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15 <book id=
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17 <title>Free Culture
</title>
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
24 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
26 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
30 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
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38 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
67 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.png" contentdepth=
"3em" width=
"100%" align=
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70 <imagedata fileref=
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73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
79 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
91 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's
<quote>e.biz
25,
</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's
<quote>50 visionaries.
</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
109 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
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127 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
130 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
132 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
136 <dedication id=
"salespoints">
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
141 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
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&N
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144 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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145 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id=
"alsobylessig">
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
167 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
171 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
174 Excerpt from an editorial titled
<quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,
</quote>
175 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
176 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
179 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
180 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
183 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
184 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
187 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
191 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
192 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
201 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
205 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
208 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
214 343.7309'
9—dc22
217 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
220 Printed in the United States of America
226 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
234 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
235 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
236 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
237 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
238 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
239 the above publisher of this book.
242 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
243 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
244 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
245 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
246 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
247 author's rights is appreciated.
251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
252 <dedication><title></title>
254 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
262 <title>List of figures
</title>
269 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
270 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
271 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
272 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
277 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
281 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
282 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
283 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
284 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
285 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
286 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
290 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
291 2 Architecture and Law: Force
292 2 Market: Concentration
295 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
296 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
297 2 Constraining Creators
298 2 Constraining Innovators
299 2 Corrupting Citizens
301 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
302 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
306 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
307 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
309 2 1. More Formalities
310 3 Registration and Renewal
313 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
314 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
315 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
323 <preface id=
"preface">
324 <title>PREFACE
</title>
325 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
326 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
329 <emphasis role=
"bold">At the end
</emphasis> of his review of my first
330 book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David
331 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
332 computer-related texts, wrote this:
336 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
337 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
338 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
339 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
340 David Pogue,
<quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
345 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
346 software, or
<quote>code,
</quote> functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
347 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
348 could always
<quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome
</quote>-like simply flip a
349 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
350 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
351 <quote>affect
</quote> us anymore.
354 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
355 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
356 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
357 causes even after the modem is turned
359 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
360 on-line have fundamentally affected
<quote>people who aren't online.
</quote> There
361 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
363 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
365 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
366 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
367 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
368 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
372 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
373 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of
<quote>free culture
</quote>—not
374 <quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free beer
</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
375 free software movement
<footnote>
377 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
378 </para></footnote>), but
<quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free speech,
</quote> <quote>free markets,
</quote>
379 <quote>free trade,
</quote> <quote>free enterprise,
</quote> <quote>free will,
</quote> and
<quote>free elections.
</quote> A
380 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
381 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
382 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
383 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
384 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
385 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
386 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
387 <quote>permission culture
</quote>—a culture in which creators get to create
388 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
392 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not
<quote>we
</quote>
393 on the Left or
<quote>you
</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
394 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
395 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
396 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
397 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
398 culture deem fundamental.
400 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
401 <indexterm><primary>Stevens, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
403 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
404 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
405 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
406 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
407 As William Safire described marching
<quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
408 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
409 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,
</quote> he formulated perhaps
410 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
412 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
416 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
417 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
418 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
419 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
420 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
421 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
422 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
427 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
428 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
429 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
430 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
431 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
432 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
433 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
434 Safire's left or on his right.
437 <emphasis role=
"strong">The inspiration
</emphasis> for the title and for
438 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
439 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
440 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
441 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
442 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
443 that this work is
<quote>merely
</quote> derivative.
446 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
447 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
448 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
449 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
450 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
451 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
452 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
453 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
456 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
457 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
458 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
459 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
460 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
464 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
465 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
466 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
467 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
468 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
469 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
470 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
478 <chapter label=
"0" id=
"c-introduction">
479 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
480 <indexterm id='idxairtraffic' class='startofrange'
>
481 <primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.
</primary>
483 <indexterm id='idxlandownership' class='startofrange'
>
484 <primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary>
486 <indexterm id='idxproprigtair' class='startofrange'
>
487 <primary>property rights
</primary>
488 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
490 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
492 <emphasis role=
"strong">On December
17</emphasis>,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
493 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
494 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
495 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
496 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
497 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
500 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
501 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
502 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
503 and all the space above, to
<quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.
</quote><footnote><para>
504 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
505 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
508 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
509 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
510 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
513 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
514 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
515 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
516 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
517 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
518 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
519 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
522 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
524 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
525 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
526 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
527 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
528 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
529 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
530 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to
<quote>an indefinite
531 extent, upwards,
</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
532 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
537 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
538 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
539 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
540 <quote>taking
</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
541 that
<quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
542 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.
</quote> But Justice Douglas
543 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
544 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
548 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
549 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
550 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
551 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
552 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
553 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
554 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
555 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
557 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
558 that there could be a
<quote>taking
</quote> if the government's use of its land
559 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
560 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece,
<quote>(Intellectual)
561 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
562 Authorship,
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
563 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
565 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
566 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
571 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.
</quote>
574 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
575 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
576 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
578 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line:
<quote>Common sense revolts
579 at the idea.
</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
580 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
581 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
582 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
584 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
585 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
586 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
588 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
589 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
590 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
591 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
592 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
593 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
594 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
595 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
596 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by
<quote>what
597 seemed reasonable
</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
598 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
599 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
600 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
601 end, the force of what seems
<quote>obvious
</quote> to everyone else
—the power of
602 <quote>common sense
</quote>—would prevail. Their
<quote>private interest
</quote> would not be
603 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
605 <indexterm startref='idxproprigtair' class='endofrange'
/>
606 <indexterm startref='idxlandownership' class='endofrange'
/>
607 <indexterm startref='idxairtraffic' class='endofrange'
/>
608 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwin' class='startofrange'
>
609 <primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary>
611 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
612 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
613 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
615 <emphasis role='strong'
>Edwin Howard Armstrong
</emphasis> is one of
616 America's forgotten inventor geniuses. He came to the great American
617 inventor scene just after the titans Thomas Edison and Alexander
618 Graham Bell. But his work in the area of radio technology was perhaps
619 the most important of any single inventor in the first fifty years of
620 radio. He was better educated than Michael Faraday, who as a
621 bookbinder's apprentice had discovered electric induction in
1831. But
622 he had the same intuition about how the world of radio worked, and on
623 at least three occasions, Armstrong invented profoundly important
624 technologies that advanced our understanding of radio.
625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
628 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
629 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
630 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
631 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
632 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
633 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
634 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
635 much less transmitter power and static.
638 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
639 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
640 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
641 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
642 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
643 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
644 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
645 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
646 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.
</quote>
649 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
653 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
654 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
655 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
656 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
657 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
658 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
<quote>music
659 box.
</quote><footnote><para>
660 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
661 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
666 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
667 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
668 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
669 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
670 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
671 a handful of networks.
675 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
676 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
677 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
678 that removed static from
<quote>radio.
</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
679 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
680 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
684 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
685 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
686 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
687 RCA.
<footnote><para> See
<quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
688 Electronic Era,
</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
689 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
691 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
695 <indexterm id='idxlessing' class='startofrange'
>
696 <primary>Lessing, Lawrence
</primary>
699 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
700 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
701 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
703 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
707 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
708 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
709 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
710 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
711 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
712 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
717 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
718 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
719 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
720 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
721 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
722 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
723 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
724 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
725 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
726 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
727 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
732 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
733 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
734 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
735 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
740 <indexterm startref='idxlessing' class='endofrange'
/>
741 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
743 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
744 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
745 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
746 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
747 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
748 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
749 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
753 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
754 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
755 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
756 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
757 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
758 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
759 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
760 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
761 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
762 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
764 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwin' class='endofrange'
/>
766 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
767 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
768 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
769 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
770 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
771 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
772 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
773 course always public spirited; the reality is something
774 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
775 to themselves, would crumble in
777 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
778 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
779 effect of technological change.
782 <emphasis role=
"strong">There's no
</emphasis> single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
783 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
784 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
785 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
786 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
787 before.
<footnote><para>
788 Amanda Lenhart,
<quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
789 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,
</quote> Pew Internet and American
790 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
791 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
793 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
797 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
798 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
799 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
800 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
801 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
802 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
803 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
804 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
805 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
808 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
809 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
810 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
811 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
812 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
813 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
817 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
818 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
819 regulation of each. By
<quote>commercial culture
</quote> I mean that part of our
820 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
821 <quote>noncommercial culture
</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
824 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
825 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his
<quote>Reader,
</quote> or
826 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
827 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
828 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
831 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
832 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
833 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
834 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
835 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
836 left this culture
<quote>free.
</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
837 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
838 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
839 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
842 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
843 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
844 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
845 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
846 marketplace.
<footnote>
848 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
849 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
850 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
851 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
852 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
853 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
854 D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote> Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
856 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
858 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
859 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
860 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
861 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
864 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
865 been erased.
<footnote><para>
866 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
868 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
870 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
871 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
872 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
873 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
874 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
875 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
876 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
877 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
878 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
879 culture, more and more a permission culture.
881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
883 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
884 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
885 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
886 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
887 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
888 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
889 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
890 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
891 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
892 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
896 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
897 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
898 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
899 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
900 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
901 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
902 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
903 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
904 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
905 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
906 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
907 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
908 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
909 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
910 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
911 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
912 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
915 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
916 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
917 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
918 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
919 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
920 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
924 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
926 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
927 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether
<quote>piracy
</quote> will
928 be permitted, and whether
<quote>property
</quote> will be protected. The
<quote>war
</quote> that
929 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
930 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
931 calls his
<quote>own terrorist war
</quote><footnote><para>
932 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
933 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,
</quote> <citetitle>New York
934 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
935 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
936 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
937 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
941 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
942 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
943 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
944 <quote>creative property.
</quote> I believe that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that the
945 law, properly tuned, should punish
<quote>piracy,
</quote> whether on or off the
949 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
950 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
951 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet
<quote>pirates
</quote> will also rid our
952 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
955 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
956 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
957 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
958 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
959 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
961 Neil W. Netanel,
<quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
962 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
963 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
965 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
966 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
967 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
968 could cultivate and extend our culture.
971 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
972 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
973 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
974 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
975 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
976 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
977 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
978 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
979 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
983 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
984 <quote>centrality of technology
</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
985 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
986 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
987 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
991 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
992 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
993 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
994 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
995 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
996 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
997 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
999 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1000 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1002 <emphasis role=
"strong">Like the Causbys'
</emphasis> battle, this war is, in part, about
<quote>property.
</quote> The
1003 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1004 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1005 this
<quote>property
</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1006 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1007 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1008 of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1009 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1010 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1011 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1012 <quote>trespassing
</quote> upon legitimate claims of
<quote>property.
</quote> It is as plain to
1013 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1016 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1017 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1018 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
1020 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1021 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1022 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1023 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1025 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1026 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1030 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1031 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1032 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1033 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1034 our
<quote>culture
</quote> was as
<quote>owned
</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1035 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1036 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1037 accepted as it is now.
1040 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1041 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1042 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1043 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1046 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1047 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1050 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1051 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1052 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1053 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1054 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1057 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1058 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1059 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1060 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1063 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1064 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1066 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1067 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1068 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1069 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of
<quote>intellectual
1070 property.
</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1071 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1072 this silliness will be much more profound.
1073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1076 <emphasis role=
"strong">The struggle
</emphasis> that rages just now centers on two ideas:
<quote>piracy
</quote> and
1077 <quote>property.
</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1081 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1082 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1083 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1084 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1085 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1086 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1089 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1090 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1091 government, pushed by big media to respond to this
<quote>something new,
</quote> is
1092 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1093 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let
<quote>common
1094 sense
</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1095 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1096 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1097 fundamental about who we have always been.
1100 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1101 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1102 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1103 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1104 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1105 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1109 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1110 <title><quote>PIRACY
</quote></title>
1112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1113 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1114 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1117 <emphasis role=
"strong">Since the inception
</emphasis> of the law regulating creative property, there has
1118 been a war against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1119 <quote>piracy,
</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1120 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1121 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1125 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1126 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1127 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1129 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1132 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1135 Today we are in the middle of another
<quote>war
</quote> against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The
1136 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1137 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1138 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1139 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1140 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1144 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1145 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1146 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1147 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1148 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will
<quote>rob the author of the
1152 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1153 increasingly to technology to defend their
<quote>property
</quote> against this
1154 <quote>piracy.
</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1155 raised to believe that
<quote>property
</quote> should be
<quote>free.
</quote> Forget tattoos,
1156 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1157 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1160 There's no doubt that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1161 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1162 notion of
<quote>piracy
</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1163 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1166 The idea goes something like this:
1170 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1171 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1172 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1173 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1174 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1178 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1179 <indexterm><primary>Girl Schouts
</primary></indexterm>
1180 <indexterm id='idxifvalue' class='startofrange'
>
1181 <primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary>
1184 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1185 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1186 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1188 See Rochelle Dreyfuss,
<quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1189 in the Pepsi Generation,
</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1191 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1192 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1193 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1194 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1196 Lisa Bannon,
<quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1197 Up,
</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1198 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1199 Zittrain,
<quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1200 Speech, No One Wins,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1201 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1203 There was
<quote>value
</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1204 <quote>right
</quote>—even against the Girl Scouts.
1206 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1208 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1209 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1211 of law protecting creative property. But the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1212 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1213 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1215 <indexterm startref='idxifvalue' class='endofrange'
/>
1217 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1218 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1219 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1220 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1221 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1224 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1225 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1226 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1227 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1228 copyright law today regulates both.
1231 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1232 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1233 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1234 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1235 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1236 more expense of doing business.
1238 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1239 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1241 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1242 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1243 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1244 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1245 <quote>copying,
</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1246 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1247 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1248 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1249 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1250 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1251 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1252 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1253 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1254 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1255 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1257 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the
<quote>Rise of the Creative
1258 Class.
</quote><footnote>
1261 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York:
1262 Basic Books,
2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1263 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1264 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1265 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1266 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1267 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1269 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1270 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1272 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1273 this creative class.
1276 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1277 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1278 context the current battles about behavior labeled
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
1282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1283 <chapter label=
"1" id=
"creators">
1284 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1285 <indexterm id=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'
>
1286 <primary>animated cartoons
</primary>
1288 <indexterm id='idxcartoonfilms' class='startofrange'
>
1289 <primary>cartoon films
</primary>
1292 <emphasis role=
"strong">In
1928</emphasis>, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1293 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1294 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1295 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1296 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1299 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1300 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1301 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1302 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1303 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1304 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1308 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1309 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1310 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1311 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1315 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1316 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1317 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1318 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1319 synchronization was pretty close.
1322 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1323 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1324 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1325 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1326 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1328 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1329 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1334 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1335 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly:
<quote>I have never been so thrilled
1336 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.
</quote>
1337 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1340 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1341 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1342 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1343 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1344 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1345 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1346 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1349 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1350 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1351 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1352 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1355 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1356 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1357 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1358 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1359 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1360 and among the best of its genre.
1363 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1366 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1367 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1369 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1370 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1371 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1372 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>:
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote> <quote>The
1373 Simpleton
</quote> (Delille),
<quote>Mischief Makers
</quote> (Carbonara),
<quote>Joyful Hurry No.
1</quote>
1374 (Baron), and
<quote>Gawky Rube
</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song,
<quote>The Turkey in the
1375 Straw,
</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1376 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1378 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1379 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1380 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1381 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote>
1382 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1386 This
<quote>borrowing
</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1387 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1388 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1390 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman,
<quote>The Mouse
1391 that Ate the Public Domain,
</quote> Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1392 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1394 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1395 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1396 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1397 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1398 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1399 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1400 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1401 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1405 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1406 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1407 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1408 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1409 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1410 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1411 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1414 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1415 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1416 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1417 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1418 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1419 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1420 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1421 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1422 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1423 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1424 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1426 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1427 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1428 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1429 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1430 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1431 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1432 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1433 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1435 <indexterm startref=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'
/>
1437 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1438 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1439 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1440 its importance. We could call this
<quote>Disney creativity,
</quote> though that
1441 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely,
<quote>Walt Disney
1442 creativity
</quote>—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1443 culture around us and makes it something different.
1445 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1446 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1447 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1448 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1449 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1451 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1452 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the
<quote>average
</quote> term by
1454 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1455 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1456 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1458 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1459 Web site associated with this book, available at
1460 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1462 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1463 copyright holders of a creative work had an
<quote>exclusive right
</quote> to control
1464 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1465 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1468 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1469 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1470 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a
<quote>lawyer-free
1471 zone.
</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1472 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1473 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1474 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1477 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1478 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1479 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1480 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1483 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1484 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1485 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1486 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1487 content from before the Great Depression.
1489 <indexterm startref='idxcartoonfilms' class='endofrange'
/>
1491 <emphasis role=
"strong">Of course
</emphasis>, Walt Disney had no monopoly on
<quote>Walt Disney creativity.
</quote>
1492 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1493 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1497 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1498 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1499 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1500 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1501 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1502 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1503 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1506 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1507 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1508 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1509 the stories that these
<quote>graphic novels
</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1510 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are
<quote>men in tights.
</quote>
1511 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1512 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1513 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1514 interestingly different way.
1517 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1518 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1519 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1522 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1523 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1524 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1525 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1526 transforming it either subtly or
1527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1528 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1529 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1530 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1531 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently
<quote>different.
</quote> But they
1532 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1533 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1534 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1537 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1538 huge. More than
33,
000 <quote>circles
</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1539 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1540 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1541 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1542 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1543 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1544 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1545 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1548 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1549 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1550 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1551 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1552 one. Doujinshi are plainly
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> There is no general
1553 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1554 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1555 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1556 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that
<quote>taking
</quote> without
1557 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1558 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1559 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1561 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1562 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1565 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1566 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1567 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me,
<quote>The
1568 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1569 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1571 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1572 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them
</quote>
1573 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1575 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1576 York: Perennial,
2000).
1579 <indexterm><primary>Superman comics
</primary></indexterm>
1581 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1582 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1583 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me,
<quote>there are these rules
1584 and you have to stick to them.
</quote> There are things Superman
<quote>cannot
</quote>
1585 do.
<quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1586 which are fifty years old.
</quote>
1588 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1590 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1591 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1592 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1593 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1594 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1595 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1596 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1598 See Salil K. Mehra,
<quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1599 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?
</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1600 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
<quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1601 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1602 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1603 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1604 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1605 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.
</quote>
1609 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1610 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1611 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1612 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1613 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1614 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1615 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1616 a more general pattern of blocking this
<quote>free taking
</quote> by the doujinshi
1620 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1621 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1622 a friend from a major Japanese law firm.
<quote>We don't have enough
1623 lawyers,
</quote> he told me one afternoon. There
<quote>just aren't enough resources
1624 to prosecute cases like this.
</quote>
1627 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1628 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1629 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1630 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1632 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1633 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1634 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1635 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1636 their clients or hurt them?
1639 <emphasis role='strong'
>Let's pause
</emphasis> for a moment.
1642 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1643 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1644 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1647 We live in a world that celebrates
<quote>property.
</quote> I am one of those
1648 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1649 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1650 <quote>intellectual property.
</quote><footnote><para>
1652 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1653 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1654 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1655 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1656 describes a set of
<quote>property
</quote> rights
—copyright, patents,
1657 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1659 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1661 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1662 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1666 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1667 plenty of value out there that
<quote>property
</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1668 mean
<quote>money can't buy you love,
</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1669 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1670 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1671 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1672 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1673 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1674 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1675 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1676 Disney's use would have been considered
<quote>fair.
</quote> There was nothing
1677 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1681 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1682 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1683 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1686 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1690 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1691 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1692 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1693 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1694 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1695 form, whether large or small.
1698 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1699 say that the copycat comic artists are
<quote>stealing.
</quote> This form of Walt
1700 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1701 particular find it hard to say why.
1704 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1705 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1706 without asking or paying for the privilege. (
<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1707 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1708 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?
</quote>) Acting companies
1709 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1710 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1711 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1712 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1713 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1714 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1715 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1718 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1719 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1720 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1721 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1722 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1723 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1724 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1725 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1729 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1730 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1731 question instead is
<quote><emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?
</quote>
1732 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1733 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1734 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1735 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1736 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1737 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1741 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1742 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1743 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1748 <chapter label=
"2" id=
"mere-copyists">
1749 <title>CHAPTER TWO:
<quote>Mere Copyists
</quote></title>
1750 <indexterm id='idxcameratech' class='startofrange'
>
1751 <primary>camera technology
</primary>
1753 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1754 <primary>photography
</primary>
1756 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1758 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1839</emphasis>, Louis Daguerre invented
1759 the first practical technology for producing what we would call
1760 <quote>photographs.
</quote> Appropriately enough, they were called
1761 <quote>daguerreotypes.
</quote> The process was complicated and
1762 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1763 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1764 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1765 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1768 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1769 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1770 <quote>automatic pictures.
</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1771 making
<quote>negatives.
</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1772 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1773 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1774 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1775 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1777 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1779 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1780 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1783 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1784 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1786 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1787 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1788 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1789 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1790 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1791 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1792 population of photographers.
1795 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1796 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1797 marketed on the basis of its simplicity.
<quote>You press the button and we
1798 do the rest.
</quote><footnote><para>
1800 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1801 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1802 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1806 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1807 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1808 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1809 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1810 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1811 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1812 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1813 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1814 chemicals.
<footnote>
1817 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1819 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1824 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1825 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1826 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1827 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1828 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1829 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1830 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1831 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1832 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1833 percent.
<footnote><para>
1836 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1837 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1839 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1842 <indexterm startref='idxcameratech' class='endofrange'
/>
1843 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1847 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1848 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1849 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1850 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1851 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes,
<quote>For the
1852 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1853 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1854 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1855 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1856 interpretation or bias.
</quote><footnote><para>
1862 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1863 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1864 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1865 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1866 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1867 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its
<quote>quality
</quote>;
1868 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1869 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1870 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1871 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1875 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1876 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1877 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1878 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1879 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1880 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1881 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1882 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1884 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1885 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1886 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1887 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1892 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1893 familiar. The photographer was
<quote>taking
</quote> something from the person or
1894 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1895 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1896 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1899 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1900 that they thought valuable.
1902 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1904 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1905 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1906 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1907 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1908 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1911 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote>
1912 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1913 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1914 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1915 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1916 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1917 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1918 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1920 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
1922 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1923 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1924 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1925 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1926 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1927 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1928 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1929 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1930 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1932 See Melville B. Nimmer,
<quote>The Right of Publicity,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1933 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
<quote>Privacy,
</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1934 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1935 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1940 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1941 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1942 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1943 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1944 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1945 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1946 Kodak would be benefiting from the
<quote>theft
</quote> committed by the
1947 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1948 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1949 from the
<quote>image-right
</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1950 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1951 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1952 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1957 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1958 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1959 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1960 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1961 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1962 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1963 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1964 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1965 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1966 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1969 <indexterm><primary>camera technology
</primary></indexterm>
1971 <emphasis role='strong'
>If you drive
</emphasis> through San
1972 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses
1973 painted over with colorful and striking images, and the logo
1974 <quote>Just Think!
</quote> in place of the name of a school. But
1975 there's little that's
<quote>just
</quote> cerebral in the projects
1976 that these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies
1977 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even
1978 the film of your VCR. Rather the
<quote>film
</quote> of digital
1979 cameras. Just Think! is a project that enables kids to make films, as
1980 a way to understand and critique the filmed culture that they find all
1981 around them. Each year, these busses travel to more than thirty
1982 schools and enable three hundred to five hundred children to learn
1983 something about media by doing something with media. By doing, they
1984 think. By tinkering, they learn.
