para>
14228 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14229 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14230 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14231 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14232 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14233 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14234 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14235 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14236 </para>
14237 <para>
14238 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14239 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14240 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14241 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14242 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14243 delivering and accessing content.
14244 </para>
14245 <para>
14246 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14247 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14248 </para>
14249 <para>
14250 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14251 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14252 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14253 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14254 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14255 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14256 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14257 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14258 </para>
14259 <para>
14260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14261 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14262 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14263 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14264 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14265 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14266 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14267 </para>
14268 <para>
14269 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14270 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14271 <para>
14272 <!-- f9. -->
14273 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14274 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14275 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14276 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14277 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14278 2004), ch. 6, available at
14279 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14280 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14281 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14282 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, <quote>Impose a
14283 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,</quote> available at
14284 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, <quote>Who's Holding Back
14285 Broadband?</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14286 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14287 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14288 available at
14289 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14290 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14291 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14292 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14293 2002, available at
14294 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, <quote>Getting Copyright Right,</quote>
14295 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14296 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14297 McCullagh, <quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,</quote> CNET News.com, 27 August
14298 2002, available at
14299 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14300 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14301 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14302 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14303 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14304 debate by about a decade. See
14305 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14306 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14307 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14308 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14309 </para></footnote>
14310 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14311 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14312 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14313 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14314 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14315 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14316 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14317 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14318 tax.
14319 </para>
14320 <para>
14321 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14322 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14323 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14324 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14325 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14326 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14327 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14328 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14329 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14330 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14331 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14332 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14333 controlling access.
14334 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14335 </para>
14336 <para>
14337 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14338 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14339 the system supports the widest range of <quote>semiotic democracy</quote>
14340 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14341 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14342 limits on derivative
14343
14344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14345 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14346 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14347 allowed to do with the content itself.
14348 </para>
14349 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
14350 <para>
14351 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14352 <quote>harm</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14353 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14354 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14355 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14356 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat <quote>free</quote> by being
14357 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14358 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14359 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14360 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14361 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14362 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14363 on-line.
14364 </para>
14365 <para>
14366 This competition has already occurred against the background of <quote>free</quote>
14367 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14368 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14369 that, there is nothing impossible at all about <quote>competing with free.</quote>
14370 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14371 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14372 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14373 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with <quote>first class</quote> seats, and meals
14374 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14375 finding ways to compete with <quote>free.</quote>
14376 </para>
14377 <para>
14378 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14379 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14380 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14381 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14382 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14383 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14384 the law.
14385 </para>
14386 <para>
14387 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14388 </para>
14389 <para>
14390
14391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14392 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14393 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14394 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14395 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14396 create.
14397 </para>
14398 <para>
14399 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14400 by
14401 </para>
14402 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14403 <listitem><para>
14404 <!-- 1. -->
14405 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14406 </para></listitem>
14407 <listitem><para>
14408 <!-- 2. -->
14409 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14410 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14411 statute;
14412 </para></listitem>
14413 <listitem><para>
14414 <!-- 3. -->
14415 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14416 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14417 </para></listitem>
14418 </orderedlist>
14419 <para>
14420 But what if <quote>piracy</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14421 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14422 consumers continue to <quote>take</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14423 something then?
14424 </para>
14425 <para>
14426 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14427 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14428 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14429 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14430 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14431 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14432 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14433 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14434 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14435 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14436 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14437 pirates.
14438 </para>
14439 <para>
14440 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14441 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14442 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14443
14444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14445 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14446 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14447 </para>
14448 </section>
14449
14450 <section id="firelawyers">
14451 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14452 <para>
14453 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14454 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14455 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14456 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14457 </para>
14458 <para>
14459 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14460 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14461 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14462 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14463 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14464 strong view queers the law.
14465 </para>
14466 <para>
14467 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14468 <quote>radical</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14469 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14470 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14471 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14472 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14473 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14474 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14475 <!-- f10. -->
14476 Lawrence Lessig, <quote>Copyright's First Amendment</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14477 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14478 </para></footnote>
14479
14480 </para>
14481 <para>
14482 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14483 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14484 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14485 </para>
14486 <para>
14487 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14488 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14489 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14490 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14491 <!-- f11. -->
14492 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14493 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14494 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14495 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14496 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14497 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14498 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14499 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14500 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14501 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?</quote> working paper, June 2003,
14502 available at
14503 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14504 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14505 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14506 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14507 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14508 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14509 </para></footnote>
14510 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14511 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14512 them it works.
14513 </para>
14514 <para>
14515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14516 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14517 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14518 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14519 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14520 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14521 practically never be done.
14522 </para>
14523 <para>
14524 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14525 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14526 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14527 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14528 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14529 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14530 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14531 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14532 </para>
14533 <para>
14534 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14535 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14536 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14537 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14538 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14539 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14540 </para>
14541 <para>
14542 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14543 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14544 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14545 its review.
14546 </para>
14547 <para>
14548 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14549 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14550 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14551 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14552 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14553 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14554 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14555 </para>
14556 <para>
14557 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14558 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14559
14560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14561 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14562 simple pragmatic question: <quote>Will it do good?</quote> When challenged about
14563 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, <quote>Why not?</quote>
14564 </para>
14565 <para>
14566 We should ask, <quote>Why?</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14567 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14568 keep your lawyers away.
14569 </para>
14570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14571 </section>
14572 </section>
14573 </chapter>
14574 <chapter label="17" id="c-notes">
14575 <title>NOTES</title>
14576 <para>
14577 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14578 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14579 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14580 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14581 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14582 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14583 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14584 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14585 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14586 the material.
14587 </para>
14588 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14589
14590 </chapter>
14591 <chapter label="18" id="c-acknowledgments">
14592 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14593 <para>
14594 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14595 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14596 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14597 to him that this book is dedicated.
14598 </para>
14599 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
14600 <para>
14601 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14602 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14603 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14604 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14605 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14606 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14607 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14608 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14609 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14610 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14611 critical eye on much of this.
14612 </para>
14613 <para>
14614 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14615 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14616 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14617 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14618 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14619 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14620 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14621 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14622 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14623 </para>
14624 <para>
14625 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14626 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14627 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14628 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14629 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14630 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14631 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14632 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14633 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14634 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14635 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14636 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14637 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14638 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14639 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, <quote>Wink,</quote> Roger Wood, <quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,</quote>
14640 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14641 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14642 a bunch of great replies.)
14643 </para>
14644 <para>
14645 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14646 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14647 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14648 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14649 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14650 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14651 throughout this book.
14652 </para>
14653 <para>
14654 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14655 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14656 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14657 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14658 </para>
14659 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->
14660
14661 </chapter>
14662 <index></index>
14663 </book>