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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 <sbr/>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
104 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
105 LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
106 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
107 CREATIVITY
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 <sbr/>LAWRENCE LESSIG
110 </para>
111
112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
113 <para>
114 THE PENGUIN PRESS
115 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
116 York, New York
117 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
118 <sbr/>All rights reserved
119 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
120 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
121 Reprinted with permission.
122 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
123 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
124 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
125 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
126 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
127 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
128 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
129 <sbr/>p. cm.
130 <sbr/>Includes index.
131 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
132 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
133 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
134 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
135 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
136 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
137 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
138 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
139 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
140 </para>
141
142 <para>
143 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
144 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
145 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
146 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
147 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
148 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
149 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
150 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
151 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
152 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
153 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
154 </para>
155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
156
157 <para>
158 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
159 it continues still.
160 </para>
161
162 <para>&translationblock;</para>
163
164 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
165 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
166 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
167 </figure>
168
169 <toc id="toc"></toc>
170
171 <lot>
172 <title>List of figures</title>
173 </lot>
174
175 <!--
176 c PREFACE xiii
177 c INTRODUCTION
178 c "PIRACY"
179 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
180 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
181 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
182 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
183 2 Film
184 2 Recorded Music
185 2 Radio
186 2 Cable TV
187 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
188 2 Piracy I
189 2 Piracy II
190 c "PROPERTY"
191 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
192 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
193 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
194 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
195 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
196 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
197 2 Beginnings
198 2 Law: Duration
199 2 Law: Scope
200 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
201 2 Architecture and Law: Force
202 2 Market: Concentration
203 2 Together
204 c PUZZLES
205 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
206 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
207 2 Constraining Creators
208 2 Constraining Innovators
209 2 Corrupting Citizens
210 c BALANCES
211 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
212 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
213 c CONCLUSION
214 c AFTERWORD
215 1 Us, Now
216 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
217 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
218 1 Them, Soon
219 2 1. More Formalities
220 3 Registration and Renewal
221 3 Marking
222 2 2. Shorter Terms
223 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
224 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
225 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
226 c NOTES
227 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
228 c INDEX
229 -->
230
231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
232
233 </chapter>
234 <chapter id="c-preface">
235 <title>PREFACE</title>
236 <para>
237 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
238 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
239 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
240 </para>
241 <blockquote>
242 <para>
243 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
244 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
245 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
246 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
247 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
248 </para></footnote>
249 </para>
250 </blockquote>
251 <para>
252 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
253 software,
254 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
255 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
256 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
257 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
258 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
259 </para>
260 <para>
261 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
262 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
263 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
265 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
266 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
267 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
268 </para>
269 <para>
270 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
271 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
272 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
273 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
274 </para>
275 <para>
276 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
277 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
278 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
279 freesoftware movement<footnote>
280 <para>
281 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 ( Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
282 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
283 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
284 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
285 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
286 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
287 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
288 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
289 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
290 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
291 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
292 or of creators from the past.
293 </para>
294 <para>
295 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
296 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
297 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
298 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
299 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
300 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
301 culture deem fundamental.
302 </para>
303 <para>
304 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
305 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
306 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
307 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
308 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
309 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
310 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
311 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
312 he asked,
313 </para>
314 <blockquote>
315 <para>
316 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
317 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
318 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
319 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
320 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
321 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
322 </para></footnote>
323 </para>
324 </blockquote>
325 <para>
326 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
327 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
328 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
329 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
330 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
331 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
332 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
333 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
334 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
335 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
336 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
337 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
338 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
339 that this work is "merely" derivative.
340 </para>
341 <para>
342 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
343 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
344 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
345 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
346 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
347 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
348 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
349 future
350 if we change the path we are on right now.
351 xv
352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
353 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
354 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
355 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
356 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
357 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
358 what I advance here.
359 </para>
360 <para>
361 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
362 between
363 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
364 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
365 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
366 property
367 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
368 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
369 culture
370 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
371 </para>
372
373 </chapter>
374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
375
376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
377 <chapter id="c-introduction">
378 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
379 <para>
380 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
381 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
382 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
383 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
384 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
385 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
386 </para>
387 <para>
388 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
389 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
390 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
391 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
392 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
393 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
394 </para></footnote>
395 For many
396 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
397 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
398 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
399 </para>
400 <para>
401 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
402 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
403 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
404 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
405 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
406 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
407 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
408 </para>
409 <para>
410 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
411 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
412 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
413 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
414 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
415 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
416 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
417 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
418 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
419 </para>
420 <para>
421 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
422 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
423 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
424 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
425 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
426 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
427 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
428 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
429 </para>
430 <blockquote>
431 <para>
432 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
433 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
434 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
435 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
436 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
437 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
438 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
439 the public has a just claim.<footnote><para>
440 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find that
441 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
442 destroyed
443 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
444 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
445 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
446 Review
447 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
448 (Mineola,
449 N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984), 1112&ndash;13.
450 </para></footnote>
451 </para>
452 </blockquote>
453 <para>
454 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
455 </para>
456 <para>
457 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
458 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
459 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
461 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
462 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
463 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
464 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
465 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
466 </para>
467 <para>
468 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
469 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
470 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
471 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
472 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
473 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
474 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
475 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
476 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
477 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
478 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
479 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
480 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
481 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
482 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
483 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
484 </para>
485 <para>
486 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
487 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
488 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
489 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
490 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
491 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
492 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
493 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
494 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
495 understanding of radio.
496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
497 </para>
498 <para>
499 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
500 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
501 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
502 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
503 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
504 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
505 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
506 much less transmitter power and static.
507 </para>
508 <para>
509 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
510 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
511 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
512 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
513 seventeen
514 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
515 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
516 device,
517 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
518 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
519 modulation
520 at two and a half meters."
521 </para>
522 <para>
523 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
524 </para>
525 <blockquote>
526 <para>
527 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
528 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
529 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
530 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
531 piano
532 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
533 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
534 "music box."<footnote><para>
535 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
536 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
537 </para></footnote>
538 </para>
539 </blockquote>
540 <para>
541 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
542 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
543 Armstrong
544 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
545 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
546 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
547 owned by a handful of networks.
548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
549 </para>
550 <para>
551 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
552 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
553 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
554 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
555 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
556 </para>
557 <blockquote>
558 <para>
559 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
560 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
561 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
562 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
563 Electronic
564 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
565
566 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
567 </para></footnote>
568 </para>
569 </blockquote>
570 <para>
571 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
572 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
573 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
574 described,
575 </para>
576 <blockquote>
577 <para>
578 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
579 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
580 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
581 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
582 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
583 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
584 </para></footnote>
585 </para>
586 </blockquote>
587 <para>
588 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
589 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
590 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
591 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
592 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
593 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
594 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
595 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
596 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
597 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
598 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
599 </para>
600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
601 <blockquote>
602 <para>
603 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
604 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
605 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
606 deviousness.<footnote><para>
607 Lessing, 256.
608 </para></footnote>
609 </para>
610 </blockquote>
611 <para>
612 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
613 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
614 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
615 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
616 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
617 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
618 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
619 least temporarily.
620 </para>
621 <para>
622 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
623 Armstrong's
624 patents. After incorporating FM technology into the emerging
625 standard for television, RCA declared the patents invalid&mdash;baselessly,
626 and almost fifteen years after they were issued. It thus refused to pay
627 him royalties. For six years, Armstrong fought an expensive war of
628 litigation
629 to defend the patents. Finally, just as the patents expired, RCA
630 offered a settlement so low that it would not even cover Armstrong's
631 lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and now broke, in 1954 Armstrong
632 wrote a short note to his wife and then stepped out of a
633 thirteenth-story
634 window to his death.
635 </para>
636 <para>
637 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
638 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From the
639 beginning, government and government agencies have been subject
640 to capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
641 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful interest
642 too often exerts its influence within the government to get the
643 government
644 to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of course always
645 public spirited; the reality is something different. Ideas that were as
646 solid as rock in one age, but that, left to themselves, would crumble in
647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
648 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
649 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
650 effect
651 of technological change.
652 </para>
653 <para>
654 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
655 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
656 Internet
657 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
658 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
659 access
660 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
661 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
662 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
663 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
664 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
665 </para></footnote>
666 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
667 of 2004.
668 </para>
669 <para>
670 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
671 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
672 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
673 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
674 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
675 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
676 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
677 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
678 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
679 </para>
680 <para>
681 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
682 Internet
683 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
684 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
685 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
686 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
687 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
688 </para>
689 <para>
690 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
691 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
692 regulation
693 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
694 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
695 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
697 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
698 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
699 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
700 </para>
701 <para>
702 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
703 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
704 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
705 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
706 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
707 culture
708 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
709 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
710 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
711 left alone by the law.
712 </para>
713 <para>
714 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
715 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
716 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
717 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
718 marketplace.<footnote><para>
719 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
720 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
721 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
722 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
723 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
724 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
725 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
726 198&ndash;200.
727 </para></footnote>
728 This is also, of
729 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
730 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
731 dominant
732 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
733 part, balanced with the free.
734 </para>
735 <para>
736 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
737 been erased.<footnote><para>
738 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
739 2001), ch. 13.
740 </para></footnote>
741 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
742 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
743 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
744 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
745 expanded
746 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
747 creativity
748 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
749 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
750 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
751 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
752 more a permission culture.
753 </para>
754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
755 <para>
756 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
757 creativity.
758 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
759 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
760 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
761 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
762 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
763 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
764 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
765 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
766 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
767 </para>
768 <para>
769 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
770 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
771 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
772 marketplace
773 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
774 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
775 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
776 century
777 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
778 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
779 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
780 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
781 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
782 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
783 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
784 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
785 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
786 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
787 </para>
788 <para>
789 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
790 happening
791 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
792 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
793 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
794 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
795 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
796 </para>
797 <para>
798 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
800 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
801 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
802 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
803 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
804 Motion
805 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
806 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
807 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
808 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
809 Times, 17 January 2002.
810 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
811 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
812 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
813 against it.
814 </para>
815 <para>
816 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
817 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
818 especially
819 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
820 property."
821 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
822 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
823 </para>
824 <para>
825 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
826 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
827 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
828 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
829 </para>
830 <para>
831 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
832 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
833 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
834 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
835 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote><para>
836 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
837 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
838 </para></footnote>
839 copyright law,
840 properly
841 balanced, protected creators against private control. Our tradition
842 was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of patrons. It instead carved out
843 a wide berth within which creators could cultivate and extend our culture.
844 </para>
845 <para>
846 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
847 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective
848 regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or critique the
849 culture
850 around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like, for permission first.
851 Permission is, of course, often granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to
852 the critical or the independent. We have built a kind of cultural
853 nobility;
854 those within the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it
855 is nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
856 </para>
857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
858 <para>
859 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
860 "centrality
861 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
862 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
863 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
864 morality
865 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
866 </para>
867 <para>
868 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
869 inspired
870 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
871 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
872 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
873 technologies
874 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
875 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
876 understand
877 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
878 </para>
879 <para>
880 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
881 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
882 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
883 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
884 sacredness
885 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
886 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
887 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
888 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
889 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
890 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
891 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
892 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
893 </para>
894 <para>
895 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
896 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
897 Common
898 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
899 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
901 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
902 on its side.
903 </para>
904 <para>
905 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
906 increasingly
907 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
908 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
909 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
910 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
911 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
912 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
913 </para>
914 <para>
915 The puzzle is, Why?
916 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
917 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
918 because
919 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
920 absolute
921 claim was wrong?
922 </para>
923 <para>
924 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
925 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
926 </para>
927 <para>
928 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
929 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
930 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
931 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
932 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
933 </para>
934 <para>
935 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
936 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
937 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
938 Armstrong
939 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
940 more powerful view?
941 </para>
942 <para>
943 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
944 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
945 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
946 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
947 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
948 arresting
949 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
950 be much more profound.
951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
952 </para>
953 <para>
954 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
955 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
956 ideas.
957 </para>
958 <para>
959 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
960 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
961 obscure
962 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
963 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
964 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
965 can be more fully understood.
966 </para>
967 <para>
968 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
969 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
970 government,
971 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
972 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
973 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
974 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
975 threatened
976 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
977 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
978 who we have always been.
979 </para>
980 <para>
981 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
982 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
983 interests
984 most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
985 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the
986 story of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a
987 consequence
988 to which most of us remain oblivious.
989 </para>
990 </chapter>
991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
992 <chapter id="c-piracy">
993 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
994
995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
996 <para>
997 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
998 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
999 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1000 capture.
1001 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1002 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1003 </para>
1004 <blockquote>
1005 <para>
1006 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1007 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1008 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1009 <!-- f1 -->
1010 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1011 </para></footnote>
1012 </para>
1013 </blockquote>
1014 <para>
1015 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1016 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1017 efficient
1018 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1019 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1020 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1021 content
1022 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1024 </para>
1025 <para>
1026 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1027 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1028 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1029 sharing
1030 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1031 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1032 </para>
1033 <para>
1034 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1035 increasingly
1036 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1037 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1038 believe
1039 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1040 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1041 </para>
1042 <para>
1043 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1044 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1045 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1046 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1047 </para>
1048 <para>
1049 The idea goes something like this:
1050 </para>
1051 <blockquote>
1052 <para>
1053 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1054 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1055 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1056 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1057 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1058 piracy.
1059 </para>
1060 </blockquote>
1061 <para>
1062 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1063 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1064 theory
1065 of creative property<footnote><para>
1066 <!-- f2 -->
1067 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1068 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1069 </para></footnote>
1070 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1071 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1072 organization,
1073 ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1074 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1075 <!-- f3 -->
1076 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1077 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1078 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1079 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1080 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1081 </para></footnote>
1082 There was "value"
1083 (the songs) so there must have been a "right"&mdash;even against the Girl
1084 Scouts.
1085 </para>
1086 <para>
1087 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1088 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1090 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1091 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1092 property.
1093 It has never taken hold within our law.
1094 </para>
1095 <para>
1096 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1097 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1098 subservient
1099 to the value of creativity. The current debate has this turned
1100 around. We have become so concerned with protecting the instrument
1101 that we are losing sight of the value.
1102 </para>
1103 <para>
1104 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1105 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1106 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1107 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1108 copyright law today regulates both.
1109 </para>
1110 <para>
1111 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't
1112 matter
1113 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1114 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1115 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1116 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1117 more expense of doing business.
1118 </para>
1119 <para>
1120 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1121 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1122 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1123 expansion
1124 would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1125 "copying,"
1126 when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does, the
1127 extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly outweighs
1128 any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects noncommercial creativity,
1129 and increasingly as it affects commercial creativity as well. Thus, as
1130 we'll see more clearly in the chapters below, the law's role is less and
1131 less to support creativity, and more and more to protect certain
1132 industries
1133 against competition. Just at the time digital technology could
1134 unleash an extraordinary range of commercial and noncommercial
1135 creativity, the law burdens this creativity with insanely complex and
1136 vague rules and with the threat of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1138 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote><para>
1139 <!-- f4 -->
1140 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002), Richard
1141 Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a labor of
1142 creativity.
1143 His work, however, doesn't directly address the legal conditions under
1144 which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about
1145 the importance and significance of this change, but I also believe the
1146 conditions
1147 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1148 </para></footnote>
1149 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1150 this creative class.
1151 </para>
1152 <para>
1153 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1154 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1155 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1156 </para>
1157
1158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1159 <sect1 id="creators">
1160 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1161 <para>
1162 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1163 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1164 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1165 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1166 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1167 </para>
1168 <para>
1169 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in
1170 the movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1171 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it
1172 would work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But
1173 when Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were
1174 unambiguous.
1175 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1176 </para>
1177 <blockquote>
1178 <para>
1179 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1180 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1181 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1182 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1183 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1184 </para>
1185 <para>
1186 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After
1187 several false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The
1188 mouth organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound
1189 department
1190 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat.
1191 The synchronization was pretty close.
1192 </para>
1193 <para>
1194 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1195 electric.
1196 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1197 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1198 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1199 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1200 <!-- f1 -->
1201 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1202 Cartoons
1203 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1204 </para></footnote>
1205 </para>
1206 </blockquote>
1207 <para>
1208 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1209 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1210 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1211 </para>
1212 <para>
1213 Disney had created something very new, based upon something
1214 relatively
1215 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity
1216 that had rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1217 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1218 Disney's
1219 invention that set the standard that others struggled to match.
1220 And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of creativity, was built
1221 upon the work of others.
1222 </para>
1223 <para>
1224 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1225 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1226 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1227 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1228 </para>
1229 <para>
1230 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1231 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1232 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1233 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1234 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1235 genre.
1236 </para>
1237 <para>
1238 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1240 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1241 direct
1242 cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1243 <!-- f2 -->
1244 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1245 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1246 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1247 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1248 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1249 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1250 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1251 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1252 </para></footnote>
1253 and both are built upon a
1254 common
1255 song as a source. It is not just from the invention of synchronized
1256 sound in The Jazz Singer that we get Steamboat Willie. It is also from
1257 Buster Keaton's invention of Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the
1258 song "Steamboat Bill," that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from
1259 Steamboat Willie, Mickey Mouse.
1260 </para>
1261 <para>
1262 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1263 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1264 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1265 <!-- f3 -->
1266 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1267 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1268 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1269 </para></footnote>
1270 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1271 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of ancient
1272 stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the differences. With
1273 Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its spark. Later, it was the
1274 quality of his work relative to the production-line cartoons with which
1275 he competed. Yet these additions were built upon a base that was
1276 borrowed.
1277 Disney added to the work of others before him, creating
1278 something
1279 new out of something just barely old.
1280 </para>
1281 <para>
1282 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1283 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1284 oblivious
1285 as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy, sweet
1286 stories,
1287 appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the Grimm fairy tales
1288 are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps overly ambitious parent
1289 who would dare to read these bloody, moralistic stories to his or her
1290 child, at bedtime or anytime.
1291 </para>
1292 <para>
1293 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried
1294 them into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1295 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1296 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of
1297 compassion
1298 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1299 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon
1300 the work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White
1301 (1937), Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi
1302 (1942), Song of the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland
1303 (1951), Robin Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1305 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1306 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1307 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1308 Treasure
1309 Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1310 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1311 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of his
1312 culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1313 </para>
1314 <para>
1315 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1316 remember
1317 and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1318 creativity
1319 except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize its
1320 importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that would
1321 be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney creativity"&mdash;a
1322 form of expression and genius that builds upon the culture around us
1323 and makes it something different.
1324 </para>
1325 <para>
1326 In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1327 relatively
1328 fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1329 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1330 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1331 <!-- f4 -->
1332 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1333 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1334 determining
1335 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1336 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1337 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1338 average
1339 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1340 Web site associated with this book, available at
1341 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1342 </para></footnote>
1343 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1344 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1345 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1346 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1347 </para>
1348 <para>
1349 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public
1350 domain.
1351 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1352 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1353 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1354 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for anyone&mdash;
1355 whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether approved or
1356 not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1357 </para>
1358 <para>
1359 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1360 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1361 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1362 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1363
1364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1365 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1366 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and
1367 1970s to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1368 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1369 content
1370 from before the Great Depression.
1371 </para>
1372 <para>
1373 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney
1374 creativity."
1375 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently,
1376 and except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1377 universal.
1378 </para>
1379 <para>
1380 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to
1381 many Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
1382 manga, or comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40
1383 percent of publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication
1384 revenue
1385 derives from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at
1386 every magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on
1387 Japan's extraordinary system of public transportation.
1388 </para>
1389 <para>
1390 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1391 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand much
1392 about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to the
1393 stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga cover
1394 every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights." And
1395 anyway,
1396 it's not as if the New York subways are filled with readers of Joyce
1397 or even Hemingway. People of different cultures distract themselves in
1398 different ways, the Japanese in this interestingly different way.
1399 </para>
1400 <para>
1401 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1402 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1403 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1404 </para>
1405 <para>
1406 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1407 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1408 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1409 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1411 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1412 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1413 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1414 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1415 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1416 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1417 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1418 </para>
1419 <para>
1420 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They
1421 are huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan
1422 produce
1423 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese
1424 come together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the
1425 country,
1426 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1427 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1428 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1429 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi
1430 market
1431 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1432 </para>
1433 <para>
1434 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those
1435 trained in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1436 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1437 American
1438 copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal one. Doujinshi are
1439 plainly "derivative works." There is no general practice by doujinshi
1440 artists of securing the permission of the manga creators. Instead, the
1441 practice is simply to take and modify the creations of others, as Walt
1442 Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under both Japanese and American
1443 law, that "taking" without the permission of the original copyright
1444 owner is illegal. It is an infringement of the original copyright to make
1445 a copy or a derivative work without the original copyright owner's
1446 permission.
1447 </para>
1448 <para>
1449 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1450 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1451 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1452 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1453 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1454
1455 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1456 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1457 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1458 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1459 <!-- f5 -->
1460 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1461 York: Perennial, 2000).
1462 </para></footnote>
1463 </para>
1464 <para>
1465 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1466 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1467 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1468 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1469 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1470 which are fifty years old."
1471 </para>
1472 <para>
1473 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1474 precisely
1475 the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that explains
1476 the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra, for
1477 example,
1478 hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these technical
1479 violations because they spur the manga market to be more wealthy and
1480 productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were banned, so
1481 the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1482 <!-- f6 -->
1483 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1484 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1485 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1486 rationality
1487 that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing legal
1488 actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga artists may be
1489 better off collectively if they set aside their individual self-interest and
1490 decide
1491 not to press their legal rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma
1492 solved."
1493 </para></footnote>
1494 </para>
1495 <para>
1496 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly
1497 acknowledges,
1498 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1499 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1500 doujinshi
1501 are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain why
1502 individual
1503 copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has no
1504 general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases individual
1505 manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not a more
1506 general
1507 pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi culture?
1508 </para>
1509 <para>
1510 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1511 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1512 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1513 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1514 to prosecute cases like this."
1515 </para>
1516 <para>
1517 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1518 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1519 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1520 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1522 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1523 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1524 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1525 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1526 their clients or hurt them?
1527 Let's pause for a moment.
1528 </para>
1529 <para>
1530 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1531 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1532 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1533 </para>
1534 <para>
1535 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1536 celebrants.
1537 I believe in the value of property in general, and I also believe
1538 in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1539 "intellectual
1540 property."<footnote><para>
1541 <!-- f7 -->
1542 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1543 Vaidhyanathan,
1544 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1545 University
1546 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1547 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1548 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1549 nature of those rights is very different.
1550 </para></footnote>
1551 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1552 property;
1553 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1554 intellectual property.
1555 </para>
1556 <para>
1557 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is plenty of
1558 value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't mean "money
1559 can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly part of a process of
1560 production, including commercial as well as noncommercial
1561 production.
1562 If Disney animators had stolen a set of pencils to draw Steamboat
1563 Willie, we'd have no hesitation in condemning that taking as wrong&mdash;
1564 even though trivial, even if unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at
1565 least under the law of the day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton
1566 or from the Brothers Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the
1567 taking
1568 from Keaton because Disney's use would have been considered
1569 "fair." There was nothing wrong with the taking from the Grimms
1570 because
1571 the Grimms' work was in the public domain.
1572 </para>
1573 <para>
1574 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1575 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1576 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1577
1578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1579 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1580 freedom
1581 is good.
1582 </para>
1583 <para>
1584 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1585 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1586 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1587 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1588 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1589 form, whether large or small.
1590 </para>
1591 <para>
1592 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1593 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1594 Disney
1595 creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in particular find
1596 it hard to say why.
1597 </para>
1598 <para>
1599 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once
1600 you begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1601 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1602 Einstein,
1603 but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity to show
1604 that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1605 perform
1606 adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1607 permission
1608 from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1609 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1610 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1611 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1612 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster films
1613 in 1997.
1614 </para>
1615 <para>
1616 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1617 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1618 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1619 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1620 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1621 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1622 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1623 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1625 </para>
1626 <para>
1627 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1628 cultures
1629 are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How free is
1630 this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for
1631 others
1632 to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members?
1633 To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the
1634 New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1635 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians
1636 generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether
1637 affiliated
1638 with a studio or not?
1639 </para>
1640 <para>
1641 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1642 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1643 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1644 </para>
1645
1646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1647 </sect1>
1648 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1649 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1650 <para>
1651
1652 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1653 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough,
1654 they were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1655 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1656 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1657 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1658 associations,
1659 by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1660 </para>
1661 <para>
1662 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1663 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1664 "automatic
1665 pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1666 making
1667 "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to be
1668 kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In the
1669 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1670 taking
1671 of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of glass, and
1672 thus it was still not a process within reach of most amateurs.
1673 </para>
1674 <para>
1675 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1676 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1678 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1679 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1680 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible, it
1681 could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to a
1682 developer,
1683 driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1684 lowering
1685 the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1686 population of photographers.
1687 </para>
1688 <para>
1689 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1690 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1691 marketed
1692 on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we do the
1693 rest."<footnote><para>
1694 <!-- f1 -->
1695 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1696 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1697 </para>
1698 <blockquote>
1699 <para>
1700 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work
1701 that any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph,
1702 from the work that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish
1703 anybody,
1704 man, woman or child, who has sufficient intelligence to
1705 point a box straight and press a button, with an instrument which
1706 altogether removes from the practice of photography the
1707 necessity
1708 for exceptional facilities or, in fact, any special knowledge of
1709 the art. It can be employed without preliminary study, without a
1710 darkroom and without chemicals.<footnote><para>
1711 <!-- f2 -->
1712 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1713 1977), 53.
1714 </para></footnote>
1715 </para>
1716 </blockquote>
1717 <para>
1718 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1719 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1720 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1721 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1722 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1723 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1724 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1725 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1726 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1727 percent.<footnote><para>
1728 <!-- f3 -->
1729 Jenkins, 177.
1730 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1731 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1732 <!-- f4 -->
1733 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1734 </para></footnote>
1735 </para>
1736 <para>
1737
1738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1739 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1740 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1741 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur
1742 photography
1743 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1744 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the first
1745 time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1746 permanent
1747 record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first time in
1748 history there exists an authentic visual record of the appearance and
1749 activities
1750 of the common man made without [literary] interpretation
1751 or bias."<footnote><para>
1752 <!-- f5 -->
1753 Coe, 58.
1754 </para></footnote>
1755 </para>
1756 <para>
1757 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1758 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1759 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1760 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1761 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1762 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1763 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1764 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1765 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1766 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1767 have before.
1768 </para>
1769 <para>
1770 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1771 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1772 legal
1773 environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1774 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions that
1775 could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1776 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1777 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1778 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1779 <!-- f6 -->
1780 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1781 </para></footnote>
1782 </para>
1783 <para>
1784 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound
1785 surprisingly
1786 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the
1787 person
1788 or building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1789 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1790 Disney
1791 was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to draw
1792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1793 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1794 that they thought valuable.
1795 </para>
1796 <para>
1797 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1798 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1799 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1800 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1801 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote><para>
1802 <!-- f7 -->
1803 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1804 Harvard
1805 Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1806 </para></footnote>) It may be
1807 that this means that the photographer gets something for nothing. Just
1808 as Disney could take inspiration from Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the
1809 Brothers
1810 Grimm, the photographer should be free to capture an image
1811 without
1812 compensating the source.
1813 </para>
1814 <para>
1815 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1816 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no permission
1817 would be required before an image could be captured and shared with
1818 others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the default.
1819 (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous people:
1820 commercial
1821 photographers who snap pictures of famous people for
1822 commercial
1823 purposes have more restrictions than the rest of us. But in the
1824 ordinary case, the image can be captured without clearing the rights to
1825 do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1826 <!-- f8 -->
1827 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1828 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1829 Review
1830 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.
1831 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
1832 </para></footnote>)
1833 </para>
1834 <para>
1835 We can only speculate about how photography would have
1836 developed
1837 had the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been
1838 against the photographer, then the photographer would have had to
1839 demonstrate permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to
1840 demonstrate permission, too, before it developed the film upon which
1841 images were captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then
1842 Eastman Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by
1843 the photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1844 infringements
1845 committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1846 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1847 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1848 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine
1849 a system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1850 </para>
1851 <para>
1852
1853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1854 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would
1855 be very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1856 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1857 govern
1858 it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1859 importance
1860 over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1861 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more easily borne
1862 the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of photography
1863 to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like that growth
1864 would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that growth in a
1865 democratic technology of expression would have been realized.