1986 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1987 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1989 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1990 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1991 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it,
<quote>Five years ago, a good
1992 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1993 professional quality for $
595.
</quote><footnote><para>
1995 H. Edward Goldberg,
<quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1996 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,
</quote>
1997 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1998 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
2000 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
2001 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
2002 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
2003 learning more and more of something teachers call
<quote>media literacy.
</quote>
2006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
2007 <quote>Media literacy,
</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
2008 Think!, puts it,
<quote>is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
2009 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
2010 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
2011 the way people access it.
</quote>
2012 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
2015 This may seem like an odd way to think about
<quote>literacy.
</quote> For most
2016 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
2017 and noticing split infinitives are the things that
<quote>literate
</quote> people know
2020 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
2022 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
2023 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
2024 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
2026 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2027 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990);
<quote>Findings on Family and TV
2028 Study,
</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
2030 it is increasingly important to understand the
<quote>grammar
</quote> of media. For
2031 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2032 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2033 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2034 (at least at first) terrible media.
2037 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2038 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2039 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
2040 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2041 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2042 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2043 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2044 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2047 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2048 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2049 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2050 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2051 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2052 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2054 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2056 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2057 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2058 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2061 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2062 about
<quote>the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2063 texture.
</quote><footnote>
2066 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2068 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2069 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2071 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2072 <quote>played
</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2073 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2074 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2075 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2076 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2077 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2078 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2080 See Scott Steinberg,
<quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,
</quote> E!online,
4
2081 November
2000, available at
2082 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>;
<quote>Timeline,
</quote> 22 November
2000,
2084 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2087 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2089 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2090 describes,
<quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2091 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2092 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2093 led.
</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2096 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2097 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2098 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2099 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2103 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2104 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2105 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2106 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2111 <quote>Read-only.
</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2112 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2116 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2117 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2118 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2119 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2122 and this literacy in particular, is to
<quote>empower people to choose the
2123 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2124 express.
</quote><footnote>
2127 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2128 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2129 </para></footnote> It is to enable students
<quote>to communicate in the
2130 language of the twenty-first century.
</quote><footnote><para>
2135 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2137 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2138 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2139 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2140 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2141 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2142 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2143 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2144 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2145 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2146 students know something about
—gun violence.
2149 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2150 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2151 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2152 away. The
<quote>kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,
</quote>
2153 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2154 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2157 Using whatever
<quote>free web stuff they could find,
</quote> and relatively simple
2158 tools to enable the kids to mix
<quote>image, sound, and text,
</quote> Barish said
2159 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2160 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2161 close to the lives of these students. The project
<quote>gave them a tool
2162 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2163 it,
</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2164 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2165 been created using only text.
<quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2166 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2167 gone and done something else,
</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2168 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2169 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2170 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2171 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2176 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?
</quote> I asked. In part,
2177 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2178 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of
<quote>constructing
2179 meaning.
</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2180 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2181 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2182 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2187 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2188 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2189 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2190 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2191 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2192 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2193 you say,
<quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.
</quote>
2194 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2195 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2196 you. [But i]nstead, if you say,
<quote>Well, with all these things that you
2197 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2198 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2199 for me something that reflects that.
</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2200 camera and
… saying,
<quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2201 make a little movie.
</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2202 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2203 about the topic.
…
2206 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2207 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2208 bump up against the fact,
<quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2209 to write something.
</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2210 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2213 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2214 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2215 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2217 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2218 had a lot of power with this language.
2220 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2221 not match with any start quote. -->
2223 <indexterm><primary>World Trade Center
</primary></indexterm>
2225 <emphasis role='strong'
>When two planes
</emphasis> crashed into the
2226 World Trade Center, another into the Pentagon, and a fourth into a
2227 Pennsylvania field, all media around the world shifted to this
2228 news. Every moment of just about every day for that week, and for
2229 weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold the
2230 story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a
2231 retelling, because we had seen the events that were described. The
2232 genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the delayed second
2233 attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole world would be
2237 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2238 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2239 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was
<quote>balance,
</quote>
2240 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2241 increasingly come to expect it,
<quote>news as entertainment,
</quote> even if the
2242 entertainment is tragedy.
2244 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2245 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2247 But in addition to this produced news about the
<quote>tragedy of September
2248 11,
</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2249 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2250 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2251 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2252 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2253 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2254 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2255 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2256 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2257 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2258 was also the Internet.
2261 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2262 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2263 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2264 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2267 by a student on the
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2271 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2272 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2273 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2274 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2275 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2276 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2277 spread practically instantaneously.
2280 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2281 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2282 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2283 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2284 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2285 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2286 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2288 <indexterm><primary>blogs (Web-logs)
</primary></indexterm>
2290 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2291 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2292 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2293 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2294 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2295 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2296 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2297 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2298 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2299 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2300 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2301 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2304 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2305 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2306 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2307 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2308 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2311 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2312 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2314 <indexterm><primary>Tocqueville, Alexis de
</primary></indexterm>
2316 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2317 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2318 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2319 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2320 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2321 most important account of early
<quote>Democracy in America.
</quote> It wasn't
2322 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2323 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2324 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2325 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2326 deliberated. Members argued about the
<quote>right
</quote> result; they tried to
2327 persuade each other of the
<quote>right
</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2328 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2329 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2331 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2332 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2336 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2337 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2338 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2340 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin,
<quote>Deliberation Day,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2341 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2343 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2344 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2345 place for
<quote>democratic deliberation
</quote> to occur.
2348 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2349 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2350 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2351 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2352 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2353 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2355 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2356 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2357 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2358 little beyond what our friends say.
2360 <indexterm id='idxblogs1' class='startofrange'
>
2361 <primary>blogs (Web-logs)
</primary>
2364 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2365 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2366 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2367 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2368 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2371 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2375 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2376 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2377 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2378 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2379 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2380 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2383 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2384 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2385 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2386 is having an effect.
2387 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2389 <indexterm><primary>Thurmond, Strom
</primary></indexterm>
2391 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2392 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2393 <quote>misspoke
</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2394 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2395 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2396 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2397 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2398 more instances of the same
<quote>misspeaking
</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2399 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2400 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2402 Noah Shachtman,
<quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,
</quote> New
2403 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2405 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2408 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2409 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2410 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2411 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2415 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2416 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2417 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2418 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2419 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2420 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2421 peer-generated rankings.
2423 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2424 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2427 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2429 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2430 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2431 difference is the absence of a financial
<quote>conflict of interest.
</quote> <quote>I think you
2432 have to take the conflict of interest
</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2433 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2434 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2435 get it out of the way.
</quote>
2437 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2438 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2440 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2441 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2442 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2443 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2444 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2446 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2448 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2449 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2450 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2451 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2452 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2453 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2454 told her that
<emphasis>they
</emphasis> were writing
<quote>the story.
</quote>)
2456 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2457 debate
—<quote>amateur
</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2458 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2459 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2460 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2461 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2462 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2464 John Schwartz,
<quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2465 Information Online,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2466 D. Kramer,
<quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,
</quote>
2467 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2468 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2470 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2471 <quote>triangulate,
</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2472 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2473 out of it
</quote>—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2476 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2477 with blogs.
<quote>It's going to become an essential skill,
</quote> Winer predicts,
2478 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2479 not clear that
<quote>journalism
</quote> is happy about this
—some journalists
2480 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2483 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2484 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2485 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
2486 <indexterm><primary>blogs (Web-logs)
</primary></indexterm>
2487 See Michael Falcone,
<quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?
</quote> <citetitle>New
2488 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. (
<quote>Not all news organizations have
2489 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2490 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2491 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2492 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2493 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2494 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.
</quote>)
2496 But it is clear that we are still in transition.
<quote>A
2498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2499 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,
</quote> Winer told me.
2500 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2501 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2502 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said,
<quote>we will
2503 be the last thing that gets shut down.
</quote>
2506 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
<quote>you
2507 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.
</quote>
2508 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2509 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2510 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2511 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2512 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2513 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2514 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2515 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2516 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2517 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2518 extraordinary to report.
2520 <indexterm startref='idxblogs1' class='endofrange'
/>
2521 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2522 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2523 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2525 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'
>
2526 <primary>advertising
</primary>
2529 <emphasis role='strong'
>John Seely Brown
</emphasis> is the chief
2530 scientist of the Xerox Corporation. His work, as his Web site
2531 describes it, is
<quote>human learning and
… the creation of
2532 knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation.
</quote>
2535 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2536 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2537 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2538 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2542 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When
<quote>a lot of us grew up,
</quote>
2543 he explains, that tinkering was done
<quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2544 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.
</quote> But digital technologies
2545 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2546 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2547 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2549 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2550 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2551 or
<quote>free collage,
</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2552 the tinkering of many others.
2555 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2556 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2557 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2558 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2559 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2562 This opportunity creates a
<quote>completely new kind of learning platform,
</quote>
2563 as Brown describes.
<quote>As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2564 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2565 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2566 if they can improve it.
</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2567 apprenticeship.
<quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.
</quote>
2570 In this process,
<quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2571 They are code.
</quote> Kids are
<quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2572 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2573 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2574 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2575 you tinker the more you improve.
</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2579 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2580 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2581 it,
<quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2582 intelligence.
</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2583 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2584 text.
<quote>The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2585 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2586 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2587 these multiple forms of intelligence.
</quote>
2589 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'
/>
2590 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2592 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2593 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2596 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2597 kind of recognition.
2600 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2601 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2602 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2603 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2604 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2605 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2606 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2609 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2610 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2611 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2612 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the
<quote>right to
2613 tinker
</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2614 general.
<footnote><para>
2616 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel,
<quote>Technological Access
2617 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,
</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2618 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2620 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2621 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2624 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,
</quote> Brown
2625 explains. We need to
<quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2626 and want to learn.
</quote>
2629 <quote>Yet,
</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2630 evince,
<quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2631 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2632 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2633 system that closes down that part of the brain.
</quote>
2635 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2637 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2638 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2639 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2640 the law to close down that technology.
2643 <quote>No way to run a culture,
</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2644 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2645 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2649 <chapter label=
"3" id=
"catalogs">
2650 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2651 <indexterm><primary>RPI
</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</see></indexterm>
2652 <indexterm id=
"idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'
>
2653 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</primary>
2656 <emphasis role='strong'
>In the fall
</emphasis> of
2002, Jesse Jordan
2657 of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as a freshman at Rensselaer
2658 Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York. His major at RPI was
2659 information technology. Though he is not a programmer, in October
2660 Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search engine technology that
2661 was available on the RPI network.
2664 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2665 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2666 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2667 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2668 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2669 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2672 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2673 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2674 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2675 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2676 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2679 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2681 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2682 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2683 engines can do this even better. The idea of
<quote>intranet
</quote> search
2684 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2685 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2686 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2687 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2688 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2691 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2692 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2693 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2694 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2695 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2696 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2697 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2700 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2701 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2702 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2703 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2704 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2705 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2706 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2707 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2708 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2712 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2713 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2714 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2715 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2716 be on users' computers.
2719 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2720 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2721 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2722 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2724 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2728 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2729 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2730 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2731 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2732 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2733 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2734 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2735 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2736 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2737 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2738 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2739 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2743 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2744 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2745 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2746 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2747 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2748 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2749 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2752 <quote>It was absurd,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>I don't think I did anything
2753 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2754 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2755 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2756 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2757 easier to use
</quote>—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2758 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2759 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2760 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2761 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2764 <indexterm><primary>statutory damages
</primary></indexterm>
2766 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2767 network and had therefore
<quote>willfully
</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2769 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2770 <quote>willful infringement,
</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2771 call
<quote>statutory damages.
</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2772 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2773 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2774 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2776 <indexterm><primary>Princeton University
</primary></indexterm>
2777 <indexterm><primary>Michigan Technical University
</primary></indexterm>
2779 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2780 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2781 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2782 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2783 huge demands for
<quote>damages
</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2784 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2785 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2786 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2787 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2788 2001.
<footnote><para>
2791 Tim Goral,
<quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2792 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,
</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2793 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2796 <indexterm startref=
"idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'
/>
2798 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2799 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2800 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2801 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2802 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2804 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt
</primary></indexterm>
2806 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2807 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2808 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2809 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2810 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2811 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2812 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse,
<quote>You don't want to pay another
2813 visit to a dentist like me.
</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2814 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2817 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2818 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2819 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2820 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2821 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2823 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2824 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2827 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2828 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2831 <primary>artists
</primary>
2832 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
2835 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2836 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2837 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2838 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2839 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2840 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2841 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2843 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2844 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2845 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2847 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2848 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2849 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2851 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in
<quote>KaZaA and Punishment,
</quote>
2852 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2856 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2857 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2858 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2863 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2864 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2865 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2866 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2870 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2871 his father told me, Jesse
<quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2872 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2873 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2874 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.
</quote>
2876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2878 <chapter label=
"4" id=
"pirates">
2879 <title>CHAPTER FOUR:
<quote>Pirates
</quote></title>
2880 <indexterm><primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary></indexterm>
2882 <emphasis role='strong'
>If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
</emphasis>
2883 using the creative property of others without their
2884 permission
—if
<quote>if value, then right
</quote> is
2885 true
—then the history of the content industry is a history of
2886 piracy. Every important sector of
<quote>big media
</quote>
2887 today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2888 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last
2889 generation's pirates join this generation's country club
—until
2895 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2897 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2898 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2899 which details Edison's
<quote>adventures
</quote> with copyright and patent.
2900 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2902 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2903 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2904 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2905 exercised through a monopoly
<quote>trust,
</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2906 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2907 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2908 this creative property
2909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2910 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2913 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2917 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2918 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2919 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2920 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2921 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2922 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2923 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2926 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2927 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2928 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2929 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2930 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2931 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2932 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2933 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2934 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2935 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2937 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2938 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2939 posted at
<quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2940 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,
</quote> available at
2941 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2942 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2943 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From
2944 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2945 the Propertization of Copyright
</quote> (September
2002), University of
2946 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2947 Working Paper No.
159.
2948 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
2950 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2951 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2952 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2956 The Napsters of those days, the
<quote>independents,
</quote> were companies like
2957 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2958 resisted.
<quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2959 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2960 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.
</quote><footnote><para>
2962 Marc Wanamaker,
<quote>The First Studios,
</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2963 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2965 That led the independents to flee the East
2966 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2967 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2968 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2972 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2973 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2974 patent holder a truly
<quote>limited
</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2977 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2978 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2979 Edison's creative property.
2982 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2983 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2985 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2986 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2988 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2989 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2991 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil
</primary></indexterm>
2993 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2994 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2995 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2996 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2997 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2998 1899 hit
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2999 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
3000 right to perform it publicly.
3002 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3004 But what if I wanted to record
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> using Edison's phonograph
3005 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
3006 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
3007 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
3008 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
3009 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
3010 <quote>public performance
</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
3011 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
3012 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
3013 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
3014 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
3015 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
3016 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
3017 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
3018 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
3019 its composer anything.
3021 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
3023 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
3024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
3025 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
3027 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3031 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3032 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3033 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3034 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3035 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3036 rights.
<footnote><para>
3038 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3039 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
3040 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3041 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
3042 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3043 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3044 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3048 <indexterm><primary>Sousa, John Philip
</primary></indexterm>
3050 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3051 people's works were
<quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3052 genius of American composers,
</quote><footnote><para>
3054 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
3055 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3057 and the
<quote>music publishing industry
</quote>
3058 was thereby
<quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.
</quote><footnote><para>
3060 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
3061 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3064 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible,
<quote>When they make money
3065 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3067 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3068 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3072 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3073 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3074 player piano argued that
<quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3075 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3076 of anything he had before their introduction.
</quote> Rather, the machines
3077 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3080 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
3081 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3082 Perforating Company of New York).
3083 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3084 Congress was
<quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3085 they represent, and whose servants they are.
</quote> <quote>All talk about
3086 `theft,'
</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3087 wrote,
<quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3088 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3089 statute.
</quote><footnote><para>
3091 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3092 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3093 Graphophone Company Association).
3095 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3098 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3099 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3100 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the
<quote>mechanical
3101 reproductions
</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3102 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3103 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3104 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3105 recorded once. This is the part of
3107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3108 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3109 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3110 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3113 American law ordinarily calls this a
<quote>compulsory license,
</quote> but I will
3114 refer to it as a
<quote>statutory license.
</quote> A statutory license is a license
3115 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3116 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3117 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3118 the fee set by the statute.
3121 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3122 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3123 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3124 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3125 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3126 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3128 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3131 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3132 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3133 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3134 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3135 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3136 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3137 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3138 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3139 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3140 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3141 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3142 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3145 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3146 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3147 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3148 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3149 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3151 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3154 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3155 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3156 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3161 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3163 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3164 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3165 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3166 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3167 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3168 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3169 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3170 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3171 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3172 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3173 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3174 choice.
<footnote><para>
3176 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3177 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3178 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3179 this report.
</para></footnote>
3183 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3184 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3187 <section id=
"radio">
3188 <title>Radio
</title>
3189 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'
>
3190 <primary>artists
</primary>
3191 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
3194 Radio was also born of piracy.
3197 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3198 <quote>public performance
</quote> of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3200 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3201 record companies printed
<quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast
</quote> and other
3202 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3203 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3204 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3205 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3206 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3207 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3208 Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3209 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3210 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3212 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3213 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3214 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3217 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3218 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3219 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3220 work. It's one thing to have
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> sung on the radio by the
3221 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3222 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3223 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3224 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3225 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3227 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3232 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3233 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3234 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3235 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3236 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3237 of playing the song.
3239 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3240 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3243 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3244 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3245 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3246 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3249 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3250 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3251 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3252 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3253 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3254 <quote>protected
</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3255 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3258 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3260 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3261 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3262 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3263 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3264 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3265 to take something for nothing.
3267 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'
/>
3269 <section id=
"cabletv">
3270 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3271 <indexterm id='idxcabletv1' class='startofrange'
>
3272 <primary>cable television
</primary>
3275 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3278 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3279 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3280 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3281 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3283 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3284 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3285 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3288 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3289 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3290 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3292 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3293 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3294 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.
</quote><footnote><para>
3296 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3297 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3298 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3299 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3301 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3303 There may have been a
<quote>public interest
</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3304 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3305 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony,
<quote>Does public
3306 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?
</quote><footnote><para>
3308 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3309 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3311 As another broadcaster put it,
3315 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3316 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3317 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3319 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3320 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3325 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3329 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3330 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3331 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3332 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3334 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3335 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3336 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3340 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3342 These were
<quote>free-ride[rs],
</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3343 Heston said, who were
<quote>depriving actors of
3344 compensation.
</quote><footnote><para>
3346 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3347 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3348 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3353 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3354 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3358 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3359 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3360 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3361 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3364 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3365 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3367 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3368 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3369 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3371 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3375 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3376 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3379 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3380 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they
<quote>pirated.
</quote>
3381 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3382 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3383 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3384 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3385 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3386 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3387 companies thus built their empire in part upon a
<quote>piracy
</quote> of the value
3388 created by broadcasters' content.
3390 <indexterm startref='idxcabletv1' class='endofrange'
/>
3392 <emphasis role='strong'
>These separate stories
</emphasis> sing a
3393 common theme. If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means using value from someone
3394 else's creative property without permission from that creator
—as
3395 it is increasingly described today
<footnote><para>
3397 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3398 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3399 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3400 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>.
<quote>The
3401 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3402 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet.
</quote>
3404 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3405 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3406 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3407 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3408 last. Every generation
—until now.
3410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3413 <chapter label=
"5" id=
"piracy">
3414 <title>CHAPTER FIVE:
<quote>Piracy
</quote></title>
3416 <emphasis role='strong'
>There is piracy
</emphasis> of copyrighted
3417 material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in many forms. The most
3418 significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized taking of other
3419 people's content within a commercial context. Despite the many
3420 justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
3421 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
3424 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of
<quote>taking
</quote>
3425 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3426 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3427 taking
<quote>piracy,
</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3428 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3429 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3430 has so often done in the past.
3431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3433 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3434 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3435 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3436 <indexterm id='idxcdsforeign' class='startofrange'
>
3437 <primary>CDs
</primary>
3438 <secondary>foreign piracy of
</secondary>
3441 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3442 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3443 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3444 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3445 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3447 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3448 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3449 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3450 also Ben Hunt,
<quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3451 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3453 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3454 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3457 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3458 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3459 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3460 This piracy is wrong.
3463 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3464 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3465 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3466 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3467 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3468 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3469 of our existence, treated as right.
3472 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3473 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3474 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3475 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3476 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3477 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3478 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3479 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3480 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3483 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3484 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3485 <beginpage pagenum=
"77"/>
3486 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3487 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3491 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3492 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3493 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3494 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3496 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3497 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The
3498 New Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3499 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3500 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3501 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3502 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3503 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3504 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3505 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3506 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3507 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3508 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3509 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3511 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents
</primary></indexterm>
3512 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3513 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3514 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3515 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3518 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3520 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3521 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3522 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3523 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3524 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3526 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3527 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3528 144–90.
<quote>In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3529 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3530 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3531 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3532 pirating were not an option.
</quote> Ibid.,
149.
3533 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3537 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3538 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3539 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3540 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3541 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3542 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?
</quote>
3543 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3544 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3545 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3546 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3547 piracy of the tangible.
3549 <indexterm startref='idxcdsforeign' class='endofrange'
/>
3551 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3552 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3553 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3554 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3555 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3556 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3557 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3558 give people the right to
<quote>take
</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3559 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3562 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3563 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3564 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3565 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3566 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what
<quote>property
</quote> means.
3568 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3570 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3571 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
<quote>steal
</quote>
3572 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3573 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3574 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3575 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3576 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3577 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3578 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3579 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3580 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3581 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3582 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3584 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3585 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3587 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3590 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3591 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3592 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3593 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3594 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3595 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3598 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3599 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3600 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3601 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3602 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3603 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3604 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3605 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3606 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3607 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3608 violating the law is still wrong.
3609 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3610 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3611 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3612 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3616 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3617 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3618 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3619 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3620 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3621 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3622 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3626 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3627 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is. Or
3628 at least, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3629 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of
<quote>piracy
</quote> are useful
3630 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3631 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3632 <quote>piracy
</quote> in that sense of the term.
3635 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3636 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3637 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3638 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3641 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3642 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3643 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3644 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3647 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3648 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3652 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3653 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3655 The key to the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that
<quote>rob[s]
3656 the author of [his] profit.
</quote><footnote><para>
3658 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3660 This means we must determine whether
3661 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3663 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3664 author of his profit.
3666 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3668 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3669 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3670 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3671 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3673 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3674 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3675 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3676 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3677 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3678 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3679 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3680 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3681 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3683 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3684 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3685 put together components that had been developed independently.
3686 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3689 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3690 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3691 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3692 system.
<footnote><para>
3694 See Carolyn Lochhead,
<quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,
</quote> <citetitle>San
3695 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1;
<quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,
</quote>
3696 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Napster Names CEO,
3697 Secures New Financing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3698 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3699 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet
</quote> (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3701 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3702 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3703 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3704 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3705 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3706 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3707 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3710 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3711 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3712 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3713 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3716 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3717 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3718 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3719 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3721 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3722 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3723 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3725 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,
</quote> <citetitle>New
3726 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3728 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3729 massive quantity of content is being
<quote>taken
</quote> on these networks. The
3730 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3731 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3734 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3735 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3736 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3737 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3738 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3739 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3744 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3745 different kinds into four types.
3747 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3750 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3751 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3752 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3753 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3754 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3755 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3756 users who download instead of purchasing.
