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18 <book id="index" lang="en">
19 <bookinfo>
20 <title>Free Culture</title>
21
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
23
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
26
27 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
28
29 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
30
31 <authorgroup>
32 <author>
33 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig</surname>
35 </author>
36 </authorgroup>
37
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41 <subjectset scheme="libraryofcongress">
42 <subject>
43 <subjectterm>Intellectual property&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
44 </subject>
45 <subject>
46 <subjectterm>Mass media&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
47 </subject>
48 <subject>
49 <subjectterm>Technological innovations&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
50 </subject>
51 <subject>
52 <subjectterm>Art&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
53 </subject>
54 </subjectset>
55
56
57 <publisher>
58 <publishername>The Penguin Press</publishername>
59 <address><city>New York</city></address>
60 </publisher>
61
62 <copyright>
63 <year>2004</year>
64 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
65 </copyright>
66 <legalnotice>
67 <para>
68 <inlinemediaobject>
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74 </imageobject>
75 <textobject>
76 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
77 </textobject>
78 </inlinemediaobject>
79 </para>
80
81 <para>
82 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
83 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
84 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
85 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
86 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
87 </para>
88 </legalnotice>
89
90 <abstract>
91 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
92 <para>
93 LAWRENCE LESSIG
94 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
95 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
96 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
97 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
98 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
99 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
100 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
101 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
102 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
103 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
104 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
105 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
106 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
107 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
108 Appeals.
109 </para>
110 </abstract>
111
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129
130 <biblioid class="isbn">1-59420-006-8</biblioid>
131
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136
137 </bookinfo>
138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
139 <dedication id="salespoints">
140 <title></title>
141 <para>
142 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
143 </para>
144 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
145 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
146 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
147 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
148 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
149 </itemizedlist>
150 </dedication>
151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
153 <dedication id="alsobylessig">
154 <title></title>
155 <para>
156 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
157 </para>
158 <para>
159 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
160 </para>
161 <para>
162 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
163 </para>
164 </dedication>
165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
166 <dedication id="frontpublisher">
167 <title></title>
168 <para>
169 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
170 </para>
171 </dedication>
172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
173 <dedication id="frontbookinfo">
174 <title></title>
175 <para>
176 FREE CULTURE
177 </para>
178
179 <para>
180 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
181 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
182 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
183 </para>
184
185 <para>
186 LAWRENCE LESSIG
187 </para>
188 </dedication>
189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
190 <colophon>
191 <para>
192 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
193 York, New York
194 </para>
195 <para>
196 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
197 </para>
198 <para>
199 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
200 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
201 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
202 </para>
203 <para>
204 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
205 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
206 </para>
207 <para>
208 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
209 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
210 </para>
211 <para>
212 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
213 </para>
214 <para>
215 Lessig, Lawrence.
216 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
217 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
218 </para>
219 <para>
220 p. cm.
221 </para>
222 <para>
223 Includes index.
224 </para>
225 <para>
226 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
227 </para>
228
229 <para>
230 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
231 </para>
232 <para>
233 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
234 </para>
235 <para>
236 KF2979.L47
237 </para>
238 <para>
239 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
240 </para>
241 <para>
242 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
243 </para>
244 <para>
245 Printed in the United States of America
246 </para>
247 <para>
248 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
249 </para>
250 <para>
251 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
252 </para>
253
254 <para>
255 &translationblock;
256 </para>
257
258 <para>
259 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
260 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
261 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
262 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
263 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
264 the above publisher of this book.
265 </para>
266 <para>
267 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
268 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
269 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
270 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
271 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
272 author's rights is appreciated.
273 </para>
274 </colophon>
275
276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
277 <dedication><title></title>
278 <para>
279 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
280 it continues still.
281 </para>
282 </dedication>
283
284 <toc id="toc"></toc>
285
286 <lot>
287 <title>List of figures</title>
288 </lot>
289
290 <!--
291 c PREFACE xiii
292 c INTRODUCTION
293 c "PIRACY"
294 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
295 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
296 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
297 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
298 2 Film
299 2 Recorded Music
300 2 Radio
301 2 Cable TV
302 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
303 2 Piracy I
304 2 Piracy II
305 c "PROPERTY"
306 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
307 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
308 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
309 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
310 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
311 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
312 2 Beginnings
313 2 Law: Duration
314 2 Law: Scope
315 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
316 2 Architecture and Law: Force
317 2 Market: Concentration
318 2 Together
319 c PUZZLES
320 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
321 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
322 2 Constraining Creators
323 2 Constraining Innovators
324 2 Corrupting Citizens
325 c BALANCES
326 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
327 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
328 c CONCLUSION
329 c AFTERWORD
330 1 Us, Now
331 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
332 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
333 1 Them, Soon
334 2 1. More Formalities
335 3 Registration and Renewal
336 3 Marking
337 2 2. Shorter Terms
338 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
339 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
340 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
341 c NOTES
342 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
343 c INDEX
344 -->
345
346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
347
348 <preface id="preface">
349 <title>PREFACE</title>
350 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
351 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
352 </indexterm>
353 <para>
354 At the end of his review of my first book, <citetitle>Code: And Other
355 Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
356 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
357 </para>
358 <blockquote>
359 <para>
360 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
361 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
362 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
363 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
364 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
365 </para></footnote>
366 </para>
367 </blockquote>
368 <para>
369 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
370 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
371 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
372 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
373 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
374 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
375 "affect" us anymore.
376 </para>
377 <para>
378 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
379 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
380 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
381 causes even after the modem is turned
382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
383 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
384 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
385 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
386 </para>
387 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
388 <para>
389 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
390 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
391 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
392 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
393 important.
394 </para>
395 <para>
396 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
397 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
398 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
399 free software movement<footnote>
400 <para>
401 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
402 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
403 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
404 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
405 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
406 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
407 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
408 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
409 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
410 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
411 "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
412 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
413 past.
414 </para>
415 <para>
416 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
417 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
418 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
419 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
420 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
421 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
422 culture deem fundamental.
423 </para>
424 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
425 <para>
426 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
427 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
428 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
429 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
430 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
431 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
432 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
433 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
434 he asked,
435 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
436 </para>
437 <blockquote>
438 <para>
439 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
440 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
441 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
442 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
443 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
444 "The Great Media Gulp," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
445 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
446 </para></footnote>
447 </para>
448 </blockquote>
449 <para>
450 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
451 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
452 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
453 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
454 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
455 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
456 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
457 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
458 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
459 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
460 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
461 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
462 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
463 that this work is "merely" derivative.
464 </para>
465 <para>
466 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
467 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
468 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
469 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
470 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
471 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
472 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
473 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
474
475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
476 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
477 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
478 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
479 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
480 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
481 what I advance here.
482 </para>
483 <para>
484 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
485 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
486 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
487 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
488 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
489 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
490 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
491 book is written.
492 </para>
493
494 </preface>
495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
496
497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
498 <chapter label="0" id="c-introduction">
499 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
500 <para>
501 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
502 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
503 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
504 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
505 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
506 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
507 </para>
508 <para>
509 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
510 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
511 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
512 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
513 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
514 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
515 </para></footnote>
516 For many
517 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
518 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
519 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
520 </para>
521 <para>
522 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
523 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
524 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
525 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
526 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
527 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
528 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
529 </para>
530 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
532 <para>
533 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
534 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
535 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
536 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
537 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
538 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
539 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
540 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
541 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
542 </para>
543 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
544 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
545 <para>
546 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
547 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
548 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
549 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
550 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
551 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
552 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
553 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
554 </para>
555 <blockquote>
556 <para>
557 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
558 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
559 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
560 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
561 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
562 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
563 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
564 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
565 <para>
566 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
567 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
568 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
569 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
570 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
571 Authorship," <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
572 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
573 1112&ndash;13.
574 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
575 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
576 </para></footnote>
577 </para>
578 </blockquote>
579 <para>
580 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
581 </para>
582 <para>
583 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
584 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
585 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
587 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
588 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
589 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
590 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
591 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
592 </para>
593 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
594 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
595 <para>
596 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
597 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
598 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
599 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
600 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
601 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
602 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
603 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
604 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
605 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
606 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
607 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
608 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
609 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
610 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
611 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
612 </para>
613 <para>
614 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
615 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
616 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
617 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
618 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
619 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
620 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
621 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
622 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
623 understanding of radio.
624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
625 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
626 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
627 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
628 </para>
629 <para>
630 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
631 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
632 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
633 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
634 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
635 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
636 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
637 much less transmitter power and static.
638 </para>
639 <para>
640 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
641 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
642 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
643 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
644 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
645 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
646 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
647 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
648 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
649 </para>
650 <para>
651 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
652 </para>
653 <blockquote>
654 <para>
655 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
656 sounded like a glass of water being poured. &hellip; A paper was crumpled
657 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
658 fire. &hellip; Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
659 and guitar number were performed. &hellip; The music was projected with a
660 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
661 box."<footnote><para>
662 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
663 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
664 </para></footnote>
665 </para>
666 </blockquote>
667 <para>
668 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
669 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
670 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
671 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
672 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
673 a handful of networks.
674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
675 </para>
676 <para>
677 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
678 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
679 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
680 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
681 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
682 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
683 </para>
684 <blockquote>
685 <para>
686 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
687 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
688 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
689 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
690 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
691 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
692
693 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
694 </para></footnote>
695 </para>
696 </blockquote>
697 <para>
698 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
699 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
700 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
701 described,
702 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
703 </para>
704 <blockquote>
705 <para>
706 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
707 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
708 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
709 unrestrained, posed &hellip; a complete reordering of radio power
710 &hellip; and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
711 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
712 </para></footnote>
713 </para>
714 </blockquote>
715 <para>
716 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
717 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
718 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
719 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
720 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
721 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
722 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
723 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
724 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
725 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
726 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
727 </para>
728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
729 <blockquote>
730 <para>
731 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
732 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
733 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
734 deviousness.<footnote><para>
735 Lessing, 256.
736 </para></footnote>
737 </para>
738 </blockquote>
739 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
740 <para>
741 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
742 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
743 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
744 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
745 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
746 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
747 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
748 least temporarily.
749 </para>
750 <para>
751 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
752 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
753 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
754 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
755 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
756 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
757 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
758 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
759 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
760 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
761 </para>
762 <para>
763 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
764 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
765 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
766 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
767 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
768 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
769 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
770 course always public spirited; the reality is something
771 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
772 to themselves, would crumble in
773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
774 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
775 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
776 effect of technological change.
777 </para>
778 <para>
779 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
780 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
781 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
782 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
783 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
784 before.<footnote><para>
785 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
786 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
787 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
788 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
789 </para></footnote>
790 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
791 of 2004.
792 </para>
793 <para>
794 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
795 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
796 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
797 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
798 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
799 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
800 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
801 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
802 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
803 </para>
804 <para>
805 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
806 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
807 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
808 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
809 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
810 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
811 has introduced.
812 </para>
813 <para>
814 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
815 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
816 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
817 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
818 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
819 parks or on
820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
821 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
822 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
823 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
824 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel</primary></indexterm>
825 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah</primary></indexterm>
826 </para>
827 <para>
828 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
829 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
830 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
831 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
832 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
833 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
834 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
835 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
836 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
837 </para>
838 <para>
839 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
840 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
841 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
842 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
843 marketplace.<footnote>
844 <para>
845 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
846 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
847 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
848 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
849 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
850 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
851 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
852 198&ndash;200.
853 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
854 </para></footnote>
855 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
856 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
857 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
858 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
859 </para>
860 <para>
861 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
862 been erased.<footnote><para>
863 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
864 2001), ch. 13.
865 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
866 </para></footnote>
867 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
868 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
869 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
870 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
871 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
872 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
873 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
874 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
875 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
876 culture, more and more a permission culture.
877 </para>
878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
879 <para>
880 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
881 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
882 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
883 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
884 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
885 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
886 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
887 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
888 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
889 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
890 Causbys.
891 </para>
892 <para>
893 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
894 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
895 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
896 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
897 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
898 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
899 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
900 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
901 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
902 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
903 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
904 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
905 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
906 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
907 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
908 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
909 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
910 </para>
911 <para>
912 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
913 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
914 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
915 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
916 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
917 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
918 remakes them.
919 </para>
920 <para>
921 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
923 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
924 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
925 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
926 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
927 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
928 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
929 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
930 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <citetitle>New York
931 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
932 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
933 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
934 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
935 against it.
936 </para>
937 <para>
938 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
939 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
940 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
941 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
942 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
943 Internet.
944 </para>
945 <para>
946 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
947 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
948 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
949 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
950 </para>
951 <para>
952 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
953 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
954 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
955 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
956 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
957 <para>
958 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <citetitle>Yale Law
959 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
960 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
961 </para></footnote>
962 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
963 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
964 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
965 could cultivate and extend our culture.
966 </para>
967 <para>
968 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
969 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
970 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
971 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
972 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
973 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
974 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
975 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
976 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
977 </para>
978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
979 <para>
980 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
981 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
982 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
983 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
984 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
985 against an industry.
986 </para>
987 <para>
988 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
989 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
990 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
991 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
992 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
993 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
994 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
995 </para>
996 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
998 <para>
999 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
1000 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1001 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1002 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1003 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1004 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1005 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1006 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1007 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1008 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1009 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
1010 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1011 trespass.
1012 </para>
1013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1015 <para>
1016 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1017 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1018 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1019 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1020 war. Unlike
1021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
1022 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1023 on its side.
1024 </para>
1025 <para>
1026 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1027 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1028 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1029 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1030 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
1031 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1032 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1033 accepted as it is now.
1034 </para>
1035 <para>
1036 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1037 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1038 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1039 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1040 </para>
1041 <para>
1042 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1043 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1044 </para>
1045 <para>
1046 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1047 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1048 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1049 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1050 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1051 </para>
1052 <para>
1053 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1054 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1055 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1056 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1057 view?
1058 </para>
1059 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1060 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1061 <para>
1062 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1063 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1064 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1065 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1066 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1067 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1068 this silliness will be much more profound.
1069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1070 </para>
1071 <para>
1072 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1073 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1074 ideas.
1075 </para>
1076 <para>
1077 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1078 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1079 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1080 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1081 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1082 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1083 </para>
1084 <para>
1085 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1086 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1087 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1088 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1089 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1090 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1091 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1092 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1093 fundamental about who we have always been.
1094 </para>
1095 <para>
1096 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1097 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1098 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1099 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1100 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1101 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1102 </para>
1103 </chapter>
1104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1105 <part id="c-piracy">
1106 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1107 <partintro>
1108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1109 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1110 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1111 </indexterm>
1112 <para>
1113 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1114 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1115 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1116 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1117 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1118 </para>
1119 <blockquote>
1120 <para>
1121 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1122 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1123 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1124 <!-- f1 -->
1125 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1126 </para></footnote>
1127 </para>
1128 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1129 </blockquote>
1130 <para>
1131 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1132 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1133 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1134 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1135 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1136 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1138 </para>
1139 <para>
1140 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1141 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1142 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1143 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1144 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1145 profit."
1146 </para>
1147 <para>
1148 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1149 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1150 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1151 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1152 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1153 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1154 </para>
1155 <para>
1156 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1157 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1158 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1159 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1160 </para>
1161 <para>
1162 The idea goes something like this:
1163 </para>
1164 <blockquote>
1165 <para>
1166 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1167 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1168 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1169 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1170 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1171 piracy.
1172 </para>
1173 </blockquote>
1174 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1175 <para>
1176 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1177 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1178 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1179 <!-- f2 -->
1180 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1181 in the Pepsi Generation," <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1182 </para></footnote>
1183 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1184 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1185 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1186 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1187 <!-- f3 -->
1188 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1189 Up," <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1190 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1191 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1192 Speech, No One Wins," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1193 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1194 </para></footnote>
1195 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1196 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1197 </para>
1198 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1199 <para>
1200 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1201 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1203 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1204 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1205 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1206 </para>
1207 <para>
1208 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1209 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1210 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1211 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1212 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1213 </para>
1214 <para>
1215 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1216 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1217 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1218 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1219 copyright law today regulates both.
1220 </para>
1221 <para>
1222 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1223 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1224 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1225 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1226 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1227 more expense of doing business.
1228 </para>
1229 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1230 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1231 <para>
1232 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1233 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1234 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1235 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1236 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1237 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1238 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1239 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1240 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1241 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1242 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1243 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1244 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1245 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1246 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1248 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative
1249 Class."<footnote>
1250 <para>
1251 <!-- f4 -->
1252 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York:
1253 Basic Books, 2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1254 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1255 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1256 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1257 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1258 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1259
1260 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1261 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1262 </para></footnote>
1263 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1264 this creative class.
1265 </para>
1266 <para>
1267 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1268 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1269 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1270 </para>
1271 </partintro>
1272
1273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1274 <chapter label="1" id="creators">
1275 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1276 <para>
1277 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1278 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1279 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1280 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1281 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1282 </para>
1283 <para>
1284 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1285 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1286 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1287 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1288 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1289 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1290 </para>
1291 <blockquote>
1292 <para>
1293 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1294 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1295 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1296 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1298 </para>
1299 <para>
1300 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1301 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1302 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1303 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1304 synchronization was pretty close.
1305 </para>
1306 <para>
1307 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1308 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1309 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1310 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1311 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1312 <!-- f1 -->
1313 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1314 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1315 </para></footnote>
1316 </para>
1317 </blockquote>
1318 <para>
1319 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1320 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1321 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1322 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1323 </para>
1324 <para>
1325 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1326 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1327 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1328 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1329 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1330 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1331 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1332 </para>
1333 <para>
1334 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1335 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1336 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1337 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1338 </para>
1339 <para>
1340 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1341 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1342 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1343 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1344 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1345 and among the best of its genre.
1346 </para>
1347 <para>
1348 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1349 Willie.
1350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1351 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1352 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1353 <!-- f2 -->
1354 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1355 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1356 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1357 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1358 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1359 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1360 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1361 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1362 </para></footnote>
1363 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1364 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1365 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1366 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1367 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1368 Mouse.
1369 </para>
1370 <para>
1371 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1372 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1373 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1374 <!-- f3 -->
1375 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1376 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1377 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1378 </para></footnote>
1379 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1380 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1381 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1382 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1383 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1384 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1385 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1386 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1387 old.
1388 </para>
1389 <para>
1390 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1391 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1392 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1393 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1394 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1395 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1396 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1397 </para>
1398 <para>
1399 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1400 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1401 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1402 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1403 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1404 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1405 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1406 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1407 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1408 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1409 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1411 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1412 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1413 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1414 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1415 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1416 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1417 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1418 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1419 </para>
1420 <para>
1421 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1422 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1423 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1424 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1425 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1426 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1427 culture around us and makes it something different.
1428 </para>
1429 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1430 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1431 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1432 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1433 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1434 <!-- f4 -->
1435 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1436 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1437 determining
1438 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1439 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1440 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1441 average
1442 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1443 Web site associated with this book, available at
1444 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1445 </para></footnote>
1446 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1447 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1448 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1449 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1450 </para>
1451 <para>
1452 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1453 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1454 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1455 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1456 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1457 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1458 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1459 </para>
1460 <para>
1461 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1462 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1463 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1464 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1465
1466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1467 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1468 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1469 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1470 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1471 content from before the Great Depression.
1472 </para>
1473 <para>
1474 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1475 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1476 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1477 universal.
1478 </para>
1479 <para>
1480 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1481 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1482 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1483 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1484 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1485 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1486 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1487 </para>
1488 <para>
1489 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1490 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1491 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1492 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1493 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1494 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1495 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1496 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1497 interestingly different way.
1498 </para>
1499 <para>
1500 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1501 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1502 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1503 </para>
1504 <para>
1505 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1506 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1507 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1508 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1509 transforming it either subtly or
1510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1511 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1512 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1513 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1514 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1515 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1516 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1517 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1518 </para>
1519 <para>
1520 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1521 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1522 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1523 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1524 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1525 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1526 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1527 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1528 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1529 </para>
1530 <para>
1531 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1532 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1533 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1534 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1535 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1536 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1537 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1538 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1539 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1540 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1541 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1542 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1543 </para>
1544 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1545 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1546 </indexterm>
1547 <para>
1548 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1549 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1550 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1551 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1552 in Japan now. &hellip; American comics were born out of copying each
1553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1554 other. &hellip; That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1555 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1556 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1557 <!-- f5 -->
1558 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1559 York: Perennial, 2000).
1560 </para></footnote>
1561 </para>
1562 <para>
1563 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1564 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1565 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1566 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1567 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1568 which are fifty years old."
1569 </para>
1570 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1571 <para>
1572 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1573 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1574 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1575 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1576 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1577 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1578 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1579 <!-- f6 -->
1580 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1581 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1582 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1583 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1584 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1585 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1586 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1587 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1588 </para></footnote>
1589 </para>
1590 <para>
1591 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1592 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1593 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1594 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1595 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1596 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1597 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1598 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1599 culture?
1600 </para>
1601 <para>
1602 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1603 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1604 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1605 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1606 to prosecute cases like this."
1607 </para>
1608 <para>
1609 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1610 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1611 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1612 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1614 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1615 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1616 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1617 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1618 their clients or hurt them?
1619 Let's pause for a moment.
1620 </para>
1621 <para>
1622 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1623 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1624 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1625 </para>
1626 <para>
1627 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1628 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1629 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1630 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1631 <!-- f7 -->
1632 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1633 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1634 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1635 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1636 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1637 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1638 very different.
1639 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1640 </para></footnote>
1641 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1642 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1643 property.
1644 </para>
1645 <para>
1646 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1647 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1648 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1649 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1650 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1651 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1652 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1653 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1654 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1655 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1656 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1657 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1658 the public domain.
1659 </para>
1660 <para>
1661 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1662 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1663 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1664
1665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1666 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1667 freedom is good.
1668 </para>
1669 <para>
1670 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1671 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1672 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1673 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1674 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1675 form, whether large or small.
1676 </para>
1677 <para>
1678 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1679 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1680 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1681 particular find it hard to say why.
1682 </para>
1683 <para>
1684 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1685 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1686 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1687 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1688 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1689 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1690 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1691 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1692 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1693 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1694 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1695 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1696 </para>
1697 <para>
1698 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1699 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1700 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1701 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1702 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1703 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1704 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1705 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1707 </para>
1708 <para>
1709 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1710 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1711 question instead is "<emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1712 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1713 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1714 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1715 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1716 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1717 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1718 a studio or not?
1719 </para>
1720 <para>
1721 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1722 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1723 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1724 </para>
1725
1726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1727 </chapter>
1728 <chapter label="2" id="mere-copyists">
1729 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1730 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1731 <primary>photography</primary>
1732 </indexterm>
1733 <para>
1734 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1735 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1736 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1737 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1738 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1739 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1740 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1741 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1742 </para>
1743 <para>
1744 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1745 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1746 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1747 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1748 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1749 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1750 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1751 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1752 amateurs.
1753 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1754 </para>
1755 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1756 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1757 </indexterm>
1758 <para>
1759 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1760 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1762 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1763 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1764 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1765 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1766 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1767 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1768 population of photographers.
1769 </para>
1770 <para>
1771 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1772 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1773 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1774 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1775 <!-- f1 -->
1776 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1777 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1778 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)</primary></indexterm>
1779 </para>
1780 <blockquote>
1781 <para>
1782 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1783 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1784 that only an expert can do. &hellip; We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1785 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1786 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1787 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1788 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1789 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1790 chemicals.<footnote>
1791 <para>
1792 <!-- f2 -->
1793 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1794 1977), 53.
1795 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1796 </para></footnote>
1797 </para>
1798 </blockquote>
1799 <para>
1800 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1801 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1802 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1803 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1804 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1805 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1806 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1807 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1808 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1809 percent.<footnote><para>
1810 <!-- f3 -->
1811 Jenkins, 177.
1812 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1813 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1814 <!-- f4 -->
1815 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1816 </para></footnote>
1817 </para>
1818 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1819 <para>
1820
1821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1822 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1823 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1824 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1825 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1826 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1827 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1828 permanent record of his family and its activities. &hellip; For the first
1829 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1830 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1831 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1832 <!-- f5 -->
1833 Coe, 58.
1834 </para></footnote>
1835 </para>
1836 <para>
1837 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1838 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1839 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1840 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1841 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1842 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1843 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1844 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1845 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1846 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1847 have before.