1866 If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might see two
1867 gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and striking
1868 images,
1869 and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a school. But
1870 there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that these busses
1871 enable.
1872 These buses are filled with technologies that teach kids to tinker
1873 with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the film of your VCR.
1874 Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think! is a project that
1875 enables
1876 kids to make films, as a way to understand and critique the filmed
1877 culture that they find all around them. Each year, these busses travel to
1878 more than thirty schools and enable three hundred to five hundred
1879 children to learn something about media by doing something with
1880 media.
1881 By doing, they think. By tinkering, they learn.
1882 </para>
1883 <para>
1884 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1885 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1886 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1887 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1888 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1889 <!-- f9 -->
1890 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1891 Software
1892 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1893 February 2002, available at
1894 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1895 </para></footnote>
1896 These buses are filled with technology that
1897 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1898 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1899 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1900 teachers call "media literacy."
1901 </para>
1902 <para>
1903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1904 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1905 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1906 deconstruct
1907 media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the way
1908 media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and the
1909 way people access it."
1910 </para>
1911 <para>
1912 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1913 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1914 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1915 about.
1916 </para>
1917 <para>
1918 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1919 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1920 commercials
1921 generally,<footnote><para>
1922 <!-- f10 -->
1923 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1924 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1925 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1926 </para></footnote>
1927 it is increasingly important to understand the
1928 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1929 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1930 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1931 constructing
1932 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1933 </para>
1934 <para>
1935 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1936 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1937 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1938 sequence
1939 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1940 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1941 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1942 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1943 emotion or builds suspense.
1944 </para>
1945 <para>
1946 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1947 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1948 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1949 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1950 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1951 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1952 </para>
1953 <para>
1954 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1955 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1956 Southern
1957 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1958
1959 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1960 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1961 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1962 texture."<footnote><para>
1963 <!-- f11 -->
1964 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1965 2002.
1966 </para></footnote>
1967 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1968 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1969 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary.
1970 Author
1971 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1972 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1973 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1974 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1975 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1976 <!-- f12 -->
1977 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1978 November
1979 2000, available at
1980 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1981 available
1982 at
1983 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1984 </para></footnote>
1985 </para>
1986 <para>
1987 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1988 describes,
1989 "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1990 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1991 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1992 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1993 </para>
1994 <para>
1995 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text to
1996 include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better film
1997 directors.
1998 The aim is not to improve the profession of filmmaking at all.
1999 Instead, as Daley explained,
2000 </para>
2001 <blockquote>
2002 <para>
2003 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2004 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2005 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2006 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2007 being read-only.
2008 </para>
2009 </blockquote>
2010 <para>
2011 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2012 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2013 twentieth century.
2014 </para>
2015 <para>
2016 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
2017 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2018 understanding
2019 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
2020 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
2021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2022 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2023 appropriate
2024 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote><para>
2025 <!-- f13 -->
2026 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2027 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2028 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2029 <!-- f14 -->
2030 Ibid.
2031 </para></footnote>
2032 </para>
2033 <para>
2034 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some
2035 than to others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who
2036 excel
2037 in written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2038 Institute
2039 for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one
2040 particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high school.
2041 The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all
2042 the traditional measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley
2043 and Barish ran a program that gave kids an opportunity to use film
2044 to express meaning about something the students know something
2045 about&mdash;gun violence.
2046 </para>
2047 <para>
2048 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2049 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2050 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2051 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2052 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2053 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2054 </para>
2055 <para>
2056 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively
2057 simple
2058 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2059 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2060 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2061 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool and
2062 empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about it,"
2063 Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating expression&mdash;far more
2064 successfully and powerfully than could have been created using only
2065 text. "If you had said to these students, `you have to do it in text,' they
2066 would've just thrown their hands up and gone and done something
2067 else," Barish described, in part, no doubt, because expressing
2068 themselves
2069 in text is not something these students can do well. Yet neither
2070 is text a form in which these ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2071 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2072 </para>
2073 <para>
2074
2075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2076 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2077 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2078 Daley
2079 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2080 meaning."
2081 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2082 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2083 increasingly,
2084 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2085 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2086 </para>
2087 <blockquote>
2088 <para>
2089 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2090 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2091 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2092 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2093 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2094 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2095 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2096 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2097 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2098 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2099 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2100 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2101 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2102 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2103 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2104 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2105 about the topic. . . .
2106 </para>
2107 <para>
2108 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2109 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2110 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2111 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2112 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2113 </para>
2114 <para>
2115 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2116 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2117 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2119 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2120 had a lot of power with this language."
2121 </para>
2122 </blockquote>
2123 <para>
2124 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2125 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2126 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2127 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2128 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2129 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2130 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2131 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2132 world would be watching.
2133 </para>
2134 <para>
2135 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2136 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2137 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2138 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2139 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2140 entertainment is tragedy.
2141 </para>
2142 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2143 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2144 <para>
2145 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2146 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2147 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2148 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2149 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2150 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2151 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2152 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2153 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2154 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2155 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2156 was also the Internet.
2157 </para>
2158 <para>
2159 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2160 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2161 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2162 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2163 movie
2164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2165 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2166 with sound or text.
2167 </para>
2168 <para>
2169 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2170 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2171 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2172 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2173 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2174 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2175 spread practically instantaneously.
2176 </para>
2177 <para>
2178 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2179 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2180 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2181 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2182 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2183 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2184 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2185 </para>
2186 <para>
2187 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2188 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2189 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2190 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2191 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2192 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2193 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2194 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2195 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2196 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2197 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2198 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2199 </para>
2200 <para>
2201 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2202 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2203 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2204 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2205 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2206 people vote
2207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2208 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2209 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2210 </para>
2211 <para>
2212 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2213 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2214 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2215 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2216 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2217 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2218 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2219 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2220 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2221 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2222 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2223 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2224 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2225 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2226 <!-- f15 -->
2227 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2228 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2229 </para></footnote>
2230 </para>
2231 <para>
2232 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2233 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2234 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2235 <!-- f16 -->
2236 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2237 Political
2238 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2239 </para></footnote>
2240 And in some towns in
2241 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2242 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2243 deliberation"
2244 to occur.
2245 </para>
2246 <para>
2247 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2248 occur.
2249 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2250 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2251 politics
2252 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2253 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2254 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2255 <!-- f17 -->
2256 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2257 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2258 </para></footnote> We say what our
2259 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2260 </para>
2261 <para>
2262 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2263 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2264 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2265 Technologies
2266 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2267 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2268
2269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2270 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2271 place.
2272 </para>
2273 <para>
2274 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2275 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2276 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2277 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2278 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2279 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2280 </para>
2281 <para>
2282 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2283 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2284 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2285 reading
2286 is having an effect.
2287 </para>
2288 <para>
2289 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2290 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2291 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2292 praising
2293 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2294 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2295 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2296 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2297 instances
2298 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2299 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2300 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2301 <!-- f18 -->
2302 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2303 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2304 </para></footnote>
2305 </para>
2306 <para>
2307 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial
2308 pressures
2309 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2310 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2311 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
2312 </para>
2313 <para>
2314 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2315 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2316 particularly
2317 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as
2318 the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks
2319 of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been
2320 selected
2321 by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
2322 </para>
2323 <para>
2324 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2326 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2327 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2328 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2329 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2330 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2331 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2332 get it out of the way."
2333 </para>
2334 <para>
2335 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2336 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
2337 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN
2338 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the
2339 consequences
2340 to its own employees.<footnote><para>
2341 <!-- f19 -->
2342 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2343 </para></footnote>
2344 It also needs to sustain a more
2345 coherent
2346 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
2347 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite
2348 uplink
2349 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
2350 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
2351 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
2352 wasn't warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2353 </para>
2354 <para>
2355 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&mdash;"amateur" not
2356 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
2357 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
2358 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia
2359 disaster
2360 revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
2361 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.<footnote><para>
2362 <!-- f20 -->
2363 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2364 Information
2365 Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
2366 "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2367 Journalism
2368 Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2369 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2370 </para></footnote>
2371 And it drives
2372 readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as Winer
2373 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly with
2374 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&mdash;with all the
2375 benefits,
2376 and costs, that might entail.
2377 </para>
2378 <para>
2379 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
2380 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for
2381 public
2382 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
2383 "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists have been told to
2384 curtail their blogging.<footnote><para>
2385 <!-- f21 -->
2386 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2387 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2388 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2389 correspondent
2390 in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March 9,
2391 stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve
2392 Olafson,
2393 a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2394 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and
2395 people he was covering.")
2396 </para></footnote>
2397 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2398
2399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2400 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2401 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2402 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2403 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2404 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2405 </para>
2406 <para>
2407 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2408 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2409 gatekeeper."
2410 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2411 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2412 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2413 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2414 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2415 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2416 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2417 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2418 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2419 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2420 extraordinary
2421 to report.
2422 </para>
2423 <para>
2424 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2425 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2426 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2427 </para>
2428 <para>
2429 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2430 differently
2431 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2432 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2433 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2434 </para>
2435 <para>
2436 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2437 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2438 lawnmower
2439 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2440 technologies
2441 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2442 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2443 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2445 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2446 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2447 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2448 tinkering of many others.
2449 </para>
2450 <para>
2451 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2452 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2453 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2454 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2455 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2456 </para>
2457 <para>
2458 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2459 platform,"
2460 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2461 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2462 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2463 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2464 becomes
2465 a major apprenticeship platform."
2466 </para>
2467 <para>
2468 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2469 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2470 abstract,
2471 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2472 doing
2473 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2474 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2475 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2476 </para>
2477 <para>
2478 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2479 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2480 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2481 multiple
2482 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2483 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2484 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2485 artistic,
2486 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2487 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2488 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2489 </para>
2490 <para>
2491 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2492 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2493
2494 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2495 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2496 of recognition.
2497 </para>
2498 <para>
2499 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2500 Indeed,
2501 as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2502 increasingly
2503 highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2504 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that your
2505 child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all around.
2506 The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that
2507 technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2508 </para>
2509 <para>
2510 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and
2511 scholars.
2512 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in
2513 chapter
2514 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2515 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in general.<footnote><para>
2516 <!-- f22 -->
2517 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological
2518 Access
2519 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2520 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2521 </para></footnote>
2522 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2523 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2524 </para>
2525 <para>
2526 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,"
2527 Brown explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up
2528 digital
2529 think and want to learn."
2530 </para>
2531 <para>
2532 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2533 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2534 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2535 architecture
2536 that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that
2537 closes down that part of the brain."
2538 </para>
2539 <para>
2540 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2541 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2542 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2543 the law to close down that technology.
2544 </para>
2545 <para>
2546 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2547 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2548 </para>
2549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2550 </sect1>
2551 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2552 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2553 <para>
2554 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled
2555 as a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2556 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2557 programmer,
2558 in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2559 engine
2560 technology that was available on the RPI network.
2561 </para>
2562 <para>
2563 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research
2564 institutions.
2565 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and
2566 engineering
2567 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five
2568 thousand undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high
2569 school class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience
2570 to imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2571 </para>
2572 <para>
2573 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration
2574 to one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2575 available
2576 on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network
2577 is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as
2578 more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2579 </para>
2580 <para>
2581 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2583 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving
2584 the quality of search on the network. Specialty search engines can do
2585 this even better. The idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines
2586 that search within the network of a particular institution, is to provide
2587 users of that institution with better access to material from that
2588 institution.
2589 Businesses do this all the time, enabling employees to have
2590 access
2591 to material that people outside the business can't get. Universities
2592 do it as well.
2593 </para>
2594 <para>
2595 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2596 Microsoft,
2597 for example, has a network file system that makes it very easy
2598 for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2599 information
2600 about the publicly (within that network) available content.
2601 Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this technology. It
2602 used Microsoft's network file system to build an index of all the files
2603 available within the RPI network.
2604 </para>
2605 <para>
2606 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2607 Indeed,
2608 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had
2609 built. His single most important improvement over those engines was
2610 to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a
2611 user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed before, if you
2612 tried to access a file through a Windows browser that was on a
2613 computer
2614 that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse modified the
2615 system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that a user could
2616 click to see if the machine holding the file was still on-line.
2617 </para>
2618 <para>
2619 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2620 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2621 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2622 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2623 be on users' computers.
2624 </para>
2625 <para>
2626 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2627 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2628 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2629 students
2630 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2632 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2633 computer.
2634 </para>
2635 <para>
2636 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2637 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means,
2638 of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this point is
2639 absolutely
2640 clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files in
2641 their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
2642 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a
2643 university
2644 where he was studying information science, and hence,
2645 tinkering
2646 was the aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made
2647 no money from this tinkering; he was not connected to any business
2648 that would make any money from this experiment. He was a kid
2649 tinkering
2650 with technology in an environment where tinkering with
2651 technology
2652 was precisely what he was supposed to do.
2653 </para>
2654 <para>
2655 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2656 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2657 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2658 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2659 universities.
2660 A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from the suit.
2661 As he read these papers and watched the news reports about them, he
2662 was increasingly astonished.
2663 </para>
2664 <para>
2665 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong. . . .
2666 I don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran
2667 or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way
2668 that promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the
2669 search engine in a way that would make it easier to use"&mdash;again, a
2670 search engine, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows
2671 filesharing
2672 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members
2673 of the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not
2674 himself created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing
2675 to do with music.
2676 </para>
2677 <para>
2678 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2679 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2681 demanded
2682 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2683 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2684 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2685 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2686 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2687 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2688 </para>
2689 <para>
2690 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2691 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2692 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2693 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2694 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2695 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2696 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2697 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2698 <!-- f1 -->
2699 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2700 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2701 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2702 </para></footnote>
2703 </para>
2704 <para>
2705 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2706 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2707 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2708 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2709 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2710 </para>
2711 <para>
2712 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2713 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2714 essentially
2715 make it impossible for him to work in many fields of technology
2716 for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him understand that this
2717 process of being sued was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father
2718 recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told
2719 Jesse, "You don't want to pay another visit to a dentist like me.") And
2720 throughout, the RIAA insisted it would not settle the case until it took
2721 every penny Jesse had saved.
2722 </para>
2723 <para>
2724 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2725 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2726 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2727 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2728 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2730 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2731 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2732 </para>
2733 <para>
2734 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at
2735 winning,
2736 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2737 </para>
2738 <para>
2739 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2740 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2741 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2742 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2743 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2744 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2745 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2746 <!-- f2 -->
2747 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2748 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2749 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2750 </para></footnote>
2751 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2752 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2753 student
2754 for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2755 <!-- f3 -->
2756 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2757 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2758 </para></footnote>
2759 </para>
2760 <para>
2761 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2762 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2763 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2764 activist:
2765 </para>
2766 <blockquote>
2767 <para>
2768 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2769 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2770 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2771 absurd
2772 what the RIAA has done.
2773 </para>
2774 </blockquote>
2775 <para>
2776 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2777 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2778 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2779 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2780 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2781 </para>
2782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2783 </sect1>
2784 <sect1 id="pirates">
2785 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2786 <para>
2787
2788 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2789 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2790 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2791 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2792 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2793 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2794 </para>
2795 <sect2 id="film">
2796 <title>Film</title>
2797 <para>
2798 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2799 <!-- f1 -->
2800 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2801 history.
2802 See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2803 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2804 </para></footnote>
2805 Creators
2806 and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in the early
2807 twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents granted the
2808 inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2809 exercised
2810 through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2811 Company,
2812 and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property&mdash;patents.
2813 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property
2814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2815 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2816 </para>
2817 <para>
2818 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2819 </para>
2820 <blockquote>
2821 <para>
2822 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2823 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2824 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2825 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2826 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2827 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2828 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2829 </para>
2830 <para>
2831 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the
2832 number of nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the
2833 independent
2834 movement by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known
2835 as the General Film Company to block the entry of non-licensed
2836 independents. With coercive tactics that have become legendary,
2837 General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment, discontinued
2838 product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
2839 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all
2840 U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent
2841 William Fox who defied the Trust even after his license was
2842 revoked.<footnote><para>
2843 <!-- f2 -->
2844 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2845 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2846 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2847 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2848 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2849 discussion
2850 of the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits
2851 imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison
2852 to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the
2853 Propertization
2854 of Copyright" (September 2002), University of Chicago Law
2855 School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper
2856 No. 159.
2857 </para></footnote>
2858 </para>
2859 </blockquote>
2860 <para>
2861 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2862 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2863 resisted.
2864 "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents'
2865 resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life
2866 and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2867 <!-- f3 -->
2868 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2869
2870 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2871 </para></footnote>
2872 That led the independents to flee the
2873 East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2874 filmmakers
2875 there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And the
2876 leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
2877 </para>
2878 <para>
2879 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2880 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2881 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2882
2883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2884 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2885 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2886 Edison's
2887 creative property.
2888 </para>
2889 </sect2>
2890 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2891 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2892 <para>
2893 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2894 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2895 </para>
2896 <para>
2897 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2898 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2899 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2900 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2901 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2902 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2903 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2904 right to perform it publicly.
2905 </para>
2906 <para>
2907 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's
2908 phonograph or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was
2909 clear enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that
2910 I performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2911 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2912 recording.
2913 But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a "public
2914 performance"
2915 if I recorded the song in my own house (even today, you don't
2916 owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in the shower), or if I
2917 recorded the song from memory (copies in your brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash;
2918 regulated by copyright law). So if I simply sang the song into a
2919 recording
2920 device in the privacy of my own home, it wasn't clear that I owed the
2921 composer anything. And more importantly, it wasn't clear whether I
2922 owed the composer anything if I then made copies of those recordings.
2923 Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively pirate someone
2924 else's song without paying its composer anything.
2925 </para>
2926 <para>
2927 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2929 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2930 put it,
2931 </para>
2932 <blockquote>
2933 <para>
2934 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2935 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2936 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and
2937 companies
2938 who cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain
2939 of the composer and publisher without any regard for [their] rights.<footnote><para>
2940 <!-- f4 -->
2941 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2942 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2943 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of
2944 South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2945 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2946 Hackensack,
2947 N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2948 </para></footnote>
2949 </para>
2950 </blockquote>
2951 <para>
2952 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2953 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2954 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2955 <!-- f5 -->
2956 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2957 (statement
2958 of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2959 </para></footnote>
2960 and the "music publishing industry"
2961 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2962 <!-- f6 -->
2963 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2964 (statement
2965 of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2966 </para></footnote>
2967 As John Philip
2968 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2969 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2970 <!-- f7 -->
2971 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2972 (statement
2973 of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2974 </para></footnote>
2975 </para>
2976 <para>
2977 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So,
2978 too, do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who
2979 developed
2980 the player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2981 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any
2982 composer
2983 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the
2984 machines
2985 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2986 <!-- f8 -->
2987 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2988 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2989 Perforating
2990 Company of New York).
2991 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2992 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2993 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2994 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2995 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2996 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2997 <!-- f9 -->
2998 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2999 (prepared
3000 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
3001 American
3002 Graphophone Company Association).
3003 </para></footnote>
3004 </para>
3005 <para>
3006 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
3007 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
3008 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
3009 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
3010 control
3011 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
3012 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
3013 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
3014
3015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3016 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3017 authorizes
3018 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3019 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3020 </para>
3021 <para>
3022 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
3023 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
3024 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
3025 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
3026 recordings
3027 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
3028 by the statute.
3029 </para>
3030 <para>
3031 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3032 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
3033 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
3034 whatever
3035 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
3036 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
3037 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
3038 </para>
3039 <para>
3040 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3041 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
3042 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
3043 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
3044 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
3045 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
3046 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
3047 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
3048 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
3049 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
3050 stifle
3051 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
3052 <!-- f10 -->
3053 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3054 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3055 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3056 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3057 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3058 </para></footnote>
3059 </para>
3060 <para>
3061 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3062 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3063 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3064 relates,
3065 </para>
3066 <blockquote>
3067 <para>
3068 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3070 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3071 industry
3072 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3073 importance
3074 in the United States and throughout the world; records
3075 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3076 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3077 access
3078 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3079 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3080 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3081 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3082 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3083 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3084 improved
3085 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
3086 <!-- f11 -->
3087 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House
3088 Committee
3089 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83,
3090 (8 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention
3091 to this report.
3092 </para></footnote>
3093 </para>
3094 </blockquote>
3095 <para>
3096 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3097 creative
3098 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3099 </para>
3100 </sect2>
3101 <sect2 id="radio">
3102 <title>Radio</title>
3103 <para>
3104 Radio was also born of piracy.
3105 </para>
3106 <para>
3107 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3108 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3109 <!-- f12 -->
3110 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
3111 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3112 messages
3113 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3114 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3115 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3116 Manufacturing
3117 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
3118 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3119 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3120 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3121 </para></footnote>
3122 As I described above,
3123 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3124 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3125 composer
3126 money for that performance.
3127 </para>
3128 <para>
3129 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3130 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3131 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3132 Birthday"
3133 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3134 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3135 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3136 station.
3137 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3138 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3139 composer
3140 of the music for his work.
3141
3142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3143 </para>
3144 <para>
3145 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3146 radio
3147 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3148 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3149 something
3150 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3151 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3152 playing the song.
3153 </para>
3154 <para>
3155 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3156 music.
3157 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3158 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3159 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3160 </para>
3161 <para>
3162 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3163 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3164 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3165 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3166 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3167 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3168 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3169 </para>
3170 <para>
3171 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3172 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3173 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3174 ordinarily
3175 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3176 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3177 something for nothing.
3178 </para>
3179 </sect2>
3180 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3181 <title>Cable TV</title>
3182 <para>
3183
3184 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3185 </para>
3186 <para>
3187 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
3188 cable television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
3189 content
3190 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
3191 companies
3192 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3194 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3195 broadcasters'
3196 content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did&mdash;
3197 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3198 </para>
3199 <para>
3200 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3201 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3202 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3203 <!-- f13 -->
3204 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3205 Subcommittee
3206 on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3207 Committee
3208 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966) (statement of
3209 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3210 </para></footnote>
3211 There may have
3212 been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV, but as
3213 Douglas
3214 Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
3215 Broadcasters,
3216 asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3217 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3218 <!-- f14 -->
3219 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3220 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3221 </para></footnote>
3222 As another broadcaster put it,
3223 </para>
3224 <blockquote>
3225 <para>
3226 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3227 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3228 paid for.<footnote><para>
3229 <!-- f15 -->
3230 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3231 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3232 </para></footnote>
3233 </para>
3234 </blockquote>
3235 <para>
3236 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3237 enough:
3238 </para>
3239 <blockquote>
3240 <para>
3241 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3242 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3243 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3244 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3245 <!-- f16 -->
3246 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3247 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3248 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3249 </para></footnote>
3250 </para>
3251 </blockquote>
3252 <para>
3253 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3254 Charlton
3255 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."<footnote><para>
3256 <!-- f17 -->
3257 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3258 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3259 </para></footnote>
3260 </para>
3261 <para>
3262 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3263 Attorney
3264 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3265 </para>
3266 <blockquote>
3267 <para>
3268 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3269 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3270 copyright
3271 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3272 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3273
3274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3275 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3276 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3277 <!-- f18 -->
3278 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3279 Zimmerman,
3280 acting assistant attorney general).
3281 </para></footnote>
3282 </para>
3283 </blockquote>
3284 <para>
3285 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3286 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3287 owners nothing.
3288 </para>
3289 <para>
3290 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3291 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3292 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3293 resolved
3294 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3295 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3296 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3297 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3298 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3299 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3300 broadcasters'
3301 content.
3302 </para>
3303 <para>
3304 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3305 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3306 permission
3307 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
3308 <!-- f19 -->
3309 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3310 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3311 Information, available at
3312 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3313 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3314 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3315 </para></footnote>
3316 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3317 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3318 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3319 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3320 generation&mdash;until now.
3321 </para>
3322 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3323 </sect2>
3324 </sect1>
3325 <sect1 id="piracy">
3326 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3327 <para>
3328
3329 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3330 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3331 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3332 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3333 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3334 stop it.
3335 </para>
3336 <para>
3337 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3338 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3339 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3340 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3341 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3342 outright
3343 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3344 so often done in the past.
3345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3346 </para>
3347 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3348 <title>Piracy I</title>
3349 <para>
3350 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3351 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3352 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3353 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3354 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3355 <!-- f1 -->
3356 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3357 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3358
3359 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3360 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3361 </para></footnote>
3362 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3363 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3364 worldwide to piracy.
3365 </para>
3366 <para>
3367 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3368 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3369 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3370 This piracy is wrong.
3371 </para>
3372 <para>
3373 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3374 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3375 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3376 foreign
3377 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3378 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3379 developing
3380 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3381 existence, treated as right.
3382 </para>
3383 <para>
3384 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3385 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3386 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3387 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3388 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3389 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3390 violate
3391 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3392 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3393 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3394 </para>
3395 <para>
3396 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3397 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3399 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3400 pirate
3401 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3402 childhood.
3403 </para>
3404 <para>
3405 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3406 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3407 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3408 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3409 <!-- f2 -->
3410 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3411 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3412 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3413 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3414 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3415 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3416 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3417 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3418 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3419 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3420 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3421 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3422 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3423 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3424 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3425 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3426 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3427 is wrong.
3428 </para>
3429 <para>
3430 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3431 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3432 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3433 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3434 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3435 <!-- f3 -->
3436 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3437 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3438 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3439 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3440 instance
3441 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3442 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3443 </para></footnote>
3444 </para>
3445 <para>
3446 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3447 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3448 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3449 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3450 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3451 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3452 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3453 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3454 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3455 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3456 piracy of the tangible.
3457 </para>
3458 <para>
3459 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3460 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3461 property
3462 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3463 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3464 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3465 licenses
3466 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3467 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3468 copyrighted
3469 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3470
3471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3472 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3473 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3474 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3475 technology
3476 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3477 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3478 </para>
3479 <para>
3480 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3481 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3482 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3483 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3484 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3485 nation
3486 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3487 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3488 benefit
3489 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3490 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3491 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3492 Microsoft.
3493 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3494 </para>
3495 <para>
3496 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3497 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3498 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3499 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3500 become
3501 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3502 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3503 </para>
3504 <para>
3505 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3506 alcoholic
3507 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3508 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3509 ordinarily
3510 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3511 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3512 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3513 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3514 giving
3515 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3516 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3517 copyright
3518 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3519 wrong.
3520 </para>
3521 <para>
3522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3523 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3524 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3525 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3526 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3527 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3528 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3529 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3530 is flat out wrong.
3531 </para>
3532 <para>
3533 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this
3534 part suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3535 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the way
3536 it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful and
3537 productive,
3538 to produce either new content or new ways of doing business.
3539 Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all "piracy" in
3540 that sense of the term.
3541 </para>
3542 <para>
3543 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3544 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3545 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3546 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3547 </para>
3548 <para>
3549 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3550 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3551 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3552 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3553 </para>
3554 <para>
3555 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3556 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3557 sharing
3558 to survive.
3559 </para>
3560 </sect2>
3561 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3562 <title>Piracy II</title>
3563 <para>
3564 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3565 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3566 <!-- f4 -->
3567 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3568 </para></footnote>
3569 This means we must determine whether
3570 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3572 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3573 author of his profit.
3574 </para>
3575 <para>
3576 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3577 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3578 innovations.
3579 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3580 arguably,
3581 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3582 <!-- f5 -->
3583 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3584 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3585 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3586 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3587 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3588 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3589 technology
3590 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3591 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3592 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3593 put together components that had been developed independently.
3594 </para>
3595 <para>
3596 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3597 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3598 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3599 system.<footnote><para>
3600 <!-- f6 -->
3601 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3602 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3603 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3604 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3605 "Napster's
3606 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3607 "Hollywood
3608 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3609 </para></footnote>
3610 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3611 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3612 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3613 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3614 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3615 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3616 or your 20,000 best friends.
3617 </para>
3618 <para>
3619 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3620 Americans
3621 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3622 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3623 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3624 <!-- f7 -->
3625 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3626 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3627 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3628 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3629 </para></footnote>
3630 A survey by the NPD
3631 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3632 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3633 <!-- f8 -->
3634 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3635 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3636 </para></footnote>
3637 The vast
3638 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3639 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3640 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3641 enjoy
3642 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3643 </para>
3644 <para>
3645 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3646 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3647 infringement,
3648 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3649 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3650 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3651 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3652 </para>
3653 <para>
3654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3655 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3656 different kinds into four types.