3757 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3761 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3762 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3763 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3764 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3765 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3766 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3767 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3772 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3773 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3774 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3775 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3776 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3777 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3778 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend
<quote>recalling
</quote> old
3779 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3780 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3781 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3782 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3783 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3789 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3790 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3795 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3798 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3799 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3800 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3801 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3803 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3804 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3806 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3807 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3808 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3809 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3810 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3811 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3814 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3815 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3816 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3817 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3818 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of
<quote>theft
</quote> that is
3819 <quote>devastating
</quote> the industry.
3821 <indexterm id='idxcassette' class='startofrange'
>
3822 <primary>cassette recording
</primary>
3823 <secondary>VCRs
</secondary>
3826 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3827 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3828 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3829 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3830 & Young put it,
<quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3831 technology, the labels fought it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3833 <indexterm><primary>cassette recording
</primary></indexterm>
3834 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3835 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3836 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3837 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3838 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption
<quote>Home taping
3839 is killing music.
</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3840 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3841 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3842 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3843 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3844 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3845 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3846 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3847 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3848 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3849 regulating technology was the answer.
3852 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3853 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3854 turnaround.
<quote>In the end,
</quote> Cap Gemini concludes,
<quote>the `crisis'
… was
3855 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3857 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3858 innovation at the major labels.
</quote><footnote><para>
3860 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3863 <indexterm startref='idxcassette' class='endofrange'
/>
3865 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3866 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3867 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3868 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3869 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3870 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3871 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3872 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3875 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3876 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3877 The
<quote>net harm
</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3878 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3879 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3880 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3881 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3885 <indexterm id='idxcdssales' class='startofrange'
>
3886 <primary>CDs
</primary>
3887 <secondary>sales levels of
</secondary>
3890 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3891 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3892 actually suggest it might be close.
3895 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3896 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3897 percent.
<footnote><para>
3899 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3901 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3902 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3903 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3904 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3905 #
16</ulink>:
<quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3906 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3907 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3908 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3909 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3910 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3911 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3914 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3915 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3916 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3917 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3918 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3919 account for at least some of the loss.
<quote>From
1999 to
2001, the average
3920 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19.
</quote><footnote>
3923 Jane Black,
<quote>Big Music's Broken Record,
</quote> BusinessWeek online,
13
3924 February
2003, available at
3925 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3926 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3929 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3930 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes,
<quote>The
3931 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3932 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3933 $
19.99.
</quote><footnote><para>
3940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3941 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3942 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3943 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3944 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3945 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3946 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3949 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3950 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3951 The recording industry constantly asks,
<quote>What's the difference between
3952 downloading a song and stealing a CD?
</quote>—but their own numbers
3953 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3954 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3955 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3956 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3957 Kazaa
<quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit
</quote>—then the industry
3958 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3959 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3960 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3961 a huge difference between
<quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.
</quote>
3963 <indexterm startref='idxcdssales' class='endofrange'
/>
3965 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3966 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3967 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3971 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3972 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3973 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3974 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3975 available.
<footnote><para>
3977 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3978 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3979 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3980 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3981 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3982 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3984 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3985 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3986 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3987 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3988 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3991 <primary>books
</primary>
3992 <secondary>resales of
</secondary>
3995 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3997 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3998 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3999 today.
<footnote><para>
4002 <primary>books
</primary>
4003 <secondary>resales of
</secondary>
4005 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores
4006 in existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the
4007 United States, an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter
4008 Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book
4009 Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
4010 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used
4011 records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See National
4012 Association of Recording Merchandisers,
<quote>2002 Annual Survey
4013 Results,
</quote> available at
4014 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
4016 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
4017 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
4018 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
4019 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
4020 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
4021 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
4022 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
4023 the content they sell.
4025 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
4027 <primary>books
</primary>
4028 <secondary>out of print
</secondary>
4031 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
4032 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
4033 the content available isn't making money from making the content
4034 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
4035 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
4036 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's
<quote>Two Love Songs,
</quote>
4037 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
4038 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
4039 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
4040 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
4041 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
4044 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
4045 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
4046 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
4047 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
4048 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
4051 <indexterm id='idxbooksfreeonline1' class='startofrange'
>
4052 <primary>books
</primary>
4053 <secondary>free on-line releases of
</secondary>
4056 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
4057 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
4058 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
4059 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
4060 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
4061 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
4063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
4064 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
4065 would be a great advertisement for the
<quote>real
</quote> book. People would read
4066 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
4067 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4068 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4069 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4072 <indexterm startref='idxbooksfreeonline1' class='endofrange'
/>
4074 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4075 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4076 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4077 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4080 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4081 understandably says,
<quote>This is how much we've lost,
</quote> we must also ask,
4082 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4083 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4084 unavailable?
</quote>
4087 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4088 chapter, much of the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4089 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4090 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
4091 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4092 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4093 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4094 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4095 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4096 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4097 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4098 found only with time.
4101 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4102 just what you call type A sharing?
</quote>
4105 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4107 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4108 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4110 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4112 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4114 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4115 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4116 <quote>down to zero.
</quote><footnote><para>
4118 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4119 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4122 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
4123 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4124 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
4125 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
4129 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4130 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4131 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4132 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4133 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4134 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4135 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4136 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4137 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4140 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4141 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4142 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4143 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4144 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4145 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4146 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4149 <primary>artists
</primary>
4150 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
4153 So, as we've seen, when
<quote>mechanical reproduction
</quote> threatened the
4154 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4155 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4156 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4157 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4158 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4159 complained to Congress that their
<quote>creative property
</quote> was not being
4160 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4161 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4164 <indexterm id='idxcabletv2' class='startofrange'
>
4165 <primary>cable television
</primary>
4168 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4169 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4170 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4171 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4172 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4178 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4179 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4180 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4181 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4182 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4183 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4184 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4185 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4186 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4187 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4188 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4189 Congress chose a path that would assure
4190 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4191 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4193 <indexterm startref='idxcabletv2' class='endofrange'
/>
4194 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4195 <indexterm id='idxcassettevcrs1' class='startofrange'
>
4196 <primary>cassette recording
</primary>
4197 <secondary>VCRs
</secondary>
4200 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4201 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4202 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4203 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4204 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4205 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4206 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4207 <quote>record
</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4208 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4209 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4210 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4213 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4214 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4215 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4216 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4217 machine to copy only if there were a special
<quote>copy me
</quote> signal on the
4218 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4219 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4220 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4222 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4223 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4224 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4225 for the architecture it chose.
4228 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4229 champion. Valenti called VCRs
<quote>tapeworms.
</quote> He warned,
<quote>When there are
4230 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4231 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4232 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4233 copyright.
</quote><footnote><para>
4235 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4236 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4237 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4238 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4240 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4241 creative judgment,
</quote> he told Congress,
<quote>to understand the devastation
4242 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4243 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4244 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4245 and plain common sense.
</quote><footnote><para>
4247 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4249 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4250 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4252 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4255 — a use the Court would later hold was not
<quote>fair.
</quote> By
4256 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4257 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4258 copyrightowners,
</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would
<quote>take from the
4259 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4260 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4261 profit from its reproduction.
</quote><footnote><para>
4263 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4268 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4269 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4270 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4271 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the
<quote>Hollywood
4272 Circuit
</quote>—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4273 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4274 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4275 called
<quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry
</quote> (worse
4276 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4277 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4278 technology.
<footnote><para>
4280 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4283 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4286 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4289 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4290 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4295 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4296 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4298 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4300 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4301 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4303 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4305 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4310 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4311 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4312 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4313 enough, this
<quote>taking
</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4314 together, a pattern is clear:
4317 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4318 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"left">
4322 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS
<quote>PIRATED
</quote></entry>
4323 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4324 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4329 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4330 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4331 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4332 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4335 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4336 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4338 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4341 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4342 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4343 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4344 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4348 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4349 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4350 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4355 <indexterm startref='idxcassettevcrs1' class='endofrange'
/>
4357 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4358 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4360 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4361 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4362 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4363 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4364 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4365 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4366 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4367 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4368 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,
</quote>
4369 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4370 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
4371 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4373 In each case, throughout our history,
4374 that change meant that someone got a
<quote>free ride
</quote> on someone else's
4378 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4379 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4380 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4381 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4382 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
4383 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4384 the behavior of the
<quote>pirates.
</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4385 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4390 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4391 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4392 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4393 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4394 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4396 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4397 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4398 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4399 permission to record a song?
4402 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4403 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4404 copyright
<quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4405 over all possible uses of his work.
</quote><footnote><para>
4407 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4410 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4411 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4412 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4413 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4414 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4415 facilitate the distribution of content.
4418 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4419 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4420 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4421 should not become a tool for
<quote>stealing
</quote> from artists. But neither
4422 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4423 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4424 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4425 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4426 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4427 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4428 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4429 public interest that innovation continue.
4433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4434 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4435 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4436 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4437 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4438 efficient. Yet these
<quote>potential public benefits,
</quote> as John Schwartz
4439 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
<quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4440 fight.
</quote><footnote><para>
4442 John Schwartz,
<quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4443 Echoes Past Efforts,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4447 <emphasis role='strong'
>Yet when anyone
</emphasis> begins to talk
4448 about
<quote>balance,
</quote> the copyright warriors raise a different
4449 argument.
<quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4450 incentives,
</quote> they say,
<quote>misses a fundamental point. Our
4451 content,
</quote> the warriors insist,
<quote>is our
4452 <emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we wait for Congress to
4453 `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4454 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4455 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether
4456 the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?
</quote>
4459 <quote>It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>,
</quote> the warriors
4460 insist.
<quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4461 is protected.
</quote>
4463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4467 <part id=
"c-property">
4468 <title><quote>PROPERTY
</quote></title>
4472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4473 <emphasis role='strong'
>The copyright warriors
</emphasis> are right: A
4474 copyright is a kind of property. It can be owned and sold, and the law
4475 protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to
4476 hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand
4477 that partially determine the price she can get.
4480 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a
<quote>property
</quote> right is a
4481 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4482 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4483 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4484 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4485 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4486 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4487 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4488 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4492 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4493 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4494 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4495 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4497 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4498 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4499 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4500 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4501 when I copy the way someone else dresses),
<quote>He who receives an idea
4502 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4503 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
</quote><footnote><para>
4505 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4506 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4507 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4511 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4512 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4513 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4515 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4519 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4520 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4521 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4522 <quote>property
</quote> in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4524 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4525 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4526 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4527 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4528 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4529 Adam Mossoff,
<quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,
</quote>
4530 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4534 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4535 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4536 <quote>copyright material is property
</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4537 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4538 these stories, the significance of this true
4539 statement
—<quote>copyright material is property
</quote>— will be a bit
4540 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4541 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4546 <chapter label=
"6" id=
"founders">
4547 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4548 <indexterm><primary>Henry V
</primary></indexterm>
4549 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4550 <indexterm id='idxbooksenglishlaw' class='startofrange'
>
4551 <primary>books
</primary>
4552 <secondary>English copyright law developed for
</secondary>
4555 <emphasis role='strong'
>William Shakespeare
</emphasis> wrote
4556 <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play was first
4557 published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that Shakespeare had
4558 written. He would continue to write plays through
1613, and the plays
4559 that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American culture ever
4560 since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer seeped
4561 into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source. I
4562 once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of
4563 Henry V:
<quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of
4567 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4568 <quote>copy-right
</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4569 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4571 <indexterm><primary>Jonson, Ben
</primary></indexterm>
4572 <indexterm><primary>Dryden, John
</primary></indexterm>
4573 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4574 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4575 handsome
<quote>definitive editions
</quote> of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4576 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4577 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4578 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker,
<quote>Jacob Tonson,
4579 Bookseller,
</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4581 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4582 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4584 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4585 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4587 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4588 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the
<quote>copy
</quote> of
4589 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4592 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4593 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4594 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4596 <indexterm id='idxbritishparliament' class='startofrange'
>
4597 <primary>British Parliament
</primary>
4600 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4601 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4602 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4603 adopted the first
<quote>copyright
</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4604 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4605 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4606 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4607 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4609 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4610 <quote>copyright law.
</quote> See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4611 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4612 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4613 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4614 Tonson's control in
1774?
4617 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
<quote>copyright
</quote>
4618 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4619 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4620 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4621 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4622 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4623 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4624 that the publishers, or
<quote>Stationers,
</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4626 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4629 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4630 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4631 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4632 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4633 from legislatures
<quote>positive law.
</quote> We call the words from judges
4634 <quote>common law.
</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4635 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4636 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4637 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4638 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4641 This question was important to the publishers, or
<quote>booksellers,
</quote> as
4642 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4643 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4644 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4647 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4648 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4650 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4653 The Statute of Anne granted the author or
<quote>proprietor
</quote> of a book an
4654 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4655 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4656 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4657 copyright
<quote>expired,
</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4658 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4662 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4663 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4664 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4665 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4668 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4669 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4670 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4671 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4672 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4673 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4674 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4675 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4676 reason is there to allow someone else to
<quote>steal
</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4679 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4680 about the notion of
<quote>copyright
</quote> that existed at the time of the
4681 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4682 <quote>booksellers.
</quote>
4685 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4686 to apply the concept of
<quote>copyright
</quote> ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4687 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4688 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4689 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was a right
4690 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4691 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4694 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4695 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4696 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4697 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4699 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4701 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4702 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4703 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4704 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4705 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4706 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4707 allowed to make his films. The
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was only an exclusive
4708 right to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4710 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England
</primary></indexterm>
4711 <indexterm><primary>Statute of Monopolies (
1656)
</primary></indexterm>
4713 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4714 They had had a long and ugly experience with
<quote>exclusive rights,
</quote>
4715 especially
<quote>exclusive rights
</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4716 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4717 monopolies
—especially monopolies for works that already
4718 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4719 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4720 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the
4721 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4722 inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4723 monopoly in publishing.
4726 Thus the
<quote>copy-right,
</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4727 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4728 claim that
<quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,
</quote> try
4729 sounding convincing when uttering,
<quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4730 have it forever.
</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4731 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4732 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4734 <indexterm id='idxbooksellers' class='startofrange'
>
4735 <primary>booksellers, English
</primary>
4738 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4739 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4740 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4741 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4744 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4745 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4746 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4747 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as
<quote>old patentees
4748 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling
</quote>; they were
<quote>men who do
4749 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4750 indetted.
</quote><footnote><para>
4753 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4754 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4758 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4759 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4760 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4761 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4762 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4766 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4767 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4768 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4769 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4770 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4771 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4773 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4774 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4775 construction and spread of culture.
4778 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4779 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4780 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4781 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4782 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4783 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4784 they said; they needed more time.
4787 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4788 words that echo today,
4792 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4793 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4795 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4796 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4797 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4798 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4799 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4800 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4802 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4803 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4804 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4805 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4806 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4807 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4808 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4813 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4814 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4815 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4816 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4817 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4818 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4819 creative
<quote>property
</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4820 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4821 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4822 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4823 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4824 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4825 way to protect authors.
4828 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4829 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4830 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4831 <quote>The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4832 rancher has for cattle.
</quote><footnote><para>
4834 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4835 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4836 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4837 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4839 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4840 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4843 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4844 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4845 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4847 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4848 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4852 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4853 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4854 reprints
<quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,
</quote> at least
4855 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4857 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4859 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
4861 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4863 and became
<quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.
</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4864 them,
</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was
<quote>the young James Boswell
4865 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4866 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.
</quote><footnote><para>
4870 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4871 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4874 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4875 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4876 inexpensive editions
<quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4877 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4878 Property.
</quote><footnote><para>
4880 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4883 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4884 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4885 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4888 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block
<quote>piracy
</quote> like
4889 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the
<quote>pirates,
</quote>
4890 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4892 <indexterm><primary>Taylor, Robert
</primary></indexterm>
4894 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4895 Thomson's poem
<quote>The Seasons.
</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4896 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4897 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4898 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4899 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4901 Howard B. Abrams,
<quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4902 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4906 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4907 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4910 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4911 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4912 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4913 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4914 law would protect the author against subsequent
<quote>pirates.
</quote>
4915 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4916 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4917 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4918 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4921 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4922 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4923 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4924 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4925 with in
1710: How best to limit
4926 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4927 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4928 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4929 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4930 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4931 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4932 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4934 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4936 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4937 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4939 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4941 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4942 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4943 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4947 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4948 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4949 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4950 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4951 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4952 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4955 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4956 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4957 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4958 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4959 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4960 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4961 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4962 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4965 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4966 presented to the House and voted upon first by the
<quote>law lords,
</quote>
4967 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4968 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4969 House of Lords generally voted.
4972 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4973 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4975 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4976 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4977 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4978 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4979 passed into the public domain.
4982 <quote>The public domain.
</quote> Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4983 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4984 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4985 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4986 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4987 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4988 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4989 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4990 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4991 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4992 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4993 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4994 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4997 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4998 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4999 where most of the
<quote>pirate publishers
</quote> did their work, people
5000 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
5001 reported,
<quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
5002 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
5003 decision of which so many individuals were interested.
</quote> <quote>Great
5004 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
5005 and illuminations.
</quote><footnote><para>
5011 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
5012 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
5017 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
5018 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
5019 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
5020 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
5021 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
5022 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
5023 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
5024 successors.
<footnote><para>
5031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
5032 <quote>Ruined
</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
5033 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
5034 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
5035 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
5036 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
5037 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
5038 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
5039 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
5040 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
5041 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
5042 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
5043 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
5044 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
5045 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
5046 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
5047 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
5048 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
5049 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
5050 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
5052 <indexterm startref='idxbooksellers' class='endofrange'
/>
5054 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
5055 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
5056 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
5059 <indexterm startref='idxbritishparliament' class='endofrange'
/>
5060 <indexterm startref='idxbooksenglishlaw' class='endofrange'
/>
5061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
5063 <chapter label=
"7" id=
"recorders">
5064 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
5066 <emphasis role='strong'
>Jon Else
</emphasis> is a filmmaker. He is best
5067 known for his documentaries and has been very successful in spreading
5068 his art. He is also a teacher, and as a teacher myself, I envy the
5069 loyalty and admiration that his students feel for him. (I met, by
5070 accident, two of his students at a dinner party. He was their god.)
5073 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
5074 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
5078 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
5079 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
5080 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
5081 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
5082 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
5084 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5087 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
5088 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
5089 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
5090 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
5091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5092 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5096 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5097 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
5098 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5099 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5100 unless
<quote>fair use
</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5103 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5104 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5105 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5106 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5107 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5108 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5111 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5112 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5113 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5114 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5115 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5116 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5119 Then, as Else told me,
<quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5120 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
5121 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.
</quote>
5122 And second, Fox
<quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5123 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
5124 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.
</quote>
5126 <indexterm><primary>Herrera, Rebecca
</primary></indexterm>
5128 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5129 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5130 explained to her,
<quote>There must be some mistake here.
… We're
5131 asking for your educational rate on this.
</quote> That was the educational
5132 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5133 confirm what he had been told.
5136 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>Yes, you
5137 have your facts straight,
</quote> she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
5138 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5142 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
<quote>And
5143 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.
</quote> As an assistant
5144 to Herrera told Else later on,
<quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5148 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5149 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5150 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5151 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5152 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5153 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5154 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5155 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
5158 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5159 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5160 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5161 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5162 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5163 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5164 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5165 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5166 says the owner gets to control.
5169 For example,
<quote>public performance
</quote> is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
5170 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5171 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see
<quote>My
5172 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>,
</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5173 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5174 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5178 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5179 thought is
<quote>fair use.
</quote><footnote><para>
5181 For an excellent argument that such use is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> but that
5182 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> see Richard
5183 A. Posner with William F. Patry,
<quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5184 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5185 Law School,
5 August
2003.
5187 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>
5188 episode is clearly a fair use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>—and fair use does
5189 not require the permission of anyone.
5192 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5193 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon
<quote>fair use.
</quote> Here's his reply:
5197 The
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5198 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5199 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5200 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was
<quote>clearly
5201 fair use
</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5202 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5204 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5207 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5208 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5209 <quote>visual cue sheet
</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5210 shot in the film. They take a dim view of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and a claim of
5211 <quote>fair use
</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5214 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle></primary></indexterm>
5217 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5218 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5219 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5220 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5221 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5222 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5223 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5224 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5226 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5230 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5231 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5232 that Fox would
<quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5233 life,
</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5234 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5235 pockets, me or them.
5236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5240 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5241 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5247 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5248 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5249 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5250 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5251 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5252 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5255 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5256 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5257 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5258 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5263 <chapter label=
"8" id=
"transformers">
5264 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5265 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5266 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'
>
5267 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
5269 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary></indexterm>
5271 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1993</emphasis>, Alex Alben was a lawyer
5272 working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave was an innovative company founded
5273 by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop digital
5274 entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave began
5275 investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
5276 anticipation of the power of networks.
5278 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'
>
5279 <primary>artists
</primary>
5280 <secondary>retrospective compilations on
</secondary>
5282 <indexterm id='idxcdroms' class='startofrange'
>
5283 <primary>CD-ROMs, film clips used in
</primary>
5286 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5287 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5288 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5289 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5290 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5291 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5292 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5293 important to his career.
5296 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5297 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5298 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5299 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5303 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5304 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5305 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5306 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5307 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5310 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips.
<quote>Our
5311 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5312 Eastwood's films,
</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5313 arose.
<quote>No one had ever really done this before,
</quote> Alben explained.
<quote>No
5314 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5315 actor's career.
</quote>
5318 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5319 Slade asked,
<quote>Well, what will it take?
</quote>
5322 Alben replied,
<quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5323 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5324 else that we want to use in these film clips.
</quote> Slade said,
<quote>Great! Go
5325 for it.
</quote><footnote>
5328 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5329 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5330 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden
<quote>Rip, Mix,
5331 Burn
</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5333 <primary>artists
</primary>
5334 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5336 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5340 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5341 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5342 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5343 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5344 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5347 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5348 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5349 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5353 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5354 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5355 course we were going to use the
<quote>Make my day
</quote> clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5356 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5357 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5358 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5362 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5363 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5364 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5365 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5366 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5367 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5368 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5369 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5370 started calling people.
5373 <indexterm><primary>Sutherland, Donald
</primary></indexterm>
5375 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5376 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5377 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5378 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5379 know, $
1,
200?
</quote> And they would say,
<quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5380 to get $
1,
200.
</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5381 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5382 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5386 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—<quote>and even then we
5387 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.
</quote>
5390 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5391 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5392 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5396 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5397 hands and said,
<quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5398 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5399 actors.
</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5400 constituent parts and said,
<quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5401 directors,
… this many musicians,
</quote> and we just went at it very
5402 systematically and cleared the rights.
5407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5408 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5409 loved it, and it sold very well.
5411 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5413 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5414 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5415 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped,
<quote>There is
5416 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5417 at all.
</quote><footnote><para>
5419 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5420 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5421 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5423 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5427 For, as he acknowledged,
<quote>very few
… have the time and resources,
5428 and the will to do this,
</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5429 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5430 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5431 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5435 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5436 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5437 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5438 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5439 compensated for that.
5443 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5444 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5445 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5446 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5447 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5448 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5449 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5450 made to be more clean?
5454 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5455 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5456 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5457 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5459 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5460 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5461 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5462 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5463 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5464 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5465 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5466 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5467 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say,
<quote>Oh, I
5468 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5469 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5470 money,
</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5474 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5475 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5476 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5477 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5478 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5480 <indexterm startref='idxcdroms' class='endofrange'
/>
5481 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'
/>
5483 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5484 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5485 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5486 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5487 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5488 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5489 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5490 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5491 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5492 <quote>Does this still make sense?