1848 </para>
1849 <para>
1850 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1851 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1852 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1853 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1854 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1855 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1856 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1857 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1858 <!-- f6 -->
1859 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1860 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1861 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1862 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1863 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1864 </para></footnote>
1865 </para>
1866 <para>
1867 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1868 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1869 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1870 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1871 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1872 draw
1873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1874 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1875 that they thought valuable.
1876 </para>
1877 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1878 <para>
1879 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1880 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1881 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1882 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1883 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1884 <para>
1885 <!-- f7 -->
1886 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1887 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1888 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1889 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1890 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1891 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1892 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1893 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1894 </para>
1895 <para>
1896 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1897 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1898 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1899 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1900 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1901 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1902 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1903 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1904 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1905 <!-- f8 -->
1906 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1907 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1908 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1909 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1910 (1993).
1911 </para></footnote>)
1912 </para>
1913 <para>
1914 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1915 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1916 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1917 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1918 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1919 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1920 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1921 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1922 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1923 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1924 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1925 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1926 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1927 </para>
1928 <para>
1929
1930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1931 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1932 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1933 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1934 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1935 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1936 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1937 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1938 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1939 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1940 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1941 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1942 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1943 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1944 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1945 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1946 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1947 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1948 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1949 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1950 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1951 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1952 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1953 learn.
1954 </para>
1955 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1956 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1957 <para>
1958 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1959 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1960 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1961 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1962 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1963 <!-- f9 -->
1964 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1965 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1966 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1967 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1968 </para></footnote>
1969 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1970 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1971 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1972 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1973 </para>
1974 <para>
1975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1976 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1977 Think!, puts it, "is the ability &hellip; to understand, analyze, and
1978 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1979 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1980 the way people access it."
1981 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1982 </para>
1983 <para>
1984 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1985 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1986 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1987 about.
1988 </para>
1989 <para>
1990 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1991 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1992 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1993 <!-- f10 -->
1994 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1995 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1996 Study," <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
1997 </para></footnote>
1998 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1999 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2000 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2001 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2002 (at least at first) terrible media.
2003 </para>
2004 <para>
2005 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2006 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2007 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
2008 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2009 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
2010 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2011 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2012 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2013 </para>
2014 <para>
2015 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2016 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2017 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2018 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2019 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2020 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2021 </para>
2022 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
2023 <para>
2024 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2025 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2026 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2027
2028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2029 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2030 about "the placement of objects, color, &hellip; rhythm, pacing, and
2031 texture."<footnote>
2032 <para>
2033 <!-- f11 -->
2034 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
2035 2002.
2036 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2037 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
2038 </para></footnote>
2039 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2040 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2041 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2042 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2043 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2044 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2045 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2046 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
2047 <!-- f12 -->
2048 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
2049 November 2000, available at
2050 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
2051 available at
2052 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
2053 </para></footnote>
2054 </para>
2055 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
2056 <para>
2057 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2058 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2059 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2060 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2061 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2062 </para>
2063 <para>
2064 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
2065 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2066 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2067 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2068 </para>
2069 <blockquote>
2070 <para>
2071 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2072 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2073 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2074 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2075 being read-only.
2076 </para>
2077 </blockquote>
2078 <para>
2079 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2080 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2081 twentieth century.
2082 </para>
2083 <para>
2084 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2085 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2086 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2087 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2088 literacy,
2089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2090 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2091 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2092 express."<footnote>
2093 <para>
2094 <!-- f13 -->
2095 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2096 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2097 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2098 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2099 <!-- f14 -->
2100 Ibid.
2101 </para></footnote>
2102 </para>
2103 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2104 <para>
2105 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2106 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2107 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2108 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2109 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2110 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2111 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2112 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2113 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2114 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2115 </para>
2116 <para>
2117 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2118 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2119 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2120 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2121 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2122 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2123 </para>
2124 <para>
2125 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2126 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2127 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2128 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2129 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2130 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2131 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2132 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2133 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2134 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2135 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2136 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2137 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2138 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2139 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2140 </para>
2141 <para>
2142
2143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2144 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2145 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2146 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2147 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2148 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2149 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2150 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2151 our interview,
2152 </para>
2153 <blockquote>
2154 <para>
2155 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2156 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2157 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2158 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2159 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2160 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2161 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2162 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2163 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2164 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2165 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2166 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2167 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2168 camera and &hellip; saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2169 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2170 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2171 about the topic.&hellip;
2172 </para>
2173 <para>
2174 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2175 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2176 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2177 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2178 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2179 </para>
2180 <para>
2181 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2182 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2183 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2185 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2186 had a lot of power with this language."
2187 </para>
2188 </blockquote>
2189 <para>
2190 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2191 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2192 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2193 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2194 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2195 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2196 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2197 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2198 world would be watching.
2199 </para>
2200 <para>
2201 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2202 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2203 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2204 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2205 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2206 entertainment is tragedy.
2207 </para>
2208 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2209 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2210 <para>
2211 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2212 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2213 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2214 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2215 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2216 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2217 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2218 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2219 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2220 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2221 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2222 was also the Internet.
2223 </para>
2224 <para>
2225 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2226 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2227 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2228 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2229 movie
2230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2231 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2232 with sound or text.
2233 </para>
2234 <para>
2235 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2236 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2237 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2238 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2239 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2240 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2241 spread practically instantaneously.
2242 </para>
2243 <para>
2244 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2245 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2246 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2247 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2248 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2249 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2250 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2251 </para>
2252 <para>
2253 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2254 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2255 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2256 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2257 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2258 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2259 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2260 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2261 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2262 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2263 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2264 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2265 </para>
2266 <para>
2267 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2268 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2269 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2270 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2271 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2272 people vote
2273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2274 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2275 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2276 </para>
2277 <para>
2278 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2279 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2280 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2281 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2282 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2283 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2284 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2285 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2286 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2287 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2288 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2289 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2290 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2291 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2292 <!-- f15 -->
2293 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2294 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2295 </para></footnote>
2296 </para>
2297 <para>
2298 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2299 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2300 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2301 <!-- f16 -->
2302 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <citetitle>Journal of
2303 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2304 </para></footnote>
2305 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2306 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2307 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2308 </para>
2309 <para>
2310 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2311 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2312 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2313 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2314 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2315 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2316 <!-- f17 -->
2317 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2318 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2319 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2320 little beyond what our friends say.
2321 </para>
2322 <para>
2323 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2324 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2325 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2326 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2327 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2328
2329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2330 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2331 place.
2332 </para>
2333 <para>
2334 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2335 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2336 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2337 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2338 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2339 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2340 </para>
2341 <para>
2342 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2343 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2344 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2345 is having an effect.
2346 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2347 </para>
2348 <para>
2349 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2350 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2351 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2352 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2353 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2354 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2355 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2356 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2357 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2358 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2359 <!-- f18 -->
2360 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2361 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2362 </para></footnote>
2363 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2364 </para>
2365 <para>
2366 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2367 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2368 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2369 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2370 on.
2371 </para>
2372 <para>
2373 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2374 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2375 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2376 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2377 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2378 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2379 peer-generated rankings.
2380 </para>
2381 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2382 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2383 </indexterm>
2384 <para>
2385 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2387 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2388 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2389 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2390 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2391 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2392 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2393 get it out of the way."
2394 </para>
2395 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2396 <para>
2397 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2398 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2399 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2400 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2401 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2402 <!-- f19 -->
2403 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2404 </para></footnote>
2405 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2406 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2407 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2408 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2409 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2410 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2411 told her <emphasis>that</emphasis> they were writing "the story.")
2412 </para>
2413 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2414 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2415 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2416 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2417 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2418 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2419 had seen.<footnote><para>
2420 <!-- f20 -->
2421 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2422 Information Online," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2423 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2424 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2425 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2426 </para></footnote>
2427 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2428 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2429 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2430 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2431 </para>
2432 <para>
2433 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2434 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2435 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2436 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2437 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2438 <para>
2439 <!-- f21 -->
2440 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" <citetitle>New
2441 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2442 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2443 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2444 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2445 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2446 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2447 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2448 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2449 </para></footnote>
2450 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2451
2452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2453 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2454 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2455 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2456 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2457 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2458 </para>
2459 <para>
2460 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2461 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2462 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2463 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2464 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2465 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2466 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2467 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2468 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2469 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2470 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2471 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2472 extraordinary to report.
2473 </para>
2474 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2475 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2476 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2477 </indexterm>
2478 <para>
2479 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2480 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and &hellip; the
2481 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating &hellip; innovation."
2482 </para>
2483 <para>
2484 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2485 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2486 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2487 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2488 affect learning.
2489 </para>
2490 <para>
2491 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2492 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2493 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2494 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2495 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2496 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2498 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2499 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2500 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2501 the tinkering of many others.
2502 </para>
2503 <para>
2504 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2505 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2506 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2507 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2508 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2509 </para>
2510 <para>
2511 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2512 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you &hellip;
2513 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2514 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2515 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2516 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2517 </para>
2518 <para>
2519 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2520 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2521 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2522 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2523 platform. &hellip; You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2524 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2525 learn.
2526 </para>
2527 <para>
2528 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2529 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2530 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2531 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2532 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2533 text. "The Web &hellip; says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2534 you are visual, if you are interested in film &hellip; [then] there is a
2535 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2536 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2537 </para>
2538 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2539 <para>
2540 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2541 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2542
2543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2544 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2545 kind of recognition.
2546 </para>
2547 <para>
2548 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2549 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2550 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2551 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2552 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2553 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2554 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2555 </para>
2556 <para>
2557 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2558 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2559 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2560 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2561 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2562 general.<footnote><para>
2563 <!-- f22 -->
2564 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2565 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," <citetitle>Communications
2566 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2567 </para></footnote>
2568 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2569 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2570 </para>
2571 <para>
2572 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2573 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2574 and want to learn."
2575 </para>
2576 <para>
2577 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2578 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2579 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. &hellip; We're building an
2580 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2581 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2582 </para>
2583 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2584 <para>
2585 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2586 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2587 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2588 the law to close down that technology.
2589 </para>
2590 <para>
2591 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2592 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2593 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2594 </para>
2595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2596 </chapter>
2597 <chapter label="3" id="catalogs">
2598 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2599 <indexterm><primary>RPI</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</see></indexterm>
2600 <indexterm id="idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'>
2601 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</primary>
2602 </indexterm>
2603 <para>
2604 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2605 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2606 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2607 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2608 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2609 </para>
2610 <para>
2611 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2612 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2613 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2614 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2615 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2616 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2617 </para>
2618 <para>
2619 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2620 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2621 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2622 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2623 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2624 </para>
2625 <para>
2626 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2628 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2629 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2630 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2631 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2632 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2633 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2634 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2635 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2636 </para>
2637 <para>
2638 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2639 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2640 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2641 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2642 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2643 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2644 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2645 </para>
2646 <para>
2647 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2648 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2649 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2650 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2651 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2652 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2653 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2654 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2655 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2656 on-line.
2657 </para>
2658 <para>
2659 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2660 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2661 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2662 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2663 be on users' computers.
2664 </para>
2665 <para>
2666 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2667 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2668 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2669 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2671 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2672 computer.
2673 </para>
2674 <para>
2675 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2676 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2677 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2678 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2679 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2680 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2681 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2682 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2683 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2684 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2685 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2686 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2687 supposed to do.
2688 </para>
2689 <para>
2690 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2691 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2692 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2693 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2694 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2695 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2696 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2697 </para>
2698 <para>
2699 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2700 wrong. &hellip; I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2701 engine that I ran or &hellip; what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2702 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2703 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2704 easier to use"&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2705 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2706 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2707 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2708 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2709 with music.
2710 </para>
2711 <para>
2712 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2713 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2715 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2716 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2717 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2718 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2719 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2720 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2721 </para>
2722 <para>
2723 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2724 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2725 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2726 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2727 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2728 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2729 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2730 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2731 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2732 2001.<footnote><para>
2733
2734 <!-- f1 -->
2735 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2736 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2737 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2738 </para></footnote>
2739 </para>
2740 <indexterm startref="idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'/>
2741 <para>
2742 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2743 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2744 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2745 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2746 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2747 </para>
2748 <para>
2749 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2750 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2751 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2752 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2753 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2754 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2755 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2756 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2757 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2758 </para>
2759 <para>
2760 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2761 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2762 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2763 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2764 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2766 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2767 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2768 </para>
2769 <para>
2770 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2771 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2772 </para>
2773 <para>
2774 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2775 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2776 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2777 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2778 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2779 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2780 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2781 <!-- f2 -->
2782 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2783 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2784 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2785 </para></footnote>
2786 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2787 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2788 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2789 <!-- f3 -->
2790 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2791 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2792 </para></footnote>
2793 </para>
2794 <para>
2795 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2796 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2797 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2798 activist:
2799 </para>
2800 <blockquote>
2801 <para>
2802 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2803 an activist. &hellip; [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2804 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2805 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2806 </para>
2807 </blockquote>
2808 <para>
2809 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2810 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2811 I. &hellip; He's not a tree hugger. &hellip; I think it's bizarre that they would
2812 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2813 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2814 </para>
2815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2816 </chapter>
2817 <chapter label="4" id="pirates">
2818 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2819 <para>
2820 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2821 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2822 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2823 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2824 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2825 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2826 </para>
2827 <section id="film">
2828 <title>Film</title>
2829 <para>
2830 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2831 <!-- f1 -->
2832 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2833 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2834 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2835 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2836 </para></footnote>
2837 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2838 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2839 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2840 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2841 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2842 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2843 this creative property
2844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2845 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2846 </para>
2847 <para>
2848 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2849 </para>
2850 <blockquote>
2851 <para>
2852 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2853 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2854 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2855 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2856 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2857 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2858 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2859 </para>
2860 <para>
2861 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2862 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2863 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2864 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2865 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2866 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2867 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2868 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2869 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2870 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2871 <!-- f2 -->
2872 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2873 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2874 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2875 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2876 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2877 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2878 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2879 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2880 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2881 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2882 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2883 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William</primary></indexterm>
2884 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2885 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2886 </para>
2887 </blockquote>
2888 <para>
2889 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2890 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2891 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2892 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2893 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2894 <!-- f3 -->
2895 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2896 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2897 </para></footnote>
2898 That led the independents to flee the East
2899 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2900 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2901 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2902 did just that.
2903 </para>
2904 <para>
2905 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2906 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2907 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2908
2909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2910 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2911 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2912 Edison's creative property.
2913 </para>
2914 </section>
2915 <section id="recordedmusic">
2916 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2917 <para>
2918 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2919 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2920 </para>
2921 <indexterm id="idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'>
2922 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri</primary>
2923 </indexterm>
2924 <para>
2925 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2926 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2927 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2928 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2929 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2930 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2931 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2932 right to perform it publicly.
2933 </para>
2934 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2935 <para>
2936 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2937 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2938 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2939 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2940 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2941 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2942 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2943 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2944 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2945 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2946 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2947 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2948 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2949 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2950 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2951 its composer anything.
2952 </para>
2953 <indexterm startref="idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'/>
2954 <para>
2955 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2957 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2958 put it,
2959 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
2960 </para>
2961 <blockquote>
2962 <para>
2963 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2964 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2965 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2966 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2967 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2968 rights.<footnote><para>
2969 <!-- f4 -->
2970 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2971 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2972 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2973 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
2974 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2975 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2976 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
2977 </para></footnote>
2978 </para>
2979 </blockquote>
2980 <para>
2981 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2982 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2983 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2984 <!-- f5 -->
2985 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2986 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2987 </para></footnote>
2988 and the "music publishing industry"
2989 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2990 <!-- f6 -->
2991 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2992 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2993 </para></footnote>
2994 As John Philip
2995 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2996 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2997 <!-- f7 -->
2998 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2999 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3000 </para></footnote>
3001 </para>
3002 <para>
3003 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3004 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3005 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3006 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3007 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
3008 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
3009 <!-- f8 -->
3010
3011 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
3012 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3013 Perforating Company of New York).
3014 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3015 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3016 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
3017 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3018 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3019 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3020 statute."<footnote><para>
3021 <!-- f9 -->
3022 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
3023 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3024 Graphophone Company Association).
3025 </para></footnote>
3026 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company</primary></indexterm>
3027 </para>
3028 <para>
3029 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3030 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3031 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
3032 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3033 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3034 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3035 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3036 recorded once. This is the part of
3037
3038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3039 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3040 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3041 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3042 </para>
3043 <para>
3044 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
3045 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
3046 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3047 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3048 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3049 the fee set by the statute.
3050 </para>
3051 <para>
3052 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3053 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3054 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3055 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3056 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3057 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3058 Grisham.
3059 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
3060 </para>
3061 <para>
3062 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3063 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
3064 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
3065 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3066 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3067 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3068 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3069 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3070 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3071 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3072 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3073 creativity.<footnote><para>
3074
3075 <!-- f10 -->
3076 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3077 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3078 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3079 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3080 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3081 </para></footnote>
3082 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3083 </para>
3084 <para>
3085 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3086 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3087 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3088 relates,
3089 </para>
3090 <blockquote>
3091 <para>
3092 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3094 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3095 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3096 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3097 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3098 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3099 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3100 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3101 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3102 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3103 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3104 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3105 choice.<footnote><para>
3106 <!-- f11 -->
3107 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3108 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3109 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3110 this report.</para></footnote>
3111 </para>
3112 </blockquote>
3113 <para>
3114 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3115 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3116 </para>
3117 </section>
3118 <section id="radio">
3119 <title>Radio</title>
3120 <para>
3121 Radio was also born of piracy.
3122 </para>
3123 <para>
3124 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3125 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3126 <!-- f12 -->
3127 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3128 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3129 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3130 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3131 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3132 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3133 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3134 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3135 Copyright," <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3136 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3137 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3138 </para></footnote>
3139 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3140 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3141 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3142 </para>
3143 <para>
3144 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3145 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3146 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3147 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3148 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3149 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3150 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3151 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3152 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3153 music for his work.
3154 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3155
3156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3157 </para>
3158 <para>
3159 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3160 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3161 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3162 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3163 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3164 of playing the song.
3165 </para>
3166 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3167 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3168 </indexterm>
3169 <para>
3170 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3171 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3172 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3173 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3174 </para>
3175 <para>
3176 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3177 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3178 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3179 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3180 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3181 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3182 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3183 her anything.
3184 </para>
3185 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3186 <para>
3187 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3188 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3189 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3190 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3191 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3192 to take something for nothing.
3193 </para>
3194 </section>
3195 <section id="cabletv">
3196 <title>Cable TV</title>
3197 <para>
3198
3199 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3200 </para>
3201 <para>
3202 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3203 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3204 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3205 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3207 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3208 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3209 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3210 give away.
3211 </para>
3212 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3213 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3214 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3215 <para>
3216 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3217 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3218 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3219 <!-- f13 -->
3220 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3221 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3222 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3223 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3224 Commission).
3225 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3226 </para></footnote>
3227 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3228 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3229 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3230 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3231 <!-- f14 -->
3232 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3233 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3234 </para></footnote>
3235 As another broadcaster put it,
3236 </para>
3237 <blockquote>
3238 <para>
3239 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3240 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3241 paid for.<footnote><para>
3242 <!-- f15 -->
3243 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3244 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3245 </para></footnote>
3246 </para>
3247 </blockquote>
3248 <para>
3249 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3250 </para>
3251 <blockquote>
3252 <para>
3253 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3254 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3255 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3256 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3257 <!-- f16 -->
3258 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3259 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3260 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3261 </para></footnote>
3262 </para>
3263 </blockquote>
3264 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3265 <para>
3266 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3267 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3268 compensation."<footnote><para>
3269 <!-- f17 -->
3270 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3271 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3272 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3273 </para>
3274 </footnote>
3275 </para>
3276 <para>
3277 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3278 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3279 </para>
3280 <blockquote>
3281 <para>
3282 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3283 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3284 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3285 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. &hellip; The
3286
3287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3288 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3289 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3290 <!-- f18 -->
3291 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3292 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3293 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3294 </para></footnote>
3295 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3296 </para>
3297 </blockquote>
3298 <para>
3299 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3300 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3301 </para>
3302 <para>
3303 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3304 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3305 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3306 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3307 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3308 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3309 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3310 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3311 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3312 created by broadcasters' content.
3313 </para>
3314 <para>
3315 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3316 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3317 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3318 today<footnote><para>
3319 <!-- f19 -->
3320 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3321 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3322 Information</citetitle>, available at
3323 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3324 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3325 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3326 </para></footnote>
3327 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3328 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3329 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. &hellip; The list is long and
3330 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3331 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3332 </para>
3333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3334 </section>
3335 </chapter>
3336 <chapter label="5" id="piracy">
3337 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3338 <para>
3339 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3340 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3341 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3342 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3343 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3344 should stop it.
3345 </para>
3346 <para>
3347 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3348 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3349 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3350 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3351 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3352 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3353 has so often done in the past.
3354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3355 </para>
3356 <section id="piracy-i">
3357 <title>Piracy I</title>
3358 <para>
3359 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3360 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3361 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3362 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3363 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3364 <!-- f1 -->
3365 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3366 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3367 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3368 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," <citetitle>Financial
3369 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3370 </para></footnote>
3371 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3372 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3373 </para>
3374 <para>
3375 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3376 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3377 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3378 This piracy is wrong.
3379 </para>
3380 <para>
3381 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3382 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3383 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3384 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3385 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3386 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3387 of our existence, treated as right.
3388 </para>
3389 <para>
3390 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3391 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3392 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3393 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3394 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3395 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3396 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3397 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3398 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3399 </para>
3400 <para>
3401 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3402 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3404 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3405 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3406 similar childhood.
3407 </para>
3408 <para>
3409 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3410 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3411 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3412 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3413 <!-- f2 -->
3414 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: <citetitle>Who
3415 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3416 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3417 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3418 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3419 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3420 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3421 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3422 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3423 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3424 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3425 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3426 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3427 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3428 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3429 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3430 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3431 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3432 is wrong.
3433 </para>
3434 <para>
3435 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3436 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3437 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3438 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3439 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3440 <!-- f3 -->
3441 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3442 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3443 144&ndash;90. "In some instances &hellip; the impact of piracy on the
3444 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3445 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3446 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3447 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3448 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3449 </para></footnote>
3450 </para>
3451 <para>
3452 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3453 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3454 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3455 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3456 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3457 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3458 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3459 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3460 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3461 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3462 piracy of the tangible.
3463 </para>
3464 <para>
3465 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3466 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3467 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3468 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3469 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3470 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3471 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3472 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3473 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3474
3475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3476 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3477 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3478 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3479 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3480 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3481 </para>
3482 <para>
3483 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3484 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3485 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3486 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3487 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3488 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3489 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3490 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3491 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3492 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3493 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3494 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3495 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3496 <indexterm>
3497 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3498 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3499 </indexterm>
3500 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3501 </para>
3502 <para>
3503 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3504 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3505 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3506 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3507 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3508 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3509 </para>
3510 <para>
3511 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3512 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3513 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3514 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3515 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3516 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3517 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3518 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3519 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3520 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3521 violating the law is still wrong.
3522 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3523 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer</primary></indexterm>
3524 <indexterm><primary>Netscape</primary></indexterm>
3525 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3526 </para>
3527 <para>
3528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3529 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3530 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3531 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3532 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3533 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3534 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3535 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3536 is flat out wrong.
3537 </para>
3538 <para>
3539 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3540 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3541 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3542 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3543 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3544 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3545 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3546 </para>
3547 <para>
3548 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3549 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3550 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3551 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3552 </para>
3553 <para>
3554 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3555 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3556 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3557 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3558 </para>
3559 <para>
3560 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3561 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3562 sharing to survive.
3563 </para>
3564 </section>
3565 <section id="piracy-ii">
3566 <title>Piracy II</title>
3567 <para>
3568 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3569 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3570 <!-- f4 -->
3571 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3572 </para></footnote>
3573 This means we must determine whether
3574 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3576 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3577 author of his profit.
3578 </para>
3579 <para>
3580 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3581 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3582 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3583 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3584 <!-- f5 -->
3585 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3586 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3587 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3588 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3589 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3590 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3591 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3592 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3593
3594 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3595 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3596 put together components that had been developed independently.
3597 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3598 </para>
3599 <para>
3600 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3601 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3602 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3603 system.<footnote><para>
3604 <!-- f6 -->
3605 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," <citetitle>San
3606 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3607 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3608 Secures New Financing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3609 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3610 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3611 </para></footnote>
3612 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3613 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3614 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3615 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3616 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3617 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3618 or your 20,000 best friends.