3657 </para>
3658 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3659 <listitem><para>
3660 <!-- A. -->
3661 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3662 purchasing
3663 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3664 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3665 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3666 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3667 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3668 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3669 instead
3670 of purchasing.
3671 </para></listitem>
3672 <listitem><para>
3673 <!-- B. -->
3674 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3675 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3676 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3677 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3678 succeed.
3679 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3680 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3681 recommendations
3682 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3683 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3684 </para></listitem>
3685 <listitem><para>
3686 <!-- C. -->
3687 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3688 copyrighted
3689 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3690 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3691 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3692 rewarding
3693 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3694 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3695 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3696 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3697 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3698 available.)
3699 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3700 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3701 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3702 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3703 a local collector.
3704 </para></listitem>
3705 <listitem><para>
3706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3707 <!-- D. -->
3708 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3709 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3710 wants to give away.
3711 </para></listitem>
3712 </orderedlist>
3713 <para>
3714 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3715 </para>
3716 <para>
3717 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3718 perspective
3719 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3720 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3721 <!-- f9 -->
3722 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3723 </para></footnote>
3724 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3725 illegal,
3726 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3727 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3728 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3729 certainly
3730 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3731 suggests.
3732 </para>
3733 <para>
3734 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3735 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3736 Hollywood,
3737 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3738 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3739 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3740 that is "devastating" the industry.
3741 </para>
3742 <para>
3743 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3744 harmful
3745 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3746 practice
3747 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3748 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3749 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3750 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3751 <!-- f10 -->
3752 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3753 Industry's
3754 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3755 industry's
3756 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3757 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3758 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3759 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3760 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3761 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3762 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3763 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3764 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3765 </para></footnote>
3766 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3767 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3768 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3769 problem,
3770 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3771 </para>
3772 <para>
3773 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3774 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3775 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3776 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3778 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3779 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3780 <!-- f11 -->
3781 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3782 </para></footnote>
3783 </para>
3784 <para>
3785 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3786 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3787 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least the
3788 society
3789 that inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record
3790 industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR&mdash;the question is
3791 not simply whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also how
3792 harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of
3793 sharing
3794 are.
3795 </para>
3796 <para>
3797 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3798 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3799 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3800 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3801 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3802 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3803 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3804 </para>
3805 <para>
3806 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3807 because
3808 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3809 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3810 </para>
3811 <para>
3812 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3813 percent,
3814 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3815 <!-- f12 -->
3816 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3817 available at
3818 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3819 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3820 25 June 2003, available at
3821 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3822 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3823 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3824 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3825 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3826 music
3827 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3828 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3829 </para></footnote>
3830 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3831 Internet
3832 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3833 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3834 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3835 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3836 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3837 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote><para>
3838 <!-- f13 -->
3839 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3840 February
3841 2003, available at
3842 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3843 </para></footnote>
3844 Competition
3845 from other forms of media could also account for some of the decline.
3846 As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film High
3847 Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on
3848 DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3849 <!-- f14 -->
3850 Ibid.
3851 </para></footnote>
3852 </para>
3853 <para>
3854
3855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3856 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3857 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3858 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3859 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3860 although
3861 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3862 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3863 </para>
3864 <para>
3865 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3866 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3867 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3868 between
3869 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3870 numbers
3871 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3872 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3873 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3874 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3875 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3876 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3877 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3878 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3879 between
3880 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3881 </para>
3882 <para>
3883 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3884 assume,
3885 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3886 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3887 costs?
3888 </para>
3889 <para>
3890 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3891 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3892 available.
3893 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3894 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3895 <!-- f15 -->
3896 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3897 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3898 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3899 Committee
3900 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3901 statement
3902 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3903 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3904 </para></footnote>
3905 And while it's
3906 conceivable
3907 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3908 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3909 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3910 distributor
3911 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3912 make it available.
3913 </para>
3914 <para>
3915 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3917 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3918 thousands
3919 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3920 <!-- f16 -->
3921 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3922 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3923 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3924 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3925 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3926 National
3927 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3928 Results,"
3929 available at
3930 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3931 </para></footnote>
3932 These
3933 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3934 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3935 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3936 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3937 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3938 companies
3939 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3940 owner for the content they sell.
3941 </para>
3942 <para>
3943 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3944 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the
3945 content available isn't making money from making the content
3946 available.
3947 It is also different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a
3948 record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone
3949 shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have
3950 it. That difference would matter economically if the owner of the
3951 copyright were selling the record in competition to my sharing. But
3952 we're talking about the class of content that is not currently
3953 commercially
3954 available. The Internet is making it available, through
3955 cooperative
3956 sharing, without competing with the market.
3957 </para>
3958 <para>
3959 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3960 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3961 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3962 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3963 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3964 shut as well?
3965 </para>
3966 <para>
3967 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3968 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3969 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3970 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3971 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3972 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3973
3974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3975 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3976 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3977 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3978 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3979 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3980 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3981 great book!)
3982 </para>
3983 <para>
3984 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits
3985 society
3986 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3987 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3988 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3989 </para>
3990 <para>
3991 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3992 understandably
3993 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How
3994 much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies?
3995 What is the content that otherwise would be unavailable?"
3996 </para>
3997 <para>
3998 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter,
3999 much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good.
4000 And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of this piracy is
4001 motivated
4002 by a new way of spreading content caused by changes in the
4003 technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the tradition that
4004 gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and cable TV, the
4005 question we should be asking about file sharing is how best to preserve
4006 its benefits while minimizing (to the extent possible) the wrongful harm
4007 it causes artists. The question is one of balance. The law should seek
4008 that balance, and that balance will be found only with time.
4009 </para>
4010 <para>
4011 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4012 just what you call type A sharing?"
4013 </para>
4014 <para>
4015 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4016 effect
4017 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4018 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4019 Napster
4020 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4021 developed
4022 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
4023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4024 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
4025 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4026 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
4027 <!-- f17 -->
4028 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
4029 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
4030 MHP, available at
4031 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
4032 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
4033 Fanning's
4034 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
4035 </para></footnote>
4036 </para>
4037 <para>
4038 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4039 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4040 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
4041 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
4042 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
4043 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4044 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4045 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4046 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4047 </para>
4048 <para>
4049 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4050 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4051 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
4052 content
4053 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4054 technology.
4055 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
4056 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
4057 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4058 </para>
4059 <para>
4060 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
4061 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4062 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4063 composers,
4064 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
4065 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
4066 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
4067 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
4068 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
4069 broadcast),
4070 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
4071 </para>
4072 <para>
4073 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4074 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4075 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4076 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4077 companies
4078 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
4079 </para>
4080 <para>
4081
4082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4083 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4084 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
4085 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
4086 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
4087 Second,
4088 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
4089 content
4090 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
4091 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
4092 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
4093 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
4094 Congress
4095 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
4096 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
4097 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
4098 control
4099 over the future (cable).
4100 </para>
4101 <para>
4102 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4103 producers
4104 and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another
4105 technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today,
4106 VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's
4107 claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a device,
4108 Disney
4109 and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage in
4110 copyright
4111 infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a "record"
4112 button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies and
4113 shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright infringement
4114 of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and Universal claimed, be
4115 partially liable for that infringement.
4116 </para>
4117 <para>
4118 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4119 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4120 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4121 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4122 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4123 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4124 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4125 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4126 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4127 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4128 system
4129 to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4130 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4131 for the architecture it chose.
4132 </para>
4133 <para>
4134 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4135 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When
4136 there are 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be
4137 invaded
4138 by millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and
4139 essence of the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4140 copyright."<footnote><para>
4141 <!-- f18 -->
4142 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4143 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4144 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4145 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4146 </para></footnote>
4147 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing
4148 and creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the
4149 devastation
4150 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of
4151 millions
4152 of tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4153 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4154 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4155 <!-- f19 -->
4156 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4157 </para></footnote>
4158 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4159 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4160 <!-- f20 -->
4161 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4162 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4163 </para></footnote>
4164 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4165 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4166 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4167 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4168 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4169 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4170 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4171 <!-- f21 -->
4172 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4173 of Jack Valenti).
4174 </para></footnote>
4175 </para>
4176 <para>
4177 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4178 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4179 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4180 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4181 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4182 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4183 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4184 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4185 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4186 technology.<footnote><para>
4187 <!-- f22 -->
4188 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4189 1981).
4190 </para></footnote>
4191 </para>
4192 <para>
4193 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4194
4195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4196 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4197 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4198 Court wrote,
4199 </para>
4200 <blockquote>
4201 <para>
4202 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4203 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4204 market
4205 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4206 authority
4207 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4208 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4209 implicated
4210 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4211 <!-- f23 -->
4212 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4213 </para></footnote>
4214 </para>
4215 </blockquote>
4216 <para>
4217 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4218 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4219 Congress
4220 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4221 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4222 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4223 </para>
4224
4225 <table id="t1">
4226 <title>Table</title>
4227 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4228 <thead>
4229 <row>
4230 <entry>CASE</entry>
4231 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4232 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4233 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4234 </row>
4235 </thead>
4236 <tbody>
4237 <row>
4238 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4239 <entry>Composers</entry>
4240 <entry>No protection</entry>
4241 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4242 </row>
4243 <row>
4244 <entry>Radio</entry>
4245 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4246 <entry>N/A</entry>
4247 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4248 </row>
4249 <row>
4250 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4251 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4252 <entry>No protection</entry>
4253 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4254 </row>
4255 <row>
4256 <entry>VCR</entry>
4257 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4258 <entry>No protection</entry>
4259 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4260 </row>
4261 </tbody>
4262 </tgroup>
4263 </table>
4264
4265 <para>
4266 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4267 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4268 <!-- f24 -->
4269 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4270 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4271 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4272 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4273 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4274 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4275 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4276 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4277 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4278 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4279 </para></footnote>
4280 In each case, throughout our history,
4281 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4282 work.
4283 </para>
4284 <para>
4285 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4286 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4287 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4288 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4289 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4290 legitimacy
4291 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4292 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4293 the interests at stake.
4294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4295 </para>
4296 <para>
4297 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4298 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4299 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4300 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4301 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4302 regulated?
4303 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4304 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4305 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4306 permission to record a song?
4307 </para>
4308 <para>
4309 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4310 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4311 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4312 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4313 <!-- f25 -->
4314 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4315 (1984).
4316 </para></footnote>
4317 Instead, the particular uses that the
4318 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4319 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4320 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4321 technology
4322 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4323 the distribution of content.
4324 </para>
4325 <para>
4326 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4327 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4328 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4329 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4330 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4331 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4332 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4333 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4334 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4335 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4336 protection
4337 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4338 continue.
4339 </para>
4340 <para>
4341
4342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4343 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4344 superior
4345 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4346 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4347 network.
4348 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4349 efficient.
4350 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4351 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4352 <!-- f26 -->
4353 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4354 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4355 </para></footnote>
4356 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4357 warriors
4358 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4359 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4360 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4361 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4362 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4363 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4364 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4365 </para>
4366 <para>
4367 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4368 just as any other property is protected."
4369 </para>
4370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4371 </sect2>
4372 </sect1>
4373 </chapter>
4374 <chapter id="c-property">
4375 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4376 <para>
4377
4378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4379 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4380 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4381 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4382 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4383 the price she can get.
4384 </para>
4385 <para>
4386 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4387 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4388 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4389 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4390 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4391 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4392 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4393 going
4394 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4395 thing I am taking then?
4396 </para>
4397 <para>
4398 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4399 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4401 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4402 narrow
4403 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4404 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4405 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4406 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4407 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4408 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4409 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4410 <!-- f1 -->
4411 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4412 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4413 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4414 </para></footnote>
4415 </para>
4416 <para>
4417 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4418 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4419 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4420 expression
4421 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4422 property.
4423 </para>
4424 <para>
4425 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4426 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4427 turning
4428 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4429 "property"
4430 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4431 <!-- f2 -->
4432 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4433 intangible.
4434 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4435 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4436 physical
4437 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4438 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4439 Property?
4440 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4441 373, 429 n. 241.
4442 </para></footnote>
4443 </para>
4444 <para>
4445 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4446 preceding
4447 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4448 material
4449 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4450 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4451 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4452 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4453 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4454 us draw.
4455 </para>
4456
4457 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4458 <sect1 id="founders">
4459 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4460 <para>
4461 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4462 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4463 Shakespeare
4464 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4465 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4466 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4467 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4468 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4469 adaptation
4470 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4471 </para>
4472 <para>
4473 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4474 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4475 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4476 <!-- f1 -->
4477 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4478 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4479 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4480 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4481 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4482 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4483 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4484 </para></footnote>
4485 Tonson was the
4486 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4487 <!-- f2 -->
4488 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4489 Vanderbilt
4490 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4491 </para></footnote>
4492 who
4493 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4494 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4495 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4497 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4498 copyright.
4499 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4500 produce
4501 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4502 </para>
4503 <para>
4504 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4505 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4506 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4507 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4508 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4509 renewable
4510 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4511 published
4512 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4513 <!-- f3 -->
4514 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4515 "copyright
4516 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4517 </para></footnote>
4518 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4519 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4520 </para>
4521 <para>
4522 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4523 "copyright"
4524 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4525 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4526 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4527 expired
4528 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4529 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4530 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4531 publishers,
4532 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4533 </para>
4534 <para>
4535 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4536 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4537 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4538 govern
4539 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4540 "positive
4541 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4542 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4543 legislature,
4544 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4545 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4546 expired
4547 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4548 independent
4549 of any positive law.
4550 </para>
4551 <para>
4552 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4553 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4554 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4555 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4556
4557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4558 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4559 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4560 ultimately
4561 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4562 </para>
4563 <para>
4564 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4565 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4566 however,
4567 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4568 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4569 "expired,"
4570 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4571 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4572 </para>
4573 <para>
4574 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4575 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4576 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4577 </para>
4578 <para>
4579 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4580 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4581 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4582 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4583 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4584 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4585 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4586 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4587 reason
4588 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4589 </para>
4590 <para>
4591 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4592 special
4593 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4594 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4595 "booksellers."
4596 </para>
4597 <para>
4598 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4599 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4600 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4601 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4602 others
4603 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4604 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4605 beyond
4606 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4608 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4609 restrictions
4610 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4611 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4612 perform, and so on.
4613 </para>
4614 <para>
4615 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4616 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4617 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4618 permission
4619 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4620 anything,
4621 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4622 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4623 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4624 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4625 </para>
4626 <para>
4627 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4628 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4629 especially
4630 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4631 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4632 monopolies&mdash;especially
4633 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4634 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4635 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4636 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4637 Monopolies,
4638 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4639 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4640 publishing.
4641 </para>
4642 <para>
4643 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4644 naturally
4645 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4646 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4647 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4648 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4649 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4650 specialinterest
4651 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4652 </para>
4653 <para>
4654 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4655 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4656 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4657 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4659 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4660 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4661 themselves
4662 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4663 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4664 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4665 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4666 <!-- f4 -->
4667 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4668 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4669 </para></footnote>
4670 </para>
4671 <para>
4672 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4673 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4674 Enlightenment
4675 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4676 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4677 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4678 that idea.
4679 </para>
4680 <para>
4681 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4682 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4683 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4684 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4685 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4686 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4687 compromise
4688 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4689 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4690 construction and spread of culture.
4691 </para>
4692 <para>
4693 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4694 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4695 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4696 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4697 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4698 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4699 they said; they needed more time.
4700 </para>
4701 <para>
4702 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4703 words that echo today,
4704 </para>
4705 <blockquote>
4706 <para>
4707 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4708 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4710 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4711 establishing
4712 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4713 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4714 Discouragement
4715 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4716 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4717 of the Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4718 <!-- f5 -->
4719 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4720 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4721 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4722 Encouragement
4723 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4724 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4725 mentioned
4726 (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
4727 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4728 </para></footnote>
4729 </para>
4730 </blockquote>
4731 <para>
4732 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4733 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4734 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4735 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4736 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4737 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4738 creative
4739 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4740 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4741 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4742 protections
4743 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4744 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4745 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4746 authors.
4747 </para>
4748 <para>
4749 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4750 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4751 chutzpah.
4752 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4753 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4754 for cattle."<footnote><para>
4755 <!-- f6 -->
4756 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4757 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4758 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4759 </para></footnote>
4760 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4761 author.
4762 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4763 </para>
4764 <para>
4765 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4766 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4767 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4768 <!-- f7 -->
4769 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4770 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4771 </para></footnote>
4772 </para>
4773 <para>
4774 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4775 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4776 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4777 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4778 <!-- f8 -->
4779 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4780 1993), 92.
4781 </para></footnote>
4782 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4784 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4785 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4786 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4787 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4788 <!-- f9 -->
4789 Ibid., 93.
4790 </para></footnote>
4791 </para>
4792 <para>
4793 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4794 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4795 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4796 defiance
4797 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."<footnote><para>
4798 <!-- f10 -->
4799 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4800 Borwell).
4801 </para></footnote>
4802 His
4803 books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
4804 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4805 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4806 </para>
4807 <para>
4808 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4809 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4810 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4811 </para>
4812 <para>
4813 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to
4814 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4815 requirements
4816 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4817 protection
4818 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4819 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4820 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4821 <!-- f11 -->
4822 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4823 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4824 Review
4825 29 (1983): 1152.
4826 </para></footnote>
4827 </para>
4828 <para>
4829 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4830 English
4831 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4832 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4833 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4834 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4835 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4836 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4837 common
4838 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4839 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4840 </para>
4841 <para>
4842 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if justice
4843 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles&mdash;Mansfield's
4844 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4845 issue that Parliament had struggled with in 1710: How best to limit
4846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4847 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4848 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4849 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4850 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4851 believed,
4852 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4853 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4854 </para>
4855 <para>
4856 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4857 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4858 </para>
4859 <para>
4860 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4861 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4862 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4863 <!-- f12 -->
4864 Ibid., 1156.
4865 </para></footnote>
4866 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4867 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4868 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4869 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4870 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4871 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4872 </para>
4873 <para>
4874 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4875 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4876 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4877 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4878 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4879 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4880 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4881 statute were no longer protected.
4882 </para>
4883 <para>
4884 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4885 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4886 members
4887 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4888 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4889 Lords generally voted.
4890 </para>
4891 <para>
4892 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4893 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4895 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one
4896 majority
4897 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4898 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright
4899 was fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by
4900 copyright
4901 passed into the public domain.
4902 </para>
4903 <para>
4904 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4905 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4906 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4907 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4908 Anglo-American
4909 history, the legal control over creative works expired, and the
4910 greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare,
4911 Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4912 </para>
4913 <para>
4914 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4915 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4916 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4917 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4918 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4919 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4920 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4921 Edinburgh
4922 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4923 illuminations."<footnote><para>
4924 <!-- f13 -->
4925 Rose, 97.
4926 </para></footnote>
4927 </para>
4928 <para>
4929 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4930 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4931 reported:
4932 </para>
4933 <blockquote>
4934 <para>
4935 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what
4936 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4937 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4938 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4939 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4940 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4941 competency
4942 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4943 shilling to devise to their successors.<footnote><para>
4944 <!-- f14 -->
4945 Ibid.
4946 </para></footnote>
4947 </para>
4948 </blockquote>
4949 <para>
4950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4951 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4952 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4953 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4954 England
4955 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4956 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4957 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4958 exclusive
4959 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4960 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4961 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4962 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4963 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4964 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4965 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop&mdash;
4966 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4967 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4968 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4969 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4970 the many.
4971 </para>
4972 <para>
4973 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4974 antimonopoly,
4975 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4976 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4977 protected.
4978 </para>
4979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4980 </sect1>
4981 <sect1 id="recorders">
4982 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4983 <para>
4984 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4985 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4986 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4987 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4988 He was their god.)
4989 </para>
4990 <para>
4991 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4992 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4993 today.
4994 </para>
4995 <para>
4996 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4997 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4998 Stagehands
4999 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
5000 During
5001 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
5002 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
5003 </para>
5004 <para>
5005 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
5006 stagehands
5007 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
5008 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
5009 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
5010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5011 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5012 about the scene.
5013 </para>
5014 <para>
5015 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5016 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
5017 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5018 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5019 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
5020 </para>
5021 <para>
5022 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
5023 permission.
5024 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
5025 four-and-a-halfsecond
5026 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
5027 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
5028 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5029 </para>
5030 <para>
5031 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5032 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5033 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5034 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5035 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5036 </para>
5037 <para>
5038 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
5039 discovered
5040 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at least
5041 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
5042 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
5043 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
5044 was in the corner of the shot."
5045 </para>
5046 <para>
5047 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
5048 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
5049 Herrera.
5050 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
5051 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
5052 educational
5053 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5054 confirm what he had been told.
5055 </para>
5056 <para>
5057 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
5058 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
5059 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
5060
5061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5062 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
5063 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
5064 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
5065 money."
5066 </para>
5067 <para>
5068 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
5069 playing
5070 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5071 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
5072 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
5073 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
5074 Trinity, from ten years before.
5075 </para>
5076 <para>
5077 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
5078 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
5079 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
5080 permission
5081 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5082 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5083 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5084 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
5085 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
5086 owner gets to control.
5087 </para>
5088 <para>
5089 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
5090 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5091 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
5092 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
5093 copyright
5094 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5095 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set by
5096 the law.
5097 </para>
5098 <para>
5099 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5100 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
5101 <!-- f1 -->
5102 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
5103 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
5104 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
5105 file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
5106 </para></footnote>
5107 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
5108 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use
5109 does not require the permission of anyone.
5110 </para>
5111 <para>
5112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5113 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
5114 </para>
5115 <blockquote>
5116 <para>
5117 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
5118 between
5119 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
5120 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
5121 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
5122 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
5123 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5124 </para>
5125 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5126 <listitem><para>
5127 <!-- 1. -->
5128 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
5129 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
5130 require
5131 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5132 licensing
5133 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5134 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5135 process to a halt.
5136 </para></listitem>
5137 <listitem><para>
5138 <!-- 2. -->
5139 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5140 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5141 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5142 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5143 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5144 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5145 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5146 exhaustion
5147 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5148 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5149 principle.
5150 </para></listitem>
5151 <listitem><para>
5152 <!-- 3. -->
5153 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5154 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5155 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5156 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5157 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5158 legal
5159 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5161 </para></listitem>
5162 <listitem><para>
5163 <!-- 4. -->
5164 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5165 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5166 money.
5167 </para></listitem>
5168 </orderedlist>
5169 </blockquote>
5170 <para>
5171 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5172 therefore
5173 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5174 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5175 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5176 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5177 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5178 </para>
5179 <para>
5180 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5181 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5182 publishers'
5183 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5184 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5185 </para>
5186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5187 </sect1>
5188 <sect1 id="transformers">
5189 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5190 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5191 <para>
5192 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5193 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5194 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5195 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5196 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5197 </para>
5198 <para>
5199 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5200 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5201 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.
5202 In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to build
5203 retrospectives
5204 on the work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was
5205 Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5206 Eastwood,
5207 with clips from his films and interviews with figures important
5208 to his career.
5209 </para>
5210 <para>
5211 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor
5212 and as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with
5213 Eastwood,
5214 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5215 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5216 </para>
5217 <para>
5218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5219 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5220 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5221 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5222 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5223 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5224 </para>
5225 <para>
5226 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5227 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5228 Eastwood's
5229 films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No
5230 one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No one had
5231 ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an actor's
5232 career."
5233 </para>
5234 <para>
5235 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5236 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5237 </para>
5238 <para>
5239 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5240 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5241 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5242 for it."<footnote><para>
5243 <!-- f1 -->
5244 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5245 publicity&mdash;rights
5246 an artist has to control the commercial exploitation of his
5247 image.
5248 But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as this chapter
5249 evinces.
5250 </para></footnote>
5251 </para>
5252 <para>
5253 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5254 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5255 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5256 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5257 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5258 </para>
5259 <para>
5260 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5261 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5262 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5263 </para>
5264 <blockquote>
5265 <para>
5266 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.
5267 We made some artistic decisions about what film clips to
5268 include&mdash;of
5269 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip
5270 from Dirty Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground
5271 who's wiggling under the gun and you need to get his
5272 permission.
5273 And then you have to decide what you are going to pay
5274 him.
5275 </para>
5276 <para>
5277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5278 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5279 dayplayer
5280 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5281 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5282 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5283 So we had to identify the people&mdash;some of them were hard to
5284 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5285 crashing through the glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5286 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5287 others, and we just started calling people.
5288 </para>
5289 </blockquote>
5290 <para>
5291 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5292 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5293 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5294 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5295 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5296 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5297 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5298 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5299 career.
5300 </para>
5301 <para>
5302 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5303 were totally in the clear."
5304 </para>
5305 <para>
5306 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5307 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5308 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5309 </para>
5310 <blockquote>
5311 <para>
5312 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up
5313 their hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many
5314 copyrights,
5315 there's the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director,
5316 there's the actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into
5317 its constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this
5318 many directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it
5319 very systematically and cleared the rights.
5320 </para>
5321 </blockquote>
5322 <para>
5323
5324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5325 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5326 loved it, and it sold very well.
5327 </para>
5328 <para>
5329 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5330 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
5331 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5332 nothing
5333 so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
5334 all."<footnote><para>
5335 <!-- f2 -->
5336 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5337 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5338 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5339 </para></footnote>
5340 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5341 has to be made?
5342 </para>
5343 <para>
5344 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5345 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5346 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5347 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5348 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5349 </para>
5350 <blockquote>
5351 <para>
5352 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5353 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5354 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5355 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5356 compensated for that.
5357 </para>
5358 </blockquote>
5359 <para>
5360 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5361 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5362 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5363 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5364 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5365 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5366 creative
5367 process could be made to be more clean?
5368 </para>
5369 <blockquote>
5370 <para>
5371 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5372 mechanism&mdash;where
5373 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5374 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5375 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5377 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5378 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5379 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5380 paying
5381 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5382 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5383 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5384 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5385 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5386 investments
5387 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5388 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5389 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5390 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5391 one of these things together.
5392 </para>
5393 </blockquote>
5394 <para>
5395 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some
5396 of the richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and
5397 access that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him
5398 a year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity
5399 is never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5400 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5401 Republican
5402 hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5403 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5404 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea
5405 that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing
5406 flythrough
5407 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5408 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5409 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5410 regulationminimizing
5411 Republican should look at the rights and ask, "Does this
5412 still make sense?"
5413 </para>
5414 <para>
5415 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5416 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5417 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5418 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5419
5420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5421 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5422 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5423 </para>
5424 <para>
5425 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5426 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5427 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5428 judges loved every minute of it.
5429 </para>
5430 <para>
5431 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5432 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5433 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5434 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5435 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5436 were just violated in this room?"
5437 </para>
5438 <para>
5439 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5440 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5441 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.
5442 Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for
5443 this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle of federal
5444 marshals
5445 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point:
5446 A year before anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two
5447 years before another member of our panel, David Boies, would defend
5448 Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was
5449 trying
5450 to get the judges to see that the law would not be friendly to the
5451 capacities that this technology would enable. Technology means you
5452 can now do amazing things easily; but you couldn't easily do them
5453 legally.
5454 </para>
5455 <para>
5456 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5457 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5458 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5459 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5460 planted in your presentation.
5461 </para>
5462 <para>
5463 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5465 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never
5466 before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on
5467 computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes
5468 images of politicians and blends them with music to create biting
5469 political
5470 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of
5471 the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is through
5472 the mixing of Flash! and music.
5473 </para>
5474 <para>
5475 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5476 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5477 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5478 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5479 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5480 </para>
5481 <para>
5482 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5483 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or
5484 mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5485 necessarily
5486 requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the
5487 system
5488 could simply make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate
5489 artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for
5490 example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright owner of an
5491 unregistered
5492 work for the derivative reuse of his work will be a flat 1 percent
5493 of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the copyright owner." Under
5494 this rule, the copyright owner could benefit from some royalty, but he
5495 would not have the benefit of a full property right (meaning the right
5496 to name his own price) unless he registers the work.