</quote>
5494 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'
/>
5496 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5497 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5498 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5499 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5502 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5503 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5506 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5507 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5508 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5509 judges loved every minute of it.
5511 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5513 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5514 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5515 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5516 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5517 began his talk with a question:
<quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5518 were just violated in this room?
</quote>
5520 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5521 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5523 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5524 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5525 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5526 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5527 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5528 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5529 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5530 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5531 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5532 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5533 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5534 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5535 couldn't easily do them legally.
5538 We live in a
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5539 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5540 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5541 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5542 planted in your presentation.
5544 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5546 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5548 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5549 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5550 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5551 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5552 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5553 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5554 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5557 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5558 wanted to be
<quote>legal,
</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5559 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5560 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5561 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5564 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5565 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5566 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5567 necessarily requiring that the
<quote>free
</quote> use be free as in
<quote>free beer.
</quote>
5568 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5569 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5570 along: a rule, for example, that says
<quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5571 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5572 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5573 copyright owner.
</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5574 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5575 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5579 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5580 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5581 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5582 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5585 <emphasis role='strong'
>In February
2003</emphasis>, DreamWorks
5586 studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers, the comic genius of
5587 <citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5589 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5590 would work together to form a
<quote>unique filmmaking pact.
</quote> Under the
5591 agreement, DreamWorks
<quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5592 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5593 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5594 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5595 entertainment.
</quote>
5598 The announcement called this
<quote>film sampling.
</quote> As Myers explained,
5599 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5600 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5601 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5602 to take that same concept and apply it to film.
</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5603 quoted as saying,
<quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5604 new audiences, it is Mike.
</quote>
5607 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5608 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5609 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5610 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5611 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5612 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5613 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5614 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5617 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5618 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of
<quote>fair use.
</quote>
5619 Much of
<quote>sampling
</quote> should be considered
<quote>fair use.
</quote> But few would
5620 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5621 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5622 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5623 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5624 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5625 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5626 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5627 curse, reserved for the few.
5629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5631 <chapter label=
"9" id=
"collectors">
5632 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5633 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'
>
5634 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
5636 <indexterm><primary>bots
</primary></indexterm>
5638 <emphasis role='strong'
>In April
1996</emphasis>, millions of
5639 <quote>bots
</quote>—computer codes designed to
5640 <quote>spider,
</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy
5641 content
—began running across the Net. Page by page, these bots
5642 copied Internet-based information onto a small set of computers
5643 located in a basement in San Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots
5644 finished the whole of the Internet, they started again. Over and over
5645 again, once every two months, these bits of code took copies of the
5646 Internet and stored them.
5649 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5650 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5651 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5652 the world. Using a technology called
<quote>the Way Back Machine,
</quote> you could
5653 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5654 well as when those pages changed.
5656 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'
>
5657 <primary>Orwell, George
</primary>
5660 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5661 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5662 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5663 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5668 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5669 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5670 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5673 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5674 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5675 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5676 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5677 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5679 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'
/>
5681 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5682 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5683 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5684 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5685 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5687 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
5688 <indexterm><primary>White House press releases
</primary></indexterm>
5689 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5690 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5691 press release stated,
<quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.
</quote> That was
5692 later changed, without notice, to
<quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5693 Have Ended.
</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5696 <indexterm><primary>history, records of
</primary></indexterm>
5698 <emphasis role='strong'
>We take it
</emphasis> for granted that we can
5699 go back to see what we remember reading. Think about newspapers. If
5700 you wanted to study the reaction of your hometown newspaper to the
5701 race riots in Watts in
1965, or to Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963,
5702 you could go to your public library and look at the newspapers. Those
5703 papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in
5704 paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back and
5705 remember
—not just what it is convenient to remember, but
5706 remember something close to the truth.
5709 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5710 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5711 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5712 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5713 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5714 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5715 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5718 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5719 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5720 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5721 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5723 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5724 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5725 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5726 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5729 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5730 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5731 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5732 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5733 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5734 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5735 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5736 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5738 <indexterm><primary>Vanderbilt University
</primary></indexterm>
5740 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5741 human history. At the end of
2002, it held
<quote>two hundred and thirty
5742 terabytes of material
</quote>—and was
<quote>ten times larger than the
5743 Library of Congress.
</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5744 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5745 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5746 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5747 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5748 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5749 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5750 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5751 is available to scholars for a very low fee.
<quote>But other than that,
5752 [television] is almost unavailable,
</quote> Kahle told me.
<quote>If you were
5753 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5754 just a graduate student?
</quote> As Kahle put it,
5757 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
5759 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5760 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5761 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5762 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5763 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5766 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5767 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5771 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5772 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5773 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5774 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5775 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5776 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5779 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5780 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5781 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5782 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5783 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5787 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5788 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5789 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5790 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5791 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and
<quote>borrowed
5792 back.
</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5793 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5794 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5796 Doug Herrick,
<quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5797 the Library of Congress,
</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5798 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5799 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5804 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5805 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5806 broadcasts, so there was no fear of
<quote>theft.
</quote> But as technology enabled
5807 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5808 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5809 <quote>copyrighted.
</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5810 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5811 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5812 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5815 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5817 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5818 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5819 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5820 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5821 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5822 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5825 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5827 <primary>archive.org
</primary>
5828 <seealso>Internet Archive
</seealso>
5831 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5832 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 <quote>ephemeral films
</quote> (meaning
5833 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5834 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5835 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5836 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5837 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5838 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5839 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5840 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5841 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5842 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5843 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
<quote>Duck and Cover
</quote> film
5844 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5845 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5846 few minutes
—for free.
5849 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5850 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5851 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5852 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5853 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5857 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5858 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5859 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5860 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5861 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5862 has
—a noncommercial life.
5865 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5866 of creative property goes through different
<quote>lives.
</quote> In its first
5869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5870 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5871 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5872 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5873 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5874 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5877 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5878 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5879 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5880 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5881 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5882 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5886 <primary>books
</primary>
5887 <secondary>out of print
</secondary>
5890 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5891 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5894 <primary>books
</primary>
5895 <secondary>out of print
</secondary>
5897 Dave Barns,
<quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5898 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5899 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5900 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5901 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5902 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5903 </para></footnote>). After
5904 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5905 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5906 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5907 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5908 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5911 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5912 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5913 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5914 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5915 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5916 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5917 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5918 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5922 <emphasis role='strong'
>For most of
</emphasis> the twentieth century,
5923 it was economics that made this so. It would have been insanely
5924 expensive to collect and make accessible all television and film and
5925 music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily high. So even
5926 though the law in principle would have restricted the ability of a
5927 Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5929 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5930 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5931 little practical effect.
5934 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5935 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5936 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5937 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5938 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5939 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5942 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5943 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5944 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5949 <primary>books
</primary>
5950 <secondary>total number of
</secondary>
5953 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5954 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5955 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5956 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5957 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5958 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5959 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5960 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5961 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5962 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5963 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5967 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5968 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5969 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5970 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5971 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5972 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5973 will draw upon it to understand it;
5974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5975 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5976 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5977 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5978 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5979 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5982 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5983 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5984 call these
<quote>archives,
</quote> as warm as the idea of a
<quote>library
</quote> might seem,
5985 the
<quote>content
</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5986 someone's
<quote>property.
</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5987 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5989 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'
/>
5990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5992 <chapter label=
"10" id=
"property-i">
5993 <title>CHAPTER TEN:
<quote>Property
</quote></title>
5994 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5995 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5997 <emphasis role='strong'
>Jack Valenti
</emphasis> has been the president
5998 of the Motion Picture Association of America since
1966. He first came
5999 to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
6000 administration
—literally. The famous picture of Johnson's
6001 swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of President
6002 Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty years of
6003 running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps the most
6004 prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
6007 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
6008 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
6009 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
6010 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
6011 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
6012 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
6013 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
6014 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
6015 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
6017 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
6018 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
6019 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
6020 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
6021 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
6022 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
6023 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
6026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
6027 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
6028 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
6029 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
6030 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
6031 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
6032 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
6033 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
6034 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
6035 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
6039 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
6040 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
6041 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
6042 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
6043 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
6044 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
6045 redefine the meaning of
<quote>creative property.
</quote>
6048 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
6053 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
6054 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
6055 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
6056 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
6057 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
6058 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
6059 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
6060 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
6062 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
6063 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
6064 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
6065 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
6066 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
6072 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
6073 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
6074 <quote>central theme
</quote> to which
<quote>reasonable men and women
</quote> will return is
6076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
6077 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
6078 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.
</quote>
6079 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
6080 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
6083 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
6084 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
6085 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
6086 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
6087 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
6088 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
6089 it comes to the nature and scope of
<quote>creative property.
</quote> His views
6090 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
6091 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
6092 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
6095 While
<quote>creative property
</quote> is certainly
<quote>property
</quote> in a nerdy and
6096 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
6098 Lawyers speak of
<quote>property
</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
6099 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
6100 object. Thus, my
<quote>property right
</quote> to my car gives me the right to
6101 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
6102 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of
<quote>property
</quote> to
6103 <quote>lawyer talk,
</quote> see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
6104 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
6105 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
6106 <quote>creative property owners
</quote> have been
<quote>accorded the same rights and
6107 protection resident in all other property owners.
</quote> Indeed, if creative
6108 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
6109 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
6113 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
6114 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6115 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6116 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
6117 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6118 culture would develop.
6121 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6122 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
6123 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6124 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
6125 differently from the rights resident in all other property
6126 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
6127 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
6128 the same would be to
6130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6131 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6132 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6136 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6137 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6138 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6139 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6140 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6141 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6142 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old.
6145 <emphasis role='strong'
>To get
</emphasis> just a hint that there is
6146 something fundamentally wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no
6147 further than the United States Constitution itself.
6150 The framers of our Constitution loved
<quote>property.
</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6151 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6152 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
6153 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6154 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's
<quote>Takings
6155 Clause,
</quote> to pay you
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for that taking. The
6156 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6157 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
6158 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6161 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6162 Valenti calls
<quote>creative property.
</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6163 power to create
<quote>creative property,
</quote> the Constitution
6164 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a
<quote>limited time,
</quote> Congress
6165 take back the rights that it has granted and set the
<quote>creative
6166 property
</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6167 the expiration of a copyright term
<quote>takes
</quote> your copyright and turns it
6168 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6169 pay
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for this
<quote>taking.
</quote> Instead, the same
6170 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6172 requires that you lose your
<quote>creative property
</quote> right without any
6173 compensation at all.
6176 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6177 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6178 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6179 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6180 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6181 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6185 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6186 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6187 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6188 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6189 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6190 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
6191 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6192 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6193 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6194 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6197 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6198 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6199 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6200 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6201 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6205 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6206 history of these
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights, and the control that they
6207 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6208 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6209 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
6210 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6211 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6212 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6213 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6214 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6215 also control how culture develops.
6219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6220 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6221 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6222 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6223 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6224 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6225 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6226 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6228 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6229 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6230 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6233 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6234 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6235 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6236 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6237 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6238 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6239 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6240 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6241 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6242 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6243 Web, you can be punished
6244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6245 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6246 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6247 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6249 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6251 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6252 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6253 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6254 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6255 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6256 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6257 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6258 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6259 the source of the enforcement.
6261 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6263 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6264 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6265 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6266 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6267 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6268 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6269 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6270 individual or group might behave.
6272 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6274 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6275 <quote>architecture
</quote>—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6276 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6277 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6278 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6279 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6280 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6281 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6282 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6283 theft, but by nature, by
<quote>architecture.
</quote> If a
500-pound boulder
6284 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6285 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6286 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6291 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6292 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6293 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6294 undermined by another.
6297 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6298 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6299 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6300 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6301 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6302 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6303 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6305 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6306 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6308 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6309 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6310 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6312 So, for example, consider the
<quote>freedom
</quote> to drive a car at a high
6313 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6314 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6315 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6316 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6317 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6318 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6319 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6320 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6321 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6322 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6323 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6326 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6327 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6328 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6330 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6331 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6332 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6333 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6334 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6335 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6336 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>The New Chicago School,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6339 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6340 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6341 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6342 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6343 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6344 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6345 used to require that other laws be more
6346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6347 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6348 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6351 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6353 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6354 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6355 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6357 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6359 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6360 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6361 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6362 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6363 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6367 Some people object to this way of talking about
<quote>liberty.
</quote> They object
6368 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6369 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6370 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6371 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6372 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6373 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6374 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6375 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6376 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6377 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6378 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a
6379 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6380 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6381 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6382 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6383 <citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6384 1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6385 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons,
<quote>The
6386 Right to Work,
</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6387 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6388 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6389 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6390 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6391 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6392 12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6393 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6394 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6395 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6396 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990)
</primary></indexterm>
6397 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6398 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6399 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6402 <section id=
"hollywood">
6403 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6405 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6406 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6407 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6408 rallying makes sense.
6411 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6414 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6415 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6416 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6418 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6419 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6422 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6423 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6424 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6425 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6426 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6427 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6428 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6429 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6430 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6431 this form of infringement.
6434 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6435 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6436 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6437 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6438 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6439 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6442 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6443 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6444 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6445 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6448 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6449 looting that results.
6451 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6452 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6453 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6456 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6457 warriors. Indeed, in a
<quote>White Paper
</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6458 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6459 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6460 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6461 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6462 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6463 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6464 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6465 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6467 <indexterm><primary>steel industry
</primary></indexterm>
6469 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6470 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6471 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6472 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6473 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6474 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6475 life. Homeowners living in a
6477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6478 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6479 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6480 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6481 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6482 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6483 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6486 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6487 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6488 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6489 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6490 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6491 Brown describes it, its
<quote>architecture of revenue.
</quote>
6493 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry
</primary></indexterm>
6494 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
6495 <indexterm><primary>camera technology
</primary></indexterm>
6497 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6498 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6499 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6500 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6501 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6502 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6503 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6505 See Geoffrey Smith,
<quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?
</quote>
6506 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6507 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6508 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6509 R. Schoenberger,
<quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?
</quote> Forbes.com,
6
6510 October
2003, available at
6511 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6514 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6515 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6516 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6517 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6518 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6519 weakened the
<quote>stickiness
</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6520 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6521 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6522 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6523 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6524 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6526 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
6527 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6529 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6530 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6531 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6533 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6534 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6535 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6536 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents,
<quote>established companies
6537 have an interest in excluding future competitors.
</quote><footnote><para>
6539 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6542 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6543 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6544 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6545 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6546 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6550 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6551 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6552 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6553 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6554 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6555 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6556 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6557 opportunities for innovation and change.
6560 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6561 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6562 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6563 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6564 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6565 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6566 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6567 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution:
<quote>Congress
6568 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech.
</quote> So when
6569 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would
<quote>abridge
</quote> the freedom
6570 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6571 regulation is justified.
6574 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6576 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6577 <quote>justified.
</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6578 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6579 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6580 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6583 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6585 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6586 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6589 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6590 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6591 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6592 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6593 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6594 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6597 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6598 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6599 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6601 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6602 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6604 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6605 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6606 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6607 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6610 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6611 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6612 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6613 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6614 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6615 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6616 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6618 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James
</primary></indexterm>
6620 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6621 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an
<quote>environmentalism
</quote> for
6622 culture.
<footnote><para>
6624 See, for example, James Boyle,
<quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6625 Environmentalism for the Net?
</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6627 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6628 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6629 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6630 <quote>for free.
</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6631 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6632 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6634 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6635 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6636 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6637 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6638 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6641 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6642 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6643 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6644 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6645 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6646 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6647 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6648 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6649 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6652 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6653 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6656 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6658 <section id=
"beginnings">
6659 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6661 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6662 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
<quote>creative
6663 property
</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6664 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6667 The power to establish
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights is granted to
6668 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6669 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6672 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6673 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6674 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6677 We can call this the
<quote>Progress Clause,
</quote> for notice what this clause
6678 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6679 <quote>creative property rights.
</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6680 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6681 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6682 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6685 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6686 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6687 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6688 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6689 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6690 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6691 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6692 copyrights extend
<quote>to Authors
</quote> only.
6695 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6696 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6697 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6698 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6699 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6700 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6701 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6702 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6703 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6704 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6705 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6706 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6707 concentrations of power.
6710 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
<quote>copyright
</quote>
6711 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6712 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6713 <quote>copyright
</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6714 years since they first struck its design.
6717 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6718 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6720 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6723 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6724 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6725 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6730 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6731 <title><quote>Copyright
</quote> today.
</title>
6732 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6739 <section id=
"lawduration">
6740 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6742 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6743 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6744 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6745 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6746 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6747 authorship.
<footnote>
6750 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6751 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6752 485–86:
<quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6753 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6754 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis></quote>
6756 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6758 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6759 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6760 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6761 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6762 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6763 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6766 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6767 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6768 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6769 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6770 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6771 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6774 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6775 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6776 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6777 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6778 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6781 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6782 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6783 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6784 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6785 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6786 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6787 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6789 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6790 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel,
<citetitle>A
6791 History of Book Publishing in the United States
</citetitle>, vol.
1,
<citetitle>The Creation
6792 of an Industry,
1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6793 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6794 1790 act; William J. Maher,
<citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6795 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context
</citetitle>,
7–10 (
2002),
6796 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6797 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6798 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6799 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6800 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6801 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6802 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6805 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6806 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6808 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6809 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6810 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6814 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6815 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6816 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6817 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6818 domain.
<footnote><para>
6820 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6821 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6822 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6823 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
<quote>Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
</quote>
6824 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright
</citetitle>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6825 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6826 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote>
6827 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6828 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6831 <primary>books
</primary>
6832 <secondary>out of print
</secondary>
6835 <primary>books
</primary>
6836 <secondary>resales of
</secondary>
6839 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6840 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6841 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6843 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6844 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6845 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6846 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6847 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6848 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6851 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6852 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6853 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6854 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6855 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6856 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6859 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6860 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6861 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6862 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6863 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6864 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6865 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6866 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6869 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6870 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6871 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6872 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6875 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6876 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6877 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6880 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6881 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6882 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6883 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6884 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6885 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6886 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6890 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6891 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6892 maximum term. For
<quote>natural
</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6893 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6894 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6895 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6896 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6897 was ninety-five years.
6900 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6901 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6902 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6903 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6904 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6905 that terms be
<quote>limited,
</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6909 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6910 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6911 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6912 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6913 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6914 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6915 years.
<footnote><para>
6917 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6918 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6919 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6920 Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote> loc. cit.
6923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6925 <section id=
"lawscope">
6926 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6928 The
<quote>scope
</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6929 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6930 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6931 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6934 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only
<quote>maps,
6935 charts, and books.
</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6936 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6937 the author the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> copyrighted works. That
6938 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6939 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6940 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6941 did not extend to what lawyers call
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> It would not,
6942 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6943 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6944 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6947 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6948 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6949 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6950 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6951 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6952 work not only the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> the work, but also the
6953 exclusive right of control over any
<quote>copies
</quote> of that work. And most
6954 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6955 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6956 <quote>derivative work
</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6957 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6958 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6959 on the initial creative work.
6962 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6963 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6964 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6966 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6967 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6968 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6969 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6970 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6971 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6972 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6976 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6977 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6978 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6979 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6980 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6981 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6982 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6983 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6984 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6985 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6986 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6990 All of these
<quote>formalities
</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6991 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6992 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6993 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6994 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6995 copy available for others to copy.
6998 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
7002 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
7003 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
7004 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
7005 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
7006 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
7007 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7009 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner,
<quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
7010 Creation of American Literature,
</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
7011 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
7012 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
7015 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
7016 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
7017 the United States
—publishers.
7020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
7021 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
7022 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
7023 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
7024 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
7025 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
7026 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
7030 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
7031 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
7032 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
7033 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
7034 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
7035 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
7039 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
7040 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
7041 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
7044 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
7046 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
7047 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of
<quote>derivative
7048 rights.
</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
7049 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
7050 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
7051 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
7052 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
7054 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
7055 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
7058 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
7059 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
7061 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
7063 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
7064 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
7065 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
7066 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
7069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
7070 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
7071 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
7072 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
7073 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
7074 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
7075 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
7076 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
7077 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
7078 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
7080 Jonathan Zittrain,
<quote>The Copyright Cage,
</quote> <citetitle>Legal
7081 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
7082 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
7083 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
7085 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
7086 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
7087 the wrong of direct piracy.
7090 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
7091 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
7092 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
7093 of my book.
<footnote><para>
7095 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
7096 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
7097 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere
<quote>copies
</quote> and
7098 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld,
<quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
7099 Copyright's Constitutionality,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
7100 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
7102 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb
</primary></indexterm>
7104 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
7107 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
7108 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
7109 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
7110 called
<quote>Mickey Mouse,
</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
7111 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
7115 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
7116 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
7117 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
7118 the rights originally granted.
7121 <section id=
"lawreach">
7122 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
7124 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7125 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7126 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7127 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
7129 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
7130 certainly regulates more than
<quote>copies
</quote>—a public performance of a
7131 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
7132 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7133 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a
<quote>copy
</quote>;
17
7134 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
7135 existing law (which regulates
<quote>copies;
</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7136 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7141 <quote>Copies.
</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
7142 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
7143 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that
<quote>creative
7144 property
</quote> deserves the
<quote>same rights
</quote> as all other property, it is the
7145 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7146 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7147 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7148 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7149 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7150 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
7151 the trigger for copyright law.
7154 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7155 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7156 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7157 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
7159 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7160 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7161 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7162 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7165 because it is clear that the
7166 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7167 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7170 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7173 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
7174 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
7175 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
7177 <indexterm id='idxbooksusetypes' class='startofrange'
>
7178 <primary>books
</primary>
7179 <secondary>three types of uses of
</secondary>
7182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7183 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7184 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7185 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7186 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7187 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7188 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7189 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7190 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7191 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7192 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7193 acts do not make a copy.
7195 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
7196 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
7197 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
7200 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7201 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7202 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7203 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7204 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7205 diagram on next page).
7208 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7209 that remain unregulated because the law considers these
<quote>fair uses.
</quote>
7211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7212 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
7213 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
7214 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
7217 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7218 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7219 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7220 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7221 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7222 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7223 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such
<quote>fair uses
</quote>
7224 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7226 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7227 <title>Unregulated copying considered
<quote>fair uses.
</quote></title>
7228 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7231 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7232 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7233 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7237 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7238 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7239 are nonetheless deemed
<quote>fair
</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7241 <indexterm startref='idxbooksusetypes' class='endofrange'
/>
7243 <primary>books
</primary>
7244 <secondary>on Internet
</secondary>
7247 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7248 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7250 I don't mean
<quote>nature
</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7251 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7252 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7253 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7256 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7257 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7258 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7259 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7260 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7261 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7262 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7263 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7264 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7268 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7269 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7270 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7271 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7272 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7273 the book once, ten times, or every
7274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7275 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7276 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7277 none of those uses produced a copy.
7280 <primary>books
</primary>
7281 <secondary>on Internet
</secondary>
7284 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7285 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7286 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7287 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7288 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7289 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7290 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7291 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7292 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7293 copyright owner's wish.
7296 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7297 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7298 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7299 points also become clear:
7302 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7303 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7304 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7305 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7306 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7307 part of free culture before the Internet.
7310 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7311 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7312 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7313 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7314 using a machine.
<quote>Copy and paste
</quote> and
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> become
7315 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7316 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7317 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7318 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7322 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7325 burden on category
3 (
<quote>fair use
</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7326 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7327 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7328 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7329 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7330 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7331 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7332 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7336 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7337 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7338 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7339 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7340 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7341 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7342 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7345 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'
>
7346 <primary>advertising
</primary>
7349 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7350 in the business of making
<quote>trailer
</quote> advertisements for movies available
7351 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7352 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7353 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7355 <indexterm><primary>browsing
</primary></indexterm>
7357 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7358 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7359 previews. The idea was to expand their
<quote>selling by sampling
</quote>
7360 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7361 <quote>browsing.