3619 </para>
3620 <para>
3621 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3622 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3623 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3624 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3625
3626 <!-- f7 -->
3627 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3628 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3629 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3630 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3631 </para></footnote>
3632 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3633 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3634 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3635 <!-- f8 -->
3636 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <citetitle>New
3637 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3638 </para></footnote>
3639 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3640 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3641 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3642 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3643 </para>
3644 <para>
3645 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3646 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3647 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3648 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3649 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3650 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3651 of harm it entails.
3652 </para>
3653 <para>
3654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3655 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3656 different kinds into four types.
3657 </para>
3658 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3659 <listitem><para>
3660 <!-- A. -->
3661 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3662 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3663 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3664 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3665 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3666 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3667 users who download instead of purchasing.
3668 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3669 </para></listitem>
3670 <listitem><para>
3671 <!-- B. -->
3672 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3673 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3674 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3675 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3676 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3677 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3678 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3679 music purchased.
3680 </para></listitem>
3681 <listitem><para>
3682 <!-- C. -->
3683 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3684 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3685 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3686 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3687 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3688 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3689 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3690 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3691 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3692 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3693 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3694 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3695 a local collector.
3696 </para></listitem>
3697 <listitem><para>
3698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3699 <!-- D. -->
3700 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3701 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3702 wants to give away.
3703 </para></listitem>
3704 </orderedlist>
3705 <para>
3706 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3707 </para>
3708 <para>
3709 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3710 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3711 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3712 harmful.<footnote><para>
3713 <!-- f9 -->
3714 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3715 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3716 </para></footnote>
3717 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3718 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3719 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3720 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3721 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3722 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3723 </para>
3724 <para>
3725 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3726 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3727 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3728 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3729 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3730 "devastating" the industry.
3731 </para>
3732 <para>
3733 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3734 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3735 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3736 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3737 &amp; Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3738 technology, the labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3739 <!-- f10 -->
3740 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3741 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3742 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3743 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3744 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3745 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3746 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3747 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3748 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3749 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3750 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3751 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3752 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3753 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3754 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3755 regulating technology was the answer.
3756 </para>
3757 <para>
3758 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3759 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3760 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' &hellip; was
3761 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3763 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3764 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3765 <!-- f11 -->
3766 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3767 </para></footnote>
3768 </para>
3769 <para>
3770 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3771 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3772 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3773 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3774 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3775 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3776 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3777 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3778 </para>
3779 <para>
3780 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3781 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3782 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3783 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3784 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3785 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3786 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3787 them.
3788
3789 </para>
3790 <para>
3791 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3792 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3793 actually suggest it might be close.
3794 </para>
3795 <para>
3796 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3797 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3798 percent.<footnote><para>
3799 <!-- f12 -->
3800 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3801 available at
3802 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3803 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3804 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3805 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3806 #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3807 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3808 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3809 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3810 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3811 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3812 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3813 shipments)."
3814 </para></footnote>
3815 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3816 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3817 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3818 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3819 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3820 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3821 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3822 <!-- f13 -->
3823 <para>
3824 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3825 February 2003, available at
3826 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3827 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3828 </para>
3829 </footnote>
3830 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3831 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, "The
3832 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3833 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3834 $19.99."<footnote><para>
3835 <!-- f14 -->
3836 Ibid.
3837 </para></footnote>
3838 </para>
3839 <para>
3840
3841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3842 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3843 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3844 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3845 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3846 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3847 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3848 </para>
3849 <para>
3850 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3851 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3852 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3853 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own numbers
3854 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3855 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3856 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3857 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3858 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry
3859 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3860 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3861 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3862 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3863 </para>
3864 <para>
3865 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3866 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3867 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3868 these costs?
3869 </para>
3870 <para>
3871 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3872 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3873 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3874 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3875 available.<footnote><para>
3876 <!-- f15 -->
3877 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3878 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3879 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3880 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3881 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3882 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3883 </para></footnote>
3884 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3885 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3886 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3887 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3888 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3889 </para>
3890 <para>
3891 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3893 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3894 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3895 today.<footnote><para>
3896 <!-- f16 -->
3897 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3898 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3899 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3900 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3901 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3902 National
3903 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3904 Results,"
3905 available at
3906 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3907 </para></footnote>
3908 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3909 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3910 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3911 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3912 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3913 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3914 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3915 the content they sell.
3916 </para>
3917 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3918 <para>
3919 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3920 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3921 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3922 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3923 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3924 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3925 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3926 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3927 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3928 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3929 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3930 </para>
3931 <para>
3932 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3933 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3934 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3935 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3936 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3937 shut as well?
3938 </para>
3939 <para>
3940 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3941 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3942 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3943 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3944 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
3945 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3946
3947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3948 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3949 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3950 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3951 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3952 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3953 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3954 great book!)
3955 </para>
3956 <para>
3957 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3958 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3959 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3960 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3961 </para>
3962 <para>
3963 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3964 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3965 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3966 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3967 unavailable?"
3968 </para>
3969 <para>
3970 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3971 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3972 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3973 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
3974 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3975 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3976 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3977 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3978 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3979 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3980 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3981 found only with time.
3982 </para>
3983 <para>
3984 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3985 just what you call type A sharing?"
3986 </para>
3987 <para>
3988 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3989 effect
3990 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3991 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3992 Napster
3993 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3994 developed
3995 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3997 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3998 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3999 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
4000 <!-- f17 -->
4001 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
4002 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
4003 MHP, available at
4004
4005 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
4006 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4007 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
4008 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
4009 </para></footnote>
4010 </para>
4011 <para>
4012 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4013 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4014 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
4015 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
4016 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
4017 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4018 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4019 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4020 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4021 </para>
4022 <para>
4023 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4024 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4025 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4026 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4027 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4028 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4029 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4030 </para>
4031 <para>
4032 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
4033 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4034 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4035 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4036 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4037 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4038 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
4039 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4040 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4041 benefit was enough.
4042 </para>
4043 <para>
4044 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4045 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4046 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4047 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4048 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4049 price.
4050 </para>
4051 <para>
4052
4053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4054 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4055 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
4056 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4057 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4058 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4059 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4060 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4061 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4062 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4063 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4064 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4065 Congress chose a path that would assure
4066 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
4067 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4068 </para>
4069 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
4070 <para>
4071 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4072 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4073 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4074 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4075 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4076 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4077 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4078 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4079 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4080 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4081 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4082 </para>
4083 <para>
4084 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4085 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4086 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4087 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4088 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4089 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4090 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4091 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4093 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4094 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4095 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4096 for the architecture it chose.
4097 </para>
4098 <para>
4099 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4100 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4101 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4102 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4103 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4104 copyright."<footnote><para>
4105 <!-- f18 -->
4106 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4107 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4108 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4109 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4110 </para></footnote>
4111 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4112 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4113 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4114 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4115 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4116 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4117 <!-- f19 -->
4118 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4119 </para></footnote>
4120 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4121 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4122 <!-- f20 -->
4123 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4124 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4125 </para></footnote>
4126 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4127 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4128 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4129 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4130 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4131 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4132 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4133 <!-- f21 -->
4134 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4135 of Jack Valenti).
4136 </para></footnote>
4137 </para>
4138 <para>
4139 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4140 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4141 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4142 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4143 Circuit"&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4144 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4145 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4146 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4147 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4148 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4149 technology.<footnote><para>
4150 <!-- f22 -->
4151 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4152 1981).
4153 </para></footnote>
4154 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex</primary></indexterm>
4155 </para>
4156 <para>
4157 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4158
4159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4160 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4161 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4162 Court wrote,
4163 </para>
4164 <blockquote>
4165 <para>
4166 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4167 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4168 market
4169 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4170 authority
4171 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4172 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4173 implicated
4174 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4175 <!-- f23 -->
4176 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4177 </para></footnote>
4178 </para>
4179 </blockquote>
4180 <para>
4181 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4182 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4183 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4184 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4185 together, a pattern is clear:
4186 </para>
4187
4188 <informaltable id="t1">
4189 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4190 <thead>
4191 <row>
4192 <entry>CASE</entry>
4193 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4194 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4195 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4196 </row>
4197 </thead>
4198 <tbody>
4199 <row>
4200 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4201 <entry>Composers</entry>
4202 <entry>No protection</entry>
4203 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4204 </row>
4205 <row>
4206 <entry>Radio</entry>
4207 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4208 <entry>N/A</entry>
4209 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4210 </row>
4211 <row>
4212 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4213 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4214 <entry>No protection</entry>
4215 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4216 </row>
4217 <row>
4218 <entry>VCR</entry>
4219 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4220 <entry>No protection</entry>
4221 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4222 </row>
4223 </tbody>
4224 </tgroup>
4225 </informaltable>
4226
4227 <para>
4228 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4229 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4230 <!-- f24 -->
4231 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4232 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4233 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4234 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4235 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4236 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4237 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4238 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4239 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4240 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4241 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4242 </para></footnote>
4243 In each case, throughout our history,
4244 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4245 work.
4246 </para>
4247 <para>
4248 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4249 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4250 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4251 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4252 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4253 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4254 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4255 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4256 interests at stake.
4257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4258 </para>
4259 <para>
4260 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4261 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4262 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4263 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4264 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4265 regulated?
4266 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4267 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4268 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4269 permission to record a song?
4270 </para>
4271 <para>
4272 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4273 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4274 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4275 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4276 <!-- f25 -->
4277 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4278 (1984).
4279 </para></footnote>
4280 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4281 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4282 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4283 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4284 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4285 facilitate the distribution of content.
4286 </para>
4287 <para>
4288 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4289 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4290 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4291 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4292 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4293 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4294 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4295 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4296 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4297 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4298 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4299 public interest that innovation continue.
4300 </para>
4301 <para>
4302
4303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4304 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4305 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4306 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4307 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4308 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4309 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4310 fight."<footnote><para>
4311 <!-- f26 -->
4312 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4313 Echoes Past Efforts," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4314 </para></footnote>
4315 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4316 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4317 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4318 warriors insist, "is our <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we
4319 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4320 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4321 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4322 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4323 arrest him?"
4324 </para>
4325 <para>
4326 "It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4327 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4328 </para>
4329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4330 </section>
4331 </chapter>
4332 </part>
4333 <part id="c-property">
4334 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4335 <partintro>
4336 <para>
4337
4338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4339 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4340 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4341 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4342 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4343 the price she can get.
4344 </para>
4345 <para>
4346 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4347 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4348 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4349 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4350 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4351 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4352 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4353 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4354 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4355 then?
4356 </para>
4357 <para>
4358 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4359 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4361 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4362 narrow
4363 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4364 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4365 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4366 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4367 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4368 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4369 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4370 <!-- f1 -->
4371 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4372 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4373 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4374 </para></footnote>
4375 </para>
4376 <para>
4377 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4378 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4379 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4380 expression
4381 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4382 property.
4383 </para>
4384 <para>
4385 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4386 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4387 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4388 "property" in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4389 <!-- f2 -->
4390 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4391 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4392 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4393 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4394 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4395 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4396 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4397 </para></footnote>
4398 </para>
4399 <para>
4400 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4401 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4402 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4403 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4404 these stories, the significance of this true
4405 statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash; will be a bit
4406 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4407 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4408 </para>
4409 </partintro>
4410
4411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4412 <chapter label="6" id="founders">
4413 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4414 <indexterm><primary>Henry V</primary></indexterm>
4415 <para>
4416 William Shakespeare wrote <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play
4417 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4418 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4419 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4420 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4421 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4422 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4423 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4424 is so full of clichés."
4425 </para>
4426 <para>
4427 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4428 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4429 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4430 <!-- f1 -->
4431 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4432 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4433 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4434 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4435 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4436 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4437 Bookseller," <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4438 </para></footnote>
4439 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4440 the Conger<footnote><para>
4441 <!-- f2 -->
4442 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4443 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4444 </para></footnote>
4445 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4446 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4447 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4448 that no
4449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4450 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4451 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4452 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4453 </para>
4454 <para>
4455 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4456 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4457 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4458 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4459 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4460 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4461 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4462 additional years.<footnote><para>
4463 <!-- f3 -->
4464 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4465 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4466 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4467 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4468 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4469 Tonson's control in 1774?
4470 </para>
4471 <para>
4472 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4473 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4474 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4475 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4476 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4477 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4478 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4479 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4480 books.
4481 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4482 </para>
4483 <para>
4484 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4485 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4486 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4487 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4488 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4489 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4490 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4491 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4492 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4493 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4494 </para>
4495 <para>
4496 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4497 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4498 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4499 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4500
4501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4502 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4503 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4504 ultimately
4505 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4506 </para>
4507 <para>
4508 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4509 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4510 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4511 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4512 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4513 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4514 believed.
4515 </para>
4516 <para>
4517 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4518 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4519 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4520 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4521 </para>
4522 <para>
4523 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4524 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4525 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4526 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4527 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4528 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4529 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4530 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4531 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4532 </para>
4533 <para>
4534 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4535 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4536 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4537 "booksellers."
4538 </para>
4539 <para>
4540 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4541 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4542 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4543 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4544 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4545 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4546 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4547 generally how
4548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4549 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4550 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4551 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4552 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4553 </para>
4554 <para>
4555 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4556 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4557 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4558 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4559 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4560 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4561 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive
4562 right to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4563 </para>
4564 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England</primary></indexterm>
4565 <para>
4566 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4567 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4568 especially "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had
4569 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4570 monopolies&mdash;especially monopolies for works that already
4571 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4572 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4573 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the
4574 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4575 inventions. And by 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4576 monopoly in publishing.
4577 </para>
4578 <para>
4579 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4580 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4581 claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4582 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4583 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4584 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4585 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4586 </para>
4587 <para>
4588 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4589 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4590 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4591 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4593
4594 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4595 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4596 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4597 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4598 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4599 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4600 indetted."<footnote><para>
4601
4602 <!-- f4 -->
4603 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4604 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4605 </para></footnote>
4606 </para>
4607 <para>
4608 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4609 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4610 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4611 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4612 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4613 with that idea.
4614 </para>
4615 <para>
4616 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4617 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4618 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4619 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4620 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4621 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4622 compromise
4623 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4624 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4625 construction and spread of culture.
4626 </para>
4627 <para>
4628 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4629 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4630 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4631 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4632 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4633 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4634 they said; they needed more time.
4635 </para>
4636 <para>
4637 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4638 words that echo today,
4639 </para>
4640 <blockquote>
4641 <para>
4642 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4643 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4644 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4645 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4646 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4647 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4648 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4649 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4650 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4651 <!-- f5 -->
4652 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4653 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4654 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4655 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4656 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4657 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4658 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4659 </para></footnote>
4660 </para>
4661 </blockquote>
4662 <para>
4663 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4664 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4665 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4666 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4667 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4668 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4669 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4670 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4671 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4672 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4673 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4674 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4675 way to protect authors.
4676 </para>
4677 <para>
4678 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4679 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4680 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4681 "The publishers &hellip; had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4682 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4683 <!-- f6 -->
4684 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4685 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4686 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4687 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4688 </para></footnote>
4689 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4690 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4691 </para>
4692 <para>
4693 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4694 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4695 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4696 <!-- f7 -->
4697 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4698 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4699 </para></footnote>
4700 </para>
4701 <para>
4702 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4703 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4704 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4705 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4706 <!-- f8 -->
4707 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4708 1993), 92.
4709 </para></footnote>
4710 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4712 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4713 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4714 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4715 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4716 <!-- f9 -->
4717 Ibid., 93.
4718 </para></footnote>
4719 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James</primary></indexterm>
4720 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4721 </para>
4722 <para>
4723 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4724 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4725 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4726 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4727 Property."<footnote><para>
4728 <!-- f10 -->
4729 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4730 Borwell).
4731 </para></footnote>
4732 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4733 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4734 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4735 </para>
4736 <para>
4737 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4738 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4739 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4740 </para>
4741 <para>
4742 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4743 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4744 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4745 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4746 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4747 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4748 <!-- f11 -->
4749 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4750 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4751 (1983): 1152.
4752 </para></footnote>
4753 </para>
4754 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4755 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4756 </indexterm>
4757 <para>
4758 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4759 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4760 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4761 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4762 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4763 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4764 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4765 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4766 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4767 </para>
4768 <para>
4769 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4770 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4771 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4772 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4773 with in 1710: How best to limit
4774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4775 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4776 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4777 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4778 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4779 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4780 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4781 </para>
4782 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4783 <para>
4784 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4785 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4786 </para>
4787 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4788 <para>
4789 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4790 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4791 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4792 <!-- f12 -->
4793 Ibid., 1156.
4794 </para></footnote>
4795 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4796 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4797 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4798 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4799 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4800 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4801 </para>
4802 <para>
4803 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4804 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4805 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4806 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4807 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4808 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4809 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4810 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4811 </para>
4812 <para>
4813 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4814 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4815 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4816 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4817 House of Lords generally voted.
4818 </para>
4819 <para>
4820 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4821 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4823 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4824 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4825 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4826 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4827 passed into the public domain.
4828 </para>
4829 <para>
4830 "The public domain." Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4831 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4832 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4833 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4834 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4835 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4836 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4837 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4838 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4839 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4840 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4841 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4842 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4843 </para>
4844 <para>
4845 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4846 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4847 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4848 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4849 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4850 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4851 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4852 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4853 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4854 <!-- f13 -->
4855 Rose, 97.
4856 </para></footnote>
4857 </para>
4858 <para>
4859 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4860 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4861 reported:
4862 </para>
4863 <blockquote>
4864 <para>
4865 By the above decision &hellip; near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4866 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4867 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4868 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4869 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4870 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4871 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4872 successors.<footnote><para>
4873 <!-- f14 -->
4874 Ibid.
4875 </para></footnote>
4876 </para>
4877 </blockquote>
4878 <para>
4879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4880 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4881 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4882 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4883 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4884 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4885 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4886 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4887 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4888 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4889 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4890 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4891 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4892 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4893 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4894 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4895 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4896 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4897 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4898 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4899 </para>
4900 <para>
4901 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4902 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4903 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4904 protected.
4905 </para>
4906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4907 </chapter>
4908 <chapter label="7" id="recorders">
4909 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4910 <para>
4911 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4912 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4913 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4914 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4915 He was their god.)
4916 </para>
4917 <para>
4918 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4919 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4920 today.
4921 </para>
4922 <para>
4923 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4924 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4925 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4926 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4927 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4928 stage.
4929 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4930 </para>
4931 <para>
4932 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4933 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4934 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4935 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
4936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4937 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4938 about the scene.
4939 </para>
4940 <para>
4941 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4942 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
4943 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4944 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4945 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4946 </para>
4947 <para>
4948 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4949 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4950 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4951 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4952 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4953 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4954 </para>
4955 <para>
4956 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4957 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4958 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4959 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4960 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4961 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4962 </para>
4963 <para>
4964 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4965 &hellip; that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4966 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4967 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4968 to use this four-point-five seconds of &hellip; entirely unsolicited
4969 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4970 </para>
4971 <para>
4972 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4973 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4974 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. &hellip; We're
4975 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4976 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4977 confirm what he had been told.
4978 </para>
4979 <para>
4980 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4981 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4982 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4983 about
4984
4985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4986 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4987 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4988 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4989 the money."
4990 </para>
4991 <para>
4992 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4993 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4994 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4995 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4996 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4997 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
4998 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4999 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
5000 </para>
5001 <para>
5002 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5003 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5004 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5005 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5006 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5007 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5008 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5009 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5010 says the owner gets to control.
5011 </para>
5012 <para>
5013 For example, "public performance" is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
5014 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5015 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
5016 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
5017 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5018 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
5019 by the law.
5020 </para>
5021 <para>
5022 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5023 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
5024 <!-- f1 -->
5025 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
5026 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
5027 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5028 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5029 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5030 </para></footnote>
5031 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5032 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
5033 not require the permission of anyone.
5034 </para>
5035 <para>
5036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5037 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
5038 </para>
5039 <blockquote>
5040 <para>
5041 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5042 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5043 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5044 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
5045 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5046 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5047 </para>
5048 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5049 <listitem><para>
5050 <!-- 1. -->
5051 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5052 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5053 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5054 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5055 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5056 </para></listitem>
5057 <listitem><para>
5058 <!-- 2. -->
5059 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5060 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5061 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
5062 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5063 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5064 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5065 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5066 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5067 principle.
5068 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
5069 </para></listitem>
5070 <listitem><para>
5071 <!-- 3. -->
5072 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5073 School &hellip; who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5074 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5075 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5076 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5077 pockets, me or them.
5078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5079 </para></listitem>
5080 <listitem><para>
5081 <!-- 4. -->
5082 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5083 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5084 money.
5085 </para></listitem>
5086 </orderedlist>
5087 </blockquote>
5088 <para>
5089 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5090 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5091 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5092 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5093 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5094 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5095 </para>
5096 <para>
5097 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5098 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5099 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5100 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5101 not.
5102 </para>
5103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5104 </chapter>
5105 <chapter label="8" id="transformers">
5106 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5107 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5108 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5109 <para>
5110 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5111 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5112 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5113 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5114 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5115 </para>
5116 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5117 <para>
5118 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5119 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5120 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5121 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5122 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5123 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5124 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5125 important to his career.
5126 </para>
5127 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5128 <para>
5129 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5130 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5131 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5132 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5133 </para>
5134 <para>
5135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5136 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5137 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5138 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5139 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5140 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5141 </para>
5142 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5143 <para>
5144 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5145 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5146 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5147 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5148 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5149 actor's career."
5150 </para>
5151 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5152 <para>
5153 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5154 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5155 </para>
5156 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5157 <para>
5158 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5159 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5160 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5161 for it."<footnote>
5162 <para>
5163 <!-- f1 -->
5164 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5165 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5166 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5167 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5168 <indexterm>
5169 <primary>artists</primary>
5170 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5171 </indexterm>
5172 </para></footnote>
5173 </para>
5174 <para>
5175 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5176 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5177 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5178 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5179 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5180 </para>
5181 <para>
5182 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5183 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5184 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5185 </para>
5186 <blockquote>
5187 <para>
5188 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5189 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5190 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5191 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5192 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5193 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5194 </para>
5195 <para>
5196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5197 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5198 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5199 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5200 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5201 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5202 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5203 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5204 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5205 started calling people.
5206 </para>
5207 </blockquote>
5208 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5209 <para>
5210 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5211 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5212 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5213 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5214 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5215 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5216 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5217 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5218 career.
5219 </para>
5220 <para>
5221 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;"and even then we
5222 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5223 </para>
5224 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5225 <para>
5226 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5227 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5228 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5229 </para>
5230 <blockquote>
5231 <para>
5232 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5233 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5234 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5235 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5236 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5237 directors, &hellip; this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5238 systematically and cleared the rights.
5239 </para>
5240 </blockquote>
5241 <para>
5242
5243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5244 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5245 loved it, and it sold very well.
5246 </para>
5247 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5248 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5249 <para>
5250 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5251 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5252 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5253 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5254 at all."<footnote><para>
5255 <!-- f2 -->
5256 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5257 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5258 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5259 </para></footnote>
5260 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5261 has to be made?
5262 </para>
5263 <para>
5264 For, as he acknowledged, "very few &hellip; have the time and resources,
5265 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5266 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5267 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5268 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5269 </para>
5270 <blockquote>
5271 <para>
5272 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5273 he or she gets paid very well. &hellip; And then when 30 seconds of
5274 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5275 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person &hellip; should be
5276 compensated for that.
5277 </para>
5278 </blockquote>
5279 <para>
5280 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5281 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5282 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5283 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5284 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5285 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5286 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5287 made to be more clean?
5288 </para>
5289 <blockquote>
5290 <para>
5291 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5292 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5293 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5294 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5296 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5297 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5298 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5299 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5300 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5301 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5302 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5303 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5304 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5305 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5306 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5307 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5308 </para>
5309 </blockquote>
5310 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5311 <para>
5312 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5313 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5314 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5315 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5316 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5317 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5318 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5319 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5320 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5321 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5322 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5323 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5324 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5325 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5326 "Does this still make sense?"
5327 </para>
5328 <para>
5329 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5330 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5331 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5332 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5333
5334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5335 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5336 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5337 </para>
5338 <para>
5339 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5340 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5341 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5342 judges loved every minute of it.
5343 </para>
5344 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5345 <para>
5346 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5347 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5348 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5349 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5350 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5351 were just violated in this room?"