5497 </para>
5498 <para>
5499 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5500 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5501 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5502 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5503 </para>
5504 <para>
5505 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an
5506 agreement
5507 with Mike Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5509 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and
5510 Dream-Works
5511 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under
5512 the agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5513 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use of
5514 stateof-the-art
5515 digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other actors into the
5516 film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
5517 </para>
5518 <para>
5519 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers
5520 explained,
5521 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on
5522 existing films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5523 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5524 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5525 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to new
5526 audiences, it is Mike."
5527 </para>
5528 <para>
5529 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5530 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5531 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5532 remains
5533 under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5534 announcement
5535 is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5536 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5537 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5538 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5539 </para>
5540 <para>
5541 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5542 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5543 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5544 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5545 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5546 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5547 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5548 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5549 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5550 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5551 curse, reserved for the few.
5552 </para>
5553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5554 </sect1>
5555 <sect1 id="collectors">
5556 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5557 <para>
5558 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5559 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5560 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5561 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5562 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5563 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5564 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5565 </para>
5566 <para>
5567 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5568 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5569 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5570 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5571 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
5572 as when those pages changed.
5573 </para>
5574 <para>
5575 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5576 appreciated.
5577 In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5578 constantly
5579 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5580 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5581 </para>
5582 <para>
5583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5584 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5585 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5586 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5587 </para>
5588 <para>
5589 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5590 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5591 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5592 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5593 library&mdash;constantly
5594 updated, without any reliable memory.
5595 </para>
5596 <para>
5597 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5598 Machine,
5599 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5600 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5601 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5602 remember and what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5603 <!-- f1 -->
5604 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5605 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
5606 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5607 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5608 E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5609 </para></footnote>
5610 </para>
5611 <para>
5612 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5613 remember
5614 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5615 reaction
5616 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965,
5617 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5618 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5619 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5620 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what it is
5621 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5622 </para>
5623 <para>
5624 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5625 repeat
5626 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5627 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5628 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5629 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5630 researchers,
5631 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5632 </para>
5633 <para>
5634 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5635 Internet
5636 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5637 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5638 important
5639 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5641 important
5642 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5643 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5644 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the one kept by the
5645 Internet
5646 Archive.
5647 </para>
5648 <para>
5649 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5650 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5651 researcher.
5652 In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5653 success.
5654 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5655 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5656 Internet
5657 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5658 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
5659 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5660 </para>
5661 <para>
5662 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5663 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5664 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5665 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5666 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5667 constructing
5668 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5669 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5670 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5671 culture
5672 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5673 recorded
5674 each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a specific
5675 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5676 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5677 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5678 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5679 put it,
5680 </para>
5681 <blockquote>
5682 <para>
5683 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5684 Murphy
5685 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5686 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5687 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5688 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5689
5690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5691 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5692 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5693 </para>
5694 </blockquote>
5695 <para>
5696 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5697 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5698 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5699 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5700 nineteenthcentury
5701 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5702 understand
5703 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5704 </para>
5705 <para>
5706 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5707 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5708 libraries.
5709 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5710 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5711 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5712 </para>
5713 <para>
5714 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of
5715 Congress
5716 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5717 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5718 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915
5719 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5720 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5721 library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at all&mdash;in the library archive of the
5722 film company.<footnote><para>
5723 <!-- f2 -->
5724 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5725 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3 (1980): 5;
5726 Anthony
5727 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5728 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
5729 </para></footnote>
5730 </para>
5731 <para>
5732 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5733 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5734 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5735 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5736 required
5737 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5738 "copyrighted."
5739 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5740 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5741 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5742 anyone who would look.
5743 </para>
5744 <para>
5745 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5747 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5748 stations
5749 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5750 September
5751 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5752 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
5753 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5754 Anyone
5755 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5756 events of that day.
5757 </para>
5758 <para>
5759 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5760 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films"
5761 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5762 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5763 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5764 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5765 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5766 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5767 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5768 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5769 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5770 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5771 culture.
5772 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5773 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5774 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes&mdash;for free.
5775 </para>
5776 <para>
5777 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5778 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5779 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5780 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5781 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5782 </para>
5783 <para>
5784 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5785 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5786 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5787 culture.
5788 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5789 during
5790 a second life that all creative property has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5791 </para>
5792 <para>
5793 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5794 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5795
5796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5797 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5798 market
5799 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5800 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5801 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5802 market,
5803 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5804 </para>
5805 <para>
5806 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5807 tradition
5808 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5809 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5810 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5811 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5812 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5813 </para>
5814 <para>
5815 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5816 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5817 <!-- f3 -->
5818 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5819 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5820 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5821 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5822 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5823 Review
5824 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5825 </para></footnote>). After it is
5826 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5827 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5828 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5829 second
5830 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5831 spread and stability of culture.
5832 </para>
5833 <para>
5834 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5835 creative
5836 property does not hold true with the most important components
5837 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5838 these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&mdash;there is no
5839 guarantee
5840 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5841 libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5842 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5843 Beyond
5844 that, culture disappears.
5845 </para>
5846 <para>
5847 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5848 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5849 accessible
5850 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5851 extraordinarily
5852 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5853 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5855 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5856 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5857 practical
5858 effect.
5859 </para>
5860 <para>
5861 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5862 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5863 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5864 distributed
5865 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5866 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5867 archive of all moving images and sound.
5868 </para>
5869 <para>
5870 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5871 imagined
5872 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5873 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5874 Kahle describes,
5875 </para>
5876 <blockquote>
5877 <para>
5878 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5879 music.
5880 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5881 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5882 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5883 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5884 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5885 company.
5886 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5887 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5888 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5889 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5890 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5891 press.
5892 </para>
5893 </blockquote>
5894 <para>
5895 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5896 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5897 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5898 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5899 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5900 remains
5901 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5903 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5904 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5905 become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a future for our past. The
5906 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5907 Alexandria real again.
5908 </para>
5909 <para>
5910 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5911 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5912 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5913 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5914 someone's
5915 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5916 Kahle and others would exercise.
5917 </para>
5918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5919 </sect1>
5920 <sect1 id="property-i">
5921 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5922 <para>
5923 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5924 Association
5925 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5926 with Lyndon Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture
5927 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5928 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5929 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5930 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5931 </para>
5932 <para>
5933 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5934 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
5935 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5936 criticism.
5937 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5938 producers
5939 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5940 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5941 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5942 programs
5943 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5944 Entertainment,
5945 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5946 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5947 </para>
5948 <para>
5949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5950 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5951 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5952 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5953 important
5954 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5955 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5956 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5957 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5958 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5959 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5960 Washingtonian way.
5961 </para>
5962 <para>
5963 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5964 culture
5965 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5966 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5967 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5968 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5969 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5970 the meaning of "creative property."
5971 </para>
5972 <para>
5973 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5974 perfectly:
5975 </para>
5976 <blockquote>
5977 <para>
5978 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5979 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5980 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5981 fundamental
5982 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5983 Creative
5984 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5985 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5986 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5987 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5988 <!-- f1 -->
5989 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5990 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5991 Subcommittee
5992 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5993 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th
5994 Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5995 </para></footnote>
5996 </para>
5997 </blockquote>
5998 <para>
5999 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
6000 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
6001 "central
6002 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
6003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
6004 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
6005 protections
6006 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
6007 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
6008 be no second-class property owners.
6009 </para>
6010 <para>
6011 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
6012 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
6013 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
6014 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
6015 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
6016 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
6017 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
6018 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
6019 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
6020 </para>
6021 <para>
6022 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
6023 precise
6024 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
6025 <!-- f2 -->
6026 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
6027 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
6028 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
6029 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
6030 ordinary
6031 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
6032 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
6033 26&ndash;27.
6034 </para></footnote> it has never been the
6035 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
6036 "accorded
6037 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
6038 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
6039 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
6040 undesirable, change in our tradition.
6041 </para>
6042 <para>
6043 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
6044 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6045 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6046 overturned
6047 in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
6048 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6049 culture would develop.
6050 </para>
6051 <para>
6052 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6053 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
6054 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6055 history.
6056 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
6057 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
6058 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
6059 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
6060
6061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6062 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6063 Creativity
6064 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
6065 control.
6066 </para>
6067 <para>
6068 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
6069 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6070 notwithstanding,
6071 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
6072 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
6073 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
6074 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
6075 opportunity
6076 for new creativity to threaten the old.
6077 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
6078 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
6079 Constitution itself.
6080 </para>
6081 <para>
6082 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
6083 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6084 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if it
6085 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&mdash;it is
6086 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
6087 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
6088 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
6089 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6090 </para>
6091 <para>
6092 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6093 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
6094 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
6095 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
6096 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
6097 Congress
6098 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
6099 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
6100 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
6101 Instead,
6102 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6104 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
6105 compensation
6106 at all.
6107 </para>
6108 <para>
6109 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6110 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
6111 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
6112 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
6113 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
6114 effectively
6115 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
6116 </para>
6117 <para>
6118 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6119 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6120 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6121 appointed
6122 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
6123 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
6124 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
6125 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
6126 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
6127 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
6128 it, we should, too.
6129 </para>
6130 <para>
6131 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6132 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
6133 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
6134 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
6135 creative
6136 property there must be a public domain?
6137 </para>
6138 <para>
6139 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6140 history
6141 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6142 enabled.
6143 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6144 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6145 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6146 protected,
6147 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6148 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6149 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6150 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6151 </para>
6152 <para>
6153
6154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6155 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6156 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6157 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6158 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6159 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6160 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6161 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6162 </para>
6163 <figure id="fig-1331">
6164 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6165 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6166 </figure>
6167 <para>
6168 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6169 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6170 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6171 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6172 represent
6173 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&mdash;
6174 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6175 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6176 punishments
6177 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6178 example,
6179 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6180 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6182 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6183 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6184 </para>
6185 <para>
6186 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6187 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6188 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6189 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6190 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6191 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6192 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6193 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6194 the source of the enforcement.
6195 </para>
6196 <para>
6197 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6198 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6199 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6200 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6201 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6202 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6203 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6204 group might behave.
6205 </para>
6206 <para>
6207 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6208 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a constraint on
6209 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6210 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6211 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6212 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6213 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6214 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6215 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6216 "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6217 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket
6218 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6219 enforces this constraint.
6220 </para>
6221 <para>
6222
6223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6224 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6225 obvious:
6226 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6227 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6228 another.
6229 </para>
6230 <para>
6231 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6232 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6233 particular
6234 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6235 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6236 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6237 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6238 consider how these four in particular interact.
6239 </para>
6240 <para>
6241 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6242 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6243 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6244 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6245 rational
6246 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6247 maximum
6248 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6249 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6250 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6251 community
6252 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50
6253 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6254 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6255 a different town, or at night.
6256 </para>
6257 <para>
6258 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6259 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6260 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6261 <!-- f3 -->
6262 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6263 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6264 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6265 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6266 expressed.
6267 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6268 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6269 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6270 </para></footnote>
6271 The law, in other words, sometimes
6272 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6273 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6274 increase
6275 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6276 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6277 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6278 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6280 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6281 example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6282 </para>
6283 <figure id="fig-1361">
6284 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6285 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6286 </figure>
6287 <para>
6288 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6289 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6290 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6291 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6292 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6293 another.<footnote><para>
6294 <!-- f4 -->
6295 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6296 because
6297 their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6298 particular
6299 moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6300 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6301 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6302 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss of
6303 freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of
6304 ordinary
6305 life.
6306 I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which depends
6307 upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue against any
6308 insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of liberty. As I
6309 argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political thought with a
6310 broader focus than the narrow question of what the government did when.
6311 John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from the
6312 tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
6313 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.
6314 John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor
6315 from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The Right
6316 to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.
6317 Commons: Selected Essays (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans
6318 with Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical
6319 disabilities
6320 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making
6321 access to those places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000).
6322 Each of these interventions to change existing conditions changes the
6323 liberty of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6324 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these
6325 groups might face.
6326 </para></footnote>
6327 </para>
6328 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6329 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6330 <para>
6331
6332 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6333 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6334 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6335 rallying makes sense.
6336 </para>
6337 <para>
6338 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6339 Internet:
6340 </para>
6341 <figure id="fig-1371">
6342 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6343 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6344 </figure>
6345 <para>
6346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6347 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The
6348 law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties
6349 on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6350 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture)
6351 and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those
6352 penalties
6353 are mitigated by norms we all recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping
6354 other kids' records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be
6355 infringement,
6356 but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least)
6357 had no problem with this form of infringement.
6358 </para>
6359 <para>
6360 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s
6361 and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes
6362 dramatically,
6363 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6364 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6365 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6366 becomes
6367 an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6368 </para>
6369 <para>
6370 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6371 Technology
6372 has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
6373 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of
6374 protection
6375 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq
6376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6377 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6378 looting that results.
6379 </para>
6380 <figure id="fig-1381">
6381 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6382 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6383 </figure>
6384 <para>
6385 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6386 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6387 Department
6388 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6389 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6390 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6391 Internet
6392 had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6393 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6394 innovative
6395 marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to develop
6396 code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should educate
6397 kids to better protect copyright.
6398 </para>
6399 <para>
6400 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6401 preserve
6402 the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
6403 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry
6404 to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life
6405 you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if
6406 something
6407 comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a
6408
6409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6410 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6411 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6412 property
6413 (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to
6414 bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions
6415 have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when
6416 imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6417 </para>
6418 <para>
6419 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6420 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6421 technological
6422 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the
6423 changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the
6424 content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown
6425 describes
6426 it, its "architecture of revenue."
6427 </para>
6428 <para>
6429 But just because a particular interest asks for government support,
6430 it doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6431 technology
6432 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6433 follow
6434 that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6435 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6436 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6437 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6438 <!-- f5 -->
6439 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6440 BusinessWeek
6441 online, 2 August 1999, available at
6442 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more recent
6443 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6444 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003,
6445 available
6446 at
6447 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6448 </para></footnote>
6449 Does anyone believe the government should ban
6450 digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the
6451 freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks
6452 from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the
6453 subject
6454 of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the
6455 "stickiness"
6456 of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the
6457 TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this
6458 change has weakened the television advertising market. But does
6459 anyone
6460 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial
6461 television?
6462 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to
6463 switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6464 </para>
6465 <para>
6466 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6467 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6468 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6470 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6471 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6472 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6473 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6474 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6475 <!-- f6 -->
6476 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6477 </para></footnote>
6478 And relative to a
6479 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6480 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6481 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6482 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6483 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6484 Brezhnev.
6485 </para>
6486 <para>
6487 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6488 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6489 government
6490 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6491 guarantee
6492 that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the
6493 duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they
6494 create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
6495 are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for
6496 innovation
6497 and change.
6498 </para>
6499 <para>
6500 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include, obviously,
6501 copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
6502 complaining
6503 about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in
6504 a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be
6505 especially
6506 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government
6507 to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and
6508 dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First
6509 Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .
6510 abridging the freedom of speech." So when Congress is being asked to
6511 pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom of speech, it should ask&mdash;
6512 carefully&mdash;whether such regulation is justified.
6513 </para>
6514 <para>
6515 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6516 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6517 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6518 "justified."
6519 My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the
6520 question
6521 of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon
6522 your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the
6523 changes the content industry wants.
6524 </para>
6525 <para>
6526 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6527 </para>
6528 <para>
6529 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6530 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6531 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6532 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6533 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6534 </para>
6535 <para>
6536 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6537 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6538 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6539 </para>
6540 <para>
6541 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued
6542 that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6543 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6544 reproduce.
6545 Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6546 </para>
6547 <para>
6548 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly
6549 did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of
6550 problems
6551 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse
6552 than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately,
6553 the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at
6554 least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways
6555 to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6556 </para>
6557 <para>
6558 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6559 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6560 culture.<footnote><para>
6561 <!-- f7 -->
6562 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6563 Environmentalism
6564 for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6565 </para></footnote>
6566 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of
6567 this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that
6568 authors
6569 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given
6570 away "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6571 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6572 environment,
6573 much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6575 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6576 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6577 protecting
6578 copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
6579 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware
6580 of our actions' effects on the environment.
6581 </para>
6582 <para>
6583 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6584 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6585 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6586 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6587 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6588 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6589 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6590 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6591 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6592 </para>
6593 <para>
6594 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6595 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6596 be lost.
6597 </para>
6598 </sect2>
6599 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6600 <title>Beginnings</title>
6601 <para>
6602 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and
6603 improved
6604 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
6605 "creative property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the
6606 English
6607 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6608 </para>
6609 <para>
6610 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6611 Congress
6612 in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I,
6613 section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6614 </para>
6615 <para>
6616 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6617 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6618 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6619
6620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6621 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does
6622 not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant "creative
6623 property
6624 rights." It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The
6625 grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the
6626 purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of
6627 rewarding
6628 authors.
6629 </para>
6630 <para>
6631 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we
6632 saw in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6633 assure
6634 that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture
6635 by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume
6636 the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike
6637 the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6638 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6639 </para>
6640 <para>
6641 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6642 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
6643 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built
6644 a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them
6645 short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the
6646 federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6647 concentrating
6648 power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce
6649 the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose members were
6650 at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected
6651 by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built
6652 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to
6653 prevent
6654 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
6655 </para>
6656 <para>
6657 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
6658 "copyright"
6659 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they
6660 ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put
6661 our "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
6662 210 years since they first struck its design.
6663 </para>
6664 <para>
6665 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6666 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6668 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6669 started here:
6670 </para>
6671 <figure id="fig-1441">
6672 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6673 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6674 </figure>
6675 <para>
6676 We will end here:
6677 </para>
6678 <figure id="fig-1442">
6679 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6680 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6681 </figure>
6682 <para>
6683 Let me explain how.
6684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6685 </para>
6686 </sect2>
6687 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6688 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6689 <para>
6690 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6691 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6692 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6693 protecting
6694 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6695 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6696 authorship.<footnote><para>
6697 <!-- f8 -->
6698 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6699 United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1, 485&ndash;86:
6700 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6701 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6702 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6703 </para></footnote>
6704 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6705 the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6706 common
6707 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6708 published
6709 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6710 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6711 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6712 </para>
6713 <para>
6714 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6715 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6716 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6717 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6718 copyrights
6719 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6720 state copyrights expired as well.
6721 </para>
6722 <para>
6723 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6724 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6725 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6726 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6727 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6728 </para>
6729 <para>
6730 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6731 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6732 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6733 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6734 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6735 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6736 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6737 <!-- f9 -->
6738 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6739 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6740 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6741 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6742 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6743 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6744 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6745 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6746 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6747 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6748 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6749 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6750 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6751 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6752 </para>
6753 <para>
6754 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6755 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6756 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6757 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6758 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6759 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6760 copyright, either.
6761 </para>
6762 <para>
6763 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6764 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6765 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6766 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6767 domain.<footnote><para>
6768 <!-- f10 -->
6769 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6770 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6771 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6772 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6773 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6774 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6775 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6776 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6777 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6778 </para>
6779 <para>
6780 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6781 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6782 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6783 <!-- f11 -->
6784 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6785 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6786 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6787 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6788 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6789 effectively free.
6790 </para>
6791 <para>
6792 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6793 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6794 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6795 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6796 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6797 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6798 </para>
6799 <para>
6800 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6801 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6802 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6803 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6804 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6805 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6806 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6807 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6808 </para>
6809 <para>
6810 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6811 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6812 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6813 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6814
6815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6816 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6817 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6818 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6819 </para>
6820 <para>
6821 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6822 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6823 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6824 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6825 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6826 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6827 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6828 value.
6829 </para>
6830 <para>
6831 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6832 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6833 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6834 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6835 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6836 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6837 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6838 was ninety-five years.
6839 </para>
6840 <para>
6841 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6842 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6843 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6844 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6845 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6846 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6847 them.
6848 </para>
6849 <para>
6850 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6851 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6852 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6853 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6854 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6855 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6856 years.<footnote><para>
6857 <!-- f12 -->
6858 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6859 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6860 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6861 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6862 </para></footnote>
6863 </para>
6864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6865 </sect2>
6866 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6867 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6868 <para>
6869 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6870 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6871 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6872 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6873 </para>
6874 <para>
6875 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6876 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6877 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6878 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6879 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6880 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6881 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6882 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6883 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6884 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6885 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6886 </para>
6887 <para>
6888 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6889 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6890 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6891 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6892 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6893 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6894 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6895 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6896 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6897 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6898 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6899 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6900 on the initial creative work.
6901 </para>
6902 <para>
6903 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6904 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6905 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6907 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6908 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6909 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6910 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6911 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6912 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6913 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6914 </para>
6915 <para>
6916 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6917 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6918 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6919 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6920 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6921 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6922 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6923 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6924 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6925 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6926 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6927 original author.
6928 </para>
6929 <para>
6930 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6931 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6932 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6933 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6934 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6935 copy available for others to copy.
6936 </para>
6937 <para>
6938 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6939 differences.
6940 </para>
6941 <para>
6942 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6943 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6944 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6945 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6946 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6947 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6948 <!-- f13 -->
6949 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6950 Creation
6951 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6952 International
6953 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6954 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6955 </para></footnote>
6956 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6957 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6958 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6959 </para>
6960 <para>
6961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6962 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6963 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6964 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6965 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6966 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6967 creative
6968 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6969 restrained.
6970 </para>
6971 <para>
6972 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6973 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6974 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6975 reduced
6976 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6977 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6978 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6979 </para>
6980 <para>
6981 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6982 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6983 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6984 </para>
6985 <para>
6986 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6987 control
6988 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6989 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6990 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6991 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6992 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6993 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6994 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6995 exclusive
6996 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6997 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6998 </para>
6999 <para>
7000 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
7001 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
7002 expansion
7003 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
7004 copyright.
7005 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
7006 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
7007 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
7008 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
7009 </para>
7010 <para>
7011
7012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
7013 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
7014 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
7015 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
7016 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
7017 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
7018 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
7019 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
7020 protect
7021 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
7022 <!-- f14 -->
7023 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
7024 2003, available at
7025 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
7026 </para></footnote>
7027 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
7028 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
7029 the wrong of direct piracy.
7030 </para>
7031 <para>
7032 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
7033 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
7034 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
7035 transformative
7036 use of my book.<footnote><para>
7037 <!-- f15 -->
7038 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
7039 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
7040 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
7041 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
7042 Constitutionality,"
7043 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
7044 </para></footnote>
7045 These two different uses of my creative work are
7046 treated the same.
7047 </para>
7048 <para>
7049 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
7050 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
7051 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
7052 creates
7053 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
7054 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
7055 originally created?
7056 </para>
7057 <para>
7058 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
7059 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
7060 simply
7061 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
7062 rights originally granted.
7063 </para>
7064 </sect2>
7065 <sect2 id="lawreach">
7066 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
7067 <para>
7068 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7069 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7070 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7071 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
7072 <!-- f16 -->
7073 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
7074 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
7075 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
7076 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
7077 sometimes
7078 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
7079 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
7080 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7081 </para></footnote>
7082 </para>
7083 <para>
7084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7085 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
7086 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
7087 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
7088 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
7089 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
7090 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
7091 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
7092 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
7093 trigger for copyright law.
7094 </para>
7095 <para>
7096 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7097 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7098 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7099 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
7100 <!-- f17 -->
7101 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
7102 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
7103 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
7104 basis
7105 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
7106 </para></footnote>
7107 because it is clear that the
7108 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7109 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7110 </para>
7111 <para>
7112 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7113 empty circle.
7114 </para>
7115 <figure id="fig-1521">
7116 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
7117 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
7118 </figure>
7119 <para>
7120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7121 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7122 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
7123 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
7124 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
7125 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
7126 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
7127 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
7128 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
7129 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
7130 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
7131 not make a copy.
7132 </para>
7133 <figure id="fig-1531">
7134 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
7135 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
7136 </figure>
7137 <para>
7138 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7139 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7140 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7141 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7142 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7143 diagram on next page).
7144 </para>
7145 <para>
7146 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7147 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
7148 </para>
7149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7150 <figure id="fig-1541">
7151 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7152 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7153 </figure>
7154 <para>
7155 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
7156 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7157 unregulated.
7158 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
7159 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
7160 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
7161 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
7162 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
7163 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7164 </para>
7165 <figure id="fig-1542">
7166 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
7167 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7168 </figure>
7169 <para> </para>
7170 <figure id="fig-1551">
7171 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7172 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7173 </figure>
7174 <para>
7175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7176 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7177 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7178 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7179 </para>
7180 <para>
7181 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7182 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7183 <!-- f18 -->
7184 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7185 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7186 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7187 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7188 </para></footnote>
7189 And because of this single,
7190 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7191 category
7192 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7193 unregulated
7194 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7195 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7196 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7197 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
7198 category
7199 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7200 copyrighted
7201 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
7202 burden of this shift.
7203 </para>
7204 <para>
7205 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7206 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7207 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7208 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7209 nothing
7210 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7212 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
7213 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7214 produced
7215 a copy.
7216 </para>
7217 <para>
7218 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7219 different
7220 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7221 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7222 copyright
7223 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7224 accidental
7225 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7226 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7227 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7228 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7229 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7230 </para>
7231 <para>
7232 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7233 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7234 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7235 points also become clear:
7236 </para>
7237 <para>
7238 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7239 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7240 presumptively
7241 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7242 evidence
7243 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7244 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7245 free culture before the Internet.
7246 </para>
7247 <para>
7248 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7249 transformative
7250 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7251 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7252 transformation
7253 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7254 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7255 releasing
7256 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7257 justification.
7258 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7259 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7260 transformative
7261 uses of creative work.
7262 </para>
7263 <para>
7264 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7265
7266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7267 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7268 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7269 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7270 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7271 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7272 Internet,
7273 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7274 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7275 protected
7276 before because reading was not regulated.
7277 </para>
7278 <para>
7279 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7280 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7281 depend
7282 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7283 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7284 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7285 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7286 protections
7287 of fair use are not enough.
7288 </para>
7289 <para>
7290 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7291 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7292 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7293 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7294 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7295 </para>
7296 <para>
7297 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7298 began
7299 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7300 previews.
7301 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7302 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7303 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7304 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7305 before
7306 you bought it.
7307 </para>
7308 <para>
7309 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7310 distributors
7311 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7312 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7313 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7315 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7316 business
7317 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7318 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7319 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7320 immediately.
7321 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7322 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7323 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7324 </para>
7325 <para>
7326 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7327 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7328 infringed"
7329 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7330 willful
7331 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7332 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7333 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7334 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7335 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7336 </para>
7337 <para>
7338 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7339 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7340 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7341 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7342 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7343 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7344 Disney's permission.
7345 </para>
7346 <para>
7347 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7348 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7349 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7350 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7351 marketplace,
7352 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7353 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7354 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7355 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7356 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7357 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7358 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7359 </para>
7360 <para>
7361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7362 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7363 control
7364 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7365 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7366 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7367 Noble
7368 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7369 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7370 argument
7371 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7372 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7373 exercising
7374 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7375 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7376 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7377 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7378 </para>
7379 <para>
7380 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7381 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7382 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7383 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7384 owners
7385 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7386 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7387 </para>
7388 </sect2>
7389 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7390 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7391 <para>
7392 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7393 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7394 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7395 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7396 </para>
7397 <para>
7398 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7399 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7400 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7401 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7402 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7403 your freedom.
7404 </para>
7405 <para>
7406 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7407 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7409 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7410 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7411 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7412 <!-- f19 -->
7413 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7414 Contemporary
7415 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7416 </para></footnote>
7417 </para>
7418 <para>
7419 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7420 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7421 you were."<footnote><para>
7422 <!-- f20 -->
7423 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7424 </para></footnote>
7425 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7426 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7427 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7428 </para>
7429 <para>
7430 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7431 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7432 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7433 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7434 </para>
7435 <para>
7436 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7437 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7438 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7439 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7440 copyrighted
7441 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7442 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7443 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7444 that is not at all funny.
7445 </para>
7446 <para>
7447 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7448 </para>
7449 <para>
7450 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7451 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7452 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7453 technology,
7454 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7455 </para>
7456 <para>
7457 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7458 Reader.
7459 </para>
7460 <para>
7461 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7462 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7463 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7464 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7465 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7466 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7468 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7469 called Permissions.