</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7362 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7363 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7366 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7367 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7368 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7369 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7371 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7372 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7373 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7374 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7375 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7376 <quote>fair use
</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7377 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7381 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7382 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had
<quote>willfully
7383 infringed
</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7384 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7385 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7386 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7387 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7388 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7391 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7392 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7393 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7394 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7395 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7396 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7397 Disney's permission.
7399 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'
/>
7401 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7402 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7403 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7404 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7405 was in the marketplace, the
<quote>first-sale doctrine
</quote> would free the
7406 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7407 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7408 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7409 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7410 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7411 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7412 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7414 <indexterm><primary>Barnes
& Noble
</primary></indexterm>
7415 <indexterm><primary>browsing
</primary></indexterm>
7417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7418 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7419 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7420 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7421 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7422 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7423 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7424 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7425 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7426 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7427 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7428 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7429 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7430 happening are quite slight.
7433 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7434 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7435 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7436 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7437 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7438 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7441 <section id=
"lawforce">
7442 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7444 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7445 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7446 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7447 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7450 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7451 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7452 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7453 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7454 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7457 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7458 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7459 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7461 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7462 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7465 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7466 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7468 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7469 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7470 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7471 plan.
<footnote><para>
7473 See David Lange,
<quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7474 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7478 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7479 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers
<quote>were brothers long before
7480 you were.
</quote><footnote><para>
7482 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7483 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7484 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7486 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7487 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7488 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7489 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7492 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7493 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7494 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7495 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7497 <indexterm id='idxbooksoninternet' class='startofrange'
>
7498 <primary>books
</primary>
7499 <secondary>on Internet
</secondary>
7502 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7503 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7504 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7505 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7506 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7507 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7508 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7509 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7511 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7512 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7514 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7515 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7518 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7521 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7522 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7523 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7524 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7528 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7532 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7533 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7534 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7535 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7536 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7537 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7538 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7541 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7542 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7544 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7545 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7546 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7549 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7550 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7552 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7553 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7554 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7558 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7559 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7560 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7561 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7562 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7563 read aloud through the computer.
7566 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7567 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7568 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7569 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7571 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7572 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote></title>
7573 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7576 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7577 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7580 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7581 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote>.
</title>
7582 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7585 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7586 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7590 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7591 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>The Future of Ideas
</quote>.
</title>
7592 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7595 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7598 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7599 <quote>permissions
</quote>— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7600 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7601 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7602 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7603 power.
<footnote><para>
7605 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7606 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7607 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7608 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7609 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7610 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7611 subsequently acquired the book.
7613 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7614 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7615 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7616 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7617 control that the law would enable.
7620 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7621 within which the e-book
<quote>lives.
</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7622 permissions, they are not the sort of
<quote>permissions
</quote> that most of us
7623 deal with. When a teenager gets
<quote>permission
</quote> to stay out till
7624 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7625 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7626 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7627 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7628 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7629 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7630 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7631 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7632 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7633 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7637 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7638 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7639 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7640 you tried to type
<quote>Warner Brothers,
</quote> erased
<quote>Brothers
</quote> from the
7642 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7645 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7646 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7647 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7648 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7649 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7650 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7651 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7654 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7655 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7656 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7657 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7658 to defeat these protections as well?
7661 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7665 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7666 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7667 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7668 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7669 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7671 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7673 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7674 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>Alice's Adventures in
7675 Wonderland
</quote>.
</title>
7676 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7678 <beginpage pagenum=
"164"/>
7680 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7681 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7682 <quote>permissions
</quote> indicated, not allowed to
<quote>read aloud
</quote>!
7685 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7686 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7687 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7688 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7689 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7690 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7693 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7694 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7695 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7696 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7697 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7698 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7699 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7700 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7701 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7702 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7703 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7706 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7707 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7708 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7709 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7710 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7713 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7714 <indexterm startref='idxbooksoninternet' class='endofrange'
/>
7716 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7717 story of mine that makes the same point.
7719 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7720 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7722 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'
>
7723 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7725 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7726 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7727 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7730 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named
<quote>Aibo.
</quote> The Aibo
7731 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7732 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7735 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7736 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7737 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7738 <beginpage pagenum=
"165"/>
7739 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7740 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7741 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7744 <quote>Teach
</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7745 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7746 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7747 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7748 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7749 their computer
<quote>dog
</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7751 <indexterm><primary>hacks
</primary></indexterm>
7753 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7754 <citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7755 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7756 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7757 them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much more positive
7758 term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7759 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7760 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7761 old computer doesn't run, or
<quote>drive,
</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7762 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7763 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7767 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7768 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7769 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7770 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7774 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7775 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7776 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7777 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7778 than Sony had built.
7780 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7781 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'
/>
7782 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7784 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7785 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7786 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7787 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7790 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7791 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7792 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7793 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7794 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7795 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7796 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7797 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7800 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7801 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7802 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7803 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7804 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7805 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7806 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7807 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7808 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7811 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7813 See Pamela Samuelson,
<quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,
</quote>
7814 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
<quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7815 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,
</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7816 January
2002;
<quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7817 DMCA,
</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7818 Holland,
<quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,
</quote> <citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7819 May
2001; Janelle Brown,
<quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?
</quote> Salon.com,
7820 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<quote>Frequently Asked
7821 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case,
</quote> available at
7822 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7823 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7825 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7826 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7827 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7828 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7831 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7832 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7833 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7834 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7835 <quote>this music cannot be copied,
</quote> and have a computer respect that
7836 command. The technology was to be part of a
<quote>trusted system
</quote> of
7837 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7841 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7842 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7843 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7844 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7848 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7849 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7850 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7851 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7854 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7855 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7856 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7857 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7858 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7859 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7862 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7863 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7864 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7865 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7866 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7867 constituted, succeed.
7869 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7870 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7872 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'
>
7873 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7875 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7876 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7877 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7880 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7881 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7882 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7887 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7888 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7889 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7892 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7893 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'
/>
7894 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7896 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7897 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7898 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7902 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7904 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7905 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7906 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (
<quote>DMCA
</quote>).
7910 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7911 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7912 spreading such information an offense.
7915 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7916 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7917 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7918 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7919 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7920 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7921 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7922 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7923 protection for copyright owners.
7926 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7927 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7928 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7929 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7930 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7933 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7934 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7935 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7936 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7937 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7938 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7939 have been a copyright violation.
7941 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7942 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7944 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7945 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7948 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7949 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7950 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7951 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7952 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7953 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7954 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7956 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7957 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7960 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7961 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7962 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7963 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7964 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7965 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7967 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7968 <indexterm id='idxcassettevcrs2' class='startofrange'
>
7969 <primary>cassette recording
</primary>
7970 <secondary>VCRs
</secondary>
7973 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7974 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7975 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7976 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7977 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7978 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
<quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,
</quote>
7979 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7980 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7981 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7985 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7986 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7987 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7988 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7989 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7990 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the
<quote>Neighborhood
</quote>
7991 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7992 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7993 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7994 broadcasting has always been
<quote>You are an important person just the way
7995 you are. You can make healthy decisions.
</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7996 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7997 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7998 important.
<footnote><para>
8001 <primary>cassette recording
</primary>
8002 <secondary>VCRs
</secondary>
8004 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
8005 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
8006 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
8007 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
8008 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
8013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
8014 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
8015 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
8016 the VCR responsible.
8019 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
8021 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
8024 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
8027 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
8028 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
8029 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
8030 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
8031 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
8032 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
8034 <indexterm id='idxhandguns' class='startofrange'
>
8035 <primary>handguns
</primary>
8038 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
8039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
8040 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
8041 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
8042 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
8045 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
8046 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
8047 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
8049 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
8051 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
8052 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
8053 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
8054 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
8055 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
8056 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
8058 <indexterm startref='idxhandguns' class='endofrange'
/>
8059 <indexterm startref='idxcassettevcrs2' class='endofrange'
/>
8060 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
8061 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
8063 <primary>Sony
</primary>
8064 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
8067 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
8068 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
8069 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
8070 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
8071 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
8072 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
8075 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
8076 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
8077 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
8078 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
8079 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
8080 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
8081 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
8082 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
8083 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
8084 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
8087 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
8088 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
8089 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
8090 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
8091 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
8092 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
8093 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
8094 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
8095 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
8099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
8100 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
8101 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
8102 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
8103 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
8104 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
8106 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet,
<quote>Legal Fictions,
8107 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
8108 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
8112 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
8113 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
8114 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
8115 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
8116 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
8118 <indexterm><primary>bots
</primary></indexterm>
8120 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
8121 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
8122 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
8123 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
8124 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
8125 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
8126 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
8127 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
8130 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
8131 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
8132 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
8133 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
8134 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
8135 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
8138 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
8139 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
8141 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
8142 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
8143 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
8144 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
8145 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
8147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
8148 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
8149 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
8150 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
8151 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
8152 market for creative work, has become the single most important
8153 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
8154 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
8155 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
8159 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8160 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8161 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8162 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8163 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8166 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8167 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8168 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8169 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8170 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8171 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8172 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8173 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8177 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8180 <indexterm><primary>cable television
</primary></indexterm>
8182 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8183 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8184 ownership,
<quote>five companies control
85 percent of our media sources.
</quote><footnote><para>
8186 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8187 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
8188 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
8189 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8190 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
8191 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
8193 Lynette Holloway,
<quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8194 Slide,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
8196 The
<quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8197 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.
</quote><footnote><para>
8199 Molly Ivins,
<quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,
</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
8202 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
8203 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
8204 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
8205 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8206 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8209 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8210 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8212 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
8213 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8214 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
8215 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
8216 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
8217 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8219 <indexterm><primary>cable television
</primary></indexterm>
8221 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8222 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8223 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8224 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8225 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
8226 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
8227 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8228 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8229 protected
— by the market.
8232 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8233 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8234 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8235 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8239 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8240 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
8241 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8242 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8243 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8244 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8245 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8246 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8247 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8248 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
8250 James Fallows,
<quote>The Age of Murdoch,
</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
8252 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8257 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8258 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8259 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8260 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8262 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8263 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8264 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8268 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8269 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8273 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8274 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8275 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8276 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8279 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8280 integration may matter.
8282 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8283 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8284 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8286 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
8287 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8288 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8289 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8290 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8293 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8294 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8295 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8296 control.
<footnote><para>
8298 Leonard Hill,
<quote>The Axis of Access,
</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8299 Forum,
<quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,
</quote> St. Louis,
8300 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8301 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8302 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8303 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8309 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8310 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8311 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8312 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
8313 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8314 television
—75 percent of it
—was
<quote>independent
</quote> of the
8318 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8319 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8320 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8321 2002, only five independent television studios remained.
<quote>In
1992,
8322 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8323 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8324 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent.
</quote> <quote>In
1992,
16
8325 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8326 year there was one.
</quote><footnote><para>
8328 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8329 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8330 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8331 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8332 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8333 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8334 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8337 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8338 that ran it.
<quote>In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8339 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8340 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8341 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8342 63%.
</quote><footnote><para>
8347 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8349 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8350 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8351 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8352 owned by the network.
8355 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8356 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8357 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8358 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8359 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8363 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8364 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8365 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8366 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8368 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8369 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8370 handful.
<footnote><para>
8372 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,
</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8373 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8374 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8379 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8380 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8381 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8382 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8383 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8384 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8385 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8386 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8387 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8390 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8392 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8393 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the
<quote>Innovator's
8394 Dilemma
</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8395 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8396 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8397 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8399 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8400 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8401 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8402 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8403 Kim B. Clark,
<quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8404 Concepts in Technological Evolution,
</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8405 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8406 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8407 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8408 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8410 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8411 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8413 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8416 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8417 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8418 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8422 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8423 suggest the concern.
8426 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8427 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8428 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8431 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8432 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8433 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8436 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8437 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8438 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8439 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8440 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8441 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8442 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8443 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8444 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8445 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8446 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8447 outweigh these costs.
8450 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8451 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8452 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8455 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'
>
8456 <primary>advertising
</primary>
8459 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8460 a media campaign as part of the
<quote>war on drugs.
</quote> The campaign produced
8461 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8462 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8463 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8464 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8465 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8466 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8467 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8468 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8471 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8472 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8475 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8476 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8477 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8481 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8483 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8484 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8485 message will be heard then?
8488 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8489 <quote>controversial
</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8490 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8491 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8492 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8493 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8494 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8495 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8496 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8498 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8499 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8500 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as
<quote>against
8501 [their] policy.
</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8502 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8503 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8504 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8505 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8506 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives,
<quote>On the Issue of
8507 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>New
8508 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8509 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8510 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown,
<quote>Ad
8511 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8512 Radio,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8513 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8514 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8515 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8516 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8517 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8518 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross,
<quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8519 After Muni Rejects Ad,
</quote> SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8520 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8521 was that the criticism was
<quote>too controversial.
</quote>
8522 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8523 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8524 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8525 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8526 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8527 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8528 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
8532 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8533 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8534 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8535 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8536 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8537 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8538 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8539 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8540 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8542 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'
/>
8544 <section id=
"together">
8545 <title>Together
</title>
8547 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8548 copyright warriors that the government should
<quote>protect my property.
</quote>
8549 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8550 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8553 But when we see how dramatically this
<quote>property
</quote> has changed
—
8554 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8555 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8556 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8560 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8561 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8562 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8563 the massively expanded
<quote>property
</quote> rights granted by copyright
8564 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8565 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8569 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8570 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8571 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8575 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8576 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8577 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8578 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8579 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8580 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8581 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8582 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8583 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8584 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8587 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8588 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8589 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8590 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8591 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8592 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8593 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8594 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8595 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8596 in control that technology and the market enable.
8599 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8600 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8602 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8603 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8604 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8605 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8608 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8609 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8610 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8611 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8612 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8613 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8614 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8615 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8616 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8617 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8618 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8619 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8620 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8621 known.
<footnote><para>
8623 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his
<quote>four surrenders
</quote> of
8624 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8625 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8629 <emphasis role='strong'
>This has been
</emphasis> a long chapter. Its
8630 point can now be briefly stated.
8633 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8634 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8635 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8636 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8637 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8640 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8641 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"left">
8645 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8646 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8651 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8652 <entry>©</entry>
8656 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8665 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8666 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8667 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8670 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8671 noncommercial work was also free.
8674 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8677 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8678 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"left">
8682 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8683 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8688 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8689 <entry>©</entry>
8690 <entry>©</entry>
8693 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8702 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8703 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8704 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8705 transformation were still essentially free.
8708 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8709 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8710 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8711 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8712 we could say the law began to look like this:
8715 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8716 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"left">
8721 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8726 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8727 <entry>©</entry>
8728 <entry>©</entry>
8731 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8732 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8740 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8741 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8742 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8743 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8744 that the law now looks like this:
8747 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8748 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"left">
8753 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8758 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8759 <entry>©</entry>
8760 <entry>©</entry>
8763 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8764 <entry>©</entry>
8765 <entry>©</entry>
8772 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8773 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8776 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8777 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8780 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8781 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8782 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8783 these domains actually does any good.
8786 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8787 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8788 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8789 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8790 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8791 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8792 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8793 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8794 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8795 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8798 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8799 course copyright is a kind of
<quote>property,
</quote> and of course, as with any
8800 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8801 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8802 property rights
<footnote><para>
8804 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8805 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8806 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey,
<quote>The
8807 Disintegration of Property,
</quote> in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8808 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8810 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8812 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8813 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8814 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8815 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the
<quote>copyright
</quote>
8816 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8817 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8818 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8819 vibrant and rich free culture.
8821 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
8823 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8824 limits on the scope of the interests protected by
<quote>property.
</quote> The very
8825 birth of
<quote>copyright
</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8826 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8827 story of chapter
6). The tradition of
<quote>fair use
</quote> is animated by a
8828 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8829 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8832 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8833 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8834 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8835 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8836 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8837 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8838 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8839 dominates the debate today.
8842 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8843 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8844 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8845 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8846 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8847 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8848 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8849 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8850 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8851 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8858 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8859 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8862 <chapter label=
"11" id=
"chimera">
8863 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8864 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8865 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8867 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8868 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8870 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8871 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The
</quote> (Wells)
</primary>
8875 <emphasis role='strong'
>In a well-known
</emphasis> short story by
8876 H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez trips (literally, down an
8877 ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in the Peruvian
8878 Andes.
<footnote><para>
8880 H. G. Wells,
<quote>The Country of the Blind
</quote> (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8881 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8882 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8884 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with
<quote>sweet water, pasture,
8885 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8886 that bore an excellent fruit.
</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8887 takes this as an opportunity.
<quote>In the Country of the Blind,
</quote> he tells
8888 himself,
<quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.
</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8889 villagers to explore life as a king.
8892 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8893 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8894 <quote>blind.
</quote> They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8895 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8896 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8897 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated.
<quote>`You
8898 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8899 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8904 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8905 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8906 affection, a young woman who to him seems
<quote>the most beautiful thing in
8907 the whole of creation,
</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8908 description of what he sees
<quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8909 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8910 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8911 indulgence.
</quote> <quote>She did not believe,
</quote> Wells tells us, and
<quote>she could
8912 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.
</quote>
8915 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his
<quote>mysteriously delighted
</quote>
8916 love, the father and the village object.
<quote>You see, my dear,
</quote> her
8917 father instructs,
<quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8918 anything right.
</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8921 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion.
<quote>His brain
8922 is affected,
</quote> he reports.
8925 <quote>What affects it?
</quote> the father asks.
<quote>Those queer things that are
8926 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8930 The doctor continues:
<quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8931 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8932 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8933 irritant bodies [the eyes].
</quote>
8936 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!
</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8937 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8938 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8939 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8942 <emphasis role='strong'
>It sometimes
</emphasis> happens that the eggs
8943 of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
8944 <quote>chimera.
</quote> A chimera is a single creature with two sets
8945 of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be different from the
8946 DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8949 plot for murder mysteries.
<quote>But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8950 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8951 scene.
…</quote>
8953 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8954 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8956 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8957 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8958 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8959 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8960 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8961 understanding of a
<quote>person
</quote> should reflect this reality.
8964 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8965 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8966 unfairly enough,
<quote>the copyright wars,
</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8967 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question
<quote>What is
8968 p2p file sharing?
</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8969 wrong. One side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8970 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8971 thirty years without any question at all.
</quote> That's true, at least in
8972 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8973 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8974 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8975 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8978 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8979 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8980 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8981 <quote>friends
</quote> beyond recognition to say
<quote>my ten thousand best friends
</quote> can
8982 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8983 what
<quote>we have always been allowed to do,
</quote> we have not always been
8984 allowed to share music with
<quote>our ten thousand best friends.
</quote>
8987 Likewise, when the other side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like walking
8988 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8989 with it,
</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8990 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8991 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8993 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8998 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8999 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
9000 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
9001 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
9002 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
9003 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
9004 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
9005 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
9008 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
9009 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
9010 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
9011 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
9012 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
9015 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
9016 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
9017 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
9018 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
9019 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
9020 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
9021 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
9022 implemented.
<footnote><para>
9024 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
9025 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
9026 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
9027 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
9029 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9030 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
9031 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
9032 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
9033 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
<quote>House Bill Aims to Up
9034 Stakes on Piracy,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
9035 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
9036 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
9037 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
9038 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
9039 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
9040 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
9041 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
9042 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
9043 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
9044 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
9045 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
9046 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
9047 Elizabeth Young,
<quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,
</quote> redandblack.com,
9048 August
2003, available at
9049 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
9050 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
9051 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
9052 identities, see James Collins,
<quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
9053 Name Students,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
9054 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
9055 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
9056 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9060 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
9062 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
9063 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
9064 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
9065 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
9066 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
9069 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
9070 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
9071 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
9072 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
9073 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
9074 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
9075 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
9076 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
9080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
9081 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
9082 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
9083 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
9084 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
9085 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
9086 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
9089 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to
<quote>steal
</quote> music. My
9090 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
9091 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
9092 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
9093 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
9094 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
9095 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
9096 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
9097 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
9098 protection for copyrighted material,
9102 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
9103 material, and we want to protect those rights.
9106 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
9107 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
9108 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
9109 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
9110 produce a totally different industry model.
9113 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
9114 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
9115 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
9116 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
9117 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
9118 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
9119 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
9120 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
9121 interests.
<footnote><para>
9123 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
9124 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
9125 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
9126 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
9127 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
9128 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
9129 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
9132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
9134 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
9135 one of
<quote>the major labels.
</quote> Its position on these matters has now
9137 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
9140 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
9141 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
9142 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
9145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
9147 <chapter label=
"12" id=
"harms">
9148 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
9150 <emphasis role='strong'
>To fight
</emphasis> <quote>piracy,
</quote> to
9151 protect
<quote>property,
</quote> the content industry has launched a
9152 war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
9153 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both
9154 direct and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these
9155 damages will be suffered most by our own people.
9158 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
9159 particular, the consequences for
<quote>free culture.
</quote> But my aim now is to
9160 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9164 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9165 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9166 power of the property called
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> is at its greatest in
9169 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
9170 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
9172 Yet
<quote>common sense
</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
9173 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
9174 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9175 rejection of
<quote>piracy
</quote> still has play.
9177 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9180 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9181 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9182 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9183 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9184 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9186 <section id=
"constrain">
9187 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
9189 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9190 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9191 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9192 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9193 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9194 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9195 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9196 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9197 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9198 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9199 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9200 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
9201 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9204 This digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> is in part an extension of the
9205 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9206 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9207 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9208 of digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9209 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9210 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9211 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9212 the culture all around.
9215 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9216 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9220 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9221 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9222 storytelling extended across the globe.
9225 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9226 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9227 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9228 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9229 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9230 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9231 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9232 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9233 work is presumptively illegal.
9236 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9237 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9238 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9239 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9240 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9241 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
9242 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9243 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
9244 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9245 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
9246 million.
<footnote><para>
9248 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
9249 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
9250 the settlement, see MCI press release,
<quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9251 Approval for SEC Settlement
</quote> (
7 July
2003), available at
9252 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
9253 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9255 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9256 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9257 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
9258 suffering.
<footnote>
9260 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9261 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
9262 an overview, see Tanya Albert,
<quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9263 Say Tort Reformers,
</quote> amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
9264 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
9265 and
<quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,
</quote> CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
9267 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9269 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
9271 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9272 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9273 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9274 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9276 <indexterm><primary>art, underground
</primary></indexterm>
9278 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9279 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9280 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9281 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9282 Disneys
<quote>pirates.
</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9283 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9287 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9288 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9289 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9290 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
9291 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9292 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9293 fraught. Already, exhibits of
<quote>illegal art
</quote> tour the United
9294 States.
<footnote><para>
9297 See Danit Lidor,
<quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
9299 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9300 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9302 In what does their
<quote>illegality
</quote> consist?
9303 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9304 critical or reflective.
9306 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
9308 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9309 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9310 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
9311 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9312 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9313 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9314 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9315 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9316 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9317 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9319 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
9321 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9322 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9323 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9324 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9325 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9326 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9327 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9328 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9329 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9332 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9333 described in chapter
9334 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9335 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9336 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9337 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9343 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9344 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9345 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9346 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9347 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9348 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9349 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9350 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9353 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9354 <quote>breathing room
</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9355 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9356 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9357 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9358 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9359 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9360 these rules have little relationship to the
<quote>law
</quote> with which judges
9364 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9365 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9366 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9367 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9368 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9369 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9370 <quote>copyright
</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9371 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9372 culture that is free.