5352 </para>
5353 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5354 <para>
5355 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5356 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5357 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5358 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5359 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5360 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5361 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5362 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5363 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5364 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5365 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5366 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5367 couldn't easily do them legally.
5368 </para>
5369 <para>
5370 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5371 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5372 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5373 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5374 planted in your presentation.
5375 </para>
5376 <para>
5377 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5379 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5380 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5381 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5382 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5383 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5384 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5385 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5386 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5387 </para>
5388 <para>
5389 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5390 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5391 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5392 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5393 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5394 </para>
5395 <para>
5396 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5397 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5398 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5399 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5400 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5401 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5402 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5403 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5404 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5405 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5406 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5407 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5408 registers the work.
5409 </para>
5410 <para>
5411 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5412 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5413 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5414 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5415 </para>
5416 <para>
5417 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5418 Myers, the comic genius of <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5420 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5421 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5422 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5423 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5424 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5425 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5426 entertainment."
5427 </para>
5428 <para>
5429 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5430 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5431 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5432 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5433 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5434 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5435 new audiences, it is Mike."
5436 </para>
5437 <para>
5438 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5439 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5440 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5441 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5442 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5443 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5444 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5445 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5446 </para>
5447 <para>
5448 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5449 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5450 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5451 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5452 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5453 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5454 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5455 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5456 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5457 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5458 curse, reserved for the few.
5459 </para>
5460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5461 </chapter>
5462 <chapter label="9" id="collectors">
5463 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5464 <para>
5465 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5466 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5467 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5468 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5469 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5470 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5471 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5472 </para>
5473 <para>
5474 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5475 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5476 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5477 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5478 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5479 well as when those pages changed.
5480 </para>
5481 <para>
5482 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5483 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5484 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5485 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5486 reports.
5487 </para>
5488 <para>
5489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5490 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5491 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5492 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5493 </para>
5494 <para>
5495 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5496 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5497 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5498 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5499 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5500 </para>
5501 <para>
5502 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5503 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5504 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5505 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5506 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5507 <!-- f1 -->
5508 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5509 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5510 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5511 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5512 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5513 </para></footnote>
5514 </para>
5515 <para>
5516 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5517 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5518 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5519 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5520 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5521 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5522 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5523 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5524 truth.
5525 </para>
5526 <para>
5527 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5528 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5529 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5530 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5531 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5532 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5533 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5534 </para>
5535 <para>
5536 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5537 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5538 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5539 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5541 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5542 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5543 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5544 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5545 </para>
5546 <para>
5547 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5548 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5549 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5550 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5551 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5552 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5553 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5554 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5555 </para>
5556 <para>
5557 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5558 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5559 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5560 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5561 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5562 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5563 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5564 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5565 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5566 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5567 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5568 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5569 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5570 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5571 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5572 </para>
5573 <blockquote>
5574 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan</primary></indexterm>
5575 <para>
5576 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5577 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5578 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5579 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5580 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5581
5582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5583 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it &hellip; it would be almost
5584 impossible. &hellip; Those materials are almost unfindable. &hellip;
5585 </para>
5586 </blockquote>
5587 <para>
5588 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5589 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5590 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5591 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5592 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5593 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5594 </para>
5595 <para>
5596 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5597 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5598 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5599 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5600 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5601 work.
5602 </para>
5603 <para>
5604 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5605 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5606 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5607 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5608 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5609 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5610 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5611 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5612 <!-- f2 -->
5613 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5614 the Library of Congress," <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5615 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5616 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5617 Co., 1992), 36.
5618 </para></footnote>
5619 </para>
5620 <para>
5621 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5622 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5623 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5624 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5625 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5626 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5627 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5628 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5629 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5630 </para>
5631 <para>
5632 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5634 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5635 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5636 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5637 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5638 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5639 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5640 events of that day.
5641 </para>
5642 <para>
5643 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5644 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5645 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5646 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5647 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5648 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5649 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5650 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5651 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5652 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5653 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5654 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5655 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5656 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5657 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5658 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5659 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5660 </para>
5661 <para>
5662 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5663 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5664 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5665 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5666 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5667 to find them.
5668 </para>
5669 <para>
5670 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5671 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5672 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5673 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5674 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5675 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5676 </para>
5677 <para>
5678 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5679 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5680 life, if the
5681
5682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5683 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5684 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5685 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5686 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5687 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5688 </para>
5689 <para>
5690 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5691 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5692 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5693 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5694 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5695 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5696 longer sold.
5697 </para>
5698 <para>
5699 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5700 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5701 <!-- f3 -->
5702 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5703 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5704 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5705 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5706 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," <citetitle>Boston
5707 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5708 </para></footnote>). After
5709 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5710 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5711 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5712 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5713 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5714 </para>
5715 <para>
5716 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5717 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5718 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5719 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5720 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5721 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5722 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5723 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5724 disappears.
5725 </para>
5726 <para>
5727 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5728 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5729 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5730 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5731 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5732 generally, the
5733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5734 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5735 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5736 little practical effect.
5737 </para>
5738 <para>
5739 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5740 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5741 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5742 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5743 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5744 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5745 </para>
5746 <para>
5747 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5748 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5749 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5750 Kahle describes,
5751 </para>
5752 <blockquote>
5753 <para>
5754 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5755 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5756 movies, &hellip; and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5757 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5758 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5759 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5760 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5761 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5762 &hellip; thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5763 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5764 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5765 </para>
5766 </blockquote>
5767 <para>
5768 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5769 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5770 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5771 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5772 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5773 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5774 will draw upon it to understand it;
5775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5776 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5777 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5778 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5779 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5780 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5781 </para>
5782 <para>
5783 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5784 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5785 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5786 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5787 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5788 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5789 </para>
5790 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5791 </chapter>
5792 <chapter label="10" id="property-i">
5793 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5794 <para>
5795 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5796 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5797 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5798 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5799 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5800 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5801 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5802 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5803 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
5804 </para>
5805 <para>
5806 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5807 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5808 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5809 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5810 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5811 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5812 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5813 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5814 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5815 Warner Brothers.
5816 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5817 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5818 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5819 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5820 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5821 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5822 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5823 </para>
5824 <para>
5825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5826 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5827 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5828 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5829 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5830 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5831 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5832 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5833 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5834 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5835 Washingtonian way.
5836 </para>
5837 <para>
5838 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5839 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5840 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5841 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5842 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5843 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5844 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5845 </para>
5846 <para>
5847 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5848 perfectly:
5849 </para>
5850 <blockquote>
5851 <para>
5852 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5853 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5854 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5855 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5856 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5857 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5858 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5859 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5860 <!-- f1 -->
5861 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5862 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5863 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5864 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5865 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5866 Valenti).
5867 </para></footnote>
5868 </para>
5869 </blockquote>
5870 <para>
5871 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5872 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5873 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5874 this:
5875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5876 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5877 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5878 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5879 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5880 </para>
5881 <para>
5882 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5883 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5884 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5885 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
5886 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5887 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5888 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5889 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5890 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5891 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5892 </para>
5893 <para>
5894 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5895 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5896 <!-- f2 -->
5897 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5898 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5899 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5900 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5901 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5902 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
5903 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5904 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5905 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5906 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5907 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5908 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5909 in our tradition.
5910 </para>
5911 <para>
5912 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5913 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5914 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5915 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5916 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5917 culture would develop.
5918 </para>
5919 <para>
5920 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5921 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5922 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5923 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5924 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5925 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5926 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5927 the same would be to
5928
5929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5930 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5931 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5932 perfect control.
5933 </para>
5934 <para>
5935 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5936 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5937 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5938 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5939 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5940 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5941 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5942 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5943 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5944 Constitution itself.
5945 </para>
5946 <para>
5947 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5948 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5949 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5950 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5951 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5952 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5953 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5954 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
5955 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5956 </para>
5957 <para>
5958 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5959 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5960 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5961 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5962 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5963 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5964 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5965 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5966 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5967 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5969 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5970 compensation at all.
5971 </para>
5972 <para>
5973 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5974 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5975 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5976 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5977 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5978 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5979 itself.
5980 </para>
5981 <para>
5982 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5983 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5984 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5985 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5986 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5987 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5988 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5989 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5990 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5991 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5992 </para>
5993 <para>
5994 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5995 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
5996 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
5997 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
5998 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
5999 domain?
6000 </para>
6001 <para>
6002 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6003 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6004 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6005 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6006 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
6007 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6008 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6009 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6010 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6011 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6012 also control how culture develops.
6013 </para>
6014 <para>
6015
6016 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6017 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6018 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6019 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6020 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6021 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6022 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6023 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6024 </para>
6025 <figure id="fig-1331">
6026 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6027 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6028 </figure>
6029 <para>
6030 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6031 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6032 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6033 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6034 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6035 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6036 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6037 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6038 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6039 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6040 Web, you can be punished
6041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6042 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6043 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6044 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
6045 </para>
6046 <para>
6047 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6048 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6049 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6050 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6051 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6052 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6053 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6054 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6055 the source of the enforcement.
6056 </para>
6057 <para>
6058 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6059 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6060 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6061 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6062 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6063 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6064 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6065 individual or group might behave.
6066 </para>
6067 <para>
6068 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6069 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
6070 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6071 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6072 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6073 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6074 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6075 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6076 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6077 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
6078 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6079 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6080 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6081 </para>
6082 <para>
6083
6084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6085 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6086 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6087 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6088 undermined by another.
6089 </para>
6090 <para>
6091 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6092 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6093 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6094 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6095 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6096 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6097 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6098 </para>
6099 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6100 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6101 </indexterm>
6102 <para>
6103 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6104 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6105 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6106 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6107 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6108 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6109 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6110 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6111 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6112 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6113 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6114 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6115 </para>
6116 <para>
6117 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6118 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6119 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6120 <!-- f3 -->
6121 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6122 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6123 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6124 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6125 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6126 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6127 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6128 June 1998.
6129 </para></footnote>
6130 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6131 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6132 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6133 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6134 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6135 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6136 used to require that other laws be more
6137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6138 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6139 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6140 driving.
6141 </para>
6142 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6143
6144 <figure id="fig-1361">
6145 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6146 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6147 </figure>
6148 <para>
6149 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6150 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6151 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6152 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6153 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6154 another.<footnote>
6155 <para>
6156 <!-- f4 -->
6157 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6158 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6159 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6160 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6161 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6162 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6163 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6164 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6165 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6166 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6167 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6168 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a long tradition of
6169 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6170 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6171 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6172 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana:
6173 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6174 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6175 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6176 J. Samuels, eds., <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6177 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6178 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6179 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6180 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6181 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6182 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6183 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6184 of these groups might face.
6185 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6186 </para></footnote>
6187 </para>
6188 <section id="hollywood">
6189 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6190 <para>
6191 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6192 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6193 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6194 rallying makes sense.
6195 </para>
6196 <para>
6197 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6198 Internet:
6199 </para>
6200 <figure id="fig-1371">
6201 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6202 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6203 </figure>
6204 <para>
6205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6206 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6207 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6208 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6209 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6210 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6211 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6212 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6213 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6214 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6215 this form of infringement.
6216 </para>
6217 <para>
6218 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6219 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6220 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6221 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6222 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6223 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6224 </para>
6225 <para>
6226 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6227 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6228 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6229 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6230 Iraq
6231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6232 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6233 looting that results.
6234 </para>
6235 <figure id="fig-1381">
6236 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6237 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6238 </figure>
6239 <para>
6240 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6241 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6242 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6243 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6244 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6245 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6246 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6247 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6248 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6249 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6250 </para>
6251 <para>
6252 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6253 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6254 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6255 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6256 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6257 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6258 life. Homeowners living in a
6259
6260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6261 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6262 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6263 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6264 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6265 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6266 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6267 </para>
6268 <para>
6269 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6270 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6271 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6272 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6273 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6274 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6275 </para>
6276 <para>
6277 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6278 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6279 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6280 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6281 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6282 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6283 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6284 <!-- f5 -->
6285 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6286 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6287 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6288 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6289 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6290 October 2003, available at
6291 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6292 </para></footnote>
6293
6294 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6295 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6296 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6297 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6298 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6299 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6300 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6301 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6302 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6303 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6304 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6305 </para>
6306 <para>
6307 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6308 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6309 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6311 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6312 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6313 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6314 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6315 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6316 <!-- f6 -->
6317 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6318 </para></footnote>
6319 And relative to a
6320 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6321 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6322 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6323 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6324 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6325 Brezhnev.
6326 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6327 </para>
6328 <para>
6329 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6330 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6331 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6332 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6333 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6334 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6335 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6336 opportunities for innovation and change.
6337 </para>
6338 <para>
6339 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6340 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6341 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6342 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6343 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6344 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6345 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6346 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6347 shall make no law &hellip; abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6348 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6349 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6350 regulation is justified.
6351 </para>
6352 <para>
6353 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6355 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6356 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6357 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6358 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6359 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6360 </para>
6361 <para>
6362 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6363 </para>
6364 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6365 <primary>DDT</primary>
6366 </indexterm>
6367 <para>
6368 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6369 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6370 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6371 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6372 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6373 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6374 </para>
6375 <para>
6376 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6377 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6378 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6379 </para>
6380 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6381 <para>
6382 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6383 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6384 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6385 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6386 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6387 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6388 </para>
6389 <para>
6390 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6391 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6392 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6393 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6394 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6395 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6396 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6397 </para>
6398 <para>
6399 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6400 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6401 culture.<footnote><para>
6402 <!-- f7 -->
6403 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6404 Environmentalism for the Net?" <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6405 </para></footnote>
6406 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6407 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6408 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6409 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6410 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6411 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6413 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6414 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6415 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6416 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6417 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6418 </para>
6419 <para>
6420 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6421 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6422 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6423 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6424 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6425 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6426 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6427 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6428 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6429 </para>
6430 <para>
6431 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6432 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6433 be lost.
6434 </para>
6435 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6436 </section>
6437 <section id="beginnings">
6438 <title>Beginnings</title>
6439 <para>
6440 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6441 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6442 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6443 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6444 </para>
6445 <para>
6446 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6447 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6448 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6449 </para>
6450 <para>
6451 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6452 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6453 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6454
6455 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6456 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6457 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6458 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6459 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6460 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6461 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6462 </para>
6463 <para>
6464 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6465 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6466 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6467 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6468 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6469 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6470 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6471 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6472 </para>
6473 <para>
6474 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6475 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6476 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6477 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6478 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6479 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6480 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6481 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6482 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6483 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6484 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6485 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6486 concentrations of power.
6487 </para>
6488 <para>
6489 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6490 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6491 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6492 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6493 years since they first struck its design.
6494 </para>
6495 <para>
6496 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6497 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6499 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6500 started here:
6501 </para>
6502 <figure id="fig-1441">
6503 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6504 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6505 </figure>
6506 <para>
6507 We will end here:
6508 </para>
6509 <figure id="fig-1442">
6510 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6511 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6512 </figure>
6513 <para>
6514 Let me explain how.
6515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6516 </para>
6517 </section>
6518 <section id="lawduration">
6519 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6520 <para>
6521 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6522 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6523 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6524 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6525 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6526 authorship.<footnote>
6527 <para>
6528 <!-- f8 -->
6529 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6530 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6531 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6532 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6533 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis>"
6534 (emphasis added).
6535 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6536 </para></footnote>
6537 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6538 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6539 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6540 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6541 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6542 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6543 </para>
6544 <para>
6545 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6546 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6547 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6548 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6549 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6550 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6551 </para>
6552 <para>
6553 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6554 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6555 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6556 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6557 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6558 </para>
6559 <para>
6560 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6561 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6562 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6563 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6564 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6565 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6566 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6567 <!-- f9 -->
6568 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6569 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6570 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6571 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6572 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6573 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6574 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6575 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6576 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6577 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6578 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6579 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6580 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6581 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6582 </para>
6583 <para>
6584 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6585 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6587 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6588 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6589 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6590 copyright, either.
6591 </para>
6592 <para>
6593 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6594 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6595 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6596 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6597 domain.<footnote><para>
6598 <!-- f10 -->
6599 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6600 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6601 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6602 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6603 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6604 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6605 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6606 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6607 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6608 </para>
6609 <para>
6610 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6611 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6612 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6613 <!-- f11 -->
6614 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6615 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6616 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6617 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6618 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6619 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6620 </para>
6621 <para>
6622 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6623 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6624 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6625 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6626 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6627 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6628 </para>
6629 <para>
6630 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6631 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6632 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6633 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6634 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6635 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6636 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6637 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6638 </para>
6639 <para>
6640 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6641 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6642 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6643 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6644
6645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6646 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6647 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6648 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6649 </para>
6650 <para>
6651 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6652 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6653 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6654 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6655 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6656 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6657 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6658 value.
6659 </para>
6660 <para>
6661 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6662 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6663 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6664 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6665 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6666 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6667 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6668 was ninety-five years.
6669 </para>
6670 <para>
6671 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6672 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6673 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6674 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6675 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6676 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6677 them.
6678 </para>
6679 <para>
6680 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6681 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6682 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6683 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6684 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6685 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6686 years.<footnote><para>
6687 <!-- f12 -->
6688 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6689 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6690 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6691 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6692 </para></footnote>
6693 </para>
6694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6695 </section>
6696 <section id="lawscope">
6697 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6698 <para>
6699 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6700 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6701 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6702 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6703 </para>
6704 <para>
6705 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6706 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6707 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6708 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6709 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6710 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6711 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6712 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6713 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6714 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6715 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6716 </para>
6717 <para>
6718 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6719 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6720 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6721 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6722 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6723 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6724 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6725 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6726 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6727 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6728 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6729 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6730 on the initial creative work.
6731 </para>
6732 <para>
6733 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6734 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6735 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6737 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6738 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6739 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6740 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6741 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6742 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6743 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6744 secured.
6745 </para>
6746 <para>
6747 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6748 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6749 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6750 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6751 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6752 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6753 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6754 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6755 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6756 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6757 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6758 original author.
6759 </para>
6760 <para>
6761 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6762 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6763 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6764 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6765 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6766 copy available for others to copy.
6767 </para>
6768 <para>
6769 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6770 differences.
6771 </para>
6772 <para>
6773 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6774 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6775 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6776 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6777 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6778 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6779 <!-- f13 -->
6780 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6781 Creation of American Literature," 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6782 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6783 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6784
6785 </para></footnote>
6786 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6787 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6788 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6789 </para>
6790 <para>
6791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6792 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6793 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6794 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6795 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6796 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6797 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6798 were restrained.
6799 </para>
6800 <para>
6801 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6802 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6803 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6804 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6805 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6806 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6807 protect it.
6808 </para>
6809 <para>
6810 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6811 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6812 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6813 </para>
6814 <para>
6815 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6816 control
6817 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6818 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6819 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6820 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6821 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6822 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6823 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6824 exclusive
6825 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6826 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6827 </para>
6828 <para>
6829 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6830 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6831 expansion
6832 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6833 copyright.
6834 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6835 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6836 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6837 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6838 </para>
6839 <para>
6840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6841 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6842 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6843 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6844 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6845 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6846 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6847 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6848 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6849 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6850 <!-- f14 -->
6851 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <citetitle>Legal
6852 Affairs</citetitle>, July/August 2003, available at
6853 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6854 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6855 </para></footnote>
6856 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6857 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6858 the wrong of direct piracy.
6859 </para>
6860 <para>
6861 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6862 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6863 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6864 of my book.<footnote><para>
6865 <!-- f15 -->
6866 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6867 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6868 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6869 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6870 Copyright's Constitutionality," <citetitle>Yale Law
6871 Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially
6872 pp. 53&ndash;59).
6873 </para></footnote>
6874 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6875 </para>
6876 <para>
6877 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6878 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6879 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6880 called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6881 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6882 created?
6883 </para>
6884 <para>
6885 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6886 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6887 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6888 the rights originally granted.
6889 </para>
6890 </section>
6891 <section id="lawreach">
6892 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6893 <para>
6894 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6895 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6896 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6897 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6898 <!-- f16 -->
6899 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6900 certainly regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a
6901 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6902 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6903 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17
6904 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
6905 existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6906 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6907 </para></footnote>
6908 </para>
6909 <para>
6910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6911 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6912 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6913 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6914 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6915 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6916 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6917 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6918 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6919 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6920 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
6921 the trigger for copyright law.
6922 </para>
6923 <para>
6924 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6925 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6926 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6927 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6928 <!-- f17 -->
6929 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
6930 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
6931 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
6932 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
6933 technology.
6934 </para></footnote>
6935 because it is clear that the
6936 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6937 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6938 </para>
6939 <para>
6940 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6941 empty circle.
6942 </para>
6943 <figure id="fig-1521">
6944 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6945 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6946 </figure>
6947 <para>
6948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6949 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6950 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6951 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6952 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6953 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6954 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6955 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6956 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6957 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6958 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6959 acts do not make a copy.
6960 </para>
6961 <figure id="fig-1531">
6962 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6963 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6964 </figure>
6965 <para>
6966 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6967 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6968 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6969 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6970 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6971 diagram on next page).
6972 </para>
6973 <para>
6974 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6975 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6976 </para>
6977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6978 <figure id="fig-1541">
6979 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6980 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6981 </figure>
6982 <para>
6983 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
6984 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6985 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
6986 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
6987 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
6988 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
6989 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses"
6990 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6991 </para>
6992 <figure id="fig-1542">
6993 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6994 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6995 </figure>
6996 <para> </para>
6997 <figure id="fig-1551">
6998 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6999 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7000 </figure>
7001 <para>
7002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7003 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7004 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7005 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7006 </para>
7007 <para>
7008 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7009 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7010 <!-- f18 -->
7011 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7012 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7013 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7014 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7015 of copies remain.
7016 </para></footnote>
7017 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7018 digital network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses
7019 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7020 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7021 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7022 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7023 a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into category 2. And those who
7024 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7025 exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7026 shift.
7027 </para>
7028 <para>
7029 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7030 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7031 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
7032 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7033 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7034 the book once, ten times, or every
7035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7036 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7037 use&mdash;reading&mdash; could be regulated by copyright law because
7038 none of those uses produced a copy.
7039 </para>
7040 <para>
7041 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7042 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7043 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
7044 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7045 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7046 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7047 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7048 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7049 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7050 copyright owner's wish.
7051 </para>
7052 <para>
7053 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7054 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7055 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7056 points also become clear:
7057 </para>
7058 <para>
7059 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7060 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7061 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7062 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7063 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7064 part of free culture before the Internet.
7065 </para>
7066 <para>
7067 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7068 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7069 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7070 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7071 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
7072 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7073 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7074 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7075 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7076 creative work.
7077 </para>
7078 <para>
7079 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7080
7081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7082 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to
7083 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7084 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7085 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7086 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7087 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7088 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7089 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7090 regulated.
7091 </para>
7092 <para>
7093 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7094 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7095 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7096 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7097 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7098 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7099 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7100 enough.
7101 </para>
7102 <para>
7103 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7104 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7105 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7106 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7107 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7108 </para>
7109 <para>
7110 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began
7111 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7112 previews. The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling"
7113 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7114 "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7115 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7116 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7117 </para>
7118 <para>
7119 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7120 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7121 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7122 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7123 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7124 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7125 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7126 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7127 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7128 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7129 "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7130 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7131 their rights.
7132 </para>
7133 <para>
7134 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7135 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7136 infringed" on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7137 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7138 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7139 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7140 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7141 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7142 </para>
7143 <para>
7144 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7145 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7146 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7147 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7148 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7149 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7150 Disney's permission.
7151 </para>
7152 <para>
7153 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7154 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7155 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7156 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7157 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7158 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7159 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7160 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7161 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7162 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7163 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7164 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7165 </para>
7166 <para>
7167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7168 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7169 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7170 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7171 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7172 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7173 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7174 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7175 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7176 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7177 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7178 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7179 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7180 happening are quite slight.
7181 </para>
7182 <para>
7183 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7184 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7185 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7186 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7187 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7188 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7189 </para>
7190 </section>
7191 <section id="lawforce">
7192 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7193 <para>
7194 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7195 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7196 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7197 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7198 </para>
7199 <para>
7200 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7201 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7202 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7203 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7204 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7205 your freedom.