7470 </para>
7471 <figure id="fig-1611">
7472 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7473 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7474 </figure>
7475 <para>
7476 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7477 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7478 </para>
7479 <figure id="fig-1612">
7480 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7481 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7482 </figure>
7483 <para>
7484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7485 According to my eBook
7486 Reader, I have the permission
7487 to copy to the clipboard of the
7488 computer ten text selections
7489 every ten days. (So far, I've
7490 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7491 I also have the permission to
7492 print ten pages from the book
7493 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7494 the permission to use the Read
7495 Aloud button to hear
7496 Middlemarch
7497 read aloud through the
7498 computer.
7499 </para>
7500 <para>
7501 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7502 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7503 </para>
7504 <figure id="fig-1621">
7505 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7506 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7507 </figure>
7508 <para>
7509 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7510 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7511 the book.
7512 </para>
7513 <figure id="fig-1622">
7514 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7515 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7516 </figure>
7517 <para>
7518 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7519 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7520 </para>
7521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7522 <figure id="fig-1631">
7523 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7524 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7525 </figure>
7526 <para>
7527 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7528 </para>
7529 <para>
7530 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7531 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7532 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7533 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7534 under
7535 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7536 <!-- f21 -->
7537 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7538 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7539 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7540 obligation
7541 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7542 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7543 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7544 </para></footnote>
7545 When my e-book of
7546 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7547 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7548 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7549 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7550 </para>
7551 <para>
7552 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7553 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7554 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7555 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7556 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7557 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7558 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7559 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7560 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7561 restrictions:
7562 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7563 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7564 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7565 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7566 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7567 </para>
7568 <para>
7569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7570 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7571 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7572 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7573 </para>
7574 <para>
7575 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7576 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7577 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7578 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7579 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7580 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7581 </para>
7582 <para>
7583 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7584 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7585 technologies
7586 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7587 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7588 protections as well?
7589 </para>
7590 <para>
7591 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7592 eBook Reader.
7593 </para>
7594 <para>
7595 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7596 public
7597 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7598 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7599 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7600 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7601 </para>
7602 <figure id="fig-1641">
7603 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7604 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7605 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7606 </figure>
7607 <para>
7608 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7609 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7610 allowed
7611 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7612 "permissions"
7613 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7614 </para>
7615 <para>
7616 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7617 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7618 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7619 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7620 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7621 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7622 </para>
7623 <para>
7624 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7625 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7626 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7627 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7628 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7629 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7630 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7631 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7632 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7633 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7634 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7635 </para>
7636 <para>
7637 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7638 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7639 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7640 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7641 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7642 often crazy.
7643 </para>
7644 <para>
7645 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7646 story of mine that makes the same point.
7647 </para>
7648 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7649 <para>
7650 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7651 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7652 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7653 </para>
7654 <para>
7655 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7656 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7657 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7659 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7660 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7661 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7662 </para>
7663 <para>
7664 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7665 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7666 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7667 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7668 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7669 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7670 </para>
7671 <para>
7672 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7673 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7674 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7675 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7676 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7677 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7678 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7679 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7680 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7681 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7682 </para>
7683 <para>
7684 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7685 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7686 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7687 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7688 ethically.
7689 </para>
7690 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7691 <para>
7692 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7693 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7694 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7695 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7696 than Sony had built.
7697 </para>
7698 <para>
7699 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7700 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7701 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7702 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7703 the
7704
7705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7706 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7707 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7708 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7709 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7710 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7711 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7712 dog to dance?
7713 </para>
7714 <para>
7715 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7716 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7717 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7718 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7719 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7720 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7721 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7722 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7723 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7724 </para>
7725 <para>
7726 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7727 <!-- f22 -->
7728 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7729 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7730 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7731 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7732 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7733 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7734 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7735 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7736 Questions
7737 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7738 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7739 </para></footnote>
7740 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7741 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7742 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7743 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7744 </para>
7745 <para>
7746 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7747 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7748 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7749 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7750 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7751 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7752 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7753 Internet much more.
7754 </para>
7755 <para>
7756 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7757 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7758 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7759 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7760 </para>
7761 <para>
7762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7763 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7764 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7765 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7766 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7767 </para>
7768 <para>
7769 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7770 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7771 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7772 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7773 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7774 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7775 </para>
7776 <para>
7777 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7778 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7779 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7780 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7781 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7782 constituted, succeed.
7783 </para>
7784 <para>
7785 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7786 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7787 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7788 wrote:
7789 </para>
7790 <blockquote>
7791 <para>
7792 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7793 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7794 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7795 </para>
7796 </blockquote>
7797 <para>
7798 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7799 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7800 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7801 </para>
7802 <blockquote>
7803 <para>
7804 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7806 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7807 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7808 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7809 </para>
7810 </blockquote>
7811 <para>
7812 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7813 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7814 spreading such information an offense.
7815 </para>
7816 <para>
7817 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7818 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7819 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7820 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7821 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7822 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7823 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7824 </para>
7825 <para>
7826 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7827 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7828 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7829 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7830 </para>
7831 <para>
7832 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7833 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7834 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7835 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7836 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7837 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7838 have been a copyright violation.
7839 </para>
7840 <para>
7841 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7842 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7843 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7844 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7845 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7846 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7847 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7849 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7850 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7851 </para>
7852 <para>
7853 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7854 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7855 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7856 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7857 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7858 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7859 </para>
7860 <para>
7861 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7862 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7863 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7864 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7865 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7866 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7867 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7868 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7869 </para>
7870 <blockquote>
7871 <para>
7872 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7873 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7874 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7875 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7876 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7877 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7878 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7879 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7880 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7881 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7882 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7883 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7884 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7885 important.<footnote><para>
7886 <!-- f23 -->
7887 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7888 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7889 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7890 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7891 </para></footnote>
7892 </para>
7893 </blockquote>
7894 <para>
7895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7896 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7897 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7898 the VCR responsible.
7899 </para>
7900 <para>
7901 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7902 the DMCA.
7903 </para>
7904 <para>
7905 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7906 </para>
7907 <para>
7908 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7909 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7910 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7911 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7912 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7913 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7914 </para>
7915 <para>
7916 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7918 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7919 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7920 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7921 and bad uses.
7922 </para>
7923 <figure id="fig-1711">
7924 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7925 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7926 </figure>
7927 <para>
7928 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7929 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7930 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7931 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7932 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7933 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7934 </para>
7935 <para>
7936 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7937 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7938 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7939 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7940 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7941 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7942 </para>
7943 <para>
7944 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7945 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7946 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7947 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7948 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7949 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7950 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7951 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7952 </para>
7953 <para>
7954 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7955 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7956 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7957 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7958 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7959 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7960 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7961 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7962 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7963 </para>
7964 <para>
7965
7966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7967 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7968 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7969 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7970 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7971 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7972 <!-- f24 -->
7973 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7974 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7975 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7976 </para></footnote>
7977 </para>
7978 <para>
7979 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7980 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7981 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7982 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7983 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7984 </para>
7985 <para>
7986 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7987 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7988 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7989 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7990 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7991 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7992 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7993 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7994 </para>
7995 <para>
7996 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7997 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7998 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7999 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
8000 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
8001 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
8002 </para>
8003 </sect2>
8004 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
8005 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
8006 <para>
8007 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
8008 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
8009 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
8010 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
8011 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
8012 find better ways
8013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
8014 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
8015 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
8016 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
8017 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
8018 market for creative work, has become the single most important
8019 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
8020 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
8021 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
8022 control.
8023 </para>
8024 <para>
8025 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8026 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8027 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8028 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8029 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8030 </para>
8031 <para>
8032 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8033 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8034 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8035 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8036 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8037 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8038 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8039 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8040 of the media.
8041 </para>
8042 <para>
8043 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8044 nature.
8045 </para>
8046 <para>
8047 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8048 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8049 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
8050 <!-- f25 -->
8051 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8052 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
8053 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote> The five
8054 recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8055 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
8056 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
8057 <!-- f26 -->
8058 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8059 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
8060 </para></footnote>
8061 The "five largest cable companies pipe
8062 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
8063 <!-- f27 -->
8064 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
8065 31 May 2003.
8066 </para></footnote>
8067 </para>
8068 <para>
8069 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8070 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8072 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
8073 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
8074 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
8075 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
8076 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
8077 nation's radio advertising revenues.
8078 </para>
8079 <para>
8080 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8081 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8082 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8083 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8084 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
8085 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
8086 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8087 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8088 protected&mdash; by the market.
8089 </para>
8090 <para>
8091 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8092 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8093 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8094 </para>
8095 <blockquote>
8096 <para>
8097 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8098 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
8099 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8100 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8101 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8102 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8103 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8104 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8105 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8106 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
8107 <!-- f28 -->
8108 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
8109 2003): 89.
8110 </para></footnote>
8111 </para>
8112 </blockquote>
8113 <para>
8114 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8115 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8116 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8117 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8118 </para>
8119 <figure id="fig-1761">
8120 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
8121 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
8122 </figure>
8123 <para>
8124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8125 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8126 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8127 distribute content?
8128 </para>
8129 <para>
8130 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8131 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8132 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8133 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8134 </para>
8135 <para>
8136 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8137 integration may matter.
8138 </para>
8139 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8140 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8141 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8142 <para>
8143 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
8144 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8145 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8146 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8147 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8148 </para>
8149 <para>
8150 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8151 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8152 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8153 control.<footnote><para>
8154 <!-- f29 -->
8155 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8156 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8157 Missouri,
8158 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8159 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8160 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8161 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8162 </para></footnote>
8163 </para>
8164 <para>
8165
8166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8167 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
8168 forbade
8169 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
8170 law required a separation between the networks and the content
8171 producers;
8172 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
8173 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8174 television&mdash;75
8175 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
8176 </para>
8177 <para>
8178 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8179 independence.
8180 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8181 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8182 studios;
8183 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8184 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8185 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8186 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
8187 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8188 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
8189 <!-- f30 -->
8190 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8191 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
8192 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8193 Consumers
8194 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8195 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8196 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8197 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
8198 </para></footnote>
8199 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
8200 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8201 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8202 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
8203 number
8204 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8205 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
8206 <!-- f31 -->
8207 Ibid.
8208 </para></footnote>
8209 </para>
8210 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8211 <para>
8212 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8213 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8214 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8215 owned by the network.
8216 </para>
8217 <para>
8218 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8219 ownership
8220 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8221 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8222 </para>
8223 <blockquote>
8224 <para>
8225 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8226 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8227 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8228 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8230 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8231 production
8232 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8233 than a handful.<footnote><para>
8234 <!-- f32 -->
8235 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8236 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8237 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8238 </para></footnote>
8239 </para>
8240 </blockquote>
8241 <para>
8242 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8243 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8244 Increasingly
8245 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8246 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8247 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8248 inside,
8249 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8250 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8251 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8252 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8253 </para>
8254 <para>
8255 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8256 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8257 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8258 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8259 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8260 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8261 <!-- f33 -->
8262 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8263 National
8264 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8265 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8266 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8267 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8268 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8269 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8270 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
8271 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
8272 </para></footnote>
8273
8274 Lumbering
8275 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8276 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8277 </para>
8278 <para>
8279 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8280 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8281 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8282 measure.
8283 </para>
8284 <para>
8285 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8286 suggest the concern.
8287 </para>
8288 <para>
8289 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8290 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8291 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8292 </para>
8293 <para>
8294 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8295 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8296 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8297
8298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8299 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8300 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8301 collateral
8302 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8303 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8304 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8305 opportunities
8306 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8307 because
8308 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8309 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8310 nations
8311 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8312 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8313 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8314 </para>
8315 <para>
8316 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8317 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8318 depend
8319 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8320 these issues.
8321 </para>
8322 <para>
8323 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8324 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8325 campaign
8326 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8327 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8328 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8329 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8330 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8331 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8332 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8333 the pro-legalization campaign.
8334 </para>
8335 <para>
8336 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8337 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8338 </para>
8339 <para>
8340 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8341 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8342 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8343 drug war. Can you do it?
8344 </para>
8345 <para>
8346 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8348 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8349 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8350 message
8351 will be heard then?
8352 </para>
8353 <para>
8354 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8355 avoiding
8356 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8357 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8358 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8359 Amendment,
8360 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8361 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8362 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8363 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8364 <!-- f34 -->
8365 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
8366 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8367 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8368 policy."
8369 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8370 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8371 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8372 returned
8373 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.
8374 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8375 example,
8376 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8377 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4.
8378 Outside
8379 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8380 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8381 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8382 Advertising
8383 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988):
8384 449&ndash;79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8385 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d
8386 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8387 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8388 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8389 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8390 Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8391 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground was
8392 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8393 </para></footnote>
8394 </para>
8395 <para>
8396 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived in
8397 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8398 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8399 access
8400 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8401 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8402 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8403 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8404 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8405 get to know about.
8406
8407 </para>
8408 </sect2>
8409 <sect2 id="together">
8410 <title>Together</title>
8411 <para>
8412 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8413 copyright
8414 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8415 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8416 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8417 </para>
8418 <para>
8419 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8420 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8421 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8422 cultivate
8423 our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins to seem
8424
8425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8426 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8427 supplement
8428 the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets
8429 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8430 massively
8431 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8432 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8433 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8434 </para>
8435 <para>
8436 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8437 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8438 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8439 our culture today.
8440 </para>
8441 <para>
8442 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8443 notwithstanding.
8444 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8445 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8446 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8447 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8448 adjustment
8449 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8450 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8451 adjustment
8452 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8453 regulation&mdash;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8454 </para>
8455 <para>
8456 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8457 constant
8458 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8459 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8460 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8461 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8462 copyright
8463 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8464 technology
8465 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8466 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8467 response
8468 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8469 market enable.
8470 </para>
8471 <para>
8472 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8473 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8475 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8476 changing
8477 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8478 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8479 development
8480 of our culture than now.
8481 </para>
8482 <para>
8483 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8484 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8485 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8486 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8487 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8488 independent
8489 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8490 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8491 remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny
8492 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a
8493 massive
8494 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8495 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8496 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8497 known.<footnote><para>
8498 <!-- f35 -->
8499 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8500 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8501 </para></footnote>
8502 </para>
8503 <para>
8504 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8505 </para>
8506 <para>
8507 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8508 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8509 distinguished
8510 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8511 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8512 that copyright law has undergone.
8513 In 1790, the law looked like this:
8514 </para>
8515
8516 <table id="t2">
8517 <title></title>
8518 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8519 <thead>
8520 <row>
8521 <entry></entry>
8522 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8523 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8524 </row>
8525 </thead>
8526 <tbody>
8527 <row>
8528 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8529 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8530 <entry>Free</entry>
8531 </row>
8532 <row>
8533 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8534 <entry>Free</entry>
8535 <entry>Free</entry>
8536 </row>
8537 </tbody>
8538 </tgroup>
8539 </table>
8540
8541 <para>
8542 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8543 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8544 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8545
8546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8547 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8548 noncommercial work was also free.
8549 </para>
8550 <para>
8551 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8552 </para>
8553
8554 <table id="t3">
8555 <title></title>
8556 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8557 <thead>
8558 <row>
8559 <entry></entry>
8560 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8561 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8562 </row>
8563 </thead>
8564 <tbody>
8565 <row>
8566 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8567 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8568 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8569 </row>
8570 <row>
8571 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8572 <entry>Free</entry>
8573 <entry>Free</entry>
8574 </row>
8575 </tbody>
8576 </tgroup>
8577 </table>
8578
8579 <para>
8580 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8581 published,
8582 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8583 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8584 transformation were still essentially free.
8585 </para>
8586 <para>
8587 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8588 after
8589 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8590 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8591 expanded.
8592 Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more
8593 common,
8594 we could say the law began to look like this:
8595 </para>
8596
8597 <table id="t4">
8598 <title></title>
8599 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8600 <thead>
8601 <row>
8602 <entry></entry>
8603 <entry>COPY</entry>
8604 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8605 </row>
8606 </thead>
8607 <tbody>
8608 <row>
8609 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8610 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8611 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8612 </row>
8613 <row>
8614 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8615 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8616 <entry>Free</entry>
8617 </row>
8618 </tbody>
8619 </tgroup>
8620 </table>
8621
8622 <para>
8623 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8624 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8625 commercial
8626 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8627 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8628 means that the law now looks like this:
8629 </para>
8630
8631 <table id="t5">
8632 <title></title>
8633 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8634 <thead>
8635 <row>
8636 <entry></entry>
8637 <entry>COPY</entry>
8638 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8639 </row>
8640 </thead>
8641 <tbody>
8642 <row>
8643 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8644 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8645 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8646 </row>
8647 <row>
8648 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8649 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8650 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8651 </row>
8652 </tbody>
8653 </tgroup>
8654 </table>
8655
8656 <para>
8657 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8658 creativity
8659 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&mdash;
8660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8661 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules designed
8662 to regulate commercial publishers.
8663 </para>
8664 <para>
8665 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8666 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8667 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8668 these domains actually does any good.
8669 </para>
8670 <para>
8671 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8672 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8673 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8674 especially,
8675 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8676 reasons
8677 sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8678 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8679 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8680 rights were more sharply restricted.
8681 </para>
8682 <para>
8683 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8684 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8685 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8686 notwithstanding,
8687 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<footnote><para>
8688 <!-- f36 -->
8689 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8690 movement
8691 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8692 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8693 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8694 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
8695 </para></footnote>)
8696 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8697 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8698 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8699 technologies.
8700 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8701 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8702 work. American culture was born free, and for almost 180 years our
8703 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8704 </para>
8705 <para>
8706 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8707 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8708 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8709 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8710 of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8711 concern
8712 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8713 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding
8714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8715 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8716 familiar
8717 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And
8718 granting
8719 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8720 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8721 (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8722 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8723 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8724 </para>
8725 <para>
8726 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8727 response
8728 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8729 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8730 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8731 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8732 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8733 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8734 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8735 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8736 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8737 </para>
8738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8739 </sect2>
8740 </sect1>
8741 </chapter>
8742 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8743 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8744
8745 <para> </para>
8746
8747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8748 <sect1 id="chimera">
8749 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8750 <para>
8751
8752 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8753 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8754 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8755 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8756 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8757 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8758 </para></footnote>
8759 The valley is extraordinarily
8760 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8761 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8762 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8763 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8764 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8765 </para>
8766 <para>
8767 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8768 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8769 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8770 Indeed,
8771 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8772 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8773 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8774 understand,'
8775 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8776 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8777 </para>
8778 <para>
8779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8780 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8781 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8782 affection,
8783 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8784 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8785 description
8786 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8787 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8788 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8789 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8790 understand,
8791 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8792 </para>
8793 <para>
8794 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8795 delighted"
8796 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8797 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8798 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8799 </para>
8800 <para>
8801 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8802 is affected," he reports.
8803 </para>
8804 <para>
8805 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8806 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8807 such a way as to affect his brain."
8808 </para>
8809 <para>
8810 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8811 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8812 and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8813 [the eyes]."
8814 </para>
8815 <para>
8816 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8817 inform
8818 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8819 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8820 believe
8821 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8822 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8823 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8824 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8825 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8826
8827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8828 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8829 certainty
8830 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8831 </para>
8832 <para>
8833 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8834 impossible.
8835 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8836 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8837 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8838 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8839 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8840 </para>
8841 <para>
8842 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8843 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8844 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8845 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8846 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8847 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8848 records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8849 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8850 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8851 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8852 respects,
8853 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8854 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8855 </para>
8856 <para>
8857 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8858 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8859 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8860 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8861 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8862 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8863 allowed
8864 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8865 </para>
8866 <para>
8867 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8868 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8869 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
8870 releases
8871 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
8872 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
8873 </para>
8874 <para>
8875
8876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8877 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8878 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
8879 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8880 something
8881 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
8882 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
8883 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $1,000.
8884 According
8885 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
8886 liable
8887 for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8888 </para>
8889 <para>
8890 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
8891 it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
8892 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
8893 asserts,
8894 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
8895 chimera. What rules should govern it?
8896 </para>
8897 <para>
8898 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8899 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
8900 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
8901 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
8902 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
8903 computer
8904 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
8905 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.<footnote><para>
8906 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8907 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8908 "Copyright
8909 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8910 at
8911 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8912 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8913 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8914 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8915 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8916 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8917 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8918 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8919 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8920 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8921 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8922 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8923 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8924 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8925 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8926 billion
8927 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8928 Elizabeth
8929 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8930 August 2003, available at
8931 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8932 targeting
8933 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8934 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8935 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8936 D3, available at
8937 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8938 </para></footnote>
8939
8940 </para>
8941 <para>
8942 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
8943 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
8944 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8945 copyrighted
8946 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
8947 regulated,
8948 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8949 </para>
8950 <para>
8951 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8952 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8953 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8954 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8955 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8956 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8957 alternative.
8958 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8959 of the two extremes.
8960 </para>
8961 <para>
8962
8963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8964 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8965 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8966 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8967 content
8968 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8969 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8970 innovation
8971 and new creativity will be lost.
8972 </para>
8973 <para>
8974 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8975 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8976 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8977 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8978 innovation
8979 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8980 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8981 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8982 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8983 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8984 material,
8985 </para>
8986 <blockquote>
8987 <para>
8988 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8989 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8990 </para>
8991 <para>
8992 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8993 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8994 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8995 answer
8996 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8997 well produce a totally different industry model.
8998 </para>
8999 <para>
9000 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
9001 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
9002 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
9003 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
9004 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
9005 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
9006 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
9007 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
9008 interests.<footnote><para>
9009 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
9010 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
9011 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
9012 Protection,
9013 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
9014 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
9015 EMusic.com),
9016 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
9017 Congressional
9018 Testimony File.
9019 </para></footnote>
9020 </para>
9021 </blockquote>
9022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
9023 <para>
9024 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
9025 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
9026 changed.
9027 </para>
9028 <para>
9029 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
9030 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
9031 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
9032 </para>
9033
9034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
9035 </sect1>
9036 <sect1 id="harms">
9037 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
9038 <para>
9039
9040 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
9041 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
9042 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
9043 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
9044 prohibition,
9045 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
9046 </para>
9047 <para>
9048 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
9049 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
9050 extend
9051 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9052 justified?
9053 </para>
9054 <para>
9055 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9056 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9057 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
9058 our history.
9059 </para>
9060 <para>
9061 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
9062 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
9063 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9064 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
9065 </para>
9066 <para>
9067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9068 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9069 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9070 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9071 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9072 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9073 </para>
9074 <sect2 id="constrain">
9075 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
9076 <para>
9077 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9078 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9079 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9080 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9081 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9082 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9083 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9084 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9085 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9086 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9087 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9088 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
9089 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9090 </para>
9091 <para>
9092 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
9093 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9094 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9095 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9096 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
9097 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9098 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9099 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9100 the culture all around.
9101 </para>
9102 <para>
9103 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9104 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9105
9106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9107
9108 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9109 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9110 storytelling extended across the globe.
9111 </para>
9112 <para>
9113 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9114 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9115 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9116 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9117 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9118 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9119 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9120 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9121 work is presumptively illegal.
9122 </para>
9123 <para>
9124 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9125 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9126 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9127 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9128 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9129 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
9130 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9131 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
9132 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9133 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
9134 million.<footnote><para>
9135 <!-- f1. -->
9136 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
9137 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
9138 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9139 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
9140 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
9141 </para></footnote>
9142 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9143 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9144 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9145 suffering.<footnote><para>
9146 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9147 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9148 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9149 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9150 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9151 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9152 available at
9153 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9154 recent months.
9155 </para></footnote>
9156 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9157 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9158 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9159 </para>
9160 <para>
9161 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9162 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
9163 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
9164 creative
9165 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
9166 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
9167 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
9168
9169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9170 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
9171 create,
9172 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
9173 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
9174 begin
9175 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
9176 necessarily
9177 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
9178 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
9179 "illegal
9180 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
9181 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
9182 available
9183 at
9184 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9185 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9186 </para></footnote>
9187 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9188 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9189 critical or reflective.
9190 </para>
9191 <para>
9192 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9193 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
9194 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9195 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9196 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9197 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9198 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9199 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9200 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9201 </para>
9202 <para>
9203 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9204 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9205 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9206 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9207 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9208 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9209 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9210 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9211 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9212 </para>
9213 <para>
9214 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9215 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
9216 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9217 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9218 law regulates such a use.
9219 </para>
9220 <para>
9221
9222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9223 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9224 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9225 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9226 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9227 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9228 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9229 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9230 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9231 </para>
9232 <para>
9233 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9234 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9235 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9236 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9237 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9238 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9239 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9240 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9241 comfort themselves.
9242 </para>
9243 <para>
9244 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9245 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9246 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9247 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9248 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9249 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9250 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9251 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9252 culture that is free.
9253 </para>
9254 <para>
9255 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9256 </para>
9257 <blockquote>
9258 <para>
9259 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9260 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9261 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9262 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9263 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9265 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9266 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9267 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9268 </para>
9269 </blockquote>
9270 </sect2>
9271 <sect2 id="innovators">
9272 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9273 <para>
9274 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9275 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9276 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9277 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9278 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9279 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9280 </para>
9281 <para>
9282 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9283 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9284 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9285 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9286 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9287 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9288 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9289 </para>
9290 <para>
9291 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9292 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9293 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9294 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9295 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9296 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9297 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9298 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9299 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9300 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9301 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9302 </para>
9303 <para>
9304 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9306 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9307 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9308 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9309 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9310 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9311 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9312 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9313 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9314 </para>
9315 <para>
9316 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9317 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9318 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9319 </para>
9320 <para>
9321 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9322 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9323 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9324 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9325 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9326 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9327 </para>
9328 <para>
9329 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9330 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9331 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9332 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9333 Raitt. And so on.
9334 </para>
9335 <para>
9336 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9337 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9338 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9339 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9340 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9341 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9342 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9343 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9344 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9345 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9346 </para>
9347 <para>
9348 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9349 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9350
9351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9352 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9353 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9354 the kind of content the users liked.
9355 </para>
9356 <para>
9357 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9358 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9359 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9360 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9361 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9362 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9363 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9364 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9365 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9366 they had already bought.
9367 </para>
9368 <para>
9369 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9370 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9371 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9372 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9373 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9374 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9375 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9376 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9377 </para>
9378 <para>
9379 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9380 </para>
9381 <para>
9382 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9383 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9384 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9385 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9386 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9387 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9388 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9389 demanded.
9390 </para>
9391 <para>
9392 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9393 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9394 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9395 clients in this
9396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9397 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9398 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9399 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9400 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9401 </para>
9402 <para>
9403 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9404 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9405 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9406 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9407 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9408 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9409 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9410 innovation
9411 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9412 Revolution
9413 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9414 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9415 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9416 Times, 28 May 2001.
9417 </para></footnote>
9418 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9419 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9420 industry
9421 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9422 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9423 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9424 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9425 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9426 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9427 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9428 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9429 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9430 </para>
9431 <blockquote>
9432 <para>
9433 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9434 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9435 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9436 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9437 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9438 forward
9439 for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9440 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote><para>
9441 <!-- f5. --> Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9442 2003, available at
9443 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli
9444 for this example.
9445 </para></footnote>
9446 </para>
9447 </blockquote>
9448 <para>
9449 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9450 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the
9451 law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system that will
9452 obviously
9453 and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard enough to start
9454 a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is constantly
9455 threatened
9456 by litigation.
9457 </para>
9458 <para>
9459
9460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9461 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9462 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9463 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9464 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9465 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9466 imposes,
9467 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9468 conservative
9469 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9470 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9471 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9472 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9473 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9474 </para>
9475 <para>
9476 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9477 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9478 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9479 systematically
9480 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9481 industries
9482 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9483 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9484 competition.
9485 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9486 competition.
9487 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9488 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9489 overregulatedregulated
9490 market.
9491 </para>
9492 <para>
9493 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9494 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9495 burden
9496 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9497 culture
9498 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9499 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9500 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9501 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9502 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9503 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9504 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9505 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9507 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9508 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9509 creativity.
9510 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9511 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9512 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9513 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9514 technology
9515 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9516 </para>
9517 <para>
9518 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9519 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9520 Internet's
9521 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9522 feature
9523 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9524 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9525 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9526 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9527 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9528 </para>
9529 <para>
9530 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9531 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9532 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9533 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9534 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9535 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9536 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9537 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9538 </para></footnote>
9539
9540 Congress
9541 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9542 "broadcast
9543 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9544 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9545 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9546 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9547 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9548 violators
9549 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9550 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9551 </para></footnote>
9552
9553 </para>
9554 <para>
9555 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9556 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9557 regulation
9558 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9559 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9560
9561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9562 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9563 those requirements.