9375 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9379 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9380 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9381 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9382 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9383 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9385 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying,
<quote>This has been
9386 cleared.
</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9387 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9391 <section id=
"innovators">
9392 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9394 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9395 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9396 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9397 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9398 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9399 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9402 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9403 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9404 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9405 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9406 other aspect by substituting
<quote>free market
</quote> every place I've spoken of
9407 <quote>free culture.
</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9408 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9410 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9412 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9413 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9414 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9415 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9416 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9417 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9418 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9419 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9420 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9421 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9422 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9424 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9426 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9428 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9429 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9430 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9431 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9432 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9433 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9434 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9435 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9436 <quote>nuclear pall
</quote> that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9439 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9440 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9441 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9443 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
9445 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9446 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9447 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9448 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9449 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9450 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9452 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9453 <indexterm id='idxcdsprefdata' class='startofrange'
>
9454 <primary>CDs
</primary>
9455 <secondary>preference data on
</secondary>
9458 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9459 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9460 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9461 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9465 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9466 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9467 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9468 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9469 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9470 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9471 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9472 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9473 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9474 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9477 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9478 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9481 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9482 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9483 the kind of content the users liked.
9485 <indexterm startref='idxcdsprefdata' class='endofrange'
/>
9487 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9488 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9489 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9490 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9491 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9492 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9493 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9494 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9495 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9496 they had already bought.
9498 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9499 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9502 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9503 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9504 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9505 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9506 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9507 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9508 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9509 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9512 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9515 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9516 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9517 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9518 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9519 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9520 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9521 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9525 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9526 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9527 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9530 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9531 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9532 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9533 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9535 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9536 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9537 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9538 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad
</primary></indexterm>
9540 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9541 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9542 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9543 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9544 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9546 See Joseph Menn,
<quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9547 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9548 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown,
<quote>The Music
9549 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,
</quote> Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9550 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9551 See also Jon Healey,
<quote>Online Music Services Besieged,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9552 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9554 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9555 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9556 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9557 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9558 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9559 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9560 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9561 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9562 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9563 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9564 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9565 discussion with BMW:
9566 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9567 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9570 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9571 <indexterm><primary>cars, MP3 sound system in
</primary></indexterm>
9573 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9574 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9575 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9576 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9577 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9578 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9579 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9582 Rafe Needleman,
<quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,
</quote> <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9584 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9585 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9586 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9591 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with
<quote>your money or your
9592 life
</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9593 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9594 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9595 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9596 constantly threatened by litigation.
9600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9601 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9602 enterprises. The point is the definition of
<quote>illegal.
</quote> The law is a
9603 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9604 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9605 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9606 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9607 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9608 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9609 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9610 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9611 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9612 much less creativity.
9614 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9616 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9617 use. Whatever the
<quote>real
</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9618 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9619 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9620 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9621 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9622 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9623 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9624 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9625 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9628 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9629 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9630 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9631 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9632 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9633 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9634 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9635 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9636 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9637 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9638 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9639 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9641 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9642 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9643 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9647 <emphasis role='strong'
>The uncertainty
</emphasis> of the law is one
9648 burden on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more
9649 directly. This is the effort by many in the content industry to use
9650 the law to directly regulate the technology of the Internet so that it
9651 better protects their content.
9654 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9655 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9656 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9657 this feature is a
<quote>bug.
</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9658 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9659 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9660 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables
<quote>piracy,
</quote> then,
9661 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9663 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9665 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9666 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9667 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9668 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9669 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> GartnerG2 and
9670 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9671 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9672 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9674 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9675 <quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9676 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9677 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9678 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9679 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9680 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9682 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9686 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9687 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9688 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9689 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9692 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9696 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9697 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9698 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9700 See David McGuire,
<quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,
</quote> Newsbytes,
9701 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9703 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9704 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9706 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9709 <emphasis role='strong'
>There is one
</emphasis> more obvious way in
9710 which this war has harmed innovation
—again, a story that will be
9711 quite familiar to the free market crowd.
9714 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9715 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9716 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9717 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9720 <primary>cassette recording
</primary>
9721 <secondary>VCRs
</secondary>
9724 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9725 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9726 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9727 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9728 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9730 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9731 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9732 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9734 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9735 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9736 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9737 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9738 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9741 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9742 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9743 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9744 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9745 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9748 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9750 <indexterm><primary>Grokster, Ltd.
</primary></indexterm>
9751 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9752 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9753 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9754 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9755 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9756 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9757 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9758 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9759 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9760 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9761 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9762 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9765 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9766 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9767 here.
<footnote><para>
9769 <indexterm><primary>Tauzin, Billy
</primary></indexterm>
9770 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9771 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9772 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9773 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9774 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9775 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9776 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a
<quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that
9777 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9778 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9779 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9780 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2,
<quote>Copyright and
9781 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
33–34,
9783 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9784 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9785 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz
</primary></indexterm>
9786 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9788 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9789 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9792 <primary>artists
</primary>
9793 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9798 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9799 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9800 artist doesn't get paid for that
<quote>radio performance
</quote> unless he or she
9801 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9802 version of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote>—to memorialize her famous
9803 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9804 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9805 copyright owners of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> would get some money, whereas
9806 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9807 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9810 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9811 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9812 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9813 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9814 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9815 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9816 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9817 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9821 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9822 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9823 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9824 spectrum. Thus, I can
<quote>tune in
</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9825 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9826 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9830 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9831 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9832 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9833 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9834 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9835 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9836 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9837 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9838 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9839 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9840 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9842 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9845 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9846 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9847 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9848 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9849 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9850 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9851 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9856 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9857 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9858 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9859 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9860 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9861 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9862 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9863 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9864 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9865 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9866 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9867 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9868 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9875 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9876 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9877 underestimated the power of
<quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9878 legislation
</quote><footnote><para>
9882 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9885 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9886 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9887 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9888 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9889 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9892 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'
>
9893 <primary>artists
</primary>
9894 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9897 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9898 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9901 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9902 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9903 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9904 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9905 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9906 of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9907 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9908 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9909 burdens terrestrial radio.
9912 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9913 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9914 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9915 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9916 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9919 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9920 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9921 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9922 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9923 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9924 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9925 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9926 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9927 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9928 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9929 C. Picker,
<quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9930 Distribution,
</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461:
<quote>This was
9931 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9932 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9933 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9934 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9935 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.
</quote>
9936 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9937 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9939 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9942 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'
/>
9944 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9945 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9946 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9947 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9950 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9952 name of the service;
9955 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9958 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9961 date of transmission;
9964 time of transmission;
9967 time zone of origination of transmission;
9970 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9973 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9976 sound recording title;
9979 ISRC code of the recording;
9982 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9985 featured recording artist;
9994 UPC code of the retail album;
10000 copyright owner information;
10003 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
10006 name of the service or entity;
10009 channel or program;
10012 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
10015 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
10018 time zone where the signal was received (user);
10021 unique user identifier;
10024 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
10029 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
10030 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
10031 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
10032 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
10033 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
10034 that terrestrial radio does not.
10037 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
10038 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
10039 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
10041 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
10042 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'
>
10043 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
10046 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
10047 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
10048 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
10052 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
10053 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
10054 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
10055 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
10056 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
10057 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… <quote>How do you come up with a
10059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
10060 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
10061 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
10062 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
10063 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
10064 business.
…</quote>
10067 <primary>artists
</primary>
10068 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
10071 And the RIAA experts said,
<quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
10072 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
10073 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
10074 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>.
</quote> (Emphasis
10078 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'
/>
10080 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
10081 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
10082 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
10083 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
10084 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
10085 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
10086 effective to prevent it.
10089 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
10090 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
10092 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
10094 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
10095 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
10098 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
10099 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
10100 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
10103 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
10104 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
10105 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
10106 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
10107 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie,
<quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,
</quote> Pew
10108 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
10109 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
10110 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
10111 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
10113 According to the RIAA,
10114 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
10115 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
10117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
10118 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
10119 the world, but against students building search engines, and
10121 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
10122 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
10123 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
10125 response by the other.
10128 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
10129 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
10130 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
10131 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
10132 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
10133 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
10134 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
10135 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
10136 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
10137 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
10138 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
10139 was.
<footnote><para>
10141 Alex Pham,
<quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,
</quote> <citetitle>Los
10142 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
10144 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
10145 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
10146 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
10147 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
10148 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
10149 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
10153 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
10154 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
10155 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
10156 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
10157 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
10158 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
10159 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
10160 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
10161 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
10163 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel,
<quote>Alcohol Consumption During
10164 Prohibition,
</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
10167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
10168 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
10169 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
10171 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
10172 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
10173 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
10175 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
10176 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
10177 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
10178 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
10179 cheat.
<footnote><para>
10181 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein,
<quote>Tax
10182 Compliance,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
10183 compliance literature).
10185 We pride ourselves on our
<quote>free society,
</quote> but an endless array of
10186 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
10187 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10188 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
10191 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10192 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
10193 students about the importance of
<quote>ethics.
</quote> As my colleague Charlie
10194 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
10195 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
10196 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
10197 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
10198 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
10199 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
10200 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
10201 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
10202 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
10203 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
10204 lives both normally and legally, since
<quote>normally
</quote> entails a certain
10205 degree of illegality.
10206 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
10209 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10210 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10211 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10212 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10213 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10214 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10215 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10216 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10217 to consider the alternative.
10221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10222 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10223 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10224 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10225 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10226 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10229 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10230 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10231 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10232 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10233 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10234 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10235 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10236 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10237 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10238 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10239 introduced this different idea of
<quote>sharing.
</quote> We need to be able to
10240 call these twenty million Americans
<quote>citizens,
</quote> not
<quote>felons.
</quote>
10243 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10244 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10245 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10246 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10247 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10248 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10249 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10250 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10251 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10252 a nation of felons?
10255 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10258 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10259 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10260 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10261 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10265 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That
<quote>use
</quote> of the
10266 recordings is free.
10269 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10270 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10271 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am
<quote>free
</quote> to copy,
10272 or
<quote>rip,
</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10273 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that
<quote>freedom
</quote> was a
10274 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the
<quote>Rip, Mix, Burn
</quote>
10275 capacities of digital technologies.
10277 <indexterm><primary>Andromeda
</primary></indexterm>
10278 <indexterm id='idxcdsmix' class='startofrange'
>
10279 <primary>CDs
</primary>
10280 <secondary>mix technology and
</secondary>
10283 This
<quote>use
</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10284 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10285 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10286 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10287 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10288 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10289 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10290 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10291 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10294 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
10295 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10296 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10297 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10298 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10299 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10300 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10301 on people's machines.
10304 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10305 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10306 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10307 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10308 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10309 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10312 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10313 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10314 plastic or were part of a massively complex
<quote>digital rights
10315 management
</quote> system.
10317 <indexterm startref='idxcdsmix' class='endofrange'
/>
10319 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10320 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10321 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10322 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10323 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10324 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10325 freedom to move content easily?
10328 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10329 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10330 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10331 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10332 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10333 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10334 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10335 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10336 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10339 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10340 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10341 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10342 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10343 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10344 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10345 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10348 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10349 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10350 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10351 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10354 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10355 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10359 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10360 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10362 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
10363 <indexterm id='idxisps' class='startofrange'
>
10364 <primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary>
10367 <emphasis role='strong'
>There's one more
</emphasis> aspect to this
10368 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and
10369 follows directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier
10370 Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the
10371 <quote>collateral damage
</quote> that
<quote>arises whenever you turn
10372 a very large percentage of the population into criminals.
</quote> This
10373 is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10376 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,
</quote> von Lohmann
10378 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10382 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10383 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10384 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10385 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10386 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10387 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think,
<quote>Oh, well,
10388 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.
</quote> Well, what this campaign
10389 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10390 American Internet-using population into
<quote>lawbreakers.
</quote>
10394 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10395 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10396 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10399 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10400 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10401 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10402 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10403 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10404 an Internet user is revealed.
10407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10408 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10409 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10410 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10411 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10412 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10413 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10414 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10415 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10417 See Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10418 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,
</quote>
10419 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs,
<quote>Worried Parents
10420 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10421 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10422 Being Sued,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10423 Graham,
<quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10424 2003,
4D; John Schwartz,
<quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10425 Fan, Either,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi,
<quote>Is
10426 Brianna a Criminal?
</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10431 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10432 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10433 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10435 See
<quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10436 Some Methods Used,
</quote> CNN.com, available at
10437 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10439 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10440 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10441 one of those MP3s will have the same
<quote>fingerprint.
</quote>
10444 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10445 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10446 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10447 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10448 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10449 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10450 network is
<quote>cooperating
</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10451 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10452 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10453 as a
<quote>criminal.
</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10454 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10456 See Jeff Adler,
<quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,
</quote>
10457 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>Four
10458 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10459 Colleges,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10460 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10461 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas,
<quote>Music
10462 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10463 Lawsuit Possible,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox,
<quote>RIAA
10464 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10465 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10466 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Download Warning
101: Freshman
10467 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10468 Sharing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11;
<quote>Raid, Letters
10469 Are Weapons at Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10471 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10472 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10474 <indexterm startref='idxisps' class='endofrange'
/>
10476 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10477 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10478 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10479 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10480 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10481 this
<quote>contraband
</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10485 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10486 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10488 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10492 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10493 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10494 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10495 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10496 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10497 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10498 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10499 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10500 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10501 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10502 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10503 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10504 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10505 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10506 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10507 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10512 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered
<quote>criminals
</quote> under
10513 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10514 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10515 considered
<quote>criminals,
</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10516 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10517 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10524 <part id=
"c-balances">
10525 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10530 <emphasis role='strong'
>So here's
</emphasis> the picture: You're
10531 standing at the side of the road. Your car is on fire. You are angry
10532 and upset because in part you helped start the fire. Now you don't
10533 know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket, filled with
10534 gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10537 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10538 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10539 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10540 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10541 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10545 <emphasis role='strong'
>A war
</emphasis> about copyright rages all
10546 around
—and we're all focusing on the wrong thing. No doubt,
10547 current technologies threaten existing businesses. No doubt they may
10548 threaten artists. But technologies change. The industry and
10549 technologists have plenty of ways to use technology to protect
10550 themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This is a fire
10551 that if let alone would burn itself out.
10554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10555 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10556 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10557 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10558 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10559 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10560 made that is happening all around.
10563 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10564 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10565 gasoline onto this fire.
10568 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10569 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10570 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10571 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10574 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10575 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10576 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10577 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10578 success will require.
10582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10583 <chapter label=
"13" id=
"eldred">
10584 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10585 <indexterm id=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'
>
10586 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel
</primary>
10589 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1995</emphasis>, a father was frustrated
10590 that his daughters didn't seem to like Hawthorne. No doubt there was
10591 more than one such father, but at least one did something about
10592 it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in New
10593 Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
10594 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would
10595 make this nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
10598 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10599 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10600 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10601 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10602 them available for free.
10605 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10606 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10607 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10608 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10609 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10611 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10612 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10613 accessible
—today.
10616 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10617 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10618 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10619 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10620 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10621 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10622 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10623 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10624 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10625 commercial publications of public domain works.
10627 <indexterm startref=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'
/>
10629 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10630 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10631 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10632 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10633 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10634 call the
<quote>noncommercial publishing industry,
</quote> which before the
10635 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10636 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10637 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10638 generally.
<footnote><para>
10640 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10641 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10642 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10643 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10644 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10645 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10646 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10647 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10648 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10649 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10650 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10651 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10652 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10653 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10654 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10657 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10658 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10659 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10660 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10661 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10662 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10663 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10664 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10665 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10666 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10667 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10668 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10670 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10671 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10675 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10676 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10677 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10678 <quote>copyrights should be forever.
</quote><footnote><para>
10680 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10681 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10682 The full text is:
<quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10683 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10684 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10685 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10686 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10687 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10688 Congress,
</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10693 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10694 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10695 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10696 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10697 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10698 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10702 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10704 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10706 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10707 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10709 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10713 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10714 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10715 their
… Writings.
…
10719 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10720 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10721 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10722 something
—for example, to regulate
<quote>commerce among the several
10723 states
</quote> or
<quote>declare War.
</quote> But here, the
<quote>something
</quote> is something quite
10724 specific
—to
<quote>promote
… Progress
</quote>—through means that
10725 are also specific
— by
<quote>securing
</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights
</quote> (i.e.,
10726 copyrights)
<quote>for limited Times.
</quote>
10729 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10730 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10731 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10732 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be
<quote>limited
</quote> will have
10733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10734 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10735 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10736 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms
<quote>on the
10737 installment plan,
</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10738 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10741 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10742 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10743 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10744 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10745 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10746 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10747 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10748 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10749 this gravy train going.
10752 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10753 government.
<quote>Corruption
</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10754 bribed. Rather,
<quote>corruption
</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10755 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10756 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10757 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10758 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10761 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10762 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10763 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10764 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10765 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10766 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10767 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10768 published by anyone for free.
10771 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10772 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10773 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10774 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10778 <quote>Next year,
</quote> the adviser announces,
<quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10781 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10782 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10783 those works.
</quote>
10786 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,
</quote> she continues,
<quote>that
10787 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10788 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10789 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.
</quote>
10792 <quote>Hope?
</quote> a fellow board member says.
<quote>Can't we be doing something
10796 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>We could contribute
10797 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10798 they support the bill.
</quote>
10801 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10802 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it.
<quote>How much
10803 would we get if this extension were passed?
</quote> you ask the adviser.
<quote>How
10804 much is it worth?
</quote>
10807 <quote>Well,
</quote> the adviser says,
<quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10808 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10809 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10810 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate.
</quote>
10813 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10814 correct conclusion:
10817 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10818 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10820 would assure that the bill was passed?
</quote>
10823 <quote>Absolutely,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>It is worth it to you to
10825 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10826 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000.
</quote>
10829 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10830 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10831 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10832 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10834 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10836 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10837 the copyright term extended.
10840 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10841 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10842 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10845 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10847 Term Extension Act, this
<quote>theory
</quote> about incentives was proved
10848 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10849 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10850 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10851 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10852 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press,
<quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10853 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,
</quote>
10854 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10856 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10857 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10858 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10859 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown,
<quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10860 Age,
</quote> available at
10861 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10863 Disney is estimated to have
10864 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10865 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10867 Alan K. Ota,
<quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,
</quote>
10868 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10869 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10874 <emphasis role='strong'
>Constitutional law
</emphasis> is not oblivious
10875 to the obvious. Or at least, it need not be. So when I was considering
10876 Eldred's complaint, this reality about the never-ending incentives to
10877 increase the copyright term was central to my thinking. In my view, a
10878 pragmatic court committed to interpreting and applying the
10879 Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the power
10880 to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
10881 constitutional requirement that terms be
<quote>limited.
</quote> If
10882 they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again and
10886 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10887 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10888 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10889 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10890 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10891 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10895 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10899 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10900 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10901 power to regulate only
<quote>commerce among the several states
</quote> (aka
10903 commerce
</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10904 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10909 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10910 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10911 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10912 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10913 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10915 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
10917 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10918 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10919 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10920 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10921 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10922 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10923 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10924 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10925 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10926 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10927 position to second-guess Congress.
10930 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,
</quote>
10931 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10932 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10934 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10935 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10936 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10937 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10939 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10943 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10944 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10946 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10947 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10948 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10949 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10950 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10951 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10952 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10953 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10954 limitation to
<quote>limited times
</quote> notwithstanding.
10956 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10957 yield the conclusion that Congress
10958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10959 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10960 term, then there would be no
<quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power over
10961 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10962 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10963 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10964 term of existing copyrights.
10967 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10968 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10969 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10970 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10971 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10972 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10973 demonstrating the
<quote>fidelity
</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10974 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10975 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10976 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10977 were going to be petty politicians.
10980 <emphasis role='strong'
>Now let's pause
</emphasis> for a moment to
10981 make sure we understand what the argument in
10982 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10983 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10984 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10985 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10986 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10987 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10988 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10989 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10990 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10991 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10992 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10993 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10994 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10995 piracy that affects us all.
10998 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
11000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
11001 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
11002 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than
<quote>legal piracy.
</quote><footnote><para>
11004 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
11005 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
11006 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
11008 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
11009 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
11010 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
11012 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
11015 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
11017 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
11019 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
11020 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
11021 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
11022 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
11023 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
11024 bought to extend them again.
11027 <emphasis role='strong'
>It is valuable
</emphasis> copyrights that are
11028 responsible for terms being extended. Mickey Mouse and
11029 <quote>Rhapsody in Blue.
</quote> These works are too valuable for
11030 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from
11031 copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.
11032 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from
11033 the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The real
11034 harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The real
11035 harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially exploited,
11036 and no longer available as a result.
11039 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
11040 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
11041 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
11042 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
11043 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
11044 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
11045 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
11047 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
11048 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
11049 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
11054 Think practically about the consequence of this
11055 extension
—practically,
11056 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
11058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
11059 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
11060 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
11061 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
11063 9,
873. What would you have to do?
11065 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
11067 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
11068 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
11069 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
11070 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
11071 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
11072 list of books still under copyright.
11075 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
11076 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
11079 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
11081 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
11082 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
11083 being at least a list?
11086 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
11087 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
11089 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
11091 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
11092 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
11095 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,
</quote> the
11096 apologists for the system respond.
<quote>Why should there be a list of
11097 copyright owners?
</quote>
11100 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
11101 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
11102 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
11103 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
11104 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
11105 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
11106 what tangible property.
11109 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
11110 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
11111 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
11113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
11114 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
11115 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
11117 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
11118 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
11119 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
11120 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
11121 know quite well who owns what property.
11124 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
11125 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
11127 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
11128 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
11129 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
11130 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
11131 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
11132 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
11133 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
11136 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
11137 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
11139 for other creative works is much more dire.
11141 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'
>
11142 <primary>Agee, Michael
</primary>
11144 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11145 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
11147 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
11148 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
11149 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
11150 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
11151 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
11152 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
11153 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
11154 money. According to one estimate,
<quote>Roach has sold about
60,
000
11155 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
11156 films.
</quote><footnote><para>
11158 See David G. Savage,
<quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,
</quote>
11159 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
<quote>Classic Movies,
11160 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
11161 Down Copyright Extension,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
11164 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
11167 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
11168 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
11169 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
11170 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
11173 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
11175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
11176 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
11177 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
11178 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
11179 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
11180 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
11181 work available for distribution.
11184 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11185 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11186 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11187 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11188 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
11189 mm film.
<footnote><para>
11191 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11192 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11193 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
11194 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
11195 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
11196 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
11201 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11203 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11204 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11205 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11206 locate the copyright owner.
11209 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
11210 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
11211 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
11212 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
11213 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
11214 to these films is exceptionally high.
11217 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11218 copyright owner when she shows up?
</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11219 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11220 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11221 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11222 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11223 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11224 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11225 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11228 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11231 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11233 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11234 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11235 the copyright expires.
11237 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'
/>
11239 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11240 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11241 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11243 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11247 <emphasis role='strong'
>Of all the
</emphasis> creative work produced
11248 by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has continuing commercial
11249 value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a crucially important
11250 legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright creates incentives
11251 to produce and distribute the creative work. For that tiny fraction,
11252 the copyright acts as an
<quote>engine of free expression.
</quote>
11255 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11256 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11258 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11259 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11260 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11262 the commercial life ends.
11265 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11266 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
11267 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11269 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11271 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11272 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
11273 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11274 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11275 have, we need to have access to this history.
11278 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11281 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11282 this context do no good.