7206 </para>
7207 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7208 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7209 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7210 </indexterm>
7211 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7212 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7213 </indexterm>
7214 <para>
7215 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7216 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7218 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7219 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7220 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7221 plan.<footnote><para>
7222 <!-- f19 -->
7223 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <citetitle>Law and
7224 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7225 </para></footnote>
7226 </para>
7227 <para>
7228 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7229 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7230 you were."<footnote><para>
7231 <!-- f20 -->
7232 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7233 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7234 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7235 </para></footnote>
7236 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7237 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7238 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7239 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7240 </para>
7241 <para>
7242 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7243 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7244 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7245 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7246 </para>
7247 <para>
7248 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7249 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7250 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7251 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7252 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7253 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7254 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7255 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7256 </para>
7257 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7258 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7259
7260 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7261 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7262 </indexterm>
7263 <para>
7264 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7265 </para>
7266 <para>
7267 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7268 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7269 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7270 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7271 technology.
7272 </para>
7273 <para>
7274 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7275 Reader.
7276 </para>
7277 <para>
7278 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7279 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7280 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7281 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7282 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7283 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7284 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7285 copy of
7286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7287 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7288 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7289 </para>
7290 <figure id="fig-1611">
7291 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7292 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7293 </figure>
7294 <para>
7295 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7296 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7297 </para>
7298 <figure id="fig-1612">
7299 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7300 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7301 </figure>
7302 <para>
7303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7304 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7305 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7306 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7307 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7308 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7309 read aloud through the computer.
7310 </para>
7311 <para>
7312 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7313 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7314 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7315 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7316 </para>
7317 <figure id="fig-1621">
7318 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7319 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7320 </figure>
7321 <para>
7322 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7323 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7324 the book.
7325 </para>
7326 <figure id="fig-1622">
7327 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7328 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7329 </figure>
7330 <para>
7331 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7332 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7333 Ideas</citetitle>:
7334 </para>
7335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7336 <figure id="fig-1631">
7337 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7338 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7339 </figure>
7340 <para>
7341 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7342 </para>
7343 <para>
7344 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7345 "permissions"&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7346 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7347 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7348 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7349 power.<footnote><para>
7350 <!-- f21 -->
7351 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7352 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7353 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7354 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7355 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7356 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7357 subsequently acquired the book.
7358 </para></footnote>
7359 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7360 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7361 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7362 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7363 control that the law would enable.
7364 </para>
7365 <para>
7366 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7367 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7368 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7369 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7370 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7371 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7372 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7373 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7374 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7375 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7376 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7377 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7378 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7379 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7380 won't read aloud.
7381 </para>
7382 <para>
7383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7384 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7385 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7386 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7387 sentence.
7388 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7389 </para>
7390 <para>
7391 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7392 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7393 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7394 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7395 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7396 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7397 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7398 </para>
7399 <para>
7400 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7401 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7402 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7403 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7404 to defeat these protections as well?
7405 </para>
7406 <para>
7407 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7408 eBook Reader.
7409 </para>
7410 <para>
7411 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7412 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7413 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7414 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7415 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7416 following report:
7417 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7418 </para>
7419 <figure id="fig-1641">
7420 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7421 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7422 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7423 </figure>
7424 <para>
7425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7426 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7427 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7428 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7429 </para>
7430 <para>
7431 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7432 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7433 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7434 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7435 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7436 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7437 </para>
7438 <para>
7439 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7440 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7441 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7442 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7443 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7444 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7445 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7446 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7447 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7448 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7449 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7450 </para>
7451 <para>
7452 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7453 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7454 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7455 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7456 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7457 often crazy.
7458 </para>
7459 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7460 <para>
7461 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7462 story of mine that makes the same point.
7463 </para>
7464 <indexterm id="idxaibo" class='startofrange'>
7465 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7466 </indexterm>
7467 <para>
7468 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7469 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7470 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7471 </para>
7472 <para>
7473 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7474 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7475 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7477 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7478 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7479 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7480 </para>
7481 <para>
7482 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7483 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7484 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7485 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7486 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7487 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7488 </para>
7489 <para>
7490 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7491 word <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7492 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7493 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much
7494 more positive term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the program to
7495 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7496 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7497 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7498 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7499 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7500 </para>
7501 <para>
7502 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7503 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7504 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7505 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7506 ethically.
7507 </para>
7508 <para>
7509 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7510 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7511 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7512 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7513 than Sony had built.
7514 </para>
7515 <indexterm startref="idxaibo" class='endofrange'/>
7516 <para>
7517 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7518 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7519 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7520 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7521 the
7522
7523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7524 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7525 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7526 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7527 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7528 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7529 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7530 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7531 </para>
7532 <para>
7533 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7534 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7535 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7536 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7537 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7538 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7539 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7540 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7541 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7542 </para>
7543 <para>
7544 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7545 <!-- f22 -->
7546 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7547 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7548 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7549 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7550 DMCA," <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7551 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7552 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7553 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7554 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7555 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7556 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7557 </para></footnote>
7558 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7559 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7560 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7561 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7562 </para>
7563 <para>
7564 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7565 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7566 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7567 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7568 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7569 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7570 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7571 Internet much more.
7572 </para>
7573 <para>
7574 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7575 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7576 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7577 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7578 </para>
7579 <para>
7580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7581 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7582 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7583 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7584 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7585 </para>
7586 <para>
7587 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7588 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7589 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7590 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7591 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7592 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7593 </para>
7594 <para>
7595 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7596 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7597 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7598 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7599 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7600 constituted, succeed.
7601 </para>
7602 <para>
7603 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7604 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7605 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7606 wrote:
7607 </para>
7608 <blockquote>
7609 <para>
7610 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7611 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7612 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7613 </para>
7614 </blockquote>
7615 <para>
7616 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7617 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7618 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7619 </para>
7620 <blockquote>
7621 <para>
7622 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7624 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7625 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7626 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7627 </para>
7628 </blockquote>
7629 <para>
7630 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7631 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7632 spreading such information an offense.
7633 </para>
7634 <para>
7635 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7636 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7637 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7638 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7639 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7640 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7641 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7642 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7643 protection for copyright owners.
7644 </para>
7645 <para>
7646 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7647 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7648 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7649 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7650 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7651 </para>
7652 <para>
7653 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7654 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7655 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7656 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7657 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7658 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7659 have been a copyright violation.
7660 </para>
7661 <para>
7662 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7663 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7664 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7665 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7666 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7667 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7668 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7670 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7671 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7672 </para>
7673 <para>
7674 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7675 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7676 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7677 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7678 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7679 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7680 </para>
7681 <para>
7682 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7683 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7684 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7685 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7686 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7687 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "<citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>,"
7688 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7689 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7690 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7691 </para>
7692 <blockquote>
7693 <para>
7694 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7695 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7696 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7697 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7698 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7699 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7700 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7701 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7702 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7703 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7704 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7705 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7706 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7707 important.<footnote><para>
7708 <!-- f23 -->
7709 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7710 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7711 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7712 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7713 </para></footnote>
7714 </para>
7715 </blockquote>
7716 <para>
7717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7718 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7719 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7720 the VCR responsible.
7721 </para>
7722 <para>
7723 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7724 the DMCA.
7725 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7726 </para>
7727 <para>
7728 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7729 </para>
7730 <para>
7731 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7732 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7733 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7734 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7735 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7736 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7737 </para>
7738 <para>
7739 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7741 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7742 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7743 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7744 and bad uses.
7745 </para>
7746 <figure id="fig-1711">
7747 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7748 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7749 </figure>
7750 <para>
7751 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7752 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7753 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7754 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7755 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7756 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7757 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7758 </para>
7759 <para>
7760 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7761 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7762 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7763 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7764 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7765 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7766 </para>
7767 <para>
7768 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7769 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7770 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7771 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7772 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7773 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7774 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7775 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7776 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7777 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7778 </para>
7779 <para>
7780 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7781 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7782 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7783 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7784 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7785 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7786 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7787 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7788 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7789 </para>
7790 <para>
7791
7792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7793 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7794 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7795 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7796 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7797 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7798 <!-- f24 -->
7799 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7800 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7801 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7802 </para></footnote>
7803 </para>
7804 <para>
7805 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7806 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7807 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7808 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7809 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7810 </para>
7811 <para>
7812 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7813 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7814 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7815 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7816 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7817 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7818 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7819 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7820 </para>
7821 <para>
7822 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7823 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7824 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7825 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7826 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7827 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7828 </para>
7829 </section>
7830 <section id="marketconcentration">
7831 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7832 <para>
7833 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7834 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7835 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7836 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7837 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7838 find better ways
7839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7840 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7841 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7842 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7843 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7844 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7845 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7846 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7847 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7848 control.
7849 </para>
7850 <para>
7851 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7852 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7853 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7854 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7855 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7856 </para>
7857 <para>
7858 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7859 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7860 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7861 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7862 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7863 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7864 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7865 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7866 of the media.
7867 </para>
7868 <para>
7869 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7870 nature.
7871 </para>
7872 <para>
7873 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7874 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7875 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7876 <!-- f25 -->
7877 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7878 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7879 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7880 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7881 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7882 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7883 <!-- f26 -->
7884 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7885 Slide," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
7886 </para></footnote>
7887 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7888 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7889 <!-- f27 -->
7890 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
7891 31 May 2003.
7892 </para></footnote>
7893 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7894 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
7895 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
7896 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
7897 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group</primary></indexterm>
7898 </para>
7899 <para>
7900 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7901 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7903 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
7904 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7905 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
7906 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
7907 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
7908 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7909 </para>
7910 <para>
7911 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7912 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7913 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7914 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7915 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7916 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7917 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7918 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7919 protected&mdash; by the market.
7920 </para>
7921 <para>
7922 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7923 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7924 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7925 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7926 </para>
7927 <blockquote>
7928 <para>
7929 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7930 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7931 &hellip; Fox TV shows &hellip; Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7932 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7933 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7934 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7935 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7936 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7937 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7938 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7939 <!-- f28 -->
7940 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
7941 2003): 89.
7942 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7943 </para></footnote>
7944 </para>
7945 </blockquote>
7946 <para>
7947 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7948 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7949 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7950 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7951 </para>
7952 <figure id="fig-1761">
7953 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7954 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7955 </figure>
7956 <para>
7957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7958 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7959 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7960 distribute content?
7961 </para>
7962 <para>
7963 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7964 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7965 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7966 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7967 </para>
7968 <para>
7969 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7970 integration may matter.
7971 </para>
7972 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7973 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7974 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7975 <para>
7976 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
7977 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7978 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7979 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7980 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7981 </para>
7982 <para>
7983 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7984 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7985 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7986 control.<footnote><para>
7987 <!-- f29 -->
7988 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7989 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7990 Missouri, 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7991 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7992 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7993 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7994 </para></footnote>
7995 </para>
7996 <para>
7997
7998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7999 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8000 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8001 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8002 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
8003 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8004 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
8005 networks.
8006 </para>
8007 <para>
8008 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8009 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
8010 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8011 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
8012 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8013 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8014 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
8015 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8016 year there was one."<footnote><para>
8017 <!-- f30 -->
8018 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8019 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
8020 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8021 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8022 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8023 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8024 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
8025 2003.
8026 </para></footnote>
8027 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8028 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
8029 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8030 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8031 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8032 63%."<footnote><para>
8033 <!-- f31 -->
8034 Ibid.
8035 </para></footnote>
8036 </para>
8037 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8038 <para>
8039 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
8040 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8041 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8042 owned by the network.
8043 </para>
8044 <para>
8045 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8046 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8047 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8048 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
8049 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
8050 </para>
8051 <blockquote>
8052 <para>
8053 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8054 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8055 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8056 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8058 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8059 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8060 handful.<footnote><para>
8061 <!-- f32 -->
8062 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
8063 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8064 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8065 </para></footnote>
8066 </para>
8067 </blockquote>
8068 <para>
8069 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8070 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8071 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8072 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8073 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8074 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8075 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8076 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8077 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8078 democracy.
8079 </para>
8080 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8081 <para>
8082 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8083 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8084 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8085 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8086 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8087 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8088 <!-- f33 -->
8089 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8090 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8091 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8092 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8093 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8094 Concepts in Technological Evolution," <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8095 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8096 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8097 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8098 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8099
8100 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8101 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8102 sprinting.
8103 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8104 </para>
8105 <para>
8106 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8107 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8108 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8109 measure.
8110 </para>
8111 <para>
8112 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8113 suggest the concern.
8114 </para>
8115 <para>
8116 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8117 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8118 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8119 </para>
8120 <para>
8121 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8122 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8123 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8124
8125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8126 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8127 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8128 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8129 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8130 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8131 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8132 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8133 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8134 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8135 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8136 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8137 outweigh these costs.
8138 </para>
8139 <para>
8140 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8141 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8142 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8143 these issues.
8144 </para>
8145 <para>
8146 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8147 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8148 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8149 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8150 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8151 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8152 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8153 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8154 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8155 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8156 </para>
8157 <para>
8158 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8159 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8160 </para>
8161 <para>
8162 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8163 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8164 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8165 war. Can you do it?
8166 </para>
8167 <para>
8168 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8170 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8171 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8172 message will be heard then?
8173 </para>
8174 <para>
8175 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8176 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8177 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8178 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8179 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8180 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8181 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8182 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8183 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8184 <!-- f34 -->
8185 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8186 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8187 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8188 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8189 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8190 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8191 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8192 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8193 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8194 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," <citetitle>New
8195 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8196 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8197 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8198 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8199 Radio," <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8200 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8201 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8202 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8203 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8204 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8205 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8206 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8207 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8208 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8209 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8210 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8211 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8212 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8213 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8214 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8215 </para></footnote>
8216 </para>
8217 <para>
8218 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8219 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8220 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8221 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8222 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8223 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8224 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8225 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8226 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8227 </para>
8228 </section>
8229 <section id="together">
8230 <title>Together</title>
8231 <para>
8232 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8233 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8234 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8235 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8236 </para>
8237 <para>
8238 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8239 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8240 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8241 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8242 to seem
8243
8244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8245 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8246 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8247 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8248 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8249 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8250 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8251 be redefined.
8252 </para>
8253 <para>
8254 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8255 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8256 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8257 our culture today.
8258 </para>
8259 <para>
8260 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8261 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8262 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8263 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8264 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8265 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8266 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8267 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8268 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8269 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8270 </para>
8271 <para>
8272 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8273 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8274 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8275 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8276 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8277 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8278 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8279 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8280 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8281 in control that technology and the market enable.
8282 </para>
8283 <para>
8284 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8285 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8287 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8288 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8289 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8290 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8291 </para>
8292 <para>
8293 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8294 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8295 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8296 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8297 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8298 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8299 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8300 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8301 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8302 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8303 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8304 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8305 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8306 known.<footnote><para>
8307 <!-- f35 -->
8308 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8309 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8310 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8311 </para></footnote>
8312 </para>
8313 <para>
8314 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8315 </para>
8316 <para>
8317 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8318 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8319 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8320 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8321 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8322 </para>
8323
8324 <informaltable id="t2">
8325 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8326 <thead>
8327 <row>
8328 <entry></entry>
8329 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8330 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8331 </row>
8332 </thead>
8333 <tbody>
8334 <row>
8335 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8336 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8337 <entry>Free</entry>
8338 </row>
8339 <row>
8340 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8341 <entry>Free</entry>
8342 <entry>Free</entry>
8343 </row>
8344 </tbody>
8345 </tgroup>
8346 </informaltable>
8347
8348 <para>
8349 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8350 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8351 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8352
8353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8354 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8355 noncommercial work was also free.
8356 </para>
8357 <para>
8358 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8359 </para>
8360
8361 <informaltable id="t3">
8362 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8363 <thead>
8364 <row>
8365 <entry></entry>
8366 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8367 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8368 </row>
8369 </thead>
8370 <tbody>
8371 <row>
8372 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8373 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8374 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8375 </row>
8376 <row>
8377 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8378 <entry>Free</entry>
8379 <entry>Free</entry>
8380 </row>
8381 </tbody>
8382 </tgroup>
8383 </informaltable>
8384
8385 <para>
8386 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8387 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8388 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8389 transformation were still essentially free.
8390 </para>
8391 <para>
8392 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8393 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8394 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8395 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8396 we could say the law began to look like this:
8397 </para>
8398
8399 <informaltable id="t4">
8400 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8401 <thead>
8402 <row>
8403 <entry></entry>
8404 <entry>COPY</entry>
8405 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8406 </row>
8407 </thead>
8408 <tbody>
8409 <row>
8410 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8411 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8412 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8413 </row>
8414 <row>
8415 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8416 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8417 <entry>Free</entry>
8418 </row>
8419 </tbody>
8420 </tgroup>
8421 </informaltable>
8422
8423 <para>
8424 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8425 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8426 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8427 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8428 that the law now looks like this:
8429 </para>
8430
8431 <informaltable id="t5">
8432 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8433 <thead>
8434 <row>
8435 <entry></entry>
8436 <entry>COPY</entry>
8437 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8438 </row>
8439 </thead>
8440 <tbody>
8441 <row>
8442 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8443 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8444 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8445 </row>
8446 <row>
8447 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8448 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8449 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8450 </row>
8451 </tbody>
8452 </tgroup>
8453 </informaltable>
8454
8455 <para>
8456 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8457 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8458 creativity&mdash;
8459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8460 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8461 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8462 </para>
8463 <para>
8464 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8465 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8466 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8467 these domains actually does any good.
8468 </para>
8469 <para>
8470 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8471 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8472 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8473 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8474 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8475 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8476 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8477 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8478 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8479 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8480 </para>
8481 <para>
8482 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8483 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8484 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8485 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8486 property rights<footnote><para>
8487 <!-- f36 -->
8488 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8489 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8490 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8491 Disintegration of Property," in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8492 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8493 Press, 1980).
8494 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement</primary></indexterm>
8495 </para></footnote>)
8496 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8497 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8498 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8499 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8500 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8501 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8502 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8503 vibrant and rich free culture.
8504 </para>
8505 <para>
8506 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8507 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8508 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8509 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8510 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8511 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8512 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8513 chapter 7). Adding
8514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8515 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8516 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8517 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8518 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8519 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8520 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8521 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8522 dominates the debate today.
8523 </para>
8524 <para>
8525 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8526 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8527 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8528 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8529 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8530 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8531 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8532 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8533 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8534 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8535 lawyer.
8536 </para>
8537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8538 </section>
8539 </chapter>
8540 </part>
8541 <part id="c-puzzles">
8542 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8543
8544 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8545 <chapter label="11" id="chimera">
8546 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8547 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8548 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8549 </indexterm>
8550 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8551 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8552 </indexterm>
8553 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8554 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8555 </indexterm>
8556
8557 <para>
8558 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8559 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8560 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8561 <!-- f1. -->
8562 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8563 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8564 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8565 </para></footnote>
8566 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8567 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8568 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8569 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8570 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8571 villagers to explore life as a king.
8572 </para>
8573 <para>
8574 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8575 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8576 "blind." They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8577 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8578 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8579 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8580 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8581 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8582 alone!'"
8583 </para>
8584 <para>
8585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8586 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8587 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8588 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8589 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8590 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8591 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8592 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8593 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8594 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8595 </para>
8596 <para>
8597 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8598 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8599 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8600 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8601 </para>
8602 <para>
8603 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8604 is affected," he reports.
8605 </para>
8606 <para>
8607 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8608 called the eyes &hellip; are diseased &hellip; in such a way as to affect
8609 his brain."
8610 </para>
8611 <para>
8612 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8613 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8614 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8615 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8616 </para>
8617 <para>
8618 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8619 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8620 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8621 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8622 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8623 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8624 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8625 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8626
8627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8628 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8629 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8630 scene. &hellip;"
8631 </para>
8632 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8633 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8634 <para>
8635 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8636 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8637 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8638 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8639 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8640 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8641 </para>
8642 <para>
8643 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8644 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8645 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8646 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8647 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8648 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8649 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8650 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8651 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8652 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8653 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8654 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8655 </para>
8656 <para>
8657 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8658 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8659 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8660 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8661 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8662 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8663 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8664 </para>
8665 <para>
8666 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8667 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8668 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8669 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8670 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8671 from Tower.
8672 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8673 </para>
8674 <para>
8675
8676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8677 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8678 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8679 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8680 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8681 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8682 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8683 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8684 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8685 </para>
8686 <para>
8687 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8688 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8689 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8690 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8691 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8692 </para>
8693 <para>
8694 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8695 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8696 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8697 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8698 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8699 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8700 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8701 implemented.<footnote><para>
8702 <!-- f2. -->
8703 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8704 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8705 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003,
8706 available at
8707 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8708 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8709 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8710 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8711 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8712 Stakes on Piracy," <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8713 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8714 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8715 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8716 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8717 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8718 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8719 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8720 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8721 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8722 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8723 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8724 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8725 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8726 August 2003, available at
8727 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8728 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8729 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8730 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8731 Name Students," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8732 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8733 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.</primary></indexterm>
8734 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8735 </para></footnote>
8736
8737 </para>
8738 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8739 <para>
8740 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8741 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8742 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8743 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8744 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8745 </para>
8746 <para>
8747 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8748 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8749 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8750 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8751 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8752 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8753 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8754 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8755 </para>
8756 <para>
8757
8758 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8759 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8760 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8761 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8762 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8763 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8764 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8765 </para>
8766 <para>
8767 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8768 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8769 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8770 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8771 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8772 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8773 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8774 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8775 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8776 protection for copyrighted material,
8777 </para>
8778 <blockquote>
8779 <para>
8780 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8781 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8782 </para>
8783 <para>
8784 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8785 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8786 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8787 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8788 produce a totally different industry model.
8789 </para>
8790 <para>
8791 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8792 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8793 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8794 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8795 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8796 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8797 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8798 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8799 interests.<footnote><para>
8800 <!-- f3. -->
8801 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8802 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8803 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8804 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
8805 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8806 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8807 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
8808 </para>
8809 </blockquote>
8810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8811 <para>
8812 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8813 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8814 changed.
8815 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
8816 </para>
8817 <para>
8818 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8819 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8820 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8821 </para>
8822
8823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8824 </chapter>
8825 <chapter label="12" id="harms">
8826 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8827 <para>
8828 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8829 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8830 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8831 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8832 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8833 </para>
8834 <para>
8835 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8836 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8837 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8838 justified?
8839 </para>
8840 <para>
8841 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8842 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8843 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8844 our history.
8845 </para>
8846 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8847 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8848 <para>
8849 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8850 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8851 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8852 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8853 </para>
8854 <para>
8855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8856 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8857 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8858 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8859 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8860 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8861 </para>
8862 <section id="constrain">
8863 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8864 <para>
8865 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8866 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8867 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8868 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8869 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8870 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8871 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8872 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8873 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8874 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8875 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8876 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8877 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8878 </para>
8879 <para>
8880 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8881 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8882 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8883 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8884 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8885 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8886 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8887 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8888 the culture all around.
8889 </para>
8890 <para>
8891 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8892 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8893
8894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8895
8896 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8897 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8898 storytelling extended across the globe.
8899 </para>
8900 <para>
8901 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8902 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8903 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8904 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8905 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8906 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8907 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8908 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8909 work is presumptively illegal.
8910 </para>
8911 <para>
8912 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8913 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8914 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8915 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8916 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8917 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8918 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8919 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8920 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8921 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8922 million.<footnote><para>
8923 <!-- f1. -->
8924 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
8925 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8926 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8927 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8928 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8929 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8930 </para></footnote>
8931 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8932 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8933 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8934 suffering.<footnote>
8935 <para>
8936 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8937 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8938 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8939 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8940 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8941 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8942 available at
8943 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8944 recent months.
8945 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8946 </para></footnote>
8947 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8948 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8949 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8950 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8951 </para>
8952 <para>
8953 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8954 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
8955 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
8956 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
8957 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
8958 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
8959 designed to
8960
8961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8962 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
8963 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
8964 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
8965 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
8966 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
8967 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
8968 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
8969 States.<footnote><para>
8970 <!-- f3. -->
8971
8972 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
8973 2003, available at
8974 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8975 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8976 </para></footnote>
8977 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8978 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8979 critical or reflective.
8980 </para>
8981 <para>
8982 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8983 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
8984 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
8985 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8986 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8987 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8988 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8989 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8990 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8991 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8992 </para>
8993 <para>
8994 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8995 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8996 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8997 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8998 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8999 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9000 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9001 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9002 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9003 </para>
9004 <para>
9005 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9006 described in chapter
9007 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
9008 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9009 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9010 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9011 use.
9012 </para>
9013 <para>
9014
9015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9016 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9017 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9018 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9019 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9020 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9021 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9022 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9023 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9024 </para>
9025 <para>
9026 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9027 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9028 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9029 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9030 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9031 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9032 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9033 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9034 comfort themselves.