9564 </para>
9565 <para>
9566 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9567 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9568 impose.<footnote><para>
9569 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9570 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9571 </para></footnote>
9572 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9573 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9574 harm than good.
9575 </para>
9576 <para>
9577 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9578 innovation&mdash;again,
9579 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9580 crowd.
9581 </para>
9582 <para>
9583 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9584 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9585 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9586 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9587 </para>
9588 <para>
9589 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9590 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9591 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9592 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9593 2001).
9594 </para></footnote>
9595 overall this history of copyright
9596 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9597 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9598 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9599 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9600 </para>
9601 <para>
9602 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9603 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9604 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9605 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9606 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9607 </para>
9608 <para>
9609 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9610 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9611 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9612 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9613 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9614 copyright
9615 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9616 music
9617 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9618 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9619 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9620 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9621 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9622 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9623 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9624 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9625 </para></footnote>
9626 It has been
9627 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9628 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9629 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9630 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9631 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9632 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9633 August
9634 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9635 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9636 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9637 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9638 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9639 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9640 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9641 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9642 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9643 </para></footnote>
9644 But there is one
9645 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9646 demise
9647 of Internet radio.
9648 </para>
9649 <para>
9650
9651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9652 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9653 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9654 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9655 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9656 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9657 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9658 copyright
9659 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9660 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9661 </para>
9662 <para>
9663 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9664 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9665 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9666 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9667 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9668 Probably
9669 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9670 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9671 efforts
9672 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9673 </para>
9674 <para>
9675 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9676 technology
9677 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9678 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9679 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9680 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9681 regular
9682 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9683 </para>
9684 <para>
9685 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9686 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9687 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9688 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9689 broadcasters
9690 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9691 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9692 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9693 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9694 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9695 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9696 in to this new form of radio.
9697 </para>
9698 <para>
9699
9700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9701 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9702 improvement
9703 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9704 improvement
9705 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9706 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9707 establish
9708 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9709 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9710 </para>
9711 <blockquote>
9712 <para>
9713 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9714 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9715 radio
9716 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9717 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9718 competition
9719 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9720 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9721 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9722 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9723 communications
9724 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9725 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9726 acquire
9727 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9728 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9729 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9730 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9731 </para></footnote>
9732 </para>
9733 </blockquote>
9734 <para>
9735 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9736 Armstrong
9737 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9738 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9739 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9740 </para></footnote>
9741 to
9742 retard
9743 the growth of this competing technology.
9744 </para>
9745 <para>
9746 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9747 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9748 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9749 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9750 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9751 radio?
9752 </para>
9753 <para>
9754 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9755 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9756
9757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9758 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9759 phenomenon
9760 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9761 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9762 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9763 hypothetical
9764 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9765 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9766 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9767 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9768 </para>
9769 <para>
9770 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9771 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed
9772 adfree
9773 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9774 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9775 over $1 million a year.<footnote><para>
9776 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9777 Arbitration
9778 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9779 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9780 (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9781 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9782 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9783 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2,
9784 available at
9785 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9786 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9787 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9788 Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9789 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9790 digital
9791 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9792 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9793 powerful
9794 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9795 </para></footnote>
9796 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9797 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9798 </para>
9799 <para>
9800 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9801 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9802 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9803 </para>
9804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9805 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9806 <listitem><para>
9807 name of the service;
9808 </para></listitem>
9809 <listitem><para>
9810 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9811 </para></listitem>
9812 <listitem><para>
9813 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9814 </para></listitem>
9815 <listitem><para>
9816 date of transmission;
9817 </para></listitem>
9818 <listitem><para>
9819 time of transmission;
9820 </para></listitem>
9821 <listitem><para>
9822 time zone of origination of transmission;
9823 </para></listitem>
9824 <listitem><para>
9825 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9826 </para></listitem>
9827 <listitem><para>
9828 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9829 </para></listitem>
9830 <listitem><para>
9831 sound recording title;
9832 </para></listitem>
9833 <listitem><para>
9834 ISRC code of the recording;
9835 </para></listitem>
9836 <listitem><para>
9837 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9838 </para></listitem>
9839 <listitem><para>
9840 featured recording artist;
9841 </para></listitem>
9842 <listitem><para>
9843 retail album title;
9844 </para></listitem>
9845 <listitem><para>
9846 recording label;
9847 </para></listitem>
9848 <listitem><para>
9849 UPC code of the retail album;
9850 </para></listitem>
9851 <listitem><para>
9852 catalog number;
9853 </para></listitem>
9854 <listitem><para>
9855 copyright owner information;
9856 </para></listitem>
9857 <listitem><para>
9858 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9859 </para></listitem>
9860 <listitem><para>
9861 name of the service or entity;
9862 </para></listitem>
9863 <listitem><para>
9864 channel or program;
9865 </para></listitem>
9866 <listitem><para>
9867 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9868 </para></listitem>
9869 <listitem><para>
9870 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9871 </para></listitem>
9872 <listitem><para>
9873 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9874 </para></listitem>
9875 <listitem><para>
9876 Unique User identifier;
9877 </para></listitem>
9878 <listitem><para>
9879 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9880 </para></listitem>
9881 </orderedlist>
9882
9883 <para>
9884 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9885 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9886 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9887 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9888 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9889 does not.
9890 </para>
9891 <para>
9892 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9893 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9894 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9895 </para>
9896 <para>
9897 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed
9898 obvious
9899 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9900 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9901 </para>
9902 <blockquote>
9903 <para>
9904 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9905 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9906 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9907 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9908 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9909 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9910
9911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9912 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9913 Because
9914 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9915 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9916 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9917 of business. . . ."
9918 </para>
9919 <para>
9920 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9921 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9922 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9923 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9924 </para>
9925 </blockquote>
9926 <para>
9927 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9928 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9929 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9930 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9931 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9932 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9933 effective to prevent it.
9934 </para>
9935 </sect2>
9936 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9937 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9938 <para>
9939 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9940 dinosaurs
9941 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9942 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9943 </para>
9944 <para>
9945 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9946 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9947 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9948 </para>
9949 <para>
9950 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9951 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9952 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9953 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9954 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9955 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9956 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9957 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9958 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9959 </para></footnote>
9960 According to the RIAA,
9961 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9962 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9963
9964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9965 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9966 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9967 increasingly
9968 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9969 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9970 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9971 extreme
9972 response by the other.
9973 </para>
9974 <para>
9975 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9976 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9977 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9978 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9979 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9980 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9981 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9982 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9983 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9984 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9985 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9986 was.<footnote><para>
9987 <!-- f16. --> Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9988 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9989 </para></footnote>
9990 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to
9991 defend
9992 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9993 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9994 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9995 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9996 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9997 they oppose.
9998 </para>
9999 <para>
10000 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
10001 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
10002 experimented
10003 with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
10004 consumption
10005 of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war against
10006 drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent of its
10007 preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition, consumption was
10008 up to 70 percent of the preprohibition level. Americans were drinking
10009 just about as much, but now, a vast number were criminals.<footnote><para>
10010 <!-- f17. --> Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
10011 Prohibition,"
10012 American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
10013 </para></footnote>
10014 We have
10015
10016 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
10017 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of
10018 regulated
10019 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
10020 <!-- f18. --> National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
10021 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
10022 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
10023 </para></footnote>
10024
10025 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of the
10026 population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
10027 majority
10028 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
10029 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.<footnote><para>
10030 <!-- f19. --> See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
10031 Compliance,"
10032 Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of compliance
10033 literature).
10034 </para></footnote>
10035 We
10036 pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of ordinary
10037 behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a huge
10038 proportion
10039 of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10040 </para>
10041 <para>
10042 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10043 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
10044 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told
10045 a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students
10046 who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and
10047 sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven
10048 cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the
10049 norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to teach them how
10050 to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds
10051 separate,
10052 or honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that
10053 your case is over. Generations of Americans&mdash;more significantly in
10054 some parts of America than in others, but still, everywhere in America
10055 today&mdash;can't live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally"
10056 entails a certain degree of illegality.
10057 </para>
10058 <para>
10059 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10060 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how
10061 to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10062 depends,
10063 in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10064 intended
10065 and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and
10066 collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be changed.
10067 Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much greater than
10068 the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason to consider the
10069 alternative.
10070 </para>
10071 <para>
10072
10073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10074 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10075 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10076 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10077 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10078 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10079 </para>
10080 <para>
10081 My point is instead one that democracies understood for
10082 generations,
10083 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law
10084 depends upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more
10085 repeatedly,
10086 we as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect
10087 the law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10088 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law or
10089 not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether
10090 my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law sow
10091 increasing
10092 disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they impose.
10093 Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10094 introduced
10095 this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to call these
10096 twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
10097 </para>
10098 <para>
10099 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from
10100 the Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10101 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10102 asking
10103 is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be
10104 whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve
10105 the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to
10106 assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three million
10107 Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other ways to
10108 assure that artists get paid without transforming America into a nation
10109 of felons?
10110 </para>
10111 <para>
10112 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10113 </para>
10114 <para>
10115 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These
10116 pieces of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.
10117 The law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10118 copyright
10119 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used
10120
10121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10122 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
10123 recordings is free.
10124 </para>
10125 <para>
10126 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10127 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10128 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
10129 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10130 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a right:
10131 In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
10132 capacities
10133 of digital technologies.
10134 </para>
10135 <para>
10136 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10137 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10138 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10139 program
10140 called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music:
10141 Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others&mdash;the
10142 potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists,
10143 these technologies help build a creativity with play lists that is itself
10144 independently
10145 valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and
10146 meaningful
10147 in their own right.
10148 </para>
10149 <para>
10150 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
10151 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10152 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair
10153 return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10154 experiment
10155 with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10156 technologies,
10157 for example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or
10158 they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content on people's
10159 machines.
10160 </para>
10161 <para>
10162 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10163 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in
10164 hacker circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that
10165 protect
10166 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10167 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10168 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10169
10170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10171 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10172 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10173 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
10174 management"
10175 system.
10176 </para>
10177 <para>
10178 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10179 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10180 interfere
10181 with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what
10182 if there were another way to assure that artists are paid, without
10183 locking
10184 down any content? What if, in other words, a different system
10185 could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom
10186 to move content easily?
10187 </para>
10188 <para>
10189 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I
10190 offer
10191 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10192 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system
10193 achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright
10194 system
10195 achieved, but left consumers and creators much more free, then
10196 we'd have a very good reason to pursue this alternative&mdash;namely,
10197 freedom.
10198 The choice, in other words, would not be between property and
10199 piracy; the choice would be between different property systems and the
10200 freedoms each allowed.
10201 </para>
10202 <para>
10203 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10204 turning
10205 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature
10206 of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for
10207 producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today
10208 control the vast majority of the distribution of content in the world,
10209 would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go
10210 the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10211 </para>
10212 <para>
10213 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already
10214 saddled Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against
10215 this new form of competition. For them the choice is between
10216 fortythree
10217 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10218 </para>
10219 <para>
10220 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10221 understandable
10222 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10223
10224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10225 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10226 tradition
10227 as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10228 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10229 important
10230 to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10231 prohibition.
10232 As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann
10233 describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises whenever you turn
10234 a very large percentage of the population into criminals." This is the
10235 collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10236 </para>
10237 <para>
10238 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10239 explains,
10240 </para>
10241 <blockquote>
10242 <para>
10243 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10244 evaporate
10245 to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright infringer,
10246 how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright
10247 infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of your
10248 computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10249 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh,
10250 well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this
10251 campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
10252 percentage
10253 of the American Internet-using population into
10254 "lawbreakers."
10255 </para>
10256 </blockquote>
10257 <para>
10258 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10259 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10260 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10261 </para>
10262 <para>
10263 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the
10264 RIAA launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn
10265 over the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating
10266 copyright law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple
10267 request
10268 to a judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the
10269 identity of an Internet user is revealed.
10270 </para>
10271 <para>
10272
10273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10274 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general
10275 strategy to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10276 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10277 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10278 family's
10279 computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the
10280 family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop the
10281 RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10282 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10283 <!-- f20. --> See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10284 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10285 Washington
10286 Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
10287 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
10288 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being
10289 Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson Graham,
10290 "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September 2003, 4D;
10291 John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either,"
10292 New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a
10293 Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
10294 </para></footnote>
10295
10296 </para>
10297 <para>
10298 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10299 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10300 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10301 <!-- f21. --> See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry
10302 Discloses
10303 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10304 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10305 </para></footnote>
10306 Using a sophisticated
10307 hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a fingerprint of
10308 every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those MP3s will
10309 have the same "fingerprint."
10310 </para>
10311 <para>
10312 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10313 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just like the
10314 cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does
10315 your daughter, where these songs came from. But she copies these
10316 songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to college and
10317 connects it to a college network, and if the college network is
10318 "cooperating"
10319 with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't properly protected
10320 her content from the network (do you know how to do that yourself ?),
10321 then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as a "criminal."
10322 And under the rules that universities are beginning to deploy,<footnote><para>
10323 <!-- f22. --> See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent," Boston
10324 Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four Students Sued
10325 over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at Colleges,"
10326 Washington
10327 Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix,
10328 Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science Monitor, 2 September 2003,
10329 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to
10330 Loyola;
10331 Two Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible," Chicago
10332 Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy Guns on
10333 Universities," Internet News, 30 January 2003, available at
10334 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #48</ulink>; Benny
10335 Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman Orientation This Fall to
10336 Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing," San Francisco
10337 Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters Are Weapons at
10338 Universities,"
10339 USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10340 </para></footnote>
10341 your
10342 daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer network.
10343 She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10344 </para>
10345 <para>
10346 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10347 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead
10348 that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that
10349 they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes
10350 her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat this
10351 "contraband"
10352 as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students
10353
10354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10355 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10356 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10357 Says von Lohmann,
10358 </para>
10359 <blockquote>
10360 <para>
10361 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10362 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10363 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10364 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog
10365 where you could randomly choose any person off the street and be
10366 confident that they were committing an unlawful act that could
10367 put them on the hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of
10368 millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but
10369 speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit
10370 civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
10371 closest
10372 analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has
10373 eroded all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many
10374 Americans
10375 as criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing
10376 is an order of magnitude larger number of Americans than drug
10377 use. . . . If forty to sixty million Americans have become
10378 lawbreakers,
10379 then we're really on a slippery slope to lose a lot of civil
10380 liberties for all forty to sixty million of them.
10381 </para>
10382 </blockquote>
10383 <para>
10384 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals"
10385 under the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10386 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being considered
10387 "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is
10388 American,
10389 a constant war on our own people or a concerted effort through
10390 our democracy to change our law?
10391 </para>
10392
10393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10394 </sect2>
10395 </sect1>
10396 </chapter>
10397 <chapter id="c-balances">
10398 <title>BALANCES</title>
10399
10400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10401 <para>
10402 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10403 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10404 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10405 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10406 </para>
10407 <para>
10408 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10409 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to stop&mdash;or
10410 before
10411 she understands just why she should stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air.
10412 The gasoline is about to hit the blazing car. And the fire that gasoline
10413 will ignite is about to ignite everything around.
10414 </para>
10415 <para>
10416 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on the
10417 wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10418 businesses.
10419 No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies change.
10420 The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use technology
10421 to protect themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This
10422 is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10423 </para>
10424 <para>
10425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10426 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10427 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to eliminate
10428 the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is not the real
10429 threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small fire in the
10430 corner,
10431 there is a massive change in the way culture is made that is
10432 happening
10433 all around.
10434 </para>
10435 <para>
10436 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more
10437 important
10438 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to
10439 avoid pouring gasoline onto this fire.
10440 </para>
10441 <para>
10442 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a
10443 simpler,
10444 binary view. However much many people push to frame this
10445 debate
10446 more broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We
10447 rubberneck to look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on
10448 the road.
10449 </para>
10450 <para>
10451 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10452 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small brace
10453 of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this debate. We must
10454 understand these failures if we're to understand what success will
10455 require.
10456 </para>
10457
10458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10459 <sect1 id="eldred">
10460 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10461 <para>
10462
10463 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
10464 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least
10465 one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10466 programmer
10467 living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10468 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10469 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10470 come alive.
10471 </para>
10472 <para>
10473 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10474 Hawthorne
10475 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave
10476 birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a
10477 library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10478 them available for free.
10479 </para>
10480 <para>
10481 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10482 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10483 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10484 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10485 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10487 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne,
10488 and many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10489 accessible&mdash;today.
10490 </para>
10491 <para>
10492 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the
10493 same source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10494 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10495 permission
10496 of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10497 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10498 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10499 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10500 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10501 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10502 commercial
10503 publications of public domain works.
10504 </para>
10505 <para>
10506 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications
10507 of public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are
10508 literally
10509 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world
10510 have discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share
10511 works that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we
10512 might call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10513 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10514 social
10515 causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10516 individuals
10517 and groups dedicated to spreading culture generally.<footnote><para>
10518 <!-- f1. --> There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
10519 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world
10520 of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who were distributing porn
10521 but were not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.
10522 Such a class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the
10523 costs of distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors
10524 got special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down
10525 the Communications Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the
10526 burden on noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed
10527 Congress's power. The same point could have been made about
10528 noncommercial
10529 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10530 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at
10531 least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect
10532 noncommercial
10533 pornographers.
10534 </para></footnote>
10535
10536 </para>
10537 <para>
10538 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10539 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10540 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public library.
10541 But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10, in 1998, for
10542 the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of
10543 existing
10544 copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to
10545 add any works more recent than 1923 to his collection until 2019.
10546 Indeed,
10547 no copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until
10548 that year (and not even then, if Congress extends the term again). By
10549 contrast, in the same period, more than 1 million patents will pass into
10550 the public domain.
10551 </para>
10552 <para>
10553
10554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10555 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10556 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10557 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10558 "copyrights
10559 should be forever."<footnote><para>
10560 <!-- f2. --> The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
10561 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
10562 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
10563 copyright
10564 laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is also Jack
10565 Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the
10566 Committee
10567 may look at that next Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2
10568 (October 7, 1998).
10569 </para></footnote>
10570
10571 </para>
10572 <para>
10573 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10574 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10575 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10576 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10577 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10578 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10579 to undertake.
10580 </para>
10581 <para>
10582 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10583 constitutional
10584 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10585 interpretation.
10586 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10587 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10588 importantly
10589 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10590 </para>
10591 <blockquote>
10592 <para>
10593 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10594 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10595 their . . . Writings. . . .
10596 </para>
10597 </blockquote>
10598 <para>
10599 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10600 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10601 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10602 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10603 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10604 specific&mdash;to
10605 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10606 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10607 </para>
10608 <para>
10609 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10610 extending
10611 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10612 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10613 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10615 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10616 Congress
10617 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10618 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10619 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10620 </para>
10621 <para>
10622 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10623 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10624 consideration
10625 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10626 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10627 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10628 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10629 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10630 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10631 keep this gravy train going.
10632 </para>
10633 <para>
10634 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10635 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10636 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10637 beneficiaries
10638 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10639 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10640 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10641 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10642 </para>
10643 <para>
10644 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10645 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10646 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10647 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10648 continues
10649 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10650 benefits
10651 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10652 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10653 by anyone for free.
10654 </para>
10655 <para>
10656 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10657 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10658 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10659 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10660 report:
10661 </para>
10662 <para>
10663 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10664
10665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10666 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10667 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10668 those works.
10669 </para>
10670 <para>
10671 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10672 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10673 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10674 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10675 </para>
10676 <para>
10677 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10678 about it?"
10679 </para>
10680 <para>
10681 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10682 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10683 they support the bill."
10684 </para>
10685 <para>
10686 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10687 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10688 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10689 much is it worth?"
10690 </para>
10691 <para>
10692 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10693 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10694 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10695 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10696 </para>
10697 <para>
10698 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10699 correct conclusion:
10700 </para>
10701 <para>
10702 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10703 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10704 contributions
10705 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10706 </para>
10707 <para>
10708 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10709 contribute
10710 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10711 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10712 </para>
10713 <para>
10714 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10715 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10716 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10717 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10719 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10720 copyrights
10721 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10722 the copyright term extended.
10723 </para>
10724 <para>
10725 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10726 legislation
10727 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10728 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10729 </para>
10730 <para>
10731 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10732 Copyright
10733 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10734 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10735 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10736 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10737 contributions.<footnote><para>
10738 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10739 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10740 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10741 </para></footnote>
10742 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10743 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10744 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10745 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10746 Age," available at
10747 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10748 </para></footnote>
10749 Disney is estimated to have
10750 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10751 cycle.<footnote><para>
10752 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10753 Congressional
10754 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10755 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10756 </para></footnote>
10757
10758 </para>
10759 <para>
10760 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10761 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10762 reality
10763 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10764 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10765 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10766 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10767 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10768 "limited."
10769 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10770 and again.
10771 </para>
10772 <para>
10773 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10774 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10775 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10776 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10777 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10778 scholars,
10779 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10780
10781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10782 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10783 guns near schools.
10784 </para>
10785 <para>
10786 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10787 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10788 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10789 "interstate
10790 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10791 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10792 interstate
10793 commerce.
10794 </para>
10795 <para>
10796 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10797 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10798 activity,
10799 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10800 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10801 interpreted
10802 to impose no limit.
10803 </para>
10804 <para>
10805 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10806 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10807 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10808 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10809 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10810 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10811 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10812 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10813 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10814 government
10815 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10816 </para>
10817 <para>
10818 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10819 arguments,"
10820 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10821 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10822 </para></footnote>
10823 If anything Congress says is interstate
10824 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10825 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10826 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10827 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10828 </para></footnote>
10829
10830 </para>
10831 <para>
10832 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10833 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10834 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10835 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10836 context
10837 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10838 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10839 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10840 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10841 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10842 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10843 </para></footnote>
10844 And if it is applied to the
10845 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10846 Congress
10847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10848 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10849 existing
10850 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10851 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10852 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10853 copyrights
10854 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10855 existing copyrights.
10856 </para>
10857 <para>
10858 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10859 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10860 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10861 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10862 rejected
10863 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10864 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10865 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10866 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10867 boring.
10868 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10869 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10870 </para>
10871 <para>
10872 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10873 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10874 Constitution's
10875 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10876 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10877 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10878 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10879 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10880 already
10881 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10882 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10883 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10884 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10885 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10886 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10887 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10888 </para>
10889 <para>
10890 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10891
10892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10893 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10894 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10895 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10896 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10897 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10898 </para></footnote>
10899 But
10900 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10901 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10902 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10903 </para>
10904 <para>
10905 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10906 copyright
10907 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10908 influence
10909 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10910 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10911 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10912 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10913 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10914 bought to extend them again.
10915 </para>
10916 <para>
10917 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10918 extended.
10919 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10920 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10921 society
10922 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10923 Disney's.
10924 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10925 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10926 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10927 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10928 exploited,
10929 and no longer available as a result.
10930 </para>
10931 <para>
10932 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10933 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10934 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10935 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10936 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10937 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10938 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10939 Congressional
10940 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10941 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10942 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10943 </para></footnote>
10944
10945 </para>
10946 <para>
10947 Think practically about the consequence of this
10948 extension&mdash;practically,
10949 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10950
10951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10952 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10953 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10954 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10955 remaining
10956 9,873. What would you have to do?
10957 </para>
10958 <para>
10959 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10960 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10961 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10962 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10963 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10964 list of books still under copyright.
10965 </para>
10966 <para>
10967 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10968 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10969 </para>
10970 <para>
10971 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10972 owners
10973 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10974 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10975 being at least a list?
10976 </para>
10977 <para>
10978 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10979 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10980 practically
10981 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10982 thousands
10983 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10984 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10985 </para>
10986 <para>
10987 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10988 apologists
10989 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10990 owners?"
10991 </para>
10992 <para>
10993 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10994 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10995 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10996 suggesting
10997 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10998 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10999 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
11000 </para>
11001 <para>
11002 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
11003 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
11004 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
11005
11006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
11007 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
11008 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
11009 happen
11010 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
11011 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
11012 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
11013 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
11014 know quite well who owns what property.
11015 </para>
11016 <para>
11017 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
11018 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
11019 already
11020 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
11021 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
11022 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
11023 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
11024 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
11025 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
11026 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
11027 </para>
11028 <para>
11029 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
11030 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
11031 consequence
11032 for other creative works is much more dire.
11033 </para>
11034 <para>
11035 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach
11036 Studios,
11037 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee
11038 is a direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films
11039 were made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky
11040 Dog, is currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
11041 1923 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee
11042 controls the exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great
11043 deal of money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
11044 60,000 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent films."<footnote><para>
11045 <!-- f11. --> See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright
11046 Law," Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic
11047 Movies, Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today
11048 on Striking Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9
11049 October
11050 2002.
11051 </para></footnote>
11052
11053 </para>
11054 <para>
11055 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare
11056 virtue in this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the
11057 Supreme Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
11058 will, if left standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
11059 </para>
11060 <para>
11061 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
11062
11063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
11064 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it survives at
11065 all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work not
11066 now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the
11067 owners
11068 of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit
11069 from the work must exceed the costs of making the work available for
11070 distribution.
11071 </para>
11072 <para>
11073 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11074 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11075 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11076 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11077 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
11078 mm film.<footnote><para>
11079 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11080 Supporting
11081 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
11082 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
11083 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
11084 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
11085 </para></footnote>
11086
11087 </para>
11088 <para>
11089 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11090 important.
11091 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11092 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11093 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11094 locate the copyright owner.
11095 </para>
11096 <para>
11097 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
11098 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
11099 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
11100 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
11101 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
11102 exceptionally
11103 high.
11104 </para>
11105 <para>
11106 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11107 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
11108 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11109 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11110 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11111 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11112 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11113 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11114 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11115 </para>
11116 <para>
11117 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11118
11119 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11120 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11121 benefit
11122 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11123 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11124 the copyright expires.
11125 </para>
11126 <para>
11127 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11128 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11129 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11130 canisters
11131 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11132 than dust.
11133 </para>
11134 <para>
11135 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
11136 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
11137 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
11138 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
11139 creative
11140 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
11141 free expression."
11142 </para>
11143 <para>
11144 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11145 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11146 indicated,
11147 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11148 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11149 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11150 distributors,
11151 the commercial life ends.
11152 </para>
11153 <para>
11154 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11155 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
11156 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11157 between
11158 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11159 Friday
11160 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11161 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
11162 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11163 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11164 have, we need to have access to this history.
11165 </para>
11166 <para>
11167 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11168
11169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11170 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11171 this context do no good.
11172 </para>
11173 <para>
11174 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11175 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11176 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
11177 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
11178 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used book
11179 store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the copyright
11180 owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its commercial
11181 life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
11182 </para>
11183 <para>
11184 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11185 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were so high, it
11186 was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains of
11187 a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
11188 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the
11189 end of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
11190 </para>
11191 <para>
11192 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11193 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11194 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11195 would not have interfered with anything.
11196 </para>
11197 <para>
11198 But this situation has now changed.
11199 </para>
11200 <para>
11201 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11202 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11203 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11204 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11205 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once
11206 a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it and make it
11207 available
11208 to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give new life to
11209 copyrighted
11210 material after it passes out of its commercial life. It is now
11211 possible to preserve and assure universal access to this knowledge and
11212 culture, whereas before it was not.
11213 </para>
11214 <para>
11215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11216 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of
11217 producing
11218 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
11219 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11220 permission
11221 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other
11222 aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these
11223 things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want
11224 to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
11225 radically
11226 different context.
11227 </para>
11228 <para>
11229 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms:
11230 Now that technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria,
11231 the law gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11232 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
11233 commercial
11234 market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about culture
11235 after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright is
11236 serving
11237 no purpose at all related to the spread of knowledge. In this
11238 context,
11239 copyright is not an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11240 </para>
11241 <para>
11242 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11243 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11244 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11245 culture widely?"
11246 </para>
11247 <para>
11248 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest
11249 that publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11250 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11251 eliminate
11252 the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a
11253 library
11254 is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you think the
11255 role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its role is to archive
11256 culture, whether there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture
11257 or not&mdash;then we can't count on the commercial market to do our
11258 library
11259 work for us.