11285 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11286 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11287 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11288 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11289 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11290 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11291 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11292 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11293 was independent of copyright law.
11296 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11297 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
11298 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11299 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11300 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11301 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11302 market didn't have more to offer.
11305 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11306 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11307 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11308 would not have interfered with anything.
11311 But this situation has now changed.
11313 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'
>
11314 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
11317 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11318 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11319 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11320 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11321 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11322 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11323 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11324 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11325 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11326 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11330 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11331 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11332 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11333 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11334 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11335 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11336 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11337 written for a radically different context.
11340 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11341 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11342 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11343 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11344 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11345 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11346 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
11347 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11348 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11351 You may well ask,
<quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11352 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11353 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11354 culture widely?
</quote>
11357 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11358 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11359 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11360 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11361 of a library is to serve what
<quote>the market
</quote> would demand. But if you
11362 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11363 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11364 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11365 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11367 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'
/>
11369 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11370 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11371 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11372 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11375 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11376 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11377 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11378 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11379 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11381 Jason Schultz,
<quote>The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,
</quote> 20
11382 December
2002, available at
11383 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11388 <emphasis role='strong'
>In January
1999</emphasis>, we filed a lawsuit
11389 on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
11390 asking the court to declare the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
11391 Act unconstitutional. The two central claims that we made were (
1)
11392 that extending existing terms violated the Constitution's
11393 <quote>limited Times
</quote> requirement, and (
2) that extending terms
11394 by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11397 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11398 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11399 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11400 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11401 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11404 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11405 copyrights be for
<quote>limited Times
</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11406 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11407 <quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11408 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11409 terms that are
<quote>limited.
</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11410 to interpret the term
<quote>limited Times
</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11411 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11412 power to extend existing terms.
11415 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11416 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11417 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11418 whole, where the court will sit
<quote>en banc
</quote> to hear the case.
11420 <indexterm><primary>Tatel, David
</primary></indexterm>
11422 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11423 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11426 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11427 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11428 overstepped its bounds.
11431 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11432 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11433 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11434 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11435 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11438 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11439 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11440 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11441 briefs and preparing for argument.
11444 <emphasis role='strong'
>It is over
</emphasis> a year later as I write
11445 these words. It is still astonishingly hard. If you know anything at
11446 all about this story, you know that we lost the appeal. And if you
11447 know something more than just the minimum, you probably think there
11448 was no way this case could have been won. After our defeat, I received
11449 literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and supporters,
11450 thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed cause. And
11451 none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail from my
11452 client, Eric Eldred.
11455 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11456 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11457 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11460 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11462 <emphasis role='strong'
>The mistake
</emphasis> was made early, though
11463 it became obvious only at the very end. Our case had been supported
11464 from the very beginning by an extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart,
11465 and by the law firm he had moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and
11466 Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11468 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11469 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11470 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11472 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11473 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11474 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11476 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11477 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11478 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11479 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11480 told me, if we could make the issue seem
<quote>important
</quote> to the Supreme
11481 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11482 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against
<quote>the
11483 most powerful media companies in the world.
</quote>
11486 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11487 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11488 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11489 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11490 <quote>right
</quote> as in
<quote>true,
</quote> I thought, but it is
<quote>wrong
</quote> as in
<quote>it just shouldn't be
11491 that way.
</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11492 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11493 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11495 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11496 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11498 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11499 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11500 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11502 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11503 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11504 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11507 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11508 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11509 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11510 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11511 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11512 why it was unconstitutional.
11515 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11518 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11519 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11520 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11521 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11522 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11523 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11524 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11525 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11526 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11527 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11528 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11529 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11530 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11531 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11534 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11535 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11536 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11537 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11538 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11539 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11540 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11541 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11542 to get bogged down?
</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11543 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11544 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11545 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11546 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11547 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11550 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11551 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11552 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11553 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11554 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11555 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11558 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11559 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11562 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11563 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11564 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11565 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11566 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11567 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11568 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11569 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11570 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11571 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11572 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11575 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11576 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11577 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11578 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11579 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11580 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11582 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11584 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11585 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11586 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11587 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11590 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11591 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11592 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11593 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11594 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11596 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11597 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11598 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11599 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11600 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11601 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11602 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11603 nothing more than
<quote>rent-seeking
</quote>—the fancy term economists use
11604 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11607 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11608 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11609 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11610 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11611 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11612 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11613 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11614 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11617 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11618 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11619 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11620 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan
</primary></indexterm>
11621 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen
</primary></indexterm>
11622 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11625 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11626 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11627 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11628 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11629 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11630 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11631 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11632 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11633 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11634 confidence in our argument.
11635 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11638 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11639 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these
<quote>friends
</quote> included
11640 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11641 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11645 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11646 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11647 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11648 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11649 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11650 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11654 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11655 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11656 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11657 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11658 domain, then people could use it to
<quote>glorify drugs or to create
11659 pornography.
</quote><footnote><para>
11661 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11662 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11664 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11665 <quote>protection
</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11666 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11667 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11669 Dinitia Smith,
<quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11670 Mouse Joins the Fray,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11674 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11675 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11676 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11679 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11680 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11681 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11682 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11683 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say,
<quote>Give us twenty years
11684 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11685 better with them than anyone else.
</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11686 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11687 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11688 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11691 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11692 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11693 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11694 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11695 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11698 <emphasis role='strong'
>Between February
</emphasis> and October, there
11699 was little I did beyond preparing for this case. Early on, as I said,
11700 I set the strategy.
11702 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
11703 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11705 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11706 called
<quote>the Conservatives.
</quote> The other we called
<quote>the Rest.
</quote> The
11707 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11708 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11709 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11710 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line
11711 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11712 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11714 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11715 <indexterm id='idxginsburg' class='startofrange'
>
11716 <primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
</primary>
11719 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11720 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11721 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11724 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11725 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11726 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11727 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11728 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11731 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11732 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11733 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11734 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11735 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11736 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11737 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11738 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11741 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11743 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11744 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11745 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11746 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11747 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11748 these retrospective extensions.
11750 <indexterm startref='idxginsburg' class='endofrange'
/>
11752 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11753 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11754 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11755 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11756 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11757 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11760 This analysis of
<quote>the Rest
</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11761 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11762 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11763 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11764 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation
—the
11765 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11766 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11767 powers have limits.
11770 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11771 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11772 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11774 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11775 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11776 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11777 supposed to be
<quote>limited.
</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11778 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
11779 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11780 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11784 <emphasis role='strong'
>The argument
</emphasis> on the government's
11785 side came down to this: Congress has done it before. It should be
11786 allowed to do it again. The government claimed that from the very
11787 beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
11788 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say
11789 that practice is unconstitutional.
11792 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11793 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831
11794 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11796 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11799 But this
<quote>consistency
</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11801 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11802 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11803 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11805 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11807 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11808 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11810 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11811 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11814 <emphasis role='strong'
>Oral argument
</emphasis> was scheduled for the
11815 first week in October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the
11816 argument. During those two weeks, I was repeatedly
11817 <quote>mooted
</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11820 help in the case. Such
<quote>moots
</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11821 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11824 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11825 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11826 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11827 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11829 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11830 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11833 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11834 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11836 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11837 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11838 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11839 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11840 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11843 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11844 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11845 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11846 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11847 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.
</quote>
11849 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11851 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11852 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11853 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11854 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11855 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11856 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11857 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11858 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11861 <emphasis role='strong'
>The night before
</emphasis> the argument, a
11862 line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The case
11863 had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
11864 culture. Hundreds stood in line
11866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11867 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11868 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11871 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11872 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11873 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11874 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11876 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11877 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11878 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11879 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11880 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11881 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11882 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11883 family of the Justices.
11886 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11887 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11888 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11889 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11891 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11893 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11894 The history was bothering her.
11898 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11899 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11900 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11901 practice that began with the very first act.
11905 She was quite willing to concede
<quote>that this flies directly in the face
11906 of what the framers had in mind.
</quote> But my response again and again
11907 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11911 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11912 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11914 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11919 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11920 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11921 Kennedy, who observed,
11925 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11926 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11927 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11928 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11929 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11933 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11939 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11940 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11941 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11942 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11943 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11946 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11948 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11949 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11950 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11951 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11952 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11955 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11956 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11957 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11960 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11961 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11967 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11968 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11971 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11972 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11974 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11975 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11976 into the Copyright Clause.
11979 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.
</primary></indexterm>
11981 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11982 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11983 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11987 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11988 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11989 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11990 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11995 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11996 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11997 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11998 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11999 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
12000 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
12001 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
12002 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
12003 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
12004 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
12008 <emphasis role='strong'
>As I left
</emphasis> the court that day, I
12009 knew there were a hundred points I wished I could remake. There were a
12010 hundred questions I wished I had
12012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
12013 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
12017 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
12018 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
12019 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
12020 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
12021 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
12022 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
12023 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
12024 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
12025 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
12026 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
12027 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
12028 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
12029 law that it had established elsewhere.
12032 <emphasis role='strong'
>The morning
</emphasis> of January
15,
2003, I
12033 was five minutes late to the office and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from
12034 the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the message, I could tell in an
12035 instant that she had bad news to report.The Supreme Court had affirmed
12036 the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven justices had voted in the
12037 majority. There were two dissents.
12040 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
12041 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
12042 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
12045 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
12046 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
12047 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
12051 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
12052 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
12053 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
12054 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
12055 even appear in the Court's opinion.
12057 <indexterm><primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
</primary></indexterm>
12060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
12061 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
12062 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
12063 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
12066 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
12067 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
12068 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
12069 they had worked so hard to defeat.
12072 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
12073 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
12074 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
12075 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
12076 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
12077 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
12078 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
12079 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
12080 be limited, but in this context it would not.
12083 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
12084 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
12085 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
12086 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
12087 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
12088 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
12089 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
12090 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
12091 the system we have.
12093 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
12095 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
12096 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
12097 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
12098 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
12099 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
12100 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
12101 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
12102 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
12103 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
12105 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
12107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
12108 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
12109 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
12110 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
12111 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
12112 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
12113 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
12114 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
12115 <quote>limited,
</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
12116 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
12119 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
12120 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
12121 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
12122 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
12123 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
12126 <emphasis role='strong'
>Defeat brings depression
</emphasis>. They say
12127 it is a sign of health when depression gives way to anger. My anger
12128 came quickly, but it didn't cure the depression. This anger was of two
12131 <indexterm><primary>originalism
</primary></indexterm>
12133 It was first anger with the five
<quote>Conservatives.
</quote> It would have been
12134 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
12135 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
12136 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
12137 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
12138 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
12139 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is
<quote>originalism
</quote>—to
12140 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
12141 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
12142 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other
<quote>originalist
</quote> rulings. Where was their
12143 <quote>originalism
</quote> now?
12146 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
12147 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
12148 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
12149 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
12151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
12152 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
12153 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
12154 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
12155 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
12156 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
12157 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
12161 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
12163 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
12166 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12168 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
12169 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
12170 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
12171 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
12172 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
12173 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
12174 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
12175 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
12176 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
12179 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
12180 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
12181 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
12182 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
12183 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
12184 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
12185 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
12186 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
12187 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
12188 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
12189 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
12190 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
12191 effort to persuade; but I
12192 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
12193 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
12194 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
12195 should decide the issue.
12197 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12199 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
12200 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12202 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
12205 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12206 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12207 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12208 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12211 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12212 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12213 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12214 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12218 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12219 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12220 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
12221 case was a mistake.
<quote>The Court is not ready,
</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
12222 issue should not be raised until it is.
12223 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12226 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12227 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12228 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12229 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12230 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12231 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12232 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
12235 <emphasis role='strong'
>While the reaction
</emphasis> to the Sonny
12236 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the
12237 Court's decision was mixed. No one, at least in the press, tried to
12238 say that extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won
12239 that battle over ideas. Where
12241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12242 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12243 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12244 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12245 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12246 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12250 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12251 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12252 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12253 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12254 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12255 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12259 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12260 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12261 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12262 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The
<quote>powerful and wealthy
</quote> line is a bit
12263 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12264 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12266 <figure id=
"fig-18">
12267 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
12268 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
12269 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12272 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12273 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That
<quote>grand experiment
</quote> we call the
12274 <quote>public domain
</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think,
<quote>Honey,
12275 I shrunk the Constitution.
</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12276 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12277 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12278 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12282 <chapter label=
"14" id=
"eldred-ii">
12283 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
12285 <emphasis role='strong'
>The day
</emphasis>
12286 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I
12287 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
12288 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was denied
—meaning the case was
12289 really finally over
—fate would have it that I was giving a
12290 speech to technologists at Disney World.) This was a particularly
12291 long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city from
12292 Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my computer and
12293 wrote an op-ed piece.
12295 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12297 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12298 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12299 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12300 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12301 Justice Kennedy:
<quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12302 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12303 that.
</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12304 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12307 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12308 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12310 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12311 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12312 the work passed into the public domain.
12315 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12316 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12317 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12320 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12321 is either the
<quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act
</quote> or the
<quote>Copyright
12322 Term Deregulation Act.
</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12323 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12324 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12325 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
12326 everything else, let the content go.
12328 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12330 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12331 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12332 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12333 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12334 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12335 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12336 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12337 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12338 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12339 the stupid harm of the present system.
12342 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12343 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12344 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12345 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12346 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12347 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12348 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12349 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12350 where copyright owners could be identified.
12352 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12353 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12356 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
12357 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12358 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12359 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12361 <indexterm><primary>German copyright law
</primary></indexterm>
12362 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12363 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12364 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12365 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
12366 every text of the Convention has provided that
<quote>the enjoyment and the
12367 exercise
</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention
<quote>shall not be subject
12368 to any formality.
</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12369 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12370 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12371 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12372 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12373 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12374 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12375 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12376 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12377 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
12378 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12379 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
12380 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a
<quote>natural right.
</quote> Natural
12381 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12382 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12383 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12384 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12385 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12388 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12389 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12390 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12391 <quote>Walt Disney creativity
</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12392 know what's protected and what's not.
12394 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12396 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12397 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12398 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12399 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12400 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12401 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12402 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
12403 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12406 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12407 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12408 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12409 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12410 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12411 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12414 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12415 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12416 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12417 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12419 imposed upon creators.
12422 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12423 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12426 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12427 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12428 the government. He has a property right over the table
<quote>naturally,
</quote>
12429 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12430 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12434 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12435 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12436 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12437 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12438 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12439 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12443 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12444 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12445 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12446 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12447 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12448 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12449 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12450 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12451 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12452 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12453 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12454 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12455 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12456 system of protection for property generally.
12459 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12460 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12461 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12462 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12463 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12464 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12465 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12466 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12469 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12470 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12471 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12474 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12475 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12476 didn't
<quote>get.
</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12477 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12478 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be,
<quote>short,
</quote> then this
12479 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12480 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12481 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12484 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12485 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12486 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12487 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12488 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12489 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12490 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12493 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12494 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12495 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12496 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12497 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12500 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12501 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12502 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12503 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12504 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12507 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12508 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12509 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12513 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12514 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12515 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12518 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12519 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12520 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12521 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12522 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12523 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12524 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12525 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12526 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12527 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12529 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12531 <emphasis role='strong'
>When Steve Forbes
</emphasis> endorsed the
12532 idea, some in Washington began to pay attention. Many people contacted
12533 me pointing to representatives who might be willing to introduce the
12534 Eldred Act. And I had a few who directly suggested that they might be
12535 willing to take the first step.
12538 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12539 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12540 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12541 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12542 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog,
<quote>we are
12543 close.
</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12544 something good might happen here.
12545 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12548 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12549 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12550 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12551 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12552 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12553 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12556 The MPAA argued first that Congress had
<quote>firmly rejected the central
12557 concept in the proposed bill
</quote>—that copyrights be renewed. That
12558 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's
<quote>firm rejection
</quote> had occurred
12559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12560 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12561 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12562 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12563 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12564 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12565 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12566 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12567 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12568 argued that the bill would impose
<quote>enormous
</quote> costs, since a
12569 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12570 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12571 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12572 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12573 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12574 film is a valid derivative use.
12577 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12578 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12579 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12580 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12581 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12582 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12585 <emphasis role='strong'
>At the beginning
</emphasis> of this book, I
12586 told two stories about the law reacting to changes in technology. In
12587 the one, common sense prevailed. In the other, common sense was
12588 delayed. The difference between the two stories was the power of the
12589 opposition
—the power of the side that fought to defend the
12590 status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
12591 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
12592 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
12595 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12596 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12597 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12598 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12604 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12605 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12606 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12607 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12608 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12609 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12610 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12611 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12612 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12614 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12616 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12617 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12618 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12619 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12620 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12621 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the
<quote>Dark
12622 Content
</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12623 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12626 What does this industry really want?
12629 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12630 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12631 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12632 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12633 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12634 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12635 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12636 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12640 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12641 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12642 its aim not the protection of
<quote>property
</quote> but the rejection of a
12643 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12644 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12648 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12649 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12652 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12653 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12654 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12655 and to share its own creation.
12657 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12658 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12660 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12661 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12662 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12663 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12664 block the progress of others.
12667 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12668 <quote>property
</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12669 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12670 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing
<quote>permission
12671 society.
</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12672 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12673 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12678 <chapter label=
"15" id=
"c-conclusion">
12679 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12680 <indexterm id=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'
>
12681 <primary>antiretroviral drugs
</primary>
12683 <indexterm id=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'
>
12684 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies
</primary>
12686 <indexterm id=
"idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'
>
12687 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in
</primary>
12690 <emphasis role='strong'
>There are more
</emphasis> than
35 million
12691 people with the AIDS virus worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live
12692 in sub-Saharan Africa. Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen
12693 million Africans is proportional percentage-wise to seven million
12694 Americans. More importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12697 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12698 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12699 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12700 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12701 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12702 the disease almost invisible.
12705 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12706 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12707 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12708 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12710 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12711 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12712 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
<quote>Final Report: Integrating
12713 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy
</quote> (London,
2002),
12715 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12717 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12718 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12723 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12724 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12725 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12726 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12727 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12728 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12731 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12732 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12733 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12734 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12735 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12736 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12737 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12738 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12742 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12743 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12744 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12745 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12746 costs significantly below the market price.
12749 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12750 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12751 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12752 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12753 Africa from India. This is called
<quote>parallel importation,
</quote> and it is
12754 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12755 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12758 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12759 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12760 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12761 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12765 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12766 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12767 characterized it,
<quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12768 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12769 imports.
</quote><footnote><para>
12771 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12772 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12773 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12774 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12775 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12776 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12777 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12778 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12779 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12782 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12783 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12784 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12785 possible trade sanctions.
12786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12787 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12788 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12789 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12790 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12791 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12792 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12793 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12794 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12795 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12796 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12798 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12799 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12800 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12801 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12804 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12805 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12806 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12807 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12808 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12809 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12810 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12811 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12814 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12815 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12816 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12817 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12818 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12819 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12822 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12823 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12824 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12825 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12826 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12827 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12831 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12832 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12835 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12837 See Sabin Russell,
<quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12838 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12839 May
1999, A1, available at
12840 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12841 (
<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12842 system of intellectual property protection
</quote>); Robert Weissman,
<quote>AIDS
12843 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12844 Medicines,
</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12845 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12846 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson,
<quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12847 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12848 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,
</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12849 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12852 It was because
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> would be violated that these
12853 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12854 importance of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> that led these government actors
12855 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12858 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12859 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12860 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12861 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12862 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the
<quote>sanctity
</quote> of an
12863 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12864 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12865 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12868 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12869 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12870 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12871 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12872 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12873 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12876 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12877 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12878 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12879 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12880 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12881 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12884 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12885 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12886 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask,
<quote>How
12887 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12888 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?
</quote> Because there is no
<quote>sound
12889 bite
</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12890 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12891 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12893 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12894 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12895 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12896 idea called
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote>
12899 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12900 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12901 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12902 What is the argument?
12905 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12906 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12907 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12908 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12909 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12910 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12911 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12912 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12913 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12914 were balanced in just this sense.
12917 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12918 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12919 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12920 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12921 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12922 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12924 <indexterm startref=
"idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'
/>
12925 <indexterm startref=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'
/>
12926 <indexterm startref=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'
/>
12928 <emphasis role='strong'
>A simple idea
</emphasis> blinds us, and under
12929 the cover of darkness, much happens that most of us would reject if
12930 any of us looked. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in
12931 ideas that we don't even notice how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a
12932 people who are dying without them. So uncritically do we accept the
12933 idea of property in culture that we don't even question when the
12934 control of that property removes our
12935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12936 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12937 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12938 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12939 this common sense open its eyes.
12942 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12943 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12944 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12945 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12946 to fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12947 the idea of
<quote>creative property,
</quote> while transforming real creators into
12948 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12949 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12950 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12951 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12952 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12953 produce the
<quote>perfect storm
</quote> for free culture.
12955 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
12956 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'
>
12957 <primary>biomedical research
</primary>
12959 <indexterm><primary>Wellcome Trust
</primary></indexterm>
12961 <emphasis role='strong'
>In August
2003</emphasis>, a fight broke out
12962 in the United States about a decision by the World Intellectual
12963 Property Organization to cancel a meeting.
<footnote><para>
12964 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12965 August
2003, E1, available at
12966 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New,
<quote>Global Group's
12967 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12968 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12969 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New,
<quote>U.S. Official
12970 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12971 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12972 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12974 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12975 a meeting to discuss
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12976 goods.
</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12977 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12978 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12979 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12980 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12981 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12982 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12983 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12984 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12985 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12986 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12988 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12989 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12990 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12991 in the early
1980s. And it included
<quote>open source and free software.
</quote>
12992 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12993 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12994 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12996 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'
/>
12998 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12999 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
13000 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
13001 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
13002 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
13005 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
13006 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
13009 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
13010 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
13011 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
13012 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
13016 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
13017 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
13018 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
13019 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
13020 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
13021 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
13022 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
13023 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
13024 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
13025 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
13026 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
13027 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
13028 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
13029 talk about an
<quote>Information Society
</quote> unless one also talked about the
13030 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
13031 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
13032 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
13034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
13035 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
13036 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
13037 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
13040 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
13041 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
13042 thus the meeting about
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create
13043 public goods
</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
13046 But there is one project within that list that is highly
13047 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is
<quote>open source
13048 and free software.
</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
13049 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
13050 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
13051 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
13052 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
13053 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
13054 rather than
<quote>proprietary software,
</quote> for their own internal uses.
13057 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
13058 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
13059 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
13060 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
13061 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
13062 operating system, the most famous bit of
<quote>free software
</quote>—and IBM
13063 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support
<quote>open source and
13064 free software
</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
13065 to support a mode of software development that is different from
13066 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
13068 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
13069 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
13070 <quote>open source
</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
13071 principal opposition is to
<quote>free software
</quote> licensed under a
<quote>copyleft
</quote>
13072 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
13073 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith,
<quote>The Future
13074 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,
</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
13075 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
13076 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
13077 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
13078 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
13079 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
13080 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
13081 May
2001), available at
13082 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
13084 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13085 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft
</quote> licenses
</primary></indexterm>
13086 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13087 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13090 More important for our purposes, to support
<quote>open source and free
13091 software
</quote> is not to oppose copyright.
<quote>Open source and free software
</quote>
13092 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
13093 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
13094 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
13096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
13097 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
13098 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
13099 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
13100 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
13101 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
13102 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
13103 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
13104 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
13105 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
13108 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
13109 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
13110 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
13111 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
13112 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
13113 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
13114 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
13116 Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> available at
<ulink
13117 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
13119 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
13120 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
13123 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
13124 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
13125 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
13126 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
13127 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
13128 its lobbying efforts.