9035 </para>
9036 <para>
9037 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9038 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9039 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9040 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9041 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9042 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9043 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9044 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9045 culture that is free.
9046 </para>
9047 <para>
9048 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9049 </para>
9050 <blockquote>
9051 <para>
9052 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9053 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9054 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9055 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made &hellip; you're not
9056 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9058 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9059 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9060 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9061 </para>
9062 </blockquote>
9063 </section>
9064 <section id="innovators">
9065 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9066 <para>
9067 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9068 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9069 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9070 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9071 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9072 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9073 </para>
9074 <para>
9075 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9076 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9077 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9078 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9079 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9080 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9081 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9082 </para>
9083 <para>
9084 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9085 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9086 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9087 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9088 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9089 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9090 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9091 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9092 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9093 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9094 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9095 </para>
9096 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9097 <para>
9098 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9100 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9101 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9102 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9103 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9104 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9105 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9106 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9107 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9108 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9109 </para>
9110 <para>
9111 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9112 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9113 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9114 </para>
9115 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael</primary></indexterm>
9116 <para>
9117 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9118 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9119 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9120 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9121 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9122 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9123 </para>
9124 <para>
9125 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9126 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9127 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9128 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9129 Raitt. And so on.
9130 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9131 </para>
9132 <para>
9133 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9134 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9135 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9136 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9137 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9138 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9139 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9140 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9141 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9142 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9143 </para>
9144 <para>
9145 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9146 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9147
9148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9149 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9150 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9151 the kind of content the users liked.
9152 </para>
9153 <para>
9154 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9155 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9156 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9157 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9158 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9159 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9160 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9161 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9162 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9163 they had already bought.
9164 </para>
9165 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9166 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9167 </indexterm>
9168 <para>
9169 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9170 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9171 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9172 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9173 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9174 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9175 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9176 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9177 </para>
9178 <para>
9179 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9180 </para>
9181 <para>
9182 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9183 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9184 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9185 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9186 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9187 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9188 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9189 demanded.
9190 </para>
9191 <para>
9192 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9193 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9194 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9195 clients in this
9196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9197 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9198 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9199 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9200 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9201 </para>
9202 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9203 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9204 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9205 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad</primary></indexterm>
9206 <para>
9207 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9208 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9209 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9210 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9211 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9212 <!-- f4. -->
9213 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9214 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9215 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9216 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9217 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9218 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9219 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9220 </para></footnote>
9221 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9222 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9223 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9224 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9225 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9226 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9227 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9228 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9229 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9230 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9231 <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9232 discussion with BMW:
9233 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
9234 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
9235 </para>
9236 <blockquote>
9237 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9238 <para>
9239 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9240 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9241 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9242 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9243 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9244 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9245 United States with bona fide MP3 players. &hellip; <footnote>
9246 <para>
9247 <!-- f5. -->
9248 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9249 2003, available at
9250 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9251 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9252 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9253 </para></footnote>
9254 </para>
9255 </blockquote>
9256 <para>
9257 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9258 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9259 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9260 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9261 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9262 constantly threatened by litigation.
9263 </para>
9264 <para>
9265
9266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9267 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9268 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a
9269 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9270 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9271 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9272 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9273 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9274 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9275 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9276 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9277 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9278 much less creativity.
9279 </para>
9280 <para>
9281 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9282 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9283 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9284 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9285 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9286 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9287 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9288 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9289 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9290 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9291 </para>
9292 <para>
9293 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9294 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9295 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9296 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9297 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9298 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9299 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9300 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9301 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9302 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9303 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9304 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9306 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9307 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9308 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9309 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9310 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9311 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9312 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9313 </para>
9314 <para>
9315 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9316 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9317 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9318 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9319 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9320 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9321 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9322 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9323 </para>
9324 <para>
9325 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9326 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9327 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9328 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9329 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9330 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9331 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9332 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9333 </para></footnote>
9334 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9335 "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device capable of
9336 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9337 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9338 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9339 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9340 copyright violators and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9341 <!-- f7. -->
9342 GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9343 </para></footnote>
9344 </para>
9345 <para>
9346 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9347 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9348 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9349 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9350 and costs on
9351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9352 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9353 those requirements.
9354 </para>
9355 <para>
9356 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9357 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9358 would impose.<footnote><para>
9359 <!-- f8. -->
9360 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9361 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9362 </para></footnote>
9363 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9364 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9365 harm than good.
9366 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
9367 </para>
9368 <para>
9369 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9370 innovation&mdash;again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9371 free market crowd.
9372 </para>
9373 <para>
9374 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9375 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9376 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9377 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9378 </para>
9379 <para>
9380 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9381 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9382 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9383 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9384 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9385 <!-- f9. -->
9386 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9387 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9388 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9389 </para></footnote>
9390 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10 details,
9391 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9392 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9393 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9394 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9395 </para>
9396 <para>
9397 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9398 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9399 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9400 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9401 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9402 </para>
9403 <para>
9404 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9405 <!-- f10. -->
9406 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9407 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9408 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9409 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9410 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9411 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9412 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9413 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9414 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9415 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9416 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9417 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9418 liability.
9419 </para></footnote>
9420 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9421 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9422 here.<footnote><para>
9423 <!-- f11. -->
9424 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9425 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9426 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9427 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9428 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9429 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9430 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9431 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9432 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9433 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9434 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9435 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9436 available at
9437 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9438 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9439 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz</primary></indexterm>
9440 </para></footnote>
9441 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9442 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9443 </para>
9444 <para>
9445
9446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9447 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9448 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9449 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9450 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9451 version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9452 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9453 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9454 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9455 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9456 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
9457 </para>
9458 <para>
9459 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9460 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9461 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9462 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9463 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9464 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9465 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9466 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9467 recording artists.
9468 </para>
9469 <para>
9470 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9471 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9472 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9473 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9474 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9475 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9476 metropolitan area.
9477 </para>
9478 <para>
9479 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9480 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9481 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9482 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9483 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9484 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9485 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9486 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9487 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9488 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9489 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9490 </para>
9491 <para>
9492
9493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9494 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9495 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9496 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9497 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9498 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9499 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9500 FM radio,
9501 </para>
9502 <blockquote>
9503 <para>
9504 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9505 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9506 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9507 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9508 than by technical restrictions. &hellip; Armstrong likened the situation
9509 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9510 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9511 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9512 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9513 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9514 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9515 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9516 shackles.<footnote><para>
9517 <!-- f12. -->
9518 Lessing, 239.
9519 </para></footnote>
9520 </para>
9521 </blockquote>
9522 <para>
9523 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9524 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9525 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9526 legislation"<footnote><para>
9527 <!-- f13. -->
9528 Ibid., 229.
9529 </para></footnote>
9530 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9531 </para>
9532 <para>
9533 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9534 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9535 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9536 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9537 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9538 radio?
9539 </para>
9540 <para>
9541 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9542 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9543
9544 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9545 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9546 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9547 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9548 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9549 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9550 of "Happy Birthday" on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9551 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9552 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9553 burdens terrestrial radio.
9554 </para>
9555 <para>
9556 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9557 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9558 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9559 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9560 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9561 <para>
9562 <!-- f14. -->
9563 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9564 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9565 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9566 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9567 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9568 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9569 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9570 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9571 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9572 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9573 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9574 Distribution," <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9575 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9576 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9577 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9578 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9579 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9580 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9581 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9582 </para></footnote>
9583 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9584 equivalent fee.
9585 </para>
9586 <para>
9587 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9588 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9589 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9590 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9591 </para>
9592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9593 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9594 <listitem><para>
9595 name of the service;
9596 </para></listitem>
9597 <listitem><para>
9598 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9599 </para></listitem>
9600 <listitem><para>
9601 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9602 </para></listitem>
9603 <listitem><para>
9604 date of transmission;
9605 </para></listitem>
9606 <listitem><para>
9607 time of transmission;
9608 </para></listitem>
9609 <listitem><para>
9610 time zone of origination of transmission;
9611 </para></listitem>
9612 <listitem><para>
9613 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9614 </para></listitem>
9615 <listitem><para>
9616 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9617 </para></listitem>
9618 <listitem><para>
9619 sound recording title;
9620 </para></listitem>
9621 <listitem><para>
9622 ISRC code of the recording;
9623 </para></listitem>
9624 <listitem><para>
9625 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9626 </para></listitem>
9627 <listitem><para>
9628 featured recording artist;
9629 </para></listitem>
9630 <listitem><para>
9631 retail album title;
9632 </para></listitem>
9633 <listitem><para>
9634 recording label;
9635 </para></listitem>
9636 <listitem><para>
9637 UPC code of the retail album;
9638 </para></listitem>
9639 <listitem><para>
9640 catalog number;
9641 </para></listitem>
9642 <listitem><para>
9643 copyright owner information;
9644 </para></listitem>
9645 <listitem><para>
9646 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9647 </para></listitem>
9648 <listitem><para>
9649 name of the service or entity;
9650 </para></listitem>
9651 <listitem><para>
9652 channel or program;
9653 </para></listitem>
9654 <listitem><para>
9655 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9656 </para></listitem>
9657 <listitem><para>
9658 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9659 </para></listitem>
9660 <listitem><para>
9661 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9662 </para></listitem>
9663 <listitem><para>
9664 unique user identifier;
9665 </para></listitem>
9666 <listitem><para>
9667 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9668 </para></listitem>
9669 </orderedlist>
9670
9671 <para>
9672 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9673 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9674 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9675 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9676 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9677 that terrestrial radio does not.
9678 </para>
9679 <para>
9680 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9681 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9682 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9683 </para>
9684 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9685 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
9686 <para>
9687 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9688 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9689 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9690 </para>
9691 <blockquote>
9692 <para>
9693 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9694 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9695 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9696 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9697 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9698 webcasters asked the RIAA, &hellip; "How do you come up with a
9699
9700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9701 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9702 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9703 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9704 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9705 business. &hellip;"
9706 </para>
9707 <para>
9708 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9709 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9710 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9711 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9712 added.)
9713 </para>
9714 </blockquote>
9715 <para>
9716 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9717 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9718 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9719 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9720 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9721 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9722 effective to prevent it.
9723 </para>
9724 </section>
9725 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9726 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9727 <para>
9728 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9729 dinosaurs
9730 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9731 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9732 </para>
9733 <para>
9734 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9735 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9736 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9737 </para>
9738 <para>
9739 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9740 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9741 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9742 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9743 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9744 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9745 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9746 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9747 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9748 </para></footnote>
9749 According to the RIAA,
9750 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9751 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9752
9753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9754 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9755 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9756 increasingly
9757 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9758 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9759 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9760 extreme
9761 response by the other.
9762 </para>
9763 <para>
9764 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9765 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9766 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9767 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9768 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9769 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9770 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9771 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9772 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9773 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9774 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9775 was.<footnote><para>
9776 <!-- f16. -->
9777 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," <citetitle>Los
9778 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
9779 </para></footnote>
9780 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9781 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9782 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9783 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9784 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9785 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9786 they oppose.
9787 </para>
9788 <para>
9789 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9790 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9791 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9792 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9793 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9794 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9795 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9796 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9797 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9798 <!-- f17. -->
9799 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9800 Prohibition," <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9801 </para></footnote>
9802 We have
9803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9804 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9805 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9806 <!-- f18. -->
9807 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9808 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9809 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9810 </para></footnote>
9811 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9812 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9813 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9814 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9815 cheat.<footnote><para>
9816 <!-- f19. -->
9817 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9818 Compliance," <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9819 compliance literature).
9820 </para></footnote>
9821 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9822 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9823 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9824 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
9825 </para>
9826 <para>
9827 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9828 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9829 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9830 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9831 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9832 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9833 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9834 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9835 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9836 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9837 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9838 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9839 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9840 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9841 degree of illegality.
9842 <indexterm><primary>law schools</primary></indexterm>
9843 </para>
9844 <para>
9845 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9846 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9847 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9848 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9849 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9850 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9851 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9852 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9853 to consider the alternative.
9854 </para>
9855 <para>
9856
9857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9858 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9859 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9860 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9861 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9862 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9863 </para>
9864 <para>
9865 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9866 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9867 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9868 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9869 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9870 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9871 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9872 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9873 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9874 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9875 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9876 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9877 </para>
9878 <para>
9879 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9880 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9881 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9882 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9883 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9884 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9885 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9886 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9887 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9888 a nation of felons?
9889 </para>
9890 <para>
9891 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9892 </para>
9893 <para>
9894 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9895 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9896 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9897 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9898 used
9899
9900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9901 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9902 recordings is free.
9903 </para>
9904 <para>
9905 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9906 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9907 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9908 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9909 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9910 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9911 capacities of digital technologies.
9912 </para>
9913 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9914 <para>
9915 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9916 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9917 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9918 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9919 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9920 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9921 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9922 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9923 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9924 </para>
9925 <para>
9926 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9927 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9928 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9929 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9930 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9931 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9932 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9933 on people's machines.
9934 </para>
9935 <para>
9936 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9937 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9938 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9939 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9940 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9941 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9942
9943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9944 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9945 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9946 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9947 management" system.
9948 </para>
9949 <para>
9950 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9951 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9952 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9953 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9954 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9955 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9956 freedom to move content easily?
9957 </para>
9958 <para>
9959 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9960 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9961 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9962 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9963 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9964 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9965 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9966 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9967 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9968 </para>
9969 <para>
9970 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9971 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9972 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9973 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9974 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9975 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9976 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9977 </para>
9978 <para>
9979 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9980 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9981 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9982 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9983 </para>
9984 <para>
9985 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9986 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9987
9988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9989
9990 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9991 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9992 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9993 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9994 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9995 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9996 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9997 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9998 generally.
9999 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
10000 </para>
10001 <para>
10002 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10003 explains,
10004 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10005 </para>
10006 <blockquote>
10007 <para>
10008 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10009 evaporate to one degree or another. &hellip; If you're a copyright
10010 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10011 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10012 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10013 access? &hellip; Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10014 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10015 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10016 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10017 </para>
10018 </blockquote>
10019 <para>
10020 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10021 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10022 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10023 </para>
10024 <para>
10025 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10026 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10027 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10028 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10029 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10030 an Internet user is revealed.
10031 </para>
10032 <para>
10033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10034 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10035 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10036 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10037 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10038 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10039 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10040 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10041 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10042 <!-- f20. -->
10043 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10044 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10045 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10046 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10047 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10048 Being Sued," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10049 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
10050 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10051 Fan, Either," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10052 Brianna a Criminal?" <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
10053 </para></footnote>
10054
10055 </para>
10056 <para>
10057 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10058 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10059 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10060 <!-- f21. -->
10061 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10062 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10063 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10064 </para></footnote>
10065 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10066 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10067 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10068 </para>
10069 <para>
10070 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10071 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10072 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10073 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10074 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10075 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10076 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10077 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10078 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10079 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10080 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10081 <!-- f22. -->
10082 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10083 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10084 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10085 Colleges," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10086 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," <citetitle>Christian Science
10087 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10088 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10089 Lawsuit Possible," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10090 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10091 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10092 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10093 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10094 Sharing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10095 Are Weapons at Universities," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10096 </para></footnote>
10097 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10098 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10099 </para>
10100 <para>
10101 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10102 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10103 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10104 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10105 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10106 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10107 college students
10108
10109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10110 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10111 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10112 Says von Lohmann,
10113 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10114 </para>
10115 <blockquote>
10116 <para>
10117 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10118 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10119 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10120 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10121 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10122 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10123 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10124 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10125 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10126 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10127 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10128 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10129 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10130 larger number of Americans than drug use. &hellip; If forty to sixty
10131 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10132 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10133 million of them.
10134 </para>
10135 </blockquote>
10136 <para>
10137 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10138 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10139 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10140 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10141 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10142 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10143 </para>
10144
10145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10146 </section>
10147 </chapter>
10148 </part>
10149 <part id="c-balances">
10150 <title>BALANCES</title>
10151 <partintro>
10152
10153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10154 <para>
10155 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10156 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10157 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10158 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10159 </para>
10160 <para>
10161 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10162 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10163 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10164 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10165 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10166 everything around.
10167 </para>
10168 <para>
10169 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10170 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10171 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10172 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10173 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10174 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10175 </para>
10176 <para>
10177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10178 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10179 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10180 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10181 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10182 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10183 made that is happening all around.
10184 </para>
10185 <para>
10186 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10187 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10188 gasoline onto this fire.
10189 </para>
10190 <para>
10191 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10192 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10193 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10194 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10195 </para>
10196 <para>
10197 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10198 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10199 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10200 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10201 success will require.
10202 </para>
10203 </partintro>
10204
10205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10206 <chapter label="13" id="eldred">
10207 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10208 <indexterm id="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'>
10209 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel</primary>
10210 </indexterm>
10211 <para>
10212 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10213 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10214 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10215 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10216 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10217 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10218 come alive.
10219 </para>
10220 <para>
10221 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10222 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10223 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10224 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10225 them available for free.
10226 </para>
10227 <para>
10228 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10229 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10230 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10231 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10232 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10234 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10235 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10236 accessible&mdash;today.
10237 </para>
10238 <para>
10239 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10240 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10241 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10242 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10243 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10244 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10245 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10246 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10247 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10248 commercial publications of public domain works.
10249 </para>
10250 <indexterm startref="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'/>
10251 <para>
10252 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10253 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10254 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10255 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10256 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10257 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10258 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10259 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10260 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10261 generally.<footnote><para>
10262 <!-- f1. -->
10263 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10264 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10265 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10266 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10267 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10268 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10269 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10270 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10271 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10272 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10273 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10274 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10275 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10276 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10277 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10278 </para>
10279 <para>
10280 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10281 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10282 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10283 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10284 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10285 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10286 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10287 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10288 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10289 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10290 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10291 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10292 </para>
10293 <para>
10294
10295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10296 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10297 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10298 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10299 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10300 <!-- f2. -->
10301 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10302 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10303 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10304 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10305 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10306 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10307 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10308 </para></footnote>
10309
10310 </para>
10311 <para>
10312 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10313 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10314 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10315 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10316 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10317 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10318 to undertake.
10319 </para>
10320 <para>
10321 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10322 constitutional
10323 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10324 interpretation.
10325 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10326 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10327 importantly
10328 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10329 </para>
10330 <blockquote>
10331 <para>
10332 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science &hellip;
10333 by securing for limited Times to Authors &hellip; exclusive Right to
10334 their &hellip; Writings. &hellip;
10335 </para>
10336 </blockquote>
10337 <para>
10338 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10339 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10340 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10341 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10342 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10343 specific&mdash;to "promote &hellip; Progress"&mdash;through means that
10344 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10345 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10346 </para>
10347 <para>
10348 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10349 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10350 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10351 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10353 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10354 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10355 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10356 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10357 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10358 </para>
10359 <para>
10360 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10361 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10362 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10363 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10364 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10365 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10366 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10367 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10368 this gravy train going.
10369 </para>
10370 <para>
10371 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10372 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10373 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10374 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10375 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10376 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10377 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10378 </para>
10379 <para>
10380 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10381 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10382 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10383 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10384 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10385 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10386 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10387 published by anyone for free.
10388 </para>
10389 <para>
10390 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10391 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10392 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10393 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10394 report:
10395 </para>
10396 <para>
10397 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10398
10399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10400 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10401 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10402 those works.
10403 </para>
10404 <para>
10405 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10406 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10407 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10408 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10409 </para>
10410 <para>
10411 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10412 about it?"
10413 </para>
10414 <para>
10415 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10416 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10417 they support the bill."
10418 </para>
10419 <para>
10420 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10421 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10422 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10423 much is it worth?"
10424 </para>
10425 <para>
10426 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10427 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10428 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10429 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10430 </para>
10431 <para>
10432 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10433 correct conclusion:
10434 </para>
10435 <para>
10436 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10437 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10438 contributions
10439 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10440 </para>
10441 <para>
10442 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10443 contribute
10444 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10445 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10446 </para>
10447 <para>
10448 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10449 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10450 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10451 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10453 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10454 copyrights
10455 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10456 the copyright term extended.
10457 </para>
10458 <para>
10459 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10460 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10461 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10462 </para>
10463 <para>
10464 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10465 Copyright
10466 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10467 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10468 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10469 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10470 contributions.<footnote><para>
10471 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10472 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10473 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10474 </para></footnote>
10475 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10476 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10477 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10478 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10479 Age," available at
10480 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10481 </para></footnote>
10482 Disney is estimated to have
10483 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10484 cycle.<footnote><para>
10485 <!-- f5. -->
10486 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10487 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10488 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10489 </para></footnote>
10490
10491 </para>
10492 <para>
10493 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10494 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10495 reality
10496 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10497 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10498 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10499 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10500 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10501 "limited."
10502 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10503 and again.
10504 </para>
10505 <para>
10506 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10507 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10508 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10509 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10510 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10511 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10512 Supreme Court's
10513
10514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10515 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10516 guns near schools.
10517 </para>
10518 <para>
10519 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10520 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10521 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10522 "interstate
10523 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10524 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10525 interstate
10526 commerce.
10527 </para>
10528 <para>
10529 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10530 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10531 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10532 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10533 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10534 </para>
10535 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
10536 <para>
10537 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10538 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10539 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10540 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10541 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10542 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10543 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10544 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10545 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10546 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10547 position to second-guess Congress.
10548 </para>
10549 <para>
10550 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10551 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10552 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10553 </para></footnote>
10554 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10555 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10556 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10557 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10558 <!-- f7. -->
10559 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10560 </para></footnote>
10561 </para>
10562 <para>
10563 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10564 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10565 <!-- f8. -->
10566 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10567 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10568 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10569 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10570 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10571 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10572 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10573 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10574 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10575 </para></footnote>
10576 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10577 yield the conclusion that Congress
10578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10579 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10580 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10581 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10582 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10583 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10584 term of existing copyrights.
10585 </para>
10586 <para>
10587 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10588 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10589 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10590 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10591 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10592 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10593 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10594 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10595 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10596 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10597 were going to be petty politicians.
10598 </para>
10599 <para>
10600 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10601 argument in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10602 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10603 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10604 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10605 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10606 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10607 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10608 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10609 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10610 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10611 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10612 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10613 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10614 piracy that affects us all.
10615 </para>
10616 <para>
10617 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10618
10619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10620 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10621 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10622 <!-- f9. -->
10623 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10624 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10625 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10626 </para></footnote>
10627 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10628 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10629 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10630 charter.
10631 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10632 </para>
10633 <para>
10634 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10635 copyright
10636 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10637 influence
10638 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10639 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10640 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10641 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10642 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10643 bought to extend them again.
10644 </para>
10645 <para>
10646 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10647 extended.
10648 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10649 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10650 society
10651 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10652 Disney's.
10653 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10654 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10655 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10656 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10657 exploited,
10658 and no longer available as a result.
10659 </para>
10660 <para>
10661 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10662 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10663 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10664 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10665 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10666 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10667 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10668 Congressional
10669 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10670 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10671 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10672 </para></footnote>
10673
10674 </para>
10675 <para>
10676 Think practically about the consequence of this
10677 extension&mdash;practically,
10678 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10679
10680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10681 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10682 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10683 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10684 remaining
10685 9,873. What would you have to do?
10686 </para>
10687 <para>
10688 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10689 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10690 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10691 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10692 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10693 list of books still under copyright.
10694 </para>
10695 <para>
10696 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10697 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10698 </para>
10699 <para>
10700 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10701 owners
10702 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10703 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10704 being at least a list?
10705 </para>
10706 <para>
10707 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10708 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10709 practically
10710 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10711 thousands
10712 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10713 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10714 </para>
10715 <para>
10716 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10717 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10718 copyright owners?"
10719 </para>
10720 <para>
10721 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10722 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10723 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10724 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10725 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10726 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10727 what tangible property.
10728 </para>
10729 <para>
10730 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10731 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10732 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10733
10734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10735 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10736 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10737 happen
10738 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10739 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10740 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10741 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10742 know quite well who owns what property.
10743 </para>
10744 <para>
10745 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10746 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10747 already
10748 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10749 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10750 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10751 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10752 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10753 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10754 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10755 </para>
10756 <para>
10757 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10758 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10759 consequence
10760 for other creative works is much more dire.
10761 </para>
10762 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10763 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
10764 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films</primary></indexterm>
10765 <para>
10766 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10767 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10768 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10769 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
10770 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10771 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10772 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10773 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10774 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10775 films."<footnote><para>
10776 <!-- f11. -->
10777 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10778 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10779 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10780 Down Copyright Extension," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
10781 </para></footnote>
10782
10783 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
10784 </para>
10785 <para>
10786 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10787 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10788 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10789 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10790 </para>
10791 <para>
10792 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10793
10794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10795 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10796 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10797 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10798 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10799 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10800 work available for distribution.