11260 </para>
11261 <para>
11262 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11263 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11264 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11265 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11266
11267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11268 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11269 culture,
11270 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11271 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11272 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure to
11273 provide that value.<footnote><para>
11274 <!-- f13. --> Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
11275 December
11276 2002, available at
11277 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11278 </para></footnote>
11279
11280 </para>
11281 <para>
11282 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in
11283 federal
11284 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11285 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11286 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11287 violated
11288 the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11289 extending
11290 terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11291 </para>
11292 <para>
11293 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11294 argument.
11295 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11296 dismissed
11297 our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11298 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11299 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11300 </para>
11301 <para>
11302 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11303 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11304 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11305 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11306 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11307 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to
11308 interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11309 interpretation,
11310 Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11311 power to extend existing terms.
11312 </para>
11313 <para>
11314 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11315 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11316 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11317 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11318 </para>
11319 <para>
11320 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11321 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11322
11323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11324 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11325 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11326 overstepped
11327 its bounds.
11328 </para>
11329 <para>
11330 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11331 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11332 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11333 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11334 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11335 </para>
11336 <para>
11337 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11338 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11339 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11340 briefs and preparing for argument.
11341 </para>
11342 <para>
11343 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
11344 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we
11345 lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just the
11346 minimum,
11347 you probably think there was no way this case could have been
11348 won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by
11349 well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11350 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11351 significant
11352 to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11353 </para>
11354 <para>
11355 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11356 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11357 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11358 mistake lost it.
11359 </para>
11360 <para>
11361 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the
11362 very end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11363 extraordinary
11364 lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had moved
11365 to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11367 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11368 ignored
11369 this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11370 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11371 </para>
11372 <para>
11373 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11374 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11375 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11376 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11377 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11378 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11379 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11380 most powerful media companies in the world."
11381 </para>
11382 <para>
11383 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11384 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11385 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11386 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11387 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11388 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11389 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11390 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11391 interpretation
11392 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11393 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11394 unconstitutional,
11395 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11396 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11397 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11398 Constitution,
11399 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11400 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11401 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11402 </para>
11403 <para>
11404 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11405 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11406 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11407 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11408 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11409 why it was unconstitutional.
11410 </para>
11411 <para>
11412 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11413
11414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11415 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11416 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11417 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11418 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11419 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11420 minority.
11421 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11422 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11423 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11424 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11425 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11426 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11427 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11428 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11429 </para>
11430 <para>
11431 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11432 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11433 beginning.
11434 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11435 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11436 Republican
11437 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11438 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11439 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11440 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11441 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11442 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11443 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11444 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11445 </para>
11446 <para>
11447 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11448 supporting
11449 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11450 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11451 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11452 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11453 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11454 </para>
11455 <para>
11456 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse
11457 as it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11458
11459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11460 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/
11461 Linux possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11462 uncertainty
11463 by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11464 copyright
11465 scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11466 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11467 history
11468 of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief by
11469 Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11470 </para>
11471 <para>
11472 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11473 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11474 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11475 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11476 </para>
11477 <para>
11478 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11479 argument
11480 I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that
11481 unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film would
11482 disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely clear.
11483 </para>
11484 <para>
11485 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11486 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11487 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The
11488 economists,
11489 as the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11490 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11491 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do anything
11492 to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were nothing more
11493 than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use to describe
11494 special-interest legislation gone wild.
11495 </para>
11496 <para>
11497 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we
11498 gathered
11499 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been
11500 with us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court,
11501 we added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court:
11502 Alan Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group
11503 that had made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories
11504 in the Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and
11505 dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11506
11507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11508 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11509 finally,
11510 former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11511 </para>
11512 <para>
11513 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11514 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11515 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11516 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand
11517 up for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief
11518 lawyer in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11519 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11520 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11521 personally
11522 disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of confidence in
11523 our argument.
11524 </para>
11525 <para>
11526 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11527 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11528 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11529 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11530 copyright holders.
11531 </para>
11532 <para>
11533 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to
11534 gain from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11535 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11536 contributions
11537 such power induced. And of course it was not surprising that the
11538 copyright holders would defend the idea that they should continue to
11539 have the right to control who did what with content they wanted to
11540 control.
11541 </para>
11542 <para>
11543 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11544 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11545 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11546 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11547 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11548 pornography."<footnote><para>
11549 <!-- f14. -->
11550 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11551 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11552 </para></footnote>
11553 That was also the motive of
11554 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11555 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11556 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11557 <!-- f15. -->
11558 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11559 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11560 </para></footnote>
11561 That's
11562
11563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11564 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11565 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11566 </para>
11567 <para>
11568 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11569 debate.
11570 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11571 copyrights,
11572 Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will favor.
11573 Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate
11574 and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to
11575 control
11576 the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do better
11577 with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward the
11578 popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11579 Congress
11580 gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way, that's just
11581 what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11582 </para>
11583 <para>
11584 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the
11585 CTEA mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11586 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
11587 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11588 favorites,
11589 through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11590 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond
11591 preparing for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11592 </para>
11593 <para>
11594 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11595 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11596 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11597 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11598 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11599 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11600 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11601 powers had limits.
11602 </para>
11603 <para>
11604 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11605 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
11606 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that the
11607 Constitution
11608 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11609 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to
11610 implement
11611 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the
11612 Court's role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11613 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11614 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11615 </para>
11616 <para>
11617 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11618 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11619 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11620 context
11621 of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11622 excellent
11623 and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11624 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11625 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11626 context
11627 to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
11628 </para>
11629 <para>
11630 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also
11631 viewed as unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter
11632 strongly favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both
11633 were also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11634 believed,
11635 there was a very important free speech argument against these
11636 retrospective extensions.
11637 </para>
11638 <para>
11639 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11640 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11641 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11642 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11643 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11644 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11645 </para>
11646 <para>
11647 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11648 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11649 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11650 overriding
11651 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11652 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11653 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11654 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11655 </para>
11656 <para>
11657 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11658 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11659
11660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11661 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11662 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11663 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11664 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11665 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11666 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11667 copyright be limited.
11668 </para>
11669 <para>
11670 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11671 Congress
11672 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11673 government
11674 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11675 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11676 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11677 </para>
11678 <para>
11679 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11680 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11681 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11682 existing
11683 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11684 </para>
11685 <para>
11686 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11687 extended
11688 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11689 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11690 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11691 existing
11692 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11693 restraint
11694 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11695 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11696 hesitated
11697 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11698 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11699 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11700 arrived
11701 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11702 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11703
11704 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11705 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11706 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11707 </para>
11708 <para>
11709 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11710 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11711 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11712 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11713 Congress
11714 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11715 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11716 this central idea.
11717 </para>
11718 <para>
11719 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11720 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with
11721 Solicitor
11722 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the
11723 Supreme Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern
11724 speak:
11725 </para>
11726 <para>
11727 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11728 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11729 consistent
11730 practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the
11731 harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don't see
11732 that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11733 </para>
11734 <para>
11735 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11736 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11737 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11738 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11739 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11740 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11741 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11742 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11743 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11744 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11745 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11746
11747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11748 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11749 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11750 </para>
11751 <para>
11752 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11753 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11754 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11755 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11756 congressmen
11757 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11758 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11759 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11760 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11761 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11762 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11763 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11764 family of the Justices.
11765 </para>
11766 <para>
11767 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11768 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11769 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11770 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11771 </para>
11772 <para>
11773 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11774 The history was bothering her.
11775 </para>
11776 <blockquote>
11777 <para>
11778 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11779 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11780 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11781 practice that began with the very first act.
11782 </para>
11783 </blockquote>
11784 <para>
11785 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11786 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11787 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11788 </para>
11789 <blockquote>
11790 <para>
11791 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11792 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11793 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11794 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11795 is yes.
11796 </para>
11797 </blockquote>
11798 <para>
11799 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11800 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11801 Kennedy, who observed,
11802 </para>
11803 <blockquote>
11804 <para>
11805 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11806 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11807 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11808 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11809 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11810 </para>
11811 </blockquote>
11812 <para>
11813 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11814 student,
11815 I answered,
11816 </para>
11817 <blockquote>
11818 <para>
11819 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11820 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11821 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11822 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11823 effectively
11824 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11825 </para>
11826 </blockquote>
11827 <para>
11828 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11829 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11830 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11831 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11832 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11833 </para>
11834 <para>
11835 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11836 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11837 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11838 </para>
11839 <para>
11840 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11841 sympathetic.
11842 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11843
11844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11845 </para>
11846 <blockquote>
11847 <para>
11848 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11849 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11850 </para>
11851 <para>
11852 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11853 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11854 domain
11855 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11856 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11857 into the Copyright Clause.
11858 </para>
11859 </blockquote>
11860 <para>
11861 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11862 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11863 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11864 </para>
11865 <blockquote>
11866 <para>
11867 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11868 unlimited
11869 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11870 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11871 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11872 an unlimited time.
11873 </para>
11874 </blockquote>
11875 <para>
11876 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11877 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11878 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11879 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11880 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11881 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11882 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11883 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11884 specific
11885 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11886 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11887 </para>
11888 <para>
11889 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11890 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11891
11892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11893 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11894 optimistic.
11895 </para>
11896 <para>
11897 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11898 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11899 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11900 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11901 believed
11902 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11903 Copyright
11904 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11905 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11906 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11907 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11908 Copyright
11909 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11910 believe
11911 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11912 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11913 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11914 </para>
11915 <para>
11916 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11917 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11918 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11919 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11920 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11921 </para>
11922 <para>
11923 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11924 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11925 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11926 </para>
11927 <para>
11928 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11929 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11930 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11931 </para>
11932 <para>
11933 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11934 distinguish
11935 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11936 argument
11937 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11938 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11939 in the Court's opinion.
11940 </para>
11941 <para>
11942
11943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11944 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11945 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11946 generally,
11947 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11948 </para>
11949 <para>
11950 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11951 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11952 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11953 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11954 </para>
11955 <para>
11956 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11957 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11958 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11959 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11960 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11961 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11962 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11963 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11964 would not.
11965 </para>
11966 <para>
11967 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers'
11968 values
11969 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent five&mdash;get to
11970 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the
11971 values
11972 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that
11973 I said I hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue
11974 here was important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I
11975 might hate a system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional
11976 values that it will respect, that is the system we have.
11977 </para>
11978 <para>
11979 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11980 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
11981 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension
11982 of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had
11983 governed
11984 in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court
11985 discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the very same words
11986 in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally different things
11987 depending
11988 upon whether the words were about patents or copyrights.
11989 The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11990 </para>
11991 <para>
11992
11993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11994 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11995 written,
11996 was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11997 copyrights
11998 has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said
11999 that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8 percent of
12000 the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the
12001 actual
12002 number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the
12003 point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and
12004 the existing term was so long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was
12005 unconstitutional.
12006 </para>
12007 <para>
12008 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
12009 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
12010 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
12011 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
12012 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
12013 </para>
12014 <para>
12015 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
12016 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
12017 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
12018 </para>
12019 <para>
12020 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
12021 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
12022 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
12023 argument,
12024 I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having tried
12025 to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of integrity.
12026 These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the proper mode
12027 of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to first understand
12028 the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light of the structure
12029 of the Constitution. That method had produced Lopez and many other
12030 "originalist" rulings. Where was their "originalism" now?
12031 </para>
12032 <para>
12033 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
12034 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
12035 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
12036 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
12037
12038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
12039 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
12040 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
12041 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
12042 apply
12043 to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
12044 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that they
12045 liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their own
12046 principles.
12047 </para>
12048 <para>
12049 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
12050 myself.
12051 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
12052 the law as it is.
12053 </para>
12054 <para>
12055 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
12056 idealism
12057 about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
12058 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that
12059 this case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices
12060 that the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
12061 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted on
12062 arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of principles.
12063 I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need to waste my
12064 time showing it should also follow in popularity.
12065 </para>
12066 <para>
12067 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
12068 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
12069 conversation
12070 in different directions, where the truth about the harm that
12071 this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to this
12072 Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically,
12073 corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown
12074 the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the
12075 question
12076 to make the logical point. I had shown them how they could strike
12077 this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a hundred places
12078 where I could have helped them want to, yet my stubbornness, my
12079 refusal
12080 to give in, stopped me. I have stood before hundreds of audiences
12081 trying to persuade; I have used passion in that effort to persuade; but I
12082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
12083 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
12084 passion
12085 I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court should
12086 decide the issue.
12087 </para>
12088 <para>
12089 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
12090 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12091 Kathleen Sullivan?
12092 </para>
12093 <para>
12094 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12095 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12096 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12097 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12098 </para>
12099 <para>
12100 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12101 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12102 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12103 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12104 have persuaded.
12105 </para>
12106 <para>
12107 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12108 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12109 intellectual
12110 property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case was
12111 a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
12112 not be raised until it is.
12113 </para>
12114 <para>
12115 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12116 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12117 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12118 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12119 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12120 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12121 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
12122 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
12123 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
12124 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
12125 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
12126
12127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12128 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12129 skeptical
12130 of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good thing,
12131 even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was attacked,
12132 it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful law. The New
12133 York Times wrote in its editorial,
12134 </para>
12135 <blockquote>
12136 <para>
12137 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12138 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12139 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand
12140 experiment,
12141 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw
12142 freely on the entire creative output of humanity is one of the
12143 reasons
12144 we live in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12145 </para>
12146 </blockquote>
12147 <para>
12148 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12149 hilarious
12150 images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view
12151 of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page. The
12152 "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch in the face felt
12153 exactly like that.
12154 </para>
12155 <para>
12156 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12157 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
12158 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
12159 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in
12160 our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12161 fathered,
12162 the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12163 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12164 </para>
12165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12166 </sect1>
12167 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
12168 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
12169 <para>
12170 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
12171 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
12172 denied&mdash;meaning
12173 the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would have it that
12174 I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.) This was a
12175 particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city
12176 from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my
12177 computer
12178 and wrote an op-ed piece.
12179 </para>
12180 <para>
12181 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12182 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12183 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12184 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12185 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12186 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12187 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12188 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12189 </para>
12190 <para>
12191 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12192 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12194 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12195 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12196 the work passed into the public domain.
12197 </para>
12198 <para>
12199 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12200 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12201 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12202 </para>
12203 <para>
12204 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12205 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
12206 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12207 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12208 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12209 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
12210 everything else, let the content go.
12211 </para>
12212 <para>
12213 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes
12214 endorsed
12215 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12216 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people
12217 can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican
12218 might say, here government regulation is simply getting in the way of
12219 innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the
12220 government is blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no
12221 good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference between Democrats
12222 and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm
12223 of the present system.
12224 </para>
12225 <para>
12226 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12227 requirement.
12228 For one of the hardest things about the current system for
12229 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to
12230 look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not
12231 required,
12232 since marking content is not required, since no formality at all
12233 is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask
12234 permission to use or license their work. This system would lower these
12235 costs, by establishing at least one registry where copyright owners
12236 could be identified.
12237 </para>
12238 <para>
12239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12240 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
12241 removed
12242 in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by
12243 abandoning
12244 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12245 <!-- f1. --> Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12246 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12247 formalities
12248 such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
12249 author's
12250 claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act, every text
12251 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
12252 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any
12253 formality."
12254 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article
12255 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue
12256 to impose some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as
12257 a condition of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of
12258 copies of works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12259 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12260 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12261 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12262 anonymous
12263 or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual
12264 Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation Press, 2001),
12265 153&ndash;54.
12266 </para></footnote>
12267 The
12268 Europeans
12269 are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
12270 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12271 tradition
12272 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were
12273 to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the
12274 dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not
12275 upon the special favor of the government.
12276 </para>
12277 <para>
12278 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12279 absurd
12280 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a
12281 world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12282 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12283 know what's protected and what's not.
12284 </para>
12285 <para>
12286 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin
12287 in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12288 Convention
12289 in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as
12290 the abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated
12291 because
12292 the stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was
12293 as if a Charles Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the
12294 failure
12295 to dot an i or cross a t resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12296 </para>
12297 <para>
12298 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12299 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
12300 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
12301 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities
12302 totally,
12303 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more
12304 equitable
12305 system of registration.
12306 </para>
12307 <para>
12308 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12309 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12310 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12311 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12312 burden
12313 imposed upon creators.
12314 </para>
12315 <para>
12316 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12317 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12318
12319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12320 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table,
12321 his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the
12322 government.
12323 He has a property right over the table "naturally," and he can
12324 assert that right against anyone who would steal the table, whether or
12325 not he has informed the government of his ownership of the table.
12326 </para>
12327 <para>
12328 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For
12329 the argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12330 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12331 formalities
12332 turns upon the special problems that creative property
12333 presents.
12334 The law of formalities responds to the special physics of creative
12335 property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
12336 </para>
12337 <para>
12338 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12339 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is
12340 to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just
12341 because you must register the car with the state and tag it with a
12342 license.
12343 In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important
12344 reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes the markets more
12345 efficient and because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without
12346 a registration system for land, landowners would perpetually have to
12347 guard their property. With registration, they can simply point the
12348 police
12349 to a deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would
12350 be much easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden
12351 to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but
12352 those burdens produce a much better system of protection for property
12353 generally.
12354 </para>
12355 <para>
12356 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12357 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12358 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12359 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12360 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12361 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12362 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12363 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12364
12365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12366 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12367 take their place.
12368 </para>
12369 <para>
12370 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12371 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12372 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12373 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12374 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12375 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12376 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12377 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12378 </para>
12379 <para>
12380 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12381 inability
12382 to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a
12383 huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12384 library
12385 can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12386 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the copyright
12387 system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been seen before
12388 because there are no formalities.
12389 </para>
12390 <para>
12391 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12392 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12393 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12394 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12395 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12396 </para>
12397 <para>
12398 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12399 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12400 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12401 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12402 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12403 </para>
12404 <para>
12405 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12406 registering
12407 the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the hassle
12408 worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with registration?
12409 </para>
12410 <para>
12411 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12412 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12413 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12414
12415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12416 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12417 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12418 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12419 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12420 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12421 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12422 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12423 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12424 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12425 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12426 </para>
12427 <para>
12428 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12429 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12430 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12431 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12432 </para>
12433 <para>
12434 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12435 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12436 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12437 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12438 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12439 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12440 something good might happen here.
12441 </para>
12442 <para>
12443 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12444 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12445 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12446 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12447 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12448 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12449 </para>
12450 <para>
12451 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12452 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12453 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12455 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12456 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12457 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12458 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12459 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12460 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12461 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12462 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12463 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12464 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12465 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12466 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12467 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12468 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12469 film is a valid derivative use.
12470 </para>
12471 <para>
12472 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12473 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12474 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12475 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12476 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12477 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12478 </para>
12479 <para>
12480 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12481 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12482 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12483 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12484 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12485 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12486 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12487 threat.
12488 </para>
12489 <para>
12490 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12491 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12492 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12493 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12494 sense?
12495 </para>
12496 <para>
12497
12498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12499 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12500 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12501 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12502 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12503 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12504 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12505 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12506 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12507 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12508 </para>
12509 <para>
12510 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12511 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12512 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12513 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12514 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12515 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12516 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12517 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12518 </para>
12519 <para>
12520 What does this industry really want?
12521 </para>
12522 <para>
12523 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12524 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12525 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12526 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12527 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12528 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12529 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12530 permission first.
12531 </para>
12532 <para>
12533 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12534 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12535 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12536 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12537 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12538 </para>
12539 <para>
12540 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12541 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12542
12543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12544 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12545 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12546 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12547 and to share its own creation.
12548 </para>
12549 <para>
12550 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12551 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12552 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12553 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12554 block the progress of others.
12555 </para>
12556 <para>
12557 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12558 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12559 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12560 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12561 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12562 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12563 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12564 </para>
12565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12566 </sect1>
12567 </chapter>
12568 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12569 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12570 <para>
12571 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12572 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12573 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12574 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12575 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12576 </para>
12577 <para>
12578 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12579 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12580 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12581 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12582 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12583 the disease almost invisible.
12584 </para>
12585 <para>
12586 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12587 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12588 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12589 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12590 population:
12591 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12592 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12593 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12594 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12595 available at
12596 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12597 release
12598 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12599 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12600 </para></footnote>
12601 </para>
12602 <para>
12603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12604 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12605 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12606 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12607 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12608 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12609 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12610 </para>
12611 <para>
12612 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12613 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12614 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12615 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12616 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12617 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12618 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12619 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12620 changes.
12621 </para>
12622 <para>
12623 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12624 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12625 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12626 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12627 costs significantly below the market price.
12628 </para>
12629 <para>
12630 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12631 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12632 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12633 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12634 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12635 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12636 permitted within the European Union.<footnote><para>
12637 <!-- f2. --> See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12638 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12639 </para></footnote>
12640 </para>
12641 <para>
12642 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12643 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12644 Association
12645 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12646 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12647 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12648 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12649 Prepared
12650 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12651 2000), 14, available at
12652 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12653 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12654 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12655 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12656 (statement of James Love).
12657 </para></footnote>
12658 Through the
12659 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12660 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12661 request,
12662 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12664 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12665 began
12666 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12667 government's
12668 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12669 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12670 companies,
12671 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12672 international
12673 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12674 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12675 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12676 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12677 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12678 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12679 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12680 Prepared
12681 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12682 2000), 15.
12683 </para></footnote>
12684 </para>
12685 <para>
12686 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12687 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12688 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12689 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12690 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12691 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12692 marginal,
12693 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12694 the flow of medications into Africa.
12695 </para>
12696 <para>
12697 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12698 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12699 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12700 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12701 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12702 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12703 </para>
12704 <para>
12705 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12706 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12707 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12708 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12709 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12710 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12711 by U.S. companies.
12712 </para>
12713 <para>
12714 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12715 information,
12716 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12718 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12719 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12720 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12721 May 1999, A1, available at
12722 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12723 markets
12724 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12725 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12726 Access
12727 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12728 available at
12729 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12730 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12731 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12732 Synopsis,"
12733 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12735 </para></footnote>
12736 It was because "intellectual property"
12737 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12738 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12739 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12740 response
12741 to AIDS.
12742 </para>
12743 <para>
12744 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12745 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12746 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12747 direct
12748 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12749 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12750 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12751 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12752 many to die for such an abstraction?
12753 </para>
12754 <para>
12755 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12756 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12757 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12758 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12759 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12760 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12761 </para>
12762 <para>
12763 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12764 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12765 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12766 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12767 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12768 technology.
12769 They could be overcome.
12770 </para>
12771 <para>
12772 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12773 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12774 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12775 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12776 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12777 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12778 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12779 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12781 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12782 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12783 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12784 idea called "intellectual property."
12785 </para>
12786 <para>
12787 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12788 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12789 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12790 What is the argument?
12791 </para>
12792 <para>
12793 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12794 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12795 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12796 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12797 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12798 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12799 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12800 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12801 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12802 balanced in just this sense.
12803 </para>
12804 <para>
12805 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12806 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12807 extremism.
12808 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12809 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12810 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12811 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12812 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12813 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12814 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12815 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12816 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12817 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12819 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12820 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12821 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12822 this common sense open its eyes.
12823 </para>
12824 <para>
12825 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12826 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12827 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12828 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12829 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12830 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12831 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12832 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12833 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12834 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12835 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12836 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12837 </para>
12838 <para>
12839 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12840 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12841 meeting.<footnote><para>
12842 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12843 August 2003, E1, available at
12844 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12845 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12846 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12847 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12848 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12849 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12850 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12851 </para></footnote>
12852 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12853 decided
12854 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12855 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12856 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12857 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12858 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12859 protocols
12860 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12861 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12862 project
12863 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12864 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12865 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12866 comprised
12867 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12868 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12870 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12871 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12872 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12873 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12874 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12875 </para>
12876 <para>
12877 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12878 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12879 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12880 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12881 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12882 </para>
12883 <para>
12884 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12885 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12886 meeting.
12887 </para></footnote>
12888 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12889 noncommercial
12890 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12891 perspectives.
12892 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12893 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12894 property issues.
12895 </para>
12896 <para>
12897 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12898 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12899 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12900 Society
12901 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12902 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12903 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12904 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12905 interrupted
12906 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12907 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12908 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12909 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12910 relatively
12911 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12912 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12913 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12914 information
12915 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12916 immoderate
12917 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12918 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12919 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12920 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12921 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12922 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12923 </para>
12924 <para>
12925 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12926 property,
12927 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12928 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12929 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12930 agenda.
12931 </para>
12932 <para>
12933 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12934 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12935 software."
12936 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12937 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12938 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12939 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12940 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12941 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12942 software," for their own internal uses.
12943 </para>
12944 <para>
12945 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12946 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12947 noncommercial
12948 software. There are many important companies that depend
12949 fundamentally
12950 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12951 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12952 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12953 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12954 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12955 support a mode of software development that is different from
12956 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12957 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12958 sophisticated.
12959 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12960 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12961 opposition
12962 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12963 license
12964 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12965 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12966 Marketplace
12967 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12968 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12969 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12970 available at
12971 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12972 president,
12973 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12974 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12975 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12976 </para></footnote>
12977 </para>
12978 <para>
12979 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12980 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12981 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12982 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12983 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12984 by
12985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12986 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12987 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12988 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12989 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12990 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12991 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12992 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12993 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12994 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12995 </para>
12996 <para>
12997 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12998 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12999 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
13000 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
13001 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
13002 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
13003 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
13004 <!-- f9. -->
13005 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
13006 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
13007 </para></footnote>
13008 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
13009 </para>
13010 <para>
13011 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
13012 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
13013 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
13014 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
13015 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
13016 its lobbying efforts.
13017 </para>
13018 <para>
13019 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
13020 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
13021 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
13022 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
13023 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
13024 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
13025 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
13026 goals of WIPO."
13027 </para>
13028 <para>
13029 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
13030 </para>
13031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
13032 <para>
13033 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
13034 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
13035 right called "copyright." Without it, restrictions imposed by those
13036 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
13037 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
13038 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
13039 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
13040 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
13041 </para>
13042 <para>
13043 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
13044 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
13045 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
13046 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
13047 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
13048 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
13049 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
13050 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
13051 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
13052 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
13053 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
13054 </para>
13055 <para>
13056 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
13057 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
13058 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
13059 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
13060 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
13061 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
13062 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
13063 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
13064 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
13065 right to decide what to do with their property.
13066 </para>
13067 <para>
13068 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
13069 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
13070 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
13071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
13072 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
13073 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
13074 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
13075 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
13076 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
13077 way possible.
13078 </para>
13079 <para>
13080 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
13081 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
13082 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
13083 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
13084 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
13085 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
13086 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
13087 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
13088 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
13089 that control.
13090 </para>
13091 <para>
13092 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13093 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
13094 <!-- f10. --> See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
13095 </para></footnote>
13096 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13097 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
13098 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
13099 </para>
13100 <para>
13101 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13102 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13103 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13104 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13105 </para>
13106 <blockquote>
13107 <para>
13108 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13109 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13110 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
13111 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
13112 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13113 say anything wrong. But in the world
13114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13115 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13116 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13117 </para>
13118 </blockquote>
13119 <para>
13120 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13121 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13122 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13123 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13124 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13125 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13126 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13127 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13128 </para>
13129 <para>
13130 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13131 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13132 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
13133 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13134 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
13135 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
13136 </para>
13137 <para>
13138 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13139 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13140 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13141 our own country's history).
13142 </para>
13143 <para>
13144 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13145 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
13146 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13147 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13148 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13149 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13150 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13151 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
13152 democracy in the world, become?
13153 </para>
13154 <para>
13155 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13156 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13157 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13159 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13160 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
13161 </para>
13162 <para>
13163 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13164 There are moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that
13165 surprise. When the FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules,
13166 which would thereby further increase the concentration in media
13167 ownership,
13168 an extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this
13169 change. For perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the
13170 NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and
13171 CodePink Women for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC
13172 policy. An astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC,
13173 demanding
13174 more hearings and a different result.
13175 </para>
13176 <para>
13177 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad
13178 coalition
13179 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile
13180 hearings
13181 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement
13182 had become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision,
13183 and there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13184 concentration
13185 in the media.
13186 </para>
13187 <para>
13188 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13189 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13190 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13191 players.