13130 <indexterm><primary>Boland, Lois
</primary></indexterm>
13132 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
13133 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
13134 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
13135 Office, explained that
<quote>open-source software runs counter to the
13136 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.
</quote>
13137 She is quoted as saying,
<quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
13138 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
13139 goals of WIPO.
</quote>
13142 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
13144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
13146 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
13147 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
13148 right called
<quote>copyright
</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
13149 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it
<quote>runs counter
</quote> to the mission
13150 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
13151 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
13152 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
13153 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
13155 <indexterm><primary>generic drugs
</primary></indexterm>
13157 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to
<quote>promote
</quote>
13158 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
13159 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
13160 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
13161 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
13162 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
13163 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
13164 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
13165 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
13166 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
13167 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
13169 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
13171 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
13172 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
13173 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
13174 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
13175 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to
<quote>waive
</quote> or
13176 <quote>disclaim
</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
13177 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
13178 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
13179 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
13180 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
13181 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
13183 <indexterm id='idxboland' class='startofrange'
>
13184 <primary>Boland, Lois
</primary>
13187 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
13188 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,
</quote> she's
13189 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
13190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
13191 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
13192 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from
<quote>waiving
</quote> or
13193 <quote>disclaiming
</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
13194 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
13195 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
13199 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
13200 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called
<quote>feudalism.
</quote> Under
13201 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
13202 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
13203 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
13204 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
13205 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
13206 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
13207 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
13210 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13211 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
13213 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13214 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
13216 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
13217 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13219 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13220 choice now is whether that information society will be
13221 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
13225 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13226 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13227 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13228 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13232 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13233 it should be (
<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13234 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
13235 not simply to promote intellectual property rights
</quote>), not as it is. If
13236 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13237 say anything wrong. But in the world
13238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13239 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13240 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13244 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13245 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13246 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13247 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13248 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13249 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13250 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13251 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13253 <indexterm startref='idxboland' class='endofrange'
/>
13255 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13256 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13257 <quote>goal
</quote> of a government should be
<quote>to promote the right balance
</quote> of
13258 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13259 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism.
<quote>Typical for
13260 an academic,
</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13263 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13264 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13265 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13266 our own country's history).
13269 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13270 government should be to
<quote>seek balance,
</quote> then count me with the silly,
13271 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13272 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13273 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13274 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13275 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13276 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
13277 democracy in the world, become?
13280 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13281 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13282 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13283 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13284 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13285 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
13287 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
13288 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
13289 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
13291 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13294 <emphasis role='strong'
>There are moments
</emphasis> of hope in this
13295 struggle. And moments that surprise. When the FCC was considering
13296 relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby further increase the
13297 concentration in media ownership, an extraordinary bipartisan
13298 coalition formed to fight this change. For perhaps the first time in
13299 history, interests as diverse as the NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org,
13300 William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women for Peace organized to
13301 oppose this change in FCC policy. An astonishing
700,
000 letters were
13302 sent to the FCC, demanding more hearings and a different result.
13305 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13306 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13307 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13308 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13309 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13310 concentration in the media.
13313 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13314 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13315 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13316 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13317 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13320 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13321 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13322 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13323 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13324 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13325 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
13326 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
13328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13330 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13331 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13332 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13333 Americans have a long history of fighting
<quote>big,
</quote> wisely or not. That
13334 we could be motivated to fight
<quote>big
</quote> again is not something new.
13337 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13338 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13339 the idea of
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13340 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13341 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13342 called
<quote>property
</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13345 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13348 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
13350 <emphasis role='strong'
>As I write
</emphasis> these final words, the
13351 news is filled with stories about the RIAA lawsuits against almost
13352 three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
13354 John Borland,
<quote>RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers,
</quote> CNET News.com, September
13356 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
13357 R. La Monica,
<quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,
</quote> CNN/Money,
8 September
13359 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
13360 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty,
<quote>Sued for a Song,
13361 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
13362 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13363 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13364 Defendants,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13365 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
13367 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
13369 Eminem has just been sued for
<quote>sampling
</quote> someone else's
13370 music.
<footnote><para>
13372 Jon Wiederhorn,
<quote>Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,
</quote>
13373 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
13374 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
13376 The story about Bob Dylan
<quote>stealing
</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13377 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
13379 Kenji Hall, Associated Press,
<quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13380 Dylan Songs,
</quote> Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
13381 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
13382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13384 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
13385 anonymous
—reports
<quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13386 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13387 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13388 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13389 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.
</quote> Congressmen are
13390 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13391 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13392 kids who use a computer to share content.
13394 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
13395 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
13396 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13397 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
13398 <indexterm><primary>BBC
</primary></indexterm>
13399 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in
</primary></indexterm>
13401 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13402 that it will build a
<quote>Creative Archive,
</quote> from which British citizens can
13403 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13404 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,
</quote> BBC press release,
13405 24 August
2003, available at
13406 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13408 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13409 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13410 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13411 country.
<footnote><para>
13413 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,
</quote> Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
13415 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13418 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13419 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13420 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13421 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13422 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13423 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13424 day into the Causbys.
13427 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13428 potential is ever to be realized.
13430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13434 <chapter label=
"16" id=
"c-afterword">
13435 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13439 <emphasis role='strong'
>At least some
</emphasis> who have read this
13440 far will agree with me that something must be done to change where we
13441 are heading. The balance of this book maps what might be done.
13444 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13445 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13446 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13447 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13450 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13451 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13452 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13453 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13457 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13458 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13459 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13460 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13461 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13465 <section id=
"usnow">
13466 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13468 <emphasis role='strong'
>Common sense
</emphasis> is with the copyright
13469 warriors because the debate so far has been framed at the
13470 extremes
—as a grand either/or: either property or anarchy,
13471 either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is the
13472 choice, then the warriors should win.
13475 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13476 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13477 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—<quote>All Rights
13478 Reserved
</quote>— and those who reject copyright
—<quote>No Rights
13479 Reserved.
</quote> The
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13480 permission before you
<quote>use
</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The
<quote>No
13481 Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13482 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13485 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13486 tilted in the
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13487 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13488 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13492 original design of the Internet was
<quote>no rights reserved.
</quote> Content was
13493 <quote>taken
</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13497 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13498 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13499 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13500 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13501 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13502 architecture made the effective default
<quote>no rights reserved,
</quote> the
13503 future architecture will make the effective default
<quote>all rights
13504 reserved.
</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13505 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13506 content requires permission. The
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> world that defines
13507 the Internet today will become a
<quote>get permission to cut and paste
</quote>
13508 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13511 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13512 <quote>all rights reserved
</quote> nor
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> but
<quote>some rights
13513 reserved
</quote>— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13514 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13515 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13519 <section id=
"examples">
13520 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13521 <indexterm id='browsing' class='startofrange'
>
13522 <primary>browsing
</primary>
13525 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13526 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13527 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13528 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13529 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13530 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13531 to your neighbors or boss. The
<quote>privacy
</quote> of your browsing habits was
13535 What made it assured?
13537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13539 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13540 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13541 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13542 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13543 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13544 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13545 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13546 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13547 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13548 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13549 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13550 (there is no law protecting
<quote>privacy
</quote> in public places), and in many
13551 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13552 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13554 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13556 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13557 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13558 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13559 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13560 <quote>recently viewed
</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13561 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13562 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13563 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13564 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13567 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13568 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13569 people should have the
<quote>right
</quote> to browse in a library without the
13570 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13571 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13572 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13573 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13576 <indexterm startref='browsing' class='endofrange'
/>
13578 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13579 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13580 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13581 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13584 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg,
<quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13585 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13586 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13588 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13589 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13590 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13591 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13592 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13593 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13594 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13597 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13598 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13599 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13602 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13603 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13604 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13605 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13606 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13607 care much about controlling their software.
13608 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13610 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13612 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13613 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13614 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13615 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13616 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13620 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13621 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13622 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13623 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13624 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13625 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13626 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13627 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13628 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13632 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13633 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13634 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13635 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13636 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13637 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13638 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13641 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13642 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13644 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13645 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13646 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13647 fundamentally weakened.
13649 <indexterm><primary>Torvalds, Linus
</primary></indexterm>
13651 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13652 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13653 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's
<quote>Linux
</quote>
13654 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13655 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13656 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13659 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13660 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13661 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13662 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13663 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13664 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13665 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13666 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13670 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13671 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13672 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13673 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13674 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13675 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13678 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13679 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13680 scientific journals are produced.
13682 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13683 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13686 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13687 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13688 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13689 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13690 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13691 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13692 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13693 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13694 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13695 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13696 and Westlaw are also free
13697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13698 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13699 Court opinion through their respective services.
13702 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13703 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13704 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13705 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13706 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13707 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13708 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13711 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13712 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13713 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13716 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13717 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13718 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13719 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13720 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13721 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13722 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13723 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13724 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13725 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13728 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13729 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13730 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13731 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13732 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13736 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13737 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13738 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13739 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13741 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13742 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13743 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13744 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13745 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13746 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13747 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13750 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13751 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13752 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13753 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13754 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13755 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13758 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13761 <section id=
"oneidea">
13762 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13763 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13764 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13767 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13768 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13770 <indexterm><primary>Stanford University
</primary></indexterm>
13772 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13773 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13774 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13775 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13776 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13777 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13778 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13779 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13780 make this possible.
13783 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13784 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13785 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13786 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13787 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13788 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13789 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13790 human-readable description, and
13791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13792 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13793 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13794 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13795 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13796 different than the
<quote>All
</quote> or
<quote>No
</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13797 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13798 certain freedoms are given.
13801 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13802 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13803 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13804 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13805 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13806 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (
<quote>share and share
13807 alike
</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13808 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13809 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13812 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13813 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13814 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13815 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13816 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13817 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13818 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13819 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13823 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13824 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13825 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13826 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13827 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13828 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13830 of content (
<quote>content conducers,
</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13831 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13832 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13833 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13836 The aim is not to fight the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13837 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13838 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13839 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13840 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13841 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13842 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13843 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13844 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13845 to begin to build those rules.
13847 <indexterm id='idxbooksfreeonline2' class='startofrange'
>
13848 <primary>books
</primary>
13849 <secondary>free on-line releases of
</secondary>
13852 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13853 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13854 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13855 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13856 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13859 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13860 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13861 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13862 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13863 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13864 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13865 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13866 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13867 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13868 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13871 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13872 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13873 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13874 was a total success.
13876 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13877 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13879 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13880 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13882 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13883 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13884 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13885 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13886 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13889 <indexterm startref='idxbooksfreeonline2' class='endofrange'
/>
13890 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy
</primary></indexterm>
13891 <indexterm><primary>rap music
</primary></indexterm>
13892 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13894 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13895 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13896 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13897 reasons. Many who use the
<quote>sampling license
</quote> do so because anything
13898 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13899 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13900 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13901 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13902 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13903 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13904 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13905 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not
<quote>allow
</quote>
13906 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13907 high
<footnote><para>
13909 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13910 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13911 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13912 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13913 </para></footnote>),
13914 these artists release into the creative environment content
13915 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13918 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13919 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13920 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13921 you are effectively saying you believe in the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote>
13922 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13923 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13924 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13925 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13926 this notion of
<quote>Some Rights Reserved,
</quote> and gives many the chance to
13930 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13931 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13932 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13933 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13936 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13937 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13940 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13941 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13942 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13943 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13944 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13945 steps are possible.
13948 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13949 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13950 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13951 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13952 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13953 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13954 creativity to spread more easily.
13956 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13961 <section id=
"themsoon">
13962 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13964 <emphasis role='strong'
>We will
</emphasis> not reclaim a free culture
13965 by individual action alone. It will also take important reforms of
13966 laws. We have a long way to go before the politicians will listen to
13967 these ideas and implement these reforms. But that also means that we
13968 have time to build awareness around the changes that we need.
13971 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13972 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13973 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13977 <section id=
"formalities">
13978 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13980 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13981 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13982 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13983 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13987 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13988 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13992 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13993 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13994 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13995 default is control, and
<quote>formalities
</quote> are banished.
14001 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14002 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
14003 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
14004 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
14005 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
14006 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
14007 formalities were getting in the way.
14010 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
14011 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
14012 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
14013 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
14014 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
14015 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
14016 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
14017 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
14018 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
14019 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
14022 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
14024 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
14025 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
14026 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
14027 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
14028 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
14029 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
14032 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
14033 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
14034 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
14035 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
14036 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
14037 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
14038 developed by others.
14041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
14043 <section id=
"registration">
14044 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
14046 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
14047 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
14048 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
14049 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
14050 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
14051 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
14052 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
14053 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
14054 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
14055 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
14056 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
14059 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
14060 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
14061 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
14062 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
14063 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
14064 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
14065 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
14068 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
14069 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
14070 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
14071 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
14072 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
14073 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
14074 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
14075 with which registration occurs up.
14078 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
14079 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
14080 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
14081 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
14082 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
14083 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
14084 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
14085 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
14086 formality
—while producing a database
14087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
14088 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
14092 <section id=
"marking">
14093 <title>MARKING
</title>
14095 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
14096 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
14097 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
14098 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
14099 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
14100 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
14101 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
14102 uniformly across all media.
14105 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
14106 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
14107 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
14111 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
14112 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
14113 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
14114 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
14115 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
14116 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
14117 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
14118 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
14121 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
14122 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
14123 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
14124 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
14125 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
14126 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
14128 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
14129 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
14130 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
14132 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be
<quote>use unless someone
14133 complains.
</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
14134 stop using the work in any new
14135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
14136 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
14137 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
14141 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
14142 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
14143 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
14144 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
14145 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
14148 <primary>CDs
</primary>
14149 <secondary>copyright marking of
</secondary>
14152 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
14153 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
14154 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
14155 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
14156 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
14157 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
14158 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
14159 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
14160 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
14161 other important functions.
14164 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
14165 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
14166 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
14167 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
14168 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
14169 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
14172 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
14173 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
14174 make things unclear.
14177 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
14178 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
14179 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
14180 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
14181 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
14182 that assertion at the appropriate time.
14185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
14188 <section id=
"shortterms">
14189 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
14191 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
14192 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
14196 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
14197 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
14198 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
14199 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
14200 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
14201 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
14204 <quote>A Radical Rethink,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
14206 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
14208 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14211 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14212 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
14213 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
14216 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14219 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
14220 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
14221 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
14222 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14223 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14224 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
14228 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
14229 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14230 fuzziness of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and the distinction between
<quote>ideas
</quote> and
14231 <quote>expression.
</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14232 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
14233 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
14234 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
14235 <quote>lawyer-free zone
</quote> makes the complexities of
<quote>fair use
</quote> and
14236 <quote>idea/expression
</quote> less necessary to navigate.
14237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14241 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
14242 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14243 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
14244 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
14245 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
14246 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
14247 pension.
<footnote><para>
14249 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14250 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
14252 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
14254 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
14255 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
14257 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
14261 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
14262 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
14263 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
14264 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
14265 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
14266 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
14267 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
14268 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
14269 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
14270 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14271 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14272 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14273 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14274 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
14277 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
14278 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
14279 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14283 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas
<quote>radical.
</quote> (After all, I
14284 call them
<quote>extremists.
</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14285 than the term under Richard Nixon. How
<quote>radical
</quote> can it be to ask for
14286 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14292 <section id=
"freefairuse">
14293 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
14294 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary></indexterm>
14296 <primary>property rights
</primary>
14297 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
14300 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14301 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14302 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14303 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14304 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14305 the emergence of that new technology.
14308 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
<quote>exclusive
14309 right
</quote> to
<quote>their writings.
</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14310 right to
<quote>their writings
</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14311 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14312 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14313 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14314 though that movie is not
<quote>my writing.
</quote>
14317 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
14318 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14319 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
14321 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14322 University Press,
1967),
32.
14324 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14325 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14326 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14327 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
14331 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14332 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14333 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14334 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
14335 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
14340 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14341 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14342 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14343 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14344 Consider each limitation in turn.
14347 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14348 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14349 sense to protect John
14351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14352 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14353 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14354 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14355 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14356 after the creative work is done.
14357 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
14360 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14361 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14362 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14363 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14364 material. When all
<quote>reuse
</quote> of creative material was within the control
14365 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14366 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14367 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14368 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14369 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14370 the creative process. Smothers it.
14372 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
14374 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14375 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14376 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
14377 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
14378 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14382 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14383 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14384 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14385 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
14388 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14389 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
14390 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
14392 His view is that the law should be written so that
14393 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14396 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14397 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14398 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14399 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14400 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14403 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14405 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14406 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14407 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14408 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14412 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
14413 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
14415 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14416 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14417 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
14418 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14419 battles around the sharing of music.
14422 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14423 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14424 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14425 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14426 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14427 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14428 innovation on the network.
14431 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14432 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14433 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14434 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14435 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14438 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14439 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14440 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14441 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
14442 four different kinds of sharing:
14444 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14447 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14448 for purchasing CDs.
14452 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14453 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14458 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14459 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14460 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14464 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14465 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14466 owner plainly endorses.
14470 <primary>cassette recording
</primary>
14471 <secondary>VCRs
</secondary>
14474 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14475 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14476 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14477 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14478 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14479 significantly weakened.
14482 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14483 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14484 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14485 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14486 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14490 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14491 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14495 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14496 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14497 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14498 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14499 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14500 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14501 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14502 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14503 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14504 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14507 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14508 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14509 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14511 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14512 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14513 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14514 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14515 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14516 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14517 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14518 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14519 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14521 <indexterm><primary>cell phones, music streamed over
</primary></indexterm>
14523 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14524 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14525 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14526 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14527 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14528 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14529 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14530 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14531 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14532 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14533 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14534 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14535 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14536 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14537 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14538 paying for this content even though
<quote>free
</quote> content is available in the
14539 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14541 See, for example,
<quote>Music Media Watch,
</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14542 April
2002, available at
14543 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14548 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14549 present: It is emphatically temporary. The
<quote>problem
</quote> with file
14550 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14551 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14552 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14553 makers today to be
<quote>solving
</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14554 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14555 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14556 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14557 artists get paid, during
14559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14560 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14561 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14564 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different
<quote>problems
</quote>
14565 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14566 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14567 <quote>problem
</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14568 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14569 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14570 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14571 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14572 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14575 Type C content raises a different
<quote>problem.
</quote> This is content that was,
14576 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14577 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14578 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14579 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14580 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14581 way that returns something to the artist.
14584 <primary>books
</primary>
14585 <secondary>out of print
</secondary>
14588 <primary>books
</primary>
14589 <secondary>resales of
</secondary>
14592 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14593 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14594 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14595 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14596 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14597 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14598 from the author's perspective, this
<quote>sharing
</quote> of his content without
14599 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14602 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14603 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14604 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14605 providers would be free, under this rule, to
<quote>share
</quote> that content,
14606 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14607 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14608 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14613 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14614 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14615 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14616 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14617 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14618 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14619 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14623 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14624 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14625 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14626 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14627 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14628 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14629 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14630 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14633 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14634 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14635 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14636 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14637 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14638 delivering and accessing content.
14641 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14642 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14645 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14646 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14647 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14648 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14649 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14650 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14651 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14652 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14656 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14657 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14658 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14659 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14660 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14661 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14664 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14665 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14668 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'
>
14669 <primary>artists
</primary>
14670 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14672 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14673 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14674 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14675 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14676 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14677 2004), ch.
6, available at
14678 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14679 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14680 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14681 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
<quote>Impose a
14682 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,
</quote> available at
14683 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Who's Holding Back
14684 Broadband?
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14685 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14686 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14688 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14689 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14690 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14691 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14693 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry,
<quote>Getting Copyright Right,
</quote>
14694 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14695 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14696 McCullagh,
<quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,
</quote> CNET News.com,
27 August
14698 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14699 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14700 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14701 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14702 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14703 debate by about a decade. See
14704 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14705 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14706 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14707 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14708 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'
/>
14710 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14711 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14712 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14713 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14714 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14715 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14716 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14717 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14720 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14722 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14723 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14724 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14725 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14726 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14727 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14728 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14729 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14730 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14731 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14732 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14733 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14734 controlling access.
14737 <primary>artists
</primary>
14738 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14741 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14742 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14743 the system supports the widest range of
<quote>semiotic democracy
</quote>
14744 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14745 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14746 limits on derivative
14748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14749 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14750 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14751 allowed to do with the content itself.
14753 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
14755 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14756 <quote>harm
</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14757 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14758 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14759 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14760 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat
<quote>free
</quote> by being
14761 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14762 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14763 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14764 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14765 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14766 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14769 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
14770 <indexterm><primary>cable television
</primary></indexterm>
14772 This competition has already occurred against the background of
<quote>free
</quote>
14773 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14774 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14775 that, there is nothing impossible at all about
<quote>competing with free.
</quote>
14776 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14777 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14778 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14779 theaters are often luxurious
—with
<quote>first class
</quote> seats, and meals
14780 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14781 finding ways to compete with
<quote>free.
</quote>
14784 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14785 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14786 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14787 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14788 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14789 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14793 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14798 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14799 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14800 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14801 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14805 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14808 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14811 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14815 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14816 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14821 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14822 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14826 But what if
<quote>piracy
</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14827 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14828 consumers continue to
<quote>take
</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14832 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14833 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14834 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14835 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14836 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14837 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14838 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14839 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14840 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14841 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14842 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14846 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14847 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14848 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14851 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14852 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14856 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14857 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14859 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14860 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14861 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14862 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14865 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14866 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14867 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14868 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14869 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14870 strong view queers the law.
14873 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14874 <quote>radical
</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14875 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14876 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14877 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14878 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14879 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14880 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14882 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Copyright's First Amendment
</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14883 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14888 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14889 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14890 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14893 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14894 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14895 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14896 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14898 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14899 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14900 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14901 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14902 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14903 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14904 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14905 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14906 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14907 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?
</quote> working paper, June
2003,
14909 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14910 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14911 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14912 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14913 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14914 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14916 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14917 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14922 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14923 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14924 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14925 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14926 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14927 practically never be done.
14930 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14931 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14932 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14933 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14934 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14935 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14936 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14937 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14940 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14941 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14942 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14943 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14944 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14945 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14948 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14949 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14950 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14953 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
14955 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14956 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14957 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14958 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14959 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14960 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14961 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14964 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14965 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14968 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14969 simple pragmatic question:
<quote>Will it do good?
</quote> When challenged about
14970 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers,
<quote>Why not?
</quote>
14973 We should ask,
<quote>Why?
</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14974 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14975 keep your lawyers away.
14977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14981 <chapter label=
"17" id=
"c-notes">
14982 <title>NOTES
</title>
14984 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14985 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14986 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14987 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14988 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14989 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14990 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14991 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14992 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14996 <!-- insert endnotes here -->
14998 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
15001 <chapter label=
"18" id=
"c-acknowledgments">
15002 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
15004 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
15005 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
15006 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
15007 to him that this book is dedicated.
15009 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
15011 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
15012 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
15013 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
15014 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
15015 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
15016 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
15017 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
15018 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
15019 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
15020 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
15021 critical eye on much of this.
15024 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
15025 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
15026 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
15027 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
15028 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
15029 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
15030 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
15031 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
15032 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
15035 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
15036 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
15037 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
15038 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
15039 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
15040 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
15041 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
15042 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
15043 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
15044 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
15045 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
15046 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
15047 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
15048 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
15049 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams,
<quote>Wink,
</quote> Roger Wood,
<quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,
</quote>
15050 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
15051 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
15052 a bunch of great replies.)
15055 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
15056 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
15057 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
15058 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
15059 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
15060 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
15061 throughout this book.
15064 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
15065 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
15066 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
15067 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
15069 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->