10801 </para>
10802 <para>
10803 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10804 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10805 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10806 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10807 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10808 mm film.<footnote><para>
10809 <!-- f12. -->
10810 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10811 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
10812 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10813 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10814 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
10815 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10816 </para></footnote>
10817
10818 </para>
10819 <para>
10820 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10821 important.
10822 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10823 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10824 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10825 locate the copyright owner.
10826 </para>
10827 <para>
10828 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10829 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10830 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10831 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10832 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10833 to these films is exceptionally high.
10834 </para>
10835 <para>
10836 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10837 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10838 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10839 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10840 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10841 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10842 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10843 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10844 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10845 </para>
10846 <para>
10847 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10848
10849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10850 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10851 benefit
10852 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10853 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10854 the copyright expires.
10855 </para>
10856 <para>
10857 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10858 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10859 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10860 canisters
10861 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10862 than dust.
10863 </para>
10864 <para>
10865 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10866 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10867 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10868 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10869 creative
10870 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10871 free expression."
10872 </para>
10873 <para>
10874 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10875 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10876 indicated,
10877 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10878 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10879 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10880 distributors,
10881 the commercial life ends.
10882 </para>
10883 <para>
10884 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10885 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10886 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10887 between
10888 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10889 Friday
10890 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10891 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10892 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10893 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10894 have, we need to have access to this history.
10895 </para>
10896 <para>
10897 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10898
10899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10900 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10901 this context do no good.
10902 </para>
10903 <para>
10904 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10905 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10906 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10907 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10908 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10909 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10910 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10911 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10912 was independent of copyright law.
10913 </para>
10914 <para>
10915 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10916 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10917 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10918 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10919 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10920 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10921 market didn't have more to offer.
10922 </para>
10923 <para>
10924 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10925 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10926 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10927 would not have interfered with anything.
10928 </para>
10929 <para>
10930 But this situation has now changed.
10931 </para>
10932 <para>
10933 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10934 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10935 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10936 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10937 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10938 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10939 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10940 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10941 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10942 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10943 </para>
10944 <para>
10945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10946 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10947 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10948 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10949 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10950 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10951 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10952 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10953 written for a radically different context.
10954 </para>
10955 <para>
10956 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10957 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10958 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10959 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
10960 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
10961 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
10962 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
10963 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
10964 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
10965 </para>
10966 <para>
10967 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10968 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10969 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10970 culture widely?"
10971 </para>
10972 <para>
10973 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10974 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10975 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10976 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10977 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10978 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10979 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10980 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10981 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10982 </para>
10983 <para>
10984 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10985 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10986 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10987 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10988
10989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10990 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10991 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10992 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10993 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10994 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10995 <!-- f13. -->
10996 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10997 December 2002, available at
10998 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10999 </para></footnote>
11000
11001 </para>
11002 <para>
11003 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11004 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11005 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11006 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11007 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11008 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11009 </para>
11010 <para>
11011 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11012 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11013 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11014 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11015 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11016 </para>
11017 <para>
11018 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11019 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11020 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11021 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11022 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11023 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11024 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11025 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11026 power to extend existing terms.
11027 </para>
11028 <para>
11029 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11030 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11031 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11032 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11033 </para>
11034 <para>
11035 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11036 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11037
11038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11039 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11040 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11041 overstepped its bounds.
11042 </para>
11043 <para>
11044 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11045 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11046 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11047 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11048 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11049 </para>
11050 <para>
11051 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11052 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11053 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11054 briefs and preparing for argument.
11055 </para>
11056 <para>
11057 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11058 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11059 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11060 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11061 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11062 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11063 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11064 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11065 </para>
11066 <para>
11067 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11068 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11069 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11070 mistake lost it.
11071 </para>
11072 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11073 <para>
11074 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11075 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11076 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11077 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11078 heat
11079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11080 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11081 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11082 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11083 </para>
11084 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11085 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11086 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11087 <para>
11088 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11089 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11090 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11091 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11092 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11093 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11094 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11095 most powerful media companies in the world."
11096 </para>
11097 <para>
11098 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11099 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11100 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11101 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11102 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11103 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11104 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11105 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11106 interpretation
11107 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11108 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11109 unconstitutional,
11110 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11111 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11112 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11113 Constitution,
11114 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11115 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11116 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11117 </para>
11118 <para>
11119 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11120 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11121 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11122 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11123 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11124 why it was unconstitutional.
11125 </para>
11126 <para>
11127 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11128
11129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11130 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11131 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11132 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11133 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11134 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11135 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11136 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11137 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11138 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11139 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11140 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11141 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11142 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11143 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11144 </para>
11145 <para>
11146 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11147 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11148 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11149 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11150 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11151 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11152 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11153 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11154 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11155 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11156 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11157 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11158 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11159 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11160 </para>
11161 <para>
11162 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11163 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11164 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11165 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11166 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11167 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11168 </para>
11169 <para>
11170 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11171 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11172
11173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11174 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11175 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11176 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11177 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11178 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11179 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11180 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11181 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11182 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
11183 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11184 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11185 </para>
11186 <para>
11187 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11188 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11189 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11190 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11191 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11192 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11193 </para>
11194 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
11195 <para>
11196 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11197 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11198 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11199 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11200 clear.
11201 </para>
11202 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11203 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11204 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11205 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11206 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11207 <para>
11208 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11209 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11210 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11211 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11212 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11213 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11214 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11215 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11216 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11217 </para>
11218 <para>
11219 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11220 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11221 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11222 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11223 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11224 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11225 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11226 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11227
11228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11229 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11230 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11231 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11232 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan</primary></indexterm>
11233 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen</primary></indexterm>
11234 </para>
11235 <para>
11236 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11237 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11238 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11239 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11240 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11241 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11242 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11243 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11244 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11245 confidence in our argument.
11246 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11247 </para>
11248 <para>
11249 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11250 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11251 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11252 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11253 copyright holders.
11254 </para>
11255 <para>
11256 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11257 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11258 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11259 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11260 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11261 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11262 wanted to control.
11263 </para>
11264 <para>
11265 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11266 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11267 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11268 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11269 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11270 pornography."<footnote><para>
11271 <!-- f14. -->
11272 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11273 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11274 </para></footnote>
11275 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11276 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11277 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11278 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11279 <!-- f15. -->
11280 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11281 Mouse Joins the Fray," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11282 </para></footnote>
11283 That's
11284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11285 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11286 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11287 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11288 </para>
11289 <para>
11290 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11291 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11292 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11293 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11294 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11295 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11296 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11297 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11298 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11299 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11300 </para>
11301 <para>
11302 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11303 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11304 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11305 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11306 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11307 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11308 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11309 </para>
11310 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
11311 <para>
11312 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11313 called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The
11314 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11315 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11316 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11317 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line
11318 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11319 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11320 </para>
11321 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11322 <para>
11323 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11324 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11325 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11326 the Constitution
11327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11328 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11329 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11330 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11331 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11332 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11333 </para>
11334 <para>
11335 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11336 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11337 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11338 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11339 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11340 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11341 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11342 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11343 sense.
11344 </para>
11345 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11346 <para>
11347 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11348 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11349 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11350 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11351 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11352 these retrospective extensions.
11353 </para>
11354 <para>
11355 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11356 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11357 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11358 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11359 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11360 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11361 </para>
11362 <para>
11363 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to
11364 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11365 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11366 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11367 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the
11368 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11369 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11370 powers have limits.
11371 </para>
11372 <para>
11373 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11374 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11375 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11377 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11378 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11379 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11380 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11381 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with
11382 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11383 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11384 be limited.
11385 </para>
11386 <para>
11387 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11388 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11389 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11390 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11391 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11392 </para>
11393 <para>
11394 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11395 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11396 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11397 existing
11398 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11399 </para>
11400 <para>
11401 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11402 extended
11403 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11404 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11405 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11406 existing
11407 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11408 restraint
11409 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11410 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11411 hesitated
11412 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11413 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11414 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11415 arrived
11416 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11417 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11418
11419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11420 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11421 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11422 </para>
11423 <para>
11424 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11425 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11426 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11427 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11428 Congress
11429 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11430 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11431 this central idea.
11432 </para>
11433 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11434 <para>
11435 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11436 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11437 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11438 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11439 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11440 </para>
11441 <para>
11442 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11443 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11444 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11445 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11446 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11447 </para>
11448 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11449 <para>
11450 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11451 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11452 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11453 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11454 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11455 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11456 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11457 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11458 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11459 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11460 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11461
11462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11463 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11464 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11465 </para>
11466 <para>
11467 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11468 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11469 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11470 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11471 congressmen
11472 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11473 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11474 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11475 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11476 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11477 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11478 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11479 family of the Justices.
11480 </para>
11481 <para>
11482 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11483 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11484 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11485 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11486 </para>
11487 <para>
11488 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11489 The history was bothering her.
11490 </para>
11491 <blockquote>
11492 <para>
11493 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11494 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11495 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11496 practice that began with the very first act.
11497 </para>
11498 </blockquote>
11499 <para>
11500 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11501 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11502 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11503 </para>
11504 <blockquote>
11505 <para>
11506 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11507 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11509 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11510 is yes.
11511 </para>
11512 </blockquote>
11513 <para>
11514 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11515 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11516 Kennedy, who observed,
11517 </para>
11518 <blockquote>
11519 <para>
11520 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11521 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11522 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11523 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11524 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11525 </para>
11526 </blockquote>
11527 <para>
11528 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11529 student,
11530 I answered,
11531 </para>
11532 <blockquote>
11533 <para>
11534 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11535 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11536 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11537 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11538 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11539 </para>
11540 </blockquote>
11541 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11542 <para>
11543 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11544 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11545 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11546 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11547 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11548 </para>
11549 <para>
11550 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11551 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11552 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11553 </para>
11554 <para>
11555 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11556 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11557
11558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11559 </para>
11560 <blockquote>
11561 <para>
11562 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11563 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11564 </para>
11565 <para>
11566 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11567 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11568 domain
11569 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11570 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11571 into the Copyright Clause.
11572 </para>
11573 </blockquote>
11574 <para>
11575 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11576 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11577 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11578 </para>
11579 <blockquote>
11580 <para>
11581 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11582 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11583 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11584 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11585 time.
11586 </para>
11587 </blockquote>
11588 <para>
11589 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11590 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11591 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11592 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11593 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11594 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11595 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11596 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11597 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11598 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11599 Court to my side.
11600 </para>
11601 <para>
11602 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11603 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11604
11605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11606 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11607 optimistic.
11608 </para>
11609 <para>
11610 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11611 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11612 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11613 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11614 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11615 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11616 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11617 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11618 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11619 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11620 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11621 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11622 law that it had established elsewhere.
11623 </para>
11624 <para>
11625 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11626 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11627 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11628 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11629 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11630 </para>
11631 <para>
11632 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11633 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11634 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11635 </para>
11636 <para>
11637 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11638 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11639 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11640 reasoning.
11641 </para>
11642 <para>
11643 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11644 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11645 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11646 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11647 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11648 </para>
11649 <para>
11650
11651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11652 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11653 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11654 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11655 </para>
11656 <para>
11657 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11658 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11659 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11660 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11661 </para>
11662 <para>
11663 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11664 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11665 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11666 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11667 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11668 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11669 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11670 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11671 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11672 </para>
11673 <para>
11674 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11675 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11676 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11677 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11678 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11679 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11680 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11681 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11682 the system we have.
11683 </para>
11684 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11685 <para>
11686 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11687 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11688 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11689 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11690 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11691 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11692 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11693 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11694 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11695 </para>
11696 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11697 <para>
11698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11699 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11700 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11701 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11702 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11703 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11704 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11705 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11706 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11707 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11708 </para>
11709 <para>
11710 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11711 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11712 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11713 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11714 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11715 </para>
11716 <para>
11717 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11718 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11719 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11720 </para>
11721 <para>
11722 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11723 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
11724 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11725 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11726 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11727 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11728 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11729 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11730 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11731 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11732 "originalism" now?
11733 </para>
11734 <para>
11735 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11736 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11737 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11738 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11739
11740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11741 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11742 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11743 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11744 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11745 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11746 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11747 own principles.
11748 </para>
11749 <para>
11750 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11751 myself.
11752 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11753 the law as it is.
11754 </para>
11755 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11756 <para>
11757 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11758 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11759 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11760 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11761 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11762 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11763 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11764 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11765 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11766 </para>
11767 <para>
11768 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11769 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11770 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11771 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11772 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11773 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11774 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11775 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11776 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11777 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11778 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11779 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11780 effort to persuade; but I
11781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11782 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11783 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11784 should decide the issue.
11785 </para>
11786 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11787 <para>
11788 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11789 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11790 Kathleen Sullivan?
11791 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11792 </para>
11793 <para>
11794 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11795 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11796 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11797 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11798 </para>
11799 <para>
11800 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11801 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11802 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11803 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11804 have persuaded.
11805 </para>
11806 <para>
11807 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11808 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11809 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11810 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11811 issue should not be raised until it is.
11812 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11813 </para>
11814 <para>
11815 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11816 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11817 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11818 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11819 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11820 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11821 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11822 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11823 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11824 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11825 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11826
11827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11828 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11829 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11830 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11831 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11832 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11833 </para>
11834 <blockquote>
11835 <para>
11836 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11837 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11838 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11839 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11840 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11841 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11842 </para>
11843 </blockquote>
11844 <para>
11845 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11846 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11847 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
11848 (<xref linkend="fig-18"/>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit
11849 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
11850 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11851 </para>
11852 <figure id="fig-18">
11853 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</title>
11854 <graphic fileref="images/18.png"></graphic>
11855 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11856 </figure>
11857 <para>
11858 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11859 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11860 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11861 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11862 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11863 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11864 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11865 </para>
11866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11867 </chapter>
11868 <chapter label="14" id="eldred-ii">
11869 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11870 <para>
11871 The day <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11872 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was
11873 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11874 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11875 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11876 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11877 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11878 </para>
11879 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11880 <para>
11881 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11882 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11883 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11884 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11885 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11886 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11887 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11888 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11889 </para>
11890 <para>
11891 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11892 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11894 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11895 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11896 the work passed into the public domain.
11897 </para>
11898 <para>
11899 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11900 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11901 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11902 </para>
11903 <para>
11904 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11905 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11906 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11907 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11908 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11909 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11910 everything else, let the content go.
11911 </para>
11912 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11913 <para>
11914 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11915 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11916 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11917 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11918 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11919 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11920 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11921 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11922 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11923 the stupid harm of the present system.
11924 </para>
11925 <para>
11926 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11927 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11928 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11929 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11930 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11931 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11932 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11933 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11934 where copyright owners could be identified.
11935 </para>
11936 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11937 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11938 <para>
11939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11940 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
11941 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11942 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11943 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11944 <!-- f1. -->
11945 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11946 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11947 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11948 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11949 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11950 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11951 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11952 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11953 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11954 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11955 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11956 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11957 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11958 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11959 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11960 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
11961 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
11962 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11963 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11964 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11965 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11966 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11967 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11968 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11969 </para>
11970 <para>
11971 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11972 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11973 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11974 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11975 know what's protected and what's not.
11976 </para>
11977 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11978 <para>
11979 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11980 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11981 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11982 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11983 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11984 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11985 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
11986 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
11987 </para>
11988 <para>
11989 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11990 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11991 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11992 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11993 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11994 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11995 </para>
11996 <para>
11997 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11998 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11999 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12000 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12001 burden
12002 imposed upon creators.
12003 </para>
12004 <para>
12005 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12006 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12007
12008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12009 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12010 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12011 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
12012 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12013 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12014 table.
12015 </para>
12016 <para>
12017 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12018 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12019 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12020 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12021 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12022 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12023 spread.
12024 </para>
12025 <para>
12026 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12027 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12028 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12029 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12030 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12031 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12032 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12033 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12034 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12035 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12036 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12037 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12038 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12039 system of protection for property generally.
12040 </para>
12041 <para>
12042 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12043 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12044 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12045 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12046 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12047 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12048 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12049 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12050
12051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12052 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12053 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12054 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
12055 </para>
12056 <para>
12057 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12058 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12059 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12060 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12061 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12062 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12063 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12064 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12065 </para>
12066 <para>
12067 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12068 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12069 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12070 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12071 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12072 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12073 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
12074 </para>
12075 <para>
12076 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12077 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12078 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12079 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12080 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12081 </para>
12082 <para>
12083 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12084 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12085 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12086 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12087 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12088 </para>
12089 <para>
12090 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12091 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12092 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12093 registration?
12094 </para>
12095 <para>
12096 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12097 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12098 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12099
12100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12101 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12102 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12103 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12104 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12105 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12106 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12107 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12108 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12109 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12110 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12111 </para>
12112 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12113 <para>
12114 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12115 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12116 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12117 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12118 </para>
12119 <para>
12120 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12121 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12122 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12123 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12124 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12125 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12126 something good might happen here.
12127 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12128 </para>
12129 <para>
12130 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12131 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12132 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12133 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12134 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12135 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12136 </para>
12137 <para>
12138 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12139 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12140 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12142 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12143 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12144 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12145 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12146 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12147 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12148 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12149 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12150 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12151 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12152 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12153 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12154 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12155 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12156 film is a valid derivative use.
12157 </para>
12158 <para>
12159 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12160 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12161 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12162 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12163 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12164 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12165 </para>
12166 <para>
12167 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12168 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12169 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12170 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12171 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12172 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12173 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12174 threat.
12175 </para>
12176 <para>
12177 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12178 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12179 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12180 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12181 sense?
12182 </para>
12183 <para>
12184
12185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12186 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12187 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12188 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12189 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12190 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12191 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12192 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12193 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12194 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12195 </para>
12196 <para>
12197 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12198 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12199 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12200 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12201 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12202 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12203 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12204 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12205 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin</primary></indexterm>
12206 </para>
12207 <para>
12208 What does this industry really want?
12209 </para>
12210 <para>
12211 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12212 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12213 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12214 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12215 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12216 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12217 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12218 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12219 first.
12220 </para>
12221 <para>
12222 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12223 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12224 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12225 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12226 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12227 theirs</emphasis>.
12228 </para>
12229 <para>
12230 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12231 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12232
12233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12234 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12235 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12236 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12237 and to share its own creation.
12238 </para>
12239 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12240 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12241 <para>
12242 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12243 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12244 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12245 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12246 block the progress of others.
12247 </para>
12248 <para>
12249 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12250 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12251 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12252 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12253 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12254 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12255 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12256 </para>
12257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12258 </chapter>
12259 </part>
12260 <chapter label="15" id="c-conclusion">
12261 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12262 <para>
12263 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12264 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12265 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12266 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12267 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12268 </para>
12269 <para>
12270 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12271 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12272 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12273 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12274 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12275 the disease almost invisible.
12276 </para>
12277 <para>
12278 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12279 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12280 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12281 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12282 population:
12283 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12284 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12285 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12286 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12287 available at
12288 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12289 release
12290 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12291 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12292 </para></footnote>
12293 </para>
12294 <para>
12295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12296 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12297 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12298 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12299 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12300 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12301 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12302 </para>
12303 <para>
12304 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12305 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12306 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12307 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12308 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12309 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12310 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12311 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12312 changes.
12313 </para>
12314 <para>
12315 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12316 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12317 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12318 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12319 costs significantly below the market price.
12320 </para>
12321 <para>
12322 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12323 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12324 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12325 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12326 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12327 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12328 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12329 <para>
12330 <!-- f2. -->
12331 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12332 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12333 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12334 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12335 </para></footnote>
12336 </para>
12337 <para>
12338 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12339 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12340 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa &hellip;
12341 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12342 imports."<footnote><para>
12343 <!-- f3. -->
12344 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12345 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12346 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12347 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12348 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12349 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12350 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12351 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12352 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12353 Love).
12354 </para></footnote>
12355 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12356 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12357 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12358 possible trade sanctions.
12359 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12360 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12361 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12362 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12363 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12364 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12365 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12366 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12367 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12368 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12369 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12370 <!-- f4. -->
12371 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12372 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12373 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12374 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12375 </para>
12376 <para>
12377 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12378 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12379 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12380 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12381 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12382 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12383 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12384 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12385 </para>
12386 <para>
12387 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12388 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12389 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12390 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12391 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12392 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12393 </para>
12394 <para>
12395 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12396 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12397 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12398 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12399 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12400 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12401 by U.S. companies.
12402 </para>
12403 <para>
12404 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12405 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12406 argument
12407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12408 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12409 <!-- f5. -->
12410 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12411 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12412 May 1999, A1, available at
12413 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12414 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12415 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12416 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12417 Medicines," <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12418 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12419 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12420 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12421 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <citetitle>Widener Law
12422 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12424 </para></footnote>
12425 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12426 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12427 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12428 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12429 </para>
12430 <para>
12431 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12432 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12433 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12434 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12435 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12436 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12437 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12438 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12439 </para>
12440 <para>
12441 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12442 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12443 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12444 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12445 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12446 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12447 </para>
12448 <para>
12449 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12450 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12451 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12452 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12453 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12454 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12455 </para>
12456 <para>
12457 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12458 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12459 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12460 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12461 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12462 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12463 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12464 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12466 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12467 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12468 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12469 idea called "intellectual property."
12470 </para>
12471 <para>
12472 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12473 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12474 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12475 What is the argument?
12476 </para>
12477 <para>
12478 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12479 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12480 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12481 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12482 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12483 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12484 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12485 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12486 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12487 were balanced in just this sense.
12488 </para>
12489 <para>
12490 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12491 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12492 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12493 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12494 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12495 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12496 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12497 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12498 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12499 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12500 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12501 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12502 our
12503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12504 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12505 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12506 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12507 this common sense open its eyes.
12508 </para>
12509 <para>
12510 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12511 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12512 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12513 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12514 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12515 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12516 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12517 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12518 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12519 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12520 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12521 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12522 </para>
12523 <para>
12524 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12525 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12526 meeting.<footnote><para>
12527 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12528 August 2003, E1, available at
12529 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12530 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12531 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12532 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12533 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12534 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12535 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12536 </para></footnote>
12537 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12538 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12539 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12540 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12541 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12542 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12543 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12544 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12545 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12546 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12547 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12548 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12549 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12551 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12552 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12553 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12554 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12555 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12556 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12557 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12558 </para>
12559 <para>
12560 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12561 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12562 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12563 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12564 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12565 </para>
12566 <para>
12567 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12568 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12569 meeting.
12570 </para></footnote>
12571 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12572 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12573 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12574 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12575 property issues.
12576 </para>
12577 <para>
12578 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12579 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12580 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12581 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12582 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12583 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12584 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12585 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12586 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12587 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12588 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12589 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12590 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12591 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12592 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12593 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12594 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12595 stuff of
12596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12597 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12598 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12599 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12600 </para>
12601 <para>
12602 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12603 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12604 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12605 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12606 </para>
12607 <para>
12608 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12609 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12610 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12611 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12612 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12613 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12614 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12615 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12616 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12617 </para>
12618 <para>
12619 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12620 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12621 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12622 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12623 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12624 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12625 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12626 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12627 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12628 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12629 <!-- f8. -->
12630 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12631 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12632 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12633 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12634 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12635 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12636 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," <citetitle>Government Policy
12637 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12638 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12639 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12640 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12641 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12642 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12643 May 2001), available at
12644 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12645 </para></footnote>
12646 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12647 <indexterm><primary>"copyleft" licenses</primary></indexterm>
12648 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12649 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12650 </para>
12651 <para>
12652 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12653 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12654 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12655 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12656 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12657 by
12658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12659 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12660 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12661 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12662 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12663 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12664 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12665 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12666 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12667 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12668 </para>
12669 <para>
12670 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12671 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12672 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12673 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12674 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12675 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12676 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12677 <!-- f9. -->
12678 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12679 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12680 </para></footnote>
12681 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12682 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
12683 </para>
12684 <para>
12685 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12686 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12687 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12688 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12689 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12690 its lobbying efforts.
12691 </para>
12692 <para>
12693 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12694 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12695 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12696 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12697 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12698 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12699 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12700 goals of WIPO."