13192 The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not mean
13193 that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13194 </para>
13195 <para>
13196 The danger in media concentration comes not from the
13197 concentration,
13198 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13199 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13200 powerful
13201 companies that control an ever expanding slice of the media. It
13202 is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated range of
13203 rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme form&mdash;that makes
13204 their bigness bad.
13205 </para>
13206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13207 <para>
13208 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13209 competition
13210 and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood as being
13211 about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We Americans have a
13212 long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That we could be
13213 motivated
13214 to fight "big" again is not something new.
13215 </para>
13216 <para>
13217 It would be something new, and something very important, if an
13218 equal number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built
13219 within the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien
13220 to our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13221 because
13222 the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything called
13223 "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13224 </para>
13225 <para>
13226 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13227 of our tragedy.
13228 </para>
13229 <para>
13230 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13231 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
13232 <!-- f11. --> John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com,
13233 September 2003, available at
13234 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music
13235 Industry
13236 Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September 2003, available at
13237 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a
13238 Song, N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily
13239 News, 9 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet
13240 Surprised
13241 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13242 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13243 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
13244 available
13245 at
13246 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
13247 </para></footnote>
13248
13249 Eminem
13250 has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's music.<footnote><para>
13251 <!-- f12. --> Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
13252 17 September 2003, available at
13253 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
13254 </para></footnote>
13255 The
13256 story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
13257 finished
13258 making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13259 <!-- f13. --> Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13260 Dylan
13261 Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13262 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13264 </para></footnote>
13265 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists
13266 he must remain anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with
13267 these studio guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd
13268 love to use but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've
13269 got scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but
13270 it would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
13271 talking
13272 about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers thought
13273 to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for kids who
13274 use a computer to share content.
13275 </para>
13276 <para>
13277 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13278 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13279 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13280 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13281 24 August 2003, available at
13282 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13283 </para></footnote>
13284 And in Brazil, the
13285 culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero of Brazilian music,
13286 has joined with Creative Commons to release content and free licenses
13287 in that Latin American country.<footnote><para>
13288 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August
13289 2003, available at
13290 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13291 </para></footnote>
13292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13293 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13294 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13295 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13296 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13297 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13298 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13299 day into the Causbys.
13300 </para>
13301 <para>
13302 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13303 potential is ever to be realized.
13304
13305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13306
13307 </para>
13308 </chapter>
13309 <chapter id="c-afterword">
13310 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13311 <para>
13312
13313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13314 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that
13315 something
13316 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of
13317 this book maps what might be done.
13318 </para>
13319 <para>
13320 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13321 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13322 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13323 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13324 </para>
13325 <para>
13326 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must
13327 recruit
13328 a significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13329 authors,
13330 musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this story in their
13331 own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
13332 </para>
13333 <para>
13334 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13335 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13336 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13337 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13338 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13339 </para>
13340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13341
13342 <sect1 id="usnow">
13343 <title>US, NOW</title>
13344 <para>
13345 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so
13346 far has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13347 property
13348 or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that
13349 really
13350 is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13351 </para>
13352 <para>
13353 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13354 extremes
13355 in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There
13356 are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights Reserved"&mdash;
13357 and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights Reserved." The "All
13358 Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask permission before
13359 you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved"
13360 sorts believe you should be able to do with content as you wish,
13361 regardless
13362 of whether you have permission or not.
13363 </para>
13364 <para>
13365 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13366 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13367 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13368 regardless
13369 of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
13370
13371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13372 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13373 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13374 unprotected.
13375 </para>
13376 <para>
13377 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13378 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13379 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13380 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13381 character
13382 of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13383 architecture
13384 made the effective default "no rights reserved," the future
13385 architecture will make the effective default "all rights reserved." The
13386 architecture
13387 and law that surround the Internet's design will increasingly
13388 produce an environment where all use of content requires permission.
13389 The "cut and paste" world that defines the Internet today will become
13390 a "get permission to cut and paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
13391 </para>
13392 <para>
13393 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
13394 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
13395 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13396 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13397 freedoms
13398 that we could just take for granted before.
13399 </para>
13400
13401 <sect2 id="examples">
13402 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13403 <para>
13404 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13405 recognize
13406 this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before
13407 the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about
13408 our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore
13409 and browsed through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need
13410 to worry about explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or
13411 boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was assured.
13412 </para>
13413 <para>
13414 What made it assured?
13415 </para>
13416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13417 <para>
13418 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13419 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13420 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13421 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13422 Korea,
13423 working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be assured.
13424 But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable enough to
13425 spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of us (again,
13426 we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient architecture of
13427 real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount of privacy. That
13428 privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law (there is no law
13429 protecting
13430 "privacy" in public places), and in many places, not by norms
13431 (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs that
13432 friction
13433 imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13434 </para>
13435 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13436 <para>
13437 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13438 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13439 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13440 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13441 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13442 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13443 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13444 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13445 </para>
13446 <para>
13447 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13448 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13449 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13450 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13451 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13452 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13453 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13454 disappears.
13455 </para>
13456 <para>
13457 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13458 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13459 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13460 friction
13461 did.<footnote><para>
13462 <!-- f1. --> See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13463 Architecture
13464 of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology Law
13465 Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13466 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink> (describing examples in
13467 which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked
13468 Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (New York:
13469 Random
13470 House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs between technology and privacy).
13471 </para></footnote>
13472 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the
13473 pattern
13474 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13475
13476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13477 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13478 technology
13479 now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively act
13480 where, before, privacy was given by default.
13481 </para>
13482 <para>
13483 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13484 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13485 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the binaries&mdash;
13486 was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data General
13487 machine
13488 on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
13489 about controlling their software.
13490 </para>
13491 <para>
13492 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he
13493 was a researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that
13494 developed
13495 when one was free to explore and tinker with the software that
13496 ran on machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented
13497 programmer,
13498 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify
13499 other people's work.
13500 </para>
13501 <para>
13502 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In
13503 a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that
13504 someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a
13505 theorem,
13506 you could take what someone else did and change it. In a classics
13507 department, if you believed a colleague's translation of a recently
13508 discovered
13509 text was flawed, you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman,
13510 it seemed obvious that you should be free to tinker with and improve
13511 the code that ran a machine. This, too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't
13512 it be open for criticism like anything else?
13513 </para>
13514 <para>
13515 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13516 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs
13517 from one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least
13518 in the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13519 companies
13520 started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just
13521 take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make it easier for
13522 me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13523 </para>
13524 <para>
13525 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13526 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13528 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13529 economics
13530 of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about it,
13531 then the freedom to change and share software would be
13532 fundamentally
13533 weakened.
13534 </para>
13535 <para>
13536 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free
13537 operating
13538 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13539 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13540 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13541 </para>
13542 <para>
13543 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13544 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13545 Software
13546 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the
13547 source code for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone
13548 building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free
13549 as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code
13550 would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13551 fundamental
13552 goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a byproduct.
13553 </para>
13554 <para>
13555 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13556 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13557 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13558 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13559 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13560 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13561 </para>
13562 <para>
13563 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13564 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13565 scientific journals are produced.
13566 </para>
13567 <para>
13568 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13569 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13570 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13571 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13572 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13573 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13574 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13575 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13576 service.
13577 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13578 anyone
13579 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13581 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13582 Court opinion through their respective services.
13583 </para>
13584 <para>
13585 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13586 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13587 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13588 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13589 allowed
13590 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13591 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13592 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13593 </para>
13594 <para>
13595 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13596 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13597 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13598 </para>
13599 <para>
13600 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13601 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13602 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13603 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13604 because
13605 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13606 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13607 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13608 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13609 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13610 access to a paper journal.
13611 </para>
13612 <para>
13613 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13614 demanding
13615 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13616 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13617 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13618 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13619 </para>
13620 <para>
13621 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13622 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13623 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13624 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13626 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13627 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13628 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13629 available
13630 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13631 copyright
13632 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13633 redistribute the work for free.
13634 </para>
13635 <para>
13636 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13637 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13638 markets.
13639 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13640 traditional
13641 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13642 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13643 presumptively
13644 a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13645 </para>
13646
13647 </sect2>
13648 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13649 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13650 <para>
13651 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13652 increasing
13653 control effected through law and technology.
13654 </para>
13655 <para>
13656 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a
13657 nonprofit
13658 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13659 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright
13660 on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for
13661 people to build upon other people's work, by making it simple for
13662 creators
13663 to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their
13664 work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to
13665 bulletproof
13666 licenses, make this possible.
13667 </para>
13668 <para>
13669 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.
13670 By developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13671 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that
13672 can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13673 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13674 automatically
13675 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three
13676 expressions
13677 together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable description, and
13678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13679 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13680 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone
13681 who accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the
13682 ideal that the person associated with the license believes in something
13683 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13684 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13685 certain
13686 freedoms are given.
13687 </para>
13688 <para>
13689 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13690 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13691 creator
13692 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13693 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13694 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13695 freedoms
13696 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13697 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13698 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13699 lastly, any educational use.
13700 </para>
13701 <para>
13702 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13703 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13704 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13705 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13706 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13707 governed
13708 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13709 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13710 content
13711 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13712 public
13713 domain.
13714 </para>
13715 <para>
13716 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13717 Commons.
13718 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13719 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13720 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13721 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13722 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13724 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13725 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13726 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13727 </para>
13728 <para>
13729 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13730 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13731 culture
13732 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13733 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13734 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13735 background
13736 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13737 against the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with
13738 different
13739 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13740 use them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13741 effectively
13742 to begin to build those rules.
13743 </para>
13744 <para>
13745 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13746 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13747 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13748 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13749 Commons
13750 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13751 </para>
13752 <para>
13753 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13754 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1) those
13755 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2)
13756 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13757 free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book
13758 instead
13759 of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2) will download
13760 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.
13761 If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing
13762 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13763 </para>
13764 <para>
13765 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13766 conclusion.
13767 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13768 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13769 a total success.
13770 </para>
13771 <para>
13772 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
13773 content
13774 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13776 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13777 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13778 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13779 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13780 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13781 well.
13782 </para>
13783 <para>
13784 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13785 proprietary
13786 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13787 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13788 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13789 anything
13790 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
13791 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
13792 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13793 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13794 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
13795 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
13796 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
13797 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
13798 are so high<footnote><para>
13799 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
13800 (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
13801 Lucre
13802 production, available at
13803 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13804 </para></footnote>),
13805 these artists release into the creative environment content
13806 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13807 </para>
13808 <para>
13809 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
13810 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
13811 importance
13812 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
13813 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13814 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13815 appropriate
13816 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
13817 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
13818 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
13819 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
13820 </para>
13821 <para>
13822 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13823 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13824 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13825 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13826
13827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13828 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13829 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13830 </para>
13831 <para>
13832 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13833 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13834 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13835 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13836 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13837 steps are possible.
13838 </para>
13839 <para>
13840 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13841 individuals
13842 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
13843 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13844 complements
13845 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13846 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
13847 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
13848 more easily.
13849 </para>
13850
13851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13852 </sect2>
13853 </sect1>
13854 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13855 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13856 <para>
13857 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13858 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13859 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13860 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13861 changes that we need.
13862 </para>
13863 <para>
13864 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13865 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13866 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13867 to our end.
13868 </para>
13869
13870 <sect2 id="formalities">
13871 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13872 <para>
13873 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13874 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13875 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13876 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13877 </para>
13878 <para>
13879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13880 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13881 requirements
13882 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13883 </para>
13884 <para>
13885 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13886 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13887 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13888 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13889 </para>
13890 <para>
13891 Why?
13892 </para>
13893 <para>
13894 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13895 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13896 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13897 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13898 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13899 formalities
13900 were getting in the way.
13901 </para>
13902 <para>
13903 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13904 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13905 burdens
13906 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13907 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13908 creative
13909 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13910 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13911 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13912 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13913 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13914 speak.
13915 </para>
13916 <para>
13917 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13918 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13919 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13920 by other countries as well.
13921 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13922 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13923 require
13924 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13925 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13926 </para>
13927 <para>
13928 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13929 registering
13930 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13931 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13932 second
13933 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13934 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13935 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13936 </para>
13937
13938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13939
13940 <sect3 id="registration">
13941 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13942 <para>
13943 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13944 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13945 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13946 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13947 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13948 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13949 policymaking,
13950 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13951 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13952 about formalities, their first reaction is panic&mdash;nothing could be worse
13953 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13954 </para>
13955 <para>
13956 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13957 tradition
13958 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13959 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13960 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13961 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13962 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13963 subject to standards that the government sets.
13964 </para>
13965 <para>
13966 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13967 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13968 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13969 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13970 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13971 performed
13972 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13973 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13974 registration occurs up.
13975 </para>
13976 <para>
13977 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13978 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13979 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13980 establish
13981 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13982 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13983 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13984 registering
13985 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13986 substantially
13987 lower the burden of this formality&mdash;while producing a database
13988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13989 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13990 </para>
13991
13992 </sect3>
13993 <sect3 id="marking">
13994 <title>MARKING</title>
13995 <para>
13996 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13997 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13998 punishment
13999 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to imposing
14000 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
14001 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
14002 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
14003 marking
14004 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
14005 </para>
14006 <para>
14007 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
14008 copyrighted
14009 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
14010 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
14011 the work.
14012 </para>
14013 <para>
14014 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
14015 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
14016 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
14017 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
14018 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
14019 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
14020 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
14021 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
14022 </para>
14023 <para>
14024 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
14025 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
14026 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
14027 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
14028 copyright
14029 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
14030 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
14031 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
14032 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
14033 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
14034 </para></footnote>
14035 The meaning of an unmarked work would
14036 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
14037 complain,
14038 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
14039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
14040 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
14041 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
14042 their work.
14043 </para>
14044 <para>
14045 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
14046 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
14047 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
14048 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
14049 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
14050 </para>
14051 <para>
14052 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method
14053 for marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
14054 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
14055 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
14056 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
14057 consideration
14058 of which method could best be integrated into the registration
14059 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to
14060 innovate;
14061 but we would count on the government to keep the product of
14062 innovation
14063 in line with its other important functions.
14064 </para>
14065 <para>
14066 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
14067 requirements.
14068 If photographs were marked by author and year, there
14069 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
14070 example,
14071 all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick step. The
14072 aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the system itself
14073 should be kept as simple as possible.
14074 </para>
14075 <para>
14076 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
14077 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
14078 make things unclear.
14079 </para>
14080 <para>
14081 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
14082 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
14083 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
14084 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
14085 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
14086 that assertion at the appropriate time.
14087 </para>
14088
14089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
14090 </sect3>
14091 </sect2>
14092 <sect2 id="shortterms">
14093 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
14094 <para>
14095 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
14096 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
14097 natural authors.
14098 </para>
14099 <para>
14100 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
14101 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
14102 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
14103 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
14104 endorsed
14105 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.<footnote><para>
14106 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
14107 at
14108 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
14109 </para></footnote>
14110 Others have
14111 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14112 </para>
14113 <para>
14114 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14115 copyright's
14116 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
14117 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
14118 </para>
14119 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14120 <listitem><para>
14121 <!-- (1) -->
14122 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
14123 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
14124 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
14125 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14126 derivative
14127 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14128 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
14129 author.
14130 </para></listitem>
14131 <listitem><para>
14132 <!-- (2) -->
14133 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
14134 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14135 fuzziness
14136 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
14137 "expression."
14138 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14139 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
14140 unprotected.
14141 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
14142 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
14143 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
14144 complexities
14145 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
14146 navigate.
14147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14148 </para></listitem>
14149 <listitem><para>
14150 <!-- (3) -->
14151 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
14152 Especially
14153 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14154 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
14155 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
14156 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
14157 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
14158 veteran
14159 to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
14160 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14161 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
14162 available at
14163 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
14164 </para></footnote>
14165 If we make veterans suffer that
14166 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
14167 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
14168 </para></listitem>
14169 <listitem><para>
14170 <!-- (4) -->
14171 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
14172 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
14173 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
14174 mistake
14175 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
14176 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
14177 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
14178 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
14179 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
14180 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
14181 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
14182 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
14183 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
14184 increasing
14185 their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.
14186 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
14187 about that now.
14188 </para></listitem>
14189 </orderedlist>
14190 <para>
14191 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
14192 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
14193 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
14194 </para>
14195 <para>
14196 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
14197 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
14198 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
14199 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14200 </para>
14201
14202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14203
14204 </sect2>
14205 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
14206 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
14207 <para>
14208 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14209 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14210 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14211 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14212 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14213 the emergence of that new technology.
14214 </para>
14215 <para>
14216 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
14217 "exclusive
14218 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
14219 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
14220 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
14221 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
14222 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
14223 </para>
14224 <para>
14225 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
14226 expanded
14227 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
14228 translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
14229 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
14230 University Press, 1967), 32.
14231 </para></footnote>
14232 The courts have expanded
14233 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
14234 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
14235 Benjamin
14236 Kaplan.
14237 </para>
14238 <blockquote>
14239 <para>
14240 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14241 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14242 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14243 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
14244 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
14245 </para></footnote>
14246 </para>
14247 </blockquote>
14248 <para>
14249 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14250 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14251 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14252 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14253 Consider each limitation in turn.
14254 </para>
14255 <para>
14256 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
14257 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
14258
14259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14260 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14261 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14262 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14263 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14264 after the creative work is done.
14265 </para>
14266 <para>
14267 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
14268 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
14269 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
14270 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
14271 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
14272 perhaps
14273 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
14274 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
14275 creative
14276 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
14277 pouring
14278 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
14279 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
14280 </para>
14281 <para>
14282 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of
14283 the Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation
14284 for foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
14285 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
14286 negotiation
14287 for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much
14288 more sense.
14289 </para>
14290 <para>
14291 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14292 protected,
14293 and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14294 protected.
14295 This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul
14296 Goldstein.<footnote><para>
14297 <!-- f7. --> Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14298 Jukebox
14299 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14300 </para></footnote>
14301 His view is that the law should be written so that expanded
14302 protections follow expanded uses.
14303 </para>
14304 <para>
14305 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the
14306 legal
14307 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14308 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14309 incentives
14310 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a
14311 strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14312 </para>
14313 <para>
14314 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14316 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14317 certain
14318 statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great
14319 deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights
14320 regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14321 </para>
14322 </sect2>
14323
14324 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
14325 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14326 <para>
14327 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't
14328 be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most
14329 people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other policy issue that
14330 better
14331 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing
14332 of music.
14333 </para>
14334 <para>
14335 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14336 Internet's
14337 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14338 powerfully
14339 than any other single application. It was the Internet's killer
14340 app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was the
14341 application
14342 that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the application
14343 that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill innovation on
14344 the network.
14345 </para>
14346 <para>
14347 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music
14348 in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14349 performed,
14350 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14351 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14352 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14353 </para>
14354 <para>
14355 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14356 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14357 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14358 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14359 </para>
14360 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14361 <listitem><para>
14362 <!-- A. -->
14363 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14364 for purchasing CDs.
14365 </para></listitem>
14366 <listitem><para>
14367 <!-- B. -->
14368 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14369 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14370 </para></listitem>
14371 <listitem><para>
14372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14373 <!-- C. -->
14374 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14375 access
14376 to content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright
14377 or that would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14378 </para></listitem>
14379 <listitem><para>
14380 <!-- D. -->
14381 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14382 access
14383 to content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the
14384 copyright owner plainly endorses.
14385 </para></listitem>
14386 </orderedlist>
14387 <para>
14388 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14389 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14390 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14391 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14392 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14393 significantly weakened.
14394 </para>
14395 <para>
14396 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14397 controversial.
14398 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is
14399 real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly
14400 greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
14401 </para>
14402 <para>
14403 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14404 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14405 should respond.
14406 </para>
14407 <para>
14408 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
14409 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
14410 content.
14411 It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of content
14412 in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we
14413 in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and
14414 very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and down. Although
14415 wireless access is growing, most of us still get access across wires. Most
14416 only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The idea of the
14417 always
14418 on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
14419 </para>
14420 <para>
14421 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14422 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14423 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14425 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14426 question
14427 should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this world?
14428 The question should be, what law will we require when the network
14429 becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is one in
14430 which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net; where
14431 everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the Rockies&mdash;you can
14432 instantaneously be connected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as
14433 ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service, where with the flip of a
14434 device,
14435 you are connected.
14436 </para>
14437 <para>
14438 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14439 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio, content
14440 that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the
14441 critical point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give
14442 access to content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you
14443 access to content than it will be to download and store content on the
14444 many devices you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other
14445 words, to subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as
14446 everyone
14447 in the download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies
14448 essentially
14449 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if
14450 the services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14451 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell
14452 phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14453 paying
14454 for this content even though "free" content is available in the form
14455 of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14456 <!-- f8. --> See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
14457 3 April 2002, available at
14458 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14459 </para></footnote>
14460
14461 </para>
14462 <para>
14463 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14464 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14465 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14466 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14467 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14468 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14469 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14470 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14471 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14472 artists get paid, during
14473
14474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14475 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14476 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14477 </para>
14478 <para>
14479 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14480 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14481 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14482 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14483 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14484 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14485 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14486 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14487 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14488 </para>
14489 <para>
14490 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14491 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14492 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14493 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14494 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14495 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14496 way that returns something to the artist.
14497 </para>
14498 <para>
14499 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14500 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14501 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14502 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14503 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14504 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14505 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14506 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14507 </para>
14508 <para>
14509 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply
14510 deem out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make
14511 copies of the music available for sale, then commercial and
14512 noncommercial
14513 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14514 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would
14515 be incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing
14516 has ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14517 </para>
14518 <para>
14519
14520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14521 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14522 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14523 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14524 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14525 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14526 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14527 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14528 trade.
14529 </para>
14530 <para>
14531 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14532 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14533 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14534 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14535 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14536 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14537 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14538 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14539 </para>
14540 <para>
14541 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14542 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14543 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14544 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14545 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14546 delivering and accessing content.
14547 </para>
14548 <para>
14549 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14550 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14551 </para>
14552 <para>
14553 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14554 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14555 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14556 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14557 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14558 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14559 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14560 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14561 </para>
14562 <para>
14563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14564 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14565 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14566 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14567 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14568 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14569 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14570 </para>
14571 <para>
14572 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14573 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote><para>
14574 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14575 10 October 2000), available at
14576 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14577 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14578 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14579 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14580 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14581 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14582 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14583 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14584 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14585 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14586 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14587 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14588 available at
14589 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14590 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14591 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14592 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14593 2002, available at
14594 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14595 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14596 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14597 McCullagh,
14598 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14599 2002, available at
14600 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14601 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14602 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14603 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14604 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14605 debate
14606 by about a decade. See
14607 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14608 </para></footnote>
14609 Fisher suggests a
14610 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14611 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14612 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14613 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14614 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14615 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14616 basis
14617 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14618 compensation
14619 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14620 </para>
14621 <para>
14622 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14623 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14624 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14625 simple:
14626 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14627 system.
14628 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14629 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14630 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14631 facilitating
14632 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14633 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14634 exchange
14635 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14636 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14637 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14638 </para>
14639 <para>
14640 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14641 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14642 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14643 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14644 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14645
14646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14647 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14648 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14649 allowed
14650 to do with the content itself.
14651 </para>
14652 <para>
14653 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14654 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14655 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14656 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14657 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14658 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14659 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14660 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14661 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14662 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14663 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14664 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14665 on-line.
14666 </para>
14667 <para>
14668 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14669 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14670 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14671 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14672 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14673 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14674 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14675 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14676 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14677 finding ways to compete with "free."
14678 </para>
14679 <para>
14680 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14681 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14682 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14683 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14684 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14685 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14686 the law.
14687 </para>
14688 <para>
14689 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14690 </para>
14691 <para>
14692
14693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14694 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14695 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14696 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14697 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14698 create.
14699 </para>
14700 <para>
14701 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14702 by
14703 </para>
14704 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14705 <listitem><para>
14706 <!-- 1. -->
14707 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14708 </para></listitem>
14709 <listitem><para>
14710 <!-- 2. -->
14711 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14712 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14713 statute;
14714 </para></listitem>
14715 <listitem><para>
14716 <!-- 3. -->
14717 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14718 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14719 </para></listitem>
14720 </orderedlist>
14721 <para>
14722 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14723 competitive
14724 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14725 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14726 something then?
14727 </para>
14728 <para>
14729 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14730 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14731 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14732 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14733 technology
14734 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14735 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14736 market
14737 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14738 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14739 authorized
14740 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14741 compensation
14742 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14743 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14744 </para>
14745 <para>
14746 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14747 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14748 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14749
14750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14751 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14752 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14753 </para>
14754 </sect2>
14755
14756 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14757 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14758 <para>
14759 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14760 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14761 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14762 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14763 </para>
14764 <para>
14765 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14766 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14767 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14768 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14769 unwillingness
14770 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14771 the law.
14772 </para>
14773 <para>
14774 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14775 "radical"
14776 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14777 advocating
14778 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14779 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14780 example,
14781 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14782 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14783 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14784 obvious.<footnote><para>
14785 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14786 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14787 </para></footnote>
14788
14789 </para>
14790 <para>
14791 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14792 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14793 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14794 </para>
14795 <para>
14796 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14797 benefits.
14798 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14799 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14800 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14801 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14802 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14803 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14804 predicted
14805 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14806 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14807 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14808 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14809 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14810 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14811 June 2003, available at
14812 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14813 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14814 effect
14815 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14816 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14817 </para></footnote>
14818 They see a system that has been
14819 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14820 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14821 </para>
14822 <para>
14823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14824 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14825 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14826 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14827 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14828 system
14829 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14830 </para>
14831 <para>
14832 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14833 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14834 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14835 obscure
14836 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14837 little.
14838 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14839 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14840 doctrine
14841 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14842 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14843 </para>
14844 <para>
14845 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14846 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14847 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14848 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14849 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14850 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14851 </para>
14852 <para>
14853 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14854 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14855 precisely
14856 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14857 to its review.
14858 </para>
14859 <para>
14860 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14861 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14862 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14863 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14864 something.
14865 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14866 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14867 requires
14868 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14869 Russia.
14870 </para>
14871 <para>
14872 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14873 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14874
14875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14876 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14877 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14878 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14879 </para>
14880 <para>
14881 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14882 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14883 keep your lawyers away.
14884 </para>
14885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14886 </sect2>
14887 </sect1>
14888 </chapter>
14889 <chapter id="c-notes">
14890 <title>NOTES</title>
14891 <para>
14892 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide Web. As
14893 anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be highly unstable. I
14894 have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting readers to the original source
14895 through the Web site associated with this book. For each link below, you can go to
14896 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by clicking on the
14897 number after the # sign. If the original link remains alive, you will be redirected to
14898 that link. If the original link has disappeared, you will be redirected to an
14899 appropriate
14900 reference for the material.
14901 </para>
14902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14903
14904 </chapter>
14905 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14906 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14907 <para>
14908 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14909 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14910 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14911 to him that this book is dedicated.
14912 </para>
14913 <para>
14914 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14915 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard
14916 Posner, Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction
14917 and guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School
14918 and Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden,
14919 James P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert
14920 Hallman,
14921 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum,
14922 Alina Ng, and Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine
14923 Crump and Harry Surden, who helped direct their research, and to
14924 Laura Lynch, who brilliantly managed the army that they assembled,
14925 and provided her own critical eye on much of this.
14926 </para>
14927 <para>
14928 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14929 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14930 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14931 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14933 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14934 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14935 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14936 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14937 </para>
14938 <para>
14939 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly
14940 draw upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible
14941 to receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14942 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice
14943 to requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli,
14944 David Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who
14945 had specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14946 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
14947 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy
14948 Hunsinger, Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James
14949 Lindenschmidt,
14950 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey
14951 McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.
14952 Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack,
14953 Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina,
14954 Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger
14955 Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have
14956 missed anyone; with computers come glitches, and a crash of my
14957 e-mail system meant I lost a bunch of great replies.)
14958 </para>
14959 <para>
14960 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book
14961 in draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14962 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14963 regulation
14964 of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an embarrassingly large
14965 number of errors. While my work is in part inspired by Stallman's, he
14966 does not agree with me in important places throughout this book.
14967 </para>
14968 <para>
14969 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14970 insisted
14971 that there would be unending happiness away from these battles,
14972 and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever, grateful for
14973 her perpetual patience and love.
14974 </para>
14975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14976
14977 </chapter>
14978 </book>