12701 </para>
12702 <para>
12703 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12704 </para>
12705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12706 <para>
12707 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12708 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12709 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12710 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12711 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12712 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12713 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12714 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12715 </para>
12716 <para>
12717 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12718 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12719 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12720 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12721 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12722 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12723 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12724 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12725 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12726 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12727 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12728 </para>
12729 <para>
12730 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12731 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12732 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12733 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12734 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12735 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12736 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
12737 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12738 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12739 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12740 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
12741 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12742 </para>
12743 <para>
12744 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12745 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12746 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12748 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12749 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12750 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12751 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12752 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12753 way possible.
12754 </para>
12755 <para>
12756 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12757 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12758 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12759 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12760 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12761 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12762 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12763 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12764 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12765 that control.
12766 </para>
12767 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12768 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12769 <para>
12770 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12771 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12772 <!-- f10. -->
12773 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
12774 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12775 </para></footnote>
12776 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12777 choice now is whether that information society will be
12778 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
12779 toward the feudal.
12780 </para>
12781 <para>
12782 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12783 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12784 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12785 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12786 </para>
12787 <blockquote>
12788 <para>
12789 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12790 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12791 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12792 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12793 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12794 say anything wrong. But in the world
12795 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12796 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12797 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12798 </para>
12799 </blockquote>
12800 <para>
12801 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12802 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12803 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12804 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12805 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12806 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12807 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12808 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12809 </para>
12810 <para>
12811 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12812 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12813 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12814 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12815 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12816 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12817 </para>
12818 <para>
12819 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12820 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12821 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12822 our own country's history).
12823 </para>
12824 <para>
12825 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12826 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12827 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12828 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12829 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12830 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12831 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12832 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12833 democracy in the world, become?
12834 </para>
12835 <para>
12836 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12837 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12838 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12840 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12841 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12842 </para>
12843 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12844 <para>
12845 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12846 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12847 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12848 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12849 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12850 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12851 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12852 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12853 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12854 hearings and a different result.
12855 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12856 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12857 </para>
12858 <para>
12859 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12860 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12861 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12862 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12863 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12864 concentration in the media.
12865 </para>
12866 <para>
12867 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12868 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12869 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12870 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12871 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12872 </para>
12873 <para>
12874 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12875 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12876 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12877 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12878 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12879 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12880 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12881 </para>
12882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12883 <para>
12884 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12885 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12886 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12887 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12888 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12889 </para>
12890 <para>
12891 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12892 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12893 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12894 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12895 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12896 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12897 </para>
12898 <para>
12899 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12900 of our tragedy.
12901 </para>
12902 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12903 <para>
12904 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12905 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12906 <!-- f11. -->
12907 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12908 2003, available at
12909 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12910 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12911 2003, available at
12912 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12913 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12914 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
12915 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12916 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12917 Defendants," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12918 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
12919 available at
12920 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12921 </para></footnote>
12922 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12923 music.<footnote><para>
12924 <!-- f12. -->
12925 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued &hellip; by a Little Old Lady,"
12926 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12927 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12928 </para></footnote>
12929 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12930 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12931 <!-- f13. -->
12932 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12933 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12934 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12936 </para></footnote>
12937 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12938 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12939 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12940 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12941 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12942 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12943 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12944 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12945 kids who use a computer to share content.
12946 </para>
12947 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12948 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12949 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12950 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12951 <para>
12952 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12953 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12954 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12955 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12956 24 August 2003, available at
12957 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12958 </para></footnote>
12959 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12960 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12961 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12962 country.<footnote><para>
12963 <!-- f15. -->
12964 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12965 available at
12966 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12967 </para></footnote>
12968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12969 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12970 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12971 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12972 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12973 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12974 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12975 day into the Causbys.
12976 </para>
12977 <para>
12978 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12979 potential is ever to be realized.
12980
12981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12982
12983 </para>
12984 </chapter>
12985 <chapter label="16" id="c-afterword">
12986 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12987 <para>
12988
12989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12990 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12991 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12992 maps what might be done.
12993 </para>
12994 <para>
12995 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12996 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12997 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12998 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12999 </para>
13000 <para>
13001 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13002 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13003 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13004 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13005 is so important.
13006 </para>
13007 <para>
13008 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13009 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13010 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13011 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13012 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13013 </para>
13014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13015
13016 <section id="usnow">
13017 <title>US, NOW</title>
13018 <para>
13019 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13020 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13021 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13022 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13023 </para>
13024 <para>
13025 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13026 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13027 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
13028 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
13029 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13030 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13031 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13032 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13033 </para>
13034 <para>
13035 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13036 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13037 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13038 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13039 the
13040
13041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13042 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13043 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13044 unprotected.
13045 </para>
13046 <para>
13047 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13048 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13049 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13050 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13051 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13052 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13053 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13054 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13055 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13056 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13057 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13058 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13059 </para>
13060 <para>
13061 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
13062 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
13063 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13064 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13065 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13066 before.
13067 </para>
13068
13069 <section id="examples">
13070 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13071 <para>
13072 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13073 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13074 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13075 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13076 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13077 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13078 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13079 assured.
13080 </para>
13081 <para>
13082 What made it assured?
13083 </para>
13084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13085 <para>
13086 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13087 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
13088 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13089 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13090 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13091 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13092 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13093 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13094 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13095 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13096 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13097 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13098 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13099 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13100 </para>
13101 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13102 <para>
13103 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13104 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13105 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13106 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13107 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13108 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13109 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13110 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13111 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet</primary></indexterm>
13112 </para>
13113 <para>
13114 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13115 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13116 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13117 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13118 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13119 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13120 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13121 disappears.
13122 </para>
13123 <para>
13124 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13125 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13126 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13127 friction did.<footnote><para>
13128 <!-- f1. -->
13129
13130 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13131 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13132 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13133
13134 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13135 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13136 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13137 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13138 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13139 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13140 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13141
13142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13143 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13144 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13145 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13146 </para>
13147 <para>
13148 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13149 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13150 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13151 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13152 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13153 care much about controlling their software.
13154 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
13155 </para>
13156 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13157 <para>
13158 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13159 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13160 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13161 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13162 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13163 people's work.
13164 </para>
13165 <para>
13166 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13167 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13168 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13169 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13170 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13171 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13172 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13173 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13174 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13175 anything else?
13176 </para>
13177 <para>
13178 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13179 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13180 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13181 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13182 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13183 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13184 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13185 </para>
13186 <para>
13187 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13188 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13190 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13191 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13192 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13193 fundamentally weakened.
13194 </para>
13195 <para>
13196 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13197 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13198 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13199 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13200 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13201 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13202 </para>
13203 <para>
13204 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13205 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13206 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13207 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13208 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13209 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13210 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13211 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13212 byproduct.
13213 </para>
13214 <para>
13215 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13216 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13217 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13218 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13219 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13220 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13221 </para>
13222 <para>
13223 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13224 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13225 scientific journals are produced.
13226 </para>
13227 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13228 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13229 </indexterm>
13230 <para>
13231 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13232 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13233 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13234 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13235 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13236 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13237 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13238 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13239 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13240 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13241 and Westlaw are also free
13242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13243 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13244 Court opinion through their respective services.
13245 </para>
13246 <para>
13247 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13248 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13249 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13250 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13251 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13252 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13253 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13254 </para>
13255 <para>
13256 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13257 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13258 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13259 </para>
13260 <para>
13261 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13262 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13263 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13264 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13265 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13266 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13267 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13268 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13269 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13270 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13271 </para>
13272 <para>
13273 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13274 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13275 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13276 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13277 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13278 granted before.
13279 </para>
13280 <para>
13281 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13282 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13283 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13284 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13286 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13287 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13288 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13289 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13290 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13291 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13292 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13293 </para>
13294 <para>
13295 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13296 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13297 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13298 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13299 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13300 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13301 and science.
13302 </para>
13303 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13304
13305 </section>
13306 <section id="oneidea">
13307 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13308 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13309 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13310 </indexterm>
13311 <para>
13312 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13313 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13314 </para>
13315 <para>
13316 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13317 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13318 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13319 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13320 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13321 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13322 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13323 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13324 make this possible.
13325 </para>
13326 <para>
13327 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13328 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13329 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13330 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13331 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13332 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13333 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13334 human-readable description, and
13335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13336 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13337 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13338 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13339 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13340 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13341 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13342 certain freedoms are given.
13343 </para>
13344 <para>
13345 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13346 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13347 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13348 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13349 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13350 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13351 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13352 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13353 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13354 </para>
13355 <para>
13356 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13357 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13358 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13359 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13360 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13361 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13362 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13363 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13364 a public domain.
13365 </para>
13366 <para>
13367 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13368 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13369 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13370 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13371 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13372 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13374 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13375 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13376 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13377 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13378 </para>
13379 <para>
13380 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13381 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13382 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13383 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13384 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13385 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13386 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13387 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13388 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13389 to begin to build those rules.
13390 </para>
13391 <para>
13392 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13393 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13394 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13395 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13396 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13397 </para>
13398 <para>
13399 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13400 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13401 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13402 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13403 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13404 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13405 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13406 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13407 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13408 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13409 </para>
13410 <para>
13411 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13412 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13413 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13414 was a total success.
13415 </para>
13416 <para>
13417 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13418 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13420 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13421 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13422 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13423 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13424 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13425 well.
13426 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)</primary></indexterm>
13427 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13428 </para>
13429 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy</primary></indexterm>
13430 <para>
13431 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13432 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13433 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13434 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13435 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13436 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13437 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13438 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13439 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13440 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13441 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13442 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13443 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13444 high<footnote><para>
13445 <!-- f2. -->
13446 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13447 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13448 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13449 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13450 </para></footnote>),
13451 these artists release into the creative environment content
13452 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13453 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter</primary></indexterm>
13454 </para>
13455 <para>
13456 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13457 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13458 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13459 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13460 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13461 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13462 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13463 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13464 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13465 say it to others.
13466 </para>
13467 <para>
13468 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13469 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13470 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13471 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13472
13473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13474 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13475 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13476 </para>
13477 <para>
13478 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13479 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13480 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13481 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13482 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13483 steps are possible.
13484 </para>
13485 <para>
13486 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13487 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13488 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13489 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13490 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13491 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13492 creativity to spread more easily.
13493 </para>
13494 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13495
13496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13497 </section>
13498 </section>
13499 <section id="themsoon">
13500 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13501 <para>
13502 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13503 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13504 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13505 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13506 changes that we need.
13507 </para>
13508 <para>
13509 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13510 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13511 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13512 to our end.
13513 </para>
13514
13515 <section id="formalities">
13516 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13517 <para>
13518 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13519 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13520 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13521 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13522 </para>
13523 <para>
13524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13525 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13526 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13527 protected.
13528 </para>
13529 <para>
13530 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13531 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13532 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13533 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13534 </para>
13535 <para>
13536 Why?
13537 </para>
13538 <para>
13539 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13540 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13541 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13542 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13543 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13544 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13545 formalities were getting in the way.
13546 </para>
13547 <para>
13548 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13549 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13550 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13551 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13552 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13553 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13554 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13555 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13556 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13557 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13558 </para>
13559 <para>
13560 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13561 <!-- f1. -->
13562 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13563 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13564 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13565 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13566 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13567 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13568 </para>
13569 <para>
13570 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13571 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13572 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13573 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13574 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13575 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13576 developed by others.
13577 </para>
13578
13579 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13580
13581 <section id="registration">
13582 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13583 <para>
13584 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13585 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13586 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13587 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13588 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13589 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13590 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13591 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13592 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13593 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13594 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13595 </para>
13596 <para>
13597 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13598 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13599 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13600 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13601 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13602 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13603 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13604 </para>
13605 <para>
13606 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13607 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13608 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13609 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13610 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13611 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13612 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13613 with which registration occurs up.
13614 </para>
13615 <para>
13616 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13617 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13618 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13619 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13620 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13621 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13622 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13623 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13624 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13626 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13627 </para>
13628
13629 </section>
13630 <section id="marking">
13631 <title>MARKING</title>
13632 <para>
13633 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13634 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13635 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13636 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13637 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13638 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13639 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13640 uniformly across all media.
13641 </para>
13642 <para>
13643 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13644 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13645 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13646 use the work.
13647 </para>
13648 <para>
13649 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13650 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13651 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13652 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13653 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13654 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13655 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13656 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13657 </para>
13658 <para>
13659 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13660 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13661 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13662 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13663 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13664 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13665 <!-- f2. -->
13666 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13667 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13668 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13669 </para></footnote>
13670 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13671 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13672 stop using the work in any new
13673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13674 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13675 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13676 their work.
13677 </para>
13678 <para>
13679 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13680 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13681 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13682 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13683 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13684 </para>
13685 <para>
13686 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13687 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13688 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13689 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13690 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13691 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13692 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13693 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13694 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13695 other important functions.
13696 </para>
13697 <para>
13698 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13699 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13700 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13701 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13702 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13703 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13704 </para>
13705 <para>
13706 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13707 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13708 make things unclear.
13709 </para>
13710 <para>
13711 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13712 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13713 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13714 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13715 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13716 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13717 </para>
13718
13719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13720 </section>
13721 </section>
13722 <section id="shortterms">
13723 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13724 <para>
13725 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13726 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13727 natural authors.
13728 </para>
13729 <para>
13730 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13731 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13732 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13733 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13734 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13735 copyright term.<footnote><para>
13736
13737 <!-- f3. -->
13738 "A Radical Rethink," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13739 available at
13740 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13741 </para></footnote>
13742 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13743 </para>
13744 <para>
13745 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13746 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13747 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13748 terms.
13749 </para>
13750 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13751 <listitem><para>
13752 <!-- (1) -->
13753 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13754 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13755 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13756 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13757 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13758 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13759 </para></listitem>
13760 <listitem><para>
13761 <!-- (2) -->
13762 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
13763 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13764 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13765 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13766 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13767 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13768 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13769 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13770 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13772 </para></listitem>
13773 <listitem><para>
13774 <!-- (3) -->
13775 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13776 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13777 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13778 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13779 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13780 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13781 pension.<footnote><para>
13782 <!-- f4. -->
13783 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13784 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13785 available at
13786 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13787 </para></footnote>
13788 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13789 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13790 single form.
13791 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
13792 </para></listitem>
13793 <listitem><para>
13794 <!-- (4) -->
13795 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13796 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13797 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13798 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13799 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13800 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
13801 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13802 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13803 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
13804 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13805 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13806 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13807 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13808 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13809 </orderedlist>
13810 <para>
13811 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
13812 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
13813 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13814 same.
13815 </para>
13816 <para>
13817 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13818 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13819 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13820 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13821 </para>
13822
13823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13824
13825 </section>
13826 <section id="freefairuse">
13827 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13828 <para>
13829 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13830 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13831 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13832 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13833 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13834 the emergence of that new technology.
13835 </para>
13836 <para>
13837 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13838 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13839 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13840 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13841 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13842 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13843 though that movie is not "my writing."
13844 </para>
13845 <para>
13846 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13847 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13848 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13849 <!-- f5. -->
13850 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13851 University Press, 1967), 32.
13852 </para></footnote>
13853 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13854 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13855 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13856 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin</primary></indexterm>
13857 </para>
13858 <blockquote>
13859 <para>
13860 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13861 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13862 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13863 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13864 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13865 </para></footnote>
13866 </para>
13867 </blockquote>
13868 <para>
13869 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13870 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13871 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13872 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13873 Consider each limitation in turn.
13874 </para>
13875 <para>
13876 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13877 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13878 sense to protect John
13879
13880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13881 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13882 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13883 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13884 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13885 after the creative work is done.
13886 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13887 </para>
13888 <para>
13889 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13890 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13891 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13892 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13893 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13894 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13895 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13896 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13897 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13898 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13899 the creative process. Smothers it.
13900 </para>
13901 <para>
13902 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13903 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13904 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13905 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13906 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13907 much more sense.
13908 </para>
13909 <para>
13910 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13911 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13912 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13913 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13914 <para>
13915 <!-- f7. -->
13916 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13917 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13918 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13919 </para></footnote>
13920 His view is that the law should be written so that
13921 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13922 </para>
13923 <para>
13924 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13925 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13926 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13927 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13928 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13929 </para>
13930 <para>
13931 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13933 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13934 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13935 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13936 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13937 </para>
13938 </section>
13939
13940 <section id="liberatemusic">
13941 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13942 <para>
13943 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13944 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13945 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13946 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13947 battles around the sharing of music.
13948 </para>
13949 <para>
13950 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13951 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13952 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13953 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13954 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13955 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13956 innovation on the network.
13957 </para>
13958 <para>
13959 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13960 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13961 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13962 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13963 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13964 </para>
13965 <para>
13966 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
13967 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
13968 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
13969 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
13970 four different kinds of sharing:
13971 </para>
13972 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13973 <listitem><para>
13974 <!-- A. -->
13975 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13976 for purchasing CDs.
13977 </para></listitem>
13978 <listitem><para>
13979 <!-- B. -->
13980 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13981 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13982 </para></listitem>
13983 <listitem><para>
13984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13985 <!-- C. -->
13986 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13987 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13988 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13989 </para></listitem>
13990 <listitem><para>
13991 <!-- D. -->
13992 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13993 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13994 owner plainly endorses.
13995 </para></listitem>
13996 </orderedlist>
13997 <para>
13998 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13999 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14000 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14001 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14002 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14003 significantly weakened.
14004 </para>
14005 <para>
14006 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
14007 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14008 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14009 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14010 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14011 networks.
14012 </para>
14013 <para>
14014 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14015 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14016 should respond.
14017 </para>
14018 <para>
14019 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14020 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14021 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14022 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14023 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
14024 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14025 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14026 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14027 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14028 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14029 </para>
14030 <para>
14031 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14032 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14033 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14035 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14036 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14037 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14038 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14039 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14040 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
14041 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
14042 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14043 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14044 </para>
14045 <para>
14046 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14047 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
14048 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14049 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
14050 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14051 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14052 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14053 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14054 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14055 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14056 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14057 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14058 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14059 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14060 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14061 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14062 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14063 <!-- f8. -->
14064 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14065 April 2002, available at
14066 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14067 </para></footnote>
14068
14069 </para>
14070 <para>
14071 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14072 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14073 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14074 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14075 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14076 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14077 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14078 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14079 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14080 artists get paid, during
14081
14082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14083 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14084 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14085 </para>
14086 <para>
14087 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14088 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14089 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14090 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14091 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14092 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14093 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14094 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14095 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14096 </para>
14097 <para>
14098 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14099 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14100 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14101 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14102 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14103 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14104 way that returns something to the artist.
14105 </para>
14106 <para>
14107 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14108 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14109 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14110 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14111 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14112 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14113 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14114 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14115 </para>
14116 <para>
14117 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14118 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14119 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14120 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14121 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14122 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14123 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14124 </para>
14125 <para>
14126
14127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14128 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14129 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14130 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14131 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14132 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14133 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14134 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14135 trade.
14136 </para>
14137 <para>
14138 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14139 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14140 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14141 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14142 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14143 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14144 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14145 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14146 </para>
14147 <para>
14148 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14149 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14150 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14151 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14152 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14153 delivering and accessing content.
14154 </para>
14155 <para>
14156 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14157 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14158 </para>
14159 <para>
14160 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14161 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14162 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14163 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14164 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14165 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14166 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14167 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14168 </para>
14169 <para>
14170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14171 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14172 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14173 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14174 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14175 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14176 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14177 </para>
14178 <para>
14179 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14180 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14181 <para>
14182 <!-- f9. -->
14183 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14184 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14185 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14186 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14187 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14188 2004), ch. 6, available at
14189 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14190 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14191 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14192 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14193 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14194 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14195 Broadband?" <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14196 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14197 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14198 available at
14199 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14200 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14201 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14202 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14203 2002, available at
14204 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14205 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14206 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14207 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14208 2002, available at
14209 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14210 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14211 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14212 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14213 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14214 debate by about a decade. See
14215 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14216 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14217 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14218 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14219 </para></footnote>
14220 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14221 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14222 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14223 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14224 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14225 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14226 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14227 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14228 tax.
14229 </para>
14230 <para>
14231 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14232 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14233 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14234 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14235 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14236 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14237 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14238 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14239 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14240 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14241 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14242 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14243 controlling access.
14244 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14245 </para>
14246 <para>
14247 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14248 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14249 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14250 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14251 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14252 limits on derivative
14253
14254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14255 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14256 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14257 allowed to do with the content itself.
14258 </para>
14259 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
14260 <para>
14261 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14262 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14263 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14264 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14265 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14266 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14267 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14268 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14269 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14270 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14271 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14272 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14273 on-line.
14274 </para>
14275 <para>
14276 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14277 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14278 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14279 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14280 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14281 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14282 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14283 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14284 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14285 finding ways to compete with "free."
14286 </para>
14287 <para>
14288 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14289 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14290 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14291 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14292 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14293 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14294 the law.
14295 </para>
14296 <para>
14297 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14298 </para>
14299 <para>
14300
14301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14302 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14303 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14304 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14305 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14306 create.
14307 </para>
14308 <para>
14309 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14310 by
14311 </para>
14312 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14313 <listitem><para>
14314 <!-- 1. -->
14315 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14316 </para></listitem>
14317 <listitem><para>
14318 <!-- 2. -->
14319 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14320 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14321 statute;
14322 </para></listitem>
14323 <listitem><para>
14324 <!-- 3. -->
14325 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14326 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14327 </para></listitem>
14328 </orderedlist>
14329 <para>
14330 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14331 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14332 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14333 something then?
14334 </para>
14335 <para>
14336 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14337 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14338 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14339 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14340 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14341 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14342 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14343 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14344 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14345 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14346 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14347 pirates.
14348 </para>
14349 <para>
14350 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14351 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14352 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14353
14354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14355 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14356 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14357 </para>
14358 </section>
14359
14360 <section id="firelawyers">
14361 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14362 <para>
14363 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14364 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14365 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14366 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14367 </para>
14368 <para>
14369 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14370 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14371 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14372 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14373 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14374 strong view queers the law.
14375 </para>
14376 <para>
14377 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14378 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14379 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14380 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14381 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14382 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14383 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14384 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14385 <!-- f10. -->
14386 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14387 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14388 </para></footnote>
14389
14390 </para>
14391 <para>
14392 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14393 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14394 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14395 </para>
14396 <para>
14397 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14398 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14399 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14400 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14401 <!-- f11. -->
14402 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14403 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14404 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14405 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14406 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14407 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14408 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14409 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14410 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14411 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14412 available at
14413 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14414 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14415 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14416 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14417 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14418 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14419 </para></footnote>
14420 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14421 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14422 them it works.
14423 </para>
14424 <para>
14425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14426 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14427 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14428 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14429 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14430 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14431 practically never be done.
14432 </para>
14433 <para>
14434 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14435 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14436 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14437 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14438 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14439 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14440 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14441 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14442 </para>
14443 <para>
14444 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14445 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14446 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14447 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14448 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14449 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14450 </para>
14451 <para>
14452 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14453 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14454 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14455 its review.
14456 </para>
14457 <para>
14458 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14459 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14460 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14461 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14462 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14463 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14464 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14465 </para>
14466 <para>
14467 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14468 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14469
14470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14471 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14472 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14473 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14474 </para>
14475 <para>
14476 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14477 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14478 keep your lawyers away.
14479 </para>
14480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14481 </section>
14482 </section>
14483 </chapter>
14484 <chapter label="17" id="c-notes">
14485 <title>NOTES</title>
14486 <para>
14487 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14488 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14489 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14490 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14491 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14492 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14493 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14494 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14495 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14496 the material.
14497 </para>
14498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14499
14500 </chapter>
14501 <chapter label="18" id="c-acknowledgments">
14502 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14503 <para>
14504 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14505 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14506 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14507 to him that this book is dedicated.
14508 </para>
14509 <para>
14510 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14511 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14512 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14513 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14514 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14515 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14516 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14517 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14518 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14519 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14520 critical eye on much of this.
14521 </para>
14522 <para>
14523 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14524 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14525 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14526 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14528 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14529 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14530 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14531 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14532 </para>
14533 <para>
14534 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14535 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14536 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14537 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14538 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14539 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14540 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14541 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14542 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14543 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14544 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14545 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14546 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14547 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14548 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14549 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14550 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14551 a bunch of great replies.)
14552 </para>
14553 <para>
14554 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14555 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14556 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14557 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14558 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14559 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14560 throughout this book.
14561 </para>
14562 <para>
14563 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14564 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14565 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14566 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14567 </para>
14568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14569
14570 </chapter>
14571 <index></index>
14572 </book>